FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON C.O. FESSENDEN (DE-42) CONFIDENTIAL LTR.
DE-142/A16-3 SERIAL 030 DATED 13 OCTOBER 1944
     
 
COMMANDER ESCORT DIVISION NINE
 
 
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
 
 
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
  CCD9/A16-3/hr  
  Serial No. 046                                                                                   
                                                                                                             20 October 1944  
     
 
From: Commander Escort Division Nine.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: The Commander Task Group 22.1.
   
Subject: Submarine Attack.
 
     
          1.        The subject attack was observed by this command from HOWARD.  
     
          2.        Planes from MISSION BAY were maintaining sono-buoy contact prior to entry of pattern area.  Previous entry in the morning had been made but with negative results although planes had good sono-buoy contact.  Area was cleared when wake interference became excessive after combing pattern area.  
     
          3.        Ships approached area in line, interval two thousand yards, course east, BLAKELY to north and FESSENDEN to south of HOWARD.  
     
          4.        Plane from MISSION BAY dropped smoke light on best estimate of sono-buoy contact when ship's were in god visual distance (about four miles).  
     
          5.        At about two miles from smoke marker BLAKELY and FESSENDEN were directed to steer 065°T and 115°T respectively while HOWARD maintained base course of 090°T.  Upon HOWARD reaching smoke marker above ship's were ordered to reform on HOWARD.  Shortly there after FESSENDEN obtained subject contact.  
     
          6.        The above procedure was used since in previous searches, planes from MISSION BAY reported contact always moving back towards the sono-buoy that formation had passed.  Generally this could always be confirmed by ship receivers.  It it the writer's opinion that all good U-boat Captain's are familiar with our standard search plans and immediately clear the direct path of approaching ships then return to swept waters.  It is believed that deviations in group search is the best countermeasure.  
     
          7.        Foxers were streamed immediately by all ships about three minutes prior to FESSENDEN's contact when noises, similar but approximately one third the intensity of Mark IV FXR gear, was heard on ship receivers.  
     
          8.        Foxers were not streamed before above time in order to get the valuable information from planes and our ship receivers.  This procedure no doubt is open to criticism but all ships were previously warned to be able to stream gear in five seconds.  More over a very careful watch was maintained on sono-buoy receiver to obtain and torpedo noises.  
     
 
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COMMANDER ESCORT DIVISION NINE
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
 
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
  CCD9/A16-3/hr  
  Serial No. 046  
                                                                                                                          20 October 1944  
  Subject:        Submarine Attack.  
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          9.        'Observant' was immediately conducted by the two assisting ships after FESSENDEN's contact.  
     
          10.        The oil slick on October 4 extended on a bearing of 300° from point of origin (where it was gushing)  yet wind was from about 055°T and current calculated as setting west.  Unable to account why the oil did not drift more to the westward or down wind, a dye marker was placed at the point of origin and observed at an interval of forty minute and then another dye marker was dropped at point of origin.  From above it was concluded there might be a possibility of the sub moving very slowly to the southward.  From above reasoning FESSENDEN and FAQUHAR were ordered to form respectively on HOWARD's quarter approximately 450 yards between ships (or 225 yds parallel to HOWARD's track).  The above three ships in formation passed the point of rising oil on course of 165°T and commenced laying a slow barrage starting at approximately 800 yards passed reference point.  No immediately visible results were obtained and ships returned to vicinity westward where planes were holding another sono-buoy contact.  However, for the record, the slick was observed on the fifth of October and the oil from point of rising was drifting towards 235°T (wind was from 055°T).  The gusher was again observed on the sixth of October and it was drifting towards 250°T (wind was from 070°T) and a pronounced V could be observed denoting the change of wind during the previous twenty four hours.  No more depth charges were dropped on the rising oil slick.  The oil slick on 6 October still covered approximately twenty five square miles although moderate to fresh breeze had been experienced since attack on 30 September.  
     
          11.        The cooperation of the plane pilots from MISSION BAY was of the highest type and made it possible for sonar contact by FESSENDEN.  
     
          12.        The navigational position of rising oil slick did not move any distance from evening of 4 October to 6 October.  
     
          13.        The remarks made by C.O. FESSENDEN in basic report are generally concurred in by this command.  However sonar conditions were far from ideal the pattern at time of attack from BT reading was "Sonar long 80/13 Mike".  The detonations from hedge hogs were heard through HOWARD's sound gear by all people near amplifier on bridge.  
     
          14.        It is believed that the U.S.S. FESENDEN seriously or mortally damaged the submarine described in basic report and that a submarine was sunk in Latitude 11 - 38 N, Longitude 34 - 40 W, (FESSENDEN'S corresponding position was always reported as 11 - 40 N, Longitude 34 - 39 W).  
     
                                                                                                       E. W. YANCEY  
     
 
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