U-57 - 8th War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

Click the icon to download a KMZ file displaying the U-boat track, significant events and locations for this patrol.  You must have Google Earth loaded on your computer to view this file.  Download Google Earth here

Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
28 Nov 17	3.30	50°11'N, 3°41'W	PERM	1,312	Danish
29 Nov 17	22.30 - 23.00	50°45'N, 5°10'W	PIERRE	112	French
30 Nov 17	08.35 - 09.25	51°09'N, 4°45'W	COURAGE	51	British
30 Nov 17	08.35 - 09.25	51°09'N, 4°45'W	GAZELLE	40	British
30 Nov 17	08.35 - 09.25	51°09'N, 4°45'W	LUSTERE (damaged)	48	British
3 Dec 17	09.41 - 10.15	55°57'N, 18°55'W	COPELAND	1,184	British
6 Dec 17	09.07	55°57'N, 18°55'W	SAINT ANTOINE DE PADOUNE (damaged)	355	French
			Total = 3,102
Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

				Control Number:   3
			G  a  n  z    G  e  h  e  i  m  !
			====================
			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
			S.M.Unterseeboot  "U  57"
			Fopr the period of the operation from 22 November to 18 December 1917.
				Kommandant:
				Kapitänleutnant
				G  e  o  r  g  .
		Enclosures:
		Track chart
		Experiences
				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 1 -
		22.11.17
		8.30 AM	Helgoland	Put to sea for remote operation, area C east of Queenstown.  [present day Cobh, Ireland]
			W 3-4, Sea 3, overcast
		12.00 Noon	Square 135 epsilon VII
		1.00 PM	Norderney Buoy	Two torpedo boats take over escort, Route Green up to D, then Route Black, 11 knots.
		11.25 PM	WSW 2-3, Sea 2, hazy	Position I, torpedo boats retrieved gear.  Requested escort at least to mine area limit without gear, since the boats already want to turn back here.
		23.11.17
		02.00 AM	WNW 2-3, Sea 3	Torpedo boats come about.  Course N for the Haaks Lightship.
		4.00 AM		Haaks Lightship abeam, many fishermen in sight.
		5.00 AM		Course 223° for the Nordhinder Lightship.
				Entered the German restricted area.
		8.00 AM	W 3, Sea 3, Vis. good	Changing courses.
		12.00 Noon	Square 123 alfa VI
		12.15 PM		In the south multiple destroyers on a westerly course, dived, no attack opportunity.
		12.45 PM		Surfaced, continued transit.
		1.10 PM		Nordhinder Lightship in sight.
		1.35 PM		Dived, put the boat on the bottom in depth 43 meters.
				I want to surface at darkness and from a safe departure location head for the northern tip of South Falls.  Channel cruise 3.00 AM, intend to cruise with the SW-current two hours after Dover low water.
		4.20 PM		Raised the boat from the bottom.  Proceeded at periscope depth, passed the lightship submerged.
		5.40 PM	WbyN 1-2, Sea 2, clear weather and Vis., bright moonshine	Surfaced, course 217.5°, both diesels GF.  While blowing the boat had a very strong oil trace, apparently the foot valves of ballast tanks, configured as a reserve fuel tanks, are not tight. Installation of valves, as they are in new boats, is suggested.
			Although the weather and the condition of the boat speak against a Channel cruise, I'm sticking to it because after this detour there isn't enough fuel oil for a cruise through the Hole [Fair Passage] at this time of year.
		10.45 PM		Dived, boat is 3 nm east of the north tip of the South Falls; to get a correct east longitude for the Channel passage, sounded the shoal to 20 meters with the boat.
		11.45 PM		Ran aground at depth 18 meters; proceeded with little speed over the South Falls, boat was blown to depth 10 meters; proceeded for 5 minutes at LF, then dove again sounded the deep channel 40 meters, there put the boat on the bottom to wait for a favorable time for the Channel passage - 3.00 AM - moonset - 2.6 knot current.
				Ship's position was determined exactly by these soundings.

	Sun and Moon Data 22.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 23.11.17

	-2 -
		24.11.17
		2.40 AM	SW 3, Sea 3, Vis. very good	Surfaced, course 196°, both GF.
		3.20 AM	Wind freshening strongly	Passed the barrier between Buoy 1 and 2, Buoys I, II and III are insight.  Net buoys and guards were not seen.
		3.40 AM		Course 190°, Gris Nez in sight directly ahead, later lighthouses at d'Alprech and Touquet.
			Passed the French coast at a distance of 4 nm and proceeded west of the Vergoyerbank -green lighted buoy burns - to the center of the Channel.
		7.36 AM	Wind and Sea increasing greatly, WSW 5, Sea 5, overcast, at times Vis. bad	Vergoyer Buoy 2 nm abeam, course 260°, port GF.
		12.00 Noon	Square 129 beta VI
		12.30 PM		Port HF, due to seas.
		5.30 PM	WSW 5-6, Sea 5, freshening, Vis. good	Fishing trawler in sight to the north.
		6.30 PM		Dived due to seas, transit depth 35 meters, both KF, course 260°.
		25.11.17
		1.00 AM	WNW 5-6, Sea 5, heavy Swell, clear	Surfaced, course 270°, starboard diesel HF, no weapons use.
		12.00 Noon	Square 055 gamma VI
		1.15 PM		Fishing trawler to the NW, avoided on the .
		5.33 PM		Destroyer in sight to the SE, dived, depth 35 meters, transit, course 295°, both KF due to seas.
		26.11.17
		12.00 Midnight	NNW 4-5, Sea 4, clear, moonlit	Surfaced, Bill of Portland Lighthouse abeam 10 nm, course 260°, starboard diesel HF
		7.50 AM		Steamer in sight to the SW, dived, steamer steers S.  No attack opportunity, so surfaced, cannon alarm, 1 hit.  Small steamer returned fire.  Because under land there are two very large outbound steamers and multiple smoke clouds in sight, broke off combat and maneuvered ahead of this supposed convoy at AK.  Three fishing trawlers come in sight under land and force me away, as a result the steamers pass out of sight, many smoke clouds are still observed.  I decide to catch the steamers at Start point.
		11.20 AM		Dived at Start Point 7 nm from land, at periscope depth 7 fishing trawlers pass at high speed, the large steamers don't come in sight, sailed into Weymouth.
		12.00 Noon	Square 022 epsilon VI
		2.30 PM	WNW 3, Sea 2, Vis. good	Inbound steamer in sight with course 70°, maneuvered ahead for stern shot, steamer. . .

	Sun and Moon Data 24.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 25.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 26.11.17

	- 3 -
		continued
		26.11.17
				steers straight course and lies high out of the water, therefore set torpedo for depth 2 meters.
		3.07 PM		Shot from tube IV, K.3. torpedo, speed 8 knots, track angle 80°, range 350 meters, No detonation.
				No explanation for the miss other than the shot was fired aft of center, which is irrelevant given the length of the target, shooting data was determined exactly except for speed, the approach was simple.
				The brand new, strange looking steamer, about 1500 tons, (1 stern cannon visible) turned towards the periscope immediately after the shot.  Went to depth 50 meters at 2 x AK.  Three minutes after the shot extremely heavy detonation of a depth charge, a second soon followed, which was even closer to the boat; the boat was very strongly shaken, no leaks.  Of the previous about 20 depth charges the boat has experienced, these detonations were by far the worst.  Ran off further at AK, changing courses, after a little while two depth charges further off.
				As has often been the case in similar instances, running at high speed has proven to be successful again this time.  I can no longer expect the torpedoes to run correctly after this violent concussion and may have turn around to replace the torpedoes in home port, depending on the result of the thorough maintenance and examination of all torpedoes.
		5.50 PM	WSW 4-5, Sea 4, clear, moonlit	Surfaced, the 8.8 cm cannon is knocked athwartship, in the port diesel a valve is jammed as a result of the detonation; multiple fishing trawlers in sight, course 250°, to observe night traffic under the coast.  Starboard diesel HF.
		7.45 PM		Start Point Lighthouse in sight.
		12.00 Midnight		Start Point Lighthouse 6 nm abeam.
		27.11.17
		x.00 AM		Course 260°, starboard diesel GF, continued transit.
		12.00 Noon	Square 035 epsilon VI
		12.45 PM	Misty	Several vessels in sight in the SW, soon distinguished as a convoy of six large steamers and 4 destroyers, apparently the convoy is on course 40°, target angle starboard 2 strich [22.5°] , range 8000 meters, double line ahead, ahead two destroyers, one destroyer to each side.
			Square 138 beta I
		1.05 PM		Dived, initiated attack.
				Convoy makes a course change of at least 12 strich [135°] to starboard. As a result the boat couldn't shoot.
		2.25 PM		Surfaced, course of the convoy 70-80°, tried to maneuver ahead at AK - 12 knots.
		5.30 PM		Boat only came up slowly and when darkness fell, lost sight of the ships, which were now sailing on a straight course.  Pursued up to 7.45 PM on course 60°, without success.  A . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 26.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 27.11.17

	- 4 -
		continued
		27.11.17		Radio Signal was not sent because the course of the convoy was undetermined and a course change had to be expected at any moment.  Also I did not want to betray my presence because I hoped o be able to shoot up to the last moment that night.
				Again the low speed of the boat cost me a certain success.
		xx.xx PM		Course 280°, starboard diesel GF.  In the morning twilight the boat should be at Start Point.  Signal concerning position (passed the Channel) sent in the blind on the Net Defelector Antenna.
		28.11.17
		1.25 AM	NNW 3-4, Sea 3, moonshine, Vis. good	Several outbound steamers in sight on course 250°, maneuvered ahead of the largest, about 2000 tons, dived when the masts were as one, turned away about 100° and by time ran off 350-400 meters.  Shortly before the actual target went by, a second larger steamer, about 3000 tons, 1600-2000 meters away came into the crosshairs.
		2.30 AM	Bright clear moonlit night	Shot from tube IV, K.3. torpedo, depth 2 meters, 8 knots, hit after 2 1/2 minutes apparently on the further steamer, the first target was undershot despite favorable conditions, no explanation for this
		2.35 AM	[apparently this steamer didn't sink]	Surfaced, steamer lies stopped about 2000 meters away, apparently with the stern deeper, multiple bright lights shown at the stern are blinding and make closer observation impossible. At the same time a third outbound steamer comes in sight, I try to maneuver ahead.  Observing the sinking of the stopped steamer is not possible.
		2.50 AM		A large patrol boat came in the vicinity of the steamer quickly on an easterly course.  It is possible to avoid the fast boat by heading directly towards land and continuing close to land (1-2 nm away), and thus continue to carry out the maneuver ahead.
		3.15 AM		An inbound 3000-ton steamer comes in sight before the maneuver ahead is completed on the third steamer, therefore took on the inbound steamer.
				Approach exactly like the first attack at 1.25 AM
		3.30 AM	[this must be PERM]	Shot from tube III, G 7 AV, depth 3 meters, 8 knots, range 360 meters, hit aft.
		3.45 AM		Surfaced, steamer has a strong list, stern is overspilled, sinking is assured.
		x.30 AM		Crash dive for patrol boat.
		x.16 AM		Surfaced, course 240°, continued transit.
		10.00 AM		Course 275°, boat should be at Lizard Head in the evening twilight.
		12.00 Noon	Square 050 epsilon VI
			WSW 2-3, Sea 2,

	Sun and Moon Data 27.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 28.11.17

	- 5 -
		continued
		28.11.17
		x.10 PM		Two aircraft in sight on southerly course, dived to depth 50 meters.
		x.15 PM		At periscope depth, aircraft are still in sight, therefore proceeded at depth 50 meters.
		x.25 PM		Surfaced, aircraft still in sight.
		x.30 PM		Dived, depth 50 meters.
		x.25 PM		Surfaced, advanced to Lizard Head on course 320°, under land a square rigged schooner with a small vessel in the lee.
				The sailing vessel was already observed from 2.00 PM with conspicuous courses, apparently a U-boat trap.
		x.30 PM		Destroyer in sight in the east.  Dived, depth 40 meters.
		x.35 PM		Surfaced, sailing vessel still in sight, otherwise no traffic observed.
		x.00 PM		Went to the north between Wolf Rock and Isles of Scilly.  Despite greater visibility and bright moonshine sighted no vessels, all beacons burn with peacetime identification and full strength.
		29.11.17		Up to 4.00 AM northerly courses on the approach route to Small's-Scilly then came about, to take ambush position between the Cornwall Bank and the mainland by day.
		x.10 AM	W 3, Sea 2-3, misty	Large steamer in sight on course 45°, tried to maneuver ahead, due to low speed again impossible, starboard diesel is out of service due to a crack in a cylinder head.
			Because I can't reach the steamer, I decide to keep fighting with artillery.  On closing a second steamer comes in sight in the north on course 230°.
		x.50 AM		Dived, the steamer is too small, about 1500 tons, gave up the attack, intend artillery combat.
		x.20 AM		Surfaced, under the coast 3 nm away at times up to 6 small steamers in sight, among them to the north a large steamer, at least 3000 tons on course 230°.  Decided on a submerged attack on the latter.
		10.55 AM 11.42 AM		Dived, steamer runs on a straight course, is in ballast, boat is ahead of the steamer, masts as one, by timing ran to 1000 meters abeam, then attacked with a an 80° degree track angle.
				Shot from tube II, K.3., depth 3 meters, range 350 meters, speed 8.5 knots (propeller beats with the steamer out of the water).  Ground runner, detonation after 2 minutes; after the detonation the steamer ran off at high speed.  After the shot, I had the opportunity to pass behind the steamer, to check the approach course once again. This is now the
			second unexplained miss with K.3. torpedoes, the first K.3. shot at the trap, which I personally attribute to a torpedo failure, but for which undershooting with depth 2 meters or misjudgment of speed can be claimed, doesn't count
			The undershooting of the intended target on 28 September at 2.30 AM is counted as a miss.  After the frequent K.3.  . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 28.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 29.11.17

	- 6 -
		continued
		29.11.17	ground runners also in this case a ground runner is possible.  Stopping of the steamer, the display of light would then be due to momentary panic when the torpedo detonated in the bottom of the steamer.
		12.00 Noon	Square 080 beta 1
		12.08 PM		Surfaced, cannon alarm.  No prospect, with only one engine (8 knots) to realize a success, therefore turned away to the north to charge; under land  multiple small steamers in sight with course 50° or 230°.
				Supplemental fuel tanks were blown, oil trace disappeared.
		12.58 PM	SW 2-3, Sea 2, Vis. good	Crash dive for aircraft, depth 50 meters.
		2.00 PM		Surfaced, aircraft still in sight, dived.
		3.00 PM		Surfaced, continued transit, boat should be between Hartland Point and Trevose Head in the morning twilight.
		3.20 PM		Airship in sight in the SE.
		4.30 PM		Crash dive for aircraft.
		5.35 PM		Surfaced, small steamer in sight, there is the suspicion of a U-boat trap due to the appearance, course and position, therefore dived.
		6.10 PM		Surfaced, continued transit, course 55°.
		7.40 PM		A sailing vessel in sight, which was proceeding to sea.  Decided on a surprise artillery attack.
		10.30 PM	Square 033 beta I	Cannon alarm, took position off the sailing vessel in favorable illumination on a parallel course, rapid fire with the 8.8 cm cannon, multiple hits, range 600 meters, crew abandons ship, lifeboat alongside.  It was the French gaff rigged schooner
				L  E    P  I  E  R  R  E   about 150 tons
				with coal from Cardiff to St. Malo.
				Demolition team sent on board the sailing vessel with the lifeboat.
		11.00 PM	SW 3, Sea 2-3, moonshine, Vis. very good	Vessel in sight, white star fired as recall for demolition team;  demolition team taken on board, French disembarked, ran off at high speed.
				Sailing vessel sank quickly after detonation of the explosive charge.
			Intend to head for a waiting station north of Trevose Head.
		30.11.17
		4.45 AM		Steamer in sight in the SE, maneuvered ahead, course 50°.
		4.55 AM		Dived, stern approach, before shooting, by time after the masts had been in one bearing continually, ran off to 400 meters, track angle 80°.  Shot from tube IV, K.3., depth 1.8 meters, speed 8 knots, no detonation; target was an inbound tanker of about 2500 tons, again no explanation for K.3. miss; steamer had not noticed the shot.
		5.28 AM	SW 1, Sea 0, clear, Vis. good, bright moonlit night
		5.40 AM		Surfaced for surprise artillery attack, in order to . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 29.11.17
	Sun and Moon Data 30.11.17

	- 7 -
		continued
		30.11.17		ensure a success.
				In addition to the tanker there is a larger steamer (3000-tons) in sight on course 50°, therefore closed the latter to 1200 meters, then rapid fire from both cannons, illumination was not very favorable.  Aiming and directing fire was very difficult, so that it only succeeds in damaging the steamer.  After about 5 minutes the steamer returns fire with a large caliber cannon, turns away and flees under the coast.  Because one impact of the enemy lies well and now that the surprise was not favored by luck and destruction can hardly be achieved, I dive to avoid the enemy's fire.
		6.20 AM	Square 011 beta 1
				Ammunition consumption 30 8.8 cm and 15 10.5 cm shells.
		6.50 AM		Surfaced, inbound large tanker in sight, heading for the Lundy Sough Lighthouse on course 20°.  Tried to maneuver ahead, one side with E-motor AK. Again don't succeed in getting ahead with the low speed (10 knots), the boat came to within 1.5 nm of Lundy Island.
		7.45 AM	SW 3-4, Sea 3, Vis. good	Gave up maneuver ahead, moved off on course 270°, to not be sighted from land at lightness while charging.
		8.00 AM		Multiple vessels in sight in the NW, dived.  At lightness a sailing fishing flotilla (6 vessels) was distinguished.  Because no patrol vessels were in sight,
		8.35 AM	Square 143 gamma 1	surfaced, cannon alarm, 3 sailing vessels -
				C  O  U  R  A  G  E    B.M. 18
				G  A  Z  E  L  L  E    Ramsgate  R  249
				Name of the third not distinguished -
				sunk with artillery.  Two fishing trawlers come in sight to the north at high speed, take the boat under fire and immediately lie surprisingly well.
		9.25 AM		Dived, 30 meters, course 300°, moved off from the coast.
		12.00 Noon	Square 143 gamma I
		x 50 PM	SW 4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good	Surfaced, course 300°, headed for Small's.
		8.15 PM		Several fishing trawlers in sight in the north and three airships.
		8.18 PM		Dived, 50 meters at high speed from the diving location, which can be recognized by bilge water, moved off.
		8.33 PM		Multiple detonations, far off.
		x.00 PM		Surfaced, continued transit to Tuskar Rock, to take an ambush station there.
		11.15 PM		Crash dive before destroyer, which turned towards the boat at high speed, depth 40 meters.

Sun and Moon Data 30.11.17

	- 8 -
		01.12.17
		x.15 AM	SW 6, Sea 5-6, misty	Surfaced, course 360° to Tuskar, where a lee can be expected.
		x.00 AM		Tuskar Lighthouse in sight.
		x.00 AM		Starboard diesel is out of service at transit speed 300 RPM, armature shaft is broken.  As a result the entire starboard propulsion system is out of service.
			The clutch is disassembled with great effort and it is discovered that the starboard double dynamo shaft is broken close to the clutch, i.e. has been sheared off.  The break point mainly indicates a material defect, although the small diameter of the shaft after the recent major reconstruction (65 newton-meter weaker than before) certainly plays a role in the damage.  By removing the clutch and thereby also the shaft stub (it is stuck on the clutch), the starboard E-motor will become operable again.
			Since the main issue appears to be a material defect, so there is no immediate danger to the port shaft, the port diesel is still safe to operate, and the boat is still fully combat capable, despite the glitches I know from previous operations, I'm continuing the operation with 1 diesel, in order to be able to fire the 7 torpedoes on board.
		x.20 AM		Dived, depth 35 meters, due to sea state and to further disassemble the clutch.
		12.00 Noon	Square 152 delta IV
		x.13 PM	WNW 5-6, Sea 5, clear	Surfaced, ventilated the boat.
		x.30 PM		Dived.
		x.00 PM		Surfaced, 7 nm off Tuskar Rock cruised on the connecting line Tuskar-Holyhead.
		02.12.17
		x.00 AM	WNW 5, Sea 4, moonshine	The starboard E-motor is in operation again by disassenbling the entire clutch.
				A steamer in sight in the NE, course 200°, dived, carried out night attack.  Didn't shoot, because the steamer was too small
		x.15 AM		Surfaced.
		x 00 AM		Vessel in sight to the NE, apparently a destroyer, dived, depth 11 meters, nothing distinguished in the periscope.
		x.30 AM		Surfaced, waiting station 5 nm abeam of Lucifer Lightship.
		x 45 AM		Small steamer in sight in the NE, avoided.
		x.00 AM		Smoke clouds in sight in the S and N, dived, after the smoke cloud in the north was recognized as a steamer on course 200°.  Carried out attack, however soon gave it up because the steamer seemed very small.
			From abeam I realized that it was a larger steamer (3000 tons), whose cleverly chosen black and gray painting (in various figures) deceived me about its size.
		11.30 AM		Smoke cloud in the north, American destroyer on course 200°, no attack possibility.
		12.00 Noon	Square 134 delta IV
		x.30 PM	NW 3, Sea 3, clear	Surfaced, ventilated the boat.
		x.50 PM		Dived, ambush place.
		x.40 PM		U-boat, apparently own, in sight to the south 6 nm away, Underwater Telegraphy call . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 01.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 02.12.17

	- 9 -
		continued
		02.12.17		remained unanswered.  (U-96).
		5.05 PM		Surfaced, ambush station abeam Tuskar.
		7.40 PM	Very dark night	Several lighters in the NW, whose bearings shift very quickly among each other; closed.  Since nothing further can be seen, the bright lights are very blinding,
		8.05 PM		moved off and dived.  One vessel hat apparently turned towards me.
		10.00 PM	Moonshine	Surfaced.
		11.50 PM		Sighted an outbound steamer on course 250° to the north.  maneuvered ahead, then night attack, because it is too bright for a attack.
		03.12.17
		12.30 AM		Shot from tube III, G.6.AV, depth 3 meters, speed 9 knots, range 450 meters, hit stern.
		12.35 AM	Square 002 gamma 1	Surfaced, large freighter of at least 4000 tons sinking quickly over the stern, lifeboats are not seen, a night rescue buoy burns irregularly at the sinking location. Due to numerous pieces of wreckage and considering the propellers I refrain from looking for survivors
				Port diesel is out of service.  Injection pump II must be overhauled, apparently piston rings are broken, therefore circled on one E-motor in ambush station.
		3.45 AM		Two outbound steamers on course 70° in sight in the south.  With both E-motors AK maneuvered ahead of the largest, a tanker of 5000 tons.
		4.05 AM	NW 1, Sea 0, moonshine	Dived, steamer, whose general course was known, zack 35° to port, night attack at AK; double shot intended.  Because the boat closed well to 400 yards, the remaining shooting data is certain, at the last moment only fired a single shot.  Shot from tube I .G.7.D., depth 3 meters, speed 10 knots.
		4.28 AM
				Torpedo jumped out of the water and no longer steered deep.  Steamer turned away, miss.
			It would have been more correct to go to LF before the shot,
			1.  the depth steering of the torpedo appears to be influenced by the high attack speed,
			2   it is possible the enemy recognized the periscope before the shot from the white foam stripes in the bright moonlit night.
		5.15 AM		Surfaced, moved away from land on course 200° with one E-motor, battery condition 3000 Amp. Hours.
		5.33 AM		Port diesel again in service to charge, compressor valves had to be replaced.

	Sun and Moon Data 02.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 03.12.17

	- 10 -
		continued
		03.12.17
		11.00 AM	Square 037 epsilon 1	Outbound steamer with course S in sight on the horizon.
			St. George Channel
		11.40 AM	Calm, Sea 0, Vis. very good	Port diesel out of service again; injection pump II dismantled again, piston rings checked, valve reconditioned.
		11.45		Airship in sight in the east.  Dived, depth 50 meters, repaired the port diesel.
		12.00 Noon	Square 037 epsilon 1	Surfaced.  Port diesel in service again.  The airship passed out of sight in the wast on a northeasterly course.  Headed for the Minehead Lighthouse and the known steamer course St. George Channel - Queenstown.
		1.00 PM	W 2-3, Sea I
		9.00 PM	W 3, Sea 2, heavy Swell, misty	Minehead Lighthouse in sight in the north, 10 nm away.  Headed on the known steamer course from here to Daunt Lightship.
		09.30 PM		Inbound steamer in sight.  Maneuver ahead  and holding contact again not possible due to low speed.
		04.12.17
		3.15 AM	SSW 3-4, Sea 4, rain squall	Outbound vessel in the NE, carried out night  attack.  Shortly before the shot the vessel was recognized as the known patrol yacht off Queenstown.  The small vessel yaws strongly.  Yacht had apparently seen the boat and turned towards U-57.  Turned away and crashed dive.
		3.30 AM
		5.30 AM		Surfaced, continued transit transit to Daunt Lightship, where I hope to shoot an outbound steamer in the morning twilight.
		7.45 AM		Boat is at the point were on the last operation the surprise attack on an inbound steamer succeeded.
				This time there is nothing in sight except a patrol vessel.
		8.45 AM	It is light	Dived, ambush station A large mine boat searches west of Daunt Lightship, fishing trawlers is in sight occasionally.  Seas increase so that the boat can no longer steer at periscope depth, therefore moved off from land on course 220°.
			SW 4, Sea 4, overcast, rain
				Port diesel is out of service again, injector pump I dismantled, piston rings replaced.
		12.00 Noon	Square 028 epsilon I
		1.36 PM		Surfaced, ventilated the boat.
		1.45 PM		Dived, repaired the port diesel.
		5.30 PM	S 4, Sea 3-4, rain	Surfaced, the condition of the port diesel now forces me to break off the operation.
			Intend return transit through the Channel for the following reasons:
			1.  Greater probability that the 5 torpedoes still on board can be fired at good targets
			2.  The shorter route 1770 nm vs 1400 nm is favorable for the port diesel which is no longer safe to operate.
			3.  Earlier arrival on the shipyard for repairs.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 04.12.17

	- 11 -
		continued
		04.12.17	Due to the south wind I did not head directly for the Isles of Scilly, instead came to course 105° to Hartland Point, in order to disrupt the observed traffic there again and then from there to approach the Isles of Scilly leeward of the coast on a course of 230°.
		05.12.17
		x.30	S 5-6, Sea 5, Vis. low	A few fishing trawlers in sight in the north, avoided on the .
		12.00 Noon	Square 120 gamma I
		12.20 PM		A large fishing flotilla in sight in the north., avoided on the , it turned out to be the known fishing flotilla 30 nm south of the Small's.
		12.40 PM	Square 122 gamma I	Several fishing trawlers in sight again in the NE.  With further observation distinguished a strongly protected convoy on course 230° in broad echelon, consisting of about 7 large steamers.
			S 4, Sea 3-4, Vis. clear
	[the arrow was used in the original but it is clear the boat dived]			ahead of the largest steamer, proceeding in the center (4-masts steamer, at least 10000 tons), at the same time the first patrol line appeared over the horizon.
		12.55 PM		Periscope depth.
			I let myself drop back into the middle of the convoy, two large escort vessels pass at short range.  Intend a double shot on the 4-masted steamer and a stern shot while turning away (now only one stern shot ready) on an about 6000-ton freighter in broad echelon next to the largest steamer.
			I manage to achieve the desired position without being seen.  I turn hard to starboard for a double shot.  Shortly after the ruder order while extending [the periscope] the end position switch of the raising mechanism doesn't function.  The periscope drives with full force into the stuffing box, the starboard stud of the periscope support ring breaks, the roller chain runs out into the shaft.  I can no longer rotate the periscope and at first I assumed, as did the control room personnel from all the noise, that the periscope had been rammed.  However, since the optics were clear, so I could still look through the periscope, the order was to go to depth 15 meters so that I can still shoot my torpedoes with the forward periscope, in the event the attack periscope can be retracted. Contrary to expectations (the fuse was still intact), the attack periscope could be retracted with a chain.
			The boat can still be kept at periscope depth, the forward periscope is used, but the target for the bow shots has already passed by and the steamer was intended for the stern shot, is positioned with the bow directly towards my periscope, apparently ready for ramming.
			The situation was still too unclear to fire based only on an estimate without a periscope, as the combat periscope was still damaged.  The malfunction occurred shortly after the rudder order was given to turn in, until this time the boat was on convoy course 230°, so it had to turn at least 60° - which took the boat about 2 minutes.
		1.50 PM		To avoid being rammed, we went to depth 50 meters at 2 x AK.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 05.12.17

	- 12 -
		continued
		05.12.17	The convoy proceeded in broad echelon and was apparently led by the largest steamer, which proceeded in the center.  The escort consisted of numerous large fishing trawlers and patrol yachts, additionally an airship was spotted above the convoy.  Speed was 9-10 knots, apparently it came on course 230° from Penbroke Roadstead.
		1.55 PM	After the ramming danger was settled, immediately went to periscope depth again, in order to shoot if possible.
			Convoy had shifted to 4 strich [45°] to starboard, no further attack possibility.  In the immediate vicinity of the periscope several escort vessels, so went to depth 50 meters again.
		x.00 PM	S 2, Sea 2, overcast	Surfaced, one patrol vessel with red white top light in sight, avoided on the .  Sent Radio Message on the Net Deflector antenna concerning the convoy.  A pursuit is no longer possible for me due to the operating safety of the one (port) diesel.
				Charged the battery, repaired the [periscope] raising mechanism.
				Course 210°, headed for the Isles of Scilly.
		x.00 PM	Square 150 gamma 1	A large fishing flotilla avoided on the .  likewise a destroyer.
				Sent a Radio Message concerning breaking off the operation and return transit through the Channel.
		06.12.17
		10.45 AM	Square 053 beta 1	Sailing vessel (three-masted schooner) in sight in the south, cannon alarm, opened fire at 6000 meters with 10.5 and 8.8 cm.
			SSW 2-3, Sea 2, Vis. good
				Sailing vessel returned fire immediately with three cannons about 5-7 cm (not a trap).
		12.00 Noon	Square 062 beta I	Dived, because at range 5500 meters the sailing vessel's shots were well-placed.
		12.15 PM		Moved off , surfaced and opened fire again at range 8000 meters.  One hit observed, very favorable conditions for the artillery, so that a success is anticipated soon.  The sailing vessel shot very quickly and without guidance, so a lack of nerves is clearly noticeable.
		1.25 PM		Crash dive before an aircraft, which came out of the sun by surprise.  Apparently had no bombs, instead shot at the boat as it was diving with automatic weapons, judging by the impacts heard in the control room.
				Port exhaust gas valve leaks, so that the engine is flooded.  In addition to the leakage this also involves the risk of cracked pistons and rings during every diving maneuver.
			By these new malfunctions I am forced to give up the Channel cruise which necessitates frequent diving.  A further factor in this decision is that the port diesel has been smoking heavily and sparking brightly for some time and its performance has deteriorated significantly, so that at transit speed, with the earlier 500 amps charging at the same time, not only 100 amps come into the battery, which seems questionable to me when it comes to the

	Sun and Moon Data 05.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 06.12.17

	- 13 -
		continued
		06.12.17	Chanel cruise, where the battery is used.
		4.00 PM	SSW 2, Sea 2, overcast	Surfaced, course 290°, headed for Bull Rock.
		4.55 PM		Dived before a destroyer.
		5.30 PM		Surfaced.
		07.12.17
		12.30 AM	SW 2-3, Sea 2, Swell	Radio Message to B.d.U. that we have begun the homeward transit via Fair Island due to only limitedly operable engines.
		12.00 Noon	Square 090 beta II
		7.40 PM		Bull Rock 10 nm abeam, course 340°.
		08.12.17
		12.00 Noon	Square 070 delta III
			NW 3-4, Sea 3
		6.00 PM		Black Rock 10 nm abeam, course 25°.
		09.12.17
		12.00 Noon	Square 147 beta IV	Port diesel stopped occasionally for replacement of valves.
		9.07 PM		Barra Head 10 nm abeam.  Course 10°.
		10.12.17
		2.30 AM	SW 4, Sea 3, Vis. good	Monach Lighthouse 10 nm abeam.  Course 360°.
		2.35 AM		Port diesel out of service, pounds strongly, apparently a piston head is broken.
			Examination showed, that the piston head of cylinder V has a hole the size of an egg.  Despite keeping cylinder V off and despite later hanging up the piston, it is not possible to keep the engine running safely.  Since, in addition to cylinder V, cylinders IV and III and the injection pump I are partly inoperable, I decide to carry out a thorough repair of the port diesel - about 30 hours - in order to be able to reach the home port more safely and quickly.  Before switching off the engine at 9.00 AM, the battery must be charged.  The engine keeps beating [like a heart] strongly.  Compressed . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 06.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 07.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 08.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 09.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 10.12.17

	- 14 -
		continued
		10.12.17		air was filled.
		9.00 AM	S 6-7, Sea 6, Vis. good	Due to the sea state the boat can lie stopped on the surface without danger, boat sails with the wind behind it, course 25°, to the north, can be steered downwind.  Speed 3-4 knots.
		12.00 Noon	Square 073 gamma VI
		6.00 PM		Flannan Island 10 nm abeam.
		11.12.17
		7.15 AM	SSW Sea 6, rain, overcast	Butt of Lewis in 104°T, 19 nm away.
		10.00 AM	SSW 3, Sea 3, Vis. good	Dived due to U-boat danger, battery division.
			I want to remain in the vicinity of the Butt of Lewis, in order to have a good point of departure for the intended Fair Passage. Navigation fixes from [celestial] observations are not to be expected in these weather conditions.
		12.00 Noon	Square 152 beta VI
		4.45 PM	WSW 8, Sea 7, rain and hail squalls	Surfaced, battery condition 7500 Amp., lay stopped and drifted to the east.  Lighthouse on the Butt of Lewis in sight at times.
		12.12.17
		9.00 AM	S 6, Sea 6, misty	First start and testing of the port engine.
		11.00 AM		Port engine is limitedly operable after 57 hours of repair.
			In addition to minor work, a new piston head was placed on piston V, all rings on piston IV were replaced, injector pump I was removed and new spacers and rings were placed on the piston.  The work was carried out with great diligence and energy in the bad weather under the proven, active leadership of Naval Chief Engineer R h i n o w by the entire technical crew with great skill.  Even if it was not possible to get the engine fully operational - cylinders IV and VII are still smoking heavily, and the piston heads are apparently also torn - this overhaul of the port engine will, in all likelihood, enable the boat to be brought to a homeland harbor. The location of the boat, which seemed extremely unfavorable when the engine collapsed due to the Legerwall [strong wind and seas from open water forcing the boat towards land] and the impossibility of putting the boat on the bottom, changed over the course of the 2 1/2 days due to a change in the wind direction (the boat could sail about 60 nm in before the tower) and at times sightings of the Monach, Flannan and Butt of Lewis lighthouses were still relatively favorable, although the constant dangers that this coast in particular poses to a vessel driven by westerly storms were never ignored.
		12.00 Noon	Square 133 epsilon VI
			SSW 7, Sea 7-8, Vis. low	Course 57°, headed for Sule Skerry, port diesel GF; despite the inclement . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 10.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 11.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 12.12.17

	- 15 -
		continued
		12.12.17		weather and the inaccurate navigation, the trip was shortened due to the condition of the engines and we stuck to passing through the Fair Isle Passage.
		05.50 PM		With sudden clearing of the weather Sule Skerry comes in sight astern 5 nm away.  This means that the ship's location  is sufficiently certain for passing south of Fair Isle.
				Noup Head, the lighthouse off Fair Isle and North Ronaldsay do not burn.  No patrols sighted.
		13.12.17
		12.05 AM		Passed 3°W.
		5.10 AM	WSW 7, Sea 6, rain squalls, at times very low visibility, very high abating Swell and cross sea	Fair Isle in sight 6 strich [67.5°] to port about 2-3 nm away.  (Intended distance 8 nm); turned away.  Current calculation was wrong, the west wind blowing for a long time overturned the information from the Current Atlas.
		5.30 AM		Course 150° for the Doggerbank Lightship.
		10.35 AM		Dived to repair the port diesel, minor overhaul.
		12.00 Noon	Square 090 delta III
		2.00 PM	WNW 5-6, Sea 5, Vis. good	Surfaced, continued transit.
		14.12.17
		10.00 AM	NNW 6, Sea 6, Vis. good	Port diesel pounds strongly and must be stopped.
			Examination showed that piston cooling cylinder V failed.  Failure of piston cooling couldn't be determined in advance with the current installation - a change had already been applied for earlier, approval of the application was pending when I was last in the shipyard -
				Cylinder V was shut down.
		11.00 AM		The port diesel can only run in charging mode to achieve a better degree of balance.  When running on the propeller , the vibrations are so strong that a complete breakdown of the engine is to be expected. Starboard side electric GF, course 150°.
		12.00 Noon	Square 071 epsilon III
		5.45 PM		Sent Radio Signal:  133 alfa V.  Port diesel engine after 2 1/2 day repair Butt of Lewis now limitedly operable, Mine Signal 46.  Due to great engine uncertainty earliest pickup and bringing in is absolutely necessary.  On 15 December at 10.00 PM can be in 102 gamma.    U-57.

	Sun and Moon Data 12.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 13.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 14.12.17

	- 16 -
		continued
		14.12.17	Reasons for:
			Condition of the engines is now such that at any moment a full failure is possible.  This can pose a danger to the boat within the mine area, mainly on the stretch from square 102 gamma to Q, where the boat cannot anchor or be put on the bottom.
		15.12.17
		6.30 AM	NW 9-10, Sea 8, heavy bottom sea on the Dogger Bank	Dived due to gyro-compass failure; boat can only be held with difficulty at depth and hits bottom lightly at depth 23 meters.
		7.30 AM		Therefore surfaced, steered by the magnetic compass.  Ship's position is determined by sounding series.
		9.00 AM		Course 75°, Headed for the Dogger Bank Lightship.
		12.00 Noon	Square 051 delta VII
			NW 8, Sea 8, Vis. good
		3.00 PM		Gyro-compass in service again.
				Sighted multiple fishing vessels and a Dutch steamer to the NE with course south.
		03.40 PM		Dogger Bank South in sight.  Course 170° to Buoys 4 and 5.
				Engine must be stopped now and then for repairs and to replace flush valves.  Engine smokes always stronger  (large black spraying plume of smoke).
		7.10 PM		Arrival of Signal 1833 of the B.d.U., that bringing in not possible due to bad weather, independent entry if navigation is certain.
				Answered that escort must be awaited in square 102 gamma due to the condition of the engine.
			Certain navigation is not possible with 6 knot highest speed with the weather.
		11.30 PM		Dived and put the boat on the bottom in depth 50 meters with 5 tons negative buoyancy, the boat lies very well.
		16.12.17
		6.00 AM	NWbyN 2, Sea 3, Swell, Vis. good	Surfaced.  Radio Message to IV.U-Flottille to Radio Message 1909, that escort with gear is possible.
				Asked for the position UB 22 and headed for Buoy 6.
				Gyro-compass failed briefly.
		09.40 AM		UB 22 in sight.  Went in hailing range.  UB 22 was asked to pick up Radio Messages for U-57 because the boat must go to the bottom for repairs to the engine.  Escort is not be expected before evening.

	Sun and Moon Data 14.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 15.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 16.12.17

	- 17 -
		continued
		16.12.17
		9.52 AM		Dived, put the boat on the bottom, depth 42 meters.
		12.00 Noon	Square 103 gamma VII
		1.30 PM	WSW 1-2, Swell, Vis. good	Surfaced, exchanged Recognition Signals with UB 22.  UB 22 informs us that that he submitted a Radio Message on my behalf concerning weather conditions with the question, when can escort be expected.
		3.10 PM		To protect the engines put the boat on the bottom again; UB 22 picks up Radio Messages for U-57.
		5.00 PM		Surfaced, UB 22 informs, that escort will be in 102 gamma at 7.00 PM; escort is the 10.Torpedobootshalbflottille.
				Proceeded in the vicinity of Buoy 6 on changing courses and awaited darkness, so the transit to 102 gamma cannot be observed by an enemy U-boat in the vicinity.
		5.45 PM		Course 2° to 102 gamma.  Starboard E-motor GF, port engine charging mode.
		6.16 PM		Port engine out of service.  The engine stalls under strong hammering and the cause and duration of the damage cannot be estimated.
			I consider a Radio Message concerning tug assistance is necessary, because I'll be taken under escort by the 10. Torpedoboots Halbflottille in 40 minutes and experience shows that torpedo boats can tow submarines even in bad weather (U-22).  Weather conditions are favorable.
				Battery condition is 7000 Amp. Hours.
		7.00 PM	W 3-4, Sea 3, Vis. good	Boat is in 102 gamma, UB 22 is in the vicinity.
		7.30 PM		Three torpedo boats in sight in the SW, exchanged Recognition Signals and asked the torpedo boat to take us in tow by Morse message.  Sent present course.
				In the meantime exchanged Recognition Signals with UB 34.  One of the torpedo boats (in order to avoid unnecessary signal traffic, boat numbers were not identified) tried twice while passing by to establish a connection with U-57, but in my opinion remains too far away, so that there is no chance of the towing maneuver succeeding.
				After the second approach, approximately 9.00 PM, the torpedo boat makes a Morse message, that its turbine is damaged and another boat would tow.  After a long time (at least an hour) a second boat comes and makes two very good approaches.  On the first approach it fails to throw the throwing line.  On the second approach the connection is successfully established, the torpedo boat's tow cable is shackled onto U-57's tow cable.
		11.15 PM		3 3/4 hours after the rendezvous with the escort the escort tows the boat for the first time, however the line only comes a little stiff and is suddenly loose.  The cause is not clear to me, because the connection of the two lines by shackle and thimble was absolutely sure.  There is a possibility that the line on the torpedo boat came loose or got caught in the propeller.  The cause cannot be determined on board,

Sun and Moon Data 16.12.17

	- 18 -
		continued
		16.12.17		because the cables are too heavy to be hauled up, they have to be let go.
		11.30 PM	Since towing now seems hopeless and in order to avoid further displacement due to wind and current, I decide to drive on E-motors to point Q with the last of the battery's power so that I can be towed again when it gets light. I communicate this intention to the torpedo boat and ask for guidance [navigationally]. Speed 5 knots.
				During the long delay in square 102 gamma, a sailing vessel and a steamer came in sight to which the presence of war ships could not have remained hidden through Morse traffic, which endangers the "Yellow" route.
			In the meantime the port engine is ready for testing.  On starting it collapses again.  The cause was found to be a break in both trombone [tapered pipe for cooling water] pipes on cylinder 8.  The repair will take at least 6 hours. Trombones were removed from the starboard engine for the port.
			After there was no sign of the torpedo boats at all for a while (about an hour) - the Morse message requesting [the torpedo boat] to reduce speed was not answered - a boat on the opposite course comes in sight and asks for a course. Answer: course 80°, but please lead me as my ship's location is uncertain.
			Due to the drifting and the various towing maneuvers, my navigation, which was accurate at 7.00 AM, had become unreliable.
			I assumed that the torpedo boat, which was not involved in the towing, has better navigation. Apparently the boats have separated. Two boats arrived alone with UB 22 and UB 34. At times light signals were visible far away to port ahead in the ESE.
			The torpedo boat now sets course and signals; I proceed in company.
			About 2.00 PM a second torpedo boat came in sight and seemed to remain in the vicinity.
			Even if the low speed made it impossible to proceed with gear [mine sweeping devices], in my view the [torpedo] boats shoud not separate but instead had to bring the three [U-] boats to point Q. Fishing trawlers immediately take the lead and deploy gear at point Q.
			From the Radio Messages received during the afternoon it appears that tow assistance was requested by the torpedo boats. I therefore consider a separate Radio Signal to avoid ambiguities to be superfluous.
		17.12.17
		3.10 AM	NE 2-3, Sea 2, cloudy, rain squalls	By time, the boat must be at Point Q, stopped, Nothing is seen of the two fishing trawlers, which should lie at Q.
				Torpedo boat now asks me what course to steer, because it wants to search for the fishing trawlers on changing courses; the second boat has passed out of sight.
			Since the search for the torpedo boat is fruitless and further wandering around will make the navigation even more uncertain, . . .

	Sun and Moon Data 16.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 17.12.17

	- 19 -
		continued
		17.12.17		I ask the torpedo boat to anchor and inform him that the U-57 cannot anchor at night due to the uncertainty of the anchor gear. I myself intend to stay close to the torpedo boats at low speed and determine the ship's location in the morning twilight using sea navigation.  The position lines gained in the night were uncertain.
			I only managed to get an answer about the torpedo boat's further intentions after making three urgent inquiries after 20 minutes. Answer:  "I'm not anchoring".
			I now decide to anchor after a 3 1/2 week operation, despite the uncertainty of the anchoring gear based on experience. The anchor must be hoisted out with the capstan.
				Morse traffic to torpedo boat: "Have anchored".
				Torpedo boat remains in the vicinity.
				Port engine will be started and used for charging
				A radio bearing from Borkum at 6.00 AM shows that the boat must be about 7 nm south of Point Q.
				One torpedo boat and four fishing trawlers come in sight from the north, they close us.
				Weighed anchor.
				The fishing trawlers immediately take control of the boat and want to take me in tow.
			Because after the experience of the night I only consider a towing maneuver appropriate when it is light, I ask the fishing trawlers, to bring me with mine sweeping gear to Point Q.  In the trawlers I found the support I needed for the situation, whereas previously the escort service had only brought additional strain on the boat, although I also did not fail to recognize that, given the hopeless condition of the engines, the knowledge of the presence of torpedo boats provided some security and brought reassurance.
			Morning twilight	In the meantime UC 40, which was even further south than I was, had come up from aft to starboard. In the north at point Q, UB 34 and UB 22 come int sight, accompanied by two fishing trawlers. UC 40 went to UB 22 and UB 34 for escort.
				The three torpedo boats of the 10. Halbflottille now gathered to the north of me and passed out of sight on an easterly course, without letting me know their further intentions.  One boat still asked: "What speed will you run?"  Answer:  "6 knots".
		9.15 AM	NE 2-3, Sea 2, Vis. good, barometer is rising	The boat is at Point Q.
			Since the engine is operable again on 6 cylinders, I can continue running electrically at 6 knots, I prefer to continue running in this charging mode for the time being and wait for the tug CORNELIE WESSELS, which left Emden at 7.20 AM, to appear. (Radio Message No. 0637)
			At 10.00 AM the following Radio Message was received: "T 120 to Borkum" U-57 is being escorted under its own power, bringing U-57 to Ems river
			I have a torpedo boat transmit the message on to T 120 with a searchlight: "To correct Radio Message 0955, boat goes to Helgoland".

Sun and Moon Data 17.12.17

	- 20 -
		continued
		17.12.17	My intention was to go to Helgoland or Wilhelmshaven, depending on the condition of the engine and the weather conditions. Ems would only be considered in an extreme emergency.
			At 10.21 AM T 120 sent the following Radio Message to Leader boat of the 10. Torpedoboots-Halbflottille:  "U-boat, as defective as is, wants to go to Helgoland, not the Ems river, please give me an order.
			The request, mainly the appropriateness, of orders for me from the 10. Torpedoboots-Halbflottille is not understandable to me, since the Kommandant was not entitled to judge the extent of my engine damage and also since the 10. Torpedoboots-Halbflottille does not decide on the route the boat should take.
			At 12.00 Noon S.M.S. PILLAU came in sight ahead to starboard with a torpedo boat, approached at high speed and turns behind the convoy. PILLAU asks if she should tow me. Since the engine was once again temporarily out of service and we couldn't rely on arriving safely under our own power, I accepted the tug's help.
		12.20 PM		Went to starboard astern of PILLAU with the bow to her stern.  The connection between the two was quickly and surely established, lines hauled in and the heaviest towing hawser from Pillau affixed to the base of the 10.5 cm gun covered with 3 turns and shackled to itself.
		12.45 PM		PILLAU got underway.  Boat under tow well at 6 knots.
				Tried with the port engine, to fill the battery in any case, engine ran with strong pounding and frequent stops for minor repairs in charging mode.
				When PILLAU tried to tow at higher speed (7 knots) the hawser broke.
		12.00 Noon	Square 030 epsilon VII
			NE 2-3, Sea 2, Swell, Vis. good
		04.15 PM		Apparently the hawser frayed on the iron lip of U-57.
				Tug CORNELIE WESEL, which followed the boat since 1.35 PM immediately came alongside and took the boat in tow.  Speed 7 knots.
				PILLAU, several torpedo boats and fishing trawlers which came in sight in the meantime escort the boat.
		06.15 PM	E 2-3, Sea 2	Hawser breaks, frayed while towing.  New towing maneuver.
		07.46 PM		First towing, 5 knots.
			The four towing maneuvers placed great demands on the personnel, which, under the leadership of Kapitänleutnant A N D L E R, were met by the crew with endurance, tenacity and freshness.
		18.12.17
		3.00 AM		Battery condition in the meantime 7000 Amp. Hours so ran with the starboard E-motor, speed 7 knots.  PILLAU transfers escort service to two torpedo boats of the I. Flottille and runs in, because it emerged from a Radio Message, it seemed that the

	Sun and Moon Data 17.12.17
	Sun and Moon Data 18.12.17

	- 21 -
		continued
		18.12.17		boat was running under its own power (error in receiving a Radio Message).
		x.40 AM	NE 1-2, little Swell, Vis. very good	Battery condition 6500 Amp. Hours.  Boat can come to Wilhelmshaven under its own power with E-motors.  Therefore cast off the tug and released it to Emden.
			Tug CORNELIE WESSEL, Kommandant, Deckoffizierleutnant K l a d i n o w s k y,  has consistently worked with great seamanship that deserves recognition.
				The tug MÖVE, which was met during the night to tow, was ordered to follow the boat to Wilhelmshaven.
				Lead [1.Flottille]  boat alongside.
		x.50 AM		Passed the outer Jade,  1.Flottille broke off escort service.
		11.30 AM		Tug MÖVE was released at Genius Bank for Helgoland.
		1.30 PM		Arrived in the 1st Entrance.
		2.30 PM		Made fast alongside ODIN.
				Concluded the 18th December 1917.
				Kapitänleutnant and Kommandant.
				Total distance covered:
				Surface       2570 nm
				Submerged       355 nm
				Total:              2925 nm
				========

Sun and Moon Data 18.12.17

	Control Number:   3
	E  x  p  e  r  i  e  n  c  e  s
	S.M. Uboot "U-57" for the period of the operation from 22 November
	to 18 December 1917.
	===============
	1.   Number of torpedoes taken:                          12       2.   Number of torpedo expended:                         7       3   Number of hits:                                                3       4.         The low success of the operation has its cause in engine malfunctions that occurred day after day, the last engine failure forced return transit.  Additionally, the periscope end position switch broke during  a convoy attack on 5 December deprived the boat a certain success.           At Start Point, between the Isles of Scilly and Hartland Point as well as south of Conningbeg 5-10 nm away, observed regular unprotected independent steamer traffic by night.           Patrol were very light except for airships south of Small's and the aircraft at Trevose Head           The Channel cruise was completed without interference and navigationally certain west of South Falls.           In order to determine the longitude again exactly before the actual Cannel cruise, after a point 3 nm east of the northern tip of the South Falls was reached on the , the South Falls were sounded with the boat at depth 20 meters heading west.  When the boat came to depth 10 meters, blew, proceeded for a short stretch and then sounded the deep channel again with the boat.           The transition from deep channel to shallow and vice versa is so uniform that the boat pushed itself slowly over the shallows without any hard grounding at LF .           A trial will have to show whether sounding in this way is possible in bad weather.           Boats must avoid being spotted in the immediate vicinity of the South Falls at all costs, otherwise this type of approach will soon be counteracted by countermeasures.       5. Artillery.   a) Day shooting:  Using a large dispersion is recommended, its use will be beneficial in some cases.             A continuation and constant supply of the U-boat gunnery courses in Wilhelmshaven is necessary, as the personnel on the remote operation itself has little time and opportunity for training. The aim is for No. 1 to go on a course with No. 2 and to get the necessary practice with him at the gunnery school.   b) Night shooting:  It is desirable that the impacts be made visible to the eye or that a shell with a tracer be used, as the water columns are no longer visible at 1000 meters.  Surprise attack at this range e is very promising.              With the surprise attack on 30 November at night there was a lack of any lighting on the attachment drum and rod and the slide drum on the 10.5 cannon and 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun proved to be extremely disadvantageous.  The ordered settings were made using flashlights; the procedure is too slow and blinds the gun operators.   c) Malfunctions:  Artillery combat on 28 November failed to fire the first shot. After removing the bolt it was discovered that the spring for the re-cocking device was broken. The cause of the fracture is unknown.       6. Torpedoes.             The investigation of the three torpedoes delivered to the shipyard will show to what extent the K.3. misses were caused by strong depth charge detonations.

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	7. Communications.             The iron spray protection caps for antenna insulators have proven themselves well. Their durability is better than that of copper ones. The insulation value is the same.             A pull rod of the Radio Mast erection device broke due to a material defect and was able to be repaired using on-board equipment by repairing an elbow.       8.           The cause of the break of the port double dynamo shaft must be explained by the shipyard and the U-boat Engineer.             The many malfunctions of the port diesel are partly due to the heavy use of this engine after the starboard side failed.             In eliminating the many serious engine malfunctions that went beyond the scope of normal operational failures, the technical staff under the leadership of the Naval Chief Engineer R h i n o w demonstrated an energy and freshness that deserve special mention.       9.           The lack of a navigator while working close to land again placed a considerable additional burden on the Kommandant, who is under a lot of strain during this time.             The provision of non-commissioned officers on board who can support the Kommandant in navigation (mainly terrestrial) is again required.                                                                                                                                             Kapitänleutnant and Kommandant.

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