Copy No. ____ of 50 |
||
Op-16-Z S E C R E T | ||
NAVY DEPARTMENT |
||
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS |
||
WASHINGTON |
||
Final Report - G/Serial 33 |
||
REPORT ON THE |
||
INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM U-801 |
||
SUNK 17 MARCH 1944 |
||
DISTRIBUTION: | ||
BAD | ||
BUORD | ||
BUSHIPS | ||
BUSHIPS (Code 515) | ||
BUSHIPS (Code 815) | ||
COMINCH (F-21) | ||
COMINCH (F-4253) | ||
COMINCH (F-45) | ||
COMINCH (FX-40) | ||
COMINCH (FX-43) | ||
COMNAVEU | ||
DNI (Ottawa) | ||
G-2 (Col. Jones) | ||
Op-16-1 via Op-16-1-F | ||
Op-16-1-V | ||
Op-16-FA-4 | ||
Op-16-P | ||
Op-16-W | ||
Op-16-G | ||
Op-16-C | ||
SONRD | ||
COMINCH (F-45) | ||
Lt. J. I. Eiband (CSDIC, AFHQ) | ||
Lt. S. R. Hatton (CSDIC, AFHQ) | ||
Lt. (jg) R. J. Mullen (4th Fleet) | ||
Lt. J. T. Rugh, Jr. (JICA ME) | ||
Lt. Cdr. V. R. Taylor | ||
C.O. Naval Unit, Tracy, Calif. | ||
20 May 1944 | ||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TABLE OF CONTENTS |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION |
||
U-801 was sunk by surface gunfire at 1325 on 17 March in position 16°42' N. - 30°20' W. following a depth charge attack by U.S.S. CORRY and BRONSTEIN of Escort Division 48. The previous day U-801 had been damaged by TBF and FM2 aircraft from U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND. U-801 was of the 750-ton type and was commanded by Kapitänleutnant Joachim Brans who did not survive. U-801 was 19 days out of Lorient on her 2nd patrol when sunk. Out of a complement of 57, 47 survivors were picked up by BRONSTEIN and CORRY and later transferred to BLOCK ISLAND in which they proceeded to Norfolk, arriving 4 April 1944. | ||
Following a brief interrogation of all survivors, 10 enlisted men were brought to an interrogation center for further examination. | ||
Items of special interest appear in Chapter IX on Torpedoes. These concern the improved batteries in T-3e, FAT-2 and T-5; tactical use of T-5; scuttling charges in T-5. | ||
- 1 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER II. DETAILS OF U-801 |
||
TONNAGE | ||
750 tons. | ||
TYPE | ||
IX C. | ||
BUILDING YARD | ||
Deschimag Seebeck, Bremerhaven. | ||
BUILDING YARD NO. | ||
SE-710. | ||
FLOTILLA | ||
2nd Flotilla, Lorient. | ||
F.P.N. | ||
M-51307. | ||
COVER NAME | ||
None. | ||
INSIGNIA | ||
(a) 2nd Flotilla badge: U-boat with bolt of lightning. | ||
(b) A viking ship on the caps of the crew. | ||
PROPULSION | ||
(a) Two MAN 9-cylinder diesels. No Schnorchel fitted. | ||
(b) Siemens motors and switchboard. | ||
- 2 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
SUPERCHARGERS | ||
Rootes type blowers. | ||
FUEL OIL CAPACITY | ||
240 tons carried on last patrol. | ||
TORPEDOES CARRIED | ||
(a) 14 on last patrol. | ||
(b) 16 on first patrol. (For types, details, and pistols see Chapter IX.) | ||
RADIO EQUIPMENT | ||
Transmitters: (a) 200 watt short wave. | ||
(b) 150 watt long wave. | ||
(c) 40 watt long wave. | ||
(d) VH/F removed before 1st patrol. | ||
Receivers: (a) "Main" short wave. | ||
(b) 5-Tube 6-band Telefunken. | ||
(c) Telefunken all wave. | ||
Radar: Gema type removed in Lorient after 1st patrol. The aerial was not removed as it was expected that a new type of set would be fitted on return to Lorient, possibly the Hohentwiel. | ||
G.S.R. (GERMAN SEARCH RECEIVER) | ||
U-801 carried Naxos, Borkum and Wanz G2. She was originally fitted with Metox R-600. This was replaced in Kiel by a Wanz G1. On first patrol Naxos and Borkum were carried in addition to Wanz G1. On arrival at Lorient the Wanz G1 was replaced | ||
- 3 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
by the G2. No "Fliege" aerial was carried. | ||
D/F GEAR (DIRECTION FINDER) | ||
German Army pattern with reception of frequencies from 21 Khz. - 2600 Khz. A new type (probably Zwochenfrequenzpeiler) was to have been fitted before the last patrol but was not available. | ||
R.D.B. (RADAR DECOY BALLOONS) | ||
Four boxes carried on first patrol; 4 on second patrol. | ||
R.D.S. (RADAR DECOY SPAR BUOY) | ||
About fifteen carried on last patrol and laid on passage through the Bay of Biscay. | ||
S.B.T. (SUBMARINE BUBBLE TARGET) | ||
Fitted. | ||
DIVING SPEEDS | ||
35 seconds for periscope depth. | ||
RUBBER DINGHIES | ||
Two large type. One in stern compartment. 60 one-man floats. | ||
ARMAMENT | ||
One automatic 37-mm. on lower platform. | ||
Two twin 20-mm. on upper platform. | ||
Four M.G.s on bridge. | ||
The original armament had been one 105-mm.; one 20-mm.; one | ||
- 4 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
old type 37-mm. On arrival at Gotenhafen the new superstructure was fitted with 2 twin 20-mm. on upper platform and quadruple 20-mm. on lower platform. The old type 37-mm. was removed. The armament remained the same until before the last patrol when the 105-mm. and quadruple 20-mm. were removed, the latter being replaced by an automatic 37-mm. | ||
BRIDGE ARMOR | ||
The bridge armor was 1 to 1-1/2 cm. thick. On arrival at Lorient oval shaped armor plating was fitted around the ready use ammunition containers. Platform II was broadened for the 37-mm. | ||
AIR RAID SHELTER | ||
Removed before the last patrol. | ||
AMMUNITION | ||
M.G. 81 - normal in type and quantity. | ||
20-mm. normal in type and quantity. | ||
37-mm. There was evidently a shortage of "Minenmunition" for 37-mm. at Lorient. U-801 sailed with only 800 rounds and was due to get some more at sea. Minenmunition was stated to be now of a different shape. The diameter of the flat nose being 22/25-mm. The whole projectile was stated to be shorter and blunter. Tracer range was stated to be 4000/5000 meters. | ||
New explosive: The new explosive being used in 37-mm. and probably in guns of all calibers was stated to be Hexamtrodiphenilamin. | ||
- 5 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
Resistance to pressure: Whereas the old type ammunition could only resist pressure up to 40 maters when unprotected, the new type was said to be unharmed up to 250 meters. | ||
CONTACT KEEPER BUOYS (FÜBOS) | ||
Five boxes were carried in bow compartment on both patrols. The procedure on launching was not known. | ||
- 6 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER III. CREW |
||
TOTAL COMPLEMENT | ||
U-801 had a total crew of 57 on her last patrol. This consisted of the captain, 2 line officers, one engineer officer, 17 petty officers and 36 enlisted men. The captain, the engineer officer, seven petty officers and one enlisted man did not survive the sinking. | ||
OFFICERS | ||
After the first patrol there was a change of officers. Leutnant d. R. Jaenicke the 1st Lieutenant, originally in the Mercantile Marine and later captain of a patrol vessel in Arctic waters, was promoted Oberleutnant and transferred. His position was taken by the junior officer. The doctor, Oberassistentarzt Dr. Jenssen (later P/W, ex U-515), was relieved by a pharmacist's mate. | ||
The captain, Kapitänleutnant Joachim Brans was of the 1935 German Naval Term. Before the war he transferred to the G.A.F. and returned to the Navy in 1941. He was immediately drafted to the U-boat arm. Little is known of Brans' previous activities in the Navy except that he served for one patrol in 1942 as captain under instruction in U-84 under Oberleutnant Uphoff. While in the G.A.F. he served in bombers, making several attacks on London. For his successes in this arm he was awarded the "Goldene Front Flug Spanne", by the Führer in person, and the "Hermann Gearing Pokal" from the Reichsmarschall himself. As a man Brans was generally | ||
- 7 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
liked on board. He was strict at times but of a friendly, happy mature. As a U-boat captain he came in for much criticism by the more experienced petty officers and men on account of his nervousness and lack of drive. Others stamped him as a weak character who was much too easily influenced by his engineer officer. In his politics Brans was extremely anti-Nazi and together with the engineer officer endeavored to discourage all interest in the party on board. | ||
The 1st Lieutenant, Leutnant Fritz Buschmann of the October 1940 German Naval Term, was described as quite an efficient officer. At the sinking of U-801, however, when his captain lay dying on the bridge, Buschmann had the doubtful honor of being the first overboard. As a midshhipman he made two patrols with Hardegen, and later on U-801's first patrol he served as junior officer. | ||
The junior officer on the last patrol was Leutnant Guenther Kempkes. He had served on the previous patrol as supernumerary. Inexperienced and conceited, he was not respected by any of the crew. Towards his captors he was arrogant and ungrateful. | ||
Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Franz Schumann made 3 - 4 patrols under Heinsohn. He was forever criticizing his captain's decisions and almost invariably overruled them to the extent that U-801 was jokingly said by her crew to have two captains. An efficient officer, he displayed great calm and courage at the sinking when he went down with his ship. | ||
- 8 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
PETTY OFFICERS | ||
Of the petty officers, Oberfunkmeister Ernst Freudig was outstanding in point of U-boat service and good fortune. Before the war he had served in U-9 under Mathes. In 1939 he joined U-53 under Kutschmann and was transferred before this U-boat left on her first and fatal patrol. Until January 1941 Freudig served under Prien in U-47. In February U-47 sailed on patrol and never returned. Late in 1941 Freudig stood by the construction of U-331 and made all patrols except the last. Early in 1943 he was drafted to U-801. Freudig never thought when, after leaving U-331, he was instructing at Flensburg that he would sail in U-boats again. He credited his last appointment afloat to the fact that the U-boat arm was so seriously lacking in experienced personnel. This prisoner stated that in recent months a large number of Telegraphist Chief Petty officers were being sent to U-boats for this reason. As a group the petty officers of U-801 were quite exceptionally experienced. | ||
ENLISTED MEN | ||
Not more than one man below the rating of petty officer had any experience in U-boats before being drafted to U-801. In spite of this fact most petty officers agreed that they were keen and painstaking and displayed great calmness at the sinking. | ||
- 9 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER IV. EARLY HISTORY OF U-801 |
||
U-801 was commissioned on 24 March 1943 and proceeded as usual to the 5th Flotilla, Kiel for her acceptance trials. The working up which followed was normal and contains no incidents worthy of mention. Brans shot well during the torpedo firing trials and at the Tactical Exercises and Agru Front U-801 was well up to standard. On 7 July following the Tactical Exercises U-801 put into Gotenhafen where space had been reserved in the Deutsche Werke for her final overhaul. It was here that delay set in. U-801 was the first U-boat ever to have a final overhaul in this yard so that the workmen, who were, to a large extant, Italians, had had little experience in this kind of work. It was 12 weeks before the U-boat was ready for sea again. In early October U-801 entered the Oderwerke at Stettin for a further 3 weeks in dock, before proceeding to Kiel to fit out. | ||
- 10 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER V. FIRST PATROL OF U-801 |
||
KIEL TO BERGEN | ||
U-801 left Kiel at about 0900 on 6 November 1943 in company with the 500 tonners U-Kolbus and U-Neubert. On the evening of 8 November they tied up at Kristiansand. The following morning the U-boats sailed for Stavanger which they reached in the late afternoon. After a night in this port U-801 and U-Kolbus left on the morning of 10 November for Bergen. U-Neubert proceeded direct to her area of operation. Deep diving tests were carried out just before entering Bergen, in the course of which it was noticed that there was a water entry in the control room through a slit in the flange around the lead from the radar aerial. This defect was remedied on arrival so that it was not until 13 November that U-801 was again ready to sail. | ||
PASSAGE TO AREA OF OPERATION | ||
On 12 November two new 750-ton U-boats reached Bergen from Germany, they were commanded by Kapitänleutnant Hellriegel and Oberleutnant Mattke. On 13 November U-801 put to sea in company with the newly arrived U-boats, having topped up with fuel so that she had 232 cubic meters in her tanks. After proceeding in company for a few days the U-boats parted. Hellriegel, according to statements went to the Newfoundland area, Mattke's destination was unknown and U-801 shaped course for the area assigned to her S.W. of Rockall. A very economical speed was maintained throughout the passage and it was not until the end of November that the U-boat reached her patrol | ||
- 11 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
area, having passed as usual through the Rosengarten. Here she remained until 5 December when a signal was received from Control announcing the approach of an eastbound convoy. | ||
One night shortly before leaving the area a G.S.R. contact was obtained. U-801 submerged and before long picked up screw noises of two ships on her hydrophones when at a depth of some 50 meters. Before long a vessel passed close to the U-boat but instead of trying to attack Brans decided to go down to 130 meters. For this he was much criticized. | ||
GROUP CORONEL | ||
According to prisoners the approaching convoy had been reported by German long range reconnaissance aircraft and estimates as to its size were as high as 90 ships. In order to intercept, U-boats were directed to form a patrol line designated as GROUP CORONEL. | ||
In a heavy sea U-801 proceeded at high speed in a southwesterly direction for about two days in order to take up her position in the line. GROUP CORONEL was said to consist of 26 boats and patrolled an area some 500 miles S.W. of Rockall. (O.N.I. Note: H.X. 268 consisting of 45 merchant vessels was in approximate position 55° N. - 30° W. early in December. It is known that a considerable concentration of U-boats were somewhere in that area at that time. The convoy suffered no casualties and altered course to the north of Rockall.) Among the 26 U-boats present the following were mentioned in addition to U-801. | ||
- 12 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
U-Otto (U-270), U-Popp (U-552), U-Neide (U-415), U-761 (Geider), U-Baberg (U-618), U-541 (Petersen), U-Herwartz (U-843), U-Simmermacher (U-105), U-Zürmuhlen, U-Bender, U-Bentler, U-Lawaetz, U-Kolbus, U-Neubert, U-Schroeter, U-Möller, U-Müller, U-Dobbert. | ||
Some time before the formation of GROUP CORONEL another concentration of U-boats known as GROUP WEDDIGEN had been operating some 600 miles to the S.E. This group was disbanded when it was decided to form GROUP CORONEL and several of the U-boats were transferred to the new group. Whereas considerable success, particularly against escort vessels, was claimed in GROUP WEDDIGEN by the U-boat captains Dobbert and Franke, the U-boats in GROUP CORONEL claimed no contact with the convoy or its escorts. When in GROUP CORONEL U-801 was once caught in the beam of an aircraft equipped with searchlight but no attack followed. (O.N.I. Note: On 28/29 November 1943 a very large concentration of U-boats endeavored to attack convoys M.K.S. 31 and S.L. 140 which together consisted of 72 merchant vessels, in approximate position 40° N. - 16° W. The convoys suffered no casualties.) | ||
GROUPS SCHILL I and II | ||
After the U-boats in GROUP CORONEL had been patrolling unsuccessfully for about two weeks, it was reported by Control that the convoy had probably headed south and the order was given to intercept. In the face of appalling weather most of the U-boats were instructed to proceed at high speed in a southerly direction. Towards the end of December, having formed up into another patrol line, several U-boats, according to prisoners, made contact with | ||
- 13 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
convoy escorts. Some U-boats claimed considerable successes. Otto (U-270) and Bock each claimed the sinking of a destroyer. Petersen in U-541 and Neide in U-415 claimed the sinking of two destroyers each, the former on Christmas Eve. Simmermacher in U-105 reported sighting an aircraft carrier but was unable to attack. (O.N.I. Note: The only record of any escort vessels being sunk in approximately this area and at this time were: | ||
(a) U.S.S. LEARY escorting convoy CU9 which was sunk by a U-boat at 0504Z on 24 December in 45° N. - 22° W. after two torpedo hits. | ||
(b) H.M.S. HURRICANE sunk at 2001Z on 24 December in 45°10' N. - 22°05' W. | ||
They are presumably the two ships claimed by Petersen.) | ||
GROUP SCHILL had not been long in existence when it was divided into parts I and II to patrol different areas. Details of the composition and position of the groups could not be obtained. | ||
U-801 had not been in GROUP SCHILL when just before midnight on New Year's Eve Schunamm, the engineer officer, reported to Brans that the Diesel exhaust caps were leaking and the U-boat unseaworthy. Brans reported this to Control which signaled its concurrence and U-801 shaped course for Lorient. She still had 130 tons of fuel oil to spare. | ||
ARRIVAL AT LORIENT | ||
On 8 January 1944 U-801 entered Lorient with 90 tons of fuel in her tanks. The following morning she was boarded by the | ||
- 14 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
dockyard authorities. After a brief inspection they indicated that she was quite seaworthy and should never have returned. Schumann then pointed out that the thrust block of the starboard shaft had been causing trouble and invited inspection. | ||
Several of the crew suspected that the defects were gross exaggerations on the part of Schumann and Brans and that they might even have been intentionally caused with the connivance of some of the engine-room personnel so that there would be some excuse for returning to port. The discoveries of the dockyard authorities were apparently inconclusive so that these suspicions could never be confirmed. | ||
REPAIRS AND ALTERATIONS | ||
After repairs, which were only of a minor mature, had been completed U-801 underwent several modifications in her equipment. The 105-mm. gun was removed, the quadruple 20-mm. on Platform II was replaced by the automatic 37-mm. and this platform widened in order to receive the larger gun. The air raid shelters on the bridge which had proved too costly in space with regard to their usefulness were removed and armor plating was fitted around the ready use ammunition containers. | ||
The Gema type Radar set was removed and the Wanz G1 type G.S.R. was replaced by the type G2. | ||
By the end of February, by which time half the crew had been on leave, U-801 was all set to sail on her next patrol. | ||
- 15 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER VI. SECOND AND LAST PATROL OF U-801 |
||
DEPARTURE FROM LORIENT | ||
U-801 left Lorient at 1730 on 26 February 1944. With the exception of a mine destructor vessel, which proceeded ahead, she was alone. Some time after passing the mole the two ships were joined by a small minesweeper which took up station astern of the U-boat. Apart from the later obvious fact that U-801 was to operate in the south, the crew, with the exception of the officers had no idea of the exact area intended. | ||
A petty officer, however, quoted the Quartermaster as saying that they would proceed first to the Ivory Coast. | ||
At 0100 on 27 February U-801 carried out a deep diving test and her escort turned back. For a number of hours the U-boat proceeded submerged, then surfaced in order to charge her batteries. | ||
R.D.S. ARE RELEASED | ||
At nightfall on 27 February U-801 surfaced and released an R.D.S. Two hours later, before submerging she released another. Before dawn the U-boat surfaced again and followed the same procedure with her R.D.S. On the next 3 nights U-801 either surfaced for a period of 4 hours in the middle of the night or for 2 hours after dark and again before dawn. On each occasion R.D.S. were released so that when the Bay area had been passed all 15 R.D.S. had been expended. A signal was then made to Control reporting that the U-boat had made a safe passage of the danger area. | ||
- 16 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
MADEIRA IS SIGHTED | ||
After steaming clear of the bay area the strict diving routine was increasingly relaxed. At first it was only at night that the hours on the surface were increased, but as U-801 proceeded on her southerly course she surfaced increasingly by day. Some 10 days out of Lorient the U-boat was on the surface one night when less than a mile away, on the port bow, a lighthouse was sighted and the coast of Madeira came into sight. After passing Madeira U-801 spent several hours of daylight and all nights on the surface. So far the patrol had been entirely uneventful. | ||
- 17 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
CHAPTER VIII. SINKING OF U-801 |
||
U-801 IS ATTACKED BY AIRCRAFT | ||
On 15 March the Junior Officer, Kempkes, persuaded Brans that the area was safe enough to start some gunnery practice. In spite of the fact that gunnery practice is at all times forbidden and in face of outspoken reluctance on the part of the crew Brans agreed and some practice firing was carried out. | ||
In the late afternoon on the following day, 16 March, U-801 was proceeding untroubled over glassy seas, having just completed some practice firing. Some 12 to 15 of the crew were topside changing watch. Suddenly an aircraft alarm was given and two planes were reported dead astern at a height of about 500 meters. There had been several practice alarms that afternoon so that the crew did not at first pay overmuch attention. The 37-mm. was partially dismantled for servicing and the gun crews did not have sufficient time to load and man the lighter weapons before a pursuit plane dived down on the U-boat out of the sun and started raking the superstructure and decks with cannon fire. Doubling back sharply after its first attack the aircraft poured a further hail of shell into the U-boat and then made off. (O.N.I. Note: At 1822 GCT a fully surface U-boat on course 250°, making from 8 to 12 knots was sighted simultaneously by a TBF1-C and an FM2 from U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND. At 1826 and again at 1827 a strafing attack was delivered by the FM.) | ||
U-801 had suffered considerable damage. | ||
- 18 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
Nine of the crew who were topside at the time of the attack were wounded and one was killed outright. The barrel of one 20-mm. was shot to pieces and the after part of Platform II in the vicinity of the ammunition containers was burning fiercely. This, apart from various penetrations of the superstructure, appeared at the time to be the sum total of the damage sustained. | ||
As soon as the casualties could be brought down the hatch U-801 submerged. At a depth of some 25-30 meters one loud and two lesser explosions were heard which appeared to the crew of the U-boat something like the detonation of hand grenades. No damage was caused internally and depth was increased to about 60 meters (O.N.I. Note: At 1827.2 the TBF dropped depth charges which over-shot the target. At 1828 the U-boat was seen to submerge. At 1832.5 the TBF attacked again with depth charges but observed no explosions). | ||
U-801 REPORTS DAMAGE TO CONTROL | ||
At about 2000 the same evening U-801 surfaced and immediately signaled Control that she had been attacked, suffering casualties and damage. | ||
A meeting with a supply U-boat (Burghagen or Studt) was arranged for 20 March and it was requested that this be put forward in order that the casualties might be handed over for medical attention. A further inspection of the damage on surfacing indicated that the detonations heard after submerging had been caused by the explosion of one or more ammunition containers as a result of the | ||
- 19 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
fire which broke out on Platform II. U-801 had not been long on the surface when a G.S.R. Naxos contact was obtained and the U-boat submerged again to about 60 meters. | ||
OIL TRACE NOTED | ||
Within 20 minutes U-801 was again on the surface where she remained for 2 hours charging batteries. It was now that a strong smell of fuel oil was noticed by those on deck which led to the discovery that U-801 was leaving an oil trace, apparently caused by damage to one of her fuel tanks in the recent aircraft attack. | ||
U-801 PREPARES TO ATTACK | ||
While on the surface torpedo tubes 2, 5 & 6 were prepared for the firing of T-5 torpedoes and shortly before submerging 2 or 3 R.D.B. were released. The torpedo tubes had not long been ready when Brans thought that he would have a chance to use them. Shadows were reported astern. | ||
Although Brans was proposing to remain at periscope depth, he was, as on other occasions, persuaded by Schumann to submerge and for the next half hour U-801 remained at a depth of from 60 to 100 meters. The U-boat had just reached the surface again when Brans, after one look through the periscope, leaped down the conning tower in a state of great excitement saying that the U-boat was illuminated by aircraft flares. | ||
HUNT BY SURFACE CRAFT BEGINS | ||
U-801 submerged once more to about 60 meters and did not | ||
- 20 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
surface again until the following day. At intervals throughout the night the crew of the U-boat heard buzzing noises quite close and, therefore, realized that they were now being hunted by surface craft. There was otherwise no indication of the presence of surface craft. | ||
U-801 IS ATTACKED BY DEPTH CHARGES | ||
At about 0500 on the following morning 17 March U-801 was proceeding at a depth of 70 meters. The buzzing sound had been audible for quite a while when a loud report, followed by 5 explosions, shook the U-boat. Water entered rapidly and before long the floor plates in the Diesel compartment were awash. An investigation showed that a hole, 15-20 cms. long and 2 mm. wide had been torn in the Diesel compartment pressure hull. U-801 dropped down to about 200 meters. At this depth screw noises were picked up on the hydrophones and the buzzing sound persisted. (O.N.I. Note: At 0427 T8 made a radar contact which turned out to be a periscope. The plane attacked with depth bombs but no evidence was obtained.) | ||
U-801 ATTACKED AGAIN AND FORCED TO SURFACE | ||
For some 7-8 miles U-801 proceeded submerged gradually sinking to a greater depth which at one point was estimated at 300 meters. | ||
After a number of hours she was once more attacked by depth charges. The first 4 attacks caused no further damage but | ||
- 21 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
following the 5th attack either the main or the auxiliary bilge pump and auxiliary switchboard 3 were put out of action. (O.N.I. Note: At 0755 on 17 March an aircraft sighted an oil slick which was trailed. At 1000 Sonobuoys gave definite submarine indications, and smoke floats were dropped along the slick in order to guide the approaching U.S.S. CORRY. Eight depth charge attacks followed.) | ||
As a result of the additional damage Brans decided to surface but found difficulty in keeping his U-boat in trim. She was always stern heavy. On reaching 80 meters, further depth charges were heard. Realizing that hunting craft in unknown numbers must be very close at hand Brans decided that the only possible way of escape lay in offensive action. Tubes 2 and 6 were readied for firing on reaching periscope depth but it was discovered that the attack periscope telemotor system had failed. Brans realized that they were in a hopeless situation. At about 1310, U-801 surfaced and the order to collect the wounded prior to abandoning ship was given. (O.N.I. Note: CORRY made her final attack at 1314. Four minutes later the submarine surfaced and was sunk by the combined gunfire of CORRY and BRONSTEIN.) | ||
U-801 ATTACKED ON THE SURFACE AND SUNK | ||
A scene of the most appalling disorganization and devastation ensued. Within the U-boat the order to abandon ship never reached the bow compartment where members of the crew only realized that the end had come when they say the telegraphists destroying | ||
- 22 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||
their secret equipment. | ||
Brans was first on the bridge and after him were hoisted the wounded. The quartermaster followed with the two line officers after him. | ||
The surface craft immediately opened a very accurate fire and as the first of the men reached the bridge they saw Brans hanging like a corpse over the night firing stand. The quartermaster, lying at his feet, was a ghastly headless figure. At least 2 other lay dead. The line officers Buschmann and Kempkes were the first overboard, regardless of the fact that the captain was dead and that there were wounded to evacuate. | ||
It was Schumann, the engineer and would-be captain who took control. On reaching the bridge he lit a cigarette and stood there quite unperturbed until the last man to reach the bridge had abandoned ship and the wounded had been successfully evacuated. He was last seen going down the hatch to join a control room petty officer in the scuttling duties. Some five minutes after surfacing U-801 sank stern first. No scuttling charges were fitted. | ||
- 23 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CHAPTER VIII. TORPEDOES |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
COMPLEMENT | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
All T-3 torpedoes, including T-3 FAT II, were known to the torpedomen as T-3e. He had never heard of T-3a torpedoes. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
No T-2 (straight-running, impact firing only) were carried on either patrol. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PISTOLS | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Nineteen pistols were carried (on the last patrol), 3 of which were (Pi-1) were kept in reserve. Pi-1 pistols were fitted to T-1 FAT Is; the 3 in reserve could be used, if necessary, with T-3 and T-3 FAT II. Pi-2s were fitted to T-3 and T-3 FAT II torpedoes. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
- 24 - |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||
The combination inertia and magnetic firing pistol used with T-5 was known as Kz4B, the meaning of which was not known by the prisoner. (O.N.I. Note: "Kz" may mean "Kombination Zündung" -- combination firing.) It was confirmed that the magnetic firing was always set on "Ein" (on) position and could not be switched to "aus" (off) position. The magnetic firing, however, in pistols used with non-acoustic torpedoes, could be switched off. | ||||||||
The Pi-4 pistol was said to be inertia-firing only, and that the difference between Pi-4B and Pi-4C lay in the firing pin. | ||||||||
Before loading a torpedo fitted with Pi-2 (impact-magnetic firing) into tube, the following procedure for testing was described: A cover, on warhead, about 15 cms. from pistol, is removed; in a small cut-out section are two holes, one of which (the smaller) is not used; the diameter of the larger one is about 2-3 cms. A box-like flashlight (4" x 2"), with a 2-3 volt bulb, is fitted with two wires, one of which is fitted into the larger hole and the other is placed against any part of the warhead (which first must be scraped). The lighting of the bulb indicates that the magnetic firing is in order; if the bulb does not light, the pistol must be re-set until the proper contact is made. | ||||||||
T-5 | ||||||||
|
||||||||
- 25 - |
||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
- 26 - |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||
- 27 - |
||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
- 28 - |
||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
- 29 - |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
FAT TOEPEDOES | ||||||||||||||||
(The prisoner is somewhat confused on the subject of FAT nomenclature. It is also possible that his confusion extends to the various courses described by FATs.) | ||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
- 30 - |
||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Prisoner is not certain whether or not the scuttling mechanism is connected with the 170 and 250 settings. | ||||||||||||||||||||
T-6, T-7, T-8 | ||||||||||||||||||||
The 3 types are said to be experimental, leading to T-9. | ||||||||||||||||||||
T-9 | ||||||||||||||||||||
This type is said to be an acoustic torpedo with acoustic depth-control, not yet in use. The depth-control on T-5 has proved to be too unreliable; a 4-meter depth-setting on T-5 often changed to 5 meters during run of torpedo, particularly when sea was at 4 or more. T-9, with acoustic depth-control, will seek correct pre-set | ||||||||||||||||||||
- 31 - |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||
depth near target, and can be fired more accurately when the sea is at 4 or more. | ||
LUT TORPEDO | ||
Prisoner heard his Commanding Officer say that U-801 was to have ut" torpedoes when U-801 left on its first patrol (November 1943) from Kiel; "Lut", however, was not then ready for operational use. U-boat carrying "Lut" are to be fitted with new torpedo data computer. | ||
- 32 - |
||
S E C R E T |
||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
CHAPTER IX. OTHER U-BOATS |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
- 33 - |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||
- 34 - |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||
- 35 - |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
- 36 - |
||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||
U-BOATS IDENTIFIED BY COMMANDERS |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
- 37 - |
||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
- 38 - |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
- 39 - |
||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||
- 40 - |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||
CHAPTER X. BASES |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
- 41 - |
||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ANNEX. CREW LIST OF U-801 AND U.S. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
EQUIVALENTS OF GERMAN NAVAL RANKS. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
* Denotes casualties. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
S E C R E T |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||