UA - 3rd War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Kiel	25 February 1941	Lorient	18 March 1941	22

 

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Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
8 Mar 41	01.09	60°51'N, 18°48'W	DUNAFF HEAD	5,258	British	OB-293
			Total = 5,258
Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

 

This KTB uses the depth notation "depth T = xx meters"  Under this scheme, the actual depth was twice the depth given after T = so for example, if the KTB entry read "depth T = 50 meters, the actual depth was 100 meters.  This was intended to hide the actual depth for security purposes. This notation was used from about January 1940 to December 1941.  In these KTBs, depths written without using "T =", for example "dived to depth 35 meters" were not so disguised.

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				K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
				======================
				of
				U  n  t  e  r  s  e  e  b  o  o  t  e  s    "  U  A  "
				==============================
				Beginning:    29.  8.  1940
				Ending:        18.  3.  1941.
				2nd Patrol.
			Kommandant:             Korvetten-Kkapitän    Eckermann  .
			Distribution:	2 x O.K.M.  Skl.
				1 x B.d.U. Op.
				1 x B.d.U. Org.
				1 x 2. U.-Flottille
				1 x Boot..
				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 1 -
		1940	2nd Front Patrol.
		29.08.40	Wilhelmshaven	Transit to Kiel.
		30.08. - 20.01.41 1941	Kiel	Overhaul work in the Deutschen Werken Kiel.  Replacement of the main engines and alterations work.  Installation of the torpedo fire control installation.
		21.01.41		Shipyard trials.
				Final adjustments at the Deutsche Werke Kiel.
		28. - 31.01.41		Testing and training cruise in the western Baltic.  Strong ice interference.
				Recall to Kiel.
		01.02. - 20.02.41		Deutsche Werke Kiel, repairs to ice damage.
		21. - 24.02.41	Kiel	Outfitting the boat, degaussing.
		25.02.41	Kiel
		08.00	Very misty, Vis. low	Cast off Tirpitz Mole.  Canal cruise in tow of tug "FÖHN" due to ice in the canal.
		12.00	Kaiser Wilhelm Canal	Day's run:  15 nm Surfaced
				-  nm Submerged
		17.55	Brunsbüttel	Made fast Brunsbüttel inner harbor.
		26.02.41
		07.30	Brunsbüttel	Cast off Brunsbüttel inner harbor. Down the Elbe under escort by Sperrbrecher N.S. 2 and Fla-Jäger 25. Heavy flow drift ice to Elbe 4.
		12.00	Elbe	Day's run:  54 nm Surfaced
			E 1, clear, frost, light mist, otherwise Vis. good	-  nm Submerged
		16.22 - 17.34	Deutsche Bucht	Test dive off Helgoland.  Submerged sound measurement of the propellers by Ingenieur Hoppenrath of the Germaniawerft.
			SWbyW 2-3, light mist, Vis. medium, 8/10
		18.07	Helgoland	Entered Helgoland.  Made fast in the U-boat Harbor.

	- 2 -
		27.02.41	Helgoland
		12.00	SE 5-7. misty, Vis. medium, cloudy, cold	Day's run:  Surfaced       = 36 nm
				Submerged   =   2 nm    = 38 nm
		16.00	SE 6-7, misty, Vis. medium, cloudy, cold	Cast off Helgoland U-boat harbor. Escort by Sperrbrecher N.S. 2 to Point A and further to square 9559.
		20.00	AN 9559 lower-edge right	Released escort, because driving behind him with constant speed changes was too unsafe.
			SSE 5-6, misty, Vis. low, snow squalls, cold
		21.40		Turned on to Route Blau on course 342° at Point H.
		24.00	AN 9515 lower-center edge	Route Blau.  Course 342°, 12 knots.
			SSE 3-4, Sea 5, fog, snow squalls, very dark, Vis. low, light frost
		28.02.41
		04.00	AN 6663
			SSW 4, Sea 3, overcast, dark, Vis. low, light frost
		05.40		Route Blau, Point W, course 0°, 12 knots.
		08.00	AN 6368
			SSW 4-5, SSW 4, strong mist, Vis. low (500 meters)
		08.30	AN 6365	Dived.
				Put the boat on the bottom depth 44 meters.
		12.00		Day's run:  162.8 nm Surfaced
				1.7 nm  Submerged
		13.00		To periscope depth for Very Long Wavelength reception.
		13.58 - 14.15	AN 6365	Surfaced, boat ventilated.
			SW 4, SE 4, abating, overcast, Vis. medium	Crash dive for training.  Boat put on the bottom (depth 44 meters).
		20.00	AN 6365
			SW 3-4, SW 3, abating, cloudy, Vis. medium to good, clearing
		20.20		Surfaced, course 0°, 14 knots, Route Blau.
		24.00	AN 3843	Out of Route Blau on course 0°, 14 knots.  Headed for the deep channel at the south Norwegian coast.
			SW 3-4, SW 3, cloudy, overcast
				Atlas sounder is out of service.

	Sun and Moon Data 27.02.41
	Sun and Moon Data 28.02.41

	- 3 -
		01.03.41
		04.00	AN 3546
			SbyW 3, SW 2, clear, Vis. medium
		07.20		Dived to proceed submerged.
		08.00	AN 3197
			SbyW, SW 2, overcast, Vis. medium
		12.00	AN 3185	Day's run:  150.3 nm Surfaced
			SbyW 5, SW 3, overcast, Vis. medium	17.0 nm  Submerged
		13.15 - 13.20		Surfaced for sun observation and depth sounder check. (Freilot).
		16.00	AN 3149
			SbyW 5, SW 4, cloudy, Vis. good
		17.20 - 18.05		Surfaced for a navigation fix and depth sounder check.
				2 over deck hatches were torn away by the seas.  The remaining 2 hatches were secured by No. 1 (Ob.Btsmt. Ahnefeld) with wire despite heavy overcoming seas.  Afterwards dived again.
		20.00	AN 3143
			SW 5, SW 4, cloudy, half overcast, Vis. good
		20.20	AN 3143	Surfaced.  Began cruise on the surface.  Course 340°, 14 knots.
		23.24		Suddenly it was quite light.
				Northern Lights lasted 1/2 hour.
				Sent Short Signal:
				Have passed 59°N in the North Sea, east of 2°E.    "UA".
		24.00	AN 2971
			SW 4, SW 4, cloudy, heavy overcast, Vis. good
		02.03.41
		02.00	AN 2839	Course 0°, 14 knots.
		04.00	AN 2396
			SSW 2-3, SW 3, overcast, clear, Vis. good
		06.00	AN 2369	Course 320°, 14 knots.
				Course east of the Viking Bank in over 200-meters water to exclude any mine danger.  Intention:  Go into the Atlantic well north of the Faroes.  The only 60 nm gap between the barrier in the Faroes-Shetland area with the patrols there is not very suitable for the noisy UA.  The area of U-boat defensive measures north of the Faroes I will pass at night on the surface.

	Sun and Moon Data 01.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 02.03.41

	- 4 -
		continued
		02.03.41
		08.00	AN 2323
			SSW 3-4, SW 3, cloudy, Vis. good
		09.29	AF 8771	Crash dive for aircraft
				40° to port 5000-6000 meters away.  Apparently flew reconnaissance along the Norwegian coast.  Moved off submerged from the diving location.
		10.40		At periscope depth, afterwards surfaced, course 320°, 14 knots.
		12.00	AF 7966	Day's run:  174.5 nm Surfaced
			SSW 3, W 4, cloudy, Vis. very good	30.9 nm  Submerged
		16.00	AF 7681
			SSW 2-3, W 3, cloudy, Vis. very good
		20.00	AF 7298
			WSW 2-3, W 3, cloudy, Vis. very good
		24.00	AF 7222	Course 270°, 14 knots.
			WSW 2-3, W 3, cloudy, Vis. very good
		03.03.41
		04.00	AF 7124	Course 270°, 14 knots
			NW 2-3, W 2, cloudy, half overcast, Vis. good
		08.00	AE 9325	Boat is 60 nm north of the Faroes.
			NNE 2-3, N 2, cloudy, half overcast, short hail showers, Vis. good
		09.28	AE 9315	Crash dive for training as well as test dive.  Afterwards worked on the torpedoes submerged.
		12.00	AE 9314	Day's run:  288 nm Surfaced
			NE 4, NE 3, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. very good	7.6 nm  Submerged
		13.02		Surfaced.  Proceeded on the surface.
		14.32		Course 250°, 14 knots.
		16.00	AE 9227
			NE 5, NE 3-4, cloudy, overcast, Vis. good
		20.00	AE 9183
			NE 5-6, N 4-5, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 02.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 03.03.41

	- 5 -
		continued
		03.03.41
		24.00	AE 8633
			NE 6, N 5, cloudy, 8/10, Vis. good
		04.03.41
		04.00	AE 8682	Boat is in the Iceland Faroes Passage.
			NbyE 5, N 4-5, cloudy, 2/10, Vis. good
		08.00	AE 8582
			NbyE 4-5, N 4, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. good
		09.10		Dived to work on the torpedoes and for depth control training of the W.I. [Watch Engineer?]
		12.00	AE 8574	Day's run:  249.9 nm Surfaced
			NE 5, NE 4-5, cloudy, 7/10, hail squalls, Vis. medium	12.6 nm  Submerged
		13.45		Presented Radio Messages:
				1.)  Instructions:
				UA is about in square AE 89.  B.d.U.
				2.)  UA proceed via square AL 21 to square AL 51.  On passing 58N report position by Short Signal.    B.d.U.
		14.18		Surfaced.  Continued transit on course 250°, 12 knots.
		16.00	AE 8489
			NE 6, NE 5, cloudy, 8/10, Vis. medium
		17.00		Presented Radio Message:
			[BdU KTB AL 3122 to 3585]	Condor reports:  08.00 hours outbound convoy 40 ships, 6 destroyers in square AM 2554.  UA, U-70, U-47, U-99, U-95, U-108, U-552 on 5 March 10.00 hours form patrol line from square AL 3213 to square AL 3676
				and
				UA to U-552 from 10.00 hours in patrol line from AL 3127 to 3585 not from square AL 3213 to 3676.    B.d.U.
				The ordered post is easily reached by "UA".
				Course 216°, 10 knots.
		20.00	AE 8742
			NE 6, NE 5, cloudy, overcast, Vis. very good
		20.35		Presented Radio Message:
				UA report position by Short Signal.    B.d.U.
		21.05		Sent Short Signal AE 79.
		21.48		Short Signal confirmed.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 04.03.41

	- 6 -
		continued
		04.03.41
		22.30		Presented Radio Message:
				To UA up to U-552:  In patrol line at 10.00 hours course 115°, 10 knots, contact keeper do not attack by day, attack at night.  Remaining boats Short Signal "Yes" when at convoy.
		24.00	AE 7994	B.d.U.
			NE 6, NE 6, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. good
		05.03.41
		00.39	AL 3131	2 bright lights in sight bearing 170°T.  Closed.  A brightly illuminated steamer comes out quickly.  Runs slowly.  Closed and maneuvered ahead, went to the other side (moon lee) of the steamer, about 2000 ton size, had Finish markings brightly illuminated.  His course (40°) goes just past Iceland.  Seems to be a Petsamo steamer.  Passed on examining early tomorrow due to the heavy seas and the patrol lined planned for early tomorrow
			NE 5, NNE 5, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. good, at times hail squalls
				Stopping by night was also not possible in accordance with Standing Kriegsmarine Order 152.
		01.42		Turned away.
		04.00	AL 3122
			NEbyN 6-7, NE 5, cloudy, 9/10, hail squalls
		07.08		Test dive.
		08.00	AL 3122
			NE 6-7, NE 6, cloudy, 9/10, hail squalls
		08.15		Surfaced.
		10.00	AL 3122	Began advance in ordered patrol line.  Initial course 115°,10 knots.
			NE 6, NE 5-6, cloudy, 4/10
		10.30		Came about (every hour from now).
				The boat is much impeded by the Sea State.  Even at KF against the seas much water comes over, that the lookouts are practically ineffective.
				Before the seas the boat is impeded in its present loading condition from running at high speed settings.  Already at 2 x HF (= 14 knots) it starts to cut under.
		12.00	AL 3122
			NE 6, NE x, cloudy, 4/10, Vis. good
		16.00	AL 3122
			NE 4, NE 4, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 04.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 05.03.41

	- 7 -
		continued
		05.03.41
		17.00		Fk.Gefr. Sauerbier on watch in the radio room fainted, apparently Radio Message was not recorded.
		20.00	AL 3122
			NE 4, NE 3, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. good
		21.30		Presented Radio Message:
				Stop in reconnaissance line.
				By this it becomes clear that the patrol line is a reconnaissance line.
				The Order presented yesterday at 22.30 hours could not be considered an order for this, because it had to be understood as an extension order to the S.A.IIc Paragraph 103 and 105.
				It was determined that in the stated order here an encoding error was made.  Instead  of "From patrol line . . .", "In patrol line . . ." was presented.
		21.45		To compensate for the error came to course 110°, GF (= 15 knots).
		22.00		Presented Radio Message:
				Reconnaissance line settled.  U-95 return transit Lorient.  Occupy attack areas:  UA, AL 10 and 20, U-552 area west of Rockall Bank.  Further strips at the level of the following squares western limit 20°W.  U-70 and U-99 AM 11 focal point U-70 in the west, U-99 in the east.  U-47 AM 13, U-108 AM 15.    B.d.U.
				I decide to go to square AL 27.  This lies before the NW corner of the blockade area, steamers go through here to bypass the restricted area to the north.
		22.15	AL 3122	Course 215°, 15 knots.
		24.00	AL 3146
			NbyW 4, N 3, cloudy, 6/10, rain shower, otherwise Vis. good
		06.03.41
		04.00	AL 2438
			NbyE 3, N 3, cloudy, 3/10, Vis. good
		08.00	AL 2612
			NNE 3, NNE 2-3, cloudy, 8/10, Vis. very good
		09.43		Test dive afterwards depth control training and fire control training.
		11.08		Surfaced.
		12.00	AL 2591	Day's run:  260.3 nm Surfaced
			NbyE 3-4, N 3, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. very good	5.4 nm  Submerged

	Sun and Moon Data 05.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 06.03.41

	- 8 -
		continued
		06.03.41
		14.30	AL 2720	Reached indented position.
				Went to diesel-electric.  Before I lay cross-strips to the probable enemy-course, I first intend to run to the southern limit of my area.
		16.00	AL 2745
			NW 3, N 3, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. very good
		20.00	AL 0133
			NW 2-3, NW 1-2, cloudy, half overcast, Vis. very good
		23.40		Presented Radio Message:
				U-37 occupy attack area of U-108.  UA weather boat south of 58°N between 22 and 25°W.  Determine traffic in AL 42 and 51.    B.d.U.
				and at the same time . . .
				Signal:  Enemy convoy in sight square AM 1452.  Course 330°.    U-47.
				Orders for UA were rescinded by:
		23.50		Presented Radio Message:
				U-47 hang on, U-99, 70, UA go, U-37 operate on convoy.
				B.d.U.
		23.57	AL 0156	Came to course 50°, 15 knots.  Speed cannot be held in the sea.  Came to 14 knots.  Enemy is 420 nm away.
		24.00	AL 0156	Presented Radio Message:
			W 3, NW 3, cloudy, half overcast, Vis. good, dark horizon, moonshine	Signal:  Enemy convoy in sight AM 1427.    U-47.
				and
				UA and U-37 no weather reports.  U-95 weather report between 03.00 and 05.00 hours.    B.d.U.
		07.03.41		With seas becoming more favorable maintained GF again.
		01.30		Presented Radio Message:
			[typo AM 1421]	Convoy square 4121 lower-center.  Speed 9 knots.  30 ships.    U-47.
		04.00	AL 2776
			NNE 2, NNE 1-2, 8/10, Vis. good, dark horizon
		04.14		Presented Radio Message:  Signal:  Convoy square 1281 lower-left.    U-47.
		05.30		Presented Radio Message:  Signal:  Convoy square 1249, speed 8 knots.    U-47.
		06.10		Presented Radio Message:
				To U-99, U-70, UA, U-37:
				By Short Signal "Yes", as soon as attacking.    B.d.U.

	Sun and Moon Data 06.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 07.03.41

	- 9 -
		continued
		07.03.41
		07.00		Presented Radio Message:
				U-70 reported "Yes" by Short Signal.    B.d.U.
		08.00	AL 2814	"UA" is still about 280 nm from the convoy.  At the moment it steers a northerly course.  The meeting will depend on the time the convoy comes to a west or southwesterly course.
			NbyE 2, NbyE 1, cloudy, 3/10, Vis. good
		10.30		Converted main ballast and reserve fuel oil tank 8 for use as a ballast tank.  This was carried out despite operating on the convoy because the seaworthiness of the boat is increased and allows higher speed settings.  Afterwards a short test dive.
		11.15
		11.45		Advance continued at 16 knots.  Came to course 35° to be ahead and on the north side of the convoy in any case, because these nights this is the moon lee side.
		12.00	AL 2656	Day's run:  270.4 nm Surfaced
			NNE 2, NNE 1-2, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. good	2.9 nm  Submerged
				The latest contact keeper report is now 7 hours old.  Gradually the enemy position is more uncertain, because changes in the course of the enemy have to have a strong impact on the still considerable distance and favor a miss.
		16.00	AL 3348
			NEbyN 1, NE 1, cloudy, 6/10
		20.10		Ahead initially 1 smoke cloud over the horizon, later on getting closer more smoke clouds.  The convoy, consisting of numerous steamers, is in sight.  It is unexpectedly far to the north.
		20.00	AL 3191	With the beginning of darkness held at the limit of visibility.
			W 1, W 0, lightly cloudy, 8/10, Vis. very good	Went around ahead to the west to the north side of the convoy because the moon lee is here.  With increasing darkness angled in.
		22.30		About 22.30 hours more details are distinguished.  Also at night the convoy proceeds in broad formation, 8 columns alongside one another, apparently the columns are short 2-3, at most 4 steamers, in fact only 1 medium steamer on the wing.  Set off a bit on the wing and a bit astern each one screening destroyer.  Further destroyers are not clearly distinguished given the breadth of the front.
				Because initially despite the clouds it is too bright to attack before the half moon, the convoy is observed calmly from the front and from the attack side.
		24.00	AL 3121
			W 1, W 1, 10/10, a bit misty, Vis. medium
				Stopped temporarily for this purpose.  Several times "UA" needed more room [to maneuver], because the convoy appeared to

Sun and Moon Data 07.03.41

	- 10 -
		continued
		07.03.41
				zigzag up to 90° to both sides around the general course west.  As a result the distance between the columns is very large.
		08.03.41
		00.30		At 00.30 hours it is darker, the horizon is strongly obscured.  The convoy nearly passes out of sight at times.  There is a constant turmoil and confusion with him.
				During this period the following Radio Signals were sent
		22.17		1.)  Kr. enemy convoy n sight square 3153, westerly course.    "UA".
		00.55		2.)  Kr. enemy convoy square AL 3121 lower-left, course west, low speed.    "UA".
				Further Signals were not possible due to the following events.
				The following targets were selected for the 3 bow shots. (Tubes III and IV cannot be opened at the same time.)
				1.)  An especially fat steamer (8000-10000 GRT) in the second column.
				Two-fan from about 2000 meters.
				2.)  A 4000 GRT steamer traveling alone as wing column, somewhat antiquated construction from about 800 meters.
				"UA", had been running alongside the convoy, ran a bit ahead, turned and fired one after another as angle shots with UZO and fire control system.
		01.09	AL 3113	a)  2-fan, Eto, tubes II and IV:
				Target speed = 7 knots, target angle 80°, lead angle 13°, range = 2000 meters, spread angle 2.4°, running time 3 minutes 35 seconds and 3 minutes 39 seconds, on the 8000-1000 GRT steamer in the 2nd column.
		01.12	AL 3113	b)  Single shot, tube I. Eto:
				Target speed 7 knots, target angle 80°, lead angle 13° on the 4000 GRT steamer in the 1st column.
				The attack was not initiated from ahead, because the boat gets ahead of the columns too easily from the movements of the convoy.
				After the shots were taken turned away and moved off a bit.
		01.15		Then turned to to a parallel course to possibly still fire the G 7a from tube III, because initially a miss was feared.  Additional shots were intended for later from the other side.

	Sun and Moon Data 07.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 08.03.41

	- 11 -
		continued
		08.03.41
				The success of the shots:
				1.  2-fan on the fat steamer, range by running time = 3300 meters.  Initial hit at the level of the mast, light flame phenomenon, smoke column up to over the mast height.  Dull bang.
				After 4 seconds, the Torpedo Officer, Obersteuermann and Brückenmaat then saw still a second dark explosion column at the level of the engine room.  Thereafter the ship disappeared.  I too could not see it anymore.
				Because in the boat two detonations were heard, the sinking of the ship is to be expected.  That both torpedoes of the fan with a spread width of about 150 meters hit, means the size of the ship must have been a minimum of 180 meters.
				It is therefore it was probably even bigger.
				Subsequent remark:
			According to data with B.d.U. (B.Dienst) it was the steamer "EMPIRE ATTENDANCE".  Size not given.
				2.  Single shot, fired with the same data, broached initially.  The Brückenmaat believed he saw it as a surface runner and that it passed behind.  Therefore a miss, possibly a failure, surface runner.
				Turning back followed after running off briefly, because I feared a miss and in this case wanted to turn back again immediately.  After the hit took place I wanted to moved off and run around behind the formation.  However this turned against us at 01.21 hours when red and green stars were fired over several tens of degrees and "UA" needed more room [to maneuver].  Had to run off at higher speed athwart the convoy course.  In so doing the boat ran across the bow of the flank destroyer at some distance and was sighted, also the diesel smoked heavily.
				The destroyer turned noticeably towards and now turned with the zigzags made by UA.  When he had closed to about 600-800 meter and opened fire with the bow cannon, crash dived.  With this made a hook to starboard.
		01.28		The depth charges thrown at the diving location began an uncomfortably accurate listening depth charge pursuit of 3 1/2 hours duration.
				In 5 runs about 32 depth charges were thrown.  Apparently the boat was cross fixed by 2 destroyers working together and one vessel with a piston engine (fishing trawler)

Sun and Moon Data 08.03.41

	- 12 -
		continued
		08.03.41
				with remarkable accuracy by listening and S-gear, (sizzling sounds and mallet-like tapping at one seconds intervals.) were heard.
				The throwing vessel ran at listening speed until over the boat, apparently determined when it was over the target with a depth sounder, and first ran off at maximum speed after throwing the depth charges.  Each time the charges seemed to lie around the boat.
				Apart from the quality of enemy tracking devices, the well-known unfavorable design of the boat and its equipment, which make it unsuitable for depth charge pursuits, (with pumping by air limited to 50 meters, strong noises from all auxiliary machinery, equipment and command elements that can not be replaced by other noise-free installations) contributed to the remarkably accurate locating
				The behavior of the crew was extremely calm and confident.
				Very insightful was the listening gear operated by the No. 1 Funkmaaten, Ob.Fk.Mt. Heidgen.  With his information, it was possible to avoid any depth charge series by AK and hard rudder in the optimum way. The late acceleration of the throwing destroyer made avoidance difficult.
				Gradually, following many small malfunctions, the following failures occurred:
				Entire gyro-compass system, 30% of the room illumination despite reduced voltage,various instruments in the control room, nearly all instruments in the conning tower.  In the E-motor room with each attack another meter was burned out.  2 pairs of flood valves were slammed shut despite articulated levers and self locking worm gear drive.  The tanks can no longer be blown.
		04.40	AL 3113	Finally, after a series of depth charges, the aft diving plane jammed up and the rudder jammed.  The diving plane could not even be moved by hand.
				The boat, which was previously held at its maximum depth of T = 40 meters [actual depth 80 meters] due to the lack of pumping capability only with a strong stern down attitude and, accelerating at AK due to the depth charges, broke through the surface despite speed reduction and all measures by the Chief Engineer and could not be gotten below again since the hull valve of the negative buoyancy tank was also stuck.
				In this awkward situation, in the midst of the pursuers, I

Sun and Moon Data 08.03.41

	- 13 -
		continued
		08.03.41
				ordered preparations for scuttling the boat and to blow.  The boat took a strong list because the flood flaps port IV are tightly shut despite their articulated levers and self locking worm gear drive (open inward against blowing pressure).
		04.41	AL 3113	With an all around sweep from the conning tower, I determine that with the mist on the water's surface and darkness, at the moment, nothing was seen of the destroyers.
			SW 3-4, SW 3, dark, very misty, Vis. low
				At some distance a bright light flickers from a thrown light buoy.
		04.45		Blew fully, both diesels ready, ran off at AK.  This succeeds in spite of the diesel smoking strongly at 2 x AK and although the boat first made a full circle owing to the failed rudder and the equally failed daughter gyro-compasses.
		06.15	AE 7987	The boat had run off about 28 nm, had just been cleaned up, damage just repaired and the crew had finished breakfast, when a destroyer was reported coming up from astern.  Again he opened fire, again crash dive with a hook and a new 3 1/2 hour depth charge pursuit.
				Running off at AK was inappropriate.  The destroyer was able to follow the strong propeller noise despite the change in course and took so long only because of the small speed advantage. (1 hour 40 minutes)
				It would have been correct, to gain distance briefly and quickly at HF and them continue to run at silent running.  Whether that would have been successful remains an open question.
				With depth charge attacks sometimes over an hour apart, but always easy to track in listening gear, the destroyer overran the boat with great accuracy, always running diagonally at an angle of about 40° from the bow or stern.  It seemed as if the number of depth charges was less over time.  6 approached with about 16 depth charges.
		08.30	AL 3147	About 08.30 hours the dawn must start.  Since a depth charge day is imminent, I decide to try to get rid of the tormentor with a torpedo shot.  For this purpose, 1 Eto and 2 Atos are available in the tubes.  Immediately after a torpedo attack I went to periscope depth.  All preparations for a torpedo shot were made.  This does not go very quickly, so that another depth charge series followed at depth 25 meters, by which the fire control system failed.
			SW 3, SW 2, overcast, misty, Vis. low
		09.25

Sun and Moon Data 08.03.41

	- 14 -
		continued
		08.03.41
				At periscope depth shortly thereafter I realize to my great surprise that no destroyer can be seen.
		09.45		Surfaced cautiously.  It is very misty, visibility changing, in places only 800-1000 meters.  The destroyer is and remains gone.
				The exhaustion of his depth charges does not adequately explain the quick exit from the battlefield.  Rather, I suppose that his tracking device set at depth may have overrun the boat at 25 meters without a display and so he thought we were destroyed.
				After the lesson of last night we now cautiously run at LF and move off in large zigzags.
				Again, the behavior of the crew was good, however, after the long period of depth charge pursuit, especially after the initial relaxation, there was increased strain and agitation in the boat.
				The failure of the depth control installations was less significant this time, but a series of failures occurred, which severely limit the combat readiness of the boat.
				Primarily:
				1.)  Attack periscope out of service, flooded,
				2.)  Air search periscope blurred,
				3.)  All indicating instruments in the E-motor room are out of service.
				4.)  Medium Oil trace,
				5.)  Junkers compressor is out of service.
				When coming up again determined, that due to inexact indication of the manometer, the depth steered was T = 64 meters. [128 meters]
		12.00	AL 2286	Day's run:  240.5 nm Surfaced
			WSW 3-4, SW 3, misty, 10/10, Vis. changing	21.3 nm  Submerged
				Moved off to the southwest.  Cleared up the boat.  Depth charge damage repaired, as far as is possible.
		14.00		Presented Radio Message 0550 to UA:
				Send bearing signals for U-37 and hourly contact keeping reports.    B.d.U.
		15.00		Presented Radio Message  to UA, U-37, U-105, U-74, question contact?    B.d.U.
		16.00	AL 2444
			SW 3, SW 2, cloudy, 4/10, mist in places, Vis. good
		16.15		Answered "No" by Short Signal.

Sun and Moon Data 08.03.41

	- 15 -
		continued
		08.03.41
		20.00	AL 2394
			SW 3, SW 2-3, misty, 4/10, veil of mist, otherwise Vis. good
		21.37		Radio Message sent:
				To B.d.U.:
				Square AL 3113 1 steamer 8000 GRT.  1 failed Eto plus 3, then 8 hours depth charges.  Serious failures attack periscope,  Air search periscope blurred, all indicating instruments for the E-motors, Junkers compressor.  AL 2520.    "UA"
		23.20		Presented Radio Message:
				By Short Signal report if patrol can be continued.    B.d.U.
		23.33		Answered "Yes" by Short Signal.
		23.52		Presented Radio Message:
				"UA" can continue patrol in accordance with Short Signal.  UA occupy attack area between 62 and 60°N, east of 20°W.     B.d.U.
				The instructions originally given to the boat were:  Delayed return transit to Lorient, there refill and depart on great tour.
				Then on departure:  to train the new Chief Engineer and the boat be assigned a more abandoned sea area where strong independent traffic was observed by U-123.
				Based on this the Short Signal was answered "Yes"
				The new operational orders place the boat, which is still limited its operational capability by substantial failures, in an area in which there is either emptiness, or as yesterday showed, strongly protected convoys are to be reckoned with.
		24.00	AL 2543	This significant complication of the task causes me to sent the following Radio Message.
			SbyW 2, SW 1, 10.10, Vis. medium
		09.03.41
		01.29		To B.d.U.:
				Boat is not usable for convoy attacks in the current condition.
				"UA".
				Reasons:
				Day attack and in the upcoming full moon period, also submerged night attack are not possible with the blurred night targeting periscope.

	Sun and Moon Data 08.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 09.03.41

	- 16 -
		continued
		09.03.41
				Surface night attack . . .
				[illegible sentence here]
				The success possibilities . . .
				[illegible sentence here]
		00.20	AL 2543	Came about, . . .
				[illegible sentence here]
		04.00	AL 2389
			WSW 2, SW 1, 10/10, Vis. medium
		08.00	AL 2444
			SW 1, SW 1, misty, 10/10, fog banks
		10.34 - 11.25		Test dive.
		12.00	AL 2287
			EbyN 0-1, calm, cloudy, 9/10, Vis. good, fog banks
		12.40		Presented Radio Message:
				Attack areas
		[same as the attack area from 5 Mar]		UA AL 10 and 20.
				U-47 line between 6140 and 6054 northeast of 22°W,
				U-99 south therefrom up to 60°N, east of 20°W.
				U-37 south therefrom up to 59°06'N
				U-74, U-99 occupy attack area is no own enemy contact.
				B.d.U.
			AL 2287	At the moment , "UA" is located in the NE-corner of the assigned area.
		14.00		Came to course 310° to lie athwart the suspected steamer route.
		16.00	AL 2254
			Calm, light Swell, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. very good
		19.00	AL 2211	Came to course 220°, diesel-electric 10 knots.  Intend to head for the SW-corner of the assigned operations area in long legs.  The course leads diagonally through the area on the possible steamer routes.
		20.00	AL 2162
			Calm, light Swell, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. very good
		24.00	AL 2187
			SSW 1, light Swell, 10/10, Vis. medium

Sun and Moon Data 09.03.41

	- 17 -
		10.03.41
		04.00	[several illegible entries here]
		08.00
				[There is a listing of the damage here.  The first few introductory sentences are illegible 1.) is illegible - concerned the demolished flood valves for main ballast tank VIII.]
				2.)  The flood valves for port IX also beat but are still not completely demolished.  The beating is transmitted via the drive mechanism through the pressure hull to the drive spindle. Leakage of the bushing and complete breakage of the drive mechanism is expected with time, remedy at sea is not possible.
				3.)  Flange of the flood valve mechanism in the E-motor room leaks tightening the bolts results in little improvement.  Apparently the packing is destroyed.  It is feared that it will be pushed out at great depth.
				4.)  The starboard clutch between the E-motor and the thrust bearing beats and is warm.  Apparently, the shaft is no longer aligned here because the thrust bearing is warped.  Aligning the thrust bearing at sea is not possible.  Starboard propeller is only clear up to HF with the diesel.
				Submerged at HF at times there are strong knocking noises from the beating shaft, cannot proceed at this and higher speed levels with listening defenses.
				5.)  Damage, especially to the aft battery - 1 cell cracked.  Various covers sprung.  The compound is soft in all troughs (from fuel oil spray?).
				I decide to attempt to continue the patrol and await developments with the damage.
		12.00	AL 1618	Day's run:  217 nm Surfaced
			SbyW 3-4, S 2-3, 10/10, Vis. very good	-  nm  Submerged

Sun and Moon Data 10.03.41

	- 18 -
		continued
		10.03.41
		13.30	AL 1569	Test dive.  Afterwards depth control training and exercises with failures.  Shifted the torpedoes in the bow room.
		15.50		Surfaced.
		16.00	AL 1569
			SSW 3-4, Sea 2-3, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. very good
		16.15		Presented Radio Message:
				Air reports 12.30 hours enemy cruiser square AL 3912, course 300°.    B.d.U.
				The position is 500 nm away.  Too far to operate on it.
		20.00	AL 1716
			SbyW 3-4, Sea 3, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. very good
		24.00	AL 1776
			SbyE 1, Sea 1, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. very good, very bright moonlit night
		11.03.41
		04.00	AL 1946
			SEbyE 2-3, SSE 2, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. very good, bright moonlit night
		06.38		Reached the southern limit of the operations area.  Came to course 45°.
		08.00	AL 1985
			SbyE 3, S 2, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. good
		12.00	AL 1938	Day's run:   203 nm Surfaced
			SbyE 3, S 2, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. good	11.5 nm  Submerged
		13.00	AL 1939	Came to course 300°.
				Now I intend to run back and forth athwart the suspected steamer route.  This gives the best possibility, to sight a passing ship.
		14.00	AL 1939	Test dive.  Depth control training of the Watch Officers.  Torpedo work.
				In tube III the retaining bolt abutment is sheared due to too hard loading.  The pin itself is dented.  Tube II was reloaded.
		16.00	AL 1931
			S 5, S 4, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 10.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 11.03.41

	- 19 -
		continued
		11.03.41
		20.00	AL 1788
			S 6, Sea 5, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. good
		23.00	AL 1775	Came to course 100°.
		24.00	AL 1776
			SbyE 7-8, Sea 6, cloudy, 9/10, Vis. good
		12.03.41
		04.00	AL 1789
			SSE 7, SE 7, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. good
		08.00	AL 1799	The strong Sea State tonight had worsened the damage to the flood valves.  Port IX is apparently now also completely broken.
			SSE 6, SE 5-6, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. very good
				Port VII is newly affected with strong movements and valve flapping.
				It can be assumed that the damage will progress and the blowing possibility of the ballast tanks will be endangered.
				With this situation I decided to break off the patrol.  Course 180°.
		09.10		Radio Message sent to B.d.U.:
				Request to break off the patrol due to progressing damage.
				"UA".
		11.21		Presented Radio Message:
				To "UA", return harbor Lorient.    "B.d.U."
				The course 180° goes through square AL 42 where U-123 had strong traffic and along the suspected north-south steamer route west of the blockade area.
		12.00	AL 0125	Day's run:   128 nm Surfaced
			SE 7, SE 5, cloudy, 4/10, Vis. very good	13.0 nm  Submerged
		16.00	AL 0189
			SE 6-7, SE 5, cloudy 1/10, Vis. very good
		20.00	AL 0189	The boat works heavily in the seas.  In the lower ship the lose broken flood valves bang and flap as if they wanted to bash the boat to pieces.
			SE 7, SE 4, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. very good
		24.00	AL 4263
			SE 6-7, SE 5-6, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. very good

	Sun and Moon Data 11.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 12.03.41

	- 20 -
		13.03.41
		04.00	AL 4299	Return transit to Lorient.
			SE 5, SE 4, clear, 3/10, Vis. very good
		08.00	AL 4596
			SE 4, SE 3, cloudy, 4/10, Vis. very good
		12.00	AL 4896	Day's run:   208.8 nm Surfaced
			SE 3-4, SE 3, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. very good	- nm  Submerged
		16.00	AL 7296
			SSE 3, SE 1-2, clear, 2/10, Vis. very good
		17.21		Presented Radio Message:
				"UA" report by Short Signal if boat's battery was damaged.
				"B.d.U."
		20.00	AL 8471
			SSE 3-4, SE 2-3, cloudy, 4/10, Vis. very good
		22.00		"UA" answered the question by Short Signal "Yes".
		24.00	AL 8761
			SSE 3, SE 2, rain, 10/10, Vis. good
		14.03.41
		04.00	AL 8879
			SbyE 3, S 2, rain, 9/10, Vis. good
		08.00	BE 1362
			SSE 2-3, SE 2, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. good
		10.04. -		Test dive.
		10.45		Surfaced.
		12.00	BE 2176	Day's run:   269.0 nm Surfaced
			SSE 2-3, SE 2, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. good	2.8 nm  Submerged
		16.00	BE 2466
			Wind changing, SSE 2-3 to SSW 2-3, SE-Swell 1, cloudy, 3/10, Vis. very good

	Sun and Moon Data 13.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 14.03.41

	- 21 -
		continued
		14.03.41
		20.00	BE 2823
			SEbyS 3, SE 1, clear, cloudless, Vis. very good
		24.00	BE 2974
			SSE 2, SE 1, clear, cloudless, Vis. very good
		15.03.41
		04.00	BE 5363	Transit to Lorient.
			SEbyE 2, SE 1, cloudy, 7/10, Vis. good, bright moon
		08.00	BE 6413
			SE 2, Sea 1, clear, 1/10, Vis. very good, bright moon
		09.50 -		Test dive.
		10.05		Surfaced.
		12.00	BE 6493	Day's run:   314.5 nm Surfaced
			E 1-2, E 1, clear, 1/10, Vis. very good	0.7 nm  Submerged
		19.45		Presented Radio Message:  To "UA":  Encounter with own warships is possible.
		20.00	BF 4484	Sent Short Signal:  Am 36 hours from return harbor.    "UA".
			ENE 2, E 1, cloudy, 6/10, Vis. very good
		20.24	BF 4485	Dived for aircraft.  Flew to the south far on the western horizon.  Apparently own reconnaissance (float plane).
		21.05		Surfaced.
		22.12		Short Signal of 20.00 hours was confirmed.
		24.00	BF 4579
			ENE 2-3, E 1, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. good, moonshine
		16.03.41
		04.00	BF 4594
			ENE 1-2, clear moonlit night, Vis. very good
		08.00	BF 4685
			ENE 2, E 1, cloudy, 5/10, Vis. good
		08.35 - 08.58		Test dive.

	Sun and Moon Data 14.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 15.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 16.03.41

	- 22 -
		continued
		16.03.41
		12.00	BF 7074 [typo 5474?]	Day's run:   321.0 nm Surfaced
			ESE 102, -.- , heavy fog, Vis. 500 meters	3.3 nm  Submerged
		16.00	BF 5494
			ESE 1, clear, subsiding fog banks, Vis, bad to good
		16.05		Presented Radio Message:  To "UA"
				Due to suspicion of aircraft mines off Lorient UA remain outside the 200-meter line.  Pull in follows possibly on evening 17 March.    B.d.U.
		17.20		From now steered zigzag courses to reduce submarine threat in the area off the 200-meter line.
		20.00	BF 5581	Thick fog, Vis. 100 meters.
			EbyS 1, -.- , thick fog, Vis. 100 meters
		20.25		Sounded the 200-meter line.  In the vicinity of the 200-meter line to starboard and ahead 2 fog horns heard.  Suspect fishermen on the 200-meter line.
				Came about, initially on course 270° with E-motors moved off to improve listening.  Back and forth in position to the west at low speed.
		24.00	BF 5571
			ESE 1, flat, heavy fog, Vis. 200 meters
		17.03.41
		04.00	BF 5482
			SW 1-2, flat, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. medium
		08.00	BF 4693	Came to course 100°.
			SW 3, W 1-2, flat
		08.36 - 09.00		Test dive, afterwards crash dive training.
				Ran to the 200-meter line on easterly courses.
		12.00	BF 5485	Day's run:   206.2 nm Surfaced
			SEbyE 1-2, flat, cloudy, 10/10, Vis. good	1.3 nm  Submerged
		12.25		Presented Radio Message:
				Escort for "UA" positioned today 19.00 hours at Point 2.
				B.d.U.
		13.07		Short Signal:
				Request bearing signal transmitter I in 3 hours.    "UA".

	Sun and Moon Data 16.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 17.03.41

	- 23 -
		continued
		17.03.41
		13.45		Presented Radio Message:
				Bearing transmitter I runs from 1403 to 18.30 hours in accordance with V.B.F. 202 b.    B.d.U.
				UA can reach Point 2 at the earliest at 20.30 hours.  The boat is further out, because the escort was thought to be at Point B and calculations were from the 200-meter line.
				Therefore sent Radio Message:
		14.40		Cannot be at Point 2 before 20.30 hours.    "UA".
		16.00	BF 5547
			NbyW 1, Sea -.- , cloudy, 7/10, Vis. good
		16.00		Presented Radio Message:
				To "UA"
				First run in in the morning , times follows.  Bearing signal transmitter I will be turned off at 16.30 hours.
				B.d.U.
				Slowed down and turned to sea to kill time.
		20.00	BF 5571	Presented Radio Message:
			NNW 1, Sea -.-, cloudy, 3/10, Vis. very good	Escort for UA positioned at Point 2 tomorrow 08.00 hours.
				B.d.U.
		22.00	BF 5493	Came about.  Headed for Point 2.
		24.00	BF 5574
			NbyE 1-2, Sea -.-, cloudy, 3/10, Vis. good
		18.03.41
		00.30		Short Signal:  Request bearing transmitter I in 3 hours.    "UA".
		04.00	BF 5531	Headed for Point 2 off Lorient.
			N 2-3, N 2, clear, bright moonshine
				Presented Radio Message:
				Transmitter I runs for UA from 03.30 to 08.30 hours in accordance with War Orders.    B.d.U.
		05.05		An illuminated vessel at Point B.  From the very general data in the Nautical Handbook the lead angle was too great, so that at 06.30 hours the boat was 6° out of the inbound bearing.  Bearing signals at half-hourly intervals would have allowed the error be noted. Thus, the boat was well outside the course line and probably outside the monitored route.  Bearing signals must be taken at half-hourly intervals.

	Sun and Moon Data 17.03.41
	Sun and Moon Data 18.03.41

	- 24 -
		continued
		18.03.41
		07.45		Taken in convoy at Point 2 by 2 fishing trawlers, ran into Lorient.
		08.00	BF 6173	Escort taken over by harbor protection boat off the harbor.
			N 2, Sea 1, 81/0, misty, Vis. low
		09.55		Made fast Lorient.
				Korv.Kpt. and Kmdt.
			Summary.
			Duration of the patrol:        22 days.
			Total distance covered:     4,537 nm.
			Success:                         5000-10000 GRT.
			Concluded:  Lorient, 18 March 1941.
				Korv.Kpt. and Kmdt.

Sun and Moon Data 18.03.41

	- 25 -
			E  x  p  e  r  i  e n  c  e  s  .
			======================
			Boat:
			a)  Noise:  With the departure of the boat for Helgoland hull-borne noise measurements carried out by Ingenieur Hoppenrath of the Germaniawerft showed that "UA"is a noisy boat.
			Unfortunately, it is the systems necessary for submerged cruise and attack that make the main noise, and indeed at a level that is completely intolerable.
			Specifically, reference is made to the report sent by G.W. directly to B.d.U. Org.  It points out that for "UA", as a boat originally built for Turkey, less value was placed on the noise question than for German boats.
			The following points were highlighted:
			Under favorable listening conditions, if you have a sound value between 1 and 2, that can be heard externally
			1.)  Attack periscope:  Sound level 250-350
			2.)  Air search periscope:  Sound level 40-50
			3.)  Vacuum pump (for vacuum oil tank [hydraulic system]): Sound level 25-30
			4.)  Command converter I:  Sound level 60-70
			5.)  Diving plane (electric): Sound level 15
			6.)  Listening converter:  Sound level 5-6
			7.)  E-motors at LF - 110 RPM:  Sound level up to 1.9.
			Therefore the attack periscope is hardly practical to use and with the vacuum pump, the Kommandant must decide if he prefers, with the riveted boat, which by experience always has an oil trace from leakage at the rivets, or proceed with a loud noise source.  There is no way out here.
			A reduction of the main noise sources is only possible by in part significant and difficult structural alterations.  Only with the gyro-compass converter was it possible to reduce the sound value from 20-30 to 0.7 to 0.8, i.e. to practically eliminate the sound source.
			The described condition forces the extremely careful use of the boat.  Areas of possible sound monitoring or pursuit would be advantageous to avoid completely.
			b)  Flood valves:
			At the request of the Turks, the boat was equipped with flood valves which can be closed under water by compressed air.  For this purpose, a particularly complicated and sensitive flood valve drive mechanism was provided.  With the exception of the free-flooding ballast tank I, all main ballast tanks and main ballast and reserve fuel oil tanks are equipped with this mechanism.  Only the converted main ballast and reserve fuel oil tank V on both sides have flood valves with manual drive, which is much more reliable.  Already on the last Front patrol, towards the end, 3 of the existing flood valve drives had broken or began to break, so that the

	- 26 -
				valves could become loose and beat.
			On this patrol again several of the flood valve drives broke.  The strongly beating valves forced premature termination of the patrol, because
			a)  The damage progressed to more valves.
			b)  It was to be expected that over time, due to the valves opening inwards, that the ballast tanks or ballast and reserve fuel oil tanks would no longer be able to be blown (as was seen with ballast tank IV).
			c)  From the jolts in the drive mechanism the pressure hull bushings leaked and the flanges were leaking.
			It remains to be seen, if what is presently assumed, that this time the malfunction was a consequence of the depth charges or if its cause was in too weak design of the drive mechanism.
			Since on patrol the flood valves are driven constantly open, it is proposed that these valves, also to shorten the now necessary repairs, be completely dismantled and that the pressure hull bushings of the drive mechanism be sealed.
			Only in ballast and reserve fuel tanks II and VIII are the flood flaps to be left and repaired.  These tanks would then only be carried as fuel tanks to prevent such a malfunction from reoccurring.
			In tank VIII, however, because of the annoyance of surface cruise a simple and reliable manual drive would be provided, which leaves the flood valves in almost the "open position".
			Otherwise no new experiences.
				Korv.Kpt. and Kmdt.

 

	Comments of the B.D.U.
	1.)  The boat was forced to break off the patrol due to depth charge damage suffered on 8 March.  The behavior of the Kommandant during the attempt to escape prosecution was determined and correct.  His experiences here will be approved
	2.)  Otherwise nothing to note on the patrol.
		For the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote
		- The Chief of the Operations Department -
		i.V.

 

 

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