EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
MARCH 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER VIII
  
 
 
 
SMALL CRAFT FOR OBSERVATION AND RESCUE
  
     
          On March 12th, the Chief of Naval Operations issued an important directive on the subject of "Organization of a Voluntary Fleet of Small Craft to Undertake Certain Patrols Primarily for Rescue of Survivors." Instead of outlining a complete plan for the organization of this voluntary fleet, the Chief of Naval Operations enclosed three letters and stated: "The Commandants addressed are requested to consider the advisability of establishing voluntary patrols of small craft as suggested in the enclosures, primarily for the purpose of rescuing survivors. The Chief of Naval OPerations is desirous of obtaining recommendations at the earliest practicable date."  
     
          The first enclosure was a letter from the British representative of the Ministry of War Transport to Sir Arthur Salter in the OFfice of the British Merchant Shipping Commission. The general subject of this letter concerned "a rather alarming sense of disquiet among many merchant seamen in vessels arriving at Canadian ports," caused in part by the manner in which the British were handling announcements of merchant ship losses. "I think," wrote the representative, "the morale would be enormously improved if the U. S. A. could organize and publicize a voluntary fleet of small craft which would undertake patrols. Of course, I do not know what sort of arrangements have been made, but there must be any number of Americans who, if the government could supply them with some sort of craft, would be only  
     
 
 
 
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too willing to take a crack at it. After all, we have the example of Dunkirk where every available craft that could float was pressed into service. While my suggestion would not be quite so spectacular I do feel that a voluntary patrol would give tremendous heart to a lot of seamen. How effective it might be, it is, of course, impossible to say but I lay a great deal of stress on the voluntary end of it." This letter was forwarded by Admiral Sir Charles C. J. Little (then serving on the British Joint Staff Mission at the British Embassy in Washington) to Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations. In forwarding this letter Admiral Little wrote, "There may not be anything in it new to you and the suggestions, like many made by those without full knowledge of the situation on the coast, are possibly impracticable; but you will like to know what people are thinking. Considerable publicity by the press has been given to the sinkings on the coast and it has possibly increased the fears and apprehensions of merchant seamen."
  
 
 
 
        When Admiral Stark presented this letter to Admiral King, the latter wrote a memo as follows: "So far as the Sea Frontier is concerned I suggest that in your reply to the attached letter you will advise Admiral Little that the seriousness of the situation on the Eastern Seaboard is fully appreciated and that all possible steps are being taken. As to the small craft mentioned -- if your office will arrange for the organization of such a voluntary fleet I will see that they are employed."
  
 
 
 
        The truth of the matter was that considerable thought had already been given to the possibility of using small craft for observation and patrol in the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. As far back as September 22, 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Commander North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier had written the following letter:
  
     
 
 
 
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"Captain Howard F. Kingman, USN
  
 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
  
 
Navy Department,
  
 
Washington D.C.
  
 
 
 
"My dear Kingman:
  
 
 
 
        "The other day when Captain Paul Cassard, USN, and Lieutenant-Commander Charles F. Baldwin, USNR, paid us a visit we had a general discussion on the subject of Coastal Information. These gentlemen asked if I would submit informally my views on the subject, to the end that the matter could be taken up with the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
  
 
 
          "It is considered important that contacts and means be arranged for using the eyes and ears of yacht clubs, power squadrons, fishing fleets, and marine supply stations, etc. to obtain certain types of information. The kind of information desired is about as follows:  
     
          1. Data on citizen and alien-owned suspicious craft.  
     
          2. Suspicious activities of small craft, including fishing vessels, such as:  
     
                  (a) Questionable maneuvers off shore or in harbor.  
     
                  (b) Activities not consistent with the alleged, or ostensible use in which the craft is supposed to be operated.  
     
                  (c) The fact that suspicious craft are equipped with elaborate signaling and communication items, such as blinker lights, two-way radios of unusual power, radio telephones, etc.  
     
                  (d) Activities which indicate possible contact with vessels off shore, or the giving of information to vessels off shore.  
     
 
 
 
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                (e) Activity which indicates possible intent to sabotage navigational aids, port facilities, etc.
  
 
 
 
                (f) The transportation of suspicious individuals from ship to shore or vice versa, especially off shore.
  
 
 
 
        3. The reporting of contacts with suspicious vessels, submarines, or aircraft at sea.
  
 
 
 
        4. The reporting of sales in excessive quantity of gasoline, fuel oil, marine supplies, or provisions to small craft or fishing vessels.
  
 
 
 
        5. The reporting of suspicious floating objects or obstructions to navigation.
  
     
          6. The location of possible mines dropped by aircraft or surface vessels.  
     
          7. The reporting of disloyal services rendered by persons who are believed to be giving aid or information to enemy men-of-war, auxiliaries, or aircraft in Coastal Zones.  
     
          "In connection with the above, it is considered that the Coast Guard is the Service best equipped and organized, in view of its general duties, to obtain most of this information. District Commandants should have a flow of such information in connection with the Coastal Intelligence. It is therefore recommended that the matter be taken up with Coast Guard Headquarters, so that a definite Coast Guard organization can be developed which will be effective under present conditions, and likewise be suitable for full war requirements.  
     
 
 
 
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        "To accomplish the foregoing, it is believed essential that one or more Coast Guard officers of experience be assigned in each Coast Guard District, whose exclusive duty would be to collect and take action on the type of information specified above. A further duty would be to contact selected yacht clubs, power squadrons, fishing fleets, and marine supply stations, with the purpose of creating within such organizations a watching information service to cover the following tasks:
  
 
 
 
        (a) To gather and transmit general information as indicated in sub-heads 1 to 7, inclusive, above.
  
 
 
 
        (b) In the case of yacht clubs, to arrange for definite watch standing and patrol of harbor waters when conditions warrant such action.
  
 
 
 
        (c) The Assignment of observers in connection with Regional Air Defense.
  
 
 
 
        "To accomplish the above, planned courses of instruction must necessarily be given to the individuals concerned. Such instruction should include the following subjects:
  
     
          (a) What, how and whom to report the specified information.  
     
          (b) Methods of signaling and communication from sea to shore.  
     
          (c) Type of enemy activities, such as enemy raiders, both air and surface, submarines, various kinds of mines, etc.  
     
          (d) Recognition of our own naval and merchant vessels and aircraft.  
     
          "The Navy can assist the Coast Guard in this important work by preparing educational material and providing officer instructors and lecturers,  
     
 
 
 
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where there are not sufficient Coast Guard officers available to cover the field. But in providing this assistance, it should be borne in mind that the job is a Coast Guard job, and that the direction lies with that Service. This method of procedure will further the Coast Guard in building up its Reserve and Auxiliary Reserve, and in maintaining its field contacts.
  
 
 
 
        "In concluding this discussion, it is not to be thought that there is any lack of appreciation of the very fine work that has already been done in this field of information by the Coast Guard. The suggestions made here are intended to crystallize the subject, emphasize its importance, and insure that adequate Coast Guard personnel is assigned exclusively to this general task. Therein, I believe, lies the weakness at present, a lack of experienced officers free to concentrate on this problem. Much good ground work has already been done in this matter by the Coast Guard personnel and assistance by the Navy as suggested should rapidly produce desired results.
  
 
 
          "With best wishes,  
     
 
    Very sincerely yours,  
    J. T. G. STAPLER  
    Captain, USN (Ret.)  
    Chief of Staff."  
 
     
          This plan as outlined in the letter quoted above apparently fell on deaf ears in Washington. The next move, which had nothing to do with this plan for the use of small craft, came as a development of the Army Warning Net which was using civilian lookouts along the Atlantic coast. It was obvious that shore lookout stations could not furnish information of enemy aircraft approaching from the sea in sufficient time to permit adequate organization of defenses. Therefore, on December 10th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following dispatch to Commanders of Sea Frontiers  
     
 
 
 
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and Commandants of Naval Districts:
  
 
 
 
        "It is requested that small vessels, equipped with radio for transmitting voice or telegraph as may be required for reception by Army Warning Net ashore, be stationed fifty or more miles off shore to report approaching enemy aircraft, surface vessels and submarines to Army Aircraft Warning Service. If available, crews should be made up of Navy personnel; otherwise of undoubtedly loyal civilians. The action addressees are to acquire or charter by usual procedure a sufficient number of vessels for this service in addition to those already being acquired under War Plan 46, provided that Naval and Coast Guard craft are insufficient in number. For this purpose the highest priority is to be given to cooperation with Army Air Force Commanders by Naval Frontier Commanders."
  
 
 
          The progress in acquiring small craft for the Army Air Forces Warning Service moved very slowly. On January 29th, the Commanding General of the First Interceptor Command wrote to the Commander North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, "It is understood that the Navy is contemplating off shore warning service by means of small boats equipped with radio transmitters stationed at strategic points approximately fifty miles off shore. If possible, these boats should be located eighty miles off shore rather than fifty in order to provide additional warning and permit interception of enemy aircraft before reaching objectives."  
     
          When this letter was forwarded through the Commanding General Air Forces, Eastern Theatre of Operations, the subsequent endorsement was revealing: "This Headquarters has no knowledge of the plan outlined -- if such a plan is now in effect or is contemplated in the near future it would be  
     
 
 
 
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highly desirable that this Headquarters be informed and that plans be formulated for the joint use of reports from this off shore warning service."
  
 
 
 
        On February 10th, the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier answered this letter and stated that considerable difficulty had been experienced in obtaining suitable vessels for the proposed task. He added:
  
 
 
          "Limitations have been imposed on acquiring further vessels from the fishing fleets, the units of which would lend themselves most readily to the needs of the situation. The requirements in personnel and equipment resulting from the immediate enemy submarine operations, and the very definite limitations in what can be done with available facilities, has made difficult the accomplishment of the project. Certain craft have been obtained and are being overhauled and prepared for the task in question. Prior to the readiness of the vessels, consultation and development of a plan of operation will be taken up with the Commanding General, First Interceptor Command."  
     
          The problem of using small craft employed as fishing vessels for the purposes of observation and patrol had already been given some consideration. As early as June 30, 1941, the owner of an important sword-fishing fleet at Wakefield, R. I., had written to the Navy Department suggesting that the Navy install radio telephone equipment on vessels of his fleet so that they might be used for observation purposes. Answering the owner's letter on September 9, 1941, Rear Admiral Ingersoll, then Acting Chief of Naval OPerations, wrote as follows:  
     
          ". . . . The only basis on which the Navy could justify the furnishing of such equipment would be for purposes of National Defense. However,  
     
 
 
 
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any action of the U. S. Government to equip fishing vessels with communication facilities for the primary purpose of reporting enemy craft would be contrary to provisions of International Law.
  
 
 
 
        "Convention XI, Article 3, of the Hague Convention, 1907, provides:
  
 
 
 

        'Vessels used exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats employed in local trade are exempt from capture as well as their appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo. They cease to be exempt as soon as they take part whatever in hostilities. The contracting powers agree not to take advantage of the harmless character of the said vessels in order to use them for military purposes, while preserving their peaceful appearance.'

  
     
          "If the Navy were to so equip your vessels, such action would be in violation of the Hague Convention and also would remove any possible immunity which we would expect to be accorded by enemy craft to harmless fishing vessels. Therefore, the Navy Department cannot comply with your suggestions to equip fishing vessels with radio telephone sets."  
     
          Nevertheless, the subject was reopened again by the Chief of Naval Operations on February 12, 1942, when he wrote to the Commandant of the First Naval District as follows:  
     
          "It is requested that immediate investigation and report be made as to the feasibility of arming a considerable number of the Cape Cod fishing boats, particularly with depth charges, for anti-submarine operations on the Grand Banks and other fishing grounds in the North Atlantic, and employing them as a volunteer force under Naval control."  
     
          It was apparent that considerable change of attitude had taken place on the subject of violating international law since the declaration of war.  
     
 
 
 
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On February 18th, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier sent to his Task Group Commanders a dispatch requesting an immediate survey and report on the number of fishing craft available for observation and reporting by radio of enemy submarines, surface craft and aircraft. Three days later, these orders were supplemented and enlarged by a dispatch from Cominch, directing that rescue vessels should be provided from vessels not suitable for combat; these vessels to search for survivors and bring them in. "This measure," Cominch stated, "will not only fill an urgent need but it may well serve to reduce the number of occasions when combat vessels have to be diverted for rescue purposes." In answer to these various directives, the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District, stated that 35 Menhaden fishing boats would be available for observation purposes during the summer fishing season. The report continued:
  
 
 
 
        "As the Shipping Lane is close inshore, and as small fishing vessels have already contacted enemy submarines but were not equipped or organized to give the alarm, it is proposed to utilize about one hundred of these boats for this service. We are investigating the possibility of using New England trawlers and draggers now operating in this area."
  
 
 
          The Commandant of the First Naval District stated that the idea of organizing volunteer patrol of small craft was considered good provided certain conditions could be fulfilled; that the primary requisite would be to find vessels sufficiently rugged and seaworthy to perform the duties required. He further stated that the First Naval District section of the Joint Merchant Vessel Board had been making an extensive search of the District during the past two years for the purpose of locating vessels which could be acquired  
     
 
 
 
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and converted into patrol vessels, and that the most satisfactory types were fishing craft of the trawler and dragger type. In this connection a private shipbuilding company in Texas proposed to Commander Eastern Sea Frontier that he would be willing to construct at least 1,000 24-foot boats for use as patrol craft if such a proposal seemed feasible. Commander Eastern Sea Frontier rejected the offer, on the ground that no 24-foot boat could possibly be of any value in keeping station day in and day out through all kinds of weather. Obviously the need was for vessels sufficiently well built and equipped to withstand considerable punishment during summer and winter.
  
 
 
 
        At this stage of development, the various projects for using small craft were not only tentative but also somewhat confused. The general directives needed a coordinating plan which could avoid duplication of purpose and effort. The first move in this direction came when the Fisherman Observers were delegated to carry out those functions necessary to the success of the Army Aircraft Warning Service. On March 12th, the Commanding General of the First Interceptor Command wrote to the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier as follows:
  
 
 
          "The Intelligence Officer of the Eastern Sea Frontier has presented to this Command a plan for the utilization of a large number of fishing vessels and pleasure craft manned by captains and crews of known loyalty to the United States, who are to be used as observers for the purpose of reporting submarines, enemy raiders, derelicts, vessels on fire, vessels fueling or contacting submarines, survivors, and large flights of aircraft. It is requested that this organization report direct to the First Interceptor Command all large bodies of aircraft in excess of three (3) airplanes. It  
     
 
 
 
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is recommended that these reports of aircraft be reported to this Command in the clear, in that the information is of such nature as to require immediate action. All of these boats are equipped with ship-to-shore radio, which can immediately transmit through the American Telephone and Telegraph System from any point in the Atlantic and within a radius of approximately 1,000 miles from shore to the Interceptor Command Post, New York City.
  
 
 
 
        "In order to identify properly the originator of the report, the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, will furnish a complete list of captains and names of boats in this system. It is understood that the reporting message will originate with the name of the captain, the name of the boat, its polar location from known listening aids to navigation, and then the text of the message. The message is to include the approximate number of aircraft, the type of aircraft by number of motors, the direction of flight, and, if possible, the nationality of aircraft. It is further requested that all captains of this system be informed to call aircraft reports to Chelsea 3-2525, the charges of which will be automatically 'collect'.
 
 
 
          "In that the reports received from these sources are of such general information as to indicate a raid in any portion of the Eastern Theatre of Operations, it is recommended that the reports be received directly at the Interceptor Command rather than through air defense regions or naval districts. By this means, the information when received by this command can then be properly coordinated and disseminated to the region effecting the defensive action.  
     
          "In the event of approval of this plan, it is suggested that this Command be authorized to deal directly with the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier,  
     
 
 
 
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or his designated representative for placing the plan into effect as soon as possible. Any further suggestions for the success of this plan from the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, will be appreciated."
  
 
 
 
        Commander Eastern Sea Frontier had also expressed his deep interest in an entirely different type of project proposed by Alfred Stanford, Commodore of the Cruising Club of America. On February 23, 1942, Commodore Stanford had proposed to the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier the use of ocean-going sailing vessels for anti-submarine patrol work. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier immediately encouraged Commodore Stanford to draw up a detailed outline of his proposal. THis outline was presented to the Governing Board of the Cruising Club on March 5th, and to the annual meeting of the Cruising Club on March 24th. The eight primary tactical advantages of using sailing vessels for anti-submarine patrol were listed at that time as follows:
  
 
 
          "1. A vessel under sail gives no warning of her presence or approach to a submarine. (This advantage is shared by no other type of craft, either water or air. Even a blimp can be heard or, in the day, be seen, in time for the surfaced submarine to submerge into deep water. The minor water noises of a sailing vessel would allow her to come very close to a submarine before detection on listening apparatus.)  
     
          "2. A vessel 'hove to' (headsails backed, helm up) is a steadier type of observation platform than a destroyer or other type of patrol craft. (This is due to the keel in the water and the counterbalancing keel action of the sail in the air. An observation post aloft at the hounds, 40' to 60' from the deck, gives approximately the same or better height of eye as the bridge of a large patrol vessel.)  
     
          "3. There is less leeway or drift with a sailing vessel properly  
     
 
 
 
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'hove to' due to the counterbalancing action of the rudder forcing the ship up into the wind and the backed headsail or reefed foresail tending to drive the bow off. (Under gale conditions this leeway will not amount to more than 1 1/2 K or at the most 2K. Thus a small vessel can comfortably, safely, and effectively hold her station at sea, as has been demonstrated many times in our members' experience.)
 
 
 
 
        "4. There is less noise on a sailing vessel -- there is no engine noise to compete with the audible submarine Diesel proceeding on the surface at night or charging her batteries. It is surmised that this submarine Diesel exhaust can be heard 2-5 miles depending on conditions.
  
 
 
          "5. A sailing vessel is cheap and quick to build. While at war, economy is not a governing consideration, speed of construction is. We estimate the rough finish production cost of a 50' sailing vessel as being about $20,000-$25,000 on a production basis, maybe lower. There are probably in excess of 100 small yards on the Atlantic Coast not now engaged in naval contracts that could be geared up to handle this type of production. (A fleet of only 80 such vessels -- 40 operating; 40 relief -- could constitute an observation and patrol screen at 10 mile intervals from Cape Cod across the Gulf of Maine to Cape Sable and up the coast to Halifax; or from Ambrose Light Vessel down the Jersey Coast, across the Delaware Bay area to Cape Hatteras.)  
     
          "6. Construction of a fleet of such wooden sailing vessels -- should the experiment prove successful -- would not compete for steel plate, specialized welding and riveting shipyard labor.  
     
          "7. Having only auxiliary power, these vessels would not require engineer personnel. (A regular crew member could be quickly trained to give  
     
 
 
 
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the relatively simple power installation such attention as it might require afloat.
  
 
 
 
        "8. Cruising range, due to tankage being available for water rather than fuel and space for provisions rather than machinery, would extend far beyond normal for patrol craft of considerably greater size. (Such vessels as are being proposed could keep the sea for a two week tour of duty easily, 30 days in emergencies.)"
  
 
 
          As soon as the plan had been approved by the Cruising Club, steps were taken to enlist those who would offer their sailing vessels for an experimental patrol and within a short time 36 vessels had been lined up. At this time, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier assigned his Chief of Staff, Captain J. T. G. Stapler, and his Intelligence OFficer, Lieutenant Commander C. C. Vickery to work with the Cruising Club in preparing the preliminary details of the plan. It was believed that the vessels could be given the status of public craft so that they could be repaired, provisioned, and fueled at government expense by putting them under direct charter to the Navy or by enlisting them in the Coast Guard Auxiliary Reserve. These matters could not be settled, however, until some action had been taken by the Navy Department in Washington.  
     
          By the end of March, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier informed the Cruising Club that he hoped to have arrangements complete for volunteer ships to go on assigned patrol areas off shore by the first of June. To supervise all these plans for making proper use of sailing vessels auxiliary yachts and fishing boats, he appointed Commander Vincent Astor, U.S.N.R., a yachtsman in his own right. Thus the stage was set for important use of small craft in various phases of antisubmarine warfare throughout the waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier.  
     
 
 
 
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