U-boat Archive - U-boat KTB - SM U-86 5th War Patrol

SM U-86 - 5th War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

HMHS Llandovery Castle, assigned to Canadian Forces, was torpedoed and sunk by SM U-86 on 27 June 1918. Attacking a hospital ship was against international law and standing orders of the Imperial German Navy. The Kommandant, Helmut Patzig (Royal House Order of Hohenzollern), tried to destroy the evidence of torpedoing the ship by running down all but one of the lifeboats and machine-gunning survivors. He did not note the sinking in his KTB and swore the crew to secrecy.

The First and Second Watch Officers, Oberleutnants Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt, were charged with committing a war crime. On 21 July 1921, Dithmar and Boldt were found guilty in one of the Leipzig War Crimes Trials and were each sentenced to four years in prison. The sentences were later overturned on the grounds that the Kommandant was solely responsible. Patzig, however, had fled to Danzig, then an independent city, and thus escaped prosecution. He served in the Kriegsmarine in WWII.

Canadian author Nate Hendley's book Atrocity on the Atlantic gives an excellent account of the sinking and subsequent war crimes trial.

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Borkum	20 June 1918	Wilhelmshaven	12 July 1918	23

Click the icon to download a KMZ file displaying the U-boat track, significant events and locations for this patrol. You must have Google Earth loaded on your computer to view this file. Download Google Earth here

Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
21 Jun 18	12.30	55°45'N, 3°15'W	EGLANTINE	339	Norwegian
26 Jun 18	00.41 - 02.07	55°45'N, 12°30'W	ATLANTIAN	9,399	British
27 Jun 18	about 19.00	50°26'N, 11°42'W	LLANDOVERY CASTLE	11,423	British
30 Jun 22.30 - 1 Jul 16.00		46°57'N, 8°06'W	ORIGEN	3,545	British
1 Jul 18	22.20	47°15'N, 7°42'W	COVINGTON	16,339	American

			Total = 40,985
Note: The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website. The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

                                                                   Page 1.

                                                      Control No. 3

        Ganz Geheim !

       ============

        Kriegstagebuch

   =================

                                       S.M.Unterseeboot " U.86 "

                                          ==========================

            Kommandant : Oberleutnant z.See

                                                Patzig

      Beginning: 20 June 1918.

      Ending :    12 July 1918.

===============

© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

                                                                   Page 2.

20.06.18

x.20 AM Borkum Roadstead After meeting with Chef der 2. Geleithalbflottille departed in the wake of the leader boat together with UB 118 (Kaplt. Krauss)

N 3, overcast

                                 signed Patzig.

21.06.18

x.35 AM North Sea Released from convoy.

[AF=full speed - between GF and AK]
UB-118 out of sight, continued at AF.

x.xx AM Entered the blockade area.

12.00 Noon Dogger Bank Sailing vessel, 3 masted bark in sight. Weather at the limit for use of artillery.

NW 5-6, Sea 4-5, overcast

Square 029 delta 7 Norwegian sailing vessel.

12.30 PM
" E G L A N T I N E "

339 tons, probably with piece goods from England to Norway sunk with 56 shots 10.5 cm.

1.00 PM Test dive after artillery shooting.

1.10 PM Continued transit. Sighted multiple drifting mines.

x.30 - x.35 PM NW 4, Sea 4, cloudy

                                 signed Patzig.

22.06.18

2.35 AM NW 2, cloudy, Sea 2 Torpedo track to port, turned away, passed 10 meters ahead of the bow, periscope not seen.

North Sea

SE 1-2, cloudy, Sea SE 1, overcast

12.00 Noon Square 131 beta 2 Left the blockade area, so on the way north we will be on the convoy route announced by Bergen.

Crossed the latitude of 60°N.

x.30 PM Lat. 60°10'N Light buoy on the northern limit of the new English blockade area lies in 300 meters water and can only give the enemy navigation reference. Therefore shot it down.

Long. 4°05'E

x.40 PM Steamer of the Belgian Relief with prescribed markings. Did not examine.

Sailing vessel in sight.

                                 signed Patzig.

23.06.18

x.16 AM NNW 5-6, Sea N 5, cloudy Multiple sailing vessels in sight.

x.10 AM Again entered the blockade area.

12.00 Noon Square 081 alpha 1 Dived before a group of patrol trawlers. Proceeding submerged for about 30 nm was necessary to cross the line.

x.00 PM WNW 4-5, Sea N Course 240°.

                                 signed Patzig.

Sun and Moon Data 20.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 21.06.18

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Sun and Moon Data 23.06.18

                                                                   Page 3.

24.06.18 Atlantic Transit speed 11 knots, course 230°.

Proceeded far offshore, to get to the tactical area quickly.

12.00 Noon

06.34 PM Square 027 epsilon 6 Depth control training.

NNW 5-6, cloudy, Sea 5-6

                                 signed Patzig.

25.06.18

12.00 Noon Transit speed 11.5 knots, course 210°.

4.50 - 6.15 PM Square 003 delta 5 Dive training.

9.00 PM NNW 3, cloudy Strong enemy Radio Telegraph traffic.

10.00 PM Smoke cloud in 310°T, 1 small cruiser (American) "ROCHESTER" in sight. Behind it a convoy of 13 steamers of 7000-9000 tons in line abreast.

In the last hunting light, the boat reaches the steamer on the right wing to shoot.

                                 signed Patzig.

26.06.18

12.41 AM Torpedo shot from tubes I and II. G 6 A V+. 38 knots, enemy speed 10 knots, impact angle 90°, 1st torpedo fired under the 2nd mast, 2nd under the third mast. 1 hit before the bridge after 17 seconds - 306 meters.

Further shooting not possible. Small cruiser comes towards the torpedoing location with strong zigzagging courses and changing speed, shoots to all sides.

The second torpedo, fired at the 3rd mast, still should have hit something, because the 1st torpedo hit exactly at the fired at position. For this reason MZ pistol failure is likely.

        Since it is a large, valuable steamer and because of the lack of light I can't see whether the steamer is being abandoned, I decide to shoot a bow coup de grâce after reloading the bow tubes.

        When turning in for this attack, the small cruiser comes towards the boat at top speed, turns away 45° at about 1000 meters and draws past the stern, so:

1.02 AM Stern shot, G 6 A V+, 38 knots. Impact angle 90°. Enemy speed 20 knots. Shooting range 700 meters. Miss, because the cruiser slowed down and at the same moment as "fire" turned hard towards the boat. At this moment at 350 meters the bow shot was ready against the still floating steamer.

1.07 AM Torpedo shot, G 6 A V+, hit after 18 seconds - 340 meters and had to go to depth 40 meters due to ramming position with the small cruiser.

1.20 AM Cruiser ran off behind the convoy giving signals with his searchlight.

Sun and Moon Data 24.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 25.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 26.06.18

                                                                   Page 4.

continued

26.06.18

2.08 AM Surfaced after reloading tube I.

2.30 AM First Officer and radioman of the steamer taken prisoner.

12.00 Noon Square 143 epsilon 5 Steamer

[the time above is not 12.00 Noon but 2.00 AM, the three entries below are not PM but AM
                         " A T L A N T I A N " 9339 tons armed with 3 cannons sunk. Was the largest steamer of the convoy of 13 ships from Newport News to Liverpool with oil, 1000 tons of piece goods, 5000 bales of cotton. Departure from America 13 June - 13 days.

x.35 PM [AM] Initiated maneuver ahead. Reported the convoy by radio Message, gained contact.

x.30 PM [AM] Convoy has grown nervous. Small cruiser blinks often 6 short top lanterns - U-boat on the surface to starboard.

x.35 PM [AM] [probably 05.35 AM based on begining of civil twilight at 05.11 AM] Am to port of it - a bit close. (Statement of the First Officer) In the meantime it is getting light again. Before I could made the correct decision to make the time-consuming, but safe, hauling out around the convoy beyond the horizon to 5-10 nm before daybreak, the cruiser suddenly spotted me 3 nm next to him, because the boat and its white bow sea was brightly lit by the moon. (Until then, I hadn't thought the bow sea could actually be seen that far.)

        Cruiser made a signal 12 short flashes with the top lantern - U-boat to port, a few ships of the convoy open fire. Cruiser turned towards. Must submerge. At high submerged speed tried an attack on a steamer that had been left behind until then, but suddenly the engine was back in order and it maneuvered back into position again.

x.15 AM

x.30 AM Motor boat protection joins the convoy, throws 5 scare depth charges.

x.00 AM Surfaced, charged.

x.00 AM Am forced to submerge by a destroyer.

x.40 AM Surfaced. Now there is no prospect of maneuvering ahead, for I can only gain a position ahead at the Mull of Kintyre.

Therefore gave up further pursuit. Convoy was still reported once more by Radio Message (large antenna).

        In my opinion a double shot on the "ATLANTIAN" was correct. With 4 bow torpedoes or more a salvo on the line abreast would have been possible. The attack was easy because there was no screen. The line abreast ran on a weak, regular zigzag course.

        The shot on the small cruiser "ROCHESTER" was uncertain because of his wild zigzag course, but not without a chance of hitting.

    I felt badly about the coup de grâce shot on the "ATLANTIAN" shortly after it was released, which was the 4th torpedo. Only when the captured First Officer assured me that the shot had been fired just at the moment when the ship and engine were ready to get underway again, once again I resolved to. . .

Sun and Moon Data 26.06.18

                                                                   Page 5.

continued

26.06.18 always give ships over 5000 tons 2 torpedoes as increased security if possible.

   The second maneuver ahead of the convoy was arranged carelessly. I shouldn't have chosen 2-3 nm, but 6 nm distance to draw around and therefore I didn't get to the second attack due to my own mistake.

8.45 AM Transit speed, course 210°.

12.00 Noon Square 059 alpha 5

NNW 4, Sea 3

                                 signed Patzig.

27.06.18

Atlantic

WNW 3, Sea 3, cloudy Course 190°.

12.00 Noon Square 073 delta 2 Intend to proceed south via Point X and 402 to go to the tactical area.

                                 signed Patzig.

28.06.18 WNW 2, Sea 2-3, foggy Course 200°.

Minor diving mishap cue to flooding of the starboard diesel. Damage examined.

12.00 Noon Square 083 alpha 2 Exhaust slider and valve of the starboard diesel leaked during test dive, can only be ground in the cold condition. The boat only remains ready for diving when using the port engine alone. If possible, the starboard diesel will be shut down 10 minutes before diving during the entire operation and used little.

Reason: salt deposits in the exhaust piping, see Special Report

                                 signed Patzig.

29.06.18 ENE 4-5, Sea 4, clear, cloudy

11.56 AM U-boat in sight, seems to be own.

12.00 Noon Square 110 epsilon 7 Visual Recognition Signal is not usable.

11.59 AM Radio Telegraphy converter and Underwater Telegraphy converter are at the moment temporarily out of service (see Special Report).

Square 133 and 119 epsilon 7 The sighted U-boat extends its periscope and dives.

12.05 PM Called with Underwater Telegraphy, there was no answer.

1.00 PM It could be U-53, who reported his return transit from square 012 beta 7. The not answering the Under Water Telegraphy Recognition Signal speaks for the assumption that is was an enemy U-boat. Therefore ran off on course 0°.

2.50 PM Radio Telegraphy converter is operable again; to warn U-52 Sent Radio Message: At 12.00 Noon saw a U-boat dive before me square 019 epsilon 7.

3.22 PM No answer from U-53. U-102 announced to U-8x and all: Caution, many enemy submarines square 133 epsilon.

I ask U-102 to disseminate it.

08.47 PM Answer: Strip III, go to IV in the north. Radio Message to all boats: Square 153 delta, occupy strip III. No other boat reports at traffic time.

                                 signed Patzig.

Sun and Moon Data 26.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 27.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 28.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 29.06.18

                                                                   Page 6.

30.06.18 West exit of the Channel

5.00 AM Convoy in 270°T with course about 230°.

6.30 AM ENE 5, Sea 4, overcast, cloudy Initiated maneuver ahead and after the course of the convoy was correctly identified, Radio Message to all boats: Square 070 alpha [1] course 230°.

No one reports.

8.25 AM Dived for the 1st attack.

The convoy does not run on course 230° as accepted before, instead on course 205°. With the quite high swell at the beginning of the attack the target angle is difficult to get. Because of this misjudgment, I can no longer get into the convoy. Only a shot on the final steamer is still possible at great range: therefore as a precaution G Z A V+ torpedo double shot. Impact angle 65-70°, enemy speed 8 knots, no success.

      At 1500 to 1700 meters the shot would have been better left undone as too uncertain, however it remained unnoticed, probably the seas were too high and people were looking more ahead.

10.20 AM Surfaced. Began 2nd maneuver ahead.

[The position in this message seems bad - should be in square alpha 1] Radio Message to all U-boats: Convoy in square 022 beta 8. Course 205°, speed 8 knots.

No one reports.

12.00 Noon Square 138 alpha 1

3.20 PM Dived for the 2nd attack.

3.40 PM NE 5, Sea 5, cloudy

The convoy is extraordinarily well protected. A kind of crown of fishing trawlersstands crowded ahead of it and make getting inside seem uncertain. Because in the high wind and seas the boat cannot be steered at shallow depth, with the short Germania-boat periscope the formation is difficult to make out.

      My plan is to get in from ahead and in turning away shoot 2 with a stern shot.

      The first chain of destroyer and fishing trawlers is passed.

      Just when think I'm through the second one there's a whirring noise at the bow and it seems to be getting stronger. I throw the periscope around, which was still pointed aft. The trawler, which I thought I'd already passed, is 80-100 meters from astern. The whirring gets stronger comes to the conning tower, a force grabs the periscope and turns it out of my hand.

      Instinct: Both AK ahead, retract the periscope, all men forward, go to depth 50 meters, boat is in the net!

        The boat heels over. The periscope isn't quite retracted yet, so at 20 meters there's a cracking sound like a line breaking. The periscope is stuck and can't be turned.

      Because after 3-4 minutes nothing happens, continued the attack, went to periscope depth on stern shot course and put the auxiliary periscope into operation. But the steamers are already past, the shot is too far, 1500 meters. The attack was thwarted by the screen and failure of the periscope.

4.55 PM Surfaced. Examined the damaged periscope. A line has apparently gone over the boat, pushed the net deflector up to the tower on the port side, crushed an egg insulator, then lay against the periscope, which is dented almost along its entire length as if by a sharp file, and bent the periscope a bit. Either

Sun and Moon Data 30.06.18

                                                                   Page 7.

continued

30.06.18 the trawlers had a search line between them or an underwater explosive device caught and didn't detonate.

      The main periscope can be made operable again. The scratches are filed down and smoothed. Then the periscope can be extended and retracted again and turned when it is all the way out and all the way in. If there is a barely measurable mid-level distortion in the stuffing box, it can't be turned. Extending and retracting is also difficult.

      The periscope is limitedly ready for use

6.00 PM Maneuvered ahead.

7.20 PM Am positioned far enough ahead, dived for the 3rd attack. This time I'll try to get into the convoy going behind the protective crown at HF to shoot a bow shot.

        A flank covering trawler, which I don't want to have in front of me because of the MZ pistol, but instead behind me, forces me too close to the selected steamer. Therefore turned hard, to the opposite course.

10.30 PM G 6 A V+ stern shot 270°, impact angle 60 to 70° on the same steamer, detonation after 22 seconds = shooting range 300 meters. We are positioned 100 meters next to the fishing trawler and in ramming position with the next steamer. A 2nd shot is excluded.

Went to depth 50 meters.

16 depth charges in salvos of 3-4.

11.10 PM Surfaced. Trawlers or the convoy are still in sight. Closed the shadows.

11.42 PM Crash dive for a destroyer.

                                 signed Patzig.

01.07.18

12.19 AM Surfaced. Closed. The torpedoed steamer lies still, 3 fishing trawlers and 2 destroyers are with it.

      I decide not to pursue the convoy until this steamer sinks.

1.19 AM It is too bright for a surface coup de grâce and the protection is much too strong. Am forced to dive.

2.00 AM Surfaced. Waited for moonlight.

2.55 AM Forced to submerged again.

3.00 AM There is enough moonlight for a coup de grâce shot. The steamer lies well illuminated. The fishing trawlers and destroyers circle it. The bow lies deep about 1 meter under the hawse pipe, the stern is out up to half the propellers. So its situation doesn't look very hopeful, but the strong protection allows us to conclude: this steamer, built in the style of standard ships, has such strong bulkheads that there is hope of being able to bring it in with powerful tugs. It was hit at the front, the engine is still intact, if the stern is lowered by re-stowing it, the propeller can work again.

Sun and Moon Data 30.06.18

Sun and Moon Data 01.07.18

                                                                   Page 8.

continued

01.07.18

3.50 AM Stern shot S A V 260-300 meters, depth 3 meters.

[by position he means way the ship floated with the stern raised] Fired a bit aft. No success, because I undershot the stern at too close a distance by misjudging the position of the steamer.

3.30 AM Stern tube was reloaded. Maneuvered for a stern shot. When attacking, paid too much attention to the destroyer that is close to me, the steamer is pushed around a bit by the wind. Almost rammed the steamer with the conning tower, submerged strongly down by the bow.

4.08 AM Stern coup de grâce S A V 400-500 meters, depth 3 meters.

Aim point center fire. No success. Because the shot was perfect, I must assume torpedo failure, failure is justified by experience.

        The shots were difficult to place. In the moonlight, the protection could often only be identified very late, when the position could actually no longer be changed.

        Little can be seen in the moonlight. The battery is almost empty. The crew and the depth control crew are exhausted. My nerves also by the 24-hour attack. Therefore moved off submerged.

x.00 AM Surfaced, it is too bright, the steamer is still over the horizon.

x.x8 AM Dived

x.00 AM Surfaced, charged the battery. Stayed in the vicinity of the steamer moving back and forth 5-8 nm away.

12.00 Noon Square 016 beta 8

x.00 PM Battery is full. Closed submerged, to watch the steamer closely.

      From the lively Radio Telegraphy traffic of the patrol vessels this morning with Landsend and the still diligent protection of the trawlers and destroyers, there must be an intention to tow the steamer. The steamer itself is manned. Gun crew is ready, people on platforms are on lookout.

Atlantic, Bay of Biscay

        Despite the shortage of torpedoes, I have to decide to take another shot.

      The first attack failed, the destroyer turned towards the boat at 800 meters. I went to depth 50 meters and then went higher again in a full circle. When I reached periscope depth, the destroyer had also completed a circle around the steamer and was heading towards periscope again. I went to depth 14 meters and retracted the periscope, let it pass over the stern, after a while I go back to depth 12 meters and shot a G 6 A V+ bow shot with MZ. Detonation after 17 seconds = 320 meters.

x.xx PM Square 016 beta 8

      Moved off at depth 55 meters at AF. 3 individual depth charges.

Sun and Moon Data 01.07.18

                                                                   Page 9.

continued

01.07.18

04.30 PM All around sweep. Steamer of 6000 tons sunk. Fishing trawlers and destroyers still throw 5 depth charges, so moved off at depth 50 and 30 meters.

x.x5 PM The sinking of this steamer lasted 35 hours, The (3+4) = 7 attacks on it placed the greatest demands on personnel with considerable counter effects.

The size of this steamer is difficult to estimate. I've wavered between 3000 and 8000 tons.

x.00 PM NE 4, Sea 3, overcast, clear Radio Message to all U-boats. Have begun return transit with one torpedo square 004 beta 8.

x.20 PM Convoy in sight in 90°, coming towards the boat.

x.31 PM Dove to attack.

It should be considered that the main periscope is more stuck in the stuffing box than before; only one stern tube is ready for shooting. Is the full comittment of the boat in the convoy justified when the periscope is inoperable and so the view of the target is limited, and the destruction of a steamer cannot be achieved at least with this one torpedo? -barely-. Still the possibility that one of the ships approaching could be caused to sink by a torpedo must silence any calculation. It is a magnificent sight, the convoy rushing closer, surrounded by destroyers, the outlines of those fast ships, which with their 10,000-25,000 tons serve the war transport between America and France, becoming clearer. Unfortunately empty!! and outbound. Of these 4-mast 2-smokestack steamers there is only one Britian left. So those two came from our own shipyards!

    The small target angle can just be overcome; at 14-16 knots and counter course of our own boat for the stern shot in turning the situation develops quickly. I can’t get the biggest one, but the one to its right.

I get through the forward screen of destroyers well. It is only unfavorable, that there's only still a little hunting light and that the shot must fall in the outer column at the risk of being run over.

10.20 PM G 6 A V+ stern shot. Enemy speed 14 knots, impact angle 75°. Depth setting 3 meters. Fired at a silhouette of masts and smokestacks in disarray, the line abreast is positioned against the evening sun in cover. The shot went in a hard turn, had to go to depth 50 meters immediately to dive under the outer column.

Detonation after 52 seconds - 960 meters.

10.23 PM Moved off submerged at AF at depth 55 meters. It starts suddenly 3 minutes after firing! A violent barrage of depth charges. The first 3 lay considerably close together, with the occasional audible propeller sounds across the boat. Boat is shaken, some lights go out, torpedo hatches open slightly

Sun and Moon Data 01.07.18

                                                                   Page 10.

continued

01.07.18 and some water splashes in at the hinge and closes again. (Marker buoy burst - discovered later) depth charges are gradually getting further away.

11.30 - 11.40 PM 10-minute firing pause.

12.03 AM A new salvo of depth charges. In all 48 (73rd charge of the operation).

                                 signed Patzig.

02.07.18

Bay of Biscay

NE 3, cloudy, Sea 2

2.40 AM Surfaced, came to opposite course to the run off course to search for the result of the shot.

x.xx AM A large shadow ahead; several destroyers with it. Because only 4 steamers are in question (that are between 16000-25000 tons) and I don't assume that its had enough from one torpedo, I want to try to notify another boat.

x.37 AM Radio Message to all U-boats: Very large shot steamer square 145 gamma 8. Have shot all torpedoes, please shoot, am holding contact.

Also reported the convoy by Radio Telegraphy.

The steamer lies still. Sometimes Morsing is done, then 4 green stars were shot. I stayed at 5-8 nm away to charge the battery and for Radio Telegraphy traffic with other boats.

x.55 AM Radio Message: Square 159 gamma 8 20000 ton steamer shot. Lying still. Have shot all torpedoes. Please shoot.

Signal was given multiple times, no report or sign of understanding. After experience with yesterday's steamer, the situation seems desperately impatient. Tug assistance can intervene at any moment.

x.30 AM       To try everything, slightly beyond visual range, got the large antenna ready for transmission.

        As the masts stand, the chain link on the front mast lift breaks. The forward mast falls.

        After 2 hours of strenuous work with all hands the mast is ready again.

      Masts stand. The shackle used breaks in the chain. The forward mast falls again.

x.50 AM Antenna for the after mast alone was made ready, the Radio Telegraphy lifting motor fails, The after mast falls. The large antenna remained out of service for the rest of the operation.

x.51 AM       Because there is nothing more to do with Radio Telegraphy and no communications are achieved, again ran to the steamer location, to hold contact.

Sun and Moon Data 01.07.18

Sun and Moon Data 02.07.18

                                                                   Page 11.

continued

02.07.18

11.50 AM Steamer should be in sight.

12.20 PM By plotting in at the torpedoing location. Multiple boats in sight.

12.30 PM Square 146 gamma 8 Wreck site of a steamer.

Possibly here between 10.50 and 11.50 hours steamer

CINCINATTI- COVINGTON, 16339 tons

      ======================

12 hours after torpedo shot.

15.00 PM Searched through the boats, interesting papers, among them "Battle Signal Book of the United States Navy 1913 Strictly Confidential" and diaries etc. were found.

x.30 PM To make sure steered search courses 60-80°.

x.00 PM Forced to submerge by a destroyer.

x.00 PM Surfaced.  Began return transit on the surface. Further searching seemed pointless after the dive. I also have the impression that the radio messages, including the convoy reports, are completely without results.

x.30 PM Inbound convoy square 044 gamma 8 course 50° sighted and reported.

                                 signed Patzig.

03.07.18 Atlantic

12.00 Noon Square 118 gamma 2 Boat at times not clear to dive for 1/2 hours because the exhaust gas slider and valve for the starboard diesel cannot be closed. See Malfunction Report.

NNE 4, cloudy, Sea 3

                                 signed Patzig.

04.07.18

12.00 Noon Square 167 epsilon 3 Transit on course 10°.

x.10 - xx.20 NNW 2, Sea 3 Test dive.

[Highest square in epsilon 3 is 164]
                                 signed Patzig.

05.07.18

12.00 Noon Square 005 delta 5 Course 30°.

NW 6, Sea 6, foggy, rain                                  signed Patzig.

06.07.17

12.00 Noon Square 064 epsilon 6 Course 40°.

NNW 3, Sea 3                                  signed Patzig.

07.07.18 North Atlantic

x.xx AM SE 2, cloudy, Sea SE 2, clear 2 FOXGLOVEs and 4 to 7 fishing trawlers appear to be the northern extension of the patrols north of the Shetlands. Avoided on the surface, crossed the blockade area limit to the north.

Sun and Moon Data 02.07.18

Sun and Moon Data 03.07.18

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                                                                   Page 12.

continued

07.07.18

x.xx AM Nevertheless am forced to dive. Course 90°.

x.xx AM Surfaced. A steamer of the Belgian Relief in sight.

12.00 Noon Square 001 gamma 2

x.05 PM Since I am now pushed out of the blockade area, I decide to proceed in the neutral channel to look at and examine the vessels I come across.

x.10 PM Danish sailing vessel "NORDSTERN" from Denmark with wood for Casablanca, had no Conduct Note from the German Government. Lay in Petersburg from 1915-1917. Bought back by the shipping company in October 1917. Flag change cannot be determined.

      Since I don't know whether Casablanca is a French, Spanish or Moroccan port, released.

x.30 PM Stopped the Norwegian steamer "SAN TELMO" from Christiantia with pulp for Barcelona. Since the company "Berner and Hielsen "London"? (enclosed letter for Adm, Staff) is perhaps not a hostile one after all, or is not an intermediary, let it go.

x.xx PM Belgian steamer "UBIER" of the Belgian Relief stopped. Pepers perfect.

x.40 PM Released.

x.xx PM [handwritten] "COVINGTON" ex "CINCINATTI" Course 150°.

                                 signed Patzig.

08.07.18 North Sea The assumption that the "CINCINATTI" was sunk is confirmed by a Radio Telegraphy report from the Reuters Newspaper Service.

ENE 1-2, Sea 1

x.05 AM Northern edge of the northern English blockade area Course 180°.

Weak detonation heard far off.

x.40 AM Square 130 beta 2 Strong detonation in the foreship. Between bow cannon and the bridge about 80-meter high column of water and fuel. Boat was strongly shaken. Ran on a mine. Engines stopped. Battery gas, smoke and fire in the foreship. Lights out.

x.45 AM Both diesels and rudder (by hand) are operable again. Course by magnetic compass 180° and by sun azimuth.

Condition of the boat after examination: Not clear to dive. Due to a leak in the Kommandanten room above the battery it gives off gas and the room must be abandoned. The forward bunker (III) is broken open and has emptied. I still have enough fuel for another 15 nm about to the border of the new English blockade area.

x.xx AM Radio Telegraphy converter was operable for a short time again. Residual battery current is just enough to transmit a radio message. Square 130 beta 2. Ran onto a mine. Assistance needed urgently. Last possible radio message.

Sun and Moon Data 07.07.18

Sun and Moon Data 08.07.18

                                                                   Page 13.

continued

08.07.18 U-53 acknowledged and answers: Going to accident location.

      Then "Bringing help square 100 alpha"

Avoided multiple glass buoys on the surface.

After meeting with U-53 we steered for 100 alpha.

Square 099 alpha 4 Met U-53, only 500 liters own fuel in the consumption tanks/enough for 1 hour).

U-53 comes alongside, gives 6 tons of fuel (enough to get to Skagen/part of the crew handed in excess of requirements is handed over to U-53, the boat is prepared for demolition.

                                 signed Patzig.

09. - 10.07.18 Ran in on the East Route.

                                 signed Patzig.

11. - 12.07.18 Transit to Wilhelmshaven.

12.30 PM Made fast in the new torpedo Shipyard Wilhelmshaven.

                                 signed Patzig.

[The mention of Skagen and the East Route probably means that on 9-10 July U-86 went through the Skagerrak-Kattegat to Kiel instead of the nornal route down the west coast of Denmark direct to Wilhelmshaven. This way the boat would be less likely to encounter an enemy aircraft or ship when it was unable to dive. Then on 11-12 July the boat went through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to Wilhelmshaven.]

Sun and Moon Data 08.07.18

                              Control No. . . . 3. .

                                 Ganz Geheim.

                ===================

                         Experiences.

for the Kriegstagebuch "U-86" from 20.6. to 12.7.18.

Mission: West exit of the Channel, together with other boats.

                  Conduct of the Operation.

Outbound transit:

               Chose to proceed a great distance from land in order not to be held up by coastal and patrol vehicles during the very long days and thus strive for the fastest approach. There could also be prospects for artillery use far from land.

               Off the North Channel on the 26th of June encountered a convoy, still without destroyer escort. Shot out 11.5% of the convoy, reported, missed the 2nd attack due to own carelessness.

Return transit.

               The same plan as the outbound transit. Ran on deep mines in the new English blockade area.

In the Operations Area.   Only operated for 3 1/2 days, met the strongest traffic. On 30 June saw a convoy, reported, attacked 3 times and pursued, and after 36 hours effort brought to heel 1 steamer of 6000 tons = 23% of the convoy. 1 July saw a convoy of large ships, attacked, shot out 1 streamer of 16339 tons = 10% of the convoy, reported. On 2 July 8.30 PM, saw a convoy, reported, torpedoes were expended, began return transit.

Artillery: No experiences.

Torpedoes: The unsuccessful coup de grâce on 1 July I explain as:

               Before the shot the boat was strongly down by the bow with the danger of ramming with the tube ready at depth 45 meters. The outer tube door was only completely tight at depth 30 meters. Due to the pressure of 3 kg, water entered the pressure compensation chamber through the piston of the depth steering apparatus and caused the torpedo to steer 3-4 meters deeper. Under steering was the result. Lesson: It would have been appropriate to examine the torpedo again, equalize the pressure, drain and vent the chamber.

Crew: The health of the crew left a lot to be desired when leaving. The Second Watch Officer and almost 1/3 of the crew still suffered under the aftermath of the flu prevailing in Emden. Injuries and illnesses occurred almost daily. The uncertainty as to whether the

treatment was correct had a depressing effect; I believe that considerable training of the Watch Officers in medical matters is necessary. Likewise improvement of the apothecary.

        In the operational area there was oppressive heat and a lack of air in the boat, caused by the battery heating up to 40°C. The result was heart and breathing difficulties.

      Despite the exhaustion, the Technical crew worked tirelessly to keep things running. By eliminating the small mishaps and to tackle larger repair alternatives fresh. Thus, U. Maschinisten Maat Lehners distinguished himself by quick access when repairing the periscope on 30 June and thus enable the 3rd decisive attack. On 3 July Maschinisten Maat Kapitza worked quickly and well on opening up the exhaust valve beneath the upper deck.

        The Seamanship depth control team did a good job. The boat's successes are primarily due to the outstanding spirit that resides in the crew. In no situation was there a word of faintheartedness and the people's cooperation, borne of duty and enthusiasm, was an incentive and a joy for me. The Technical crew, led by Engineer Knoche, maintained resolute calm during the mine detonation.

Technical experiences.

        Experience with burning batteries, clogging of the exhaust pipes due to salt deposits are set forth in a Special Report.

                                 signed P a t z i g.

	Enclosures to U-86's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the document

Chart	Track chart of entire patrol

Sketches	Combat sketches

Ships	List of ships sunk

Torpedo	Torpedo and Ammunition report

Maschine	Report on Fuel and Lubricating oil and Diesel operation

Report	The Attack on Llandovery Castle - a draft description produced by dated 1 Jan 1945

Click the icons to view the associated records

Return to the U-boat KTB page




				Page 1.


				Control No. 3


				Ganz Geheim !
				============





				Kriegstagebuch
				=================

			S.M.Unterseeboot " U.86 "
			==========================


				Kommandant : Oberleutnant z.See
				Patzig


				Beginning: 20 June 1918.
				Ending : 12 July 1918.



				===============












				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved




		Page 2.

20.06.18
x.20 AM	Borkum Roadstead	After meeting with Chef der 2. Geleithalbflottille departed in the wake of the leader boat together with UB 118 (Kaplt. Krauss)
	N 3, overcast
		signed Patzig.

21.06.18
x.35 AM	North Sea	Released from convoy.
[AF=full speed - between GF and AK]		UB-118 out of sight, continued at AF.
x.xx AM		Entered the blockade area.
12.00 Noon	Dogger Bank	Sailing vessel, 3 masted bark in sight. Weather at the limit for use of artillery.
	NW 5-6, Sea 4-5, overcast
	Square 029 delta 7	Norwegian sailing vessel.
12.30 PM		" E G L A N T I N E "
		339 tons, probably with piece goods from England to Norway sunk with 56 shots 10.5 cm.
1.00 PM		Test dive after artillery shooting.
1.10 PM		Continued transit. Sighted multiple drifting mines.
x.30 - x.35 PM	NW 4, Sea 4, cloudy
		signed Patzig.

22.06.18
2.35 AM	NW 2, cloudy, Sea 2	Torpedo track to port, turned away, passed 10 meters ahead of the bow, periscope not seen.

	North Sea
	SE 1-2, cloudy, Sea SE 1, overcast
12.00 Noon	Square 131 beta 2	Left the blockade area, so on the way north we will be on the convoy route announced by Bergen.
		Crossed the latitude of 60°N.
x.30 PM	Lat. 60°10'N	Light buoy on the northern limit of the new English blockade area lies in 300 meters water and can only give the enemy navigation reference. Therefore shot it down.
	Long. 4°05'E
x.40 PM		Steamer of the Belgian Relief with prescribed markings. Did not examine.
		Sailing vessel in sight.
		signed Patzig.

23.06.18
x.16 AM	NNW 5-6, Sea N 5, cloudy	Multiple sailing vessels in sight.
x.10 AM		Again entered the blockade area.
12.00 Noon	Square 081 alpha 1	Dived before a group of patrol trawlers. Proceeding submerged for about 30 nm was necessary to cross the line.
x.00 PM	WNW 4-5, Sea N	Course 240°.
		signed Patzig.

	Sun and Moon Data 20.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 21.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 22.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 23.06.18




		Page 3.

24.06.18	Atlantic	Transit speed 11 knots, course 230°.
		Proceeded far offshore, to get to the tactical area quickly.
12.00 Noon
06.34 PM	Square 027 epsilon 6	Depth control training.
	NNW 5-6, cloudy, Sea 5-6
		signed Patzig.

25.06.18
12.00 Noon		Transit speed 11.5 knots, course 210°.
4.50 - 6.15 PM	Square 003 delta 5	Dive training.
9.00 PM	NNW 3, cloudy	Strong enemy Radio Telegraph traffic.
10.00 PM		Smoke cloud in 310°T, 1 small cruiser (American) "ROCHESTER" in sight. Behind it a convoy of 13 steamers of 7000-9000 tons in line abreast.
		In the last hunting light, the boat reaches the steamer on the right wing to shoot.
		signed Patzig.

26.06.18
12.41 AM		Torpedo shot from tubes I and II. G 6 A V+. 38 knots, enemy speed 10 knots, impact angle 90°, 1st torpedo fired under the 2nd mast, 2nd under the third mast. 1 hit before the bridge after 17 seconds - 306 meters.
		Further shooting not possible. Small cruiser comes towards the torpedoing location with strong zigzagging courses and changing speed, shoots to all sides.
	The second torpedo, fired at the 3rd mast, still should have hit something, because the 1st torpedo hit exactly at the fired at position. For this reason MZ pistol failure is likely.
	Since it is a large, valuable steamer and because of the lack of light I can't see whether the steamer is being abandoned, I decide to shoot a bow coup de grâce after reloading the bow tubes.
	When turning in for this attack, the small cruiser comes towards the boat at top speed, turns away 45° at about 1000 meters and draws past the stern, so:
1.02 AM		Stern shot, G 6 A V+, 38 knots. Impact angle 90°. Enemy speed 20 knots. Shooting range 700 meters. Miss, because the cruiser slowed down and at the same moment as "fire" turned hard towards the boat. At this moment at 350 meters the bow shot was ready against the still floating steamer.
1.07 AM		Torpedo shot, G 6 A V+, hit after 18 seconds - 340 meters and had to go to depth 40 meters due to ramming position with the small cruiser.
1.20 AM		Cruiser ran off behind the convoy giving signals with his searchlight.

	Sun and Moon Data 24.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 25.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 26.06.18




		Page 4.
continued
26.06.18
2.08 AM		Surfaced after reloading tube I.
2.30 AM		First Officer and radioman of the steamer taken prisoner.
12.00 Noon	Square 143 epsilon 5	Steamer
[the time above is not 12.00 Noon but 2.00 AM, the three entries below are not PM but AM		" A T L A N T I A N " 9339 tons armed with 3 cannons sunk. Was the largest steamer of the convoy of 13 ships from Newport News to Liverpool with oil, 1000 tons of piece goods, 5000 bales of cotton. Departure from America 13 June - 13 days.
x.35 PM [AM]		Initiated maneuver ahead. Reported the convoy by radio Message, gained contact.
x.30 PM [AM]		Convoy has grown nervous. Small cruiser blinks often 6 short top lanterns - U-boat on the surface to starboard.
x.35 PM [AM]	[probably 05.35 AM based on begining of civil twilight at 05.11 AM]	Am to port of it - a bit close. (Statement of the First Officer) In the meantime it is getting light again. Before I could made the correct decision to make the time-consuming, but safe, hauling out around the convoy beyond the horizon to 5-10 nm before daybreak, the cruiser suddenly spotted me 3 nm next to him, because the boat and its white bow sea was brightly lit by the moon. (Until then, I hadn't thought the bow sea could actually be seen that far.)
		Cruiser made a signal 12 short flashes with the top lantern - U-boat to port, a few ships of the convoy open fire. Cruiser turned towards. Must submerge. At high submerged speed tried an attack on a steamer that had been left behind until then, but suddenly the engine was back in order and it maneuvered back into position again.
x.15 AM
x.30 AM		Motor boat protection joins the convoy, throws 5 scare depth charges.
x.00 AM		Surfaced, charged.
x.00 AM		Am forced to submerge by a destroyer.
x.40 AM		Surfaced. Now there is no prospect of maneuvering ahead, for I can only gain a position ahead at the Mull of Kintyre.
	Therefore gave up further pursuit. Convoy was still reported once more by Radio Message (large antenna).
	In my opinion a double shot on the "ATLANTIAN" was correct. With 4 bow torpedoes or more a salvo on the line abreast would have been possible. The attack was easy because there was no screen. The line abreast ran on a weak, regular zigzag course.
	The shot on the small cruiser "ROCHESTER" was uncertain because of his wild zigzag course, but not without a chance of hitting.
	I felt badly about the coup de grâce shot on the "ATLANTIAN" shortly after it was released, which was the 4th torpedo. Only when the captured First Officer assured me that the shot had been fired just at the moment when the ship and engine were ready to get underway again, once again I resolved to. . .




		Page 5.
continued
26.06.18	always give ships over 5000 tons 2 torpedoes as increased security if possible.
	The second maneuver ahead of the convoy was arranged carelessly. I shouldn't have chosen 2-3 nm, but 6 nm distance to draw around and therefore I didn't get to the second attack due to my own mistake.
8.45 AM		Transit speed, course 210°.
12.00 Noon	Square 059 alpha 5
	NNW 4, Sea 3
		signed Patzig.

27.06.18
	Atlantic
	WNW 3, Sea 3, cloudy	Course 190°.
12.00 Noon	Square 073 delta 2	Intend to proceed south via Point X and 402 to go to the tactical area.
		signed Patzig.

28.06.18	WNW 2, Sea 2-3, foggy	Course 200°.
		Minor diving mishap cue to flooding of the starboard diesel. Damage examined.
12.00 Noon	Square 083 alpha 2	Exhaust slider and valve of the starboard diesel leaked during test dive, can only be ground in the cold condition. The boat only remains ready for diving when using the port engine alone. If possible, the starboard diesel will be shut down 10 minutes before diving during the entire operation and used little.
		Reason: salt deposits in the exhaust piping, see Special Report
		signed Patzig.

29.06.18	ENE 4-5, Sea 4, clear, cloudy
11.56 AM		U-boat in sight, seems to be own.
12.00 Noon	Square 110 epsilon 7	Visual Recognition Signal is not usable.
11.59 AM		Radio Telegraphy converter and Underwater Telegraphy converter are at the moment temporarily out of service (see Special Report).
	Square 133 and 119 epsilon 7	The sighted U-boat extends its periscope and dives.
12.05 PM		Called with Underwater Telegraphy, there was no answer.
1.00 PM		It could be U-53, who reported his return transit from square 012 beta 7. The not answering the Under Water Telegraphy Recognition Signal speaks for the assumption that is was an enemy U-boat. Therefore ran off on course 0°.
2.50 PM		Radio Telegraphy converter is operable again; to warn U-52 Sent Radio Message: At 12.00 Noon saw a U-boat dive before me square 019 epsilon 7.
3.22 PM		No answer from U-53. U-102 announced to U-8x and all: Caution, many enemy submarines square 133 epsilon.
		I ask U-102 to disseminate it.
08.47 PM		Answer: Strip III, go to IV in the north. Radio Message to all boats: Square 153 delta, occupy strip III. No other boat reports at traffic time.
		signed Patzig.

	Sun and Moon Data 26.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 27.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 28.06.18
	Sun and Moon Data 29.06.18




		Page 6.

30.06.18	West exit of the Channel
5.00 AM		Convoy in 270°T with course about 230°.
6.30 AM	ENE 5, Sea 4, overcast, cloudy	Initiated maneuver ahead and after the course of the convoy was correctly identified, Radio Message to all boats: Square 070 alpha [1] course 230°.
		No one reports.
8.25 AM		Dived for the 1st attack.
	The convoy does not run on course 230° as accepted before, instead on course 205°. With the quite high swell at the beginning of the attack the target angle is difficult to get. Because of this misjudgment, I can no longer get into the convoy. Only a shot on the final steamer is still possible at great range: therefore as a precaution G Z A V+ torpedo double shot. Impact angle 65-70°, enemy speed 8 knots, no success.
	At 1500 to 1700 meters the shot would have been better left undone as too uncertain, however it remained unnoticed, probably the seas were too high and people were looking more ahead.
10.20 AM		Surfaced. Began 2nd maneuver ahead.
[The position in this message seems bad - should be in square alpha 1]		Radio Message to all U-boats: Convoy in square 022 beta 8. Course 205°, speed 8 knots.
		No one reports.
12.00 Noon	Square 138 alpha 1
3.20 PM		Dived for the 2nd attack.
3.40 PM	NE 5, Sea 5, cloudy
	The convoy is extraordinarily well protected. A kind of crown of fishing trawlersstands crowded ahead of it and make getting inside seem uncertain. Because in the high wind and seas the boat cannot be steered at shallow depth, with the short Germania-boat periscope the formation is difficult to make out.
	My plan is to get in from ahead and in turning away shoot 2 with a stern shot.
	The first chain of destroyer and fishing trawlers is passed.
	Just when think I'm through the second one there's a whirring noise at the bow and it seems to be getting stronger. I throw the periscope around, which was still pointed aft. The trawler, which I thought I'd already passed, is 80-100 meters from astern. The whirring gets stronger comes to the conning tower, a force grabs the periscope and turns it out of my hand.
	Instinct: Both AK ahead, retract the periscope, all men forward, go to depth 50 meters, boat is in the net!
	The boat heels over. The periscope isn't quite retracted yet, so at 20 meters there's a cracking sound like a line breaking. The periscope is stuck and can't be turned.
	Because after 3-4 minutes nothing happens, continued the attack, went to periscope depth on stern shot course and put the auxiliary periscope into operation. But the steamers are already past, the shot is too far, 1500 meters. The attack was thwarted by the screen and failure of the periscope.
4.55 PM	Surfaced. Examined the damaged periscope. A line has apparently gone over the boat, pushed the net deflector up to the tower on the port side, crushed an egg insulator, then lay against the periscope, which is dented almost along its entire length as if by a sharp file, and bent the periscope a bit. Either




		Page 7.
continued
30.06.18	the trawlers had a search line between them or an underwater explosive device caught and didn't detonate.
	The main periscope can be made operable again. The scratches are filed down and smoothed. Then the periscope can be extended and retracted again and turned when it is all the way out and all the way in. If there is a barely measurable mid-level distortion in the stuffing box, it can't be turned. Extending and retracting is also difficult.
	The periscope is limitedly ready for use
6.00 PM		Maneuvered ahead.
7.20 PM		Am positioned far enough ahead, dived for the 3rd attack. This time I'll try to get into the convoy going behind the protective crown at HF to shoot a bow shot.
		A flank covering trawler, which I don't want to have in front of me because of the MZ pistol, but instead behind me, forces me too close to the selected steamer. Therefore turned hard, to the opposite course.
10.30 PM		G 6 A V+ stern shot 270°, impact angle 60 to 70° on the same steamer, detonation after 22 seconds = shooting range 300 meters. We are positioned 100 meters next to the fishing trawler and in ramming position with the next steamer. A 2nd shot is excluded.
		Went to depth 50 meters.
		16 depth charges in salvos of 3-4.
11.10 PM		Surfaced. Trawlers or the convoy are still in sight. Closed the shadows.
11.42 PM		Crash dive for a destroyer.
		signed Patzig.

01.07.18
12.19 AM		Surfaced. Closed. The torpedoed steamer lies still, 3 fishing trawlers and 2 destroyers are with it.
		I decide not to pursue the convoy until this steamer sinks.
1.19 AM		It is too bright for a surface coup de grâce and the protection is much too strong. Am forced to dive.
2.00 AM		Surfaced. Waited for moonlight.
2.55 AM		Forced to submerged again.
3.00 AM		There is enough moonlight for a coup de grâce shot. The steamer lies well illuminated. The fishing trawlers and destroyers circle it. The bow lies deep about 1 meter under the hawse pipe, the stern is out up to half the propellers. So its situation doesn't look very hopeful, but the strong protection allows us to conclude: this steamer, built in the style of standard ships, has such strong bulkheads that there is hope of being able to bring it in with powerful tugs. It was hit at the front, the engine is still intact, if the stern is lowered by re-stowing it, the propeller can work again.




		Page 8.
continued
01.07.18
3.50 AM		Stern shot S A V 260-300 meters, depth 3 meters.
[by position he means way the ship floated with the stern raised]		Fired a bit aft. No success, because I undershot the stern at too close a distance by misjudging the position of the steamer.
3.30 AM		Stern tube was reloaded. Maneuvered for a stern shot. When attacking, paid too much attention to the destroyer that is close to me, the steamer is pushed around a bit by the wind. Almost rammed the steamer with the conning tower, submerged strongly down by the bow.
4.08 AM		Stern coup de grâce S A V 400-500 meters, depth 3 meters.
		Aim point center fire. No success. Because the shot was perfect, I must assume torpedo failure, failure is justified by experience.
		The shots were difficult to place. In the moonlight, the protection could often only be identified very late, when the position could actually no longer be changed.
		Little can be seen in the moonlight. The battery is almost empty. The crew and the depth control crew are exhausted. My nerves also by the 24-hour attack. Therefore moved off submerged.
x.00 AM		Surfaced, it is too bright, the steamer is still over the horizon.
x.x8 AM		Dived
x.00 AM		Surfaced, charged the battery. Stayed in the vicinity of the steamer moving back and forth 5-8 nm away.
12.00 Noon	Square 016 beta 8
x.00 PM		Battery is full. Closed submerged, to watch the steamer closely.
		From the lively Radio Telegraphy traffic of the patrol vessels this morning with Landsend and the still diligent protection of the trawlers and destroyers, there must be an intention to tow the steamer. The steamer itself is manned. Gun crew is ready, people on platforms are on lookout.

	Atlantic, Bay of Biscay

		Despite the shortage of torpedoes, I have to decide to take another shot.
		The first attack failed, the destroyer turned towards the boat at 800 meters. I went to depth 50 meters and then went higher again in a full circle. When I reached periscope depth, the destroyer had also completed a circle around the steamer and was heading towards periscope again. I went to depth 14 meters and retracted the periscope, let it pass over the stern, after a while I go back to depth 12 meters and shot a G 6 A V+ bow shot with MZ. Detonation after 17 seconds = 320 meters.





x.xx PM	Square 016 beta 8
		Moved off at depth 55 meters at AF. 3 individual depth charges.




		Page 9.
continued
01.07.18
04.30 PM		All around sweep. Steamer of 6000 tons sunk. Fishing trawlers and destroyers still throw 5 depth charges, so moved off at depth 50 and 30 meters.
x.x5 PM		The sinking of this steamer lasted 35 hours, The (3+4) = 7 attacks on it placed the greatest demands on personnel with considerable counter effects.
		The size of this steamer is difficult to estimate. I've wavered between 3000 and 8000 tons.
x.00 PM	NE 4, Sea 3, overcast, clear	Radio Message to all U-boats. Have begun return transit with one torpedo square 004 beta 8.
x.20 PM		Convoy in sight in 90°, coming towards the boat.
x.31 PM		Dove to attack.
	It should be considered that the main periscope is more stuck in the stuffing box than before; only one stern tube is ready for shooting. Is the full comittment of the boat in the convoy justified when the periscope is inoperable and so the view of the target is limited, and the destruction of a steamer cannot be achieved at least with this one torpedo? -barely-. Still the possibility that one of the ships approaching could be caused to sink by a torpedo must silence any calculation. It is a magnificent sight, the convoy rushing closer, surrounded by destroyers, the outlines of those fast ships, which with their 10,000-25,000 tons serve the war transport between America and France, becoming clearer. Unfortunately empty!! and outbound. Of these 4-mast 2-smokestack steamers there is only one Britian left. So those two came from our own shipyards!
	The small target angle can just be overcome; at 14-16 knots and counter course of our own boat for the stern shot in turning the situation develops quickly. I can’t get the biggest one, but the one to its right.
		I get through the forward screen of destroyers well. It is only unfavorable, that there's only still a little hunting light and that the shot must fall in the outer column at the risk of being run over.
10.20 PM		G 6 A V+ stern shot. Enemy speed 14 knots, impact angle 75°. Depth setting 3 meters. Fired at a silhouette of masts and smokestacks in disarray, the line abreast is positioned against the evening sun in cover. The shot went in a hard turn, had to go to depth 50 meters immediately to dive under the outer column.
		Detonation after 52 seconds - 960 meters.
10.23 PM		Moved off submerged at AF at depth 55 meters. It starts suddenly 3 minutes after firing! A violent barrage of depth charges. The first 3 lay considerably close together, with the occasional audible propeller sounds across the boat. Boat is shaken, some lights go out, torpedo hatches open slightly




		Page 10.
continued
01.07.18		and some water splashes in at the hinge and closes again. (Marker buoy burst - discovered later) depth charges are gradually getting further away.
11.30 - 11.40 PM		10-minute firing pause.
12.03 AM		A new salvo of depth charges. In all 48 (73rd charge of the operation).
		signed Patzig.

02.07.18
	Bay of Biscay
	NE 3, cloudy, Sea 2
2.40 AM		Surfaced, came to opposite course to the run off course to search for the result of the shot.
x.xx AM		A large shadow ahead; several destroyers with it. Because only 4 steamers are in question (that are between 16000-25000 tons) and I don't assume that its had enough from one torpedo, I want to try to notify another boat.
x.37 AM		Radio Message to all U-boats: Very large shot steamer square 145 gamma 8. Have shot all torpedoes, please shoot, am holding contact.
		Also reported the convoy by Radio Telegraphy.
		The steamer lies still. Sometimes Morsing is done, then 4 green stars were shot. I stayed at 5-8 nm away to charge the battery and for Radio Telegraphy traffic with other boats.
x.55 AM		Radio Message: Square 159 gamma 8 20000 ton steamer shot. Lying still. Have shot all torpedoes. Please shoot.
		Signal was given multiple times, no report or sign of understanding. After experience with yesterday's steamer, the situation seems desperately impatient. Tug assistance can intervene at any moment.
x.30 AM		To try everything, slightly beyond visual range, got the large antenna ready for transmission.
		As the masts stand, the chain link on the front mast lift breaks. The forward mast falls.
		After 2 hours of strenuous work with all hands the mast is ready again.
		Masts stand. The shackle used breaks in the chain. The forward mast falls again.
x.50 AM		Antenna for the after mast alone was made ready, the Radio Telegraphy lifting motor fails, The after mast falls. The large antenna remained out of service for the rest of the operation.
x.51 AM		Because there is nothing more to do with Radio Telegraphy and no communications are achieved, again ran to the steamer location, to hold contact.




		Page 11.
continued
02.07.18
11.50 AM		Steamer should be in sight.
12.20 PM		By plotting in at the torpedoing location. Multiple boats in sight.
12.30 PM	Square 146 gamma 8	Wreck site of a steamer.
		Possibly here between 10.50 and 11.50 hours steamer
		CINCINATTI- COVINGTON, 16339 tons
		======================
		12 hours after torpedo shot.
15.00 PM		Searched through the boats, interesting papers, among them "Battle Signal Book of the United States Navy 1913 Strictly Confidential" and diaries etc. were found.
x.30 PM		To make sure steered search courses 60-80°.
x.00 PM		Forced to submerge by a destroyer.
x.00 PM		Surfaced. Began return transit on the surface. Further searching seemed pointless after the dive. I also have the impression that the radio messages, including the convoy reports, are completely without results.
x.30 PM		Inbound convoy square 044 gamma 8 course 50° sighted and reported.
		signed Patzig.
03.07.18	Atlantic
12.00 Noon	Square 118 gamma 2	Boat at times not clear to dive for 1/2 hours because the exhaust gas slider and valve for the starboard diesel cannot be closed. See Malfunction Report.
	NNE 4, cloudy, Sea 3
		signed Patzig.

04.07.18
12.00 Noon	Square 167 epsilon 3	Transit on course 10°.
x.10 - xx.20	NNW 2, Sea 3	Test dive.
[Highest square in epsilon 3 is 164]		signed Patzig.

05.07.18
12.00 Noon	Square 005 delta 5	Course 30°.
	NW 6, Sea 6, foggy, rain	signed Patzig.

06.07.17
12.00 Noon	Square 064 epsilon 6	Course 40°.
	NNW 3, Sea 3	signed Patzig.

07.07.18	North Atlantic
x.xx AM	SE 2, cloudy, Sea SE 2, clear	2 FOXGLOVEs and 4 to 7 fishing trawlers appear to be the northern extension of the patrols north of the Shetlands. Avoided on the surface, crossed the blockade area limit to the north.

	Sun and Moon Data 02.07.18
	Sun and Moon Data 03.07.18
	Sun and Moon Data 04.07.18
	Sun and Moon Data 05.07.18
	Sun and Moon Data 06.07.18
	Sun and Moon Data 07.07.18




		Page 12.
continued
07.07.18
x.xx AM		Nevertheless am forced to dive. Course 90°.
x.xx AM		Surfaced. A steamer of the Belgian Relief in sight.
12.00 Noon	Square 001 gamma 2
x.05 PM		Since I am now pushed out of the blockade area, I decide to proceed in the neutral channel to look at and examine the vessels I come across.
x.10 PM		Danish sailing vessel "NORDSTERN" from Denmark with wood for Casablanca, had no Conduct Note from the German Government. Lay in Petersburg from 1915-1917. Bought back by the shipping company in October 1917. Flag change cannot be determined.
		Since I don't know whether Casablanca is a French, Spanish or Moroccan port, released.
x.30 PM		Stopped the Norwegian steamer "SAN TELMO" from Christiantia with pulp for Barcelona. Since the company "Berner and Hielsen "London"? (enclosed letter for Adm, Staff) is perhaps not a hostile one after all, or is not an intermediary, let it go.
x.xx PM		Belgian steamer "UBIER" of the Belgian Relief stopped. Pepers perfect.
x.40 PM		Released.
x.xx PM	[handwritten] "COVINGTON" ex "CINCINATTI"	Course 150°.
	[handwritten] "COVINGTON" ex "CINCINATTI"	signed Patzig.
08.07.18	North Sea	The assumption that the "CINCINATTI" was sunk is confirmed by a Radio Telegraphy report from the Reuters Newspaper Service.
	ENE 1-2, Sea 1
x.05 AM	Northern edge of the northern English blockade area	Course 180°.
	Northern edge of the northern English blockade area	Weak detonation heard far off.
x.40 AM	Square 130 beta 2	Strong detonation in the foreship. Between bow cannon and the bridge about 80-meter high column of water and fuel. Boat was strongly shaken. Ran on a mine. Engines stopped. Battery gas, smoke and fire in the foreship. Lights out.
x.45 AM		Both diesels and rudder (by hand) are operable again. Course by magnetic compass 180° and by sun azimuth.
		Condition of the boat after examination: Not clear to dive. Due to a leak in the Kommandanten room above the battery it gives off gas and the room must be abandoned. The forward bunker (III) is broken open and has emptied. I still have enough fuel for another 15 nm about to the border of the new English blockade area.
x.xx AM		Radio Telegraphy converter was operable for a short time again. Residual battery current is just enough to transmit a radio message. Square 130 beta 2. Ran onto a mine. Assistance needed urgently. Last possible radio message.




		Page 13.
continued
08.07.18		U-53 acknowledged and answers: Going to accident location.
		Then "Bringing help square 100 alpha"
		Avoided multiple glass buoys on the surface.
		After meeting with U-53 we steered for 100 alpha.
	Square 099 alpha 4	Met U-53, only 500 liters own fuel in the consumption tanks/enough for 1 hour).
		U-53 comes alongside, gives 6 tons of fuel (enough to get to Skagen/part of the crew handed in excess of requirements is handed over to U-53, the boat is prepared for demolition.
		signed Patzig.

09. - 10.07.18		Ran in on the East Route.
		signed Patzig.

11. - 12.07.18		Transit to Wilhelmshaven.
12.30 PM		Made fast in the new torpedo Shipyard Wilhelmshaven.
		signed Patzig.


		[The mention of Skagen and the East Route probably means that on 9-10 July U-86 went through the Skagerrak-Kattegat to Kiel instead of the nornal route down the west coast of Denmark direct to Wilhelmshaven. This way the boat would be less likely to encounter an enemy aircraft or ship when it was unable to dive. Then on 11-12 July the boat went through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to Wilhelmshaven.]






				Control No. . . . 3. .


			Ganz Geheim.
			===================
			Experiences.
			for the Kriegstagebuch "U-86" from 20.6. to 12.7.18.

			Mission: West exit of the Channel, together with other boats.

			Conduct of the Operation.

			Outbound transit:
			Chose to proceed a great distance from land in order not to be held up by coastal and patrol vehicles during the very long days and thus strive for the fastest approach. There could also be prospects for artillery use far from land.
			Off the North Channel on the 26th of June encountered a convoy, still without destroyer escort. Shot out 11.5% of the convoy, reported, missed the 2nd attack due to own carelessness.

			Return transit.
			The same plan as the outbound transit. Ran on deep mines in the new English blockade area.

			In the Operations Area. Only operated for 3 1/2 days, met the strongest traffic. On 30 June saw a convoy, reported, attacked 3 times and pursued, and after 36 hours effort brought to heel 1 steamer of 6000 tons = 23% of the convoy. 1 July saw a convoy of large ships, attacked, shot out 1 streamer of 16339 tons = 10% of the convoy, reported. On 2 July 8.30 PM, saw a convoy, reported, torpedoes were expended, began return transit.

			Artillery: No experiences.

			Torpedoes: The unsuccessful coup de grâce on 1 July I explain as:
			Before the shot the boat was strongly down by the bow with the danger of ramming with the tube ready at depth 45 meters. The outer tube door was only completely tight at depth 30 meters. Due to the pressure of 3 kg, water entered the pressure compensation chamber through the piston of the depth steering apparatus and caused the torpedo to steer 3-4 meters deeper. Under steering was the result. Lesson: It would have been appropriate to examine the torpedo again, equalize the pressure, drain and vent the chamber.

			Crew: The health of the crew left a lot to be desired when leaving. The Second Watch Officer and almost 1/3 of the crew still suffered under the aftermath of the flu prevailing in Emden. Injuries and illnesses occurred almost daily. The uncertainty as to whether the






			treatment was correct had a depressing effect; I believe that considerable training of the Watch Officers in medical matters is necessary. Likewise improvement of the apothecary.
			In the operational area there was oppressive heat and a lack of air in the boat, caused by the battery heating up to 40°C. The result was heart and breathing difficulties.
			Despite the exhaustion, the Technical crew worked tirelessly to keep things running. By eliminating the small mishaps and to tackle larger repair alternatives fresh. Thus, U. Maschinisten Maat Lehners distinguished himself by quick access when repairing the periscope on 30 June and thus enable the 3rd decisive attack. On 3 July Maschinisten Maat Kapitza worked quickly and well on opening up the exhaust valve beneath the upper deck.
			The Seamanship depth control team did a good job. The boat's successes are primarily due to the outstanding spirit that resides in the crew. In no situation was there a word of faintheartedness and the people's cooperation, borne of duty and enthusiasm, was an incentive and a joy for me. The Technical crew, led by Engineer Knoche, maintained resolute calm during the mine detonation.

			Technical experiences.
			Experience with burning batteries, clogging of the exhaust pipes due to salt deposits are set forth in a Special Report.

				signed P a t z i g.