U-boat Archive - Auxiliary Cruiser KTB

Auxiliary Cruiser Pinguin (Ship 33 - HSK 5)

Part 3

26 July to 19 September 1940

Translation by Jerry Mason










	K r i e g s t a g e b u c h
	================================


		of


	S h i p 33



	Kommandant:	Kapitän zur See Krüder

	Beginning	26 July 1940
	Concluding:	19 September 1940






Enclosures 9 to 19

- 35 -





		Following the ship's assignment per Radio Message:

		To all Atlantic Forces (No. 81, 82, 83) of 24 July 40

		of a newly allocated operating area in the Cape Town sea area, I initially intend to head for the northwest corner of this area at o 0° longitude and 20°S latitude.
		With the Kommandanten UA, whose next destination in Freetown, a joint transit course of 120° is agreed up to about the presumed steamer route and, possibly convoys from South America to Freetown. With that, UA will then head for Freetown. In the event of an encounter with the "cruiser" DORSETSHIRE "which, according to the news transmitted, is currently to patrol this sea area, joint operations are planned. As long as seamanship allows, UA is to be towed.



	23.00	The lights of a steamer come in sight ahead to port approximately head on. Course of the steamer about 320°. UA broke off to take a closer look at the steamer. Ship 33 remained in the dark and showed a narrow silhouette when the moon rose.
		On return, the Kommandant informs me that he had shot a torpedo at the steamer (tanker), which, however, as a circle runner, he only narrowly escaped.
		He wants to have the torpedoes checked again before further damage. The torpedo detonated at the end of its running time. However, the steamer did not take notice of any maneuvers of the U-Boat or of the torpedo detonation that took place at a greater distance from him, drove on calmly and continued to maintain radio silence, so it can be assumed we were unnoticed.

- 36 -



	continued
	26.07.40		UA was taken in tow again.
	03.40		The towline breaks in strong oncoming Swell.
			We now proceed separately.


	12.00	07°43'N 34°00'W
		SW 2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good



	27.07.40	05°47'N 30°03'W	No particular events.
	12.00	SEbyS 3, Sea 2-3, clear, Vis. good



	28.07.40	03°46'N 26°28'W	Said goodbye to UA, sets off on course 90° to reach the suspected steamer route to Freetown by the shortest route.
	12.00	SSE 3-4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good

			Came to course 136°.

	Sun and Moon Data 26.07.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.07.40
	Sun and Moon Data 28.07.40

- 37 -



	continued
	28.07.40		I intend to pass the aforementioned suspected convoys today and the strong protection of South America traffic to Freetown by proceeding at high speed and at night, in order to then proceed at transit speed to the NE corner of my assigned operational area in the Cape Town area.


	29.07.40	00°20'S 22°37'W	No particular events.
		SbyE 3-4, Sea 2-3, clear, Vis. good



		On 24 July the following notice was received

		Radio Message:	To all (85, 86)

		On 21 July the Admiralty sent to all merchant ships in the home area:
		To protect against incoming enemy privateers report by radio regardless of the cost. The enemy is informed of this and tries to get close enough to shoot away antennas. It is therefore of the utmost importance that radio reports are sent before the enemy approaches sufficiently. The risk of false reports must be accepted. Consider ships that appear to be approaching for suprise attack as suspicious and report them immediately. The report can be withdrawn at any time if the suspicion proves to be unfounded.

			S.K.L.

	Sun and Moon Data 28.07.40
	Sun and Moon Data 29.07.40

- 38 -



	continued
	29.07.40	As a result, every approach to a steamer becomes difficult and a position report must be expected when heading for a steamer.


	Z.Z.
	===
	15°W	[GMT -1]

	30.07.40
	12.00	03°11'S 20°28'W	No particular events.
		SE 4, Sea 3, isolated showers, Vis. good



	31.07.40	05°11'S 18°21'W	Ahead to port a steamer comes in sight on a crossing course.
	08.00	ESE 3-4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good

	09.03		Came to a parallel course, ran with on course - 40° - and gradually angled in. The steamer was armed with one stern cannon.

	10.10		The steamer turns away slowly.
			Turned slowly with him.
	10.24		The steamer turned hard away, showed the stern and transmitted.
		[Enclosure 9]	(See Enclosure: Radio Report).
			Turned towards high speed and began the chase.
	10.20		The steamer set the English flag. People are seen at the cannon. Range - 10000 meters.
			Range is slowly decreasing.

	Sun and Moon Data 29.07.40
	Sun and Moon Data 30.07.40
	Sun and Moon Data 31.07.40

- 39 -

continued

31.07.40

10.55

At 4000 meters range tuned away by 35°, set war flag, steamer was asked to stop by flag signal and fire was opened because it is an armed English steamer on the run, which transmits emergency signals and location by Radio Message and whose guns are being manned.

11.00

The crew left the ship in 3 boats. Also rafts were launched. The steamer burns in the superstructure.

11.20

Examination team goes aboard.

It was the English steamer "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGN" home port Liverpool, 5358 tons, cargo 7500 tons of grain from Bahia Blanca for Newcastle via Freetown.

The crew is from the north. 4 dead are found on deck, the steamer burns.

1 demolition crate was brought out and set in place, however the igniter failed.

In the meantime the occupants of the 3 boats, in total 32 men, of these 4 severely, 4 lightly wounded, were taken on board one after another.

The crew consisted of:

Captain	William	Chalmers
1st Officer	Arthur	Ramshow, lightly wounded
2nd Officer	Cyrl	Plummer, severely wounded
3rd Officer	Harald	Roberts, severely wounded
Radio Officer	Harald	Morrison, severely wounded
1st Engineer	James	Barnes
2md Engineer	Joh.	Prier
3rd Engineer	Gustaf	Shon
4th Engineer	James	Harris

9 English		1 Swede
2 Spanish		4 Japanese

- 40 -

continued

31.07.40

5 Malayan

2 West African.

All are British subjects.

Because the steamer had transmitted its position and bearings must have been taken, I decide to sink it by torpedo, to be able to run off without further time loss. A new closing by boat for demolition would take 2-3 hours and would not be prudent in the current circumstances.

12.34

One torpedo shot from the port tubes. Hit amidships, steamer heels over to starboard on an even keel and floats keel up.

12.58

Steamer sank with slight rising of the foreship.

At the sinking location drifts much wood, rafts and grain.

13.00

Ran off at 16 knots, course 180°.

In accordance with operational orders to use only especially favorable opportunities for merchant warfare in the North and South Atlantic: to this is the position of the ship is known by the assistance call of the steamer, as emerges from the multiple requests from the C-in-C South Atlantic to the steamer for further reports.

I therefore intend, as instructed, to set off from this sea area at an accelerated rate and remain unnoticed for a while before I visit the operating area in Cape region that has been assigned to me.

	- 41 -



		"DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA"

		31 July 1940













	After the shooting

	- 42 -






		Torpedo los!

	- 43 -

	- 44 -










			Crew of the "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA"

- 45 -



	continued
	31.07.40		Shortly after the onset of darkness for a short time on the horizon the masts and smokestack of a southerly steering steamer in sight. In the meantime it has grown dark, therefore for the above reason it was not operated on further.



		Captain William C h a l m e r s of the sunken steamer "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA" said the following when interrogated by the First Prize Officer:
		His ship was 5,358 GRT size, 3243 NRT [= Net Registered Tonnage] and was on the way from Bahia Blanca to Freetown and from there understood further in convoy probably for Newcastle. It had about 7500 tons of grain for order. His shipping firm was the Larrinaga Steam Ship Company, Liverpool. He himself is a Scottish, 58 years old and resides in Carnovstie (Scotland).
		The course he steered was prescribed to him by the British Consul in Bahia Blanca. From Bahia for the first 2 days he steered east and then approximately in the center of the Atlantic changing course about every 24 hours. Since yesterday evening, 30 July, he had steered 30°.
		He further states that yesterday evening, 30 July, he saw a steamer whose course he was unable to pinpoint precisely because it was only faintly visible on the horizon. In any case, he turned around and steered south for about 4 hours and then on his usual course again. We also seemed suspicious to him, so he half changed course. He said he hadn't seen any flag signals until the moment we changed course to port. At that moment he told the First Officer to find out which flags we had set. But shortly thereafter received our first volley. He admits having sent an emergency call by radio stating his position and that he was being chased by a suspicious ship. He had not given the order to ready the cannon, but ordered that they stand ready by the boats. He says he intended to stop after the warning shot.

- 46 -



	continued
	31.07.40	When, on the orders of the Kommandanten, he was reproached by the Prize Officer that he had treated the life of his crew carelessly, because he had not heeded our flag signals, but tried to escape and gave a signal that people were tampering with the cannon, replied he said he had just gone by orders.
		He also stated that he did not know the positions of any warships here in the South Atlantic. Only from Freemantle would the convoys be assembled, usually 16 to 22 ships, and then brought to England under the protection of a cruiser, a second destroyer and about two trawlers. That convoy had existed since around January 1940.
		During the war he himself had made two trips to South America and one trip to the United States in February/March. On the last voyage he had coal for Freemantle and proceeded from there to Argentina.
		Under his papers he had manifests and bills of lading, ship certificates and crew lists.
		His crew consisted of 38 men, of these 32 were on board the ship. Among the crew were Spanish, Malayan, Japanese and Africans, but all of them lived more or less a long time in England.
		The armament consisted of a 10 cm cannon with 40 rounds of ammunition. The cannon was stamped from the year 1917. He stated that he had a trained gunner on board and that other people were trained by him. But he did not want to give the names of these people because he supposedly did not know them.

	- 47 -




			The gunner John Mullen said that he was 24 years old, and up to now had not been to sea, in Glasgow he received a month long training from the Navy in handling the 4" cannon, then sent by the merchant marine on board the "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA" and here entrusted with the existing 4" cannon. Once a week he did gunnery drills with 7 men of the crew. The Second and Third Officers were among these 7 men.
			The cannon was said to have been older, from 1916 and he had 42 rounds of ammunition to dispose of.
			4 blacks and 1 Japanese belonged to the cannon crew.
			He admits that he tampered with the cannon, allegedly only to get his binoculars there. He did not receive an order to shoot.
			Mullen appears intelligent. He states that he did not serve in the Navy and that he previously worked as a shoemaker.
			There was no range measuring equipment on board.
			There was nothing more to be got out of Mullen.




			Finally, with today's success, I it is especially gratifying pleasing that the position of a German commerce raider becomes known at a time when the English Admiralty is warning of a German raider, which last on 28 July was sighted at 24°S, 31°W on course 180° (Ship 10) and the location of Ship 21 in the North Atlantic must also be assumed to be known.
			In this way, in my opinion, through the palpable presence of various commerce raiders, the desired insecurity is best created for the enemy and he is forced to strengthen the protection his shipping overseas.

- 48 -




	01.08.40	10°54'S 17°40'W
		EbyS 6, Sea 5, overcast, showers, Vis. medium


		As is known, 28 July Ship 10 had a short fire fight with the English auxiliary cruiser "ALCANTARA" at the reported position.
		There is the possibility, that the enemy associated the loss of the "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA" on 31 July with Ship 10, if he suspects it ran off at high speed to the north.
		This possibility will bring increased uncertainty in the announced ongoing search for the German raiders and can prove useful for the further actions of Ship 10 as well.



		The announcement by the enemy that the search for the German raiders will continue after the combat confirms my decision to initially remain unnoticed in the vastness of the South Atlantic and, if necessary, to allow measures to be taken to strengthen protection of the steamer routes to fade away.

- 49 -




	02.08.40	14°56'S 16°24'W	No particular events.
		EbyS 5-7, Sea 4-5, overcast, showers, Vis. good to bad


	03.08.40	18°29'S 15°09'W
	03.00	EbyN 5, Sea 4, cloudy, squalls, Vis. good	A Radio Message makes known the positions of two American steamers passing each other on the Cape Town - Trinidad route. There is a danger of meeting both steamers at their meeting point. For this reason, we ran for 3 hours at an increased speed to the NE, then came back to base course, 160°.

	04.08.40	20°34'S 13°47'W	No particular events.
	12.00	ENE 3, Sea 2-3, cloudy, Vis. good

	05.08.40	23°38'S 11°58'W	Because the wind has come more to the north, at midday came to an easterly course to remain in the South Atlantic High.
	12.00	NbyE 3, Sea 3-4, cloudy, Vis. good
	18.00		Lay stopped to stay here for a while.
	19.30		The Third Officer of the "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA" succumbs to his serious internal injuries in the ship's hospital.

	06.08.40		Burial of the corpse.
	08..00		Ship lay stopped.
	MEZ	[GMT +0]
	====
	12.00	23°55'S 11°04'W	No particular events.
		NW 6, Sea 5-6, overcast, rain showers, Vis. good, bad in showers

	Sun and Moon Data 02.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 04.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 05.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 26.08.40

- 50 -



	continued
	06.08.40	Statement of Radio Operator Morrison of the steamer "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA" during interrogation by the Radio Officer and First Prize Officer of Ship 33:

		When the DOMINGO caught sight of a steamer the day before its capture, which he found had stopped, the Captain turned away to run for four hours. DOMINGO was heading northeast, the steamer came into view to port. No radio message was sent.
		When Ship 33 seemed to approach DOMINGO, the radio operator sent an open radio message with our description. He received the order to transmit from the Captain through the Second Officer. The radio message was initiated by "QQQQ". This sign was introduced recently and has the meaning: Armed enemy merchant ship wants to capture me. The earlier - rrr - German raider is now only used as a warning message for bringing up enemy warships. He received the description from the Second Officer. He sent: black ship, black smokestack, white superstructure and Swedish flag, plus a position for around 10.00 hours before the steamer changed course. It was strongly interfered with by radio communications from two other steamers, one of which was apparently a Panamanian. He issued his report four times. He received no confirmation from Ascension Radio, the station that he appeared to have been trying to communicate with.
		The steamer station had an approximately 6 year old 0.5 kw tube transmitter with fixed tuning for 600 meters, 620 meters, 640 meters, etc. in the range of 600 meters to 800 meters. The emergency signal was sent at 600 meters and the transmitter was a bit out of tune.
		A transportable lifeboat station was not on board. Most of the stations of English merchant ships have 0.5 kw and now often have an additional shortwave transmitter for 36 meters, 24 meters and 18 meters.
		Regarding the radio traffic of the two steamers (our interference transmission) the radio operator had the impression that we were in contact with the steamer seen the day before and had requested and received a description of the DOMINGO from him.

- 51 -

continued

06.08.40

Based on the experiences I've had so far and the radio messages received, I've come to the following assessment of the situation

1)	As a defense against the German commerce raiders, the British ordered that English steamers evade any other vessel. If a ship still believes that it is being followed by another, a radio report must be made with the acceptance of false reports, including QQQ and position.
	With these measures, it will probably hardly be possible to capture a steamer unreported. On the other hand, it will inevitably often result in false alarms, which will further increase the current uncertainty for the near future.

2)	Due to the fact that Ship 10 (naval battle ALCANTARA) and Ship 33 (sinking DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA) occurred close together and became known, it was suspected that reinforced security was deployed on the main steamer routes in the South Atlantic. The received radio messages from the SKL: "To all Atlantic Ships (16, 17) of 1 August 1940, To All (40, 41) of 7 August 1940" concerning operational radio messages to English forces and the information from the movement of the cruiser "CORNWALL" and "SHROPSHIRE" from Gibraltar to the south confirm these suspicions. On the main steamer routes strengthened security must be expected, that mean quick arrival of a cruiser or auxiliary cruisers on a call for help, as well as strongly protected convoys.

3)	The strategic goal according to the Operations Order - tying down and harassment of the enemy - appears under these circumstances at the moment. in the South Atlantic to a certain extent achieved even without the further use of the auxiliary cruiser, which would only be possible under severe danger (combat involving Ship 10).

- 52 -

continued

06.08.40

With regard to the further mission of the ship, I gave up the intention to advance on the steamer route into the operational area under the West African coast that was released to me after a long period of time since the sinking of the DOMINGO, and decide to continue the transit south in the middle of the South Atlantic and advance on the line La Plata - Cape Town to the east in the hope of encountering targets that can be hunted in transit.

07.08.40

24°18'S 11°26'W

)

12.00

SW 5-6, Sea 4-5, cloudy, Vis. good

)

08.08.40

25°44'S 13°11'W

)

12.00

SSE 3, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good

) No particular events.

)

09.08.40

28°19'S 13°14'W

)

12.00

ENE 1, Sea 1, cloudy, Vis. good

)

10.08.40

29°12'S 13°10'W

)

12.00

NWbyN 4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good

)

	Sun and Moon Data 06.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 07.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 08.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 10.08.40

- 53 -




	11.08.40
	12.00	32°39'S 12°57'W	No particular events.
		NWbyW 3, Sea 2, clear, Vis. good

	12.08.40
	12.00	34°46'S 11°10'W
		SSW 7, Sea 6-7, overcast, showers, Vis. good, in showers bad

			In events reflected in the received radio picture (transcripts of radio messages are attached) I see a confirmation of the situation assessment I have made. The collision of two steamers under the south-west coast of Africa is no doubt a result of proceeding darkened and the general nervousness.
			It is noteworthy that the cruiser that came to the aid of the rammed 18713 ton steamer CERAMIC must have been at the scene after 12 hours at the latest

	13.08.40
	12.00	34°34'S 6°55'W	No particular events.
		SW 4, Sea 4, cloudy, Vis. good

	14.08.40
	12.00	34°25'S 2°34'W	Steamer in sight on opposite course.
		WNW 4, Sea 4, overcast, rain, misty, Vis. bad	Japanese steamer "HAWAII MARU" passed at a distance of about 3 nm.
			According to a radio message from CapeTown certainly for Buenos Aires. No action in accordance with instructions.

	Sun and Moon Data 11.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 12.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 13.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 14.08.40

- 54 -




	15.08.40
	12.00	34°23'S 01°56'E	No particular events.
		SW 6, Sea 6, cloudy, showers, Vis. good to bad

	16.08.40
	12.00	35°45'S 06°01'E	No particular events.
		NWbyW 5, Sea 4, cloudy







	M.E.Z.	[GMT +0]
	17.08.40
	12.00	38°21'S 08°35'E	No particular events.
		WbyS 5-6, Sea 6, overcast, rain, Vis. medium

	18.08.40
	12.00	39°26'S 12°41'E	No particular events.
		SbyW 3, Sea 3, overcast, rain, Vis. bad

	Sun and Moon Data 15.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 16.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 17.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 18.08.40

- 55 -




	19.08.40
	01.40	39°45'S 15°19'E	A dimmed vessel came in sight ahead out of a rain squall
		SEbyE 5, Sea 5-6, overcast, squalls with showers, Vis. bad	Since a steamer route is unlikely here, about 60 nm outside of the outer objective points around Cape Town, a warship is initially suspected and turned away hard to the north. Distance about 2 nm, the ship was then identified as a large steamer, which is maintaining its westerly course with a speed of about 5-7 knots, so apparently did not notice us.
			Closing for a torpedo shot is not very promising because of the high swell.



		Two days ago it was announced in the press service of the directional beacon to Africa that 120 interned German seafarers had hijacked the steamer "QUEEN ANNE" in the port of Port Elisabeth and set off with it. In connection with the increased security under land due to the events on the steamer routes in the South Atlantic, this daring exploit by German seafarers must have triggered increased security and search in the Cape area.
		Since this dimmed steamer hardly made any speed outside of any route, I addressed him as a vessel guarding the Cape area or as an H.S.K. trap.


			After passing out of sight, we go back to the easterly course and run at 12 knots. A radio report was not observed.

- 56 -

20.08.40

12.00

40°31'S 22°22'E

SSW 3, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. medium

The following situation assessment is made regarding the possibility of mine fouling at Cape St. Francis:

1)	Nothing is known about the effect and the duration of the effectiveness of the current contamination carried out by Ship 16 on the Agulhas Bank. It can be assumed that after it became known, all traffic was initially ordered to stay outside the 200-meter line to bypass.

2)	To what extent such an arrangement still exist is also not known. If necessary, a clue can be found about this in the nautical charts or in statements by the Captains of the ships taken.

3)	If bypassing the large Agulhas Bank may have been a certain disadvantage, passing Cape St. Francis outside the 200-meter line does not have any disadvantages for overseas shipping in Cape Town and will therefore probably be the rule after the action of Ship 16. Only for local traffic, e.g. from Port Elisabeth to Simonstown etc., would a small detour be paid for by following the 200 meter line at St. Francis.

4)	In my opinion, a fouling at Cap St. Francis would not fulfill the task of burdening the enemy maritime communications with the momentary uncertainty as a result of being hit by mines.

5)	On the other hand, however, with the current assessment of increased patrols and security of the Cape area due to the general nervousness

- 57 -

continued

20.08.40

	caused by the appearance of the German commerce raiders, it requires the full commitment of the ship, which in my opinion is hardly proportionate to possible success.

6)	For any mining operation, the element of suprise is a prerequisite for successful implementation. Ship 16 was able to take full advantage of this suprise at the Agulhas operation. Currently however, there can no longer be any question of a suprise taking place.

7)	I therefore currently see no factors that could justify the use of the ship for a mine contamination under Cape St. Francis. It remains to be seen whether events will occur that will make it necessary to change the current view of the situation.

8)	The operation would only come into question at the new moon around 2 September. Until then, I intend go to the area of operations assigned to the ship in the western Indian Ocean south of 20°S until 28 August.

- 58 -




	21.08.40
	12.00	39°25'S 28°17'E	No particular events.
		NWbyW 6, Sea 5, overcast, showers, Vis. bad

	ZZ 30°E
	======

	22.08.40
	12.00	37°33'S 32°56'E	No particular events.
		NWbyW 8, Sea 7-8, overcast, stormy, Vis. bad

	23.08.40
	12.00	35°42'S 36°58'E
		SW 5, Sea 4-5, cloudy, misty, Vis. medium




		On 19 August a change to the keying material for British merchant ships.
		The almost complete insight into the steamer radio traffic, which was so informative as to the assessment of the conditions on the South Atlantic, suddenly stopped completely. I regret this all the more as such an insight would have been of great help, especially as the ship entered the new operational area east of the Cape of Good Hope.

	Sun and Moon Data 21.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 22.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 23.08.40

- 59 -



	continued
	23.08.42	So there remains the hope that the B-Dienst will soon be able to break into the new key and transmit it, because the prospect of getting their hands from an English steamer is extremely slim given the attitude of the English to the instructions of their Admiralty.





	ZZ 45°E
	======

	24.08.40
	12.00	34°09'S 40°30'E
		WbyN 5, Sea 4-5, cloudy, clear, Vis. good


	25.08.40
	12.00	32°16'S 44°09'E
		NEbyN 2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 23.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 24.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 25.08.40

	- 60 -
















				[This page is blank]

	- 61 -





				Aircraft
				on the lift
				on the upper deck















	when swinging out












				The engine is started
				Ready to slip

- 62 -







	slipped














		Take off













Sightseeing flight to
check the compass

- 63 -




	26.08.40	31°08'S 45°23'E	Launched the aircraft. Disguised as an English aircraft with English nationality markings.
	10.30	NWbyW 3, Sea 2, clear, Vis. good
	10.32		Aircraft took off for a short compass check flight. Flew off in 40°T.
	11.15		Aircraft back again over the ship. Flew off for actual reconnaissance.
	11.25		Aircraft passed out of sight.
			In the meantime the ship steered course 10°, 10 knots.
			The aircraft flew in 351°, 150 nm, then to starboard to 90°, after a flight of about 20 nm on the new course it sighted a tanker and flew towards it. It was a ship without nationality marking and name. The aircraft threw the following message prepared on board:
			"On account of the vicinity of enemy raider alter course to 180°, distance 140 nm. From that point take course directly to 31 N 37 E. Thence you get further information. Do not use wireless.
			S.N.O."

	13.37		Ship sent the aircraft on VHF:
			"GG" (agreed call sign for English steamer)
			It observed the ordered course change and then flew back.
			Ship went to full speed, course 0°.

	14.08		Aircraft was recovered. After that the ship ran at highest speed course 352° towards the sighting location.

	17.06		The aircraft was launched to check on the steamer and for close reconnaissance. Flew off in 325°.

- 64 -



	continued
	26.08.40
	17.20	Took bearings on a steamer in 275°T. The following fragments of a radio message were picked up
		" . . . . stopped . . . . white 1 set saw pson posted between funnel and mainmast has ordered us to heave to "
		I assume that it is the tanker that has been stopped, which apparently did not follow the course instructions after the plane was in sight at noon, ran on a more westerly course, is now abeam to port and sent the message about the stop.
		I decide to call back the aircraft and recover it, since a hunt for the tanker, which will have reported its location by now, would last well into the night and would bring the ship too far within the range of enemy air reconnaissance and naval forces.

	17.34	However, the aircraft flying far on the horizon, turns around by itself, flies back and send by VHF: 20° port, 23 nm, and course to: more to port.

		So the aircraft must have sighted the steamer ahead on the ordered course. The radio bearing in 275°T must refer to something else. The operational order was revoked and the aircraft received the order:
		"Steamer has transmitted, tear down the antenna, remain with the steamer.

		I am aware of the full commitment of the aircraft and its crew, in which I send it off shortly before dark with the

- 65 -



	continued
	26.08.40	order to land in the swell at night by an unknown, possibly hostile steamer and to hold it until the ship is there. But this is the only way to keep the tanker in hand at night.

		The aircraft flies off in 325°, the ship previously stopped and turned for recovery goes to course 325°, highest speed.

	17.40	The following radio message was received:
		"QQQQ VERNES position 2810 S 6004E, stopped by passenger boat and ordered to hove to . . . ."
		So this radio message comes from a steamer apparently in the Mozambique Strait stopped by an English auxiliary cruiser, an event completely independent of ours.
		Further radio message were still received:
		"GBIG are now proceeding, but . . . . are now stopped again, vessel approaching us."
		and
		"GBIG please cancel QQQQ . . . .are now proceeding on voyage."
		These alarm reports put the entire sea area in commotion and disquiet and the subsequent revocation increases uncertainty about the real situation.

		In the meantime the plane has reached the steamer and is circling above it. Since there is no report, it gets a VHF order to report the situation. No answer. It is assumed that it landed at the steamer when it got dark, because landing is difficult at night and in the swell.

- 66 -



	continued
	26.08.40		From the flight report it was seen, the VHF voice mode failed in the aircraft after receiving the order to tear away the antennas.
			At 17.48 hours the aircraft came to the steamer. One after another it tore the away the antennas and antenna stays and threw the following message:
			"Stop at once."
			It fired a few shots at the tanker with a cannon and machine guns before the bow and bridge. The steamer stopped momentarily. The aircraft landed then it got dark (18.18 hours) taxied to the tanker, shot once again at the bridge and sent the following Morse message"Remain stopping here, cruiser "CUMBERLAND" will go with you.":
			Was understood after a few repeated, then:
			"Show your lights"
			Was carried out immediately.

	18.26		At this moment the lights of the tanker and the aircraft taxing around the tanker came in sight from Ship 33.

	18.30		Crew to Action Stations.
			Lights were set to orient the aircraft.

	18.40		Morse message of the aircraft to Ship 33:
			"K to K. we are both lying stopped here, hi hi.
			Was not received by Ship 33 because without call and transmitted in English.

	19.20	29°38'S 45°11'E	Reached the steamer and with the searchlight illuminated: Norwegian tanker "FILEFJELL".

- 67 -



	continued
	26.08.40
	19.46		Prize crew on board to examine the steamer.

	20.14		Morse message of the examining officers:
			Norwegian tanker "FILEFJELL", from the Persian Gulf for Cape Town, 7,616 GRT, 10 knots, 33 man crew. Cargo 10000 tons gasoline and 500 tons oil, it runs for the English government.
			Orders to the prize crew:
			Muster the steamer, bring the leaders on board. Prize crew remain on board. When all is ready, immediately course 110°, 10 knots. Darken ship.

			In addition to the normal chart material routing instructions were found on board. The steamer had not had any radio-traffic today, and only after the antenna was torn away did he begin to doubt whether it was really an English instruction.
			Part of the crew including the officers and Captain were taken on board.

	21.44		The aircraft was recovered with difficulty in the dark and moved off on course 110° at 10 knots, the tanker in echelon ahead to starboard, 2-3 nm away.

		I intended to continue butchering the tanker in the coming days and to sink.

	27.08.40
	03.03		A darkened steamer in sight 30° to starboard, lies transverse, bearing shifted out to port.
	03.12		Initially I came to course 290°. Also the prize received orders to come about and remain in place.

	Sun and Moon Data 26.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.08.40

- 68 -



	continued
	27 08.40
	03.18	The steamer had not seen us, he holds course and speed. I came about to get a closer look.

	03.31	Full speed, I angled in slowly. The steamer is now identified as a tanker on northerly course.

	03.38	Alarm. Range 7000 meters, slowly decreasing.

	04.18	Range 3500 meters. The steamer was Morsed:
		"No wireless".
		and
	04.22	"Stop".
		At the same time the 7.5 cm cannon fired a shot before the bow.

	04.26	Steamer stopped and transmitted:
		"QQ (interference began) . . . 2937 S 4550 E stopped by unknown vessel de BRITISH COMMANDER/GJKV 0125 GMT."

		Artillery opened fire: 1 salvo.

	04.29	Steamer transmitted:
		QQQQ de BRITISH COMMANDER/GJKV now vessel shelling us. 0129 GMT."

		Artillery received permission to open fire two times: 2 hits (forecastle and center ship). Steamer stopped transmitting.
		Morse message from the steamer:
		"What ship".
		The steamer Morsed apparently badly given unrelated characters on purpose to buy time
		Searchlight illuminated: On the stern the name "BRITISH COMMANDER", London" was read.
		It is a 6901 GRT size tanker, with gray hull, yellow superstructure, without markings.

- 69 -

continued

27.07.40

On the stern one 10.2 cm cannon and a protected anti-aircraft platform with one 7.6 cm anti-aircraft cannon.

On the bridge 1 radar. Bow protection gear, on the forecastle 4 Otters. Oil fired, 10.5 knots.

04.35

In order to avoid further lingering at this place reported by the tanker, I decide to sink it with a torpedo shot.

Morse message to the steamer:

"Go into the boats, ship will be sunk in twenty minutes."

04.46

One boat appears at the bow with a part of the crew.

04.48

While above on the boat deck another boat is lowered, a man ran into the radio hut and transmitted:

"QQQQ de BRITISH COMMANDER/GJKV pson 2937S 4550E vessel shelling us."

Permission to open fire. The steamer stopped transmitting. Shortly thereafter a boat appears at the stern with the rest of the crew. The crews in the boats wear steel helmets.

04.56

Torpedo fire. The steamer soon heels to port, then floats on the air filled closed tanks and does not heel further.

Two boats with the 46-man crew were taken on board. It consists of:

Captain	John	Thornton
1st Officer	Louis John	Jones
2nd "	Edw. Logan	Mitchnson
3rd "	Allen	Brading
1st Engineer	William	Rowe
2nd "	Cecil	Fenton
3rd "	Alexander	Baird
4th "	John	Rowcroft
5th "	Robert	Newton
1st Radioman	Robert	Watson
2nd "	Richard	Long

- 70 -




	continued		34 Englanders (1 Soldier-Sergeant)
	27.08.40		1 Canadian.

		Crew of the Tanker "BRITISH COMMANDER"

		The Captain, John Thorton of the sunken steamer "BRITISH COMANDER" said, heard by the 1st Prize Officer, the following:
		His ship had was on the way from Falmouth to Abadan via Cape Town. The ship was empty. BRITISH COMMANDER was armed with 2 cannons (one 10.2 cm and one 7.6 cm anti-aircraft cannon). A Petty Officer of the English Navy was Gunner and drilled with the people at the cannons. All other people, which belonged to the cannon crew, were trained in different places in a short period of 3-4 weeks. He himself has commanded the ship for 1 1/2 years. His crew changed frequently. The Shipping Company was "British Tanker Comp. Walten on Thames".
		When he was stopped by an unknown ship on 26/27 August, even after he received a shot before the bow, he always believed it was an English warship, because the presence of a German raider in these waters was unknown. He stopped and at the same time gave the order to send a Radio Message. The immediate report of the stopping by a warship was mandated of him by the English Admiralty. This report had to be carried out under all

	- 71 -







		27 August
		06.02 hours



		Sinking of the
		English tanker
	"BRITISH COMMANDER"

	- 72 -

- 73 -



	continued
	27.08.40	circumstances, even if the men were put at risk. Since there was a slight panic among the crew, they went into the boats without any supplies. He also claims that his ship was previously in an air raid in Falmouth and that he was actively involved in the defense. The courses from Cape Town to Abadan were prescribed for him by the Admiralty. He could not or did not want to give further details
		He sank all secret papers before leaving the ship. He wanted to bring ship's papers with him, but in the excitement he forgot them. There was no money in the ship's cash box. He knew nothing of the movements of the English naval and air forces.
		The "BRITISH COMMANDER departed from Cape Town on 20 August and hoped to be in Abadan on 11 September.


	06.02		Two cannons were allowed to sink the tanker. Several hits in the waterline, engine room and boilers. However the tanker remained lying unchanged, because the air from the tanks could still not escape.

			For this reason two cannons shot individual rounds into the sloping upper deck facing us to open the tanks upwards.
			The water now flowed in through the leaks in the waterline and the air escaped mainly through the upper deck. The steamer heeled strongly to port.

	06.15		The steamer capsized. It still floated a long time keel up.

- 74 -



	continued
	27.08.40
	06.50		On Prize "FILEFJELL: course 110°, 10 knots.
			Ran at full speed behind the prize.
		29°30'S 46°06'E	While running off the sinking of the wreck was observed.

	06.55		A steamer came in sight 20° to starboard. Turned to a parallel course and ran with - 180° -, until the bearing steadied.

	07.13		Range 18300 meters Bearing 195°T

	08.02		Range 9600 meters Bearing 187°T.
			The vessel is a modern freight steamer with a raked bow and cruiser stern, runs about 14 knots and proceeds in ballast. It holds course.

	09.03		Range 3200 meters Bearing 151°T.
			The bearing was always ahead. Therefore it was slowly running away, such that the steamer does not draw past the bow. It is a gray ship with a gray superstructure, white masts and yellow smokestack, without markings and was taken as Swedish.

			I decide to stop the steamer, because it is suspicious by the missing neutrality markings and his course and the probability is great that it runs in English service or has run in to an English harbor.

- 75 -

continued

27.08.40

09.05

Turned away 20° and stopped the steamer with a warning shot from the 7.5 cm cannon. Range 3000 meters.

At the same time flag signal: Stop immediately! It is forbidden to transmit!

The steamer stopped immediately and set Norwegian flag.

Flag signal:

Were are you destined?

Calcutta.

It was the Norwegian steamer "MORVIKEN", Bergen, 5009 GRT 1938, motor, 14 knots, empty.

09.26

Set off the examination and demolition commandos with orders, to examine the steamer and within 20 minutes prepare for demolition, because I want to leave the sea area faster. Radio regular traffic (see radio report).

09.56

Two boats were launched from the MORVIKEN. The 35-man crew was taken on board.

Captain	Anthon	Norvalls
1st Officer	Sigurd	Andreassen
2nd "	Alf	Rosenbergsen
3rd "	Reidar	Haaland
1st Engineer	Lodvig	Monsen
2nd "	Olav	Eriksen
3rd "	Harald	Siestad
4th "	Sigurd	Andressen
Radioman	Eyolf	Lyngstad

24 Norwegians

1 U.S.A.

- 76 -



	continued
	27.08.40
		Crew of the Motor ship "MORVIKEN"
		The Captain Anthon N o r v a l l s of the Norwegian motor ship "MORVIKEN" said the following:
		MORVIKEN was on the way from Cape Town to Calcutta. His ship was 5008 GRT and had a crew of 35 men. There was no cargo on board. His First Officer had the watch, when on the morning of 27 August 1940 first a tanker and then a second ship came in sight. On first sighting the second ship. He received the report when the second ship was sighted. At first he was not suspicious, first when he determined that the second shop had a more southerly course, he changed course about 2 stritch [22.5°] to starboard. They couldn't find anything unusual about the second steamer, He thought it was be a Norwegian from the Wilhelmsen Shipping Company, which he knew were going to Australia. He had laid with a Wilhelmsen steamer in Argentina. He had seen their usual flag-off livery, he and his officers became suspicious. The Greeks have few good ships, and, as far as he knows, these good ships don't sail east here. Even when he got closer, he could not see anything of the armament on the suspect ship.
		Norvalls also states that in Cape Town it is believed that there are two German auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic and one in the Indian Ocean. He did not receive course instructions, only a 22 nm course from Cape Town was prescribed for him by the Port Captain.

	- 77 -









		27 August
		11.39 hours

		Sinking of the
		Norwegian
		Motor ship
		"MORVIKEN"

	- 78 -

- 79 -



	continued
	27.08.40	Later he took course clear of the Agulhas Bank, because in New York he had already heard of mine fouling of the Agulhas Bank. He had only observed aircraft reconnaissance in the vicinity of the coast. In Cape Town and off Cape Town had not seen any warships. On his way from La Plata to Cape Town with grain for local English farmers he proceeded on the direct course, not on the Great Circle because here too, for reasons mentioned above, he was not given a course instruction. He had not seen any ships.
		Norvalls also announced that he estimated that 50% of South Africans were against the war with Germany. He had nothing to say about the movements of British naval forces. He did not transmit Radio Messages either before or while being stopped.


			The steamer was destroyed because it runs in English service and is the base of the shipping company is London. Explosive charges were set. The investigation and demolition team then went back on board Ship 33.

	10.42		Detonation on MORVIKEN. The explosive charges in the engine room and cargo hold went off. There was no noticeable effect. The steamer received artillery fire for the sake of haste. Hits in the waterline. After several hits it is gradually filling up aft, the foreship always comes more out of the water. The water flows in in large quantities through the aft hatches that were opened previously. The fore deck finally erects steeply and the steamer slides quickly downward with a lateral turn.





		30°08'S 46°15'E
	11.39		Full speed, ran off on course 90°.

	12.15	NE 1-2, Sea 1, clear, Vis. good	From FILEFJELL a large cargo steamer is reported in sight abeam to port. Shortly afterwards he also comes in sight on Ship 33: bearing 20° and has

- 80 -

continued

27.08.40

westerly course. A probably longer chase would therefore bring us very far towards the location reported by BRITISH COMMANDER this morning, so will refrain from a pursuit.

13.50

The measure proves to be correct: from Durban a Radio Message was intercepted to all warships with repeated warnings about raiders in 29°37'S and 45°50'E.

16.30

Stopped, to take over fresh provisions from the tanker FILEFJELL. Demolition commandos go on board FILEFJELL. The rest of the crew was taken over.

Captain	Josef	Nordbye
1st Officer	Ingvald	Strandlie
2nd "	Kaare	Olsen
3rd "	Trygue	Stensrud
1st Engineer	Georg	Johnsen
3rd "	Hans	Mikalsen
Radioman	Thorleif	Henriksen

17 Norwegians

3 Swedes

5 Chinese

Crew of the Motor tanker "FILEFJELL"

- 81 -



	continued
	27.08.40	Captain Josef N o r d b y e of the Norwegian Motor tanker "FILEFJELL" said the following when questioned by the Prisoner Officer:

		The motor tanker "FILEFJELL" ran for 10 years in charter for the English Anglo Saxon Oil Co. On this journey it also had an English time charter, in Abadan (Persian Gulf) it loaded 10000 tons of gasoline for Cape Town. It was expected in Cape Town on 1 September 1940. His telegram traffic has been very little, only the bare essentials were telegraphed. He did not use Radio Message either before or during the capture. He had both long and short wave transmitters on board.
		The steered courses were prescribed for him by the English Admiralty (the note with the prescribed courses was found by the examination team in the chartroom of the "FILEFJELL").
		He was stopped by an aircraft with an English national emblem around noon and followed its course instructions, as he had no suspicion whatsoever. From the instructions German warships were in the area he was captured; he was not aware of anything. He himself only became suspicious when, at around 18.00 hours on 26 August, the aircraft appeared to him for the second time and cut the antenna. He stopped immediately and soon after saw a vessel which he assumed with certainty to be a German raider.
		He did not have a key from the English Admiralty on board; he always telegraphed in open language. The English Admiralty code was only given to English ships. During the entire journey he had seen no ships. He had nothing to say concerning the movements of English warships. His ship was unarmed. His crew amounted to 32 men (23 Norwegians, 4 Swedes, 5 Chinese), in the latest period they had changed frequently.
		He has not received any messages from Norway since April 1940. His shipowner is "Oken & Ugelstadt" in Oslo. He did not have any ship's money on board.

- 82 -



	continued
	27.08.40	After ending provisions transfer the prize and examination commandos came back on board.


		Tanker FILEFJELL

	19.00	The demolition charges were detonated.
		Ship 33 lay in the vicinity stopped at a safe distance of 1 nm due to the enormous gasoline cargo.
		The explosive charge was attached to the front cargo hold outboard with consideration for the gasoline cargo. The tanker began to sink. Through previously opened sea valves, more water apparently penetrated than through the leak in the hold, the tanker settled completely aft, only the gangway and aft superstructure still protruded from the water.
		The foreship with the demolition charge hole was out of the water. Finally about 24.00 hours the tanker would sink no further, it floats on the - lighter than water - gasoline.

- 83 -




	28.08.40
	01.20		Therefore I decided to sink the tanker by shooting to explode or shoot on fire, because a lingering longer of the auxiliary cruiser in this sea area did not seem advisable. Although enough hits were made with the 3.6 cm double anti-aircraft gun, the tanker did not catch on fire, a small fire caused by a hit in a pipeline on the upper deck extinguished after a short time.

	02.04	30°21'S 47°10'E	The ship was shot with a 15 cm cannon. After a few hits on the cargo hold a large tank was penetrated and the gasoline caught fire. In a few seconds the entire tanker burned with 30 meter high red flames and large smoke development,

	02.07		Ran off on course 134°, full speed.



	04.01		The fire glow of the tanker passed out of sight astern.

- 84 -



	continued
	28.08.40
	07.00		Slowed to a speed of 14 knots.

	08.45	31°31.5'S 48°38'E	Observed aircraft radio traffic, that was so close a bearing could not be taken.
		NbyW 4, Sea 3, cloudy, hazy, Vis. medium
		NbyW 4, Sea 3, cloudy, hazy, Vis. medium	The enemy either has to fly to us in a large Sunderland flying boat from land, or he has immediately in the morning on 27 August sent a cruiser or auxiliary cruiser to the sinking site of the BRITISH COMMANDER, which has now set out its on-board aircraft and is searching for us.
			In the first case, a pursuit by naval forces from a base is hardly possible at the great distance and also in the second case the prospect of success for the enemy is low, since the distance from the place of the sinking is about 200 nm and hazy weather and low rain clouds only allow a distance of 10 nm for the aircraft.

	20.00		Came to 11 knots.

	29.08.40
	12.30	34°58'S 52°55'E	100° to starboard the masts and smokestack of a steamer come in sight. It holds course about 100° directly towards us and was larger quickly. It is identified by its high smokestack and masts as a Blue Funnel Liner, about 10,000 to 12,000 tons in size, 14 knots.
		SbyW 6-7, Sea 5, cloudy, Vis. medium
			Since this sea area was visited in order to remain undetected for a while and remain separated from the traffic routes, and an auxiliary cruiser may also come into question, turned away to to port course 70°. At the same time, the steamer also turned away to the south.

	Sun and Moon Data 28.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 29.08.40

- 85 -

continued

29.08.40

13.05

The steamer is out of sight.

After the previous events, based on the statements of the captured Captains, as well as course instructions etc. found, the following can finally be determined:

1)	The capture of the Norwegian tanker FILEFJELL was only a result of the dashing and full commitment of the on-board aircraft. The war ruse used, the course instruction by an English plane fooled the Norwegian Captain. It is doubtful to me, however, whether an English ship would have been so well-behaved that it would have been mislead for a whole day and followed the course instructions without a radio confirmation.

	The antenna tear worked well and promises success in repetitions.
	From a secret instruction in the Captain's private papers it emerges that the cargo - 10,000 tons of gasoline is not intended for Cape Town, as officially stated, but for Landsend. Secret assignment because it was feared the crew will not make the trip to the war zone around England because of the dangerousness of the cargo.
2)	It must be expected that every English steamer will try by all means to send radio messages when it is captured, even with the conscious risk of the lives of its crew. For ships other than English there is the possibility of enforcing a radio ban.
3)	The Norwegian steamer "MORVIKEN" was captured in the classic form of cruiser warfare with flag signals and 1 shot before the bow, without a radio call for help. This will remain an exception.
4)	Norwegian ships do not have the English merchant ship key on board. When they do transmit, they have to send openly.

- 86 -

continued

29.08.40

5)	All ships have verbal and written instructions to stay outside the 200 meter line whenever possible. This means that almost all prospects of success for mine operations at capes or approach points are lost. The use of mines only appears promising off port entrances, but is naturally very difficult to carry out. The idea that led to the abandonment of the mine operation at Cape St. Francis was confirmed by the shipping instructions to sail only in deep water.
6)	The Capitan of the MORVIKEN initially took Ship 33 for a Wilhemsendampfer. The Greek markings were suspicious for him.
	The intention to re-camouflage the ship after the first appearance in the Indian Ocean was thereby triggered immediately. The Greek dress is discarded, the exterior of the ship is made up as a Norwegian Wilhelm's steamer "TRAFALGAR" without markings.

- 87 -




	ZZ 60°E
	======
	30.08.40	35°54'S 52°23'E
	12.00	SEbyS 2, Sea 2, clear


		I intend to remain invisible for about 1 week in the bad weather in the south and then continue the hunt at about 30°S and 60°E. There is the possibility of meeting steamers coming from the Sunda Strait in the largest area as well as to meet Australian steamers returning home. In addition, the aircraft will probably be able to be launched again at a latitude of 30°S.


	31.08.40	38°21'S 51°20'E	)
	12.00	SW 6, Sea 5-6, cloudy	)
			)
	01.09.40	39°39'S 48°23'E	)
	12.00	NWbyN 5-6, Sea 4-5, cloudy	)
			) No particular events.
	02.09.40	38°15'S 49°52'E	)
	12.00	NW 5, Sea 5, clear	)
			)
	03.09.40	35°54'S 53°13'E	)
	12.00	N 3, Sea 3, clear	)

	Sun and Moon Data 30.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 31.08.40
	Sun and Moon Data 01.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 02.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.09.40

- 88 -




	04.09.40	33°37'S 55°49'E
	12.00	NNE 2-3, Sea 2, overcast, Vis. medium	No particular events.

	05.09.40
	08.13		Launched the aircraft.

	08.18		Aircraft took off, in light wind, calm sea and very low medium-long Swell, flat sea.

			Brief reconnaissance to the SE.

	08.53		Aircraft over the ship again, close reconnaissance to the NW.

	09.33		Aircraft over the ship again.
			Reconnaissance flight in 32°T.

	09.47		Out of sight.

	11.14		Aircraft came back.

	11.25		Aircraft was recovered, Reconnaissance remained without results.
			Another reconnaissance anticipated for the afternoon. The aircraft was prepared again over midday.

	14.04		Aircraft was launched with calm wins and short Swell.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 05.09.40

	- 89 -

	- 90 -

- 91 -



	continued
	05.09.40
	14.10	30°12'S 59°58'E	Take off. The aircraft rolled on: shortly before reaching takeoff speed the aircraft jumped a couple of times in the short swell and set down hard. Suddenly the engine mount broke off, a jet of flame shot from the break and set the tank head on fire.
			The fire spread quickly over the front of the aircraft. The crew immediately left the aircraft saving the binoculars and navigation materials and was picked up by the inflatable boat that is kept ready for each take-off. The fire had now spread to the entire aircraft, and extinguishing it was hopeless. The plane fell apart and parts of it sank.

	14.25		The last of the aircraft disappeared.



		This extremely regrettable and painful loss of the aircraft is solely due to the well-known, poor take-off properties of the He 114 in moving water. According to the pilot's report, this accident - the engine breaking off while the water was moving - is typical for the He 114, and was the reason that model Arado 196 aircraft were requested for the auxiliary cruisers. Unfortunately, this requirement could not be met and due to this well-known inadequacy of the aircraft, the ship now has to complain about the loss of a means of warfare, the use of which alone had successfully captured the tanker "FILEFJELL" with 10,000 tons of gasoline.
		The loss of the built-in FuGE 17 (VHF transceiver), only one of which was available on board, is particularly painful.

- 92 -



	continued
	05.09.40	To make the spare aircraft ready for flight, the lifting platform must be set on deck, the aircraft under the platform must be taken out of the shaft without a guide and put down until the lifting platform is inserted again into the guide rails of the shaft. Since this is only believed to be possible when the ship is in a completely calm position, with the currently prevailing light swell this is not in question.


	06.09.40	29°26'S 59°33'E
		ENE 2, Sea 1-2, overcast, Vis. good	Back and forth in position on changing courses -
			at times lay stopped at night -

	07.09.40	29°24'S 57°43'E
		ENE 3, Sea 2, cloudy, clear, Vis. good	on the suspected steamer routes.
		ENE 3, Sea 2, cloudy, clear, Vis. good
			Nothing was sighted.
	08.09.40	29°40'S 56°49'E
		NE 4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good

	09.09.40	29°12.5'S 58°40'E
		NEbyE 3-4, Sea 3, cloudy, clear, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 05.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 06.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 07.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 08.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.09.40

- 93 -




	10.09.40	27°55'S 58°25'E
		NNW 3-4, Sea 3, clear, Vis. good


		Therefore, before I leave this sea area to arrive in the Australian sea area around the end of September according to orders, I decide to make another advance in the direction of Madagascar, as I assume with certainty that I will come across the steamer traffic that has so far been sought in vain.


	13.30		The following message was heard from the British steamer "CLAN MACFADYEN":
			"QQQ 1840 S 7054 E BENARTY bombed plane from ship."

	18.30		The same message was received several times from he British steamer "GLANBEG" and acknowledged by Natal Radio.


		I assume that it is the result of the operation of Ship 16 with its on-board aircraft.


	11.09.40	26°05'S 53°52'E	No particular events.
	12.00	SSE 5, Se 4, cloudy, clear, Vis. good

	Sun and Moon Data 10.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 11.09.40

- 94 -




	12.09.40
	05.55	Smoke feather in sight 80° to starboard
		Bearing 92°T.

	06.03	Turned to close, course 90°.

	06.10	Full speed, course 110°. Mast and smokestack of the steamer are distinguished.

	06.14	Course 120°.
		The bridge comes in sight directly ahead of the smokestack. The bearing shits out to starboard: The steamer is on a southwesterly course.

	06.24	Turned to run with - course 180°.

	06.30	A stern cannon is distinguished.

	06.34	Slowed down, until the bearing was steady.

	06.42	Range 18000 meters Bearing 118°T.

	07.05	Range 10600 meters Bearing 113°T.

	07.18	Range 5500 meters Bearing 112°T.
		It is a black steamer with 2 yellow masts and yellow bridge superstructure up to the black smokestack. 4 hatches (size estimated 3000-4000 tons) loaded, 1 stern cannon, 1 antiaircraft cannon.

	07.22	The distance is so low, that the steamer turns to starboard to avoid us, to get around behind us.

- 95 -



	continued
	12.09.40
	07.26	Flag signal:
		"Stop immediately"
		"Radio traffic is forbidden"
		At the same time bow cannon 1 shot before the bow.

	07.27	Steamer turned away immediately and showed us the stern.
		Battery exposed

	07.28	1 salvo
		The steamer does not stop.

	07.29	1 salvo.
		The steamer opens fire on us, shoots 500 meters short.

	07.30	Battery receives permission to open fire.
		The steamer tries to avoid hits by hard rudder maneuvers. Initially this made shooting in more difficult. During this time the steamer fired five more times, one shot of which is observed short, all the others apparently long. However, a shell ricochets off the water about 10 meters in front of the ship, penetrates the port side of the hull without detonating, and penetrates a living space without causing major damage. The impact could not be felt on the bridge

	07.32	With the 8th salvo the steamer received a hit in the stern, by which the cannon was knocked out of action.
		The artillery now lies well at the target, the steamer continues on, a hit tears the masthead with radio yardarm and antenna away, more hits in the hull, smokestack, boats, cargo holds and finally in the bridge.

- 96 -



	continued
	12.09.40
			The steamer turned to starboard, and continues on soon burning completely.

	07.39		Once more sent signal:
			"Stop immediately!"

			Because the steamer does not stop, it was accepted that the bridge was completely out of action and the engines were left to run.

	07.40		Stop, battery cease fire.

			The steamer was identified as the British "BENAVON", 5872 GRT, 12 knots, built in 1030. The steamer made little speed and came to a stop. By observation on board it did not transmit. The crew abandoned the steamer on rafts.

	08.02		The prize commandos set off, to capture the crew and if it was possible on the burning ship, to perform demolition. The smoke development of the burning steamer is very great, can be seen for 30 nm.


		I regret this because of the possible presence of English Naval Forces in this sea area, all the more as for the first time there was no radio warning from this English steamer when it was stopped.
		Therefore I intend to move off as soon as possible.

	- 97 -

	- 98 -

- 99 -



	continued
	12.09.40
		Flag message of the Examination Officer:
		'Demolition not possible due to list".

	08.15	Prize crew on board
		The Prisoner Officer reports, that the steamer loaded hemp and rubber in Manila and Singapore and was destined for London (via Durban to bunker).
		Captain and Officers had fallen, according to statements of the Chief Engineer, the IV Engineer and both radio men, no radio message was given because the system was not in service.
		The demolition was not carried out, because the steamer already had a list, also the boat could no longer approach because of the great heat radiation and the ready ammunition on board was already going into the air.
		28 men of the crew were taken on board, among them 1 dead, and 4 severely wounded. The sinking of the steamer, which burns completely and has several hits close to the waterline, is accelerated by shots in the waterline.

	09.03	1st and 6th cannons permission to fire.

	09.09	Ceased fire, the hit holes in the steamer draws in more and more water, the stern comes further out of the water. With the prevailing swell, the steamer, which is already glowing in many places, is gradually filling up.

- 100 -



	continued
	12.09.40
	09.30		A man still floating in the water was picked up. He is severely wounded and died as he was taken on board.

	09.34		I decide, to proceed on course 90° at highest speed from visibility range of the high smoke cloud and then as planned to the east.

	10.50		Before the smoke cloud has completely disappeared from sight a high white steam cloud was observed, shortly thereafter the smoke cloud cuts off, the horizon was clear.
		25°20'S 52°17'E	The steamer is sunk.

	11.42		2 dead buried.

- 101 -



	continued
	12.09.40
		The ship now has 171 prisoners on board. This means that the possibility of accommodating prisoners is exhausted as long as the mine rooms are still full of mines. Therefore I very much hope to get my hands on a ship in transit to Australia that is suitable for being sent home with the prisoners on board as a prize. Because of the great distance, only a motor ship can be used for this.
		In view of the imminent drastic change in the area of operations, it seems to me that the opportunity to send a radio report to home before leaving the previous sea area is not only favorable, but that radio direction finding of the ship is even desirable, since in connection with the events that have become known to the enemy so far, it would reduce the insecurity and uncertainty about the actual situation in the Indian Ocean with regard to commerce raiders will continue to obscure.
		For the considerations of mine operations in Australia, knowledge of the previous mining activities of Ship 36 is necessary as soon as possible.
		In addition, I consider it advisable to inform the Skl. about the discovered written instructions from the steamers, wherever possible to proceed outside the 200-meter line. Furthermore, I think it is appropriate to report the hit received when a steamer was captured, since the attitude of English captains is characteristic and, deserves to be passed to the other HSKs as a warning.
		In order not to forfeit the possibility of raising a suitable prize on the Sunda route by transmitting, I decide to first send the radio message at 32°S and 63°E.

	13.09.40	27°45'S 56°26'E
	12.00	NEbyN 2-3, Sea 2, cloudy, Vis. good	No particular events.

	Sun and Moon Data 12.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 13.09.40

- 102 -




	14.09.40	30°10'S 59°58'E
	10.50	NWbyW 4, Sea 3-4, overcast, Vis. good	Burial of the First Radio Operator of the sunken steamer "BENAVON".


		Statements of the First Engineer P o r t e o u s, Second Engineer C r a w f o r d, Officer Candidate G r a h a m, Second Radio Operator S i n g e r, Boatswain O l l e s o n of the "BENAVON".

		Graham said:

		His ship was loaded with wood (about 1300 tons), hemp (1500 tons) and rubber (about 5500 tons). It was fully loaded. The coal inventory amounts to about 380 tons and about 800 tons were to be supplied in Durban. Daily coal consumption at 11.5 knots amounted to 45 tons. The ship was on the way from Manila via Singapore, Port Swettenham, Penang and Durban to London. Penang was abandoned on August 28, 1940. In Durban they expected orders for the next port to be called, possibly to proceed in convoy. It was assumed that this would be Freetown.
		At the beginning of the war they had to paint the superstructure gray and the smokestack black. Later they painted the superstructure brown, allegedly without special order from the Admiralty, while the smokestack remained black.
		Their armament consisted of 2 cannons, a 10.5 cm and a 7.6 cm anti-aircraft cannon. There was no special lookout. The crew consists of a gunner who was a former member of the Navy and around 51 years old, 2 cadets and 4 sailors. The Second Officer was in charge of the armament. All except the gunner were trained in a 14-day gun training course at the start of the war. The last gun drill was done in Singapore. On the trip they did not do any regular exercises at the gun.
		In his opinion, the Captain was a nice guy. He would have rather have had the fight at night, since it was already hopeless for them after the first volleys, he should have stopped. In any case, however, the behavior in the event of meeting

- 103 -



	continued
	14.09.40	a German raider was already determined in advance. Everyone in the gun crew knew there was going to be a fight. He and other comrades were convinced that a German raider would not take any prisoners. He believed the raider would hit their ship to sink and let the survivors float the water. He once read something similar in a newspaper and heard from other people. That was probably the reason why they would have shot to the last.

		On 12 September 1940 he was awakened by a sailor who told him that they were being stopped by a German raider. He rushed to the gun and found the gunner, the other cadets, three sailors and the Second Officer. The loader and another man from the gun crew were missing. As far as he knew, no one gave the order to shoot. One shot because one had agreed on it beforehand. They did not have a range finder. The Second Officer was severely wounded right from the start and was carried from the platform to the deck by the gun crew. They rushed back to the gun afterwards and fired another shot or two. The gunner, a cadet and a sailor died during the battle. Wounded, he rushed out of the foredeck with other people and waited there until the firing stopped. Then they went aft and threw two rafts overboard. In his opinion, the Captain and the First Officer fell on the bridge. He observed hits there. He did not see the Third Officer. Graham had nothing to say about British naval forces. He had also heard of the bombing of a shipping company ship by an aircraft. As far as he could remember, the message came from a second ship via an African station.
		They had a total of 4 rafts and 4 boats. The boats were all shot up, including the two of the rafts. For this reason they had to go the stern again to throw two rafts overboard.

- 104 -



	continued
	14.09.40	The First Engineer Porteous and Second Engineer Crawford said.

		The "BENAVON" had a 49 man crew on board. It belonged to the Shipping Company B. Thomson & Co. (Benline) in Leith (Scotland). The "BENAVON" left on the outbound journey from Southhampton on 5 May with a full load of general cargo and for the first time proceeded, not through the Suez Canal, but around the Cape of Good Hope. To the best of his knowledge, the ship was not chartered by the English government, but was making its usual routine voyage to East Asia.
		In Penang Porteous saw an English cruiser, in the other ports no warships, but knew that there were English war ships in Singapore. They have not seen any ships since they left Penang (This statement was also confirmed by other prisoners). Two days ago, his Chinese firemen had told him about the bombing of a shipping company ship by an airplane and remarked that they did not want to let themselves be bombed. Captain Thomson, the leader of the "BENAVON" when asked by the Chief Engineer, stated that this was only a rumor and that he, the Chief Engineer, should try to convince the Chinese of the falseness of this report.
		On the last voyage home, the "BENAVON" unloaded its main load in London at the beginning of May without any difficulties.
		Porteous was still in bed at the first shot, like most of the people. He later saw the Captain on the bridge, but didn't speak with him again.
		Crawford reported on a conversation he had with the gunner a few days ago. The latter told him that they could not allow themselves to be hijacked without first having fought. They had heard that German raiders were not taking prisoners. It was said that a boat with no people was found floating in the Indian Ocean; this boat had many holes from machine-gun bullets. After their experience with a German raider, they had to admit that newspapers and stories are unbelievable.

- 105 -



	continued
	14.09.40	Crawford stated that when the engagement opened he received an order from the bridge to run at full speed. The order was given by repeatedly setting the machine graph to "Full Speed Ahead", and was approx. 2 minutes after the German raider fired the shot before the bow of the "BENAVON". Since then the Second Engineer on watch has not received any orders from the bridge. Crawford stated that he remembered that when the engine was switched off - it was done on its own initiative, since steam penetrated the engine room - the lever on the engine telegraph was in the "Stop" position. He assumed and still assumes that the telegraph was damaged by a hit and the lever fell down as a result. (At Full Speed the lever had to be up and down, at Stop it had to be down.)
		The Chinese of the stoker's watch, with the exception of one greaser, left the engine room at the first shot. After the battle opened, the Chief Engineer came into the engine room, but did nothing of his own accord to stop the ship or to contact the bridge. When the battle was over, they went on deck and took part in bringing a raft to water on the quarterdeck. the Captain was said to have been a nice and sociable man. They are of the opinion that he began the battle on the general orders of the Admiralty. They now condemn his actions and would have thought it better to stop the ship immediately. They agree that the behavior in the event of an encounter with a German raider was precisely defined beforehand.

		The Second Radio Operator Singer stated:
		He was making his first voyage with this ship. Most of the work in the Radio Department was done by the First Radio Operator. He had nothing to report about English naval forces. A few weeks ago the system according to which the received code telegrams were deciphered was changed. But the book was not changed. They hardly sent any telegrams as this was forbidden. Normally the Captain, who also had the code, decrypted the telegrams received, but the Radio Operators supported him every now and then. There had been

- 106 -



	continued
	14.09.40	no radio since leaving Penang. Two days ago they received a coded telegram from Mauritius that contained the report that a shipping company ship had been bombed by an airplane. He was not aware of any revocation of this telegram. The radio station was not known when the battle opened. The First Radio Operator tried to report the bombardment wirelessly later, but he did not succeed. He attributes the failure of the report to the shooting of the antenna.
		Boatswain Olleson confirmed the statement of the Chief engineer in terms of movements and cargo. He has seen warships in various ports, but does not remember where. He also no longer knows the types. In Singapore he heard that a German raider was in the Indian Ocean and that two or three ships were overdue.


	15.09.40
	02.17		Radio call sign: [Funkparole = callsign?]
			Ship 33, 62°E, 31°30'S, sea endurance more then 85 days, shifting my operations area to Australia, have sunk 30000 tons up to now.

	02.40		In connection with this Radio Message:
		[Francis refers to mining operation at Cape St. Francis, Ship 36 = HSK 1 Orion]	From 33. All radio messages received. Steamers have instruction to remain outside the 200 meter line. Francis given up One hit during sinking, a dud. All is well. Mine operations Shiff 36 requested.
			(See Enclosure: Radio report)


	02.50		Came to course 77°.

	Sun and Moon Data 14.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 15.09.40

- 107 -



	continued
	15.09.40	After sending the radio messages I began the easterly transit to Australia. In order to be able to carry out the first mining operation on the east coast of Australia in the new moon period around 1 October, the transit must be carried out at 11 knots. I intend to proceed at about 30° south latitude towards the Australian steamer coming home in the good weather zone.

	12.00	31°29'S 64°46'E
		NW 3-4, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good


	20.45	31°08'S 66°34'E	Burial of the Fourth Engineer of the sunken steamer "BENAVON" who died of his wounds.


	16.09.40	30°31.5'S 69°09'E	Steamer in sight to port.
	09.04	NW 3, Sea 3, overcast, Vis. good	Bearing 55°T

	09.07		Closed on course 35°, 14 knots.
			Crew to Action Stations.

	09.12		2 masts, smokestack and left of that bridge of a motor ship are distinguished.
			Westerly course.

	09.18		Range 23000 meters Bearing 59°T.
			Changed course and speed (about 11 knots) , until the range drops.

	Sun and Moon Data 15.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 16.09.40

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	continued
	16.09.40
	09.30	Cannon not distinguished.
		Gray ship with gray masts, blue ventilators, gray smokestack with black ring.

	09.48	Range 6400 meters Bearing 82°T.
		Course of the ship by bearings was 266°.

	09.50	Flag signal:
		"Stop immediately!" 1 shot before the bow.

	09.52	Further shot across the bow, because it is not recognized if the steamer had stopped, because he is heading directly towards us.

	09.54	Flag signal:
		"It is forbidden to transmit!"
		The steamer had stopped and slowed.

	09.58	Flag signal
		"I am sending a boat!"
		Steamer showed understanding.

	10.02	Flag signal:
		"Where are you bound?"

		The steamer had stopped and set Norwegian flag. It was the Norwegian motor ship "NORVARD", Oslo, of 4111 GRT.

	10.10	The Prize crew departed.

	10.21	Flag signal from motor ship "NORDVARD".
		"Algo Bay"

- 109 -



	continued
	16.09.40
	10.40		Flag message of the Examining Officer: "M.S. NORDVARD", Oslo, from Australia for Port Elizabeth, 4111 GRT, 7187 tons of wheat in sacks, speed 10.5 cm. Oil for 10 days at full speed. Between decks could be expanded for prisoners. 29-man crew. Provisions for 1 1/2 weeks. Fuel oil capacity 900 tons = 20000 nm.
			Examining Officer received orders, to take the steamer as a prize.
			The Prize crew remained on board.

			Secret papers were not found.

			The steamer had not transmitted.

	11.35		Examination commandos on board. By statement of the Examining Officer the steamer is suitable as prize to take all the prisoners to the homeland.
			According to an earlier instructions from the Admiralty, the steamer destroyed the nautical charts of the sea area. The ship loaded wheat alone in the small port of Bunbury at Freemantle and only had communicated with the Australian Customs authorities. No ship had yet been sighted on the voyage. The steamer makes a harmless impression, Norwegian crew.


		To outfit and prepare the prize, I decide to proceed with her about 180 nm northeast into the high-pressure area there and hope that at least the southwest swell, which is currently very objectionable, has subsided there.

- 110 -



	continued
	16.09.40
	12.54	Ran at 9 knots in 40°, "NORDVARD" set off abeam to port at the limit of visibility.









		Prize "NORDVARD"

- 111 -



	continued
	16.09.40	The prize "NORVARD" is very well suited for the intended purpose of taking the prosiners off the ship. After stowing a number of the wheat sacks, on which the prisoners sometimes sleep with mats, the prisoners can easily be accommodated in two gaps in the intermediate deck. The officers went in threes into the steamer's officers' quarters. The prize crew can be closed off from and housed in the bridge structure separated from the rest of the ship at night by removing the stairs. Provision rooms are only accessible from here. Cooking and baking equipment is sufficient. The cargo - 7,000 tons of wheat in sacks - will be very useful in occupied France. The only, albeit very sad, mistake of the prize is that it only has fuel for 10 days. The steamer last took oil in Canada months ago - full bunkers - 900 tons - and must now fall into our hands with empty bunkers of all things.


	17.09.40		In the morning established a a tow connection between the drifting ship, in such a way that 33, which drifts faster as a larger ship, attaches itself to NORDVARD ". Both ships lay staggered athwart the windd and light swell at the length of the towline - about 150 meters - and in relation bow to stern. Oil and water lines were passed over and , luggage and provisions were conveyed by two motorboats.
			The Norwegian crew of the prize as well as the steamer "MORVIKEN", who were transferred for the purpose first thing in the morning, work

	Sun and Moon Data 16.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 17.09.40

- 112 -

continued

17.09.40

excellently and willingly.

By evening oil, water and half of the provisions provided for 200 men for 60 days were on board.

18.09.40

Outfitting is completed.

150 prisoners were transferred, so that in total the prize crew had 179 prisoners to supervise.,

On board remain:

10 severely wounded
the Captain of the	"British Commander"
the First Watch Officer	" "
the Second Officer	" "
the Third Officer	" "
the Second Radio Operator	" "
the Gunner	" "
a steward	" "
a stoker of the "BENAVON"
a sailor of the "DOMINGO DE LARRINAGA".

19.09.40

On 19 September the prize was released at:

Latitude: 28°41S

Longitude: 71°15'E

At 7 knots arrival at the French Atlantic coast is expected in 65 days.

Transit orders see Enclosure 18.

	Sun and Moon Data 17.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 18.09.40
	Sun and Moon Data 19.09.40