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                                                                                                                 COPY No.
This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer
C.B.  04051 (99)
"U 406,"  "U 386" and "U 264"
Interrogation of Survivors
May, 1944
This Report is not to be considered accurate in all respects, having been prepared before complete information was available.  It is therefore not to be taken as historically correct.



          This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.  
          It is intended for the use of the recipients only, and for communication to such Officers under them (not below the rank of Commissioned Officer) who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties.  The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due care and caution.  



Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the
Official Secrets Acts.
C.B.  04051 (99)
"U 406," "U 386" and "U 264"
Interrogation of Survivors
May, 1944
  N.I.D. 03050/44.  


          The following report is compiled from information derived from prisoners of war.  The statements made cannot always be verified; they should therefore not be accepted as facts unless they are definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources.  


  Introductory Remarks  
    (i)  General;  (ii)  Commanding Officer;  (iii)  Complement of "U 73";  (iv)  Equivalent Ranks.  
  Details of "U 406," "U 386" and "U 264"  
    (i)  Type;  (ii)  Tonnage;  (iii)  Building Yard;  (iv)  Armament   (v)  Bridge Armour;  (vi)  Diesels; (vii) Motors and Switchboards;   (viii)  W/T Equipment;  (ix)  "Y" Service;  (x)  G.S.R.;  (xi)  Infra-Red Apparatus;  (xii)  Fübos (Contact-keeping Flare Buoys);  (xiii)  S.B.T.;  (xiv)  R.D.B.;  (xv)  Badge;  (xvi)  Flotilla;  (xvii)  Base;  (xviii)  Field Post Number;  (xix)  Cover Name.  
  Last Patrol and Sinking of "406"  
  Last Patrol and Sinking of "U 386"  
  Last Patrol and Sinking of "U 264"  
  General Remarks on U-Boats  
    (i)  Extensible Diesel Air Intake and Exhaust;  (ii)  New G.S.R. Equipment;  (iii)  Infra-red Detection Apparatus;  (iv)  Radar in Japanese Submarines;  (v)  "Y" Service;  (vi)  Bruges D/F Station;  (vii)  Small Submersible Craft;  (viii)  New Torpedoes Described as Walther Torpedoes;  (ix)  Deep Diving U-Boats;  (x)  37-mm. Guns;  (xi)  Rocket Projectors in U-Boats;  (vii)  Armoured Bridge Protection;  (xiii)  Contact-keeping Flare Buoys;  (xiv)  Radar Decoy Spar-Buoy (Short title "R.D.S.");  (xv)  Increase in Number of Potash Cartridges Carried by U-Boats;  (xvi)  Gyro Sextants;  (xvii)  T.6 Torpedoes;  (xviii)  T.5 Boomerangs;  (xix)  U-Boat Anti-Invasion Tactics;  (xx)  U-Boat/Aircraft Co-operation in Convoy Attacks;  (xxi)  Meal Routine on Patrol.    
    (i)  St. Nazaire;  (a)  New S.O. for Sixth Flotilla;  (b)  Security Measures;  (c)  Shore Defences;  (d)  Sentry Duties in Harbour;  (ii)   Penang;  (iii)  Singapore.  
  Surface Ship  
  "U 178"  
  U-Boat Commanded by Oberleutnant Giersberg  
APPENDIX "A"  Previous History of "U 406"
APPENDIX "B"  Previous History of "U 386"
APPENDIX "C"  Previous History of"U 264"  
APPENDIX "D"  Nominal Roll of "U 406"  
APPENDIX "E"  Nominal Roll of "U 386"  
APPENDIX "F"  Nominal Roll of "U 264"  
  (C52594)                                                                                                                             B2  


  (i)  General  
          "U 406," "U 386" and "U 264" formed part of a formation of about 26 U-Boats detailed to attack Convoy KMS 29 in the Atlantic.  During determined attacks made on the pack by the Second and Tenth Escort Groups on the 18th and 19th February, 1944, these were the only U-Boats sunk from which prisoners were taken.  
          "U 406" was sunk by H.M. Ships "Lossie" and "Spey" of the Tenth Escort Group at 1530 on 18th February in position 48° 32' N., 23° 36' W. and "U 386" by the same group at 1435 on 19th February, in position 48° 31' N., 22° 31' W.  
          "U 264" was sunk by H.M. Ships "Starling" and "Woodpecker" of the Second Escort Group at 1700 on 19th February, in position 48° 31' N., 22° 05 'W.  
          While "U 406" was blown to the surface and abandoned by her crew after the first series of depth-charges, which exploded right under the boat aft, the other two boats showed more fight, and "U 264" was subjected to a series of depth-charge attacks lasting several hours.  
          Each of the boats presented some item of outstanding interest, in addition to all possessing the new armament of a 37 mm. fully automatic gun on the lower bandstand and two twin 20 mm. guns on the upper bandstand.  
          "U 406" had on board a G.S.R. expert with the shore rank of Kapitänleutnant, who had with him two leading telegraphist assistants.  No less than 24 different pieces of equipment comprising various G.S.R. sets and accessories were carried, giving cover from below 5 cm. to 380 cm. with different combinations of sets and aerials.  A new type of infra-red detection apparatus was also carried on board.  Details of this equipment will be found in Section VI.  
          "U 386" included two trained "Y" service operators in her complement, whose duty was to intercept convoy R/T traffic.  This U-Boat also had a new type of armour protection on each side of the bridge, as also did "U 406."  (See Section VI.)  
          "U 264" was believed to be the first U-Boat fitted with an extensible Diesel air intake and exhaust, which enabled her to charge her batteries while proceeding submerged.  This operation, after the causes of various minor mishaps during trials had been remedied, could be carried out while proceeding at periscope depth.  (See Section VI.)  
          Of the Commanding Officers, only Kapitänleutnant Hartwig Looks of the 1936 term and Oberleutnant zur See Fritz Albrecht of the 1937 term, of "U 264" and "U 386" respectively, survived.  "U 406's" commanding officer, Kapitänleutnant Horst Dieterichs of the 1934 term, was killed on the bridge by machine-gun fire from the destroyers when his U-Boat surfaced.  
          Only one of them, Looks, was the subject of favourable comment by his men, although in his case it only amounted to a grudging admission that his harsh sense of discipline was tempered by his undoubted efficiency.  
          Dieterichs was elegant, selfish, stern and unpopular.  He used fresh water to wash himself, but denied its use to his men.  He drank the ship's real coffee alone, the remainder of the crew receiving the "Ersatz" coffee.  He instructed the cook to bake him elaborate tarts and cakes, which he ate by himself.  Extremely stern, he inflicted severe punishment for the most trivial offences.  
          It was rumoured that he had been reprimanded by Dönitz for only sinking 40,000 tons in eight patrols.  He came on board for the last operation proclaiming his determination to sink a destroyer.  
          In St. Nazaire he was intimate with the widow of a French officer whom he frequently brought down to the U-Boat shelters, although she was not allowed on board.  Prisoners had no doubt that this lady was an Allied spy.  
          Both Dieterichs and Albrecht were regarded as vacillating and even cowardly.  Dieterichs came in for particularly venomous comment for being the first man up the conning-tower hatch after giving the order to abandon ship.  
          Of Albrecht it was said that he showed no confidence in the ability of his petty officers to do their work properly and was continually poking his head into the various compartments to convince himself that everything was in order, even when he happened to know very little about the particular job in question.  His pusillanimity when on patrol was only matched by the fine figure he cut when ashore, where he liked to be regarded as a bon viveur.  
          Dr. Greven, the G.S.R. specialist from "U 406," was a highly strung and obviously most intelligent man, whose security consciousness could occasionally be shaken.  
          Nothing good could be said of any of the other officers, who to a man exhibited the particular Nazi brand of bloody-mindedness, which is the ultimate in unpleasantness.  
          Oberassistenzarzt Wolfgang Junghans of "U 264" had distinguished himself by introducing a Spartan health routine for the luckless crew, who found themselves ordered to take cold baths at 0600 every morning.  He was equally unpopular with the officers, who rounded off a merry party one night by cornering him in a narrow alley-way and beating him up soundly.  
  (C52594)                                                                                                                              B*  


          "U 406" was the only boat to have had even moderate success during her career, having sunk a total of about 42,000 tons during her eight patrols, all claimed during one attack on a convoy in her fourth patrol.  "U 264" claimed to have sunk about 14,000 tons, and "U 386" one small ship of 3,500 tons.  
          The following are the Royal Navy equivalents of German Naval ranks used in this report:  
Kapitän zur See Captain.
Fregattenkapitän Commander.
Korvettenkapitän Lieutenant-Commander.
Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant.
Oberleutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant.
Leutnant zur See Junior Sub-Lieutenant.
Oberfähnrich zur See Senior Midshipman.
Fähnrich zur See Junior Midshipman.
Oberassistenzart Surgeon Lieutenant.
          The suffix "(Ing.)" after a German rank in place of "zur See" denotes an Engineer Officer.  The suffix "der Reserve" denotes a Reserve Officer.  
"U 406"
"U 264"
  Tonnage 500 tons. 500 tons. 500 tons.
  Building Yard Danziger Werft, Danzig.  Commissioned 22nd October, 1941. Howaldtswerke, Kiel.  Commissioned October, 1942. Vulkan Werft, Vegesack.  Commissioned 22nd May, 1942.
        (a)  Guns One fully automatic 37 mm. gun on the lower bandstand (see Section VI).  Two twin 20 mm. guns on the upper bandstand, one on each side.  Two M.G.s, Type 81, on the bridge.
        140 clips of five rounds each of "Minemunition" were carried for the 37 mm. gun.
        (b)  Torpedoes Eleven carried on the last patrol; five T.5 "Gnats" and six electric "Curlies." Eleven carried on the last patrol; four were T.5 "Gnats" and the rest electric torpedoes. Ten carried on the last patrol; four T.5 "Gnats" with flattened noses, and six normal electric torpedoes.
  Bridge Armour New type protection for bridge watch, known as "Kohlenkasten" (coal scuttles).  (See Section VI). Normal.  The armoured doors between the bridge and the bandstand had been removed.
  Diesels G.W. G.W. M.A.N.  An extensible air intake and exhaust, known as the "Schnörkel," had been fitted before the last patrol.  (See Section VI).
  Motors and Switchboards B.B.C. A.E.G. A.E.G.
  W/T Equipment Standard. Standard. Standard.
  "Y" Service Not carried. A special set for intercepting convoy R/T was carried.  (See Section VI) Not carried.
  Radar Gema set, operating on the 80 cm. wavelength, carried. Not carried. Not carried.
  G.S.R. About 24 pieces of apparatus carried, making up five sets with a wavelength cover of 5-380 cm.  Four different aerials on the bridge.  (See Section VI for details). Wanze II, Borkum and Naxos sets carried, with Naxos and basket-type aerials.
  Infra-Red Apparatus "Seehund" and "Flamingo" apparatus carried (See Section (VI). Not carried. Not carried.
  Fübos (Contact-keeping flare buoys). Not carried. About 24 carried.  (See Section VI). Not carried.
  S.B.T. Carried. Carried. Eight boxes, each containing six pills, carried.  Six charges ejected each time S.B.T. was used, and seven of the boxes had been expended by the time "U 264" was sunk.


"U 406"
"U 264"
  R.D.B. Carried. Carried. Carried.  Two hydrogen bottles were fitted on each side of the bridge fairing.
  Badge Nominally, the Berlin bear, although this was not painted on the conning-tower The Flotilla badge, the prow of a Viking ship with a U-Boat superimposed was painted on the port side of the conning tower.
  Flotilla Seventh. Sixth. Sixth.
  Base St. Nazaire. St. Nazaire. St. Nazaire.
  Field Post Number M.42202. M.50010. M.02981.
  Cover Name "Spatz." "Kohlenklau." "Amigo."
          "U 406" was lying in Pen No. 14 of the St. Nazaire shelter during December, 1943, when it became known on board that the boat was to undertake a special mission.  A G.S.R. expert named Dr. Greven, with the shore rank of Kapitänleutnant, came on board shortly before Christmas, together with two leading telegraphist assistants and several cases of secret apparatus.  
          The ship's company was told that Dr. Greven was a meteorologist, and shortly before she sailed Korvettenkapitän Sohler, S.O. of the Seventh Flotilla, came on board and gave them a security lecture, telling them that they were going to sea as "guinea-pigs," and that if the trials were successful, they would have helped to bring back the old days of successful U-Boat warfare.  
          The men's chief reaction to Dr. Greven's presence was to repeat the old adage "Wenn ein Silberling einsteigt, dann säuft das Boot ab. ("When a Silver-ringer sails with you, the boat is bound to sink."  In the German Navy officers holding technical shore appointments have silver rank stripes, as distinct from the gold stripes of sea-going officers.)  
          The U-Boat left St. Nazaire in her last patrol on 5th January, 1944, and spent about two weeks operating independently while Dr. Greven conducted his trials.  They then joined the group of U-Boats to which "U 386" and "U 264" also belonged, although this caused no interruption to Dr. Greven's activities, a full description of which will be found in Section VI.  
          The group was ordered to attack an Atlantic convoy, and the attack was expected to mature about 18th February.  However, on the same morning, the C.O., considering that the fuel remaining, which was reduced to 29 tons, had reached the minimum, signalled Control reporting this fact and requesting permission to return to base.  
          No reply was received to the first signal, and it was repeated, not once, but twice, which caused serious misgivings among the men, who ascribed their subsequent sinking to the fact that one or more of the signals had been d/fd.  
          From about 1039 onwards, the C.O. received several reports from the hydrophone ratings of suspicious noises and went into the hydrophone room to listen himself.  However, he dismissed the noises as emanating from the gambolling of porpoises and retired to his bunk, ordering the hydrophone ratings not to bother him any further with such nonsense.  
          The noises continued on and off at intervals, and the crew was by no means reassured by the C.O.'s lack of interest in them.  At about 1500 the U-Boat came to periscope depth, and the First Lieutenant made the routine observation of the neighbourhood.  However, the Engineer Officer was having some difficulty in keeping the boat trimmed, and the periscope was lowered without anything of note having been observed.  
          After about 20 minutes the porpoise noises were again heard, and suspicions as to their real nature intensified.  However, before any definite steps could be taken, there was a tremendous explosion under the boat aft, which shot the watch below out of their bunks and sent the U-Boat to the surface, out of control, from a depth of 50 m. (164 ft.).  
          Complete panic reigned.  All the lights were out, the engine rooms were wrecked, the switchboards flew from their mountings, and there were several small water entries.  Dieterichs leapt for the conning-tower ladder in his under clothes and was the first man on the bridge, shouting the order to abandon ship as he ascended.  
          The Engineer Officer remained long enough to open the vents before he joined in the general scurry.  No attempt was made to man the guns and the crew abandoned ship immediately.  
          Dieterichs endeavoured to justify his precipitate exit by counting the members of the crew as they appeared up the hatch, which the crew claimed he could have done equally well from the bottom of the ladder, where he could at least have remained in control of the situation.  
          Fire had been opened on the boat by the destroyers of the escort group immediately she surfaced, and a further series of depth-charges was fired at the boat.  
          Dieterichs was hit by a bullet during the course of his arithmetical activities, and was not seen again by the crew.  
  (C52594)                                                                                                                           B*2  


          H.M.S. "Spey" picked up 45 survivors, but four of these died on board.  Some of the remainder had a grand-stand view of the sinking of "U 386" the next day, which, with the knowledge gleaned on board "Spey" that four other U-Boats had almost certainly been sunk, gave rise to considerable alarm and despondency.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 1523 on 18th February in position 48° 32' N., 23° 36' W., H.M.S. "Spey" obtained Asdic contact.  
          At 1530, ten Mark VII depth-charges were fired (setting C.).  After the charges had exploded, the U-Boat broke surface in the middle of the pattern 500 yards astern on even keel.  Fire was immediately opened with the port bridge oerlikon and very shortly afterwards all weapons that would bear joined in.  The U-Boat was lying apparently stopped and down by the bows.  Despite withering fire, several ratings were seen to abandon ship and a certain amount of return fire was experienced.  
          "Spey" did not believe that the U-Boat had been mortally damaged and altered course across her bows to lay another shallow pattern. only half this pattern was fired, however, as the shambles made by the gunfire could be seen and there were a number of men in the water to leeward.  "Rother" closed and opened fire, which was checked by "Spey."  
          The U-Boat remained afloat for about ten minutes, becoming increasingly down by the bows, and there were several unexplained explosions which were taken to be scuttling charges, or in two cases when they sounded distant to be "Gnats" exploding at the end of their run.  "Spey's" whaler managed to get alongside and the First Lieutenant and one rating scrambled on board.  There was one dead rating on the gun platform and the commanding officer was lying seriously wounded in the stomach alongside the conning-tower hatch.  The First Lieutenant got down to the control room, finding the inside in complete darkness but free from fumes.  At the bottom of the hatch was a large bag possibly containing books, but it was too heavy for him to get up the conning-tower.  He therefore climbed up again to get a line, the rating on board being fully occupied securing the whaler and keeping an eye on the wounded captain.  The First Lieutenant had barely gained the open air when the boat began to sink, and he and the rating jumped clear and swam to the whaler.)  
          "U 386," which had been lying in the same shelter at St. Nazaire as "U 264," sailed initially on her last patrol with four other U-Boats on 10th December, 1943, but returned to base within four days owing to engine trouble.  It had also been found that the hydrophones were defective at depths below 50 m.(164 ft.).  
          Putting back to sea again about 20th December, defects again developed in the engines, and they had to put back once more.  A small leak had also been detected in one of the vents.  
          "U 386" finally sailed alone on 29th December, and was ordered to join the Igel group of U-Boats operating in the North Atlantic.  This group was subsequently divided into Igel I and II.  Practically the same boats formed the Hinein and Stürmer groups for a short while, and then Hai group was formed, sub-dividing shortly before "U 386's" sinking into Hai I and II.  
          About 15th January, 'U 386" received a signal from Control ordering her to proceed to a point between Islay and Rathlin Island, and to be in that position by 21st January.  The operation was timed to coincide with a period of moonless nights.  
          Conflicting reports have been received from survivors concerning the purpose of this operation, one of the more reliable prisoners stating that they were to carry out reconnaissance duties only, and were to refrain from attacking shipping, and another equally well-informed survivor asserting that they were to proceed further into the North Channel and attack the convoys assembling there.  
          It is doubtful if the men received definite information as to the purpose of the operation, as all the signals referring to it were received in a special code which could only be deciphered by the officers.  None of the W/T operators therefore had direct knowledge of their contents.  
          Most survivors agreed, however, that it was intended, by one means or another, to create a diversion in the North Channel with the intention of drawing off some of the escort groups from the Atlantic and so ease the pressure on the U-Boats operating there.  
          Part of the mission was certainly to observe traffic in and out of Londonderry and the Mersey, and to make detailed reports on beacons, light buoys and other aids to navigation.  As it turned out, this was the only part of the operation to be accomplished with any measure of success, and even this had to be abandoned when air and surface attacks on the U-Boat reached an unhealthy intensity.  
          Even if it had not been their subsequent intention to advertise their presence by attacking vessels in the area, survivors who tended to the opposite view stated that the U-Boat intended to provide as many contacts as possible for Allied shore and ship-borne Radar sets by surfacing and releasing Radar Decoy Balloons.  
          Survivors also stated that the C.O. disliked the operation, and was glad of an opportunity to break it off.  They thought that they were the only U-Boat in the area at the time, but had heard that other boats in the Atlantic had received special instructions of some nature, and that they might be carrying out similar operations.  Prisoners insist that the question of landing or taking off saboteurs never arose.  


          Without possessing definite knowledge on the subject, survivors state that "U 386" approached Ireland on a more or less easterly course and first sighted land off the coast of Donegal.  The U-Boat then proceeded parallel to the coast round towards Londonderry, the boat being often in very shallow water, and the coast frequently sighted through the periscope.  
          Prisoners stated that the U-Boat proceeded about half-way between a minefield lying between 55° 19' N., 06° 30' W.;  55° 30' N., 06 13' W.;  55° 42' N., 06° 58' W.;  55° 32' N., 07° 10' W. and the shore.  
          By 2030 on 23rd January they had arrived in a position off Bengore Head.  The U-Boat was surfaced, and soundings indicated about 30 fms. of water.  G.S.R. watch was kept on the Wanze II and Naxos sets.  
          Half an hour later they received a strong G.S.R. contact on 170 cm., which they assumed to come from a shore-based station.  The beam remained focused, and it was accepted on board that the U-Boat had been detected.  The "Y" service set was manned and watch kept on 2,410 kc/s.  The C.O. proceeded seawards, surfaced, with both Diesels, deeming it useless to submerged in such shallow water.  
          At 2115 another Radar contact was registered, this time on 135 cm., and the operators assumed that this was a ship-borne set.  Almost simultaneously, and aircraft was sighted, which dropped a flare.  The U-Boat turned away, releasing R.D. balloons.  G.S.R. contacts were now being received on the Naxos set, but suddenly all contacts ceased abruptly, and it was assumed that the balloons were fulfilling their purpose.  At the same time, machine-gun fire was heard astern, which was thought to come from the aircraft.  
          By 2200 contacts were being received again on the Wanz II set, and the "Y" service began to pick up R/T traffic.  A shore station was heard announcing that it was going to transmit in clear.  Most of the signals were addressed to a surface unit with the code name "HORSEFLESH."  The shore station wa heard to ask if the U-Boat was proceeding out to sea.  
          Depth-charge detonations were now heard well inshore, but shortly afterwards the shadows of two destroyers were discerned astern.  At 2205 a T.5 torpedo was fired from the stern tube, the only torpedo fired during the whole patrol.  Two minutes and 47 seconds after the torpedo was fired an explosion was heard, and it was assumed that one of the destroyers had been sunk.  This belief was strengthened by the fact that G.S.R. contacts on 135 cm. ceased, and further signals from the shore station to "HORSEFLESH" remained unanswered.  
          About 2215 an aircraft flew overhead, but "U 386" refrained from engaging it, and the crew thought for a moment that they had remained undetected.  They continued to release R.D. balloons, but heard an aircraft reporting their position to the shore station, and G.S.R. contacts began to be received again on the Naxos set.  
          At least one enemy surface unit was still astern, and gun flashes were seen.  "Y" service intercepts indicated that the surface unit was requesting further aircraft to take off from an aerodrome ashore.  
          "U 386" was still heading out to sea, but at 0055 on 25th January the "Y" service intercepted a signal from a surface vessel stating that the U-Boat had been sighted.  The submerged almost immediately, only to hit the bottom at 50 fms., although the chart indicated a depth of 80 fms.  The U-Boat was trimmed, and they continued at slow speed submerged seawards.  
          Distant depth-charge explosions could still be heard further inshore, and the crew were convinced that Albrecht had deceived the enemy by proceeding out to sea close to the minefield mentioned above, under the correct assumption that the U-Boat would be sought closer inshore.  
          The U-Boat remained submerged for nearly 30 hours, only surfacing at 0730 on 25th January with 3.9 per cent. of CO2.  "U-386" only remained a short time on the surface, and then submerged again until about 2300, when she surfaced and signalled Control reporting that she had been detected and compelled to break off the operation.  The sinking of one destroyer was claimed.  Control in reply ordered her to rejoin the Igel group.  
          About the middle of February, the group of about 26 U-Boats to which "U 386" belonged, and which now bore the code-name HAI, was ordered to attack a convoy.  The position of the intended attack was signalled to the group, and it was indicated that the convoy should be in position on 16th February.  
          However, the convoy proceeded more slowly than had been estimated, and the attack was postponed to 18th February.  
          It has been arranged that German aircraft should take up position over the convoy and transmit signals for the U-Boats to home on.  It was also intended to drop contact-keeping flare buoys astern of the convoy and light up the whole area so as to place the merchant ships in silhouette.  
          During this period a signal was received from Admiral Dönitz which greatly annoyed the crew.  It urged them to do their duty with the old U-Boat spirit.  
          It was the general opinion in "U 386: that the "old fogeys" at the German Admiralty should come and take a crack themselves, as they seemed to show a complete lack of understanding of what U-Boats were up against nowadays.  
          On the night of 18th February, "U 386" was proceeding surfaced at about 2230 when the U-Boat was attacked by a four-engined searchlight aircraft.  Fire was opened with the 20 mm. guns as the aircraft tracked along the U-Boat's port side.  The searchlight went out and there was a splash of falling bombs astern.  
  (C52594)                                                                                                                           B*3  


          Shortly afterwards, an aircraft tracked along the starboard side, but fire was not opened as the target could not be seen, although "U 386" was subjected to machine-gun fire.  No bombs were dropped, and the U-Boat was not further molested; she submerged at about 0400.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  Liberator S of 53 Squadron attacked a U-Boat at 2229 on 18th February in position 49° 32' N., 23° 10' W.  The aircraft homed on to a Radar contact and at a distance of about a mile experienced intense and accurate light flak.  
          The aircraft attacked, releasing six Torpex depth-charges from 150 ft., which straddled the track about 150 ft. astern of the U-Boat.  The tail gunner opened fire with 150 rounds.  Returning to the scene about 20 minutes later, the U-Boat was sighted at 70 yards' range, but the aircraft could not get into a position to attack.)  
          The plans for attacking the convoy had received a last-minute setback as the convoy had altered course, and the German aircraft could not find it.  It was only at about 0300 on 19th February that they started to make homing signals.  
          It was not long before "U 386's" crew realized that the attack on the convoy was to be no sinecure.  Distant depth-charge explosions began to be heard as early as 0600, and continued at intervals during the whole of the forenoon and the early part of the afternoon.  
          During the whole of this period, "U 386" remained submerged, coming occasionally to periscope depth, with the crew in a state of increasing trepidation.  
          About 1430 screw noises were heard, and one vessel appeared to pass almost immediately overhead.  There was a sudden violent explosion below the boat aft, putting the main motors out of action, wrecking the lighting system and causing a considerable water entry.  
          The C.O. ordered full speed on both motors, but on learning that they were out of action, ordered the tanks to be blown.  The U-Boat surfaced at a steep angle more or less out of control.  
          An attempt was made to man the guns, but heavy fire had been opened on them, and the C.O. gave the order to abandon ship.  In the confusion the Engineer Officer was heard calling for a fire extinguisher, and several survivors thought that the acid in the batteries had been spilt as a result of the steep surfacing angle and that chlorine gas was being developed.  
          Several of the men had already abandoned ship when the Diesels were started, and the U-Boat began to gather way.  However, further bursts of fire from the attendant destroyers caused a change of heart, and the rest of the crew jumped overboard.  
          "U 386" sank rapidly by the stern, and shortly after she had disappeared there was a considerable under-water explosion, which survivors assumed to be caused by the batteries.  Several of the 18 survivors felt the effects of the pressure for two or three days after being picked up by H.M.S. "Spey."  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 1426 on 19th February in position 48° 31' N., 22° 31' W., H.M.S. "Spey" obtained an Asdic contact and at 1435 ten Mark VII depth-charges were fired.  
          The U-Boat broke surface at a range of about 800 yards at a very steep angle, bows first.  Fire was immediately opened with starboard bridge Oerlikon and all armament that would bear joined in shortly afterwards.  "Spey" then passed close ahead and straddled the U-Boat with a pattern of depth-charges.  
        During the approach there was quite a lot of return fire from the enemy, but no damage of importance was caused.  They showed considerable courage in attempting to man their guns in the face of a hail of Oerlikon and pom-pom fire and several 4 in. direct hits.  
          After the second pattern six or eight men were seen to abandon the U-Boat and "Spey" checked fire, thinking she had given up, turning to port under full wheel close to her.  She was only half-way round when the U-Boat started to go ahead again at speed, apparently on her Diesels, although she was still down by the stern and badly knocked about by gunfire.  
          "Spey" at once opened up again with everything she had, while the U-Boat succeeded in getting inside her turning circle.  The guns made excellent shooting, especially the 4 in., which scored many more direct hits, and in a short time, with the U-Boat still forging ahead at good speed and becoming increasingly down by the stern, another party of men came pouring out of the conning-tower hatch in great haste.  Finally the bows reared right up out of the water, and the boat then disappeared below the surface.)  
          After her penultimate patrol, "U 264" lay in St. Nazaire for over three months.  Damage to her stern was repaired and the extensible Diesel air intake and exhaust was fitted and tested.  (For details, see Section VI.)  It was learned that on 20th January, 1944, she berthed in Pen 13B.  On 29th January, she embarked torpedoes and ammunition, also completing with lubricating and fuel oil.  On the following day, provisions, water and oxygen bottles were shipped.  On 1st February, the final trimming tests were held.  On the forenoon of 2nd February, she was topped up with fuel and held her routine diving trial.  By noon she was ready to sail.   
          "U 264" sailed on the afternoon of 2nd February, 1944, escorted by a Sperrbrecher and several patrol craft.  
        She had received orders to operate with units of the German Air Force.  No VH/F set was carried for this purpose, but the U-Boat was supplied with a special wavelength schedule and was to be informed by Control when to look for signals.  Signals from aircraft were received on the D/F set.  The planes were described by prisoners as being Ju.88's or F.W.200's.  Orders were received from the Operations Division of the Naval Staff (Seekriegsleitung) that the U-Boat was to remain on the surface as much as possible and was not to dive when a G.S.R. contact was received.


          For a time, the co-operation with air search was unsatisfactory, the U-Boat being unable to locate enemy shipping in the areas to which she had been directed.  
          On 17th February, an aircraft was sighted and the flak guns were manned.  The plane approached the U-Boat, but Looks, not being sure of its nationality, ordered the guns' crews to hold their fire.  Recognition signals were fired but no reply was received from the plane, which flew away without attacking.  Looks then decided that the plane had been a Sunderland; he released several R.D.Bs. and submerged.  
          On the night of 18th/19th February, "U 264," following directions received from a German aircraft, approached a convoy.  A G.S.R. contact was received on a wavelength of 135 cm. and was judged to have originated from a destroyer.  About 30 minutes later, the contact-keeping aircraft dropped a contact-keeping flare, and the convoy was sighted.  
          The U-Boat attempted to signal Control giving the usual particulars of the convoy, but, due to the fact that the cypher machine jammed, only a fragmentary message was sent.  Suddenly the escorting vessels fired star shells, illuminating the U-Boat and revealing that one of the destroyers was dead astern.  "U 264" fired a T5 torpedo from her stern tube, but the destroyer came to a dead stop and the torpedo passed across her bows at a distance of about 10 yards.  Some of the prisoners attributed the miss to an imperfection in the mechanism of the torpedo.  
          The U-Boat then dived and took evasive action.  Several patterns of depth-charges were dropped, but they fell wide of the mark.  The destroyers then gave up the search and at about 0500 the entire convoy was heard passing directly over the U-Boat.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 0325 on 19th February, H.M.S. "Forester" obtained a Radar contact and fired a star shell which revealed a U-Boat on the surface.  The U-Boat dived and, at 0404, "Forester" attacked with hedgehog.  She followed the U-Boat through the convoy until 0449 when contact was lost.)  
          "U 264" remained submerged for some time after her contact with the convoy.  At about noon on 19th February, she came to a depth of about 20 m. (65 ft.) in order to signal Control.  She was then discovered by a group of destroyers which immediately began a prolonged attack.  The U-Boat immediately submerged to a greater depth and, taking evasive action, released several S.B.T. charges.  She was unable to shake off her pursuers and depth-charges continued to rain down on her.  After about the fourth attack considerable damage was sustained.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The Second Escort Group gained contact on a U-Boat at 1011 on 19th February.  At 1035, H.M.S. "Starling" dropped a ten-charge pattern set to 150/300 ft.  At 1101 and 1110, S.B.Ts. were noted.  At 1125, H.M.S. "Woodpecker" made a creeping attack of 26 depth-charges set at 500/700 ft.  A third pattern of 26 charges was dropped by "Starling" at 1129.  The fourth attack was made at 1251 by "Woodpecker" who dropped 26 charges in a creeping attack.  They were set for 500/850 ft.)  
          The damage was described by the prisoners as not of a serious nature, but its cumulative effect was fatal.  The lights failed, a high pressure air line fractured, the Diesels were shaken from their seats and the extensible Diesel intake and exhaust was broken.  Several small leaks appeared and water entered through the packing of one propeller shaft.  The gland was tightened in an attempt to stop the leak and this resulted in overheating and filling the after compartment with smoke.  
          The depth-chare attacks continued with unrelenting fury.  The U-Boat submerged to great depth, but was unable to get clear.  The prisoners estimated that between 150 and 200 depth-charges were dropped.  Asdic noises were heard, but they were of a higher pitch than usual and the prisoners believed that a new type of gear was being used.  The crew became increasingly nervous throughout the attack.  The din was so terrific that it was impossible to man the hydrophones.  Pumps were kept going, but were not able to cope with the flow of water into the boat.  The boat dived deeper and deeper, at one time reaching a depth of 210 m. (689 ft.).  
          When at last it became apparent to Looks that the U-Boat must be abandoned, he gathered his men together and said, "We are going to surface.  If we must die, we'll die for Greater Germany.  Three 'Sieg Heils' for our Führer."  
          (N.I.D. Note.  "Woodpecker" and "Starling" made a total of seven attacks on the U-Boat between 1035 and 1621.  Over 150 depth-charges were fired.)  
          At about 1700, "U 264" surfaced.  Looks gave the order to abandon ship and personally supervised the execution of the order.  He and the Engineer Officer were the last to leave, having remained below to see to the scuttling.  The prisoners believed that the U-Boat was flooded and that no scuttling charges were set.  When the U-Boat appeared on the surface, the destroyers opened fire, scoring several hits and slightly wounding three or four of the crew.  The boat was abandoned in an orderly manner and the entire ship's company was rescued by destroyers of the Escort Group.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 1659 the U-Boat broke surface, bows first.  "Starling" opened fire with all weapons and five hits were observed.  At 1707 the U-Boat sank in position 48° 31' N., 22° 05' W.  At 1735 a heavy underwater explosion was heard.)  
  (C52594)                                                                                                                           B*4  


  (i)  Extensible Diesel Air Intake and Exhaust  
          "U 264" was fitted with an extensible Diesel air intake and exhaust, referred to in the U-Boat Arm as a "Schnörkel."  Its purpose was to permit the batteries to be charges while proceeding submerged.   
          The fitting consisted basically of a trunk, about 15 ins. in diameter and about 40 ft. in length, which normally lay housed on deck on the port side forward of the bridge, and which, when raised vertically, was as high as the extended periscope.  
          The trunk contained an air intake and an exhaust, the open ends of which, faced aft and terminated in a perforated bulb.  It was raised into the vertical position hydraulically and was connected through the pressure hull and trunked to the normal Diesel air intake and exhaust, the trunking passing round the forward bulkhead of the control room and along the starboard side.  
          Self-sealing valves, apparently working on the ball-cock principle, were fitted at the inboard end of the trunk to prevent water entry, and intermediary and main hand-operated valves were fitted for disconnecting the supply of air when the "Funnel" was lowered.  
          It required considerable dexterity on the part of the Engineer Officer to keep the boat in trim, and careful concentration on the part of the duty E.R.As. to cut out the Diesels the moment the intake became blocked, as otherwise the engines drew air from inside the boat, leading very quickly to split ear-drums and lung-bleeding, and was extremely uncomfortable even for the shortest period.  
          However, after a certain amount of practice, reasonable efficiency was achieved, and with an officer at the periscope to make sure the U-Boat was not running into danger, the main object of recharging the batteries without having to surface and present a Radar target was achieved.  
          "U 264" was the first boat in St. Nazaire to be fitted with the "Schnörkel.," and the new device was supposed to be kept secret, the ship's company being required to sign additional "security certificates."  
          However, it was impossible to keep secret from other U-Boats using the same shelter, and whenever a man from "U 264" appeared in the "Zillerthal, a café reserved exclusively for U-Boat personnel, he was greeted with derisive jeers of "Here comes one of the boys with a funnel on his boat!"  
          The day for testing the "Schnörkel." for the first time came in January, 1944, when Korvettenkapitän Emmermann, S.O. of the Sixth Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Sohler, S.O. of the Seventh Flotilla, the Flotilla Engineers of both flotillas, plus a number of Engineer Officers from other boas and one or two "distinguished guests" came on board, representing such a weight of authority that ten members of the crew had to be left behind to make room for them.  
          The U-Boat proceeded to the 100-fathom line and submerged to 30 ft. to test the "Schnörkel."  The test was reasonably successful, and after a period the trunk was lowered, the U-Boat submerging deeper to 100 ft.  
          The trunk was naturally full of water up as far as the main hand valve, and the routine was to drain the section between the intermediary and the main valve by opening the main valve and allowing the water to drain into the bilges.  On coming to 30 ft. again, the trunk would be raised and the section between the top of the tube and the intermediary valve would than be drained in the same manner by opening the intermediary valve, thus rendering the "Schnörkel." ready for use again.  
          Unfortunately, when the main valve was opened, someone had forgotten to close the intermediary valve.  A solid column of water shot into the boat at high pressure, and in the ensuing panic, no-one thought of looking to see if the intermediary valve was closed, assuming that some major defect had occurred.  
          Three men who tried to get near the main valve were knocked flying by the jet, and in desperation, Emmermann gave the order to blow the tanks.  The forward tanks were blown, and with the ever increasing weight of water aft, the boat assumed an angle of about 50° as she rose.  Everyone lost their footing, and the crew, the visiting Engineer Officers and the "distinguished guests" all tumbled in a sprawling, sodden heap in the after compartment, half drowning in oil sea water.  
          The boat was brought to the surface and trimmed just in time to prevent a disaster, and it was not until they returned to the shelter that the real cause of the trouble was discovered.  The base rocked with laughter when the story of the failure of the base's star engineering talent to find such an obvious defect was recounted.  
  (ii)  New G.S.R. Equipment  
          "U 406" had about 24 pieces of G.S.R. gear on board, and these were combined into five different circuits, which gave cover between about 3 cm. and 380 cm.  All the gear was kept in the hydrophone room under the personal supervision of Dr. Greven, and any curiosity on the part of the crew was punished by heavy penalties.  
          Four of the combinations were known under the code names of "Bulldog," "Pude;," "Spitz" and "Dackel" (Bulldog, Poodle, Pomeranian and Dachshund); the larger the dog the higher the wavelength covered.  
        There were four types of aerial; a large and a small aerial of the basket type already familiar; the other two were a large and small "Parabolspiegel" (parabolic dipoles with reflector).  The larger "Paradolspiegel" was raised by air pressure on the shaft which had previously carried the radar mattress, since removed, and the smaller one had to be raised by hand.  The four parabolic reflectors were at 90° to each other in the horizontal plane.


          Details of the various sets and the wavelengths covered are as follows:  
          "Bulldog."  The large basket type aerial plus a Borkum set and a Samos set, together with an amplifier, an oscillograph and a polarisation switch.  Waveband covered 80 cm. to 380 cm.  
          "Pudel."  The small basket-type aerial plus a Borkum set and a Fanö set, together with an amplifier, an oscillograph and a polarisation switch.  Waveband covered 40 cm. to 80 cm.  
          "Spitz."  The large "Parabolspiegel," which contained a detector unit, plus an amplifier, an oscillograph and a sector switch.  Waveband covered approximately 12 cm. to 40 cm.  
          "Dackel."  The small "Parabolspiegel" plus an amplifier, and oscillograph and a sector switch.  Waveband covered 5 cm. to 12 cm.  
          With "Bulldog" and "Pudel" it was possible to read off the wavelength and other characteristics of the Radar transmission direct from the oscillograph.  With the other two sets only the pitch and quality of the note gave any indication of the characteristics of the transmission and the wavelength could not be determined.  The sector switch enabled the approximate bearing of the contact to be obtained by searching round the four sub-divisions of the aerial.  
          Another combination known as "Fliege" was also carried on board for the purpose of detecting transmissions below 5 cm. in wavelength.  Dr. Greven was convinced that the Allies are using these wavelengths for Radar transmissions, and concentrated a considerable part of his time on testing this possibility.  He only obtained one contact, however, and strongly suspected this of being a false alarm.  
          The "Fleige" combination consisted of a specially small aerial with two dipoles which Dr. Greven moved around in his hand on the bridge.  This aerial was connected through an amplifier to the "Krahwinkel" set described immediately below.  The lack of contact obtained with this combination was ascribed to imperfections in the apparatus and not to any lack of transmissions.  
          The "Krahwinkel" gear was constructed by the German Post Office authorities at their laboratories at Hirschberg, and consisted of a photographic attachment which could be used with all the combinations referred to above.  Its purpose was to record the waveform of any contact received so that this could be analyses subsequently.  
          The set appears to have had a tube similar to a cathode ray tube and contacts appeared on it as a reddish glow.  The set gave no indication of the actual wavelength on which the transmission was received.  
          Two test transmitters known as "Bug" and "Famulus" were carried on board to test the G.S.R. sets.  They were taken on to the upper deck when a test was being made.  
          Whenever a contact was obtained on one of the other sets, a signal was made to base giving the combination on which the contact had been received.  No information beyond this was signalled, as the C.O. would not allow the ship's wireless to be used for prolonged messages.  The results of these trials in "U 406" have therefore never been reported to Control.  However, there are said to have been two other boats out at the same time carrying similar equipment but no specialist.  
          Most of the contacts were obtained on "Spitz" and "Dackel," and Dr. Greven considered that the features of these two sets could be combined, giving cover from 5 cm. to 40 cm.  Practically no contacts were received on the two sets with higher wave cover, and Dr. Greven intended to recommend that the Wanze II set, which covered the wavelengths in question, should be withdrawn from service.  He said that Wanze II was the same set as Wanze I with the addition of a filter to prevent it radiating.  
          The Germans had first appreciated that the Allies were using Radar on the 10 cm. wavelength when they salvaged such a set from a crashed aircraft.  An attempt was made to copy it, but the valves could not be successfully duplicated, and the resulting apparatus was much larger and not nearly as effective as the captured set.  
  (iii)  Infra-red Detection Apparatus  
          In addition to the now familiar "Seehund" infra-red detection apparatus, an improved version known as "Flamingo" was carried on board "U 406."  The gear carried on the bridge resembled a glass bell jar, in which was a detector unit rotated by a built-in motor.  The actual receiving set was in the hydrophone compartment.  Presentation was by means of a cathode ray tube which gave a circular trace indicating the bearing of the contact.  
          The purpose of this gear was to ascertain whether the Allies are making use of infra-red rays for detection purposes.  "Flamingo" reacted correctly to the light of signal lamps shone through special filters when testing, but no practical results were achieved, and the gear was used very little, as it interfered with the functioning of the G.S.R. sets.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The "Seehund" was described by prisoners from "U 489."  See C.B. 04051(84), page 6.)  
  (iv)  Radar in Japanese Submarines  
        Dr. Greven of "U 406" stated that a Gema Radar set operating on the 80 cm. wavelength has been installed in a Japanese submarine visiting Germany, which took it back to Japan in August, 1942.  The old Metox type G.S.R. set with the Southern Cross type aerial was given to them at the same time.  Dr. Greven could not answer for what had been done during the last six months, but had not heard of any further pooling of this type of information.
          (N.I.D. Note.  This date appears very early for either Radar or G.S.R.  Both sets must have been prototypes.)  


  (v)  "Y" Service  
          "U 386" included two trained "Y" Service operators in her complement, one with a good knowledge of English and the other with a moderate knowledge of the language.  They used a type EP2SA receiver, maker unknown, which had a range cover between approximately 300 and 3,000 kc/s in five bands.  The five scales were concentric and coloured from the inside, red, yellow, blue, green and white.  Watch was normally kept on 2,410 kc/s.  
          The normal D/F loop was used in conjunction with this set, and it was expected to intercept convoy R/T up to a range of 185 miles.  
          The operators were supplied with three code books, one consisting of about ten pages of convoy code-words and code-names; the second, which was virtually never used, containing a list of peacetime callsigns, and the third a list of the X operating signals numbered from X 1 to about 900.  
          The operators kept a log of all signals received, whether in plain or in code, and the log-book was surrendered on returning to base.  An account of the operators' activities during these events off to north coast of Ireland during the last patrol will be found in Section II.  They had no working knowledge of morse, and their set was serviced for them by the W/T operators.  
  (vi)  Bruges D/F Station  
          These two "Y" operators had been trained, together with seventeen other ratings, at Schloss Terlinden in Bruges, between August and November, 1943.  This had been the first training class assembled for the purpose.  Only twelve ratings completed the course, and they were drafted in pairs to "U 386," the boats commanded by Otto, Wilberg, and Witzendorf, to one boat at Brest and to another at La Pallice.  Instruction was given in the use of the receiver, wavelengths on which to listen and the correct manner to record messages intercepted.  
          No instruction worth mentioning was given in the use of British codes, although they were told of the existence of quite a number and approximately what classes of W/T stations used them.  
          Schloss Terlinden is the main D/F station for dealing with enemy traffic from Scapa and the east and south coasts of England.  Four auxiliary stations were maintained at Den Helder, Massluis, Cap Gris Nez and one other point for taking bearings.  These prisoners had heard that there were other main D/F stations in Norway, Denmark and at Brest, but they worked independently and each had their own auxiliary stations.  
          The Bruges station was said to have played a vital part in the Dieppe raid.  R/T signals were D/F'd and intercepted, and sufficient information wa given to the German military authorities to enable them to organise effective counter-measures.  
  (vii)  Small Submersible Craft  
          Various descriptions of small submersible craft with dual-purpose propulsion and a high surface and under-water speed were obtained from survivors of these three U-Boats.  Their information ranged from a solemn statement that such boats did not need to carry any fuel at all to suggestions that they had not been found satisfactory and that their production had been discontinued.  
          Points on which several versions agreed included:  
                  (1)  Some of these craft are somewhat smaller than a 250 ton U-Boat.  
                  (2)  The Conning-tower has been replaced by a semi-hemispherical glass dome.  
                  (3)  They dive and surface by means of a set of after hydroplanes only.  
                  (4)  Their speed, both surfaced and submerged, is sufficient to enable them to escape from pursuing destroyers.  Estimates of the actual speed varied between 20 and 40 knots.  
                  They would operate in packs of about six from a parent U-Boat, probably of a large type.  
          One of the most authoritative statements concerning these craft came from the Engineer Officer of "U 406," who said that the crew numbered 18 men, and that the speed was 35 knots surfaced and 28 knots submerged.  
        He described the engines as a variety of Diesel, using a special fuel which contained oxygen and hydrogen.  An electric generator and batteries are fitted in the boats, which are used both surfaced and submerged for the production by electrolysis of "Knallgas," which is a mixture of two parts by volume of hydrogen and one part by volume of oxygen.  The engine is said to work on some sort of re-circulating system.  He expected a sufficient number of these boats to be operational by June.
  (viii)  New Torpedoes Described as Walther Torpedoes  
          "U 406's" Engineer Officer stated that these torpedoes are a development of a French invention and are propelled by a hot air turbine.  They have a speed of 50 to 60 knots.  It is not clear whether they are to be used by Waltherboots or other semi-submersible craft or not.  
  (ix)  Deep Diving U-Boats  
          The Engineer Officer of "U 406" mentioned a new type of 500-ton boat which could remain submerged for four days and dive to a depth of 400 metres (1,312 ft.)  They were said to have batteries twice the capacity of the present type, although it was not clear whether they were twice as large or merely an improved type.  A much greater number of potash cartridges would be carried.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  This may refer to the VIIC 42 type mentioned in C.B. 04051(100).)  


  (x)  37 mm. Guns  
          Survivors from these three boats confirmed all the detailed technical information on the 37 mm. gun already in our possession, derived largely from American prisoner of war sources.  Maximum range is about 3,800 m. (4,156 yards) and maximum rate of fire about 100 rounds per minute.  The new-type ammunition, referred to as "Minenmunition" and containing a powerful new explosive, is self-destroying at 4,000 m. (4,374 yards), and is fitted with an impact nose-fuse.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The R.A.F. has knowledge of ammunition up to 30 mm. in calibre referred to as "M"-munition, which has an unusually thin drawn steel casing and a high fragmentation effect.  This ammunition is not considered particularly revolutionary, although there is no proof that "Minenmunition" and "M"-munition are identical.  See also C.B. 04051 (95), page 4, Section V (iii).)  
          The gun is not considered a great success as it needs constant and lengthy attention.  Defects constantly occur, particularly to the chain in the loading mechanism which is very vulnerable.  When in perfect working order, the gun is admitted to be a most useful weapon.  
  (xi)  Rocket Projectors in U-Boats  
          It is the general impression that the 37 mm. gun will not last long as a U-Boat weapon, and that it is likely to be replaced in the near future by quadruple rocket projectors on the lower bandstand.  Great hopes are entertained for this weapon.  
  (xii)  Armoured Bridge Protection  
          Both "U 406" and "U 386" had a new type of armoured "funk-hole" provided for the bridge watch.  These were referred to as "Kohlenhasten" (coal scuttles) and consisted of 13 mm. (.51 in.) thick armoured plating arranged in a rough box-like form on the outside of the bridge fairing to port and starboard.  A portion of the bridge fairing proper had been removed on each side to permit access into them.  
          The forward end was curved inwards to the bridge fairing in order to lessen water resistance, and the lower part was tapered to the conning-tower, but was sufficiently low and broad to require members of the crew to duck outboard when proceeding past the bridge structure.  
          The box on the starboard side could accommodate three men with comfort and five men with difficulty and the box on the port side accommodated an uncomfortable maximum of three men, as the space was restricted by the Radar mattress housing, although the mattress itself had been removed.  
          These boxes were expected to provide protection against 20 mm. shell, provided these came at an angle, although survivors stated that in both boats Oerlikon bullets penetrated the armour during the sinking.   
          Several boats in the sixth and Seventh Flotillas at St. Nazaire were fitted with these funk-holes, but they are gradually being removed as they render boats slightly top-heavy, tend to slow down the boat's diving time and adversely affect the under-water maneuverability.  
          Some survivors stated that their removal had been ordered as gins' crews preferred taking cover in them to manning their guns.  The bridge watch viewed them with a favourable eye as they were most convenient for lighting cigarettes in.  
  (xiii)  Contact-keeping Flare Buoys  
          "U 386" carried about 12 boxes of contact-keeping flare buoys, each containing two dismantled buoys.   
          The buoys were described as light metal cylinders about 6 in. in diameter and 20 in. long, into the bottom of which was screwed a metal rod about .79 in. in diameter and also about 20 in. long, on the end of which was attached a solid iron plate about 6 in. in diameter and 6 in. thick.  
          The top of the cylinder contained a socket for a fuse.  When streamed, a bright flame of long duration is emitted from the top of the cylinder, which served to silhouette a convoy and act as a rallying point for other U-Boats in the vicinity.  
(xiv)  Radar Decoy Spar-Buoy (Short title R.D.S.)
          "U 264" probably carried carried about 15 Radar Decoy Spar-Buoys.  The description tallied with those carried by "U 91" and "U 744" (see C.B. 04051 (100).)  
  (xv)  Increase in Number of Potash Cartridges Carried by U-Boats  
          It is apparently becoming general for 500-ton U-Boats to carry 300 potash cartridges instead of the usual number of 150.  
  (xiv)  Gyro-Sextants  
          A new type of sextant is coming into use in the U-Boat arm which includes a gyroscope giving an artificial horizon instead of the bubble used for the same purpose normally.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  A gyro-stabilised sextant had not yet been introduced into our Service.)  
  (xvii)  T.6 Torpedoes  
          "U 406" survivors had heard of T.6 torpedoes, which were said to be an improved version of the T.5 torpedo with a higher speed and longer endurance.  


  (xviii)  T.5 Boomerangs  
          Several U-Boats have been lost recently with no reason to suppose that their loss was due to enemy action.  The Germans assumed that they were sunk by their own T.5 torpedoes, and U-Boats are now ordered to dive immediately to 50 m. (164 ft.) after firing a "Gnat."  
  (xix)  U-Boat Anti-Invasion Tactics  
          In the event of an Allied landing materialising in the St. Nazaire area, all U-Boats in any way seaworthy are instructed to embark torpedoes and proceed to sea, even if they are unable to dive.  Their instructions are to proceed to ports not yet invested by the enemy.  
          Boats in dry dock or under repair would be blown up, together with all stores, the personnel proceeding to inland bases for re-drafting.  
  (xx)  U-Boat/Aircraft Co-operation in Convoy Attacks  
          Several survivors stated that when aircraft were being used to home U-Boats on to a convoy, there was no direct communication between the U-Boats and the aircraft.  When it was intended that U-Boats should home on to shadowing aircraft, the signal "RR" would be received from Control and reference to code-tables gave the wavelength on which the aircraft would operate and the intended times of transmission, according to the day on which the message was received.  
  (xxi)  Meal Routine on Patrol  
          It has become a general routine among U-Boats operating in the Atlantic to observe the following meal times:  
                  1800:  Breakfast.  
                  2400:  Dinner.  
                  0600:  Supper.  
          At 1000 every one, except absolutely essential personnel, retires to his bunk.  
          (Above times are Central European Time.)  
  (i)  St. Nazaire  
          (a)  New S.O. for Sixth Flotilla.  Korvettenkapitän Wilhelm Schultz, S.O. of the Sixth Flotilla, was relieved about October last year by Korvettenkapitän Karl Emmermann, who came from the Tenth Flotilla.  Schults is said to have been given an appointment on Admiral Doenitz's staff.  
          (b)  Security Measures.  St. Nazaire has recently been suffering from a spy scare.  New personnel passes have now been issued for all personnel based there and supervision has become much more strict.  
          These measures have been adopted largely as a result of the exploits of two German Security Officers.  In January, 1944, one officer arrived from Germany, dressed himself up as a dock-worker, typed himself out a pass authorising him to board all U-Boats in the base, stamped it with an inked 5-mark piece, and succeeded in boarding 10 U-Boats unchallenged.  He removed the setting key for the T.5 torpedoes from one boat and walked off with it in his pocket.  
          Another officer used the same subterfuge and succeeded in planting dud bombs in eight boats before getting caught on board the ninth.  He was subjected to a thorough man-handling before he succeeded in establishing his identity.  
          A ruthless comb-out has decimated the ranks of French bar-girls, waitresses and allied professions in the neighbourhood, and one or two well-known characters are said to have been shot as spies.  Some of the bar-girls have been replaced by German "beauties," who are regarded without exception as Gestapo agents.  
          (c)  Shore Defences.  The shelters in St. Nazaire have been strengthened by the addition of turrets taken from French tanks, one of which has been mounted at each corner of the shelter.  Quadruple 20 mm. guns removed from U-Boats have been mounted on the roof as additional protection.  
          (d)  Sentry Duties in Harbour.  One P.O. and six ratings are always on duty on board a U-Boat in one of the pens, as sentries.  When fitting out for a patrol is commenced in a shelter, the number of sentries is increased to prevent dock-workers pilfering provisions.  
  (ii)  Penang  
          A survivor from the German tanker "Charlotte Schliemann," sunk in the Indian Ocean on 12th February, 1944, had been transferred from "U 178" only a fortnight before, during refuelling.  He provided the following description of Penang:  
          "U 178" was the first U-Boat to arrive in Penang and her men were lavishly entertained by the German technicians who had already arrived there for the purpose of building up the U-Boat base.  They were quartered in large converted dance-hall and were subsequently joined by the crews of four other U-Boats which arrived during September, October and November, the last of them shortly before "U 178's" departure on her last patrol at the beginning of December, 1943.  They were looked after by English-speaking half-castes and Chinese boys, with whom they frequently used to discuss the  


  state of affairs.  The boys unanimously bewailed the Japanese occupation and sighed for the old days of British rule once more.  The prisoner describes the quarters as large and comfortable.  All the internal arrangements had been provided by the Japanese and whenever additional mess stores were required the Germans demanded them from the Japanese and little difficulty was experienced in obtaining them.  
          One wharf and two or three warehouses at the Northern end of the harbour have been taken over by the Germans and sufficient torpedoes, ammunition, spare parts and stores have been brought from Germany in various blockade-runners to provide a useful reserve.  However, most of the equipment is out of date and considerable difficulty is experienced in the maintenance of the electric torpedoes, due to the deleterious effect of the excessive heat on the batteries.  
          "U 178" was in pretty poor shape when she arrived in Penang and a considerable amount of work was carried out on her.  She was not specially equipped for the tropics and no air conditioning had been installed.  The prisoner described working conditions in the boat as appalling.  The ventilating system did not work properly and the temperature inside the boat was several degrees higher than the already oppressive heat outside.  The Japanese showed themselves particularly dilatory in providing assistance and native labour.  Most of the latter were Chinese and half-castes, who were paid the derisory wage of 1.50 Straits dollars per day for their work.  
          No mail arrived for "U 178" while they were in Penang and none was sent, although it would have been possible to make a signal through their senior officer.  News of the outside world was restricted to a daily roneoed sheet compiled from German radio sources.  However, the prisoner was one of a small party who used to listen regularly to British short-wave transmissions in German.  
          Facilities for amusement ashore were limited to three cinemas, showing out of date British and American films, and a dance-hall known as "Sakura," which seems to have combined a miniature fairground.  The crew were advised of certain brothels with half-casts inmates which they were allowed to visit, although the most sumptuous one, known as the "Savoy Hotel" was reserved for Japanese officers.  The prisoner had not heard of any white women employed in these establishments.  
          Prices are high and 2.50 dollars are paid for a tot of skull-cracking hooch whisky and soda, manufactured by the Japanese and marketed in Johnny Walker bottles.  A cake soap cost 2.50 dollars.  Prices are steadily rising.  A bottle of synthetic orangeade, which cost 25 cents when they arrived, was costing 60 cents when they left on the last patrol.  Japanese-made Tiger beer is still available, although of very poor quality.  
          The native population is very badly paid and only just at subsistence level.  Rickshaw coolies and manual labourers are paid at the same rates as they were before the war, in spite of the considerable rise in the cost of living.  Both the Singapore dollar and the Dutch East Indes guilder are now at par with the yen.  U-Boat personnel only receive part of the accrued pay during the long passage out East, as otherwise their possession of so much money would be a cause of considerable friction.  
          There are occasional brawls with the Japanese soldiery and protests are lodged by the Japanese at regular intervals at the Germans' failure to show proper respect to Japanese sentries.  The prisoner could give no information on defences and minefields in the Penang area.  They are all controlled by the Japanese, who are extremely secretive.  Passage in and out of the harbour is through a narrow buoyed channel.  
  (iii)  Singapore  
          The same prisoner stated that the captain of the German base at Singapore is Kap.z.S. Von Zatorski, who has a large staff of regular German officers under him.  The prisoner saw no Siberlings there.  
          "U 178" was the only German U-Boat in Singapore at the time and they were quartered in barracks near an aerodrome on the island.  Not far away there was another set of buildings, which was used as a garage and repair shop for captured British Army vehicles.  These were being serviced by English soldiers and Australians and New Zealanders were acting as truck drivers.  The prisoner says that all these prisoners looked fit and well fed.  
          Singapore itself has a busy air about it, although, from the prisoner's description, the number of beggars has enormously increased since pre-war days.  German personnel were permitted to enter any of the hotels and public amusement places in the town and no restriction was placed on their movements.  It was not worth their while to visit the cinemas, as Japanese films only were shown.  
          Although good leather goods were still available in abundant quantity and at very cheap prices hardly anything apart from metal trinkets could be bought in the shops.  Silk and cotton goods could not be obtained and these were only available for the Japanese on a ration book basis.  The lingua franca for all transactions in shops is still English.  
          Two survivors, one from "U 406" and one from "U 264," had seen service in "Hipper" before joining the U-Boat arm.  Apart from confirming known details of the main armament they gave the following details of guns carried:  
                Three quadruple 20 mm. mountings, one on "B" turret, one on "X" turret and one by the foremast.
                  Three twin 20 mm. mountings on each side.  
                  Displacement was said to be 10,000 tons and maximum speed was given by one survivor as 35 knots and by the other as 40 knots.  


          (N.I.D. Note.  The designed speed of "Hipper" was 32.5 knots and estimated standard displacement 15,700 tons.)  
          Both prisoners had been on board for the action in the Bear Island area at the end of December, 1942, when an attempt was made to attack a Russia-bound convoy.  Number 3 Boiler Room was put out of action and No. 2 badly damaged, the speed dropping to 16 knots.  However, the bad visibility enabled her to make her escape.  
          "Hipper" put into Altenfjord, remaining there until February, and then proceeded to Wilhelmshaven via Trondheim and Kiel, where the dockyard took over the ship and she was paid off.  About half the ship's company was drafted to the U-Boat arm, including the two prisoners.  
IX.  "U 178"
          One of the survivors of the German tanker "Charlotte Schliemann," sunk in the Indian Ocean on 12th February, 1944, and transferred from "U 178" about a fortnight earlier while the U-Boat was being refuelled off Madagascar.  "U 178" was proceeding to Bordeaux.  The following details have been obtained from the prisoner:  
Type IX D 2.
Displacement 1,200 tons.
Complement 58.
Armament One 105 mm. (4.1 ins.) gun forward of the bridge (this may have been removed).
  One old-type 37 mm. (1,46 in.) gun aft.
  One 20 mm. (.79 in.) gun on the bandstand.
  Four M.Gs. on the bridge.
Torpedoes Old-type air and electric torpedoes carried, maximum capacity 32, but probably not more than 12 or 15 carried on this patrol.
Engines Two 9-cylinder M.A.N. Diesels.  
  Two M.B. 6-cylinder Diesels for charging batteries.
G.S.R. Metox and Southern Cross aerial.
Radar Not carried.
S.B.T. Carried.
R.D.B. Carried.
Freight About 140 tons of tin, 20 tons of wolfram and a small quantity of rubber were being carried.
          The prisoner who joined "U 178" in Bordeaux in February, 1943, gave the following account of her activities:  
          When he joined the boat she had just returned from a patrol in the Indian Ocean under Korvettenkapitän Ibbeken, who relinquished the command to Korvettenkapitän Dommes on arrival.  
          She left Bordeaux in March to operate off Port Elizabeth and Durban, but had no initial success and was refuelled about 25th June, 1943, by the "Charlotte Schliemann" in the latitude of Madagascar.  The U-Boats commanded by Gysae ("U 177"), Hartmann ("U 198"), Bartels, Kentrat and Lueth were also present at the refuelling rendezvous.  
          During ten days subsequent to the refuelling, six ships were sunk with a total tonnage of 30,000.  After these successes "U 178" intended to return to Europe but received orders to proceed to Penang where she arrived in August, 1943.  
          In Penang K.K. Dommes left the boat to become German U-Boat liaison officer in Tokyo and the First Lieutenant, Kapitänleutnant Spahr, assumed command.  He had been at one time Prien's Obersteuermann.  
          She was the first boat to arrive in Penang, but was soon followed by "U 177," another 1,200-tonner, "U 168" (Pich) and the boats commanded by Scharfer, Junker and Eick, all 750-tonners.  After eight weeks in Penang she proceeded to Singapore, staying there for three weeks.  On passage to Penang she was attacked in error by a Japanese anti-submarine vessel and had to put back to Singapore for a short period, subsequently returning to Penang.  
          About the middle of December "U 178" left Penang to return to Europe with a cargo of tin, rubber and tungsten on board, but with the intention of also carrying out offensive operations en route.  The 105 mm. gun and ammunition may have been disembarked to save weight.  One ship of about 8,000 tons was claimed sunk in the Bay of Bengal.  
          About 25th January she met the "Charlotte Schliemann," again off Madagascar, to refuel, and the prisoner, who was suffering from severe stomach trouble, transferred to the tanker.  


          Oberleutnant zur See Dietrich Giersberg was the sole survivor of his U-Boat when sunk in the North Atlantic on 8th October, 1943.  Apart from admitting that he was a U-Boat C.O., that his boat came from a French base and that he had been sunk as a result of an aircraft attack while surfaced, not a single item of further information could be extracted from him.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 0854 on 8th October, 1943, Liberator "R" of No. 86 Squadron, Coastal Command, attacked a U-Boat which had submerged 12 seconds previously.  Four depth charges were dropped, which exploded about 50 yards ahead of the swell.  
          At 0945, the same aircraft attacked a surfaced U-Boat with two depth-charges which fell alongside the U-Boat between the conning-tower and the stern.  There was a large explosion, with a white flash and clouds of black smoke.  The U-Boat sank vertically, stern first, leaving 15 men in the water, of whom only one was picked up.)  


          "U 406 was commissioned at the Danziger Werft, Danzig, on 22nd October, 1941.  Working up and final adjustments proceeded normally, and the boat sailed on her first patrol from Danzig on 6th April, 1942, passing through the Kiel Canal to Heligoland.  
          It is possible that mines were embarked, as several prisoners asserted that "U 406" then proceeded to a point off the Murmansk Estuary in order to lay mines.  After this operation they put into Kirkenes to re-fuel.  The boat then proceeded to St. Nazaire, where she joined the Seventh Flotilla.  
          The second patrol lasted from May to July, and took them to the South Atlantic, while the third patrol, which was in the North Atlantic, lasted from August to October.  Nothing was sunk on either of these two patrols.  
          "U 406's" only real opportunity to justify her existence occurred during the fourth patrol, on which she sailed just before Christmas, 1942.  The boat took part in a big convoy battle in the Atlantic.  
          According to survivors' stories, 53 ships out of a total of 58 in the convoy were sunk, with a gross tonnage of 374,000.  "U 406's share was five ships totalling 42,000 tons.  
          "U 406" returned to St. Nazaire at the beginning of March, 1943, and sailed on her fifth patrol towards the end of the month.  The patrol lasted three weeks and the U-Boat put into Bordeaux.  Nothing was sunk.  
          Sailing from Bordeaux on her sixth patrol at the end of April, "U 406" proceeded towards Gibraltar.  When in the latitude of the Straits she was rammed in broad daylight by the U-Boat commanded by Zurmuehlen and had a diving tank on the port side stove in, besides losing 12 tons of fuel.  "U 406" put back to St. Nazaire, arriving there on 18th May.  
          The seventh patrol, commenced on 26th June, 1943, took "U 406" to the South Atlantic.  The patrol lasted 13 weeks and during this time, "U 406" was refuelled by "U 460," commanded by Oberleutnant Schnoor.  While proceeding surfaced, later in the patrol, they were attacked by seven fighter aircraft which they assumed to be carrier-borne.  
          They were heavily machine-gunned and two men on the bridge were killed, one of whom was the First Lieutenant, Leutnant-zur-See Breitenstein.  Seven other men were injured.  "U 406" returned to St. Nazaire at the beginning of October.  
          "U 386" was commissioned at the Howaldtswerke, Kiel, in October, 1942, under Oberleutnant zur See Hans-Albrecht Kandler of the 1937 term.  Trials were carried out in the Baltic and final adjustments were made in Kiel during March and April, 1943.  
          They left Kiel in company with three other 500-ton U-Boats on 15th April and proceeded straight through the Rosengarten into the Atlantic without calling at any Norwegian port.  Some survivors stated that a small ship of about 3,500 tons was sunk about a fortnight after leaving Kiel.  
          The first patrol lasted about three weeks, and shortly after arriving at St. Nazaire, where they joined the Sixth Flotilla, Kandler left the boat owing to illness and Albrecht assumed command.  Survivors from "U 386" hinted that Kandler was now in command of a Brest boat.  
          "U 386" sailed again on 29th June, but had to return to St. Nazaire again after ten days as a result of damage to her periscope.  The second patrol actually lasted from August to October, during which they did not as much as fire a torpedo.  The only incident which elicited any comment from survivors had been the sighting of a rubber dinghy containing seven exhausted survivors from a crashed British aircraft.  No attempt was made to take them on board.  


          Some of the engine room ratings joined "U 264" for Baubelehrung as early as March, 1942.  She was commissioned at the Vulkan Yard, Vegesack, on 22nd May, 1942.  A series of minor mishaps occurred during the trials which were otherwise normal.  At Kiel the U-Boat hit a pier and damaged her bow slightly.  While engaged in torpedo firing exercises in the Bay of Danzig one of her torpedoes struck a 750-ton U-Boat which happened to be behind the target ship.  The 750-tonner was filled with high officials of the Propaganda Company.  She was badly damaged but was able to remain afloat while she was towed to Zoppot where she was beached.  During the tactical exercises "U 264" rammed "U 444" but only slight damage resulted.  (N.I.D. Note.  "U 444," commanded by Olt. Langfeld, was sunk in mid-Atlantic on 11th March, 1943.)  On another occasion a mine exploded about 10 m. distant on the port beam but no damage was done.  
          Final adjustments were carried out in September and October, 1942, in Danzig.  
          "U 264" sailed from Kiel on 3rd November, 1942, on her first patrol.  At that tine Lt. Loeschke was First Lieutenant and Flanze was Second Watchkeeping Officer.  (N.I.D. Note.  Probably Günther Loeschke of the October, 1939, term.)  The U-Boat proceeded to Kristiansand S. where she stayed one night and then sailed through the Rosengarten onto the Atlantic.  Her operational area was off Newfoundland.  There she attacked a convoy and succeeded in sinking three ships totalling 14,500 tons.  The convoy escort sighted the U-Boat on the surface and engaged her with gunfire.  A hit was scored on her after diving tank (Tauchzelle 1).  
          "U 264" then dived and was attacked by depth-charges which inflicted further damage and caused one of the Diesels to fail.  The U-Boat returned to base on one Diesel, arriving in St. Nazaire on 10th December, 1942.  There she was attached to the Sixth Flotilla.  
          The U-Boat sailed from St. Nazaire on 10th January, 1943, for a patrol area off the west coast of Africa.  Several torpedoes were fired at ships off Casablanca but no hits were scored.  
          While returning to her base "U 264" was ordered to act as escort with two other U-Boats for a tanker which was on passage from the Far East to France.  The tanker was described as a former Norwegian ship which had been taken over by the British and later captured by the Germans who re-named her "Hohenfriedburg."  The three U-Boats were ordered to take station 20 miles from the tanker, bearing respectively green 60, dead astern, and red 60.  "U 264" had damaged her port propeller, however, and could maintain a speed of only10 knots on one Diesel.  Control was informed of this situation and ordered the U-Boat to remain close to the tanker.  On two occasions "U 264" was forced to dive when aircraft approached.  One plane was said to have been a Sunderland and the other proved to be German.  
          When in the latitude of Lisbon the tanker, by making use of her extensible masts, sighted a warship on the horizon.  This proved to be a British cruiser which closed the tanker while "U 264" made desperate attempts to get into attack position.  Looks fired a spread of four torpedoes at a range of 5,500 yards but without success.  Before the tubes could be reloaded the tanker had been sunk.  "U 264" picked up 85 men of the tanker's crew and managed to embark them all.  She returned to Lorient on 4th March, 1943.  Repairs were made to the propeller and the U-Boat then proceeded to St. Nazaire.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 0945 on 26th February an 8,000-ton tanker was reported by a U.S. Liberator about 500 miles west-south-west of Cape Finisterre.  She attempted evasion but was continuously shadowed.  H.M.S. "Sussex" steered to intercept and at 1600 sighted the tanker which she engaged with gunfire, set on fire and sank at 1810.  Survivors were reported in four lifeboats.)  
          On her third patrol "U 264" operated off Newfoundland.  She sailed from St. Nazaire on 8th April, 1943, and on reaching her operational area, joined a large group of other boats in an attack on a convoy.  Four ships were sunk by Looks, before fog closed in, forcing the pack to break off the attack.  One prisoner was under the impression that "U 264" was the only boat to have scored any success.  The U-Boat returned to St. Nazaire on 2nd June, 1943.  While at her base the second bandstand was added and a 20 mm. quadruple gun was mounted.  
          "U 264" sailed on her fourth patrol from St. Nazaire on 22nd September, 1943, with orders to enter the Mediterranean with a group of U-Boats consisting of "U 642" (Brunning), "U 450" (Bohme), "U 223" (Waechter), "U 340" (Klaus), "U 732" (Carlsen) and "U 566" (Hornkohl).  Because the last three of these boats were sunk while attempting the passage of the Strait of Gibraltar, "U 264's" orders were changed and she proceeded westwards.  
         "U 264" was then ordered to a rendezvous with "U 460" a supply U-Boat commanded by Olt. Schnoor, and two other U-Boats, one of which was "U 455," commanded by Scheibe.  (N.I.D. Note.  This is reported to have been the 88th Atlantic supply operation carried out by Schnoor.)  Just as the refuelling was completed but while the hose was still connected to "U 264" an aircraft attack developed.  One prisoner stated that 15 carrier-borne planes were involved.  Two members of Schnoor's boat who were in a dinghy disconnected the hose and were taken aboard by Looks.  The U-Boats all dived but not before "U 264" received a direct hit which penetrated the water-tight stern compartment and destroyed the after torpedo tube.  Prisoners believed that the boats commanded by Schnoor and Scheibe were sunk.  
          Before "U 264" could report the damage she had sustained, Control ordered her once more to proceed into the Mediterranean.  The U-Boat, however, returned to St. Nazaire, arriving on 15th October, 1943.  
          While in base the 20 mm. quadruple mounting was replaced by a fully automatic 37 mm. gun and the extensible Diesel air intake and exhaust was fitted.  A number of the seamen were sent to Minizan for instruction in the new 37 mm. gun.  Olt Loeschke, left the U-Boat and Flanze became First Lieutenant.  Wessel and Schlichting joined the boat as Second and Third Watchkeeping Officers.  


(i)  Survivors:
English Equivalent.
Greven, Regierungsrat Dr. Karl Ludwig. Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant
18.  8.09
Heimbrecht, Werner Leutnant zur See Junior Sub-Lieutenant
17.  4.22
Clasen, Adolf Leutnant zur See Junior Sub-Lieutenant
14.  2.23
Weitz, Heinz Oberleutnant (Ing.) Sub-Lieutenant (E)
Koch, Richard Obermaschinist Chief Stoker and Chief E.R.A., 1st or 2nd Class
Kron, Werner Obermaschinist Chief Stoker and Chief E.R.A., 1st or 2nd Class
17.  8.19
Gerdau, Hermann Obersteuermann C.P.O. (Navigation
22.  7.13
Mayr, August Oberbootsmannsmaat Acting P.O. (Seaman's Branch)
26.  4.19
Schulz, Paul Oberbootsmannsmaat Acting P.O. (Seaman's Branch)
27.  6.19
Zwaka, Walter Oberbootsmannsmaat Acting P.O. (Seaman's Branch)
Schulze, Walter Obermaschinenmaat Acting Stoker P.O. and E.R.A. 4th Class
5.  7.19
Huppertz, Bruno Franz Josef Obermaschinenmaat Acting Stoker P.O. and E.R.A. 4th Class
Müller, Walter Obermaschinenmaat Acting Stoker P.O. and E.R.A. 4th Class
15.  7.18
Meyer, Hans-Jürgen Oberfunkmaat Acting P.O. Telegraphist
2.  3.19
Kunze, Gerhard Oberfunkmaat Acting P.O. Telegraphist
Pöhler, Heinz Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
30.  8.21
Schwanitz, Heinz Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
12.  1.22
Reidel, Gerhard Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
13.  6.24
Trapp, Hans Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
4.  4.20
Bonk, Heinz Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
17.  3.22
Sauer, Rudolf Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
17.  6.21
Kimmel, Kurt Alfred Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
Oehrle, Herbert Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
26.  5.24
Werner, Karl Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Schmidt, Wilhelm Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
14.  1.19
Breuker, Herbert Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Russek, Norbert Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Dettenrieder, Hans Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Behrendt, Günther Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
11.  3.23
Kahren, Jakob Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Schnitter, Gerhard Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
17.  9.23
Estermeier, Alfred Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
18.  5.24
Kohnke, Richard Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
10.  4.24
Riepl, Simon Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
22.  3.23
Rölicke, Werner Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Boketta, Rudolf Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
7.  6.24
Sack, Rudolf Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
Rossmeissl, Franz Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
12.  2.23
Froelich, Gustav Emil Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
Dittrich, Gerhard Mechanikerobergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
23.  6.23
Jung, Erich Mechanikerobergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
29.  8.22
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
  (ii)  Casualties:  
English Equivalent.
Dieterichs, Horst Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant
Räuscher Maschinenmaat Leading Stoker and E.R.A., 5th Class
Dreszler Mechanikersmaat Leading Torpedoman
Kramer Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
Heilmann. Leo Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Baatz Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Wietteck Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Hartmenn, Siegesmund Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Debus, Willi Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Kirchhoff Mechanikerobergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
  (iii)  Total Crew:  
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
        Total Crew  


(i)  Survivors:
English Equivalent.
Albrecht, Rolf Heinrich Fritz Oberleutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant 10.  5.20
Grapenthien, Curt Hermann Ernst Richard Leutnant zur See Junior Sub-Lieutenant 17.  1.22
Gieseler, Heinz Bootsmannsmaat Leading Seaman 28.11.19
Schrader, Georg Funkmaat Leading Telegraphist 3.  5.21
Dabelstein, Hans Funkhauptgefreiter Telegraphist 19.  3.21
Axnick, Heinz Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 15.  4.24
Kaluza, Erich Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 2.  5.23
Brandenburg, Theodor Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
31.  1.22
Brandenburg, Erwin Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
23.  1.24
Huber, Johann Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
Pimminger, Josef Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
15.  3.24
Blumenberg, Wolfgang Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Lahl, Werner Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Modick, Otto Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
20.  4.24
Nellessen, Willy Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
25.  5.21
Lakomski, Arthur Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
14.  9.22
Hauenschild, Erich Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
4.  3.24
Neu, Peter Matrose II Stoker, 2nd Class
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
  (ii)  Casualties:  
English Equivalent.
Karnath, (Kurt Otto?) Oberleutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant
Asmus, Werner Oberleutnant (Ing.) Sub-Lieutenant (E)
Schillinger Obermaschinist Chief Stoker and Chief Engine Room Artificer, 2st or 2nd Class
Edner Obermaschinist Chief Stoker and Chief Engine Room Artificer, 2st or 2nd Class
Mohrmann Obersteuermann C.P.O. (Navigation)
Midderhof Obermaschinenmaat Acting Stoker P.O. and E.R.A., 4th Class
Bialas Bootsmannsmaat Leading Seamen
Breitwieser Bootsmannsmaat Leading Seamen
Mattern Maschinenmaat Stoker, 1st Class
Trümpler Maschinenmaat Stoker, 1st Class
Weyel Maschinenmaat Stoker, 1st Class
Berger Maschinenmaat Stoker, 1st Class
Specht Funkmaat Leading Telegraphist
Königsfeld Mechanikersmaat Leading Torpedoman
Merkel Sanitätsmaat Leading S.B.A.
Kohnert Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
Berg Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Brandenburger, Werner Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Pfeiffer Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Kampelmann Matrosengefreiter Able Seaman
Tobben Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Fahlefeld Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Hornis Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Hummelke Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Hegels Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Hartleif Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Habeth Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Eggert Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Bechold Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Risch Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
Fentzahn Mechanikerobergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
Brehmer Mechanikerobergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
Buschkamp Artilleriemechanikergefreiter Able Seaman (Q.O.)
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
  (iii)  Total Crew:  
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
        Total Crew  


English Equivalent.
Looks, Hartwig Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant
27.  6.17
Flanze, Wolfgang Oberleutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant
19.  1.22
Wessel, Friedrich Oberleutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant
14.  3.20
Schlichting, Kurt Leutnant zur See Junior Sub-Lieutenant
Fuest, Karl Oberleutnant (Ing.) Sub-Lieutenant (E)
6.  7.20
Junghans, Wolfgang Marineoberassistenzarzt Surgeon-Lieutenant
22.  1.18
Sauer, Emil Obermaschinist Chief Stoker and Chief E.R.A., 1st or 2nd Class.
Hünn, Maxmilian Obermaschinist Chief Stoker and Chief E.R.A., 1st or 2nd Class.
24.  5.16
Glaeser, Heinz Obersteuermann C.P.O. (Navigation
5.  6.17
Zwach, Otto Oberbootsmannsmaat Acting P.O. (Seaman's Branch)
Ratzlaff, Siegfried Oberbootsmannsmaat Acting P.O. (Seaman's Branch)
31.  5.18
Schwarze, Gerhard Obermaschinenmaat Acting Stoker P.O. and E.R.A. 4th Class
12.  5.22
Bakowaki, Heinz Obermaschinenmaat Acting Stoker P.O. and E.R.A. 4th Class
30.  5.20
Reimund, Ulrich Oberfunkmaat Acting P.O. Telegraphist
28.  2.20
Schuch, Rolf Oberfunkmaat Acting P.O. Telegraphist
Lindenburger, Gunter Bootsmannsmaat Leading Seaman
10.  2.22
Buschmann, Georg Maschinenmaat Leading Stoker and E.R.A., 5th Class
6.  6.19
Bretsch, Karl Heinz Maschinenmaat Leading Stoker and E.R.A., 5th Class
1.  5.18
Küttner, Gustav Maschinenmaat Leading Stoker and E.R.A., 5th Class
Bolz, Josef Maschinenmaat Leading Stoker and E.R.A., 5th Class
7.  8.21
Hannig, Albert Mechanikersmaat Leading Torpedoman
3.  9.20
Liebscher, Harry Matrosenhauptgefreiter Able Seaman
28.  2.22
Schorsch, Horst Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
6.  1.21
Heller, Helmuth Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
Müller, Jusef Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
14.  4.22
Hupke, Ernst Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
12.  1.25
Pockrandt, Lothar Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
22.  5.23
Kugler, Georg Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
22.  8.24
Prühs, Fritz Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
Lange, Theodor Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
13.  4.22
Kuppert, Alfred Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
18.  7.24
Siegert, Walter Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
8.  3.25
Krüger, Adolf Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman
29.  9.23
Schulze, Heinrich Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Loch, August Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
Buchholz, Ludwig Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
13.  8.23
Stechow, Willi Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
24.  4.23
Neumann, Rudolf Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
31.  8.23
Grummisch, Heinz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
12.  1.25
Fischer, Herbert Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
23.  9.22
Ebeling, Heinz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
4.  1.24
Geissert, Friedrich Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
24.  8.22
Brand, Erich Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
4.  3.23
Franke, Heinz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
8.  1.22
Schärf, Jakob Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
19.  5.23
Schrage, Walter Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class
17.  6.24
Ewald, Hans Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
Karsten, Otto Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist
Stadtler, Karl Heinz Mechanikerobergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
10.  6.24
Rönnpage, Hans Mechanikergefreiter Able Seaman (S.T.)
Meyer, Hans Matrose II Stoker, 2nd Class
Officers . .
Chief and Petty Officers . .
Men . .
        Total Crew  
(C52594  500  6/44



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