U-29 - 1st War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Wilhelmshaven	19 August 1939	Wilhelmshaven	26 September 1939	39

 

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Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
8 Sep 39	12.15	49°57'N, 15°34'W	REGENT TIGER	10,176	British
13 Sep 39	15.30	49°20'N, 14°40'W	NEPTUNIA	798	British
14 Sep 39	14.15	49°43'N, 12°49'W	BRITISH INFLUENCE	8,431	British
17 Sep 39	19.50	50°05'N, 14°20'W	HMS COURAGEOUS (50)	22,500	British
			Total = 41,905
Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

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			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
			=======================
			of the Unterseebootes "U 29" for the period
			from 19.8. - 26.9.1939.
			Kommandant:	Kapitänleutnant   S  c  h  u  h  a  r  t  .
				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 1 -
		1939
		19.08.39
		08.00		Put to sea from Wilhelmshaven.
				Headed for square L 2982 via Norderney in accordance with Flottille Orders.  From there northward at transit speed 10 knots on prescribed route.
				At the same time remaining unseen beginns.
				At the beginning of darkness the conning tower number on the signal buoy was painted over, bow number and national marking removed.
		20.08. - 28.08.39		During a test dive on the morning of 20 August the boat, which was too heavy, was balanced.
				There were no special events during the outbound transit of the boat to its waiting station.
				Therefore summarized:
				The weather conditions were favorable, only one day north of the Faroe Islands it freshened to Wind Strength 5, however abated again the next day.
				Visibility conditions were unfavorable.  In the North Sea to the latitude of the Shetlands it was mostly moderate.  Afterwards it was very good until reaching the level of the Hebrides, from where nearly continuous fog and low visibility down to 100 meters prevailed.
				Remaining unseen made long underwater cruises by day necessary until passing the Faroe Islands:
				20  August    13.05 - 21.45 hours
				21      "         05.13 - 12.15 hours
				12.45 - 21.26 hours
				22      "         05.30 - 07.00 hours
				08.15 - 15.00 hours
				16.05 - 19.25 hours
				19.52 - 20.50 hours
				23      "         08.45 - 16.20 hours
				18.20 - 19.41 hours.
				In the central and northern North Sea on the steamer route from Scandinavia to England and to the passage between Orkney and the Shetland Islands the boat was forced to proceed mainly submerged, from the level of Shetland Islands there were fishermen.  Attempted to avoid these on the surface but soon gave this up as hopeless because the fishing vessels were drawn far apart in the entire sea area between the Shetland Islands and Norway and continued to dominate up to the Faroe Islands.  They had to be outmaneuvered submerged with a lot of patience.
				On 22 August at 08.15 hours at the level of the Shetland Islands the boat was passed by a sea-based aircraft.

	Sun and Moon Data 19.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 20.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 21.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 22.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 23.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 24.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 25.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 26.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 27.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 28.08.39

	- 2 -
		continued
		20.08. - 28.08.39
				The aircraft was seen late because it flew from the east before the sun horizon.  It lay on a parallel course at a passing distance of 5000 meters.
				It is not known if the boat was seen.  Dived and remained submerged for several hours to not be seen a second time.
				It was probably an English aircraft (type "Fairy Sea Fox").
				On passing the steamer route through the North Channel into the Irish Sea it was striking how little steamer traffic was found.
				From 26 August proceeded at 8 knots to save fuel.
		28.08.39
		12.00		Stopped at about Lat.    = 54°N
				Long. = 17°W
		29.08.39	Waiting Station:	The area was chosen as waiting area because it lies in a dead sector between the steamer routes.  Additionally, due to the bad visibility and weather conditions, entry into the operations area, which was traversed by a number of steamer routes, does not seem appropriate now.
		to	between = 53°N
		02.09.39	= 17°W
			and        = 54°N
			= 17°W [typo 16°W]
				Weather conditions during the waiting period were unfavorable, the wind blew from the SE, Wind Strength between 3 and 5 with corresponding Sea State.
				The strong displacement was countered by occasional steaming.
				Also the visibility conditions were mostly only moderate.  Nothing was seen, except for one vessel that came insight at night.
		03.09.39	Waiting Station
		14.00	= 53°N, 16°W	Received orders to open hostilities against England.
			SSW 2, Sea 2, overcast, Vis. very good	Proceeded into the operations are, Intend to search the northern steamer route to Canada.
				Sighted a freight steamer bearing 270°, was distinguished as Danish by its typical silhouette (course 200°).

	Sun and Moon Data 28.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 29.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 30.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 31.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 01.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 02.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 03.08.39

	- 3 -
		04.09.39	In operations area B	Intention:  cut across the steamer routes given in the Monthly Chart of the Naval Observatory on southerly course, depending on traffic intensity, monitor them on the east-west courses.
			SW 2, sunny, Vis. very good, noon freshening to S to 3, later to 7, Vis. moderate, Sea 5
		08.30		Ahead a smoke cloud below the horizon.  Boat ran towards, course of the smoke trace about 100°.
		09.00		A second smoke trace ahead to port, it was a steamer on a northerly course.
				Because the first steamer seems more promising, the second steamer is small and by his course probably Scandinavian. Decide to go around his stern  and hold contact on the ship sighted first. In the course of this contact is lost as a result of steady visibility and weather deterioration.
		21.30		Due to the weather conditions the boat lies stopped for the night, in order to avoid unnecessary fuel consumption and since attack operations are no longer possible because of the Sea State.
		05.09.39	SSW 8-9, rain, Vis. 1 nm, Sea 7-8, Noon abating to 3, sunny, Vis. very good	Storm, attack operations not possible.
		08.00		Was forced to submerge before a steamer vaguely in sight about 1000 meters astern in order to remain unnoticed, remained submerged up to 12.30 hours for necessary torpedo and engine work.
				Continued transit into the operations area on southerly course and economical speed.  Although the boat is in the area of Canadian steamer routes and visibility is excellent, no steamer traffic observed.  First at 22.00 hours at long range a brightly illuminated steamer was seen on a northerly course, again it must have been Scandinavian
				Stopped by night to save fuel.
		06.09.39	SSW 2, shifting to SSE 2, long high Swell, cloudy, sunny, Vis. good	Continued transit on southerly course at economical speed.  Despite the excellent visibility nothing seen the entire day.  It gives the impression that any steamer traffic from England to Canada has been stopped or redirected.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 05.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 06.09.39

	- 4 -
		continued
		06.09.39		Intention advance to the southern limit of the operations area, to possibly meet traffic there for North American harbors.
		22.15		At darkness the boat is positioned at the southern limit of the operations area, came to westerly course.
		07.09.39
		07.45	S 1, flat Swell, sunny, Vis. very good	Came to course 315°.  Intention  to go back to the steamer routes on northwesterly course.
				The sea is completely empty again.
		15.40		On the east a smoke trace on westerly course.  Closed the steamer submerged, however to great disappointment was recognized as Danish.  Refrained from an examination because first of all he was neutral, and coming from the east quite empty.  On the signal "Wish you a happy journey" the steamer stopped immediately, however nothing else happened.
				In connection with the encounter with the steamer came countless questions, what to do if he were English?  It must be assumed that the naval warfare would be conducted in strict adherence to the provisions of the Prize Regulations.  How can we solve the difficulty of rescuing the crew of the steamer?  The hope of meeting a second steamer in this empty sea-area, which, moreover, would have to be a neutral one, appears slight; on the other hand it seems important to stop the steamer by any means from using its radio, and get help by itself, so as not to reveal the location of the boat unnecessarily, and to warn other steamers.
				How should the boat behave, if Sea State makes the launching of boats impossible and not even a prize crew can be sent to the steamer?
				It is my intention, if necessary, to bring along a stopped steamer until sighting a second one, and then let the crew abandon the ship.
		22.00		Radio Message orders from Naval Warfare Control to go into operations area "E".

	Sun and Moon Data 06.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 07.09.39

	- 5 -
		08.09.39	Operations area E
		08.00	SSW 1, long flat Swell, cloudy, sunny, Vis. very good	In new operations area.  Intention:  on southerly course search the North American steamer routes.
		10.20		Smoke cloud ahead.
				Second smoke cloud to starboard, decide to run to this one first.  Smoke cloud was recognized as a tanker, steering a zigzag course.
		11.00		Dived to close submerged.  The tanker steers general course 100°, speed 12 knots and steers a splendid zigzag course.  There is no scheme to determine both the time and choice of courses.  The zigzags vary between 20° and 90°.
				At target angle 90° by a last strong zigzag the steamer only closes to an abeam distance of 3000 meters.  It was the REGENT TIGER" of the shipping firm C.T. Bowring and CO. London of 14000 tons loading capacity on the way from U.S.A. to London.
		12.15		Surfaced with Cannon Alarm, and fired a warning shot; when no stopping was observed, 3 further shots were fired, all to the side due to the trailing position of U-29.  After the third shot the launch of a lifeboat was observed.  At the same time the radio room reported that the tanker sent "please assistance" on the 600-meter wavelength.
				The tanker stopped its engines now and still continued ahead with little rudder.  From behind the stern a second lifeboat is seen apparently the crew was abandoning the ship in panic.  It was observed that from all parts of the ship the crew plunged into the two boats in a panic.  After the boats were lowered, no one could be seen on board, only the radio operator was still calling.  Apparently the Captain was afraid the tanker would be destroyed by artillery.
				There was no use in flag signals due to the panicked behavior of the crew.
				The two lifeboats of the prize pull further to windward.  The tanker still makes way ahead because it was not brought to a stop, instead only the engines stopped.
				I was faced with the question of whether I should try to save the radio man, who called steadily on the international steamer wavelength and communicated with a Belgian

Sun and Moon Data 08.09.39

	- 6 -
		continued
		08.09.39
				ship, radio call sign "ONJB", or if the tanker should be sunk immediately, because bringing the lifeboats back to the steamer from the distance which has grown quite large in the meantime would require a lengthly maneuver.
				Likewise launching the dinghies, etc., would have taken a long time, and moreover, a smoke feather was approaching quickly.  Also because the proximity of warships must be expected I decide to knock off the valuable target immediately.
				From 700 meters one G7a torpedo with impact fusing was fired (no magnetic fusing because the zone had still not been set for the new operations area).  Although there was little swell the torpedo ran badly, for a moment it seemed it would be a circle runner.  Instead of hitting astern it hit forward below the bridge.  From the foreship about 100 meter high sheet of flame, followed by an enormous cloud of smoke.  The entire ship was immediately shrouded in flames and smoke.
				The radio room picked up the transmissions of the already mentioned steamers, which came to assist at 15 knots and would be here in an hour.  Because the weather was good I did not worry about the crew anymore, instead ran off to the northwest.
				On later consideration, there was a danger that the tanker would burn out and remain afloat as a wreck. Therefore intended, perhaps the next day, to go back to the sinking location, which was visile from afar due to powerful clouds, to sink any remains.  This was unnecessary.  10 hours later - 22.45 hours - from about 25 nm for 15 minutes one sheet of flame after another was observed with an estimated height of 150-200 meters rising at the location of the fire and it could be assumed that the rest of the tanker would be torn apart by the explosions.
		17.30		A large three-smokestack passenger steamer with undetermined course.  It turned out to be the EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA (ex TIRPITZ).  The ship drove such a good zigzag course so it took a long time to determine the general course (east).  We managed to get within about 4800 meters, there was nothing suspicious.
		about 21.00		American freighter "ASTRIASUA" (?) on an westerly course.  Ship was called with Morse lamp, stopped immediately and gave his name.  No examination, ship carries highly visible neutrality markings and has his flag illuminated.
				By night economical speed settings

Sun and Moon Data 08.09.39

	- 7 -
		continued
		08.09.39
				on southwesterly course.
		09.09.39
			W 1, Sea 2, Swell, cloudy, sunny, Vis. very good	In spite of the promising previous day no traffic was observed.
				Ahead a smoke feather, a zigzag course was recognized, therefore an Englishman.  Due to the fast shift hoped for a warship.
				Distinguished quite a large steamer - probably - Union Castle Line - it is still not recognized if it is a freight or passenger steamer.  The ship lies on an easterly course and drives the same unpredictable strongly zigzagging course as observed twice yesterday.  I only get to within 5000 meters.  Expecting another zigzag - at the moment he steered about 10° - I decided too late to surface and as a result U-29 was in a very aft position.  Fired a warning shot which lay to the side and too short.  For a moment it seemed as if the steamer had stopped, then he suddenly turns his stern to the boat and runs off at high speed on a northwest course.  Fire opened immediately with the boat's cannon is not effective due to the range and the swell.  The steamer makes the shooting more difficult by changing course slightly between the impacts.  As soon as the boat surfaced the radio room already reported that the steamer was on the international steamer wavelength  to an Irish radio station giving his position, and that he was hunted by a U-boat, he continually updated his position.  The hope that the steamer could not hold the high speed of advance - 15 knots - soon proved erroneous.  He showed even more speed than the boat, he must run between 16 and 17 knots, the range was steadily increasing.  The chase was given up with regard to the heavy demand on the engines and the only slight hope that due to an accidental reason we could still catch up.  In addition to this, the structure of the vessel was probably a passenger steamer, whose operation, after being applied, would have seemed to me less favorable to the appearance of the boat than to be subject to speed.  In addition to this, from the structure of the ship, which turned out to be a passenger steamer, letting go following capture in accordance with the existing orders for me would have appeared less favorable to the reputation of the boat than being defeated by the speed advantage.

	Sun and Moon Data 08.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 09.09.39

	- 8 -
		continued
		09.09.39
				The mistake I made made in surfacing very late had its origins primarily in indecision about whether it was at all sensible to stop the steamer, when there was every indication that is was a passenger steamer.
				On the other hand, there was the clever and prudent behavior of the Captain, which in his opinion, saved his ship.
				After a two-hour hunt U-29 settled slowly astern and moved off on a westerly course.
				Since contrary to the expectations the main North America route except for the "REGENT TIGER" brought only passenger steamers and neutrals, however still no English freighters, I decide to go to the south in the hope of meeting there a few ships coming from North America however steering more to the south or from Central America, that have left their steamer route in the north.
		10.09.39	W 1-2, overcast, Vis. very good	Nothing in particular.
				Nothing seen except for a passenger steamer in the morning twilight on an easterly course.
				Stopped at night to save fuel.
		11.09.39	W 1-2, sunny, Vis. very good	Nothing in particular.
				Ran back to the eastern half of the area on northeasterly course.
				The sea is completely empty.
				Stopped at night to save fuel.
		12.09.39	NE 1, later shifting NW 1, heavily cloudy, medium cloud height, sunny, Vis. very good, evening isolated fog banks, long flat Swell
		05.45		From the watch at very great range below the horizon as a reflection a short bright illumination was observed and reported to me as "searchlight illumination".
				Turned towards it, course 40°.  In the twilight an avoidance maneuver for a steamer on a northerly course was necessary.
		09.19		2 Strich (22.5°) to port 2 aircraft flying from the east.  Range very great.  Due to the good visibility conditions and the quite flat water we make a very noticeable wake, dived and remained submerged for about 30 minutes.  Thereafter because the enemy was suspected to be on a westerly course, came to course 0°.
		10.38		Ahead a circling aircraft. Due to the extraordinarily clear visibility conditions

	Sun and Moon Data 09.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 10.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 11.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 12.09.39

	- 9 -
		continued
		12.09.39
				range cannot be estimated.
				Boat ran at 2 x GF.
		11.09		Went to depth 30 meters, when the aircraft came towards U-29 and so must expect that we were seen.
		11.36		Surfaced.  Aircraft bearing 330°T, came to course 300° to hold on.  Aircraft circles at changing altitudes apparently over a specific location, it barely shifts.
				Despite the extraordinary good viability on the horizon no smoke feathers or mastheads whatsoever are to be seen, no conclusions can be drawn about the nature and strength of the enemy.  A convoy would have to be betrayed by smoke feathers or be very far away.  Perhaps it is an area surveillance on the basis of the effects from U-33 and U-29.  If a carrier or another warship?  Because there are no smoke feathers or mastheads to see, it must be very far away.
				From previous experiences the boat remains on the surface, even if at time the aircraft seems to hold onto it.
		12.25		Boat was approached by the aircraft which quickly grew larger. Apparently it was an aircraft of the Hawker Osprey type, is land or sea based could not be determined.  The Watch Officer preciously thought he recognized a land-based aircraft.
				Went to depth 30 meters.  In the flat, calm sea the diving location must still be visible for a long time.
		13.10		Surfaced.  Aircraft is no longer seen.  Proceeded at 2 x GF on course 290°, since with the visibility something is still expected.  The aircraft does not come in sight again.
		15.10		Hunt was broken off for the following reasons.
				1)  In which direction did the aircraft fly off?
				2)  How far were they from their base, what was their task?  Circling a specific location for about 2 hours leads to the suspicion that they were looking for something in particular, as if they flew as an escort.  In the later case the boat should have seen a smoke feather or masthead.
				3)  Every other warship travels faster than the U-boat, therefore chasing from behind with a uncertain direction without any clue appears hopeless.

Sun and Moon Data 12.09.39

	- 10 -
		continued
		12.09.39
				4)  The level of the fuel inventory.
				Course 0° to get back to the most promising North American steamer route as quickly as possible.
		20.00		A drifting lifeboat from the "REGENT TIGER" with still nearly full outfitting was found and plundered.
		21.15		Stopped on the southern North America steamer route.
		13.09.39	NW 2, Sea 2, Swell, overcast, Vis. very good	Norwegian steamer "GAUDAL" of the Norske America Line on S-course approached submerged. because it was coming from the north did not stop.
		1x.x0		A quickly shifting smoke feather in the west, runs a minimum of 13 knots.  When it appeared on the horizon the vessel was thought to be a see going tug.
		13.10		Dived.  I observed before shutting the conning tower hatch that the tug had turned towards U-29. It must have seen us, which suggests a good lookout.  It was taken as an armed vessel.
		13.35		Surfaced.  Tug disappeared.  Pursued.
		14.22		A bit further to the north a smoke feather.  Dive prematurely and came to attack course, it is the tug again, does not zigzag and flies no flag.  Why did he want to avoid the boat?
		15.30		Surfaced with Artillery Alarm.  Range = 2500, target angle 100°.  Tug does not stop at the warning shot, instead attempts to turn away.  However the cannon fire covers so well that after 10 shots the ship stops and is abandoned in a panic.  As in the case of the "REGENT TIGER", he immediately transmitted his location and the fact of the attack.
				Nothing comes of the intention to search the tug because smoke clouds were observed on the horizon which looked like oil and seemed to come closer quickly.  The smoke clouds turned out later to be a cloud formation.  Unfortunately I decide to hasten the sinking of the ship.
				It turned out to be the 900 ton high seas tug "NEPTUNIA" of the Oversees Towage and Salvage Company, Salmouth on the way from North America to England.
				As a test 1 Eto was shot with a 4 meter depth setting. (Magnetic fusing).

	Sun and Moon Data 12.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 13.09.39

	- 11 -
		continued
		13.09.39
				The shot was fired from 350 meters.  The torpedo steered poorly in the swell.  About 150 meters before the tug it first goes deep, a powerful detonation, explosive debris, a detonation cloud in which the tug completely disappeared and behind which he reappeared completely intact.  The cause of the failure is completely unexplained.  From 600 meters a second Eto was shot.  It steered well, nothing was seen of the ejection and bubble track.  In the boat suddenly an impact was heard and 200 meters before the bow the torpedo threw up an enormous water fountain!
				Regrettably witnessed by the tug's crew.
				The tug was sunk only by artillery.
				The failure of the Etos was reported to B.d.U.  The considerations led to the conclusion that after the run of the safety range the fuse of the combat pistol was set off by the electromagnetic force of the torpedo itself.
				I am grateful not to have encountered a convoy or warship the previous day, which unquestionably would have been fired at with a four-fan of Etos.
				The tug's crew was supplied with tobacco products, they rejected further assistance.  They are in two boats, one of these has a motor and the other in tow.  The boats immediately set course east without waiting for help from steamers.
				On questioning the Captain declares not to have seen us previously.  The reason for his turning away remains unclear because he indicated he does "not understand" and the linguistic difficulties to clarify this point were too great.  In my opinion it may have been another type of zigzag course.
				The mystery of the still-transmitting ship, although already abandoned by the crew, was now also clear.  The ship had an all mechanical transmitter, in which a call for help and position is easily inserted.  So the "sacrificial death" of the radioman with "REGENT TIGER" had a natural explanation.  However, this also eliminates the need for the signal "Do not use your radio transmitter", which is difficult to compose according to the International Signal Book.
				The attempt to capture signal traffic seems to be superfluous because the signals are not being observed, but the crew immediately leave their ship.
				The attempt to pick up signal traffic at all seems unnecessary because the signals are not being attended at all, instead the crew immediately abandons ship.
				It is evident from their friendly attitude that they are grateful not to be sunk without warning, which they

Sun and Moon Data 13.09.39

	- 12 -
		continued
		13.09.39		probably expected.  Otherwise, the crew makes a completely indifferent, unperturbed impression, with many thanks for our efforts, which are probably incomprehensible to them, they set course for home.
				Initially set off to the west then to the north.  Night back and forth in position.
		20.00		A 20000 ton passenger steamer passed on a westerly course.
		14.09.39	NW 2-3, Sea 2, overcast, afternoon clearing, wind calm, Vis. very good
		06.00		A 20000 ton passenger steamers passed on a westerly course.
		07.15		Boat turned to a southerly course ahead of a tanker without position lights.
				Because it is already quite light, a surface approach is impossible due to the possibility of the tanker being armed.  Moved off to the limit of visibility and maneuvered ahead.  From 08.30 hours the tanker steers a zigzag course: therefore an Englander.  Speed of the tanker 13 knots.  By luck the maneuver ahead was not interfered with by opposite sailers although hunt took place in the middle of the main steamer route to North America.
		12.00		The boat must be position on the general course line.
		12.10		Dove.  The tanker soon comes in sight again in the periscope and drives on the strongly changing zigzag course observed in other ships.
				Surfaced at range 2000 meters and target angle 100°.
				Tanker stops after the second shot.  Both shots lie exactly ahead of the bow.  The radio station immediately starts communicating with "Landsend", reports position and requests assistance.  Crew goes calmly and orderly into both lifeboats.  Sending the boarding party over to the tanker is omitted.  The dingy cannot be launched in the prevailing Sea State and crossing with the crowded boats of the tanker would have taken too long to complete, because the crew did not in any way encourage haste.  One had the impression that they wanted to gain time, while I was anxious to destroy the prey as soon as possible.
				It turned out to be the tanker "BRITISH INFLUENCE" of the British Tankers Co., London, with 11000 tons of heating oil from the U.S.A.
		14.15		The tanker was sunk with one G 7a torpedo.  Impact fusing, because the depth was underestimated.  The torpedo hit under the engine, the ship settled  in approximately 20 minutes, without the oil catching fire, It sank vertically over the stern post.
				The two lifeboats remain with

	Sun and Moon Data 13.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 14.09.39

	- 13 -
		continued
		14.09.39		sea anchors at the sinking location.  The crew was taken over by the Norwegian steamer "IDA BAKKE"  which rushed to assist.  U-29 also remained in the center of the steamer track lying there, whose emptiness was proved again this day because no other vessel was seen except for the tanker.
				Moved off to the SW.
		15.09.39	Wind calm, flat sea, long flat Swell, sunny, Vis, very good	No particular events.
				In the morning the boat was positioned on the southern, afternoon up to 20.00 hours on the northern America Route.  The entire day and night nothing was seen, although with the exceptional weather each smoke feather with a radius of 15 nm would have to have been seen.
				In a week the boat has seen no English freighters in this area.
		14.00	[VLF broadcast - a repetition of the original short wave transmission]	Incoming Radio Message from "U-31" on very low frequency concerning the sighting of a convoy in square [BF]1253, general course 240°, 10 knots.
			[position is a typo probably BE 3541]	As stated earlier, the above Radio Message was received direct from "U-31" on short wave at 11.00 hours, but was not decrypted due to the error of a radioman.  At 16.00 hours the boat was in waiting station square BE 8541 on the northerly North American steamer route.  At highest speed I can still meet the convoy in the twilight.
				I refrained for the following reasons:
				1)  The objective of the convoy is unclear.  240° leads to Central America, North America would be about 260°, on the other hand, it is conceivable that the convoy is destined for the South Atlantic.  In any case from him - probably after darkness - a general course change is expected, for which I hope to get a contact report before midnight.
				2)  An operation now, at the twilight point seems too risky to me, especially because before sighting the convoy the escort will force me to submerge before I received an indication of its location.
				3) Based on the current observation I believe that a night with completely calm water is still expected tonight, to search at higher speed settings and also attack without a rough knowledge of the disposition of the screen is unfavorable.

	Sun and Moon Data 14.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 15.09.39

	- 14 -
		continued
		15.09.39		The water glows and phosphorizes on the boat's hull so strongly that even a somewhat attentive enemy must see the boat just as early as we see the enemy in the very dark night The wake of the boat seemed as if it were being lit up electrically.
				4)  I have only 4 tons of fuel to use for the operations area, in my opinion I can only run for 9 hours at GF.
				I decide at the beginning of darkness to move off to the south at economical transit speed and head for a point from which I have the opportunity after receiving radio messages on the nightly very low frequency period to either go to the 07.00 hour point for general course 240° or to other meeting points on other courses, if the convoy has changed course to the north.
		20.30		Course 180°, 9 knots
		16.09.39	NW 2, Sea 1-2, overcast, afternoon breaking up, Vis. very good	Radio Message from U-26.  Convoy 19.00 hours square BF 1413, course 270°, 8 knots.
				By this I expect that during the night (21.00 to 07.00 hours) the convoy steered a straight course and ran at 10 knots, from 07.00 hours again 8 knots.  At GF (14 knots) with this observation at 11.00 hours I can be at his 12.00 hours position.
		05.00		Own position square BE 3766.  Course 345°, 14 knots.
		08.10		Ahead a passenger steamer (apparently English) on course 60°.  Avoidance maneuver costs about 1 1/2 hours.
		12.00		On the U-26 reported course line of the convoy.
		14.45		Ran to meet the convoy on course 90°, 7 knots.  Observations give rise to the hope that we can still meet him because I probably overestimated his speed.
		17.00		Stopped for fuel saving reasons.  In the absence of further contact keeper messages finding the enemy is

	Sun and Moon Data 15.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 16.09.39

	- 15 -
		continued
		16.09.39
				hardly to be expected, it is likely that he made a general course change in the morning.  I think it is just as likely that his objective is the South Atlantic as North America.  For one thing there is the B-Dienst report by which English ships for the South Atlantic have received instructions to wait on departure, for the other no British ships except for passenger steamers have been seen running to the west.  It seems likely that the North America-convoys run to the north around Ireland, in order to avoid a massing of convoys at the western entrance of the Channel.
				On the American steamer route, on which the boat is located since 11.00 hours, nothing is seen.

Sun and Moon Data 16.09.39

	- 16 -
		17.09.39	E 2, Sea 2-3, long flat Swell, clear, sunny, Vis. very good	On waiting station on the America steamer route.
		16.05		A steamer comes from the west.  Because he comes directly out of the sun, it was first distinguished late.  The boats seems to be on his general course line.  General course 70°, speed 13-14 knots.
		16.17		Dived.
				Steamer zigzags, therefore an Englander.  Freighter with accommodations for passengers.  What is he now?  Size about 10000 tons, Manchester Line?  Steamer did not zigzag for a long time, as a result the passing distance was quite large, about 5000 meters.  Only now I see he has a reddish flag set and am doubtful of the nationality, possibly American? - Suddenly I see an aircraft from astern at low altitude at the steamer therefore war material or a troop transport.  I decide on a torpedo shot. However the steamer zigzags away from me before the shot could be taken, the target angle is too broad.
				Intention:  Surface after he passes out of sight, hold contact and attack without warning at night,  at the same time preparatory Radio Message for the other boats positioned to the east.  Course 80°.  Due to the aircraft escort went to depth 20 meters.
		18.00		At depth 13 meters all around sweep:  Ahead to port an oddly shaped black smoke cloud. . . . . . . . no smoke cloud, an aircraft carrier.  "ARC ROYAL" was suspected.  Range over 10000 meters, course: SW.  As escort ahead of the carrier the masts of a destroyer are recognized, it was clear to me immediately that the aircraft observed at the steamer did not belong to it but to "ARC ROYAL".
				At low speed settings I run to meet him observing continually.  I estimate medium speed.  I cannot see the aircraft escort, also I look in vain for a remote escort by destroyer.  As close escort I determine:  1 destroyer each ahead, astern and on the flanks.  The boats position forward and aft are at a distance of about 1000 meters, I can form no picture of the flank escorts.
		18.45		The carrier zigzags on a westerly course, I come to course 0°.  I decide to shoot 3 Etos as a fan with a small spread angle, to possibly get 2 hits; practically therefore as a cross between a multiple shot and a fan, depth 6 meters.  Magnetic detonation off because there is no confidence after the experience with the "NEPTUNIA".  Two aircraft circle irregularly above the entire formation.
		19.00		At target angle 90° the shooting range is too great (about 7000 meters).  While passing suddenly it seems to me the speed is quite high (20 knots).  I keep the zigzagging carrier continually under observation in the periscope.  From the previous

Sun and Moon Data 17.09.39

	- 17 -
		continued
		17.09.39
				observation of the zigzagging of the Englander, to get him I need faith not to give up.
				The carrier is too far away when suddenly he zigzags a minimum of 70° to a southerly course (225°), medium speed.  Later he goes to course 180°.  Now it all develops very quickly.  Lead angle was calculated for target angle 90° and speed 15 knots, I estimate that the passing range at target angle 90° would be 3000 meters, however decide to shoot with greater range, I expect a running track of 4000-5000 meters for the Etos.  I have absolutely no indication of the range because of the enormous and uniform height of the carrier lacks any measure for this.  Additionally I am looking exactly into the sun, for the same reason also estimating the target angle is difficult.  The periscope was driven overspilt.  The boat lies athwart the seas. Due the listening danger only ran at KF and LF.  Attack depth 14 meters.  Attack course 240°.
		19.50	φ = 50° 05'	3 torpedoes shot at target angle 100° while turning hard to starboard.  Aim point about 20 meters before the bow, center, 20 meters behind the stern.  While shooting I see the port destroyer 500 meters ahead of the boat.
			γ = 14° 20'
				Came to course 0° with hard starboard, both motors ahead AK, quickly to depth 50 meters.
				The boat barely rose after firing the third torpedo and was firmly in the hands of the Chief Engineer.
		19.53		The impact of 2 torpedoes was heard clearly in the entire boat, stopped running time 2 minutes 15 seconds = 2100 meters, immediately after the second impact a very heavy detonation, followed by several small ones.  The sounds are so loud that I have the impression that the boat was somewhat damaged.
				Jubilation in the boat, although there is great suspense about how we will fare.
				The behavior of the carrier between 19.00 hours and 19.22 hours is unexplained to me, it is conceviable that in this period a change in the aircraft escort had taken place and therefore he slowed considerably.  Nothing like that was observed by me.
				In the mean time the boat has arrived at depth 60 meters, because at this depth nothing was noted in and on the boat, will go to 80 meters.  From penetrating water (shaft bushings etc.) the limitation in the use of the motors and the sparing use of the drain pumps because of the danger from listening, the boat is sometimes so heavy that it gets to depth 105 meters. It hold itself perfectly.
				From depth 100 meters a crackling is audible in the over deck

Sun and Moon Data 17.09.39

	- 18 -
		continued
		17.09.39		which was regarded as belonging to the prosecution, but was most likely caused by the pressure of depth 100 meters. During the entire pursuit steered at depth 80 meters, both motors KF, when necessary LF.
		19.59		Strong propeller sounds approach the boat quickly and overrun the boat, 4 depth charges fall, which lie exactly over the boat (at depth 60 meters) however detonate considerably higher.  Severe concussion in the boat, I am in the conning tower, which is trembling in all its parts.  Depth fluctuations of the boat do not take place.  A few minutes later once more 6 depth charges fall with the same phenomena, a third time the fall somewhat further away, so that the strong concussion of the first two times no longer occur.
			Relative	Up to about 22.00 hours continually around the boat a concert of depth charges and propeller sounds, at times nearby and then distant again.  Overall the distance increases.  At 22.00 hours the boat had moved about 4 nm from the shooting location, however first at 24.00 hours it can be reckoned with some certainty we have escaped the persecutors. Detailed observations follow:
		19.50	Bearing,     range,    depth
			---          2500 m.  14 m.	3 torpedoes fired.
		19.52	170°       2500 m.    --	Propeller sounds of the aircraft carrier.
		19.53	---               "         40 m.	Hit of the 1st torpedo on the hull.  Afterwards detonation far stronger then the first with several following detonations.
		19.59	155°-330°  600 m.   60 m.	Propeller sounds of the destroyer from starboard astern to ahead.
				Boat was overrun by two destroyers.
				4 strong depth charge detonations over the boat from astern to forward.  In the same throwing interval, weaker detonations are heard at the same time close to the hull.  Destroyers apparently proceed in line abreast.
		20.01	---    increasing      80 m.	Destroyers are further away.  Continuous detonation sounds in the vicinity and at great range.
		20.03	280°    decreasing   90-100 m.	Two destroyers come closer.  One drove over the boat between the conning tower and the bow.  6 strong detonations.  Apparently again line abreast by the destroyers.
		20.04-20.07	not       consistent    80-100 m.	In the boat, perceptible beats on the side of the hull, with the rhythm of a acoustic transmitter
			bearable
				In the listening receiver strong crackling like boiling water.
		20.08 0 20.10	---   not determined	Destroyers come closer.  Detonations in the

Sun and Moon Data 17.09.39

	- 19 -
		continued
		17.09.39	Relative
			Bearing,     range,    depth	vicinity of the boat and a few over the boat however apparently with shallower depth settings than the depth charges.
		20.28 - 20.41	not determined       80-100 m.	Destroyers have stopped and through depth charges in a larger radius.
		20.41 - 21.56	---    200-600 m.  80-100 m.	Apparently the destroyers for a search formation.  Numerous detonations.  It sounds as if 40-50 depth charges were thrown in a single location, however range was further from the boat.
		21.56 - 23.21	---             ---          80 m.	Propeller sounds shift astern.  Bearing then always between 291° and 75°T.
		23.21 - 23.40	250°        4000 m.      80 m.	Propeller sounds were stronger, shift astern.  Boat turns 10° to starboard.  Sounds shift to 140°T and were fainter.  Still only individual detonations.
		23.56	---            ---           60 m.	Propeller sounds were fainter and exact bearings can no longer be taken.
		01.35		Boat surfaced.
				To sum up, apparently the shooting location was noticed immediately by the destroyers.  However overrunning of the boat three times does not indicate the result of locating but of a search formation without listening information.  Sound impulses similar to our S-gear [active sonar] were not determined.  Impacts on the hull were unexplained, apparently omni-directional sound waves.  Own speed lasted for the duration of the persecution KF and once in a while LF with both motors.
				Own listening at great depth was very good and without noise interference.
				Observations by Ob.Fk.Gefr. Schröter with the G.H.G. were made with icy calm and an admirable integrity even during the most critical moments.
				For questions concerning the boat, first see the report of the Chief Engineer Laufs, who had a firm hold of the boat during all the hours submerged, and whose calmness and superiority quickly spread not only to the control room staff, but also to the entire crew.  The overall demeanor of the crew was good; even though everyone had an idea of what was to be expected from the reading of war book, the reality surpassed the imagination.  The crew was heavily shaken by the persecution, which lasted for several hours, and only recovered slowly the next day.

Sun and Moon Data 17.09.39

	- 20 -
		continued
		17.09.39
				In my opinion, the destroyer that I saw while shooting must have gotten on the right track from the two torpedo detonations on the port side of the carrier and recognized the shooting location from the ejection gush of the three torpedoes.  The first depth charges fell at this location.  Together with the destroyer screening astern, he took up the persecution, but apparently the boat was never properly detected except for the first water bomb series.  However a second of how the destroyer got on the track of the boat, may also be the fact that the torpedoes passing under the destroyer were seen by this. The red warheads must have been visible in the clear, bright Atlantic waters at a depth of at least 10 meters.
		18.09.39 01.00	E 2, Sea 2, clear, bright night by day sunny, Vis. good	Propeller sounds have been lost astern, for an hour nothing significant was heard.  Boat goes slowly to depth 23 meters.  Here a sharp bang which must originate from an expansion within the boat
		01.35		Conning tower hatch open.  Course 340°, 13 knots.
				Intend to move off from the shooting location until dawn, and then subject the boat to an examination.  This showed the boat seemed to remain perfectly intact; except for the attack periscope.  There were no traces of depth charges or pressure on the upper deck.  The attack periscope is flooded, it was only subjected to pressure at the neck.  After 24 hours drying it is found that all the mirrors are coated with grease and dirt, the periscope is useless.
				Now the question of the success of the attack of U-29 arises.  I cannot bring myself to go back in order to re-attack the ship, 1.  the offensive weapons ot the boat are exhausted, the attack periscope out of service, in the bow tubes there is still 1 G7a and 1 Eto, fuel is enough only for direct transit to the homeland.
			3 lines crossed out!	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
				XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
				XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX   2. The general belief is that the ship was destroyed.  The observed detonations were so heavy, that the ship either burst into flames or flew into the air.
		10.00		Began the homeward transit.
				About 12.00 hours I get the news from English radio broadcast

	Sun and Moon Data 17.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 18.09.39

	- 21 -
		continued
		18.09.39
				Confirming the success of U-29.  We have not destroyed "ARC ROYAL" but instead "COURAGEOUS"  However we ourselves should be destroyed.   Great joy in the boat.
				Transit speed for return transit 10 knots.
				At night in calm water a type of illumination of the water, that despite low speed setting must be seen for miles.  It seems as if the waterline of the boat was illuminated with small light bulbs.  You can see fish schooling in the same light in the vicinity of the boat.
		19.09.39	Wind calm, Sea nearly mirror flat, sunny, Vis. good-medium
		00.00		Radio report concerning beginning homeward transit and destruction of "COURAGEOUS".  In the Irish Sea no traffic was observed on the steamer routes leading from the west.
		11.00		Received the acknowledgment of the Oberbefehlshabers and the award of the Iron Cross to the crew.
		20.09.39	WSW 2, Sea 1, clear, sunny, Vis. good	I decide to abbreviate the route by passing between the Shetland sand Faroes, the lookouts are now so well trained that even if the passage is monitored with the prevailing good visibility conditions there is nothing to fear.
		13.00
				There are supposed to be planes and submarines.
				Nothing seen.
		21.09.39	WSW 2, Sea 3, W-Swell, strong temperature drop, morning fog, afternoon Vis moderate changing	Trusting in the good visibility the boat went very close to the Faroes to get as far away as possible from the base of the British air reconnaissance which was suspected on the Orkney.  In so doing in the morning fog the boat bumped into several fishing trawlers at work in the area, before which it dove.

	Sun and Moon Data 18.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 19.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 20.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 21.09.39

	- 22 -
		continued
		21.09.39		It was determined that they were Danish.
				Otherwise nothing was observed.
		22.09.39	NW 2-3, Sea 5, overcast, Vis. very good	Nothing in particular, nothing was noticed, even from the expected air reconnaissance
				In the afternoon meeting with U-34 which went north around the Faroe Islands.
			Broken cloud deck, up to around midnight very bright moon, then clear dark night	The boat passed the Shetlands-Norway corner in the eastern half.  On one hand, it was important to me proceed far way from the English air bases and, on the other hand, I hoped to remain undisturbed by fishermen in the deep water of the Norwegian channel.
				Nothing was observed.
		23.09.39	Noon freshening to NNW 7-8, sunny, cloudy, Vis. very good, Sea 7	Boat is located at the level of the southern tip of the Shetlands.  Nothing was seen the entire day.
				Nothing was noticed of surveillance.  The lack of aircraft may have something to do with the weather conditions.
				In the evening at the level of Norway a merchant ship comes in sight, the conduct of merchant warfare by the Prize  Regulations in the current weather conditions is not possible.
		24.09.39	NNW 7, clear, sunny, Vis. very good, Sea 6, afternoon abating to 3, Sea 4	During the crossing of the trading routes leading from Lindesnes from East to West, the Sea State is such that merchant warfare is not possible. Two steamers are observed on the east course.
				The Skagerrak area seems to be very productive.

	Sun and Moon Data 21.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 22.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 23.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 24.09.39

	- 23 -
		continued
		24.09.39		Several smoke feathers were observed on the horizon.  A hunt by U-29 is no longer in question due to the low fuel inventory.
				About 14.00 hours U-34 was observed stopping a steamer.
				Nothing was noticed of English surveillance of the Skagerrak by seas or air forces
		21.50		Entered the mine area.  Finding and correctly entering the barrier gap is not simple navigationally due to the strong current, in this case there was a continuous check of the ship's position by sun observations.
				The depth sounder was crucial with whose help the channel was reached safely.
				10 nm off the entrance we encountered fishermen, the boat lay at this time on course 135°, steered to the east side of the channel.
			Broken cloud deck, clear bright night, at times strongly moonlit	Nothing observed.
		25.09.39	Overcast, later broken cloud deck, bright clear night, strongly moonlit, NW 3, Sea 3	At dawn put the boat on the bottom in 47 meters water.  The listening gear remained manned the entire day.  No particular sounds were observed.
		19.00		Surfaced.
				No observations.
		26.09.39	NW 3, Sea 3, heavily cloudy, rain showers, otherwise Vis. good
		04.30		Exit of the mined area.
		07.00		The towers of Borkum come in sight over the horizon. It is found that the boat has been moved to the west about 6-8 nm in the past night, despite taking the current conditions into account.

	Sun and Moon Data 24.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 25.09.39

	- 24 -
		continued
		26.09.39
		10.15		"Fire in the Ship"; fire in the E-motor room!
				From a short circuit in the direction control switch the paint of the cover panels caught on fire.  The fire was extinguished under the guidance of the Chief Engineer.  As a result the starboard E-motor was out of service.  The malfunction could have been corrected with on-board equipment.
				At the same time I passed a Vorpostenboot (fishing trawler) at a distance of 6 nm, which however, did not observe the boat and did not demand a Recognition Signal.
		12.30		Reached the Jade.
		15.45		Arrived in the III Entrance.
		16.50		Made fast U-boat Base.
				A summary of the remote patrol was reported.
				a)  Boat:  There were no major malfunctions.  During the waiting period the main drain pump was out of service for 2 days due to burning out of a field winding.  The malfunction was corrected by on board means.
				The boat proved exquisite, as regards sea and depth control features.  Only fuel was an issue. Each use of a higher speed setting (attempt to get the convoy, hunting for the tanker "BRITISH INFLUENCE" etc.) cost painfully much fuel.  The boat came back with too little fuel, which caused serious concern in the last few days.  There was no experience of how far the fuel bunkers could be emptied, and it was found that there was a strong admixture of seawater in the case of a dive at a residual level of 4-5 tons.  This point will have to be taken into account in an unfavorable season with lots of bad weather and speed loss due to Sea State.
				b)  Crew:  Health was good. serious illnesses did not occur, the food was unsatisfactory in the long run.  Outfitting provided was sufficient in quantity but did not fulfill taste in the long run. The boat has gained valuable experience on its first long-distance patrol under light conditions.

Sun and Moon Data 26.09.39

	- 25 -
			[men - here meaning enlisted sailors below the rate of Chief Petty Officer and Petty Officer]	In addition, the 39-day remote patrol made very great demands on the crew. The main burden in my opinion was borne by the men, which in addition to constant waking in 2 shifts, still fell lot of secondary tasks (own and mess service, cleaning ship, necessary work on the boat, etc.)  For the next trip we will try to take along supernumerary personnel according to available space, which will also facilitate the development of U-candidates, etc.  Arguably there are even more demands on the seamen than the technical personnel. While the Watch Officer's and seamen petty officers are in 3 watch rotations, there are only 2 for the men.  The lookout was constantly stood by two men; this means, that with 5 seamen personnel as 6th man one must have a technician who on the other hand can not be dispensed with during the ongoing work on the torpedoes.  A minimum of one seaman and one technician supernumerary is required for urgency, in order to keep the watch free of secondary tasks as far as possible.
				c)  Military:
				1.  Operations area:  No success was achieved in operations area B; the area proved to be favorable after the first notion of everyday steamers had been overcome.  The stay was favored by the calm, beautiful weather, and the excellent visibility.
				Due to the distance from land enemy reaction was not observed with the exception of the aircraft from the aircraft carrier.
				2.  Torpedo weapons:
				We were disappointed in the torpedoes. The premature detonation of 2 E-torpedoes shook our confidence strongly for a time. Independent of the instructions of T.V.A. to shoot with false zones was already realized independently on the boat and set to lowest zones.
				One torpedo with zone 9, two with 5 and safety range 200 meters were fired at the "COURAGEOUS".  This, however, eliminated the possibility of shooting with magnetic fusing, and thus perhaps a decisive success against an enemy warship.

	- 26 -
				It was not possible to test up to how much Sea State or Swell was possible for use of the torpedoes in the Atlantic. There are doubts, whether the torpedo at a shallow depth setting (destroyer) will steer without breaking the surface and be deflected in direction.  According to observations made and considerations, Sea State 4 is seen as the upper limit for the surface shots and 5 for unseen submerged shots.
				It is impossible to change the zone setting in a timely manor.  It is only rarely possible on the surface, and submerged the boat loses time and considerably affects its field of vision during the work hours.
				3.)  Merchant warfare and Prize Regulations:
				All considerations of how to treat English steamers in order to comply with the provisions of the Prize Regulations seemed superfluous with the first steamer the "REGENT TIGER".  The 3 shots with the cannon worked wonders and any lengthy flag signaling became superfluous. The attempt to ban the use of the Radio Transmitter is unnecessary due to the apparent equipping of all Englishmen with automatic transmitters
				The same proceeding, by which the ship was sunk most quickly, was also applied in the other two cases with equal success.
				If the English were already so accustomed to U-boat warfare in the first two weeks of the war (still on their way home to England), (zigzag courses, working the Radio Transmitter, attitude of the crew), it is to be expected that voyages from England - equipped there - will provide the strongest resistance.  It is even more certain our hitherto humanitarian way of war will lead to defensive tactics.
				In no case were neutrals examined, because no success was to be expected.  Most neutrals that were encountered lay on N-S courses, and were Scandinavian; the rest came from the east; neutrals with westerly course, which promised the most success were not met except for passenger steamers.  It seems fitting that these ships

	- 27 -
				may have been Dutch.
				In the second part of the patrol, when the expanded banned good list was published, no further neutrals were encountered or in the Skagerrak I could no longer stop.
				No steamers were stopped at night. Those sighted displayed neutral markings.  It was intended to attack dimmed vessels without warning.

 

	Enclosures to U-29's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the document
Chart	Track chart covering entire war patrol
Sketches	Combat sketches

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