Copy No. _46_ of 46. |
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S E C R E T |
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Op-16-Z |
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NAVY DEPARTMENT |
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS |
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WASHINGTON |
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FINAL REPORT - G/Serial 34 |
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REPORT ON THE |
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INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM U-177 |
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SUNK 6 FEBRUARY 1944 |
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DISTRIBUTION: |
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BAD |
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BUORD |
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BUSHIPS |
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BUSHIPS (Code 515) |
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BUSHIPS (Code 815) |
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COMINCH (F-21) |
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COMINCH (F-4253) |
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COMINCH (F-45) |
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COMINCH (FX-40) |
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COMINCH (FX-43) |
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COMNAVEU |
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ONI (Ottawa) |
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G-2 (Col. Jones) |
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Op-16-1 via Op-16-1-F | ||
Op-16-1-V | ||
Op-16-FA-4 | ||
Op-16-P | ||
Op-16-W | ||
Op-20-G | ||
Op-23-C | ||
SONRD | ||
C.O., Naval Unit, Tracy Calif. | ||
Lt. J. I. Eiband (CONMAVNAW, CSDIC, AFHQ) | ||
Lt. S. R. Hatton (COMNAVNAW, CSDIC, AFHQ) | ||
Lt. (jg) R. J. Mullen (4th Fleet) | ||
Lt. J. T. Rugh, Jr. (JICA/ME) | ||
Lt. Comdr. V. R. Taylor | ||
Com 4th Fleet | ||
22 May 1944 S E C R E T | ||
S E C R E T |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS |
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S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T |
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ILLUSTRATIONS |
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S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION |
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The successful career of U-177, a 1200-ton U-boat ended abruptly in position 10035' S. - 23012" W. at 1029Z on 6 February 1944, 45 seconds after the explosion of depth-charges dropped with devastating accuracy by an Ascension-based P.B.4Y of VB-107. The history of this U-boat is essentially that of the brilliant exploits of Korvettenkapitän Robert Gysae, of the 1931 Term, under whose command U-177 made two long patrols to the Indian Ocean, in the course of which Gysae was credited with the sinking of fifteen Allied ships, totaling 104,000 tons. When sunk, U-177 was on her third patrol, under the command of Korvettenkapitän Heinz Buchholz, of the 1929 Term, who relieved Gysae in Bordeaux on 10 October 1943. She had been at sea 35 days, and was again enroute to the Indian Ocean, where this time she was to carry out her patrol and then proceed to Penang for anticipated Far Eastern operations. |
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Of the complement of 65 carried on U-177's final patrol, only the second and third watch officers, two petty officers and ten men survived. The great majority were trapped in the rapidly sinking U-boat; approximately twenty men escaped the boat, but six of these, including Buchholz, were killed on deck and in the water by subsequent strafing and bombing. The 14 survivors reached an auxiliary life raft dropped by the attacking aircraft, and were rescued after 56 hours by U.S.S. OMAHA, which landed them in Recife, Brazil. A preliminary interrogation was conducted in Brazil, and 13 survivors were transferred to an interrogation center in the United States. |
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- 1 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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Buchholz, acting on explicit orders from Commander-in-Chief U-boats, had instructed his crew relative to deportment in the event of capture, with particular recommendations as to the manner in which enemy interrogators could be foiled by false and misleading statements. While, in consequence, the progress of interrogation was impeded somewhat at the outset, prisoners' security under questioning relaxed swiftly, with salutary results. No torpedo specialists were among the survivors. |
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Of particular interest is the extensive use made by U-177 on her second patrol of the helicopter carried aboard. Chapter V of this report offers a detailed, illustrated account of the construction, operation and maintenance of the helicopter, and of the training of naval personnel in its use. |
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Other special features of this report are the detailed, illustrated analysis, contained in Chapter IV, of the new type automatic 37-mm. gun recently mounted on German U-boats, and an account of German U-boat operations in the Indian Ocean (Chapters VIII and IX). |
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U.S. Navy equivalents of German ranks will be found in the Annex. |
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- 2 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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CHAPTER II. DETAILS OF U-177 |
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DISPLACEMENT |
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1200 tons. |
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TYPE |
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IX D-2. |
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BUILDING YARD |
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Deschimag, Bremen. |
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FLOTILLA |
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12th Flotilla at Bordeaux. |
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FIELD POST NUMBER |
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M-16669. |
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CALL LETTERS |
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UHJ. |
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PATRON |
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Hienrich Himler. | ||
INSIGNIA | ||
No insignia on Conning Tower. The informal insignia of U-177, worn as a cap emblem by some of her crew, was a crutch superimposed on a "U". This insignia commemorated the leg injuries suffered by Kapitänleutnant Gysae in an air raid at Bremen while U-177 was being overhauled preparatory to her first patrol | ||
- 3 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate I. Complementation and Tank Plan of 1200-ton, type IX D-2 U-boat
S E C R E T
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(See Chapter VIII). One of Gysae's crutches was carried on the bridge as a talisman, and U-177 was known to her crew as "U-KRÜCKE" (U-Crutch). |
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CAMOFLAGE |
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None. Dark gray paint over-all. |
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DIMENSIONS |
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Length over-all - 87 meters. |
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Beam - 6 meters. |
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Draft, fully loaded - 5.20 meters. |
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Draft, unloaded - 4.50 meters. |
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Pressure Hull (Diameter) - 5.60 meters. |
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Pressure Hull plating, thickness of: 25 mm. |
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COMPARTMENTATION |
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(See Plate I). |
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PRESSURE PROOF BULKHEADS |
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Four, as follows: (See Plate I). |
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1. Between forward torpedo room and petty officers' quarters |
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2. Between officers' quarters and Control Room. |
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3. Between Control Room and Diesel Engine Room. | ||
4. Between Electric Motor Room and after Torpedo Room. | ||
HATCHES Five as follows: (See Plate I). | ||
1. Forward Torpedo Room. | ||
2. Galley. | ||
- 4 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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3. Control Room. |
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4. Diesel Engine Room. |
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5. After Torpedo Room. |
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PERISCOPES |
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(a) On first and second patrols, normal equipment (one observation periscope, power turned, with fixed eyepiece; one hand-operated attack periscope). |
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(b) On final patrol, two hand-operated attack periscopes with elongation of 2 meters, permitting periscope depth procedure at 17 meters. The power turned observation periscope was removed and the two new periscopes were fitted in U-177 at Bordeaux in November or December 1943. |
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TANKS |
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DIVING |
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Depth Gauges |
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(a) "Papenberg" gauge in Control Room, graduated to 25 meters - for operation at periscope depth. |
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(b) Two pressure-spring type gauges graduated to 200 meters. |
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Tested Depth |
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90 meters. |
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-5 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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Periscope Depth |
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On first and second patrols - 15 meters. |
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On final patrol - 17 meters. |
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Crash-Diving Time |
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38 seconds to periscope depth at flank speed. |
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Maximum Depth Attained |
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140 meters (in deep dive tests). |
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BRIDGE ARMOR |
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16-mm. armor plate fitted around bridge fairing. |
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2 extra armor plates were riveted to the sides of the Conning Tower for delivery in Penang. |
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AIR RAID SHELTER ON BRIDGE |
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Not fitted. |
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GUN PLATFORMS |
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Two. (See Plate III.) |
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ARMAMENT |
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Guns and Ammunition | ||
For detailed information on this subject see Chapter IV. | ||
Torpedo Tubes | ||
Four bow, two stern. | ||
Torpedoes Carried | ||
(1) On first patrol - 24. | ||
(2) On second patrol - 24. | ||
- 6 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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(3) On last patrol - 26 or 27 (including four T-5a) Distribution of the 24 torpedoes on U-177's second patrol was given as follows: |
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Bow tubes - 4. |
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Below plates, forward - 4. |
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On plates, forward - 2 (1 port, 1 starboard). |
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Stern tubes - 2. |
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On plates, aft - 2 (1 port, 1 starboard). |
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Upper deck containers - 10. |
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(Corresponding distribution of torpedoes is believed to have obtained on the first patrol.) |
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The 10 torpedoes in the upper deck containers were air-driven; the 14 in the boat were electrics. |
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No F.A.T.'s of T-5's were carried on the first two patrols. |
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Distribution of the 26 or 27 torpedoes carried on the last patrol was similar to that on the second patrol, except that 12 torpedoes were carried in the upper deck containers, and three torpedoes were on the floor plates aft. 16 or 17 torpedoes were T-1's and T-3. Six or seven were F.A.T.-1's and F.A.T.-2's. The distribution of the four T-5's carried was variously said to be: |
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(a) One in a stern tube. |
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One in a forward tube (Tube No. 1 or No. 3). |
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- 7 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate II. Diesel and Electric Motor Rooms of 1200-ton, type IC D-2 U-boat
Click this text to view Plate III. Superstructure of U-177 - Elevation and Plan
S E C R E T
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Two on floor plates aft (1 port, 1 starboard). |
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(b) Two in stern tubes. |
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None in forward tubes. |
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Two on floor plates aft. |
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(c) Two in forward tubes. |
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Two in after tubes. |
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None stowed. |
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Pi-4 pistol was used with the T-5 torpedo. |
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MINES |
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Never carried aboard U-177. |
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HELICOPTER |
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(For detailed information on this subject see Chapter V.) |
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SCUTTLING CHARGES |
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Carried but never installed. |
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WELDING EQUIPMENT |
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Underwater welding equipment carried. |
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DEPTH CHARGE PLOTTER | ||
Not fitted. | ||
S.B.T. (SUBMARINE BUBBLE TARGET) | ||
Fitted in after head (See Plate II.) | ||
Two boxes of charges carried. | ||
PROPULSION | ||
(For details see Chapter III and Plate II.) | ||
- 8 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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Main Diesels |
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2 M.A.N. 9 cylinder, 220 H.P. each with supercharging; 1500 H.P. without supercharging. |
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Estimated speeds and R.P.M. (on both Diesels): |
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Auxiliary Diesels |
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Two M.W.M. (Motoren Werke Mannheim) 6 cylinder, 500 H.P. |
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Super Changers |
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Büchi type fitted for main Diesels. |
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Fuel Oil Capacity |
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510 tons on final patrol. |
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Electric Motors/Generators |
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Two Siemens - Schuckert, 600 H.P. each. |
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Auxiliary Generators |
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Two Siemens - Schuckert. |
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Switchboards |
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Siemens - Schuckert. |
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BATTERIES | ||||||||||||||||||||
Hafag, two banks of 52 cells each. | ||||||||||||||||||||
- 9 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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COMPRESSORS |
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Two Junkers compressors and 1 electric compressor. |
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COMPRESSED AIR SUPPLY |
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Eight groups of 3 bottles each. |
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PUMPS |
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(a) Main bilge pump. |
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(b) Auxiliary bilge and trim pump (Control Room), |
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(c) Auxiliary bilge pump (forward Torpedo Room). |
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(d) Auxiliary bilge pump (after Torpedo Room). |
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(e) Auxiliary engine cooling water pump. |
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FRESH WATER STILLS |
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Two - capacity of 32 liters each per day. |
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GERMAN ASDIC |
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Not fitted. |
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RADAR | ||
Not fitted. Prior to her final patrol, U-177 was equipped with the housing for radar antenna in conjunction with the extensive alterations made in her bridge structure. | ||
RADAR DECOY BALLOONS | ||
two boxes carried on final patrol. None was used operationally, but one balloon was released experimentally | ||
- 10 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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off La Pallice shortly after departure. |
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G.S.R. (GERMAN SEARCH RECEIVER) |
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Wanz G-2, 2 "Naxos" sets with 2 aerials, and a "Borkum" set were fitted for the last patrol. (For details of these sets see G/Serial 30, U-231, pages 8, 13.) On her first and second patrols, U-177 carried a metox R600 receiver with cross-type aerial. |
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The fixed dipole aerial was mounted on the periscope support in the center of the bridge rather than in the usual position on the bridge fairing. |
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D/F GEAR (DIRECTION FINDER) |
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Standard Lorenz M/F D/F set. |
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COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT |
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Transmitters |
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(1) Telefunken 200 watt H/F Transmitter, 20 to 80 meter wavelengths. |
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(3) Telefunken 150 watt L/F Transmitter, 250-1500 meter wavelengths. |
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(4) Lorenz 40 watt emergency transmitter. |
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Receivers |
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(1) "Main" short wave receiver (Telefunken). |
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- 11 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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(2) Telefunken all-wave receiver. |
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(3) "Elak" 10/12 broadcast receiver. |
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U.T. (Underwater Telegraph) |
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Fitted. |
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U.K. Gear (Ultra Short Wave) |
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Fitted. Lorenz manufacture. (See Chapter III.) |
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Broadcast Amplifier (40 watt) |
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Fitted. |
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ROTARY CONVERTERS |
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One 6 KVA for main transmitter and general radio purposes. |
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One 1 KVA for hydrophones and U.T. |
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One 0.3 KVA for echo-sounder and gyros. |
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The 0.3 and 1 KVA converters could be used interchangeably. |
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HTDROPHONES |
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(a) "Atlas" G.H.G. multi-unit hydrophones fitted. |
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(b) K.D.B. removed after second patrol. |
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ECHO SOUNDER |
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"Elaklot" fitted. |
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GYROS | ||
Anschütz. Master in Control Room and 7 repeaters located as follows: | ||
(1) Bridge. | ||
(2) Conning Tower. | ||
(3) Control Room. | ||
- 12 - S E C R E T |
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(4) Diesel Engine Room. |
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(5) Electric Motor Room. |
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(6) Radio Room. |
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(7) Sound Room. |
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A repeater connection was also fitted in the after Torpedo Room. |
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AIR PURIFICATION |
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(a) "Klima-anlage" air conditioning system, capable of reducing humidity by 1.5 per cent per hour. Non-cooling. |
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(b) "Kalipatronen" potash cartridges carried. |
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LIFE-SAVING AND ESCAPE GEAR |
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One inflatable rubber dinghy carried. Standard life jackets and escape lungs carried. |
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- 13 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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CHAPTER III. TECHNICAL DETAILS AND PROCEDURES |
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TANK CAPACITIES (IN LITERS) OF TYPE IX D-2 U-BOATS |
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Fuel Oil Tank 1a - Port: 22,000 liters; starboard: 22,000 liters. |
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Fuel Oil Tank 2a - Port: 24,000 liters; starboard: 24,000 liters. |
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Main Ballast and Reserve Fuel Oil Tank #2 - Port: 28,000 liters; starboard: 28,000 liters. |
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Main Ballast and Reserve Fuel Oil Tank #3 - Port: 28,000 liters; starboard: 28,000 liters. |
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Main Ballast and Reserve Fuel Oil Tank #4 - Port: 31,000 liters; starboard: 31,000 liters. |
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Regulating and Reserve Fuel Oil Tank - Port: 18,000 liters; starboard: 18,000 liters. |
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Main Ballast and Reserve Fuel Oil Tank #6 - Port: 27,000 liters; starboard: 27,000 liters. |
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Main Ballast and Reserve Fuel Oil Tank #7 - Port: 24,000 liters; starboard: 24,000 liters. |
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Fuel Oil Tank 3a - Port: 22,000 liters; starboard: 22,000 liters. |
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Fuel Oil Tank 4a - Port: 24,000 liters; starboard: 24,000 liters. |
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Lubricating Oil Supply Tank # 1: 5600 liters. | ||
Lubricating Oil Supply Tank # 2: 4500 liters. | ||
Lubricating Oil Supply Tank # 3: 4500 liters. | ||
Lubricating Oil Supply Tank # 4: 3600 liters. | ||
Lubricating Oil Supply Tank # 5: 3600 liters. | ||
Dirty Lubricating Oil Tank: 1000 liters. | ||
Main Lubricating Oil Collecting Tank - Port: 900 liters; starboard: 900 liters. | ||
- 14 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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Auxiliary-Motor Oil Collecting Tank - Port: 800 liters; starboard: 800 liters. |
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Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Gravity Tank: 1800 liters. |
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Junkers Compressor Fuel Oil Gravity Tank: 50 liters. |
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Lubricating Oil Tanks for Superchargers: Port: 60 liters; starboard: 60 liters. |
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Container for Lubricating Oil for Days Use-Lubricating Engines: 30 liters. |
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Torpedo Compensating Tank #1: 2500 liters. |
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Torpedo Compensating Tank #2: 2500 liters. |
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Torpedo Compensating Tank #3: 5000 liters. |
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Torpedo Compensating Tank #4: 5000 liters. |
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After Trimming Tank: 4500 liters. |
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Forward Trimming Tank: 4500 liters. |
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Fresh Water Tanks #1: 900 liters; #2: 1000 liters. |
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Fresh Water Tanks #3: 900 liters; #4: 900 liters. |
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Water Distillate Container #1: 250 liters. | ||
Water Distillate Container #2: 250 liters. | ||
Water Distillate Container #3: 250 liters. | ||
Emergency Water Distillate Container: 100 liters. | ||
Waste Water Tank: 1500 liters. | ||
AUXILIARY DIESELS | ||
(See Plate II) | ||
U-177 was equipped with 2 M.A.N. 9-cylinder main Diesels and 2 6-cylinder M.W.M. (Moteren Werke Mannheim) auxiliary Diesels. These auxiliary Diesels were situated in the Diesel Room forward | ||
- 15 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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of, and not connected to, the main Diesels. They served exclusively to drive 2 small generators, each of which had its own switchboard distinct from the main switchboard. |
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It was stated that the use of these auxiliary Diesels simultaneously with the main Diesels would reduce the time required for charging batteries by 2 hours. Also, the output of the auxiliary generators was sufficient to provide current for the main electric motors to run at 250 R.P.M. without any drain on the batteries. When desired, the current from the auxiliary generators could be fed to the electric motors while the main Diesels were running. This reduced the load on the main Diesels, which could then be run 50 R.P.M. faster than otherwise. |
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The auxiliary Diesels were 400 H.P. - 700 to 750 R.P.M. They were connected to the auxiliary generators by a direct drive. They had separate exhaust valves and separate mufflers, and were not fitted with superchargers. |
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Exhaust temperatures for the main Diesels at flank speed are 4700 to 4800 Celsius - for the auxiliary Diesels 3900 to 4200 Celsius. The general layout of cooling, lubricating, and fuel lines in U-177 was in all respects similar to that in H.M.S. GRAPH (ex U-570). The only differences are illustrated in Plate II. |
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SERVICING OF T-5 TORPEDOES |
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Every two days, each T-5 was partially withdrawn from the stern tubes. After a plug on the tailpiece had been removed, a whitish-yellow colored oil was poured into the opening. The purpose |
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- 16 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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of the oiling, which was also done to the two acoustic torpedoes stored on the floor plates aft, was to insure a more silent-running torpedo. |
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F.K.W. (FERNVERKEHRSKURZWELLENSENDER) |
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This is fitted into all 1200 ton U-boats, in addition to the 200 watt short-wave transmitter (20 to 80 meters wavelength) and the 40 watt emergency transmitter. The FKW is also 200 watts, but transmits on wavelengths from 13 to 100 meters. It is fitted with a separate EBG (Einheitsbetriebsgerät) (remote control panel). On U-177 the FKW was generally used, rather than the 200 watt Telefunken transmitter. Two 200 watt transmitters are carried because these boats operate so far from home that, in case of a breakdown of one of the transmitters the other can be used, the 40 watt emergency transmitter having insufficient power. |
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It was confirmed that, although U-boats operating west of Capetown and in the South Indian Ocean receive signals from Control on "AFRIKA II" Schaltung (Series) they are free to transmit on any "Schaltung" (Series) i.e. Frequency, which is being satisfactorily received by Control. |
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It was stated that there is an area of very bad reception around 050 S. and between 180 and 220 W. |
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Reception was very bad during all daylight hours, once they had passed east of Capetown. After dark, however, reception was excellent on both short and long waves. |
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- 17 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate IV. F.K.W. Long Range Short Wave Transmitter
Click this text to view Plate V. F.K.W. Transmitter - Remote Control Panel
S E C R E T
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U.K. (VH/F) GEAR |
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This was fitted with a telephone receiver, comparable to equipment carried in U-172. (O.N.I. Note: See G/Serial 29, U-172, Chapter II.) It had been built in before the last patrol, and had never been used. A survivor believed that all U-boats are now fitted with this gear, which is intended to be used for voice traffic with cooperating aircraft. When in use, it is connected to the "Stabsantenne" (Rod aerial), through the "Antennewahlschaltafel" (Aerial selector panel). |
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BORKUM G.S.R. |
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This is primarily intended as emergency gear in case of breakdown of the Wanz. It is never used simultaneously with the Wanz, since both of these have to be connected to the "Rundipol" (Basket type aerial) when in use. It is used regularly, however, in order to "rest" the Wanz, which is subject to overheating. While one survivor was not sure just how Wanz operates, the thought the automatic scanner is most subject to overheating, and stated that after about one hour's operation the outer case of the Wanz becomes so hot that it is impossible to touch it. Prisoners expressed great contempt for all G.S.R. equipment. (See Chapter XIV.) |
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- 18 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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CHAPTER IV. GUNS AND AMMUNITION IN U-177 |
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DECK ARMAMENT |
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First Patrol - One 105 mm. gun forward of Conning Tower. |
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One 20 mm. single on bandstand. |
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One 37 mm. gun (old type) on deck aft. |
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Second Patrol - One 105 mm. gun forward of Conning Tower. |
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Two single 20 mm. guns on bandstand. |
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One 37 mm. (old type) on deck aft. |
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Three M.G.-15s (demountable) on bridge. |
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Third Patrol - One 105 mm. gun forward of Conning Tower. |
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Two 20 mm. twin mounts on Platform I. |
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One new 37 mm. automatic gun on Platform II. |
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Four demountable M.G.-15s. |
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AMMUNITION CARRIED ON THIRD AND LAST PATROL |
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105 mm: U-177 carried 200 rounds of ammunition for this gun. There were 65 rounds of H.E. packed in gray containers with brown and yellow marking, 65 rounds if incendiary shells in containers marked with a red ring, and 70 rounds of "Zonenmunition" (H.E/A.A. shells) in gray containers with red markings. "Zonenmunition" rounds had yellow markings with black lettering. |
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In ready-use lockers were 38 rounds of incendiary and H.E., mixed. The rest of the ammunition for this gun was stored in the magazine. |
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20 mm: 8000 rounds of 20 mm. ammunition were carried. |
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- 19 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
|
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There were three types; mixed in more or less equal proportions: |
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A/P with tracer - pointed nose, blue with red ring. |
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H.E. with tracer - yellow markings, red ring. |
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H.E. without tracer - yellow only. |
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The last two types had aluminum fuze head, nose somewhat flattened. |
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There were 13 clips containing 18 rounds each in ready-use lockers, 48 clips of 18 rounds each in the Conning Tower, and 60 clips of 18 rounds each in the magazine. |
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Two clip-loaders were carried, but only one was ever used. These were for 20 mm. ammunition only. They were said to be very noisy but very fast. |
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37 mm: Only one type of ammunition was carried for the 37mm. gun. This was called "Minenmunition" (mine munition). It is believed to be H.E. Projectiles were painted yellow with red markings. The aluminum fuze head was not painted. |
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Clips of 5 rounds each were loaded by hand, no loader being supplied for the "Minenmunition". |
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In Bordeaux U-177 took aboard 40 water-tight containers of 25 rounds each. In La Pallice 47 additional containers, likewise of 25 rounds each, were supplied to the boat. In addition to the above containers, all of which were stored in the boat, there were about 375 rounds in clips, of which 250 were in upper deck containers. These containers had a maximum capacity of 280 rounds. |
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DETAILS OF THE VARIOUS GUNS |
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105 mm.: Elevation 65 degrees, depression 10 degrees. |
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- 20 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
|
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The gun could be elevated to 70 degrees after loading. Loading at 70 degrees was impossible because at this angle there was not room enough between the breach and the deck to insert the round. |
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H.E. and incendiary ammunition were used against ships; the "Zonenmunition" (also "Fliegermunition") was primarily for use against planes, but could also be used against surface targets. |
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The fuze of the "Zonenmunition" can be set by means of a key (See Plate VI.) For general purposes two settings are used: |
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(a) Nahzone (near zone) - 2,2 - about 2000 meters. |
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(b) Weitzone (distant zone) - 4,8 - about 5000 meters. |
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Fuzes are so set either in port or at sea at the discretion of the commanding officer. These general-purpose settings apply only when there is no time to set the fuze for each round as it is passed to the gun. Ideally, each round will be individually set. By this means, it is claimed, a perfect barrage can be set up. Settings can be made as high as 7500 meters. Fire is opened, however, when the attacking aircraft approaches the 10,000 meter zone. |
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When the projectile explodes, concussion effect is great, causing air-pockets and, in the words of one prisoner "making the pilot nervous". When a hit is scored, the explosive force is said to be extremely great. Splinter effect has a wide range. |
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Muzzle velocity, 650 meters per second; end velocity 500 meters per second. |
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There were no shields for the protection of the gunners. The usual ammunition chute from the bridge was fitted. |
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- 21 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate VI. 105-mm. Fuze Setting Key
S E C R E T
|
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20 mm: No shields were provided for the protection of gunners at the twin mounts. Ammunition was passed by hand. All ammunition self-destroying at 2000 meters. Tracer to 1800/2000 meters. Loading sequence stated to be one A/P, one H.E. with tracer, one H.E. without tracer. Rate of fire, 60 to 80 rounds per minute per barrel. Eight extra barrels were stowed in the magazine. |
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M.G.s: It was stated that the M.G. 81 twin is no longer in use on U-boats, since it did not prove very successful for marine use. There were many instances of failure to function. The M.G. 15, on the other hand, is still very popular. The rate of fire is fast, and cleaning and servicing are comparatively simple. U-177's four machine-guns were never taken topside during her last patrol. |
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Small Arms: U-177 had the following small arms on board, stored in part in the magazine, part in the Control Room: |
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3 Sub-machine guns (MP-40, possibly one of the newer model). |
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7 Mausers (7.65). |
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DETAILS OF THE NEW 37 MM. AUTOMATIC GUN |
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The new 37 mm. full-automatic gun was introduced to the U-boat arm about November 1943. There is still no definitive manual for this gun. Improvements will continue to be made as operational experience indicates their necessity. |
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1. WEIGHT - about 250 kilograms. |
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2. LENGTH OF BARREL - 3800 mm. |
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3. MUZZLE VELOCITY - 760 meters per second. |
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- 22 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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4. RANGE - Ammunition self-destroying at 4800/5000 meters. |
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5. TRACER - One gunner stated that the round has tracer to 4800/5000 meters. An officer stated that tracer begins after 1-1/2 seconds and burns for 5 to 6 seconds, average velocity being 700 meters per second. |
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6. CEILING - Stated to be 3800 meters. |
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7. RATE OF FIRE - Theoretical, 100 to 120 rounds per minute. |
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Practical, 50 to 60 rounds per minute. |
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8. SIGHTS - Ring and Bead. Demountable. Telescope sight can be substituted. Sights can be folded back to prevent their being broken off when the boat submerges. |
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9. AMMUNITION - Fixed. "Minenmunition", H.E. with tracer. |
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10. ROUNDS IN MAGAZINE - Five. |
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11. COLOR OF TRACER - Orange. |
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12. FLIGHT IN FIRST SECOND - 700 meters. |
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13. OPEN FIRE - When plane is 4000 to 5000 meters away. |
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14. WEIGHT OF ROUND - Two kilograms. |
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15. DETONATION - Impact. Has aluminum fuze head. Explodes on impact with water or lighter materials such as wood. Self-destroying at 4800/5000 meters. |
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16. WATER TIGHTNESS - There is no provision for keeping water out of the barrel or the automatic mechanism when the U-boat submerges. |
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17. BREECH BLOCK - Vertical sliding wedge type. Said to be of light metal alloy. (Other parts of steel, or nickel-chrome steel. Receiver of cast iron.) |
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- 23 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate VII. Automatic 37-mm. Gun
S E C R E T
|
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18. TRAIN - Unlimited. Training mechanism on left side. Hand wheel geared to training circle. |
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19. ELEVATION 90 degrees. Elevating gear on right side. Hand wheel geared to elevating arc. |
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20. DEPRESSION - 10 degrees. |
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21. RATE OF ELEVATION - From 10 degrees to 90 degrees in approximately 45 seconds. |
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22. RATE OF TRAINING - Complete circle in 10 seconds or more, depending upon how heavy the sea is. |
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23. GUN CREW - Five men: |
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No. 1 - Trainer (seated). |
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No. 2 - Pointer (gun fired by pointer) (seated). |
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No. 3 - Breech (loader). |
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Nos. 4 and 5 - Ammunition passers. |
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24. TIME TO PREPARE GUN FOR FIRING - When the U-boat is on the surface and the men are on deck, the gun can be put into operation in 1-1/2 minutes. When the boat has been submerged and surfaces, 3 minutes will elapse before the first shot is fired. |
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25. TIME TO SECURE GUN FOR DIVING - 60 seconds. |
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26. DIMENSIONS OF SHIELDS - 1500 mm. by 1000 mm. Thickness 15 50 20 mm. |
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27. NIGHT USE - Sights have luminous paint. |
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28. LENGTH OF RECOIL - 180 mm. |
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29. LUBRICANTS - Everything except the automatic mechanism is greased. Grease used is Z.d.M. 26. For the automatic mechanism, light oil is applied with a brush. | ||
- 24 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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30. LOADING - The gun is loaded from the top, above the automatic mechanism. |
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31. HEATING OF BARREL - It was stated that the gun could be fired for as long as 20 to 25 minutes continuously without excessive heating. |
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32. MEANS FOR REDUCING WATER RESISTANCE - Both shields are folded forward and the gun is secured. |
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33. MEANS FOR PREVENTING FIRING INTO OWN BOAT - A guard rail prevents firing into structure forward of gun platform. |
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34. RAMMER - Chain operated, actuated by a spring which is compressed by the recoil of the gun. |
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35. DISADVANTAGES - The gunner under interrogation stated that the chief disadvantage of this gun is that it requires too much servicing -- 25 to 30 minutes daily. The ammunition must also be handled very carefully. |
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36. EXPLOSIVE - The prisoner could not remember just what the explosive charge is, but remembers hearing a term like Hexanitrodiphenilamin. |
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37. STARTER AND BREAKER - There are two buttons on the upper part of the cover. One is the breaker, which interrupts the firing. The chain is stopped and further firing is impossible. The second button is the starter, which must be pushed down with much pressure and released immediately. If this starting button is pushed down slowly, jamming occurs and the button cannot be released; at the |
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- 25 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate VIII. Automatic 37-mm. Gun. - Diagram of Automatic Mechanism
S E C R E T
|
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same time there is danger that the rammer chain may no longer be under tension. Assuming that the starting button is pushed down and released correctly, the rammer chain then rams the shell into the breach (as described below). The starting button is to be used only once if there are enough shells, but should the shells run out, the gun must again be cocked. |
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38. PEDAL FIRING MECHANNISM - On the right side is a pedal operated by the pointer. When the gun is ready to fire and the command to open fire is given, the pedal is pressed. By means of a linkage, the trigger arm is actuated and the firing pin springs forward causing the gun to fire. |
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39. COCKING THE GUN - The hand cocking lever is shown at e, Plate VII, is forcibly pushed forward. This operation requires the combined strength of two men. The lever opens the breech by moving the breech block downward, at the same time causing the firing-pin spring to be engaged; simultaneously the cogged arc at the right (on the lower drawing on Plate IX) moves around to the right, pulling with it the wire or cable which is attached to the little pin shown at the forward end of the spring which is above the chain. The wire or cable pulling on the pin causes the spring to be rammed backwards within its cylindrical housing. The spring then remains under tension until the starter button is pressed. |
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- 26 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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40. FIRING - When the gun has been cocked and the breech opened as described above, No. 3 inserts the clip containing five rounds and lets if fall by its own weight. At a point about two-thirds of the length of the guide rail, the clip, which slides in a grove, falls out. About 10 rounds can be inserted. |
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Next the starting button is pressed, releasing the spring which forces the ramming chain forward. At the same time the knob on the chain catches on the end of the case and carries the round forward and rams it into the breech. At the same time the end of the case is grasped by the extractor which is now in vertical position. The breech block is now free and moves upward and the breech is closed. |
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The breech is now closed and the firing pin is under spring tension. The gun is ready to be fired. The pedal is depressed by the pointer; this releases the firing pin which snaps forward (by means of spring tension) and fires the gun. |
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The force of recoil causes automatic reopening of the breech. The ejector, which is bedded on springs, at this time throws the case out aft. The case falls to the deck. |
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Once fire has been opened, recoil forces operate all of the automatic mechanism, the various parts of which are all geared together by means of cog-wheels (not all |
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- 27 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate IX. Automatic 37-mm. Gun - Muzzle and Feed Details
S E C R E T
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of these cog-wheels are shown in any of the drawings). |
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41. RAMMER CHAIN - The rounds are inserted in the middle of the receiver cover and fall onto a tray which is likewise in the middle of the automatic mechanism. On the left side of and above this tray is the rammer, which, therefore, is situated beside the round. The rammer operates in such a way that the shell is grasped by the rammer knob from one side only. Experience has shown no disadvantage in this -- i.e., the round does not get too far to the right. |
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The chain is about 1300 mm. long and 12 mm. wide. It is just like a bicycle chain. The chain is removable by opening the fastening which holds the parts of the chain together. |
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42. PREPARING THE GUN FOR FIRING - Three men are necessary. No. 1 releases side lashings, puts up trainer's sights, opens left shield into position, and takes trainer's seat. No. 2 snaps right shield into position, releases elevation lashings, puts up pointer's sight, takes pointer's seat, and operates firing pedal. No. 3 operates the hand cocking leaver, thus putting under tension the breech block and ramming mechanism. Then he inserts the clip, pushes the starting button which shoves the round into the |
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- 28 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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breech. No. 3 also clears in case of jamming. Two other men are necessary as ammunition passers to insure rapid fire. |
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43. SECURING FOR DIVING - No. 3 pushes the breaker button so that the gun stops firing, the chain having been arrested. Immediately the dog-lever is moved and remaining rounds are removed. The breech is then closed by means of the breech-opener. The starting button is pushed and the chain is thus slacked. Then No. 2 "fires" with the pedal once more and tension of the firing spring is released. Nos. 1 and 2 secure the gun against movement, shields are secured and sights are secured in horizontal position. |
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44. RECOIL - Prisoners were rather vague as to just what parts of the gun recoil, and stated that the automatic mechanism does not recoil, but only the barrel, and specifically everything forward of the first vertical line forward of the shields, as on Plate VII, view from left. Within the receiver, along top and bottom, are the four recoil and counter-recoil springs. At left top and right bottom of the receiver are the recoil brakes (hydraulic and spring); and at right top and left bottom are the springs for counter-recoil. |
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45. BREECH BLOCK - Dimensions of the breech block are approximately 10 cm. x 10 cm. x 17 cm. Top surface |
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- 29 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate X. 37-mm. Projectile
S E C R E T
|
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is concave. No special housing. |
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The movement of the breech block is inaccurately shown in the drawings. In downward movement, the breech block does not follow an exactly vertical line as indicated, but rather a diagonal line, being farther forward at lowest position. |
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The lever or arm shown attached to the breech block in Plate IX has an arrangement of catches which automatically compress the spring behind the firing pin whenever the breech block is lowered. The spring is released by the pedal, which, when depressed, disengages the catch as shown on Plate X, drawing No. 3. |
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46. BREECH OPENER FOR JAMMING - On Plate VII, at d, is a four-sided bolt to which a wrench can be applied in case the gun jams. By turning this, one can move the breech block to its lowest position and open the breech. This has nothing to do with firing the gun or cocking it. |
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47. SERVICING - The gun must be cleaned daily. Cleaning takes 20-25 minutes except for the automatic mechanism, and the barrel, all parts are greased. The automatic mechanism is covered with light oil by means of a brush. A wire brush is run through the barrel, then an oiled brush is run through. If this is done carefully there is no question of rust starting in the barrel. |
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- 30 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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Complete overhaul is made once a week, i.e., all parts are inspected and lubricated. The automatic mechanism is taken apart and examined, re-oiled and re-assembled. |
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During U-177's passage through the Bay of Biscay, care of the guns was a difficult matter. All the guns had to be serviced in the short time that the U-boat was on the surface. When the Bay had been safely passed and there was time for adequate servicing of the guns, it was found that the 37 mm. gun was in very bad shape. Careful and thorough overhaul and lubrication restored the gun to usefulness. Daily firing practice was instituted, but there were many instances of jamming. It was found that the grease that had until then been used for all parts of the gun, including the automatic mechanism, was to blame. From then on, the thin oil, applied with a brush, was used for the automatic mechanism. This was found to be much more satisfactory, jamming occurring much less frequently during daily firing practice. |
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48. BORE - Prisoners stated that the bore does not taper. It has 8 lands and 8 groves. The rifling (to the right) was stated to be quite unlike that of other guns: the spiral is much tighter, causing more turns of the projectile. For this reason prisoners |
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- 31 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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believed that there were as many as 10 to 15 turns in the rifling. |
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49. DETAILS OF ROUND - The case is made of light metal alloy. Aluminum is one of the constituents of the alloy. The alloy oxidizes easily when allowed to become wet with sea water. Therefore, the case is kept oiled. If water splashes onto the case, it is wiped off as soon as possible and oil is applied. The same thin oil is used for this as for the oiling of the automatic mechanism. This oil was borrowed by the gunner from the engine room. |
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Rounds were stated to be pressure proof to a depth of 30 meters. If the rounds are left unprotected on deck and the U-boat submerges to a depth of less than 30 meters, it is not necessary to throw away the rounds; they must, however, be put aside until the case has been thoroughly wiped and re-oiled. If the U-boat goes to a depth of more than 30 meters, water is forced inside the rounds, usually through the aluminum fuze head, and the rounds must be thrown away. |
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The diameter of the case at the after end is about 50 mm. Near the forward end, the case tapers to a diameter of 37 mm. Length of case is about 330 mm. The case is not painted. |
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The projectile is 37 mm. in diameter at after end. |
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- 32 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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The visible part of the projectile (in complete round) is about 100 mm. long. At the forward end, the projectile tapers to the aluminum fuze head (included in above measurement. The fuze head itself is about 20 mm. long). The projectile is painted yellow and has some red figures or markings on it, these indicating reddish or orange colored tracer. The aluminum fuze head is not pointed but flat. The head has two notches for a key by means of which the fuze can be unscrewed. This was never done aboard U-177. |
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The complete round is about 430 mm. long. |
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50. RESERVE BARREL - One reserve barrel was carried in a container on Platform II under the starboard ladder. One more barrel was stowed in the Control Room. |
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51. RESERVE AUTOMATIC MECHANISM - One, carried in the Control Room. |
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52. IDENTIFICATION MARKING - The barrel of U-177's 37 mm. gun bore the following, molded in the side: b.y.v.43. |
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53. ESTIMATE OF THE GUN - The gunner who furnished much of the above information said that changes will have to be made before the gun is really suitable for use in U-boats. For one thing, the loading of rounds is difficult when the gun is at extreme |
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- 33 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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elevation, and feed may be interrupted. He also stated that far too much servicing is required. An officer believes that the gun is useless for U-boats because of the delicacy of its mechanism and numerous breakdowns. The weakest point is the rammer chain, he says. In his opinion it will soon be abandoned. |
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- 34 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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CHAPTER V. MOTORLESS OBSERVATION |
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HELICOPTER ("BACHSTELZE") USED ON 1200-TON U-BOATS |
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U-177, in common with certain other 1200-ton German U-boats used a small motorless helicopter known as a "Bachstelze" (Water Thrush) for the purpose of observation at a considerable height. The helicopter is demountable, its parts are stored on board, and it is assembled on deck when the Commanding Officer orders an ascent. In flight, it is towed by the U-boat. The following account gained from survivors, illustrated by scale drawings, gives details of pilot training and an analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the apparatus. |
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CONSTRUCTION |
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The helicopter is constructed almost entirely of light metal stated by prisoners to be aluminum. The blades of the propeller and empennage or tail parts are constructed of wooden staves with cloth covering and airplane "dope" on the outer surface. The parts of the helicopter are as follows: |
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Rotor Head with Blades. |
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Handle for Releasing Rotor and Blades. |
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Strut Wires. |
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Parachute Rip-chord. |
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Rudder Pedals. |
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Instrument Board. |
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Tow-cable. |
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- 35 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate XI. Helicopter in Operation
S E C R E T
|
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Control Stick. |
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Pilot's Seat. |
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Flexible Cable from Tachometer to Rotor Head. |
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Landing Surfaces. |
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Tubular Fuselage. |
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Parachute. |
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Fixed Stabilizing Rudder. |
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Moveable Rudder. |
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Rotor Blades. |
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Instrument board with Altimeter, Speedometer, and Tachometer. |
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Pitot tube. |
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Fixed Horizontal Stabilizers. |
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The pressure proof containers in which this helicopter is carried on board the U-boat are built into the Conning Tower. It is extremely important that these compartments remain water-tight since, if sea water were to reach the helicopter, it would be rendered unfit for operation, through damage to instruments and possible warping of the wooden parts. A third pressure proof container houses a winch, to which is attached a 300-meter cable used for towing the helicopter in the air. The fuselage is stored in the portside container, and propeller and tail assembly are stored in the starboard container. |
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EXTRA PARTS | ||
In order to insure replacement of the parts of the helicopter, the U-boat carries two complete machines; thus, if |
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- 36 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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the one in use - or any part of it - is damaged and unfit for use, it is replaced by the second one, which is stowed in the pressure hull. The second helicopter is not assembled and the parts are usually stored as follows: |
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1. The extra fuselage is placed in the starboard engine room. |
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2. The blades of the extra propeller are stored in the electric motor room. |
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3. The three extra propeller blades which are usually carried in addition to those belonging to the two complete helicopters are, as a rule, stored in munitions room #2; sometimes they are stored in the Petty Officers' room. |
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4. An extra telephone box is also stored in the electric engine room. |
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THE FUSELAGE |
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The fuselage consists of an aluminum pipe about four meters in length which has an outside diameter of 100 mm. and an inside diameter of 90 mm. with walls about 9.5 mm. in thickness. In the front part of this hollow fuselage are located the cable connections for the steering apparatus and the telephone connections. The steering cables which are connected to the foot controlled rudder run on pulleys along the hollow fuselage and are connected to the rear tail fins (see approximate placement of rollers or pulleys over which these cables run in Plate XII). The telephone wire is connected to the tow-cable and has an outlet in the fuselage at the point where |
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- 37 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate XII. Helicopter - Diagram
S E C R E T
|
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the pilot's seat is connected to the fuselage and carrier. The cable connected to the joy stick runs through the fuselage and then by means of pulleys runs up the hollow vertical tube or carrier which holds the rotor head in the propeller blades. In this way, the pitch of the propeller is controlled. It will be noted that the propeller blades are fixed in relation to the rotor head; there is no pitch control of the individual blades. The entire rotor head is tilted forward or backward and from left to right. With such a control, the head with the propeller blades can be tilted into the wind (top forward) and the revolutions per minute reduced thereby; or it can be lifted up and the wind will then increase the number of revolutions per minute. Through this simple principle the helicopter rises or descends in direct proportion to the number of revolutions of the propeller per minute. Atop the fuselage is the pilot's seat, which is attached just in front of the vertical tube or carrier containing the controls for the rotor head. The pilot is strapped on to the seat by means of a quick-release type of shoulder harness and a belly girdle. To the rear of the seat is the horizontal surface of the empennage; it is fixed and cannot be controlled. In other words, there are no elevators on the tail assembly. Atop the horizontal element is the fixed vertical fin. To the rear of this is attached the movable tail fin, or rudder, which is connected to the cables running through the hollow fuselage from the foot control pedals in front of the pilot's seat. |
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- 38 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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THE CARRIER |
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The carrier is the vertical pipe which holds the rotor head and the propeller blades. It is about 1-1/2 meters in length. In the upper end is a spindle in which the rotor head is set, though the exact method by which the rotor head is connected to the carrier and the controls have not been established. Within the vertical tube are the cables which are attached to the joy stick, the exact construction of which is also not known to survivors. |
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Just to the rear of the pilot's seat and to the rear of the carrier is an attached parachute, the rip cord of which is attached to the rotor head. Directly above the pilot's head is a release lever. A sharp pull on this lever will release the entire rotor head with propeller attached. As the rotor head falls off, it pulls the rip chord and the parachute opens. It was stated that there is no danger of the propeller hitting the pilot as the helicopter almost always flies with the tail low. As the parachute opens, the helicopter, minus the rotor head and propeller, will sink gently with the pilot to the surface of the water. The pilot must free himself from the helicopter as soon as it hits the water, and utilize his life jacket to remain afloat. |
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THE ROTOR HEAD AND PROPELLER |
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The rotor consists of a head with insert bosses into which the propeller can be inserted and bolted fast. Since the propeller blades are large in comparison to the rest of the machine, it is necessary that they be supported; therefore, there are cables running |
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- 39 - S E C R E T |
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Click this text to view Plate XIII. Helicopter - Rotor Head and Blades
S E C R E T
|
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from the top point of the head of the middle of each blade of the propeller. Furthermore, there are strut wires running from one blade to the other which give the relatively flimsy propeller assembly some stability. There are six of these stabilizing strut wires. The propeller blades consist of wooden ribs about 25-30 cm. wide. Each blade is covered with airplane cloth material, perhaps linen, and heavily doped. The blades are about three meters in length. It will be noted that the tips of the blades are rounded; and the other end is the "attach-on" which is inserted into the rotor head and holds the blade fast. |
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THE EMPANNAGE |
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The empennage, like the blades of the propeller, is constructed of wooden ribs, covered with linen, and heavily doped. The leading edge of the horizontal fin is fastened directly onto the fuselage while the trailing edge is held in position with a bolt and, possibly, a spring washer. The horizontal fin is fixed and cannot be controlled. It is approximately 700 mm. wide and about 1500 mm. long. The vertical tail fin has the same construction also, and is firmly attached above the horizontal fin. Attached to this vertical fin is the movable rudder which enables the pilot to control, within limits, the flight of the machine. Through the use of this rudder, it is possible for the helicopter to weave from side to side behind the U-boat, within an arc of about 600. |
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THE INSTRUMENT BOARD |
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The small instrument board or panel contains the following three instruments: (1) Altimeter; (2) Speedometer; (3) Propeller |
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- 40 - S E C R E T |
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S E C R E T
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Tachometer. The altimeter is the regular sensitive aneroid type. The speedometer is operated by means of a pitot. The tachometer for the propeller is operated by a flexible cable extending from the rotor spindle through the carrier and the hollow fuselage to the tachometer. |
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THE PILOT'S EQUIPMENT |
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The pilot's equipment consists of the following: (1) A combination telephone (transmitter and receiver) built into an aviator's helmet; by means of this, the pilot is in constant communication with his U-boat and can arrange the altitude of his flight by giving orders for the release or retraction of the cable attached to the winch. Also, he can announce immediately the sighting of a ship or any other object he may observe. The steel cable served as the telephone wire. The batteries used for the telephone are contained in a portable box, which also houses a combination telephone set for the use of those on board the U-boat in communicating with the pilot. (2) Binoculars. (3) Clothing. This is determined by the climate; in a cold climate, the pilot wears a leather suit lined with sheepskin and sheepskin aviator's boots; in the tropics, he wears overalls or dark blue fatigues. (4) Shoulder straps and belly girdle. |
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ASSEMBLY AT START |
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In preparing the helicopter for a take-off, at least three men are required in spite of the fact that it weighs only about 132 pounds. Approximately six to eight minutes are required for assembly, |
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depending on the training of the assembling crew. Fuselage and empennage are taken out of the special compartments and fitted together. Once the skids are attached to the bottom, the rotor head and the propeller blades are assembled, and the tow-cable is attached. The winch, with 300 meters of tow cable, is operated by compressed air supplied by the U-boat's compressors. An auxiliary crank and a brake for use in the operation of the winch are also fitted. For the take-off, the U-boat is turned into the wind. |
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THE FLIGHT |
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The U-boat travels forward with a speed regulated in accordance with the speed of the wind. In order to fly the rotor must make from 130 to 250 R.P.M. The weight of the pilot operating the helicopter influences the suspension; the heavier the pilot, the greater the number of revolutions required for lifting the helicopter into the air off the boat. Just prior to the moment the U-boat has reached the correct speed in relation to head wind, the joy stick is placed in a forward position. When the wind speed is correct, the pilot pulls back slowly on the joy stick, which sets the rotor head and propellers at an angle of backward tilt. As the wind passes through, the propeller revolves and, as the speed increases, the helicopter begins to rise on its cable. At the same time, the tow-cable is slowly fed out by the winch operator, who is careful to take up the slack at all times. The pilot must handle the joy stick with great care; he controls the helicopter through "feel", and an experienced pilot can operate it by the noise or |
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"sing" of the propeller. Since the helicopter can weave from side to side about 30 on either side of the U-boat, the pilot can observe the sector astern of the U-boat. In weaving, the pilot must make each movement slowly, precisely. A quick jerk or rapid sideward motion may tip the helicopter and cause it to fall into the sea. |
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LANDING AND DISASSEMBLY |
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When the pilot wishes to land, he must push the joy stick forward, thus tilting the rotor head forward and decreasing propeller revolutions. If this is inadequate, the U-boat must slow down. At the same time, the slackening tow-cable must be hauled in by the winch. As the helicopter is hauled in, certain members of the crew stand ready on deck to grasp it as soon as it comes within reach. This facilitates a safe landing, since movement of the U-boat might otherwise damage the helicopter which itself is bouncing in the air. The helicopter must be placed firmly on deck. In most instances, the U-boat is stopped for purposes of landing. The disassembling and stowage of the helicopter in the water tight compartments can be accomplished by three trained men in about five minutes. The plane is disassembled in reverse order of assembly, the fuselage being the last member to be placed in the storage compartments. A trained crew can expedite stowage considerably. |
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TRAINING OF PILOT |
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U-boat helicopter pilots were trained at the glider and helicopter school in Gelnhausen. The school has a landing field about 600-700 meters long and 300 meters wide. This field had a hard foundation, but no special drainage system and was without a |
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runway. The weather at Gelnhausen was not considered ideal for gliding. There was one hangar for gliders. No camouflage was used at Gelnhausen. |
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The school had about fifteen closed fuselage gliders, and three or four open fuselage gliders. There were three old NSFK glider towing planes. There were only two of the new U-boat helicopters at the school. |
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Personnel at Gelnhausen varied greatly, averaging one hundred school members, and from 50 to 300 students in the glider and helicopter training course. A survivor of U-177 who attended the course began his work at the school on 1 December 1942, and finished his instruction on 30 May 1943. At that time there were about 30 trainees in the helicopter course, all from the German Navy. The naval personnel lived in the same barracks and under the same conditions as the Luftwaffe men who were present for other training, and had no special privileges. For security reasons, the naval personnel wore no naval insignia. The survivor's instructor was Feldwebel Wieden of the Luftwaffe, who made the second war cruise on U-177, and reported on the practicality of the helicopter to the Commander-in-Chief U-boats. |
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The first part of the instruction consisted of glider training, exactly along the lines followed for training the Luftwaffe. Students undergoing helicopter training were awarded the same certificates at the completion of the course as those granted to the old students under the administration of the NSFK. This survivor was given A, B and C certificates and also the |
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pilot's license (Fulgfahrerschein). Students were first given considerable instruction in meteorology and then began actual training with the helicopter. This training lasted two weeks, during which time students received only two hours of theoretical instruction on the helicopter. |
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The survivor stated that the helicopters used at the school were of the same model as that carried by U-177. The first flight was very simple. The helicopter rested on a concrete square, and the nose-wire was attached to a winch. With a light wind blowing, and the propeller blades moving, enough power was generated to lift the helicopter about two meters off the ground. It hovered there for about two minutes, and then the student brought it down by using the elevators. About 25 practice ascents were made, and a little more of the winch was played out each time until an altitude of about 100 meters was attained. During all practice flights the winch was in a fixed position, so that only the force of a light wind, unaided by any forward towing movement, kept the helicopter aloft. |
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NOTES ON PERFORMANCE |
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(a) Range. Survivors stated that the helicopter can attain an altitude of approximately 150 meters, permitting visual observation within a radius of about 25 miles, thus augmenting normal lookout range and the use of surface detection devices. |
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(b) Faulty Communications System. Survivors stated that the telephone cable was short-circuited frequently by soaking with sea water, hampering transmission to the U-boat of orders for operation of the helicopter and sighting reports. |
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(c) Vulnerability Under Attack. If the U-boat is obliged to crash-dive under attack by aircraft, helicopter and pilot must be abandoned. |
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(d) Increase in Personnel. As a high degree of skill is required in the operation of the helicopter specially trained flying personnel must be added to the normal complement of the U-boat. |
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(e) Weather. Only a narrow range of wind and weather conditions is favorable to U-boat helicopter operations. Moreover, as the helicopter cannot be operated at night, use is confined to those area in which the U-boat may remain surfaced in daylight with relative safety. |
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CHAPTER VI. CREW OF U-177 |
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The complement of U-177 at the time of her sinking comprised 65 officers and men, as follows: 7 officers, including a doctor; 20 warrant, chief petty and petty officers; and 38 enlisted men, including 3 seaman-pilots for the helicopter. |
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OFFICERS |
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The Commanding Officer of U-177, Korvettenkapitän Heinz Buchholz, who did not survive, was of the 1929 Naval Term and 35 years old. An experienced officer, he had entered the U-boat arm in 1934 and commanded U-15 from 1937 until January 1940, when he was relieved for duty with the Operations Division of the Admiralty in Berlin. In January 1941, he went to the Kommandanten Schule (U-boat Prospective Commanding Officers' School) at Memel as instructor, and later instructed in Norway. From January 1942 until July 1942 he served as Senior Officer of the First U-boat Flotilla at Brest, leaving to take command of U-195, a new 1200 tonner, in August 1942. On 10 October 1943 he relieved Korvettenkapitän Gysae as commanding officer of U-177, U-195 having gone into the yard at Bordeaux for conversion and overhaul (See Chapter XIII). He held the Iron Cross, First Class. |
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Buchholz met with obstacles in assuming command of U-177. A stiff militarist, he brought with him from U-195 a nucleus of officers and men accustomed to his harsh and rigid tenets of conduct; but most of the experienced personnel aboard had served under Gysae, a successful, easy-going and friendly captain, with fervent |
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devotion, and did not take easily to the newly prescribed discipline. Buchholz inflicted punishments for the slightest infractions, where Gysae had been content to maintain morale through intimate and pleasant contact with his men. The contrast naturally led to friction between the Gysae and Buchholz cliques in the crew, both officers and men. |
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Little is known of Buchholz's officers who were lost; all having been reserve officers, their names do not figure in the German Navy List of 1942. The Executive Officer was Oberleutnant d.R. Heinz Walter, 28. The Engineer Officer was Leutnant (Ing.) d.R. Arno Seidenberg, 26. The Second Engineer Officer was Leutnant (Ing.) d.R. Josef Eisele, 23. The Doctor was Oberassistenzarzt d.R. Peter Becher, 28. |
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The 2nd and 3rd Watch Officers survived. Leutnant z. S. Hans-Otto Brodt, 21 was of the 1940 Naval Term. As a cadet, he served from December 1940 until February 1941 in the destroyer HERMANN SCHOEMANN, was promoted to midshipman in August 1941 and was sent to Brest for duty with the 2nd Coastal Patrol Flotilla (Minesweepers) in October 1941 for three months. He was transferred to U-boats early in 1942, was trained in the school bootU-8, under the Command of Oberleutnant z. S. Horst Deckert, and served with the 22nd (training) Flotilla at Gotenhafen as student-instructor in U-145, commanded by Oberleutnant z. S. Reimar Ziesmer, until June 1942. After further torpedo and communications training, Brodt came to U-195 as midshipman watch-officer in October 1942. He was aboard U-195 for its only patrol (See Chapter XIII) and transferred |
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with Buchholz to U-177 in October 1943, at which time he was commissioned Leutnant. Brodt idolized Buchholz and was determined to emulate his commanding officer in all respects. He was said to follow Buchholz about the boat, aping him and issuing orders to the men. He was held in great contempt by the experienced members of the crew. To his interrogators, however, he appeared to be without particular affectation or conceit, and conducted himself courteously and pleasantly. His shortcomings were ascribed to immaturity rather than stupidity. |
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The 3rd Watch Officer, who survived, was Leutnant z. S. Christian Schmidt, 20 of the May 1941 Naval Term, and brother of Leutnant z. S. Joachim Schmidt, former Executive Officer of U-203 (O.N.I. Note: U-203 was sunk on 25 April 1943; Joachim Schmidt is a prisoner of war). Schmidt spent 7 months in 1941 as apprentice seaman aboard a Sperrbrecher (mine destructor vessel) in the English Channel, subsequently doing cadet training in M-151 (minesweeper) in the Baltic and the Channel. He was transferred to the Officer Candidate School at Flensburg in February 1941, was promoted to Fähnrich in May 1942, and came to U-177 at Bremen two days after the air-raid in which Gysae was injured. He made the first patrol in U-177 as midshipman watch officer, and was put ashore on arrival at Bordeaux in January 1943 to attend various officer schools. He was promoted to Oberfähnrich in May 1943, continuing his schooling until October 1943 and, after being ordered to a U-boat doing trials in the Baltic, was transferred to Bordeaux, commissioned Leutnant, and recalled by Gysae to U-177 as his 3rd watch officer. |
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Schmidt appeared to have stood in precisely the same relationship to Gysae as Brodt had to Buchholz, that of a favored protege. His status aboard U-177 was jeopardized, therefore, by Gysae's relinquishment of command. Schmidt considered Buchholz incompetent and uninspiring and was obliged to give way to Brodt in the role of favorite junior officer. He was correct and amiable in the presence of interrogating officers; while fairly intelligent, he seemed exceedingly immature. |
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RATINGS AND ENLISTED MEN |
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Many of the more experienced men who had served under Gysae for the long first and second patrols were sent to schools prior to the final patrol and their places taken by comparatively green hands. U-177 under Buchholz was not the smoothly functioning, efficient machine it had been under Gysae. It was stated that Gysae, by virtue of his position as a U-boat ace, had been able always to retain his preferred personnel. |
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The most experienced man aboard was the Chief Quartermaster, Fabig, who had made some 20 patrols in U-boats and had been awarded the German Cross in gold. Fabig was a casualty. Hermann Schütz, the leading machinist, was to receive his commission as an Engineer Officer at the conclusion of the final patrol. Neither he, nor Müller, a machinist who was stated to have served in U-boats since 1934, survived. Boatswain's Mate Dittkowski, a survivor, came to U-177 with Buchholz, and had been in the U-boat Arm since 1940. He held the Iron Cross, First Class. |
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Apart from the aforementioned ratings, there were few experienced |
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men aboard U-177 at the time of her sinking. |
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Among the enlisted men were three seamen, Pitz, Frank and Winter, who had received extensive training ashore as U-boat helicopter pilots (See Chapter V). Pitz did not survive. |
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GYSAE AND HIS CREW |
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Korvettenkapitän Robert Gysae, of the 1931 Naval Term, served as Commanding Officer of U-177 from March 1942 until October 1943; it was stated that he was relieved in order to assume command of a U-boat Flotilla in the Baltic (O.N.I. Note: Gysae may command the 26th Flotilla at Danzig). In 1940, Gysae transferred from destroyers to U-boats, assuming command of U-98 in October 1940 and winning the Knights' Cross of the Iron Cross in January 1942, for the sinking of 12 ships with an aggregate tonnage of 84,000 tons. His record in U-177 was even more impressive. In December 1943 the Official German News Agency credited him with the sinking (in both U-98 and U-177) of 27 Allied ships totaling 188,000 tons. He received the Oak Leaves to the K.C.I.C. and his promotion to Korvettenkapitän at sea on 31 May 1942, following a successful convoy attack (See Chapter IX). After being relieved of the command of U-177 he was stated to have been awarded the "Swords to the Oak Leaves". |
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Gysae was described by survivors as a brilliant, entirely intuitive tactician. He hated routine, red tape and formality; relied heavily on instinct, and attacked the enemy with a high degree of nervous energy. It was stated that he emphasized informality not merely in the treatment of his crew but even in navigation and |
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torpedo firing. He squandered torpedoes with magnificent abandon, and conned his ship by "smell", using charts infrequently. He had never been known to resort to punishment, and spent most of his free time in the mens' quarters rather than in the wardroom. |
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When Gysae left U-177, he took all his officers along. With the exception of the Doctor; they had made both long patrols with him. The Executive Officer, Oberleutnant Burkhard Heusinger von Waldegg, of the October 1938 Naval Term, left for Prospective Commanding Officer's School. The distinguished Engineer Officer, Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Gerhard Bielig, of the 1934 Naval Term, was stated to have been given a teaching post. (O.N.I. Note: Bielig is one of the few Engineer Officers to have received the K.C.I.C. The award was made on 12 February 1943 for his part in the sinking of 51 ships totaling 280,510 tons, for having spent 454 days on patrol and for having saved his U-boat(s) from destruction three times through outstanding ability.) |
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The Chief Quartermaster, Mürl, who had acted as 3rd Watch Officer, and was considered by the crew to be the most capable man aboard, also left with Gysae. |
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MORALE |
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Morale aboard U-177, exceptionally high under Gysae because of successes gained and comradeship of officers and men, fell off badly under Buchholz. The men had little respect for their new officers and resented the change in command. The officers were not a unified team and were said by an officer survivor to have squabbled continually. |
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Under interrogation, the majority of survivors attempted originally to mislead and confuse the questioning officers. Low morale and defeatism eventually produced a highly cooperative attitude on most cases. |
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COMPLEMENT PER PATROL |
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U-177 carried 55 officers and men on her first patrol, 61 on her second and 65 on her third patrol. The increased complement on the second and third patrols were attributable to the addition of the helicopter pilots; the increase in personnel on the third over the second patrol probably resulted in the addition of G.S.R.-Radar specialists. A medical officer and a pharmacist's mate were carried on each patrol. |
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CHAPTER VII. EARLY HISTORY |
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COMMISSIONING |
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It is not known when U-177 was laid down or when launched. Of the survivors, one man came to the U-boat at the Deschimag Yards, Bremen in February 1942. U-177 had been launched and was being fitted out. The commissioning took place on 1 March 1942. Although U-177 was to be Gysae's boat, he did not commission her, as he had not yet been relieved of his former command (O.N.I. Note: Gysae is known to have commanded U-98 prior to U-177). Instead, she was commissioned formally by a Kapitänleutnant Schulze, Gysae assuming command one week later. (O.N.I. Note: This was probably Kapitänleutnant Herbert Schultze, who is believed to have been serving at that time as special U-boat consultant to Admiral von Friedeburg in Kiel). The commissioning celebration was modest, consisting of a beer party on deck following the ceremony and an informal gathering at the Lloydheim in the evening. The Directors of Deschimag presented U-177 with electric hair clippers and each man with a pocket knife. |
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TRIALS |
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Upon taking command, Gysae could not proceed immediately to the Baltic as heavy ice conditions prevailed. U-177 remained in the vicinity of the Getreidehaven, Bremen for about 40 days; Gysae trained new personnel, made a few short test runs and shallow dives, and fitted out. Early in April 1942, U-177 left Bremen, passed through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, and arrived at Kiel for her trials. |
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Normal tests were carried out at Kiel in a period of two weeks, after which U-177 proceeded to the Bay of Danzig, where further trials went off without incident. Torpedo firing took place off Danzig, and lasted until late in May. The "Agrufront" was carried out at Hela, and tactical exercises off Gotenhafen (O.N.I. Note: It is noteworthy that U-177 participated in tactical exercises from 12 - 23 June 1942 in company with the following U-boats, all of which are believed to have been sunk: U-179, U-210, U 259, U-411, U-517, U-595, U-605, U-609 and U-660. See Serial G/7, U-595). While at Gotenhafen, a doctor, Oberassistenzarzt Grosse, and a pharmacist's mate were taken aboard. Following the tactical exercises, U-177 returned to Kiel, stopping overnight at Rönne, where the customary underwater listening tests were made. |
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OVERHAUL: GYSAE'S ACCIDENT |
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From Kiel, Gysae took his boat back to the Deschimag Yard at Bremen for final overhaul. Shortly after U-177 arrived at the yard, presumably during the first week of July 1942, the Officers' Quarters ashore were demolished in the course of a heavy Allied air-raid. Oberassistenzarzt Grosse, the Doctor, was killed outright, and Gysae was seriously injured. Buried under the debris for four hours, he sustained fractures of both legs and a severe head wound. Because of his accident and hospitalization, the period of overhaul for U-177 was extended and the crew given two weeks' additional leave. A replacement for Dr. Grosse joined the U-boat in Bremen. |
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PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE |
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Late in August 1942, U-177 returned to Kiel without her |
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Commanding Officer, who was convalescing in a Bremen hospital. The U-boat was outfitted for a long war patrol, taking on fuel, torpedoes and six months' provisions. When all preparations had been completed, Gysae came on board, still limping and using crutches. The crew, enthusiastic over his recovery, adopted the crutch as an emblem for U-177 at the suggestion of the Engineer Officer, and several men improvised cap insignia for themselves. |
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On the eve of her departure, U-177 received a visit from a delegation of SS men, who ate and drank copiously aboard. They presented the U-boat with a framed portrait of Heinrich Himmler, which was hung with ceremony in the wardroom, next to a photograph of the deceased Dr. Grosse. |
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CHAPTER VIII. FIRST PATROL OF U-177 |
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U-177 left Kiel on 10 or 11 September 1942 on her initial patrol, which was to be carried out in the South Atlantic and Italian Ocean. Twenty-four torpedoes were carried. It had been planned that she should proceed to the Cape of Good Hope together with 3 other new 1200-ton U-boats, U-178 (C.O. Ibbeken), U-179 (C.O. Sobe) and U-181 (C.O. Lüth), but her departure was delayed by Gysae's injuries, and the other 1200-tonners had left Kiel 2 to 4 weeks earlier. (O.N.I. Note: U-179 is believed to have sailed from Kiel on 10 August 1942 for the Indian Ocean and to have been sunk by H.M.S. ACTIVE off Capetown 8 October 1942.) |
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The complement of U-177 on her first patrol totaled 55. Officers on this patrol were: |
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Stabsobersteuermann Mürl assumed the duties of 3rd Watch Officer and two officer candidates, Oberfähnriche Schmidt and Stengel, were carried for training. |
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It was stated that U-177 left Kiel without escort other than a single Sperrbrecher. She put into Kristiansand, where she lay overnight and completed with fuel and water. |
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PASSAGE OF THE ROSENGARTEN | ||
The entrance to the North Atlantic was made through the Rosengarten 10 days later, at which time U-177 suffered her first air attack. The officer survivor who had made this patrol asserted that this attack took place at noon on 23 September 1942 and that 3 depth charges had been dropped without causing any damage in the U-boat other than temporary failure of the lighting system. (O.N.I. Note: No aircraft attack in this area is recorded for 23 September 1942. An RAF aircraft attacked a U-boat with depth charges in position 61045' N., 1405' W. on 26 September 1942.) |
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LOSS OF COXSWAIN |
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Heavy weather was encountered following the passage of the Rosengarten. During the change of the bridge watch one night, Bootsmaat Hennings wa washed overboard and lost. His picture later was hung in the petty officers' quarters. |
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U-177 proceeded south, passing east of the Azores and west of the Cape Verde Islands and arrived in the Capetown area without further incident. |
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FIRST SUCCESS |
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U-177's initial success was attained during the last days of October 1942. A ship of some 8000 tons was sighted one morning on a course for Capetown, about 150 miles northwest of the Cape of |
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Good Hope, traveling alone at 12 to 14 knots and zigzagging. Gysae took position position at periscope depth ahead of the ship and at noon fired a spread of two torpedoes, both of which missed. He remained submerged until dusk, when he surfaced and again overtook the ship. Sometime after dark he approached his target and fired another spread of two torpedoes. The result of this attack was a spectacular explosion. Gysae prepared to take his boat down but, upon seeing the ship blow up instantaneously, remained on the surface and moved in closer. For seconds following the explosion nothing could be observed from the bridge of U-177 but a large cloud of smoke. From the force of the explosion and the fact that fragments of 88 mm. shells and other armament showered down upon the bridge of the U-boat, Gysae deduced that his victim had been a munitions ship. In describing the attack to his men, he stated that the ship had virtually been lifted out of the water by the explosion, and that no one could possibly have survived. (O.N.I. Note: Two ships, the Greek M/V AEGEUS, 4532 tons, out of Trinidad, and the U.S. M/V LA SALLE, 5462 tons, out of Panama, were overdue at Capetown on 1 November 1942 and presumed lost. The last reported position of the AEGEUS was 28.55 S. - 04.08 W. on 29 October. As the LA SALLE carried only hides, coffee and general cargo, and the AEGEUS took on, in Montreal in August 1942, a cargo of ammunition (746 tons) and automotive and field equipment (362 tons), it is believed that the latter was the ship sunk by U-177.) |
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THE "CERION" INCIDENT |
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After sinking the munitions ship Gysae took U-177 around |
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the Cape of Good Hope, and patrolled close inshore in the Port Elizabeth area for a number of days. One morning a tanker, estimated at 8000 tons, was sighted astern and Gysae gave chase. He fired a spread of two torpedoes but a heavy sea running spoiled his aim, and the torpedoes ran past the ship. Gysae did not break off, however, and pursued the tanker throughout the day and evening, delivering two more torpedo attacks, one single shot and a second spread of two. When all five torpedoes had missed the target, Gysae attempted to shell the tanker, but could not bring the 105 mm. gun to bear in the heavy seas and, after firing several fruitless rounds, secured the gun and cleared the deck. At this point a radio message was intercepted from the tanker: "Tanker CERION - We are being shelled by a U-boat". Gysae, who had been in a high state of excitement during the entire day, now deemed it wise to break off the attack in view of the betrayal of his position to coastal aircraft. U-177 withdrew at high speed on the surface and was not counter-attacked. (O.N.I. Note: The British tanker, CERION, 2588 tons, reported an attack by a U-boat at 2204 on 9 November 1942 in position 35.58 S. - 26.37 E. The CERION reached Capetown undamaged.) |
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OFF DURBAN |
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Following the CERION incident, U-177 moved up the South African coast to the approaches of Durban harbor. A considerable amount of shipping was sighted, and Allied coastal air patrol was irregular. Gysae remained within visual range of the coast and frequently took bearings from shore beacons. After a few days in this area the U-boat left the coast to intercept traffic from |
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Madagascar. |
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SINKING OF A TANKER |
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During the night of 19 November 1942 U-177 was patrolling some 250 miles due east of Durban when a vessel, thought to be a tanker of 7000 tons, was sighted. Rather than attack on the surface in bright moonlight, Gysae submerged and fired a spread of two torpedoes from periscope depth. The ship caught fire and sank rapidly. Gysae surfaced after 30 minutes to search for survivors, but no trace of the ship or its crew was found. A large quantity of oil was burning on the water. (O.N.I. Note: The Norwegian freighter GUNDA, 2241 tons, was sunk in approximate position 25.40 S. - 33.53 E., on 19 November 1942; the Greek cargo vessel, CORINTHIAKOS, 3562 tons, was sunk in approximate position 25.20 S. - 34.10 W., at 0027 on 20 November 1942. The SCOTTISH CHIEF, British tanker, 7006 tons, was sunk at 2134 Z on 20 November 1942 in 29.00 S. - 37.00 E. It is not likely that any of these was the ship sunk by U-177.) Prior to the tanker it was stated that U-177 had been in communication with U-178 (See Chapter XII), which had just torpedoed a ship but had been obliged to break off the attack because of the approach of enemy aircraft. (O.N.I. Note: The British cargo vessel, ADVISER, of 6348 tons, was torpedoed 16 November 1942 in position 32.03 S. - 33.52 E., later reaching Durban.) |
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PIERCE BUTLER |
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Survivors stated that shortly after U-177 had torpedoed the tanker, a message was intercepted from an unknown ship which had sighted the burning tanker off her stern. The ship gave call |
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letters which could not be found in books aboard U-177. Gysae proceeded eastward about 100 miles to find the ship and sighted her the next morning, on an easterly course. Gysae attacked from periscope depth with a spread of two torpedoes, both of which found the target. The crew abandoned ship in an orderly manner and Gysae surfaced immediately after the ship had sunk to question survivors. It was then ascertained that the victim was the American S.S. PIERCE BUTLER en route to Suez. (O.N.I. Note: S.S. PIERCE BUTLER, U.S. Maritime Commission cargo ship, of 7191 tons, was torpedoed at 0840 Z on 20 November 1942 in position 29.40 S. - 36.35 E. and sank within 30 minutes. All hands were saved and were landed at Durban.) |
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THE "NOVA SCOTIA" INCIDENT |
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After sinking the PIERCE BUTLER, U-177 proceeded northwest toward the South African coast and patrolled offshore between Durban and Lourenco Marques. Early one morning, a few days later, a ship was sighted and Gysae closed the potential target. The ship was identified as a British raider and was attacked from periscope depth with a spread of 3 torpedoes, 2 of which found the mark. The ship burst into flame and settled quickly, her gun crews firing upon U-177 until they were waist deep in water. Some life-belts and rafts were lowered, but a large number of men went over the side of the burning ship, which sank 15 minutes after the torpedoes had hit. |
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Gysae surfaced to interrogate the occupants of life-boats and discovered that the ship had not been a raider, but the British transport, NOVA SCOTIA, carrying 400-500 Italian prisoners of war and civilian internees from Abyssynia to South Africa. Gysae, recognizing |
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the magnitude of his blunder, at once signaled Control, outlining the circumstances of the sinking and urging that the Portuguese authorities at Lourenco Marques be requested to initiate a search for survivors. He then took two Italian civilians aboard the U-boat for the return voyage to Bordeaux and ultimate repatriation to Italy. It was stated that a very great number of Italians were burned to death or drowned, and that the spectacle was made unforgettably gruesome by the mass hysteria which overcame the doomed men. (O.N.I. Note: The British passenger vessel NOVA SCOTIA, of 6776 tons, was torpedoed and sunk about 0900 Z on 28 November 1942 in position 28.30 S. - 330 E. Within 7 hours of the attack the Portuguese East African Government was requested by the German government to search for survivors.) |
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Prior to disembarkation in Bordeaux at the conclusion of this patrol, every member of the crew of U-177 was ordered to sign a pledge to the effect that the NOVA SCOTIA incident would not be mentioned under any circumstances. |
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LLANDAFF CASTLE |
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Two days after the NOVA SCOTIA debacle, U-177 had proceeded north toward Lourenco Marques when her next target was sighted. The ship was identified as the Union Castle Mail Liner LLANDAFF CASTLE, on a course for Durban. Gysae attacked shortly after dark from periscope depth, first firing a spread of two torpedoes. After observing a hit which caused the ship to stop, Gysae delivered a spread of two torpedoes, followed by a single |
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"Fangschuss", which hit amidships, causing the ship to break in half and sink instantly; approximately 15 minutes elapsed between first attack and sinking. Following the usual procedure, Gysae surfaced to interrogate survivors, and received confirmation of the ship's identity. (O.N.I. Note: The S.S. LLANDAFF CASTLE, of 10,799 tons, was torpedoed and sunk at 1635 GMT on 30 November 1942, in position 27.20 S. - 33.40 E. while en route from Dar - Es - Salaam to Durban. One torpedo hit the boiler room on the starboard side; the 2nd and 3rd torpedoes hit after the ship was stopped, the latter hitting amidships on the port side, beneath the funnel and opposite the first hit, causing the ship to break in half and sink. The majority of the survivors - 160 in crew and 150 passengers - were rescued two days later 12 miles offshore.) |
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SARONIKOS |
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U-177 continued to patrol the approaches to Lourenco Marques and was rewarded with two more sinkings in this area. The first of these was a small Greek vessel, subsequently identified by her survivors as the SARONIKOS. Sighted in daylight, she was attacked at night, Gysae firing a single torpedo when surfaced. The ship, which was stated to be old, broke up completely and sank swiftly. Gysae approached the life-boats, questioned survivors and furnished them with bandages and other medical supplies. (O.N.I. Note: The SARONIKOS, Greek cargo vessel of 3548 tons, was sunk in the area 260S. - 340E. on 7 December 1942.) |
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EMPIRE GULL |
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Second of the successes in the approaches to Lourenco |
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Marques was the sinking of the British freighter EMPIRE GULL with torpedoes and gun fire. |
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Some days after the SARONIKOS sinking, U-177 sighted a freighter zigzagging on a course of 2700 for Lourenco Marques. Gysae attacked about midnight during a tropical rainstorm, firing a spread of two torpedoes, both of which missed as the ship changed course. Gysae now had only two torpedoes left aboard and decided to attempt the sinking by a single shot. As the ship came back to a course of 2700, Gysae fired and the torpedo hit in the area of the ship's engine room, cutting the ship's speed in half. Gysae now decided to sink the freighter with gun fire, and fired 160 to 170 rounds with his deck gun at a range of 400 meters. Some two hours, after the torpedo had hit, the freighter went down, and Gysae hailed the life-boats, identifying the ship as the EMPIRE GULL. (O.N.I. Note: The British freighter EMPIRE GULL, of 6,408 tons, was torpedoed at 2055 GMT on 12 December 1942 in position 26.00 S. - 35.00 E. while en route from Aden to Lourenco Marques. She sank at 2255 GMT after having been shelled and gutted by fire. The torpedo struck forward of the bridge on the port side. The ship's guns were useless at the given range. |
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FINAL SINKING: SAWAHLOENTO |
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After sinking the EMPIRE GULL, Gysae shaped course for home. U-177 had been at sea exactly 3 months, had 1 torpedo left, had not been refueled, and still had the long voyage to Bordeaux ahead. |
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Click this text to view Plate XIV. Operations of U-177 - First Patrol
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The final torpedo was expended in the sinking of a small Dutch ship sighted and sunk in daylight somewhat south of Durban several days later. Gysae questioned survivors and determined that his victim was the Dutch freighter SAWAHLOENTO, for Lourenco Marques out of Bahia. (O.N.I. Note: The Dutch cargo vessel SAWAHLOENTO, of 3085 tons, was sunk on 14 December 1942 in position 31.02 S. - 34.00 E.) |
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RETURN TO BORDEAUX |
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The passage to her French base was uneventful. Christmas was celebrated in the South Atlantic and U-177 reached Bordeaux on 23 January 1943 after 133 days at sea without refueling. The sinking of 8 ships, totaling 56,000 tons, was claimed for this patrol (O.N.I. Note: Crediting Gysae with 700 tons for the sinking of the unidentified tanker on 19 November 1942, the amount of shipping sunk on this patrol actually totals 49,325 tons). |
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OVERHAUL AND MODIFICATIONS |
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The superstructure of U-177 was modified extensively between her first and second patrols to accommodate the helicopter and new deck armament (See Chapters IV, V). As the U-boat had not been damaged by enemy attack at sea, no unusual overhaul was required. The crew was given long leave. |
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CHAPTER IX. SECOND PATROL OF U-177 |
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U-177 left Bordeaux under Gysae's command for the Indian Ocean on 1 April 1943, escorted by 2 coastal patrol vessels and several planes. She carried a complement of 62 officers and men, including a new doctor, Stabsoberassistenzarzt Zerning, and 4 men who were to operate the helicopter - A German Air Force N.C.O. named Wiedon, and 3 seaman - pilots, Pitz, Frank, and Herbrich. Wieden was carried for the express purpose of studying the practicability of helicopter observation on a U-boat. |
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Passage of the Bay of Biscay was made submerged, except for essential surfacing, on a course of 2400T. |
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U-177 proceeded to the South Atlantic without incident. The traditional ceremony for the Equator crossing was held, as it had been on the first patrol. |
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USE OF THE HELICOPTER |
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It was stated that in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean Gysae had ordered the helicopter aloft 80 times and that, whereas 3 ships had been sighted, there were no sinkings achieved as a result of helicopter sightings. On the other hand, U-177 had experienced no untoward difficulties during helicopter flights and had not been obliged to resort to emergency measures at any time. |
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SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON CONVOY CD-20 |
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U-177 arrived in her operational area, the shipping lanes off the Cape of Good Hope, during the last week of May 1943. |
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During the night of 28 May, Gysae engaged an eastbound |
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coastal convoy just south of the Cape, sinking three ships (See O.N.I. Note below) totaling 24,000 tons and expending 11 of his 24 torpedoes in the effort. U-177 originally made visual contact with the convoy shortly after it left Capetown the morning of the attack and followed it throughout the day. Gysae attacked about midnight, first firing 2 spreads of 2 torpedoes each, all of which missed, at a 7000 ton freighter; a third spread of 2 was fired, hits were scored, and the freighter "disappeared". A tanker of 10,000 tons now came into range as it maneuvered to pick up survivors from the freighter, and Gysae sank her with 2 torpedoes. A spread of two torpedoes hit and stopped, but did not sink her, and Gysae was obliged to fire a final "Fangschuss". |
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The entire action was over within two hours and Gysae radioed Control a synopsis of the successful undertaking. On 31 May he was notified by Control of his promotion to Korvettenkapitän and award of the Oak Leaves to the K.C.I.C. in recognition of his feat. |
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(O.N.I. Note: Two ships, totaling 14,565 tons rather than 3 totaling 24,000 tons, were sunk in this attack. The true sequence of events appears to have been as follows: Convoy CD-20, Capetown to Suez via Durban, left Capetown on 28 May 1943. At 2255 G.M.T., same date, the U.S. cargo ship AGWIMONTE, of 6679 tons, was torpedoed below the water line on the starboard side, listed heavily with deck and bridge awash and was abandoned immediately. Shortly thereafter, the Norwegian tanker, STORAS, of 7886 tons, was torpedoed and sunk, survivors taking to lifeboats and rafts. At |
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0015 G.M.T. (29 May) the AGWIMONTE was again torpedoed, her crew observing the action from the boats. Her boilers were seen to explode and she sank bow first in 10 minutes. Because of the heavy swell and overcast, and because AGWIMONTE was observed helpless and abandoned after the initial attack, Gysae surmised falsely that she had been sunk and that the torpedoes which, in fact, sank her later had accounted for a third ship. |
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The escort vessel H.M.S.A.S. VEREENIGUNG, which rescued survivors from both the AGWIMONTE and the STORAS, reported that shortly before the initial hit on the AGWIMONTE was scored, 4 explosions were heard on the port side of the convoy. It was later concluded that these explosions were caused by torpedoes which had been fired at a ship in the convoy and missed.) |
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AIRCRAFT ATTACK |
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Gysae regained contact with the same convoy 2 days later, in a thick fog, and prepared to attack a straggler. As U-177 was maneuvering into position, she was surprised by a 4-motored aircraft, which forced her to crash-dive, and dropped 3 depth charges. Gysae took the U-boat to 100 meters and no damage was caused by the charges. (O.N.I. Note: An RAF Catalina attacked a U-boat at 0815 Z on 6 June 1943 in position 31.12 S. - 16.56 E. without effecting damage. This is not, however, believed to have been the attack on U-177.) |
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UNIDENTIFIED SINKING |
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The fourth ship sunk by U-177 on this patrol was stated |
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to have been a freighter of 4600 tons, torpedoed in the Fort Elizabeth area some days after the convoy attack. Two torpedoes were fired. (O.N.I. Note: The Dutch cargo ship SALABANGKA, also proceeding from Capetown to Durban in convoy CD-20, was torpedoed and sunk on 1 June 1943 in position 31.10 S. - 29.15 E. This ship may have been sunk by U-177.) |
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MEETING WITH U-195 |
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In mid June U-177 was ordered to leave her operational area between Capetown and Port Elizabeth and rendezvous at a point 300 - 400 miles southwest of the Cape of Good Hope with U-195 (See Chapter XIII). U-195 was returning to Bordeaux and was to exchange certain supplies, instruments and personnel with U-177. The meeting took place late in the afternoon between 10 and 15 June, and lasted approximately 5 hours. A stoker named Schröder, who had been ill for some time, was put aboard U-195 for return to Bordeaux, and U-177 received a replacement for him. U-177 had burned out a coil on her port generator and was supplied with a spare part. In addition, Gysae was given certain navigational charts and shipping data for use in the Indian Ocean. There was no exchange of fuel or torpedoes. On leaving U-195, Gysae shaped course for Madagascar. |
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JASPER PARK |
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A fast freighter of 7000 tons, on a course for Durban, was sighted in late afternoon about two weeks after the meeting with U-195. U-177 was patrolling at this time an area south of Madagascar and east of Port Elizabeth. During the night, Gysae |
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fired a spread of 2 torpedoes, which missed. The following morning a spread of 2 torpedoes was fired and 2 hits were scored. The vessel was abandoned immediately, and sank shortly thereafter. Gysae surfaced and hailed the lifeboats. He learned that the ship was the JASPER PARK, with a cargo of tea for Durban. (O.N.I. Note: The British freighter, JASPER PARK, of 7129 tons, was torpedoed at 0825 G.C.T. on 6 July 1943 in position 32.56 S. - 420 E. while en route from Cochin to Durban with a cargo of tea and jute and sank 40 minutes later. Two torpedo tracks had been reported by lookouts during the previous night.) |
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MEETING WITH CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN |
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U-177 patrolled south of Madagascar for two weeks without further success. Toward the end of July, she was ordered to meet the blockade runner CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN at a point southeast of Madagascar to take on fuel and provisions. The SCHLIEMANN was acting at that time as a refueling and supply ship for 1200 ton U-boats operating in the Indian Ocean. U-177 had difficulty in finding the designated position but was homed by U-178. |
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The rendezvous with CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN was a complicated operation, involving 6 - 1200 tonners, and lasting about 2-1/2 days. As each U-boat was refueled, the other U-boats would circle the area as lookouts for enemy surface or aircraft. The other U-boats, which participated in the operations, were stated to have been U-178, U-181, U-196, U-197, and U-198 (See Chapter XII). U-177 took on 250 - 300 cubic meters of oil and some provisions. All refueling |
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was accomplished in daylight. |
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EFTHALIA MARI |
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Five or six days after the refueling, U-177 scored her next success, the sinking of a ship off the southeast coast of Madagascar. One of the few survivors from U-177 who had made this patrol believed that the ship was an 8000 ton freighter, at which a spread of 2 torpedoes was fired at dusk. One torpedo hit but did not sink the ship, and Gysae was obliged to finish her off with 100 rounds from the 105 mm. deck gun, after the crew had taken to the boats. Gysae again hailed survivors and identified the ship as the Greek freighter, EFTHALIA MARI, en route from Port Elizabeth to Madagascar. (O.N.I. Note: The Greek cargo ship, EFTHALIA MARI, of 4195 tons, was torpedoed and sunk at 1850 Z on 5 August 1943 in position 24.41 S. - 48.55 E. It is not known whether she was shelled.) |
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FINAL SINKING |
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The last ship sunk by U-177 was a collier. Torpedoed southeast of Madagascar in mid August, she exploded upon being hit and pieces of coal rained down upon the bridge of the U-boat. Gysae used 2 torpedoes. No survivors were seen. (O.N.I. NOte: The British freighter, EMPIRE STANLEY, of 6921 tons, was torpedoed at 1620 G.C.T. on 17 August 1943 in position 27.08 S. - 48.15 E. A heavy explosion blew hatches and cargo mast high and the ship sank within 3 minutes. There were 29 survivors. The EMPIRE STANLEY was en route from Durban to Aden with a cargo of coal. She is |
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believed to have been the vessel sunk at this time by U-177.) |
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The sinking of U-197 (Commanding Officer Bartels) by aircraft south of Madagascar at this time was known by radio to those aboard U-177 (See Chapter XII) |
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RETURN TO BORDEAUX |
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Gysae now had but 1 torpedo left and proceeded homeward. The northward passage through the Atlantic was without incident except that, when in approximate latitude of Walisch Bay, a freighter of 700 tons was sighted on a course of St. Helena. Gysae fired his final torpedo at the ship, but the torpedo had a damaged tail piece, which it had not been possible to repair aboard, and ran wide of the mark. |
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Passage of the Bay of Biscay was accomplished without enemy attack and U-177 reached Bordeaux at 2000 on 1 October 1943. |
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REPAIRS AND OVERHAUL: SABOTAGE |
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Ten days after U-177 returned to base Gysae was relieved by Buchholz. The U-boat went into dry dock (in Bunker No. 8 or No. 9) for extensive overhaul. The following work was carried out: |
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Diesels overhauled. |
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Torpedo tubes overhauled. |
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Batteries overhauled and partially replaced. |
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New (automatic) emergency lighting system installed. |
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Painting of bilges, interior, hull, superstructure. |
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In addition, modifications were made in the superstructure and armament. 16 mm. armor plate was fitted to the Conning Tower. |
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Click this text to view Plate XV. Operations of U-177 - Second Patrol
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Two twin 20 mm. cannons were mounted on Platform I; and a new automatic 37 mm. gun was mounted on Platform II. Both platforms were modified to receive the new guns. The 37 mm. gun could not be procured until the last days before sailing and a quadruple 20 mm. gun was mounted for use in gunnery exercises. |
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Various reasons were advanced for the installation of the new periscopes (see Chapter II). One survivor stated that power-turned observation periscope had been so damaged in drydock, while raised, by a blow received from a crane operated by a French yard worker, that it could not be raised or lowered and had to be removed. Both officer survivors maintained, however, that the change was effected in order to give U-177 an extra 2 meters of submergence for procedure at periscope depth. |
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Other sabotage to the U-boat, inflicted during her period of overhaul, and detected prior to her final patrol: |
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1. No holes had been bored in the flange of the Diesel cooling water inlet, as a result of which 4 cylinder heads were damaged by overheating. |
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2. Damage to the port generator core. |
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New equipment received included the Naxos, Borkum and Wanz G-2 Search Receivers, new antennae, and 2 new helicopters, 1 stowed in the boat, the other in the special pressure-proof containers on deck. |
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It was stated that Buchholz spent little time supervising the refitting and overhaul of U-177 after taking command, being absent on leave a greater part of the time. Work on the U-boat was completed on 15 December 1943. |
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CHAPTER X. THIRD AND FINAL PATROL OF U-177 |
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TRIALS IN THE GIRONDE |
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Prior to her final patrol, U-177 made a trial run in the Grionde Estuary, so that Buchholz could test new equipment and break in his crew. Departure from Bordeaux was at 0700 Saturday, 18 December 1943; the Flotilla Engineer, Yard Engineer, Radio technicians, German Air Force officers and a harbour pilot were aboard. |
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The new G.S.R. seta were tested, a number of trial dives were made - one to 50 meters, and the twin and quadruple 20 mm. guns were fired. |
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The new helicopter wa assembled and placed on the take-off stand for a test flight. Just as the pilot took his place, a gust of wind blew the machine off the platform and smashed it against the deck on the port side. The pilot was not injured but the helicopter was totally ruined. The debris was placed in the containers and U-177 returned to Bordeaux |
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During the 3 days following, she was depermed, was equipped with the 37 mm. gun and the two helicopters, 22 torpedoes, fresh water, provisions and 20 mm. ammunition. The crew reported for physical examinations and received final "tropical shots". |
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DEPARTURE: LAY OVER IN LA PALLICE |
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U-177 left Bordeaux at 1130 on 23 December 1943 with a minesweeper as escort, proceeding first to La Pallice. When outside the Grionde Estuary she did a practice deep dive to 160 meters, |
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checked her radio and G.S.R. equipment and tested the new 37 mm. gun. The U-boat arrived in La Pallice Christmas Eve at midnight. There was a brief celebration on board, after which officers and men went ashore to be quartered. |
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U-177 remained in La Pallice 8 days, taking on 4 or 5 T-5 torpedoes, 1000 - 1100 rounds of 37 mm. "minenmunition", 4 20 mm. barrels and 2 truckloads of spare machine parts. Two 16 mm. armor plates were welded to the sides of the Conning Tower (See Chapter II). |
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It was rumored that the spare parts and the armor plates were to be taken by U-177 to the Far East. Buchholz told his men that they must expect to be away for at least a year, so it was assumed that the U-boat was to go to Japan. The officers knew that U-177 had been ordered to go to Penang. |
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ESCORT INTO THE BAY OF BISCAY | ||
U-177 left La Pallice at 1900 Sunday, 2 January 1944, escorted by a minesweeper, 2 anti-aircraft vessels and 2 JU-52 aircraft. The aircraft circled at a distance of 6-7 miles and were stated to have searched for drifting mines. U-177 followed the minesweeper, and the "flakboote" took up positions on either beam at a distance of about 1-1/2 miles; U-177 proceeded at 3/4 speed. When the U-boat had been underway a few hours, a loud explosion was heard ahead, and Buchholz ordered the engines stopped. The minesweeper had run on a mine, but her fate was not determined by those aboard the U-boat. Shortly thereafter the 200-mater line was reached, the escort put about, and U-177 submerged. |
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PASSAGE TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC |
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U-177 proceeded through the Bay of Biscay on a course of 2400 - 2500, submerged except for a few hours each night. Buchholz being characterized by survivors as exceptionally cautious. The passage required 2 days and nights. There were no aircraft sightings or attacks. Buchholz held his westerly course until the U-boat reached a point west of the Azores. He then headed south on course 1700, which course was maintained until his sinking. U-177 continued to remain submerged in daylight. |
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MINOR DAMAGES |
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While U-177 was submerged in the general vicinity of the Azores, a crack developed in torpedo tube No. 3. The damage could not be attributed to any particular factor, but the engineer officer informed Buchholz that the tube could not be used on this patrol. |
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The Equator was crossed a few days before the sinking, and the customary ceremony held. (O.N.I. Note: Several of the survivors were readily identifiable to interrogating officers as having made their first crossing - by their short-clipped hair.) One prisoner stated that the ceremony took place on 2 February. |
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The nerves of the Diesel-room personnel were not calmed by the irregular flashing, at this time, of the automatic crash-dive light. This flashing light was controlled by a push-button in the control room, and indicated that the Diesels should be stopped. As a result of a short-circuit, which could not be traced, |
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the light flashed at moments unrelated to crash-dive commands, with the result that the Diesels were stopped frequently without reason. |
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No ships or aircraft were sighted and no attacks of any kind suffered prior to the sinking. The helicopter was never used by Buchholz. |
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CHAPTER XI. SINKING OF U-177 |
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The sinking of U-177 was effected on 6 February 1944 at 1130 (German Summer Time) with such accuracy and dispatch that survivors were obliged to abandon ship within seconds of the initial attack. U-177 was proceeding on a southeasterly course, fully surfaced and at cruising speed, when she was surprised by a four-motored U.S. bomber. The plane was stated to have approached in the 3500 - 3600 lookout sector, relative bearing of the sun being about 3000. The bridge watch lookout at the time was disposed as follows: |
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Roch sighted the plane belatedly at an estimated distance of 2000 meters, and reported it to Fabig, who could not see the plane at once, and waited a moment before giving the alarm signal. Bohr manned one of the twin 20 mm. cannon and opened fire, but the other gun crews had no opportunity to reach their guns. |
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In this connection it was stated that daily emergency gun drills had dulled the awareness of the gun crews, who "resented" the frequent interruptions of their rest. Their lethargic reaction to the genuine alarm, when it came, further sealed the fate of the U-boat. |
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The Diesels were ordered to flank speed, and the U-boat turned to starboard. The first bomb was believed by survivors |
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to have fallen directly onto the deck, well forward, the second next to the galley and the third just forward of the Control Room. All 3 detonations shook the boat so drastically that a number of men were wounded by objects torn loose from their mountings and by flying glass. The lights did not go out. Buchholz was preparing to ascend to the bridge when the detonations occurred, and climbed out of the Conning Tower a moment later. Almost immediately, the U-boat settled and water started to pour into the Control Room through the Conning Tower hatch. The engineer officer, making no effort to regulate the boat's trim, shouted "Boot taucht allein, alles raus" ("she's going down, everybody out"). |
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As one survivor clambered out, the Conning Tower was already under water, and the flow of water into the U-boat was so strong that he could hardly reach the bridge. It was believed that several large water entries forward of the Control Room had made the boat settle. About 20 officers and men, including Buchholz, jumped into the water, all others being trapped in the flooded, sinking boat. As they swam about, the bomber came over again and released 3 more depth charges on the swirl of the sinking U-boat. The detonation of these charges killed about 6 of the swimmers, including Buchholz and was felt by all of the survivors, several of whom were wounded by splinters while in the water. A moment later, there was a strong detonation from the area of the U-boat, which survivors believed to be the explosion of the batteries. |
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The bombers now circled and flew low over the survivors, who expected to be machine-gunned, as the plane had strafed the |
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U-boat while dropping the first series of depth charges; instead, they were merely photographed. Shortly thereafter, a second plane arrived as relief for the attacking bomber and dropped an inflatable rubber boat among the survivors. Fourteen officers and men reached the rubber boat. The bomber also dropped a life jacket to which provisions were attached. |
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ACTION REPORT |
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(O.N.I. NOte: The following condensation of the action report (FAW 16, 4th Fleet, VB-107 (ascension), Report No. 15, 2-6-44) is included for information and comparison.) |
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A PB4Y-1 on anti-submarine sweep from Ascension Island took off on 6 February 1944 at 0700 G.C.T. Visibility was good - (15 miles), and radar was not used. Wind was 1100 - 14 knots, and sea moderate. Submarine wake was sighted at 1025 G.C.T. from 2600 feet, at 12 miles. Submarine was sighted on course 1750 T. at 10 miles, fully surfaced. |
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When the plane was approximately 2 miles from the submarine, a moderate amount of heavy anti-aircraft fire was observed 100 yards ahead and slightly to port. The plane was put into a brief power glide and then pulled up. At three quarters of a mile and 1000 feet altitude, the plane went into its attack run, with the bow gun bearing on the U-boat's Conning Tower. No further anti-aircraft fire was observed near the plane. |
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At 1029 G.C.T. the plane released 6 Mark 47 bombs with Mark 234 fuse - 25 feet hydrostatic setting; speed - 200 knots; spacing - 60 feet; altitude - 100 feet; drop made at 150 angle |
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just forward of Conning Tower. Machine gun flashes were observed coming from a position near the Conning Tower, no men were observed on deck, and the U-boat gave no indication of attempting to crash-dive. |
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The plane regained altitude to 800 feet after strafing by tail gunner, and banked to port to continue attack with the remaining 3 bombs. The 3 bombs were released at 1030 G.C.T., the U-boat having been observed to turn 750 to starboard and to be about 25 feet below the surface. |
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After regaining altitude, the plane came in low over the scene of the attack, nothing a large oil slick and survivors in the water. |
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RESCUE OF SURVIVORS |
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The 14 survivors spent 56 hours in the rubber boat before being picked up by the U.S.S. OMAHA. As the boat was far too small to accommodate 14 men, all sat with their legs in the water. Leutnant Brodt, as the senior officer, took command, and ordered sail set for the Brazilian coast. During the first night, a freighter of some 5000 tons passed within 800 meters of the survivors, but all efforts to attract the ship's attention failed. A number of patrol planes were sighted as well as several destroyers and planes which were believed to be the elements of an anti-submarine task group. |
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Brodt was stated to have been unable to control his fury at Roch, who was considered responsible, as the lookout from whose sector the bomber had attacked, for the loss of the U-boat. Had |
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the group remained intact much longer, survivors maintained that Brodt would have provoked a mutiny by his conduct and been killed by the men. With the assumption of command, Brodt became an insufferable martinet. |
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The rations dropped by the relief plane were more than adequate, and there was no particular discomfort except that occasioned by overcrowding of the boat. Late on the second day after the sinking, a corvette approached but turned away; then the U.S.S. OMAHA hove into sight, put over a boat and brought the survivors aboard. |
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CHAPTER XII. OTHER U-BOATS |
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U-BOATS IDENTIFIED BY COMMANDERS |
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1600 TON SUPPLY U-BOATS |
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A survivor from U-177 saw in a U-boat bunker at La Pallice, between 24 December 1943 and 1 January 1944, a 1600 ton supply U-boat. The chief difference between this U-boat and the 1600 ton combination supply boat and minelayer was that there was no Conning Tower projecting above the upper deck surface. The Conning Tower hatch, projecting 3/4 of a meter above the deck, was the only raised portion visible. The survivor believed that the Conning Tower fairing and bridge had been made retractable, due to the slow diving time of a loaded supply boat, so as to minimize the danger of being rammed. No deck armament was seen. The survivor stated that this type boat was called "geisterboot" ("ghost-ship"). This U-boat was stated to have a mine-ejector opening astern comparable to that of "U-Elephant" (U-459, 1600 tons). |
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CHAPTER XIII. HISTORY AND DETAILS OF U-195 |
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(O.N.I. Note: Several of the survivors from U-177 had served in U-195 under Korvettenkapitän Buchholz and had transferred to U-177 with him in October 1943.) |
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U-195 made a single war patrol of four months' duration,. leaving Kiel 20 March 1943, operating in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean and returning to Bordeaux on 23 July 1943. Details given herein apply to equipment fitted or carried during this patrol. Shortly thereafter, U-195 was stated to have gone into drydock in Bordeaux, together with U-180 for conversion to a supply U-boat. |
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Buchholz was credited with the sinking of 3 ships totaling 24,000 tons. During her single patrol U-195 fired 13 torpedoes. |
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Buchholz's first success with U-195 was registered about 1 May 1943 when a Liberty ship of 10,000 tons was sunk in the Casablanca area. (O.N.I. Note: There is no record of this action.) Three weeks later, he sighted and chased a fast (18 knot) freighter of 8000 tons making for St. Helena. The freighter eluded U-195 for two days but was finally torpedoed and sunk just off St. Helena. Two days later a second, but slower 8000 ton freighter was torpedoed and sunk. (O.N.I. Note: The S.S. SAMUEL JORDAN KIRKWOOD, U.S. freighter of 7176 tons, was torpedoed and sunk on the night of 6/7 May in position 15.00 S. - 07.00 W. There were no other sinkings in this area at this time.) Buchholz then proceeded to the Indian Ocean, where no successes were scored. U-195 rendezvoused with U-177 in mid june 1943 several hundred miles southwest of the Cape of Good Hope (See Chapter IX) and then began the return voyage to Bordeaux. |
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On 11 July 1943, U-195 rendezvoused southwest of the Azores with U-487, a 1600 ton supply U-boat commanded by Oberleutnant z.S. d.R. Metz, two days before U-487 was sunk. Buchholz received fuel and took aboard U-195 Metz's Engineer Officer who was ill and was to return to Bordeaux. (O.N.I. Note: U-487 was sunk by aircraft from U.S.S. CORE on 13 July 1943 in position 27.15 N. - 34.18 W. The interrogation of survivors from U-487 produced no information concerning the meeting with U-195 and the transfer of the Engineer Officer, Leutnant (Ing.) d.R. Kohler, who was stated to have been a casualty.) |
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A few days later, Buchholz was ordered by Control to make |
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contact with U-Pauckstadt and to proceed in company through the Bay of Biscay (O.N.I. Note: Korvettenkapitän Hans Pauckstadt, of the 1926 Naval Term, is believed to command U-193). Shortly after meeting, both Buchholz and Pauchstadt were ordered to assist U-Zschech, which was under heavy aircraft attack. (O.N.I. Note: Kapitänleutnant Peter Zschech of the 1936 Naval Term, is believed to have commanded U-505, which returned to Lorient in mid July 1943, severely damaged after only 10 days at sea). Buchholz and Pauckstadt could not comply with this order as they were being attacked intermittently by aircraft and were obliged to remain submerged. U-Pauckstaadt was stated to have been damage by a Sunderland and two Liberators and was obliged to make for Bordeaux with U-195 rather than proceed to Lorient, her base. U-195 sustained no damage. Both U-boats arrived at Bordeaux 23 July 1943. |
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Click this text to view Plate XVI. Anti-Escort Mine
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CHAPTER XIV. GENERAL REMARKS ON U-BOATS |
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TORPEDOES |
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Steel Torpedo Tubes |
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It was stated that various U-boats, including U-198, were fitted with steel torpedo tubes. |
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Angle of Impact Switch |
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It was confirmed that the angle of impact switch is now a standard element of the torpedo data computer in U-boats. Installation of the switch was begun in December 1942. |
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F.A.T.-2 |
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The circle setting of this torpedo was stated to be "grün lang" (green long). |
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ANTI ESCORT MINES (See Plate XVI). | ||
A survivor from U-177 had been in a 750 ton U-boat at the Schichauwerft in Koenigsberg in August and September 1942. This U-boat was equipped with a shaft for the release of mines against pursuing ships. The shaft (See Plate XVI, A) passed through the pressure hull and contained 2 mines which were released, 1 at a time, by means of air pressure. The shaft was located in the motor room, about 1 meter from the after bulkhead. |
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The 750 ton U-boat in question sank 4 weeks later during its technical exercises. |
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The prisoner saw 3 or 4 anti-escort mines in the yard, and described them as follows: |
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ANTI-AIRCRAFT BALLOONS |
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It was stated that the Senior Officer of the 12th U-boat Flotilla at Bordeaux had indicated that all boats of the Flotilla, including U-177 were to be equipped with a new type of anti-aircraft balloon. A survivor said that these balloons bear no similarity to R.D.B. but are designed to float above the U-boat, attached fore and aft by wires, possibly to function as barrage balloons and keep attacking planes at a distance. |
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REMOTE CONTROL FIRING |
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Survivors had never heard of remote control firing for U-boats, and were wholly skeptical as to its feasibility. |
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NEW DECK GUNS |
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A survivor stated that he had heard in Bordeaux of plans |
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to fit some new U-boats with guns having a bore in excess of 40 mm. It was thought that these would be mounted forward of the Conning Tower. |
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MOVEMENTS OF U-BOATS (BORDEAUX) |
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Several survivors stated that all U-boats of the 12th Flotilla had been ordered to be ready for sea and leave Bordeaux prior to March 1944. No explanation was advanced for this order. |
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COVER NAMES (BORDEAUX) |
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Bordeaux-based U-boats (12th Flotilla) were stated not to have cover names. |
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GOLIATH TRANSMITTER |
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A survivor stated that the Goliath was built for the express purpose of being able to communicate with submerged U-boats operating in cooperation with aircraft. The idea was for U-boats to remain submerged in patrol lines in areas within reach of German long-range aircraft. The aircraft would search for convoy's and, on finding them, would report to Control. The U-boats, submerged to 30 meters, would then receive instructions via the Goliath and either proceed to a specified area or surface to receive beacon signals from the patrolling aircraft. Attempts to carry out this policy had failed because the Germans had no aircraft suitable for this purpose and whenever aircraft had gone out on this sort of patrol they had been promptly shot down. As a result of this the Goliath was now being used to transmit the "Tagesappel" (Repetition of the previous days' signals). This was considered a |
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waste of the special equipment of the Goliath since PARIS I and PARIS II had been quite adequate for these purposes. |
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Tagesappell for Africa II on long wave is from 2100 to 2330. |
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NEW DEVICES FOR U-BOATS |
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Survivors ridiculed the manner in which U-boat officers at French Atlantic bases whispered about the "murderous new gadget I have on my boat", and then proceeded to sea and were sunk. It is felt that many new devices (such as new G.S.R. equipment) is now being installed in U-boats solely to bolster morale. Rubber covering for U-boats was cited as being in this category. |
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CHAPTER XV. MISCELLANEOUS |
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MINES |
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Dummy Periscope Mines |
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A survivor had heard (mid 1943) that mines with dummy periscopes had been used in the Baltic. |
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Shaped Charges |
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It was stated that shaped charges had been used in mines for more than a year. (O.N.I. Note: A survivor of questionable reliability from U-409 had mentioned a spherical ground magnetic and/or acoustic mine which had a "weak spot" on top through which the explosive went up in a cone - effective up to 100 meters. |
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Mine Types |
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It was stated that 1600 ton minelayer U-boat lay 2 kinds of mines. A survivor did not know whether each was an "O" type of mine but recalled seeing a steel circumferential ring, about 10 mm. thick and 18 cm. wide, the purpose of which was to permit the mine to withstand greater pressure. |
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MORTALITY RATE IN THE GERMAN NAVY |
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The 3rd watch officer of U-177 stated that of 450 members of his "Crew" (naval term), 120 had already been killed. |
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ATTACKS ON NAVY LEAVE TRAINS |
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It wa stated that, by the middle of 1943, French sabotage and British air attacks on trains carrying German naval personnel to |
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Germany on leave from French ports had become so severe that British prisoners-of-war were transported on leave trains. It was felt that knowledge of their presence on the trains would forestall further attacks. |
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DÖNITZ AT ST. NAZAIRE |
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A survivor had been present at a formal address by Admiral Dönitz to the U-boat Flotillas based at St. Nazaire in November 1943. Six men were ordered from every U-boat then present at the various French Atlantic bases to attend the ceremony. Dönitz admitted that the U-boats were suffering certain handicaps, but expressed his faith in their ultimate triumph through "new weapons". Meanwhile, he said, it was the fast duty of the German U-boat arm to attract the full weight of the Allied air power to itself in order to divert the Allied air forces from concentrated bombings of the German homeland. |
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The new lack of confidence in Dönitz, manifested recently by officers and men captured from other U-boats, was confirmed ans echoed by survivors from U-177. |
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ANNEX. CREW LIST OF U-177 AND U.S. EQUIVALENTS |
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OF GERMAN NAVAL RANNKS. |
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* Denotes casualty. |
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d.R. denotes reserve officer. |
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(Ing.) denotes engineering duties only. |
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