CONFIDENTIAL
	NARRATIVE OF K-74 ACTION ON NIGHT OF JULY 18-19, 1943:
	K-74 was cruising on routine night A/S patrol in Richmond Area 1 at about 500 foot altitude.  Surface was calm with a slight swell, wind from 150 T., force 10 knots.  Moonlight very bright from a moon just past full.  Azimuth bearing of moon 140 T.
	At 2340 July 18 got a radar blip, range 8 miles, relative bearing slightly to starboard.  Blimp was on track 189 T.  and true bearing of blip was 240.  Radar blip was not very strong and disappeared at intervals.  Radar operator showed blip to pilot and pilot wrote dispatch to base, coding position himself.  Position as reported was 23 59 N. 80 11 W. because pilot forgot to use correct procedure to encode position, which was 25 59 N.  80 49 W.
	Course was angled to the right to the blip bearing and crew stationed at battle stations.  Pilot as navigator, ensign on elevator, AP on rudder, rigger on machine gun (shooting very good), missing man Stessel on bomb release (asked when crew first went to general quarters at beginning of flight if he knew about bomb releases Stessel replied very positively that he did, but bombs although properly armed never left rack.  Pilot said knurled knobs were turned to action position, but releases stuck on half release probably due to not holding black knob down during release), senior mech on mech panel, senior radioman on radio (used good judgment and accuracy in sending report that he was being fired on without waiting for answer to call - incidentally, same radioman was on radar at the time of first contact and notified pilot promptly),  good radioman on radar remaining men on after lookout and photographic assignments
	Drift caused blimp to pass sub abeam 1/2 mile to blimp's port.  Sub showed no sigh of seeing blimp.  Forward lookout said "there's a sub out there" when to him it clearly silhouetted in moonlight.  Several saw sub at about same time.  Others in back of car at first would hardly believe that it was a sub.  There was no question in mind of anyone who saw sub as to what it was.  There was some question, due to the proximity of Key West, that it might be a U.S. sub, but this was dispelled by pilot.
	Having seen the sub the blimp made two circles one or two miles away and took a good look at the sub in the moonlight.  Everyone seemed agreed that there was a deck gun, long and low, aft and separate from the conning tower.  They did not recall seeing any forward gun, although German 250, 517 and 740 ton subs all have a forward gun but did believe that there was a forward gun.  The 517 ton shows its after gun on a platform in the conning tower, and the 740 ton is the only German sub which shows the after gun separated from the conning tower.  Several of the crew agreed that there was the typical break in railing characteristic of German subs.
	When blimp swung around again to a position to the north of the sub and turned to a southerly heading which seemed to be direct towards the sub's tail it was decided to go in immediately to attack.  Speed was increased to 1700 r.p.m. and altitude reduced to 250 feet and blimp went straight for sub's starboard quarter.  When blimp got in to 200 yards range the sub commenced firing at the bag.  Conjecture was made by blimp crew that as far as they could tell they hadn't been seen until they started their bombing run and got in rather close.  Pilot said and crew agreed, that if bombs had released properly they couldn't have missed the sub.  Bombs were ordered both dropped at the same time, depending on time interval for bombardier to shift from one

 

	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECOND PAGE OF NARATIVE:
	rack to the other to determine spacing.  Pilot knew and swore about the fact that the bomb releases stuck in selective position.
	Blimp started .50 caliber firing almost same instant as sub.  Blimp fire declared by several to be very accurate, blimp tracers seen to go between two lines of tracers from sub twin mount, until sub firing stopped and blimp 60-rounds belt expended.  Blimp shifted belts and fired 40 rounds more until sub was past maximum depression of gun.
	Controls of blimp went out directly over sub and blimp started up at a steep angle.  Air evidently lost from forward ballonet due to sub gun fire.  Ensign Eversley pulled throttles back to regain control and stop steep climb.  Climb was evidently rather steep because several said blimp went straight up to about 1000 ft.  In dark the inclination would appear exaggerated.  Sub fire resumed from machine guns and 3 deck-gun rounds fired.  Lieutenant Grills said he heard these ; others agreed.  Size of sub machine guns was determined by size of holes in fins and plexiglass.  Bag and fins pretty well shot up because later when men were clinging to blimp car they said they could hear hissing sound of air being forced out of bullet holes in fins and this lasted some time.  Each saw tracers going into both engines, when blimp was directly over sub.  Fire started in starboard engine and mech used CO2 extinguisher and put it out.  Both engines dropped off in r.p.m. at same time.  Attempted to get started again and did get it going as blimp was settling into water.
	Lieutenant Grille slipped both slip tanks as ship started settling toward water, and dumped gasoline to lighten ship.  No evidence that any tracers hit gasoline tanks.  Statement made that no bullet or shell went into car.  Main effort at this time to lighten the ship and keep it in air until North Elbow Cay could be reached.  Sub had turned hard left from its 220 course during blimp attack.  Grills said sub turned to present deck gun - so that sub's course must have been about 110.  This was toward the moon and the wind.  When sub turned, so did blimp, keeping on sub's starboard quarter.  As controls failed blimp was headed roughly west.  It appears that if pilot had valved air aft when blimp started steep climb it might have been brought under control.  Attempt was made to start ______.
	Blimp settled into water at 2353 and water was fairly deep in car before anyone left car.  After door was not opened until water was deep enough to cover floor of car.  Port engine was running at slow speed at the time.  Man who threw life raft but lost it because he did not hold onto it and did not fasten available line to it.  Not observed as to whether raft floated.
	When pilot ordered "Abandon Ship" everyone got clear of car all right.  Lieutenant Grille dropped metal confidential folder and there seemed some delay to him about its sinking.  After he left ship he got to thinking about pistol and decided to go back for it and did.  Bag seemed to be supporting car well enough so there was no danger of being smothered under bag and men came back to car and held to rails.  Men in water separated in two groups when they thought sub would return.  Jandrowitz and another man took turns towing Stessel all night.  Impression received that Stessel could swim but would not.  Blimp drifted in wind faster than men and so those who did not want to hold onto fins had to swim to keep near blimp.  Stessel and Jandrowitz were in this group.

 

	CONFIDENTIAL
	THIRD PAGE OF NARRATIVE:
	Stessel fell behind about 1/2 mile at one time and called to the men to come back for him.  They told him to swim.  Then one went back and others followed.
	Other group was nearby but apparently separated somewhat.  Lieutenant Grills got separated when he went back to car for pistol, and upon reentering water could not see others in crew, so thought they had set off in life raft.  In morning the two groups near the ship saw the Squadron Commander in Wing J4F spot them and go away.  They later saw blimps and planes pass nearly over them.  Blimps seemed to be searching water at some distance from them with binoculars rather than looking straight down without binoculars.
	After J4F left, Stessel got separated by 50 yards or so and at about 0800 when Ensign Eversley was swimming towards him to tow him to the group and as still 30 yards distant, Stessel suddenly yelled "shark" and the men in the group not far from him saw a fin cut the surface and saw the shark attack him at the waist.  They saw his face all bloody and then didn't look that way and he disappeared.  Ensign Eversley saw shark fin and tail as he struck.
	Soon after that, the K-74 began to sink fairly fast and disappeared completely in about fifteen or twenty minutes.  There were two violent explosions, obviously from the depth charges which were still armed and apparently were released from the racks when the car broke up and took a strain on the release wires.
	Later in the morning the two groups were picked up by the U.S.S. Dahlgren which had been zoomed and summoned by the J4F from a position about 10 miles away.
	Lieutenant Grills spoke of doing considerable swimming in the direction which he thought would take him to North Elbow Cay.  Surface craft passed him fairly close aboard several times without seeing him.  He was finally picked up by SC 697 after being sighted by the blimp K-54 at 1828.
	The morale of the crew was very high.  They really learned something about keeping a good lookout.  The thought that seemed to matter the most was the fact that when they were in such a perfect position to bomb the sub the release had not been properly operated.  The only injury they seemed to have suffered was sunburn.  They were provided with Red Cross rescue clothing by the surface craft.

 

	COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:
	1.    This is the first time in the present war that an airship has intentionally and directly attacked a surfaced enemy submarine.
	2.    The possibility of improperly encoding the longitude of the radar target is never remote but it is felt that the pilots flight time of 430 hours on patrol with this Squadron, much of which was as navigator, should have precluded this mistake.  As the reported position of the target was on Cay Sal Bank in 7 fathoms of water, the Squadron Commander was convinced that the proper position was the complement of that given and it was to that position he proceeded in the Wing J4F (Widgeon) for search at daylight and near where survivors were located.
	3.    When the target was determined to be an enemy submarine, the pilot should have radioed that information in plain language.  As the radioman had to repeat his original blip message to the base due to high atmospheric static interference, he was busy almost up to the time of his emergency message.  However, he reported that he did transmit the attack information on "Scene of Action" frequency.
	4.    Doctrine and procedure direct that an airship stay out of gun range of a surfaced submarine and radio all information to the base.  As there was important friendly shipping in the area, and as the submarine took no apparent notice of the airship which had to circle within gun range trying to identify it and try to keep it within vision, the decision to attack is accepted.  "Identification" at night will in most cases lead to such close proximity as to make "attack" synonymous should the vessel be unfriendly.
	5.    Commander Gulf Sea Frontier Confidential Serial 0794 of 7 July re. "Air Attack - Radio Reports" had been received by the Squadron the day previous but had not been routed or promulgated.  This Squadron had previously worked out a similar procedure but had been instructed to await the publication of the Commander Gulf Sea Frontier order.  Therefore, the only radio signal transmitted by the K-74 during the attack was a special emergency Squadron message "OFU" (meaning "Am being fired upon") which was transmitted repeatedly about sixteen times after the enemy commenced firing.  Due to the high atmospheric static level this emergency message was not received by Naval Air Station, Richmond, but was received by the K-32 in an adjacent area and relayed to the base.  This was commendable action on the part of the radioman on the K-32.
	6.    Machine gun fire by the blimp should have commenced when the range was 500 yards and before the submarine opened fire, to prevent the sub from manning her guns.  Fire was withheld until the sub opened fire at about 200 yards.  The logical reason given for this action is that the gunner did not want to shift magazines in the middle of the attack, and as long as the pilot believed that he was unobserved by the sub he felt he could approach closer with more likelihood of successful attack if he withheld fire.  Fire was well directed and believed partially effective as the sub's fire was interrupted.  The machine gunner had been an instructor on the range.

 

	SECOND PAGE OF COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:
	7.    The tragic failure to release the bombs when directly over the sub at 250 feet definitely precluded major damage to the enemy and probably contributed to the loss of the K-74 in that the sub was permitted to continue uninterrupted fire after the blimp was overhead and the forward gun could not be depressed to fire at the sub.  Training in the use of the bomb releases has been extensive, using a drill mock-up as well as the unloaded releases on the ships in flight.  The pilot had called the ship to General Quarters three times previous to the attack and the bomber had checked out on the bomb releases.  The type L-21A Bomb Release has several times in the past been improperly operated due to its double lock safety feature.  As the bomber was lost at sea after the forced landing, the reason for the bomb release failure cannot be definitely determined, but it is in the Squadron Commander's experienced opinion that the release handle caught in the "Selective" notch half-way up the quadrant because the "Release Knob" was not fully compressed and the bomber became excited and lost the ability to operate the release to its "Salvo" position.  This has occurred even to experienced officer pilots when operating the Type L-21A Bomb Release in excitable situations.  When the opportunity to release the bomb had passed, the arming handle should have been returned to "Safe" to have prevented the detonation of the bombs as occurred after the blimp sank and broke up, releasing the bombs from their racks - as has happened on surface craft with depth charges.
	8.    The action of the crew in attempting to save the blimp from crashing and from catching fire was properly executed.
	9.    The Abandon Ship Bill was not followed due to the excitement existing.  The life raft was improperly handled by the member of the crew who was later lost.
	10.    The crew cleared the ship upon crashing from fear that the submarine would approach to capture survivors.  It is believed by the Squadron Commander that the submarine dove and cleared the area when it saw the blimp climb toward 1000 feet at a steep angle after passing directly overhead, and few seconds later drop the two slip-tanks which could have been taken for bombs.  If such is the case the sub thinks that the blimp attacked, climbed clear and then dropped "bombs" which for some reason had not been dropped directly overhead.  The turn into the moon-slick by the submarine may have been used as evasive tactics, and the moon-slick is somewhat "blinding" to the attacking aircraft, whereas the aircraft is directly illuminated to the sub by the moonlight.
	11.    Survivors had a strong desire to remove their clothes in the water because they were "heavy" and cramped their movements.  One man removed his trousers, and the pilot removed his outer clothing.
	12.    The blimp did not sink completely until about 0830 and during the early morning was used as a source of buoyancy by the crew.  It drifted in the wind faster than the men in the water so they had to "swim to catch up" whenever they lost hold.  The fins were the last source of buoyancy, and the tail-cap was the last part to sink.  When sighted by the Squadron Commander at 0745 the tail-cap extended only a few feet above the water.  An attempt to land the sighting plane (F4F - Widgeon) on the white capped surface of the sea was abandoned when it was determined that such landing would result in loss of the plane.  The load limit of the plane prevented carrying rescue equipment (except for rescue rations and kit) with four persons and a full load of fuel on board.

 

	THIRD PAGE OF COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:
	13.    The survivors stayed together well, but should have lashed themselves together with life jacket straps.
	14.    Sunburn and chafing from loose life jackets were the only injury suffered by the survivors.
	15.    The single fatality is attributed to shark attack.  He has been vomiting continuously and did not keep his arms and legs moving except at infrequent intervals.  One other survivor said that a "gray spotted shark" bumped into him but his kicking and using his knife kept the shark away.  The survivors formed a circle back to back and waved their knives and kicked to "scare off sharks" and to attract attention of aircraft.
	16.    The survivors did not consider cutting fabric from the blimp or control surfaces to use to attract attention of rescue craft, or to use as headgear for protection from sunburn.
	17.    It is believed that the action of the K-74 in attacking the submarine was the only action to formulate the definite report that there was an enemy submarine in this frontier, and therefore alerted the area prior to damage to shipping.  This alert resulted in an attack in the same area the following night by a PV on a surfaced submarine.  So many reports of sightings only have resulted in the estimate of "possible" whereas this sighting and attack resulted in a "positive" prior to further damage.
	RECOMMENDATION:
	1.    The Bomb Release Type L21A be alerted by cutting down the width of the release handle guide (piece # 33A4516) so that once the handle is unlocked from "Lock" it can be expeditiously moved through "Selective" to "Salvo" without the likelihood of hanging-up at the midway point of quadrant due to insufficient compression of the release knob.  The bomb release does not appear complex to the Squadron Commander, but he appreciates that at times where instant release is required it may become complex to the bomber.  This possibility must be removed.
	2.    The Lieutenant Grille be commended for his daring, aggressive attack under fire which is in keeping with Naval Tradition and which tended to prevent further damage in this area from this particular submarine.
	3.    That the survivors be commended for using good common sense with what they had at hand to prevent further casualties to themselves.
	4.    That an after machine gun of any caliber be mounted on the K-airship car so that fire might be directed from aft to slightly forward of the beam and directly downward.

 

	FOURTH PAGE OF COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:
	COMMENT:
	Intensive training in details is being pursued in this Squadron to prevent recurrence of the tragically disappointing failure to release the bombs, to adhere to proper communication instructions, and use all life saving equipment properly.