C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
	III.  Approach and Attack.
	(a)  Narrative:
	A "blip" was reported by radar operator at 25 miles, bearing 090 relative.  It was a very faint "blip" at that distance but became clear at 18 miles, appearing long and slender resembling a "small ship".  The pilot headed for the radar contact, flying over or through the towering cumulus clouds present in that area.  At a distance of 12 miles, a submarine was sighted through a rift in the clouds, bearing 045 relative.  Radar was then turned off.
	The plane continued in the clouds, bomb bay doors were opened, and a slow right turn was made, with the plane gradually losing altitude, until breaking through the clouds at 2000 feet, 4 to 5 miles distant from the sub.  At about 3 miles, the plane opened fire with the bow guns.  Although splashes could be seen in the vicinity of the target, firing was halted after 15 rounds to conserve ammunition for closer range.  When attempted later, the guns jammed and would not fire.  Several men were visible on the deck manning the gins and in the conning tower.  (See photograph.)  The sub opened fire at the plane at a range of about 3 miles and continued to fire throughout the plane's attack, putting the plane's starboard engine on fire.  The fire was discovered by the flight engineer as the plane was passing over the sub.
	The plane approached in a shallow power dive 20 away from the stern to give the submarine a difficult shot.  At the last moment the plane was banked steeply coming in on the starboard quarter at 200 feet skidding slightly to port.  The sub was moving at from 8 to 10 knots and the plane's speed was 180 knots.  Pilot directed co-pilot to release the bombs when about 1200 feet from the sub.  The intervalometer was set to drop bombs spaced at 60 feet apart at 180 knots.  Observers in the tail turret believe that the bombs all dropped in one salvo.  The photograph suggests the possibility that one or more fell at a prior interval.  This was caused apparently by an enemy hit shorting the power lead to the bomb bay, resulting in all (remaining) bombs dropping together.  (See detailed ordnance report and photographs.)
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	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
	III.  Approach and Attack.
	(a)  Narrative, continued:
	The nearest bombs apparently fell within about 150 feet short of the sub and some or all exploded.  Observers in the tail turret estimated the bombs fell about 50 feet short of the sub.  The sub submerged immediately after the plane passed over, apparently undamaged, smooth water being visible between the explosion and the sub.  When it could be brought to bear the tail gun was fired, but after 15 or 20 rounds it jammed.  The plane, with a fire in the exhaust stacks of the starboard engine due to a ruptured oil line, departed at full speed in order to gain as much distance as possible from the sub in the event of a forced landing.  Five miles from the scene of action and while at 400 feet, the starboard engine failed, and the propeller was feathered.  It was found that the starboard bomb bay could not be closed making flight on one engine unusually difficult.  Accordingly, all dispensable equipment, including the radar, was jettisoned, when the plane gradually lost altitude down to 200 feet. fuel was drained from the starboard wing service tank to the hull tank to lighten the load on the starboard wing.  After these measures had been taken, the pilot was able to maintain level flight by using 37" and 2650 R.P.M. on his port engine, and returned to base, a distance of 420 miles.

 

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	COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER
	I.  Attention is invited to the fact that this is the second sighting in this area in the past two days in which the presence of the submarine was first revealed by the use of ASG radar.  In neither case has there been any evidence of the enemy suspecting the presence of aircraft by the use of radar of his own or by the use of radar detecting equipment.
	II.  Altitude of flight, use of cloud cover, the turning off of the radar, and the approach are considered not only to have been in accordance with current doctrine but also showed mental alertness on the part of the pilot in that thorough preparation for the attack was made.  A plain language contact report was sent prior to the attack, a voice report on scene of action frequency was made and, subsequently, an encoded amplifying report was sent.  These communications were received by two AM's in the general area and by the base.  The AM's headed for the scene of action.  Base operations diverted two PB4Y aircraft returning from an extended offensive sweep to the scene of action, and despatched one PB4Y and one PBM-3S from the base to the scene of action.  Unfortunately nothing could reach the scene of action prior to 1800R. over three and one half hours after the attack.  At 1640P and three bearing DF was obtained which fixed the transmission near the scene of action.  This transmission was on 10,310 KC.  At 1651 another transmission on 12,261 KC gave a fix at the scene of action.  The DF operator believed that both transmissions were from the same transmitter.  It is believed that these transmissions were from the attacked submarine.
	III.  The two mine sweeps arrived at the scene of action at 2100P, 8 July.  They remained in the area until 2020P, 9 July.  Of the two planes despatched to the scene immediately after the attack, one was forced to leave at 2400P, 8 July.  The other plane remained on station in communication with the AM's until relieved the morning of 9 July by two planes from the base.  These two planes searched the area during the daylight hours of the 9th.  Another plane was despatched to cover the area until 0100P, 10 July.  At daylight on 11 July another plane searched the general area.  The result of the search was negative except for a disappearing radar blip received by one plane at about 1900P, 8 July, some 45 miles bearing 300° (T) from the scene of action.  Particular attention was given this area with negative results.
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	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
	COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER (CONT'D.)
	IV.  It is considered that the pilot opened fire outside of effective range, but this error would not have been serious since the order to cease firing was given as soon as it was evident that the range was excessive.  Just why the guns jammed at this point had not been definitely determined but the present installation of twin .50 calibre guns on a ball and socket has not been completely satisfactory due chiefly to the method of feed.  It is understood that a .50 caliber mount similar to the .30 calibre mark 14 mount is being produced for the PBM-3S airplane.  It is felt that a mount would be definitely superior to the present installation.  If a .50 calibre mount is not readily available the MK14 .30 calibre mount is recommended in preference to the present .50 calibre installation.
	V.  Had the bow guns functioned it is believed that the complexion of the succeeding events would have been changed.  The time of flight of the bomb assuming level flight of the aircraft would be approximately 3.53 seconds.  Using the trail of a MK17 bomb (since no tables are locally available for the MK47) and adding the known forward underwater travel of the MK47 bomb, the total forward travel should be approximately 1080 feet.  However, the plane was estimated to be in a shallow dive at the time of release.  This would give the bomb an initial velocity of its vertical component which would considerably shorten the flight path, tending to cause the bombs to fall short.  The personal time lag of the second pilot from the time he received the signal to press the firing key until the time the firing key was actually pressed (tending to cause the bomb to fall over) could be roughly balanced against the angle of dive of the aircraft.  After consideration of all available evidence and factors involved it is believed that probably one and possibly two bombs had been dropped by the intervalometer at the time the submarine's gunfire shattered the main bombing system conduit causing all remaining bombs to fall in one salvo.  It is considered that this lucky shot undoubtedly saved the submarine from receiving a lethal blow, since a normal intervalometer spacing of the remaining bombs would have certainly straddled the target.
	VI.  It is considered that the pilot delivered a well planned and well executed attack.  His demonstration of personal courage in pressing home the attack in the face of heavy enemy fire without the protection of his own guns is in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service.  The entire crew functioned as a smoothly operating team both during the attack and in assisting the pilot to save the plane after a direct hit on the starboard engine had caused that power plant
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	COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER (CONT'D.)
	to catch fire and fail.  The damage received in the bomb bay system prevented the starboard bomb bay from closing making flight on one engine most difficult.  The quick action of the plane captain in draining the gas from the starboard wing service tank to the hull tank to relieve the load on the starboard wing is worthy of mention.  The well timed action of the navigator in obtaining the picture of the attack from the port waist hatch under difficult conditions produced by the existing attitude of the plane is also considered commendable.  Recommendation for suitable awards is being made separately in accordance with existing instructions.
	M. H. TUTTLE.