Op-16-Z S E C R E T | ||
Copy No. ____ of 51 | ||
NAVY DEPARTMENT |
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS |
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WASHINGTON |
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Final Report - G/Serial 44 |
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REPORT ON THE |
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INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM U-960 |
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SUNK 19 MAY 1944 |
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DISTRIBUTION: | ||
BAD | ||
BUORD | ||
BUSHIPS | ||
BUSHIPS (Code 515) | ||
BUSHIPS (Code 815) | ||
COMINCH (F-21) | ||
COMINCH (F-4253) | ||
COMINCH (F-45) | ||
COMINCH (FX-40) | ||
COMINCH (FX-43) | ||
COMNAVEU | ||
DNI (Ottawa) | ||
G-2 (Col. Sweet) | ||
Op-16-1 via Op-16-1-F | ||
Op-16-FA-4 | ||
Op-16-P | ||
Op-16-W | ||
Op-20-G | ||
Op-23-C | ||
SONRD | ||
Lt. Cdr. V. R. Taylor | ||
C.O. Naval Unit, Tracy, Calif. | ||
Lt. J. I. Eiband (CSDIC, AFHQ) | ||
Lt. S. R. Hatton (CSDIC, AFHQ) | ||
Lt. J. T. Rugh, Jr., (JICA ME) | ||
COMASDEVLANT | ||
CINCLANT | ||
COM8THFLEET | ||
COM4THFLEET |
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Op-30 | ||
15 September 1944 | ||
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TABLE OF CONTENTS |
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION |
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U-969, a 500-ton U-built by Blohm $ Voss, Hamburg, and commissioned early in 1943, was sunk at 0714, 19 May 1944 in position 37.35 N. - 01.39 E. after undergoing a highly coordinated and determined air and surface attack for 42 hours. Aircraft from Coastal Command Squadrons 36, 458, 500 and French 2 S and 17 participated. The surface group consisted of ComDesDiv 25 in USS WOOLSEY, plus USS LUDLOW, NIBLACK, MADISON and BENSON. Almost all the depth charge patters were well placed; the U-boat's doom was sealed by a serious water entry combined with extensive internal damage. | ||
U-960 was commanded throughout her entire history by Oberleutnant z. S. Günther Heinrich, a respected and well-liked commanding officer, The U-boat made two Arctic patrols and one in the Atlantic, and had entered the Mediterranean approximately a week prior to her sinking. A standard 500-tonner in all respects, U-960 had a relatively normal career. She had laid mines on both Arctic patrols and Heinrich had claimed the aggregate sinking in three patrols of four merchant vessels totaling 14,000 tons, one unidentifiable escort vessel, and one destroyer. (O.N.I. Note: Four merchant vessels, totaling 17,573 tons, might be credited to Heinrich. The escort vessel claimed for U-960 was, in fact, a Russian icebreaker which was torpedoed but not sunk. There is no likelihood that Heinrich sunk a destroyer, as claimed.) | ||
Only twenty of a total complement of fifty-one officers and men were rescued, survivors including Heinrich and three of his officers. The executive officer, Oberleutnant z. S. Harries, was a casualty. A | ||
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preliminary interrogation was conducted in North Africa, and prisoners were further interrogated in the United States after an interval of several months. The majority of the survivors were moderately security conscious, and this report is based, for the most part, on information gained from a small group who responded readily to questioning. | ||
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CHAPTER II. DETAILS OF U-960 |
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TONNAGE | ||
500 tons. | ||
TYPE | ||
VII-C. | ||
BUILDING YARD | ||
Blohm and Voss, Hamburg. | ||
COMMISSIONED | ||
30 January 1943. | ||
FIELD POST NUMBER | ||
M-50098. | ||
INSIGNIA | ||
Brown Eagle, in profile, with three Yellow Crossed Arrows beneath. Mounted only in port. | ||
COVER NAME | ||
Heini. | ||
PATRON | ||
(a) Potsdam Flottenfreunde (Potsdan Navy Friends). | ||
(b) City of Potsdam, since April 1944. | ||
CALL LETTERS | ||
XTD. | ||
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FLOTILLA | ||
Third at La Pallice. While in Arctic early August to early December 1943, U-960 was temporarily attached to the 11th Flotilla at Bergen. En route to 29th Flotilla at Toulon at sinking. | ||
COLOR | ||
(1) Gray-white in Arctic. | ||
(2) Gray in Atlantic and Mediterranean. | ||
CONSTRUCTION | ||
Standard for VII-C type U-boats. | ||
ARMAMENT | ||
(1) Platform II - (a) Quadruple 20-mm. gun for First to Third Patrols. | ||
(b) Automatic 37-mm. gun for Fourth Patrol. | ||
(2) Platform I - Two twin 20-mm. guns. | ||
(3) Bridge - Two twin MG-81 demountable machine guns. | ||
(4) Magazine - (a) Two boxes of hand grenades. | ||
(b) Six pistols. | ||
AMMUNITION | ||
(1) For 37-mm. gun a total of 300 rounds carried, of which 240 were in three pressure-proof lockers on Platform II. This "Minenmunition" consisted of tracers, incendiaries | ||
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and H.E. The commanding officer determined in which order these types were fired. | ||
(2) For 20-mm. gun a total of 16,000 rounds carried, of which 560 were in two pressure-proof lockers on Platform I. | ||
TORPEDOES | ||
Maximum carried, eleven. The number of torpedoes carried varied with individual patrols. | ||
MINES | ||
Twenty-seven TMB mines carried on First and Second Patrols, of which twelve were loaded in the four forward torpedo tubes and fifteen stowed in the forward compartment. | ||
SCUTTLING CHARGES | ||
(1) One in forward compartment, port side, next to #2 tube. | ||
(2) One stowed in magazine for use in control room. Its prescribed position was on starboard aft side of control room. | ||
(3) One in stern compartment, position unknown. | ||
Each scuttling charge contained a one-half kilo explosive charge. Their purpose was solely to demolish the vents. | ||
S.B.T. (Submarine Bubble Target) | ||
Fitted in electric motor compartment. | ||
D.C.P. (Depth Charge Plotter) | ||
Not fitted. | ||
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DEPTH GAUGES | ||
Scaled to 200 meters. Greater depths were determined by use of an air-pressure gauge. | ||
MAXIMUM DIVING DEPTH | ||
235 meters (about 770 feet). | ||
CRASH-DIVING TIME | ||
Thirty-two seconds to 30 meters during tactical exercises. | ||
DIESELS | ||
(1) G.W. Diesels. | ||
(2) Fuel oil capacity - 135 to 140 - cubic meters. | ||
ELECTRIC MOTORS/GENERATORS | ||
(1) B.B.C. | ||
(2) Switchboard - Voight and Haeffner. | ||
BATTERIES | ||
Standard for VII--C type U-boats. | ||
ROTARY CONVERTERS | ||
(1) One 0.3 KVA. | ||
(2) One 1.5 KVA. | ||
(3) One 6 KVA. | ||
COMPRESSORS | ||
One Junkers, one electric compressor. | ||
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TRANSMITTERS | ||
(1) 200-watt short-wave transmitter. | ||
(2) 150-watt long-wave transmitter. | ||
(3) 40-watt short-wave emergency transmitter | ||
(4) 15-watt, 600 meter wave-length emergency transmitter for use in rubber life-boat. Aerial to be strung out by balloons or kites. | ||
RECEIVERS | ||
(1) "Main" receiver. | ||
(2) All-wave receiver. | ||
(3) Elag 10-12 short-wave receiver. | ||
U.K. GEAR | ||
Not fitted. | ||
RADAR | ||
Hohentwiel. Reserve set carried. Radar was seldom used; never in the Bay of Biscay. | ||
G.S.R. (German Search Receiver) | ||
(1) Wanz G-2. | ||
(2) Naxos. | ||
(3) Borkum. | ||
(4) Fixed-basket type aerial. | ||
(5) "Fleige" aerial. | ||
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HYDROPHONES | ||
Multi-unit hydrophones (G.H.G.) | ||
ELECTROLOT | ||
Fitted. | ||
UNDERWATER TELEPHONE | ||
Fitted. | ||
R.D.S. (Radar Decoy Spar Buoys) | ||
Not carried. | ||
R.D.B. (Radar Decoy Balloons) | ||
Carried, Used in Bay of Biscay. | ||
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CHAPTER III. EARLY HISTORY OF U-960 |
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COMMISSIONING | ||
Dates of the keel laying and launching of U-960 could not be ascertained. Officers and crew members assembled at the Blohm and Voss yards to stand by U-960 sometime prior to her commissioning on 30 January 1943. | ||
ACCEPTANCE TESTS | ||
U-960 left Hamburg on 1 February 1943 and after traveling through the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal arrived in Kiel on 2 February 1943. The acceptance tests in Kiel lasted three to four days. During this period U-960 was tested in the pressure-dock to 90 meters, which depth was guaranteed by Blohm and Voss. | ||
TRIALS AND EXERCISES | ||
After the acceptance tests U-960 made a trial speed run from Kiel to Warnemünde. Traveling at emergency speed a record high of 19.6 knots was reached. The usual speed for this trial run averages 18 - 18.45 knots. But U-960 paid a price for this attempt at glory for the starboard electric motor was seriously damaged. It was necessary to go via Hela and Gotenhafen to Danzig where U-960 arrived about mid-Februay 1943. Repairs took until early March, but the motor never operated at its best again. | ||
The remaining working up period proceeded smoothly. Six other U-boats participated in the tactical exercises with U-960. Among these were U-275, commanded by Oberleutnant Mahrholz, and U-Rollmann. | ||
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(O.N.I. Note: U-848 under Korvettenkapitän Rollmann was sunk 5 November 1943 in 10.05 S. - 18.00 W.) U-960 established a new crash-diving record when, with four men topside at the crash-dive alarm, she reached a depth of 30 meters in 32 seconds. | ||
FINAL OVERHAUL | ||
At the beginning of June 1943 U-960 and U-Rollmann traveled together through the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal en route to Hamburg and Bremen, respectively, for their final overhaul. The following changes were made in U-960 in Hamburg; Modification of the conning tower, installation of a quadruple 20-mm. gun on Platform II, removal of the 88-mm. gun, installation of radar and other radio equipment, painting ship dark gray. Most of the crew were granted leave during this final overhaul period. | ||
FINAL LOADING | ||
On 24 July 1943 U-960 returned to Kiel for final loading. This took about a week and U-960 was ready to depart on her first patrol early in August. | ||
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CHAPTER IV. FIRST PATROL OF U-960 |
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DEPARTURE AND CHANGE OF ORDERS | ||
On 3 or 4 August 1943 U-960 left Kiel on her first patrol. She was accompanied by one other 500-ton U-boat, a smaller Norwegian U-boat on trials, and the usual escort. U-960 was scheduled to proceed directly from Kiel and the personal effects of her crew had therefore been forwarded to the 3rd FLotilla. While in the Skagerrak U-960 received orders modifying her original schedule and she was ordered to proceed to Bergen where she was to equip herself for Arctic operations. | ||
ARRIVAL AND LAYOVER AT BERGEN | ||
A few hours were spent at Kristiansand and Haugesund on route to Bergen where U-960 arrived about 8 August 1943. She then became a "guest boat" of the 11th Flotilla. In Bergen U-960 picked up her modified orders and waited fourteen days for the arrival of another U-boat which was to bring additional radio equipment directly from Germany for her use. This U-boat a new 500-ton Blohm and Voss U-boat, was unaccountably delayed and U-960 put to sea on 22 August 1943 on her first patrol. The radio equipment was subsequently delivered to her by the above mentioned U-boat in Trondheim after U-960 had completed her second patrol. During this fourteen day layover in Bergen U-960 was repainted a gray-white color in anticipation of her Arctic patrols. | ||
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DEPARTURE FROM BERGEN | ||||
U-960, equipped with a deck armament of two twin 20-mm. guns on Platform I and a quadruple 20-mm. mount on Platform II, left Bergen on 22 August 1943 with only four of her original eleven T-3 torpedoes aboard. Narvik was reached on the 23rd and a few hours were spent there. U-960 proceeded farther north to Tromsö, where 27 type TBM mines were embarked. Twelve were loaded in the four forward torpedo tubes and the remaining fifteen were stowed in the forward compartment. One of the four torpedoes was loaded in #5 after tube, one stowed in the after compartment, and two stowed in the forward compartment. | ||||
LAYING OF MINES AND RETURN TO BASE | ||||
U-960 was ordered to lay mines off the island of Nowaja Semlja (Russian) in the Barents Sea. The island was reached on 31 August or 1 September 1943 and all 27 mines were laid in one and one-half hours in the harbor located on the western side of the strait which bisects the island. The weather was very foggy and U-960 remained at periscope depth during the entire minelaying operation without interruption. U-960 immediately set course for Narvik, which was reached on 4 September 1943. As a result of this successful mission five members of the crew received the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. | ||||
U-960 carried a crew of 49 on this patrol. Her officers were: | ||||
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CHAPTER V. SECOND PATROL OF U-960 |
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SECOND MINELAYING EXPEDITION | ||
U-960 left Narvik for her second patrol on 24 September 1943. This, too, was to be a minelaying expedition and she therefore left Narvik with only four T-3 torpedoes aboard. As on her first patrol, U-960 called at Tromsö where 27 TMB mines were embarked. All 27 were laid in the harbor of Dickson Island (73.30 N. - 80.00 E.) on 2 or 3 October 1943. | ||
MEETING WITH U-GRAU AND U-BRÜNNER | ||
After the successful completion of this mission U-960 notified Control and was in turn informed that she was to meet U-Grau and U-Brünner, two or three days later off the Island of Nowaja Senlja in order to supply these two U-boats with fuel oil, drinking water and food stores. The three U-boats were then to operate together. | ||
OPERATIONAL AREA | ||
The meeting was effected as planned and supplies were transferred. The three U-boats then proceeded to their operational area, the Kara Sea. U-960 was the lead boat with U-Gray and U-Brünner about six hours astern. | ||
ATTACK ON RUSSIAN CONVOY | ||
About 0600 (German War Time) 10 October 1943 U-960 sighted an eastbound Russian convoy consisting of about sixteen merchantmen and four escorts. U-960 immediately crash-dived and at a range of 4000 | ||
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meters fired one T-3 torpedo from #5 after tube at a 4000-ton merchantman. After twelve to thirteen minutes an explosion was heard and it was believed the ship sank within a minute after being hit. The escorts presumably misjudged U-960's position for in the ensuing counter-attack depth-charge explosions were heard far off, judged by one prisoner to have been at a distance of four miles. | ||
U-960 retired from the convoy and informed Control of the situation. About 1200 (G.W.T.) U-Grau and U-Brünner were met and plans for a surface attack on the convoy the same night were made. | ||
U-Grau took the lead followed by U-Brünner and U-960. At 2300 (G.W.T. U-Grau delivered the first attack and it was claimed she sank an 1800-ton merchantman. The attack drew the escorts away from the convoy and, while they were hunting U-Grau, Brünner launched his attack. A spread of four torpedoes was fired and Brünner subsequently claimed two ships sunk by this attack. U-Brünner was then forced to retire from the scene. U-960 followed up with her attack. Traveling at full speed, she fired three torpedoes from tubes #1, #2, and #4 at three targets. The torpedoes were set for a speed of 40 knots with a left curve setting. U-960 claimed two merchantmen and one escort sunk from this attack. The torpedo which hit the escort vessel was aimed originally at a merchant ship. This torpedo missed the ship, and, after having completed its run, turned left, reversed its course and hit the escort which was attempting to cur off U-960. A total of 8,600 tons, including three merchantmen and one escort vessel was claimed by U-960 for the day's operation. (O.N.I. Note: A Russian | ||
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convoy was attacked by U-boats in early October in the Kara Sea, in the general area of 74 N. - 57 E. From this attack three ships were sunk and one damaged. They were SERGEI KIROV, Russian M/V, 4146 tons; ARCHANGELSK, Russian M/V, 2480 tons; PETROVSKI, Russian M/V, 3771 tons. Torpedoed but not sunk, LENIN, Russian icebreaker, 3828 tons. | ||
This convoy was presumably the one attacked by U-960, U-Grau and U-Brünner on 10 October 1943.) | ||
RETURN TO BASE | ||
Although strong counterattacks were experienced, no damage was done to the three U-boats, and all three proceeded on independent courses to a pre-arranged meeting place off the island of Nowaja Semlja. U-960 was the last to arrive at the rendezvous for she was once sighted en route by Russian aircraft and was forced to proceed submerged for a while. Otherwise U-960 traveled at all times on the surface. | ||
It seems that the captains of the three U-boats granted their crews "shore leave" while at Nowja Semlja. Three polar bears and several polar foxes were shot. All three U-boats thereafter proceeded together to Hammerfest, Tromsö, Narvik and, finally, Trondheim, which port was reached on 25 October 1943. | ||
There was no change in officers or men for U-960's second patrol. The commanding officer, Oberleutnant Heinrich, was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class; eighteen members of the crew were awarded the Iron Cross, 2nd Class; all crew members received the U-boat badge. | ||
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CHAPTER VI. THIRD PATROL OF U-960 |
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REPAIRS AT TRONDHEIM | ||
U-960 was docked at Trondheim for seven weeks undergoing repairs. The starboard electric motor, both Diesels and the batteries were completely overhauled. Armor up to 16-mm. in thickness was added to the conning tower. The long awaited radio equipment from Germany arrived and was installed. In anticipation of her next patrol to La Pallice, U-960 was repainted a dark gray. Eleven T-3 torpedoes were embarked. | ||
CHANGE IN PERSONNEL | ||
A change in officer personnel was also effected. The executive officer, Leutnant Dähne, was relieved and left for the commanding officers' school. The second watch officer, Leutnant Sell, became the executive officer. Oberleutnant Harries (O.N.I. Note: Not in GNL) came aboard as the second watch officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) Käde (promoted 1 December 1943) remained aboard as U-960's engineer officer and Oberleutnant Heinrich continued as her commanding officer. A second class pharmacist's mate joined U-960 which brought her total complement to 50. | ||
DEPARTURE | ||
On 4 December 1943 U-960 left Trondheim on her third patrol. Her operational area was constantly changed, but it was said that she operated in the general area between Greenland and England. During | ||
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most of this patrol very heavy seas of force 6, 7 or 8 and sometimes 10 and 11 were experienced. Many injuries were suffered by the crew, including two broken legs and one broken arm. Two men suffered head wounds and two men had their teeth knocked out. The heavy seas rendered the quadruple 20-mm. gun useless, bent in the front of the conning tower and caused other superficial damage to the upper deck. Aircraft were sighted several times but no attacks developed. | ||
SINKING OF AN INDEPENDENT SHIP | ||
Sometime in the first half of January 1944 a westbound independent Liberty ship was sighted about 1600 G.W.T. U-960 immediately crash-dived. In spite of heavy seas (force 6-7) U-960 managed to keep in contact with her victim. A dusk she launched her attack. Six torpedoes were fired of which four were said to have hit the target. The ship broke in two and U-960 immediately left the area, setting course for La Pallice. Two days after this attack, U-960 was informed by Control that, although the ship had indeed broken in two, both sections were still floating. She was ordered to sink at least one of these sections. | ||
U-960 reversed course and soon found the floating hulks. A number of pictures were taken before the largest section was finally sunk by firing one torpedo into the hulk. The second hulk was left floating. U-960 once again set course for La Pallice. (O.N.I. Note: The SUMNER I. KIMBALL, U.S. merchant vessel, 7176 tons, overdue, was considered lost by enemy sub action on 16 January 1944 in area 52.35 N. - 35.00 W. An unknown ship's distress signal was picked up at 2250 Z, | ||
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16 January 1944 originating from this area. The stern of a wreck was found 18 January 1944 in position 52.24 N. - 32.00 W.) | ||
RETURN TO BASE | ||
The trip to La Pallice wa made almost entirely on the surface, even through the Bay of Biscay. This was done in spite of standing orders that all U-boats are to proceed submerged when passing through Square "Emil". A prisoner stated that all of the Bay of Biscay is known as Square "Emil". Its western limits are defined by a line drawn north from Cape Finisterre. Square "Bruno" borders on Square "Emil". Its northern limits are unknown. Square "Bruno" extends as far south as Lisbon. Square "Caesar" extends southward of Square "Bruno". It reaches into the Gibraltar area as far eastward as the Mediterranean border of Spanish and French Morocco. The Atlantic water as far south as the Azores are also included in Square "Caesar". Aircraft were sighted in the Bay of Biscay but U-960 did not dive on these occasions, nor was she attacked. | ||
About 4 February 1944 U-960 met her escort at 0600 G.W.T. at "Punkt Wasser", a point 45 miles bearing 240 degrees from La Pallice. U-960 and her escort reached La Pallice at 1100 G.W.T. the same day; here she joined the 3rd Flotilla. The engineer officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) Käde was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and the entire crew received the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. | ||
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CHAPTER VII. FOURTH PATROL OF U-960 |
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REPAIRS AT LA PALLICE | ||
Before setting out on her fourth patrol U-960 underwent extensive repairs, lasting about two months. Her conning tower was removed and reconstructed. The armor plates added in Trondheim were removed. One small air raid shelter was built in. The quadruple 20-mm. gun on Platform II was replaced by an automatic 37-mm. gun. New radio equipment was installed, including a new type of radar mattress, said by one prisoner to have a range of 42 miles. Engines and motors were dismantled and overhauled. | ||
During this overhaul period most of the crew were granted leave. The seamen, however, had to take a course on the use of the new 37-mm. gun at Mimizan. | ||
CHANGES IN PERSONNEL | ||
Changes in officer personnel were again made. The executive officer, Leutnant Sell, left U-960 to attend commanding officers' school. Oberleutnant Harries, the second watch officer, became the executive officer. Oberleutnant Stubenrauch (O.N.I. Note: Not in the GNL) came aboard as the second watch officer and Leutnant Rieckoff (O.N.I. Note: Not in the GNL) as the third watch officer. Oberleutnant (Ing.) Käde remained U-960's engineer officer and Oberleutnant Heinrich her commanding officer | ||
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DEPARTURE AND SUDDEN ORDERS TO RETURN TO BASE | ||
About 9 April 1944 U-960 departed from La Pallice on her fourth patrol. After passing through the Bay of Biscay on the surface, U-960, when about two hours from the western limit of Square "Emil", received word from Control that an eastbound tanker convoy had been located off northern Portugal and that a second convoy was located in mid-Atlantic. U-960 immediately set course to intercept the tanker convoy. An hour or two later she again heard from Control, this time being ordered inexplicably back to La Pallice. | ||
ATTACK BY MOSQUITO BOMBERS | ||
"Punkt Wasser" was reached at 0600 G.W.T. 18 April 1944. Another 500-ton U-boat was waiting together there together with an escort of five submarine chasers. About seven miles out of La Pallice the escort was augmented by an anti-aircraft ship, a mine destructor vessel and three torpedo boats. About 1100 G.W.T., with the convoy only about a mile and a half from La Pallice, twelve Mosquito bombers appeared out of nowhere and delivered a damaging attack on the convoy. Being in the most exposed position, U-960 bore the brunt of the attack. Attempts to defend herself were futile, for the 37-mm. gun jammed with the second round and had to be fed by hand. U-960 received a direct hit on the conning tower, which demolished the attack periscope. Fourteen men were wounded, four of them seriously. The other U-boat was undamaged. The bridge of one of the submarine chasers was shot away and the mine destructor vessel was so heavily damaged that it had to | ||
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be towed into port. The convoy suffered 36 casualties, none of them fatal however. None of the attacking aircraft was hit. The attack was quickly over and the convoy arrived at La Pallice at 1135 G.W.T. (O.N.I. Note: No record of this attack has been found.) | ||
TORPEDOES | ||
On this fourth patrol and the subsequent final patrol U-960 carried ten torpedoes, of which three were T-5s and seven were T-3s. The T-5 torpedoes were stowed: One in #5 after tube, one in #3 tube and one underneath the floor plates of the forward compartment. The T-3 torpedoes were stowed: Three in tubes #1, #2 and #4, three underneath the floor plates of the forward compartment, and one in the after compartment. | ||
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CHAPTER VIII. FIFTH AND FINAL PATROL OF U-960 |
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REPAIRS AT LA PALLICE | ||
During the ensuing nine day layover in La Pallice a new periscope was installed in U-960 and the conning tower repaired. The crew was not allowed ashore. The fourteen men injured in the bombing attack on 18 April 1944 and four others were detached and replaced. | ||
FALSE START | ||
On 27 April 1944 at 2030 G.W.T. U-960 left La Pallice on her fifth and last patrol. She left with one Diesel engine still in need of repairs, but the engineer officer had insisted it could be repaired at sea. His attempt to earn a possible Knight's Cross for such a deed was in vain for the Diesel could not be repaired and U-960, with escort, was obliged to return to port. Repairs took but a short while and U-960 was soon fully prepared to leave. | ||
DEPARTURE AND PASSAGE TO GIBRALTAR | ||
U-960 finally left La Pallice on 29 April 1944 at 2000 G.W.T. She left alone except for the usual escort. A course of 240 degrees was steered until the 200 meter line was reached. From that point U-960 proceeded alone. Course was set for 180 degrees and she proceeded on this course, submerged, until just off Santander, Spain. The Spanish coast was followed all the way to Gibraltar. By day, U-960 traveled submerged outside the 200 meter line, by night, surfaced within the 200 meter line. Off the north coast of Spain on | ||
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3 May at 0400 a brightly lit Spanish destroyer was sighted. Apparently, they were not detected by the destroyer. It was about this time that the crew were informed that U-960 was bound for the Mediterranean. This news was not received with enthusiasm. Wide berth was given the approaches to Lisbon to avoid detection. Everything proceeded smoothly and U-960 reached a point off Cape Trafalgar in the early hours of 9 or 10 May. | ||
PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIGHT OF GIBRALTER | ||
Setting her course on a line for Tangiers, U-960 submerged and traveled so until she reached the approximate position 35.56.30 N. - 05.56.00 W. at 0400 (G.W.T.) 9 or 10 May. U-960 came to periscope depth and took bearings. Course was set for 090 degrees and U-960 then submerged to 200 meters. At 2030 (G.W.T.) U-960 again came to periscope depth. Ceuta was on a bearing of 240 degrees which put their 2030 position at approximately 35.56.30 N. - 05.12.18 W. Upon submerging U-960 changed course to 180 degrees until 0100, 10 or 11 May when she surfaced. A control room petty officer stated that the entire passage through the Strait was effected at a depth of 200 meters. It took 22 hours and went off without incident. | ||
OPERATIONAL AREA | ||
U-960 hugged the Spanish Morocco coast as far as Cape Tres Forcas. She then headed north and, after leaving the island of Alboran to port, changed course to 090 degrees. U-960 was to continue on this course till 03 degrees east where she was to report to Control | ||
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and receive further orders. U-960 was sunk before this position was reached. As she was unable to signal her sinking Control had, therefore, never heard from U-960 since she left La Pallice. In the Mediterranean U-960 proceeded submerged at all times except for a few hours each night when she surfaced to charge batteries. | ||
U-960 CLAIMS THE SINKING OF A DESTROYER | ||
At 1200 (G.W.T.) 14 or 15 May, when off Oran, U-960 obtained hydrophone contact. The U-boat was ordered to periscope depth and a destroyer was sighted. Using hydrophone effect to maneuver herself into an attacking position, U-960 dived to 30 meters and fired one T-5 torpedo from tube #3 at 1206. The explosion of the torpedo was heard five minutes and twelve seconds later. U-960 came to periscope depth and was unable to sight the destroyer. She then dived to 60 meters and "sinking noises" were heard. Prisoners were convinced they had sunk this destroyer. No counterattacks were experienced. (O.N.I. Note: There is no record of an attack on a destroyer in this area on 14 or 15 May 1944.) | ||
U-960 CLAIMS ATTACKING A DESTROYER | ||
During daylight hours of 16 May U-960 was said to have sighted a destroyer. As she was crash-diving one T-3 torpedo was fired from periscope depth. The explosion of the torpedo was heard shortly thereafter but U-960 could not ascertain the result of this attack. (O.N.I. Note: There is no record of an attack on a destroyer in this area on 16 May 1944.) | ||
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CHAPTER IX. SINKING OF U-960 |
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U-960 ATTACKS CONVOY ON 17 MAY 1944 | ||
About 1200 (G.W.T.) U-960 obtained hydrophone effect on all sectors. She came up to periscope depth and found herself in the middle of a westbound convoy, with a number of destroyers in the lead. The order was immediately given to make all tubes ready for firing. Shortly thereafter a spread of three T-3 torpedoes from #1, #3, and #4 tubes was fired. No target was hit. U-960 dived to 180 meters and succeeded in retiring from the scene without being subjected to counterattacks. (O.N.I. Note: Three torpedoes exploded in the wake of USS ELLYSON at 1020 Z, 17 May 1944 in position 36.40 N. - 00.23 W.) | ||
U-960 SIGHTED BY AIRCRAFT | ||
During the night of 17/18 May U-960 while proceeding on the surface was surprised by a plane equipped with a search-light. No attack was made by the aircraft, but the U-boat managed to fire a few rounds. U-960 escaped an attack by diving before the plane could circle back. | ||
U-960 was again sighted on the surface by a plane during the night on 18/19 May. The aircraft flew along the starboard side of the U-boat. No attacks were made by plane or U-boat and the latter crash-dived immediately. | ||
ATTACKS ON U-960 ON 19 MAY 1944 | ||
Propeller noises of fast approaching destroyers were heard at 0230 (G.W.T.). A series of nine depth-charges exploded near U-960 | ||
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at 0235. Prisoners stated that between 0235 and 0530 some 76 depth-charge explosions were counted. They caused considerable damage to U-960. A crack of some 10-15 cm. on the D/F shaft and a 50-cm. crack on the attack periscope caused a water entry in the control room. At 0300 the commanding officer, Oberleutnant Heinrich, ordered the release of some S.B.T.'s. The outer cap of the discharge tube must have been pried loose by the depth-charge attack for when the executive officer, Oberleutnant Harries,opened the inner cap a stream of water poured into the U-boat. It was impossible to close the S.B.T. discharge tube and water kept pouring in. All radio equipment was made useless by these attacks. The main lighting system broke down with almost the first series of depth-charge explosions. The emergency lighting system functioned for a while but at 0530 this system failed and total darkness reigned within the U-boat. | ||
From 0530 to 0615 no attacks were experienced nor was any hydrophone effect obtained. | ||
Another series of devastating attacks occurred between 0615 and 0730. The starboard electric motor broke down as a result of these attacks. The continued water entry from the S.B.T. discharge tube reached the batteries and chlorine gas began to develop. It was feared the batteries would explode at any minute. | ||
At 0730 the port electric motor was put on emergency speed and, after all personnel had been ordered forward, the after part of the U-boat was sealed off. The commanding officer gave the order to surface, tanks were blown and U-960 shot upwards. | ||
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The moment U-960 reached the surface she was subjected to heavy gunfire from the destroyers. She was also attacked by an airplane. The commanding officer gave the order to fire a T-5 torpedo from #5 after tube. This could not be done as the torpedo cap was found to be jammed. The order to abandon ship was given but only 20 of the 51 men managed to get out of the U-boat before she sank at 0735. No message was sent to Control announcing her sinking. | ||
ACTION REPORT | ||
U-960 was sunk as a result of a coordinated air and surface action which lasted 42 hours. | ||
A line of seven U.S. destroyers was proceeding at 27 knots while returning from another successful hunt, which resulted in the sinking of U-616. (O.N.I. Note: See Final Report - G/Serial 41.) Three torpedoes exploded in the wake of the USS ELLYSON. A sonar search was begun immediately. However, sonar conditions were poor and no contact was made. | ||
At 1316, 17 May ComDesDiv 25 in WOOLSEY, plus LUDLOW, NIBLACK, MADISON and BENSON proceeded to the scene to relieve the other task unit. At 1458 the scouting line was formed. Scouting distance was 1500 yards, speed 15 knots. At 2155, WOOLSEY, BANSON and MADISON investigated a radar contact made by a plane but did not make contact. | ||
At 0347, 18 May, Wellington M/36 sighted and was engaged by the U-boat, which then dived. | ||
At 0758, 18 May, NIBLACK and LUDLOW joined the other three | ||
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destroyers and the group proceeded to search in the area of the sighting. Scouting distance was opened to 2500 yards. The killer group was divided into two sections at 1932 with WOOLSEY, BENSON and MADISON searching on the estimated course of the U-boat twenty miles ahead of LUDLOW and NIBLACK. At 2228, a report was received that a plane (Wellington U/36) had made a radar contact about 22 miles astern of LUDLOW and NIBLACK. These two ships proceeded to investigate but did not make contact. At 0130, 19 May, Wellington U/36 made radar contact and dropped lighted marker buoys. At 0318, LUDLOW made a brief disappearing radar contact. Three minutes later, LUDLOW's sonar operator gained a contact which was classified as submarine. | ||
On the first attack a medium pattern was dropped and a fathometer reading of ten fathoms was obtained. Contact was readily regained, but the depth charge crew was not ready and no charges were dropped on the run. However, two flares were dropped to mark the position of the submarine. | ||
At 0356 NIBLAK attacked with a nine-charge medium pattern. NIBLACK made another attack at 0407 but for some unknown reason only three charges were dropped. This attack was followed at 0417 by another very deep pattern. Contact was lost at 550 yards on this attack. LUDLOW then made two attacks at 0443 and 0454 and NIBLACK followed with an attack at 0508. | ||
It was now decided to conduct a creeping attack with NIBLACK acting as assisting ship. Before the attack could be | ||
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completed, NIBLACK lost contact and directed LUDLOW to begin echo ranging. Contact was immediately regained about 1200 yards ahead and it was now decided that Niblack would act as attacking ship. The submarine, however, appeared to head for LUDLOW and before NIBLACK was in position to drop, contact was lost. Both ships then began searching. LUDLOW regained contact and dropped a very deep pattern. Contact was again lost at about 550 yards. NIBLACK now stood in to make an attack, but was not satisfied with the approach and did not fire. | ||
LUDLOW then directed NIBLACK on a creeping attack which was made at 0705. A large stream of rising air bubbles resulted. | ||
At 0708 the submarine surfaced and was engaged with gunfire by NIBLACK and LUDLOW. The other destroyers who had arrived in the area "watched with envy but refrained from opening fire, since the situation was well in hand". During the gunfire, plane V/500 dove low and depth-charged the U-boat. | ||
About two minutes after opening fire a white flag was observed being waved on the submarine. Fire was checked but since the flag did not reappear, fire was resumed. It was subsequently learned that the commanding officer, Oberleutnant Heinrich, had waved his white cap from the conning tower, but he was soon blown over the side. | ||
At 0714 the submarine sank. NIBLACK insured the sinking by dropping a ten charge medium patter which brought the submarine to the surface momentarily only to sink again stern first. Four officers and sixteen men from the U-boat were recovered. | ||
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CHAPTER X. CREW OF U-960 |
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The crew of U-960 consisted of 51 men of whom five were officers, fifteen petty officers and thirty-one enlisted men. | ||
COMMANDING OFFICER | ||
The commanding officer, Oberleutnant z. S. Günther Heinrich of the October 1938 Term, was well-liked by his men as he took an active interest in their welfare. Under attack or in any other dangerous situation he was said to inspire his men by his cool-headedness. In spite of his youth his efficiency was not questioned by his crew. No such favorable impression was made upon his interrogators. To them Heinrich reacted in a very stiff and haughty manner and was considered as undesirable a Nazi as had yet been encountered. | ||
Prior to joining the U-boat arm, Heinrich was a member of the German Air Force; he was transferred to the German Navy and served for a while in a mine sweeper. He then joined the U-boat arm and made three patrols as executive officer on another, unidentifiable U-boat before being sent to commanding officer's school. | ||
EXECUTIVE OFFICER | ||
Oberleutnant Harries, the executive officer and only officer casualty, had served many years aboard merchant vessels. He was stationed aboard a mine destructor vessel based at Copenhagen before transferring to U-960 at Trondheim for her third patrol. He, too, was well-liked by the men. | ||
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SECOND WATCH OFFICER | ||
Oberleutnant z. S. Friedrich Karl Stubenrauch was a coastal artillery officer before coming to the U-boat arm. U-960's final patrol was his only venture in U-boats. Though older than his commanding officer he was under the latter's influence for her reacted to his interrogators in the exact manner of Heinrich. | ||
ENGINEER OFFICER | ||
The engineer officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) Karl-Heinz Käde of the December 1939 Term, was the only officer aboard U-960 thoroughly disliked by the men. He took every opportunity to make life unpleasant for them, especially by threatening them with court martial's and noting every slight misdemeanor in their records. Any man under his authority who made a mistake was reprimanded by a resounding blow from Käde's swagger stick. His unsavory character was readily apparent to his interrogators. | ||
OTHER OFFICERS | ||
The third watch officer, Leutnant z. S. Rieckhoff, was formerly with the merchant marine. He created a favorable impression upon the crew, but not upon his interrogators. Little of interest could be obtained on the personalities of the two former executive officers, Oberleutnant z. S. Udo Wolfgang Dähne of the 1939 December Term and Leutnant d. R. Sell. | ||
CREW | ||
With the exception of a few men, U-960's crew consisted of | ||
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inexperienced U-boat men when she sailed from Kiel on her first patrol. They were soon welded together, however, into a smoothly operating unit. This teamwork was broken up when eighteen men were detached at La Pallice after the fourth patrol. (O.N.I. Note: It will be remembered that this was necessitated by the bombing attack of 18 April 1944 in which many men were wounded.) Of the eighteen replacements only four had had any previous U-boat experience. The remaining fourteen were drawn from personnel reserves and boot camps without even having undergone preliminary U-boat instruction. | ||
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CHAPTER XI. OTHER U-BOATS |
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ANNEX. CREW LIST OF U-960 AND U.S. EQUIVALENTS | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
OF GERMAN NAVAL RANKS AND RATINGS. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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The names of the four remaining crew members could not be ascertained. Two were Maschinenobergefreiters (Fireman 2cl.), one was a Matrosengefreiter (Seaman 2cl.) and one was a Matrose (Apprentice Seamen). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MEN DETACHED FROM U-960 AT LA PALLICE APRIL 1944 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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The above were wounded in a bombing attack on U-960 on 18 April 1944. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(Ing.) denotes Engineering duties only. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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