BdU KTB 16-31 October 1943

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16-31 October 1943

This record was not registered or filmed with the other B.d.U. KTBs and was not translated by the U.S. Navy's team shortly after the end of WWII. The original is in the custody of the Bundesarchiv-Abt. Militararchiv in Berlin, Germany.

Bundesarchiv-Abt. Militararchiv Item RM 87/32

Copies of this document were generously made available by U-boat historian Dr. Axel Niestlé, and Thomas Weis - Curator Of The Library Of Contemporary History (Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte in der Württembergischen Landesbibliothek) Stuttgart, Germany

Translated by Jerry Mason

16.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	ET 71	U 231	-	Op(AK 53)	U 448	-	Op(AK 64)	U 645	-	BE 52
	91	-	Op(AK 64)	256	-	BD 61	455	-	AK 59	648	-	BE 69
	103	-	EH 32	260	-	BF 47	470	-	Op(AK 02)	666	-	BF 64
	123	-	Op(DQ 96)	267	-	Op(AK 64)	488	-	BD 61	709	-	BE 43
	129	-	BF 84	271	-	BD 61	505	-	BE 98	714	-	AF 48
	154	-	Op(CE 69	274	-	AF 49	516	-	CE 91	731	-	BD 61
	155	-	EH 54	275	-	BD 36	518	-	Op(DL 30)	758	-	BD 61
	161	-	Op(FQ 60)	280	-	AN 24	532	-	Op(LC 30)	762	-	BD 61
	168	-	Op(MP 20)	281	-	AL 23	533	-	Op(MF 60)	841	-	AE 70
	170	-	Op(FJ 90)	305	-	BE 68	536	-	Op(CB 66)	842	-	AL 25
	183	-	LB 78	306	-	BF 57	537	-	AJ 20	843	-	AF 59
	188	-	Op(LC 30)	309	-	Op(AM 53)	539	-	BE 52	844	-	AL 17
	190	-	CF 37	343	-	AN 35	540	-	AE 26	848	-	CD 99
	193	-	BF 81	373	-	BE 15	552	-	BD 36	849	-	AE 82
	196	-	BF 83	378	-	BD 61	575	-	BE 31	952	-	BE 69
	211	-	BF 57	402	-	BE 61	584	-	BD 61	953	-	Op(BE)
	212	-	AE 69	405	-	BF 47	592	-	BE 14	963	-	AE 79
	214	-	ED 25	413	-	Op(AK 67)	603	-	BD 61	964	-	AL 17
	218	-	EE 52	420	-	BE 61	608	-	Op(AK 67)	966	-	AE 79
	220	-	BD 52	426	-	AL 16	631	-	Op(AK 02)	967	-	AE 69
	226	-	BE 15	437	-	Op(AM 02)	641	-	BD 61	969	-	AE 79

	On Return Passage: U 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 275 - 305 - 539 - 641 - 666 - 645 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: U 666 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 466 - La Pallice; U 282 - Bergen

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.


- 2 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 45, see numeral IV a).
		2)	U 537 on its transit through the Iceland passage detected cm-locating in AF 7124 and AE 9132.
		3)	U 168 reports: On 29 and 30.9. no targets in Bombay Harbor. During the day only a few ships were observed through the periscope. Heavy traffic of sailing vessels in all directions. On the way to Mombassa and the gulf of Aden for three days sighted only sailing vessels, of which 6 were sunk by artillery in MH 7743. A 4,000 GRT cargo ship sunk on 2.10. No surface patrol, on 5.10. heavy 2-engined air patrol by day only. New area of operation = Gulf of Oman on 15.10 a four and a two salvo missed on convoy, heading 310°, speed 12 knots. Additionally, two individual misses on a large tanker, boat assumed Eto ran slow, because firing data was exact. In Gulf of Oman confused sea – single-engine air patrol by day over MF 21.
	b)	No special events.
	c)	1)	English units were located in AJ 31, AL 61.
		2)	According to intercepted message at 1200 2 enemy steamers in EH 9964.
		3)	U-boat sightings: in AL 1546, AK 03, AL 1545, AL 1511 (Convoy No. 45). MF 2125, MB 9870 (U 168 or 533) and DN 4676, another 4 sightings in unknown positions , one of them Convoy No. 45 and probably one of Biscay.
		4)	For the U boat sighting by aircraft at 1115 in AL 1511 anti-aircraft fire and engine trouble were reported.
	d)	According to Radio Intelligence (X) report stragglers of ONS 20, located east of 30° west, are ordered to go to Reykjavik immediately. Furthermore, the straggler's route is modified and now leads via AK 3177 to AK 1131.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 45.
		After moderate Westerly weather conditions on 16.10. during the night of the 17.10. it was reported temporarily WNW 1. On the morning of the 17.10. a boat reported NW 5 again, visibility 3 nm.

- 3 -

		U 426 sighted the convoy in the evening at 2005. Boat reported contact continuously until 2248 from AK 3739. It torpedoed a 6,000 GRT ship in this position only to be forced off by destroyers afterwards. The next contact keeping report by U 309 did not come until morning (0545) from AK 3558. This position lies far to the northwest but seems to be correct from cross-fixing. At 0836 a destroyer was reported by U 437 from AK 3551. No further reports about the convoy were received.
		By cross-fixing no clear speed or course of enemy can be determined apparently due to big differences in boat's positions. For example, both U 631 and U 540 reported star shells although the boats were 145 nm apart when the reports came in.
		Afternoon on 16.10. strong air patrol was beginning to take place around the convoy. 4 boats reported being attacked by airplanes, U 964 reported being attacked for the first time by airplane at 1739. At 1958 the same the boat reported war emergency: Attacked by bombs, boat seriously damaged, sinking, can remain afloat for short time only. Boats were ordered, if not further away than 60 nm, to operate on U 964. At 2335 U 232 reported it had taken on board four survivors of U 964, further search inconclusive.
		Group “Schliefen” was ordered to take position ahead of the convoy from U 426's report received at 2000. This patrol line was relocated northward after confirming the shift to the northwest by 11 boats from AK 3519 to AK 3779. After the convoy-report came in at 0600 in the morning the entire group was ordered on the convoy.
		After U 946 sank and U 631 was probably returning to port after operating on the convoy, a total of 16 boats are now operating on the convoy. These are U 844 - 470 - 437 - 308 - 762 - 231 - 91 - 448 - 267 - 413 - 603 - 841 - 426 - 540 - 271 and 842
		According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report at 1225 on 16.10. stragglers

- 4 -

		of ONS 20, located east of 30° west, were ordered to head for Reykjavik. In addition a corrected route for stragglers was now given to go from AK 3177 to AK 1131. The shift towards north west corresponds with the general course of convoy.
		The operation on ONS 20 is to be continued.
	b)	U 516 and 154, located off Norta and Ponta Delgada respectively, receive orders to move to the south and report if the present ordered area of operation provides no traffic or chances for success.
	c)	To transfer a buffer spring from U 658 to U 953 both of them are to meet at 1800 in BE 5922.
	d)	U 964 was attacked by plane at 1730 in AK 1749. At 1958 a war-emergency-report was received, saying the boat is seriously damaged, in the process of sinking and can remain afloat only a short time. From boats in salvage operation U 232 picked up four survivors. Thus loss of U-964 is confirmed.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 168 1 ship 4,000 GRT
	6 sailing ships

- 5 -

17.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	ET 68	U 231	-	Op(AK 28)	U 437	-	Op(AK 28)	U 631	-	Op(AK 26)
	91	-	Op(AK 08)	256	-	BD 61	448	-	Op(AK 02)	641	-	BD 61
	103	-	EH 68	260	-	BF 48	455	-	BD 23	645	-	BE 56
	123	-	DR 48	267	-	Op(AK 02)	466	-	BF 91	648	-	BE 67
	129	-	BF 75	271	-	BD 61	470	-	Op(AK 34)	709	-	BE 10
	154	-	Op(CE 69)	274	-	AF 47	488	-	BD 61	714	-	AF 47
	155	-	EH 73	275	-	BE 18	505	-	BE 97	731	-	BD 61
	161	-	Op(FQ 60)	280	-	AF 87	516	-	Op(CE 59)	758	-	BD 61
	168	-	Op(MP 97)	281	-	Op(AK 35)	518	-	Op(DL 30)	762	-	Op(AK 28)
	170	-	Op(FJ 90)	282	-	AF 87	532	-	Op(LC 30)	841	-	Op(AK 30)
	183	-	LB 83	305	-	BF 47	533	-	Op(MF 60)	842	-	Op(AK 30)
	188	-	LC 30	306	-	BF 49	536	-	Op(CB 60)	843	-	AF 57
	190	-	CF 30	309	-	Op(AM 35)	537	-	Op(AJ 21)	844	-	Op(AK 24)
	193	-	BF 75	383	-	AN 31	539	-	BE 64	848	-	DF 38
	196	-	BF 80	373	-	BE 33	540	-	Op(AM 33)	849	-	AE 84
	211	-	BF 48	378	-	BD 61	552	-	BD 31	952	-	BF 48
	212	-	AE 67	402	-	BF 61	575	-	BD 38	953	-	Op(BE)
	214	-	Op(DO 90)	405	-	EE 65	584	-	BD 61	963	-	AL 22
	218	-	Op(EE 80)	413	-	Op(AK 37)	592	-	BD 32	966	-	AL 22
	220	-	BD 61	420	-	BE 52	603	-	BD 61	967	-	AE 67
	226	-	BD 93	426	-	Op(AK 35)	608	-	Op(AM 39)	969	-	AL 22

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 275 - 305 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 441 - 450 - 732 - Bergen; U 340 - St. Nazaire; U 530 - La Pallice; U 219 - Bergen.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Air reconnaissance in outer Biscay.

- 6 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 45 see number IV a).
		2)	On 15.10. at 1424 in BE 1674 U-226 fired a salvo of two, which missed, on an escorted independent.
	b)	No enemy ships reported.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: 13 sightings in undeciphered positions. Of these, 3 in the North Atlantic (Convoy No. 45), 3 from escorting aircraft of an independent ship in AK and 7 sightings in unresolved positions.
		2)	English units were located in AM 4530, AM 5440, AM 4450.
		3)	An unknown ship was sending SSS-signal from LC 2358 and reporting attack by 2 missed torpedoes.
	d)	According to an Radio Intelligence (X) report stragglers of ONS 20 received instructions on 17.10. at 1104 not to proceed via spot “K” = AK 1123 but to proceed via spot “J” to Point “P” if possible. This order was nullified at 1222 and stragglers were ordered to move straight from Point “J” to Point “G” (See Convoy No. 45).

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 45.
		On the morning of 17.10. typical westerly weather conditions, freshening towards evening NW 6, sea state 5, varying visibility.
		Received no proper contact keeper reports on the convoy. Destroyer reported in AK 3551 by U 437 at 0536 on 17.10. U 91 reports at 1000 from AK 2664 broad sound bearings from 170 – 250°. U 413, having radio direction finding equipment on board, reports three bearings during the day indicating convoy is heading on a more northwesterly course, but these bearings might also refer to search groups that were detached.
		Numerous reports about air attacks were received on 17.10 . Altogether 9 boats reported 14 air attacks. U 448 had to move off for repairs, because the boat was attacked heavily twice, one dead two seriously injured. U 281 also reports two men slightly injured.

- 7 -

		The many reports about air attacks in the area of AK 2480 and 2490 during the day on 17.10. indicate the northwesterly course of convoy. Three bearings on convoy radio traffic also point to the northwest.
		On the other hand, sound bearings reported by U 91 indicate the convoy is changing of course. Additionally, an Radio Intelligence (X) report on the morning of 17.10. at 1104 indicates the stragglers route of the convoy was changed presumably towards the south west. Sadly theses reports were not received until the the morning of 18.10. at 0900. Accordingly it seems to confirm that the convoy has drifted towards southwest in approximately in AK 2660. Retroactively it must be assumed convoy took an evasive route towards the west-southwest after the boats were located by air close to the northwest course of enemy.
		Because it was still unclear in which direction the convoy would go in the night of 18.10. after the boats had operated before on northwest opponent's courses, the order given to continue searching in both directions, to the northwest as well as to the west and southwest.
		U 309 reports having fired a salvo of four. Two detonations reported after 13 minutes. Headquarters reckons one ship being torpedoed.
		At night the positions of all boats was requested. It cannot be established up to now, how many boats are missing. See also KTB for 18.10.
	b)	1)	Next convoy operation is intended on HX and SC convoys. In order to position a group in the west the following objectives are ordered: U 963 - 966 - 989 - 552 - 226 - 373 - 592 - 575 - 709 = BD 33 likewise U 402 - 603 - 584 - and 378 after replenishment. U 420 – 405 as well as 648 proceed to AL 77 after meeting with U 953.
		2)	U 967 - 212 - 714 - 274 - 843 - 280 - 282 are to report location after entering AL. Named boats will be arriving from the homeland.
	c)	1)	Radio silence is ordered within 200 nm of BD 81 except for important tactical reports.

- 8 -

		2)	U 455 is ordered to hand over remaining fuel to U 220 after arriving in BD 6122.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 309 1 ship torpedoed






















- 9 -

18.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	ET 89	U 256	-	BD 61	U 448	-	Op(AK 25)	U 641	-	BD 61
	91	-	Op(AK 01)	260	-	BF 49	450	-	BF 54	645	-	BE 65
	103	-	EJ 48	267	-	Op(AK 23)	455	-	BE 37	648	-	BE 59
	123	-	DR 51	271	-	BD 61	466	-	BF 83	709	-	BE 18
	129	-	BF 77	274	-	AE 69	470	-	Op(AM 10)	714	-	AE 69
	154	-	Op(CE 69)	275	-	BE 51	488	-	ED 61	731	-	BD 61
	155	-	ER 12	280	-	AF 76	505	-	CF 35	732	-	BF 54
	161	-	Op(FQ 60)	281	-	Op(AM 25)	516	-	Op(CE 59)	758	-	BD 61
	170	-	Op(FJ 90)	282	-	AF 84	518	-	Op(DL 30)	762	-	Op(AK 25)
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	305	-	BF 48	530	-	BF 91	841	-	Op(AK 10)
	183	-	LB 68	306	-	BF 49	532	-	Op(LC 30)	842	-	Op(AK 10)
	188	-	LC 30	309	-	Op(AK 25)	533	-	Op(MF 30)	843	-	AF 48
	190	-	CF 29	340	-	BF 67	536	-	Op(CE 60)	844	-	Op(AK 10)
	193	-	BF 74	343	-	AF 84	537	-	AJ 11	848	-	BF 38
	196	-	BF 80	373	-	BD 31	539	-	BF 48	849	-	AE 79
	211	-	BF 47	378	-	BD 61	540	-	Op(AK 10)	952	-	BF 48
	212	-	AL 79	402	-	BD 61	552	-	BD 32	953	-	Op(BE)
	214	-	DP 74	405	-	BE 64	575	-	BD 29	963	-	AL 22
	218	-	Op(EE 80)	413	-	Op(AK 14)	584	-	BD 61	966	-	AL 23
	219	-	AF 87	420	-	BE 27	592	-	BD 23	967	-	AE 59
	220	-	BD 61	426	-	Op(AK 16)	603	-	BE 61	969	-	AL 23
	226	-	BD 36	437	-	Op(AM 25)	608	-	Op(AK 27)
	231	-	Op(AK 23)	441	-	BF 54	631	-	Op(AK 10)

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 275 - 305 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 566 - Brest; U 642 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 10 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 190 was bombed by aircraft in BE 9363 on 13.10. without indication of locating. No losses.
		2)	Convoy No. 45 see IV a).
	b)	No ship reports.
	c)	1)	English units were located in CG 4360, AK 0380, AK 7320.
		2)	U-boat sightings: DB 6479
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 45.
		No further messages are received concerning the convoy. Therefore, there is little prospect that the convoy will be detected again. Furthermore, the boats are widely dispersed after the search, and are positioned so unfavorably that on detection an operation would no longer have been possible. Therefore, at noon on 18.10. boats are ordered to cease operations.
		Only in the evening at 1800 a report by U 309 is received, that the boat has been passed over by several ships in the morning of 18.10. from 0300 till 0400. After plotting these ships might have belonged to said convoy. Also U 608 reports at night, at 2000 location of the convoy in AK 0115. It reports strong night air coverage, being forced under water for three consecutive hours.
		Ship torpedoed by U 426 on 16.10. has sunk according to a report from U 842 after having sighted her lifeboats.
			Final summary of KTB from 19.10.
	b)	1)	After the convoy operation was broken off U 537, which was assigned as radio boat, was detached in order to perform special task (to deploy weather equipment).

- 11 -

		2)	Boats with objectives in BC 33 and AK 77 are planed to assemble in said area on about 24.10. Advancing boats should make sure in any case to remain unseen, proceed submerged by day and at high speed by night.
			Enemy must not discover tendency of proceeding westwards.
	c)	U 641 and 758 have replenished for return transit from U 488.
	d)	U 161, after having sunk a steamer on 27.9., has been requested several times to report position to no avail. According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report a Brazilian aircraft attacked a U-boat in FJ 9594 on 28.10. and scored hits. Because U 161 operated in this area alone, it can only refer to this boat. Loss to be assumed.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.

- 12 -

19.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FE 33	U 260	-	BF 57	U 450	-	BF 49	U 641	-	BD 61
	91	-	AK 46	267	-	AM 27	455	-	BD 61	642	-	BF 67
	103	-	EJ 78	271	-	BD 61	466	-	BF 81	645	-	BE 69
	123	-	DR 23	274	-	AE 67	470	-	AM 10	648	-	BE 50
	129	-	BE 99	275	-	BE 53	488	-	BD 61	709	-	BD 39
	154	-	Op(CE 69)	280	-	AF 73	505	-	CF 30	714	-	AE 67
	155	-	ER 41	281	-	AM 01	516	-	Op(CE 59)	731	-	BD 61
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	282	-	AF 73	518	-	Op(DB 70)	732	-	BF 49
	170	-	Op(FJ 90)	305	-	BF 49	530	-	BF 83	758	-	BD 61
	183	-	LC 20	306	-	BE 48	532	-	Op(LC 30)	762	-	AK 01
	188	-	LD 10	309	-	AM 01	533	-	Op(MF 20)	841	-	AK 10
	190	-	CF 36	340	-	BF 82	536	-	Op(CB 20)	842	-	AK 01
	193	-	BE 99	343	-	AF 52	537	-	AH 33	843	-	AF 47
	196	-	BF 88	373	-	BD 22	539	-	BF 49	844	-	AK 10
	211	-	BE 69	378	-	BD 61	540	-	AK 10	848	-	DF 98
	212	-	AE 82	402	-	BD 61	552	-	BD 13	849	-	AE 78
	214	-	DP 49	405	-	BE 56	566	-	BF 67	952	-	BF 49
	218	-	Op(EE 70)	413	-	AK 33	575	-	BD 24	953	-	Op(BE)
	219	-	AE 76	420	-	BE 27	584	-	BD 61	963	-	AL 14
	220	-	BD 61	426	-	AK 61	592	-	BD 21	966	-	AL 21
	226	-	BD 34	437	-	AK 29	603	-	BD 61	967	-	AE 82
	231	-	AK 18	441	-	BF 46	608	-	AK 19	969	-	AL 14
	256	-	BD 61	448	-	AK 64	631	-	AK 51

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 260 - 275 - 305 - 448 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: U 343 - Trontheim.
	Sailed: U 262 - 707 - La Pallice; U 586 - Bergen; U 538 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 13 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 953 reports patrol group on SW-course in BE 5688.
		2)	U 608 was shot in rocket bomb attack on 13.10. in BD 3285. One Martlet in flames. Fired from 150 meters altitude.
		3)	U 154 positioned off Ponta Delgada from 14. to 16.10. and met no traffic either in the harbor or off it. On 15.10. a Portuguese patrol vessel and once per day air patrol seen.
		4)	U 648 positioned in BF 57 and BF 48 on 11.10. flashing location detected with Naxos.
	b)	No ship reports.
	c)	U-boat sightings: in ED 5513, DB 9537 and two in unresolved positions.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Final observations on Convoy No. 45:
		The operation on the convoy from 16. - 18.10. was carried out by 17 boats, resulted in the sinking of one and the torpedoing of two other ships, 6 boats were lost in the operation: (U 964 - 540 - 841 - 470 - 631 - 844).
		The convoy was reported for the last time on 17.10. in the morning and a patrol line was then established, which did not succeed in regaining contact. It was determined later that during 17.10. the convoy had made a strong evasive movement to the southwest under the cover of strong air escort (altogether 16 air attacks were reported during the day on 17.10. all on a continuation of the previous convoy course). The boats were prevented from searching by the continuous presence of aircraft, while the convoy made off to the southwest.
		Only a single destroyer sighting during the whole operation, only 4 depth charge attacks 3 of which were conducted by escort vessels at the convoy prove that the remote escort of this convoy was hardly skirted. The particularly



- 14 -

		numerous aircraft had taken over the task of the remote escort.
		Because no remote escort vessels were actually reported, it must be accepted that the majority of boats were lost to aircraft. Whether the boats were bombed on the surface or when diving, can not be determined, because the order was not given to the remain on the surface for anti-aircraft defense.
		Anyway, the issue of strengthening firepower becomes even more urgent and is the primary requirement for the convoy battles of the future.
		In contrast to the success of the "Leuthen" convoy, this operation was a failure with the unacceptable loss of 6 boats. In the next convoy operation we will attempt a tighter deployment by quicker arrival of the boats thereby splitting the defense.
		At the appearance too stronger enemy aircraft we will attempt to avoid too high losses by timely cessation of operations, until the boats are capable of resisting enemy aircraft better by reinforced anti-aircraft armament (3.7 cm).
	b)	1)	Further objective for U 129 and U 193 is BB 60. According to the experience of U 66 there is heavy but fast independent traffic.
		2)	U 155 is given freedom to maneuver in the entire Brazilian coastal region between Pernambuco and Trinidad.
			Boat is informed of the suspected traffic situation according to existing information.
	c)	Meeting of U 648 and U 953 has not taken place because of bad weather conditions and inaccurate navigation. U 648 is ordered to continue westerly transit. U 953 will be met by another boat.
	d)	1)	Concerning the loss of U 964, U 231 reports the following according to statements from the rescued: Attack by Liberator, 3 inaccurate bombs, after 1-1/2 hours a second approach with aircraft armament and 4 bombs, of these 2 detonate under the boat, apparently

- 15 -

			depth charges. Water intake in the bow room, the boat sank approximately 30 minutes later. Aircraft throws 6 marker flares. Because there was no order to exit the boat and prepare the large life boat was given, it must be accepted that the commander had been killed previously by aircraft armament, because otherwise, the absence of these orders can not be explained.
		2)	5 boats from Convoy No. 45 have not reported despite repeated requests. These are: U 540 - 841 - 470 - 631 - 844.
			Finally of these 3 boats reported aircraft attacks namely:
			U 470 at 1916 on 16.10. from AK 2960,
			U 841 at 1506 on 17.10. from AK 2448,
			U 540 at 1818 on 17.10. from AK 2499,
			U 844 surfaced at 0314 on 16.10 after 3 hour depth charge pursuit and reported last convoy position about 2400 in AL 1641. The boat would have pursued the convoy.
			U 631 reported star shells in AK 2683 at 2251 on 16.10.
			On loss of the named boats must be accepted. Detailed information apart from the specified last messages is not at hand.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.









- 16 -

20.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FF 13	U 256	-	BD 61	U 441	-	BF 45	U 603	-	BD 61
	91	-	AK 48	260	-	BF 58	448	-	AK 93	608	-	AK 49
	103	-	ES 25	262	-	BF 91	450	-	BF 81	641	-	BE 55
	123	-	DF 97	267	-	AK 42	455	-	BD 61	642	-	BF 83
	129	-	BE 97	271	-	BD 61	466	-	BF 73	645	-	BF 47
	154	-	Op(DG 56)	274	-	AE 59	488	-	BD 61	648	-	BE 58
	155	-	ER 68	275	-	BE 64	505	-	CF 29	707	-	BF 91
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	280	-	AF 47	516	-	Op(CE 59)	709	-	BD 37
	170	-	Op(FJ 90)	281	-	AK 41	518	-	Op(DB 70)	714	-	AE 59
	183	-	LC 30	282	-	AF 47	530	-	BF 82	731	-	BD 61
	188	-	LC 30	305	-	BF 57	532	-	Op(LC 30)	732	-	BF 81
	190	-	CF 62	306	-	BE 68	533	-	Op(MF 20)	758	-	BE 56
	193	-	BE 97	309	-	AK 45	536	-	Op(BB 78)	762	-	AK 42
	196	-	BF 83	340	-	BF 84	537	-	AA 31	842	-	AK 46
	211	-	BE 68	373	-	BD 16	538	-	AO	843	-	AE 68
	212	-	AL 24	378	-	BD 61	539	-	BF 57	848	-	DS 17
	214	-	DP 56	402	-	BD 61	552	-	BD 11	849	-	AL 23
	218	-	Op(EE 70)	405	-	BE 51	566	-	BF 83	952	-	BF 57
	219	-	AF 72	413	-	AK 45	575	-	BD16	953	-	Op(BE)
	220	-	BD 61	420	-	BE 19	584	-	BD 61	963	-	AK 38
	226	-	BD 82	426	-	AK 41	586	-	BF 87	966	-	AL 14
	231	-	AK 41	437	-	AK 45	592	-	BD 12	967	-	AE 84
										969	-	AK 38

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 260 - 275 - 305 - 448 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 731 - 758 - 645 - 952.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 17 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 441 sighted a Sunderland in BF 4645 and forced the aircraft off with new automatic cannon (3.7 cm) without being attacked.
		2)	U 188 situation: 7 days in MS 90 and LC 20 with no traffic. 20.10. ME 9484 two-miss on large patrol vessel type "Protektor", afterwards 3 hour aimless sound gear pursuit. Boat set off for Penang base.
	b)	No ship sightings.
	c)	1)	Enemy units detected in AM 7920, AK 9130, AL 71/72.
		2)	U-boat sightings: BB 6745, BC 1526, BD 9631 (U 214), BD 7459, 2 further sightings in undetermined positions, one probably in Biscay, the second in CF (U 190?).
		3)	U-boat has or was attacked in BB 9793.
	d)		According to Radio Intelligence (X) report HX 261 was located in AE 9657 on 21.10. at 1300.
			Because the next HX (262) should be operated on, this message increases in significance as it confirms the rhythm of HX-convoys.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	To operate on HX 262 intend to establish a patrol line on 24.10. at 12.00 with about 23 boats from AJ 9684 to BC 3993
			Establishment of the patrol line is not to be revealed to the enemy, boats coming from the north (former group "Schlieffen") hold in the area north of the line, boats coming from the east hold to the south. The boats will be submerged by day and maintain radio silence except for tactically important messages.
			The flak boat U-271, currently positioned with the U-488 supply group,








- 18 -

			has received a new objective. It is planned to put the boat on the expected convoy particularly to counter the air escort. To what extend this use of the flak boats will lead to success remains to be seen.
		2)	New objective for U 212 - 967 - 714 and U 274 is square AK 78. If possible, named boats should also be put on the expected convoy.
		3)	5 boats currently in transit to the Mediterranean have received the following short instructions:
			U 450 - 732 and 340 west of the longitude 13° West, U 566 and 642 longitude of the Portuguese cost to the south.
			Continued transit and breakthrough of the Gibraltar Strait for the first 3 boats off the African coast, for the last two 2 boats off the Spanish coast. Advance as far as possible submerged. Only surface at night to charge. All boots will be informed of the experiences learned from the last Strait transit by U 223.
	c)	For the delivery of 2 compensating springs U 211 and 953 meeting point is BE 6728 for 21.10. at 1000.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.










- 19 -

21.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FF 23	U 260	-	BF 53	U 448	-	AK 75	U 608	-	AK 47
	91	-	AJ 69	262	-	BF 58	450	-	BF 84	641	-	BE 59
	103	-	ES 61	267	-	AK 47	455	-	BD 61	642	-	BF 85
	123	-	DF 93	271	-	BD 61	466	-	BF 48	645	-	BF 68
	129	-	BF 89	274	-	AL 21	488	-	BD 61	648	-	BE 54
	154	-	DG 84	275	-	BE 69	505	-	CF 30	707	-	BF 83
	155	-	Op(EQ 97)	280	-	AE 69	516	-	Op(CE 59)	709	-	BD 28
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	281	-	AJ 66	518	-	Op(DB 70)	714	-	AE 82
	170	-	Op(FJ 90)	282	-	AE 69	530	-	BF 81	731	-	BD 61
	183	-	LC 30	305	-	BF 52	532	-	Op(LC 30)	732	-	BF 84
	188	-	LC 30	306	-	BE 68	533	-	Op(MF 20)	758	-	BE 68
	190	-	CF 59	309	-	AJ 66	536	-	Op(BB 78)	762	-	AJ 66
	193	-	BE 89	340	-	BF 79	537	-	AH 26	842	-	AK 47
	196	-	BF 80	373	-	BD 18	538	-	AN 35	843	-	AE 67
	211	-	BE 67	378	-	BD 61	539	-	BF 58	848	-	DE 48
	212	-	AL 27	402	-	BD 61	552	-	BC 36	849	-	AL 20
	214	-	DP 73	405	-	BE 43	566	-	BF 85	952	-	BF 57
	218	-	Op(EE 70)	413	-	AK 47	575	-	BD 17	953	-	BE 67
	219	-	AF 47	420	-	BE 43	584	-	BD 41	963	-	AK 68
	220	-	BD 61	426	-	AJ 66	586	-	BF 76	966	-	AL 10
	226	-	BD 19	437	-	AJ 63	592	-	BD 14	967	-	AL 31
	231	-	AJ 69	441	-	BF 44	603	-	BD 61	969	-	AK 62
	256	-	BD 61

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 260 - 275 - 305 - 448 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: U 645 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 333 - La Pallice; U 542 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 20 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 953 is attacked in EE 6728 by a Sunderland. Boat dove off the aircraft by shooting and submerged at a favorable moment. Depth charges without effect.
		2)	U 488 reports carrier aircraft at supply point. (see paragraph IC c).
		3)	U 441 was overflown by a Boeing. Attack was repelled; no bombs.
		4)	U-532 situation: on 19.10. in MS 91 Ato salvo of three failed due to defensive maneuver of net layer Type "Protector". 20.10. two single failures and one two-fan on convoy of 10 ships and 4 escorts in MS 8330. Of these 1 hit on 6000 tonner, sinking probable. Two days of continuous air patrol. Boat began return transit. It received orders proceed to Penang for engine overhaul and supply.
	b)	No ship sightings.
	c)	1)	Enemy units were located in B- 2610, AM 7610, AM 5430.
		2)	U-boat sightings: BE 6723, DB 6578 (U-518), MP 2520 (U 533).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-953 has not met U 211 at the meeting point. It sets off without the replacement compensating springs to the southwest to the repair diesel clutch. Was asked about operational readiness of the quadruple.
		2)	Because the current U 488 supply point is compromised, after asking if all boats can reach new meeting place for fuel reasons, it is moved to BD 2819.







- 21 -

		3)	U 214 received orders to head for BD 70 at the most economical speed. Supply of the boat is planned there.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 532 1 ship 6,000 GRT.




















- 22 -

22.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FF 36	U 256	-	BD 61	U 437	-	AJ 68	U 592	-	BD 40
	91	-	AJ 90	260	-	BF 58	441	-	BE 66	603	-	BD 61
	103	-	ET 44	262	-	BF 81	448	-	BE 13	608	-	AJ 90
	123	-	DG 44	267	-	AJ 90	450	-	BF 79	641	-	BE 68
	129	-	BE 88	271	-	BD 54	455	-	BD 61	642	-	BF 87
	154	-	DS 23	274	-	AL 16	466	-	BF 47	648	-	BE 45
	155	-	Op(FB 20)	275	-	BF 47	488	-	BD 61	707	-	BF 82
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	280	-	AE 68	505	-	CF 20	709	-	BD 51
	170	-	Op(FQ 20)	281	-	AJ 68	516	-	Op(CE 59)	714	-	AE 84
	183	-	LD 46	282	-	AE 68	518	-	Op(DB 90)	731	-	BD 61
	188	-	Op(LC 30)	306	-	BE 56	530	-	BF 72	732	-	BF 79
	190	-	CF 85	305	-	BF 50	532	-	Op(LC 30)	758	-	BE 68
	193	-	BE 88	338	-	BF 91	533	-	Op(MF 20)	762	-	AJ 96
	196	-	BF 92	340	-	BF 78	536	-	Op(BB 70)	842	-	AJ 90
	211	-	BE 59	373	-	BD 42	537	-	Op(AH 25)	843	-	AE 83
	212	-	AL 19	378	-	BD 61	538	-	AN 29	848	-	DS 76
	214	-	DP 55	402	-	BD 61	539	-	BF 88	849	-	AL 20
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	405	-	BE 41	542	-	AO	952	-	BF 57
	219	-	AE 68	413	-	AJ 90	552	-	BD 40	953	-	BE 67
	220	-	BD 61	420	-	BD 17	566	-	BF 87	963	-	AK 59
	226	-	BD 40	426	-	AJ 90	575	-	BD 40	966	-	AL 10
	231	-	AJ 90	309	-	AJ 99	584	-	BD 61	967	-	AL 26
							586	-	AF 72	969	-	AK 64

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 260 - 275 - 448 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: U 305 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 424 - 343 - Trontheim.

II.	Air Reconnaissance:
	1)	Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
	2)	Reconnaissance against England - Gibraltar traffic.

- 23 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 218 was detected by night air patrol during the attempt to complete the mine task at Trinidad and while moving off applied "Aphrodite" successfully. From the message it is not clear whether the minefield was laid.
		2)	U 516 Horta situation: From 18. - 21.10. positioned off and in the channel. In the harbor 5 ships and 1 destroyer. Off the north entrance and south entrance one patrol vessel, in addition Portuguese P 1 to P 4. with device (These are possibly the English corvettes reported by a contact man which now sail under Portuguese flag). No air outside territorial waters, no attack possible. Boat continues southerly transit.
	b)	Own aircraft sighted a convoy at 1053 in BE 8196 of 22 merchant ships and 5 escorts, course 60°, 8 knots.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: EC 1244.
		2)	Radio Intelligence (X) report: U-boat attacked in DN 2881 (U 518?).
	d)	A Radio Radio Intelligence (X) report for HX 261 provided new stragglers points and meeting places, for the operations of patrol group "Siegfried" expecting HX 262. The straggler's route goes to the north of the presumed convoy course on a shorter route.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	The boats positioned in waiting position U 91 - 762 - 291 - 309 - 608 - 969 - 267 - 281 - 413 - 963 - 437 - 426 - 842 - 552 - 592 - 575 - 226 - 373 and 709 receive orders, to be in named order in patrol line positioned from AJ 9928 to BC 3938 on 24.10. at 1200. These boats form Group "Siegfried". HX 262 is expected from the evening of 24.10. Boats should reach positions unnoticed at night or proceeding submerged by day. Radio silence except for tactically important reports.
		On detecting the convoy or with 16 cbm of fuel inventory U 91

















- 24 -

		should proceed to BE 2819 to supply from U 488.
	b)	1)	U 154 received orders, to occupy the same operations area as U 155 (northeast coast of Brazil).
		2)	U 68 has freedom to maneuver in the sea area of square FP upper third, FH and EW (Guinea Bay).
		3)	U 308 and 466, attempt on Gibraltar convoys is planned for the new moon, head temporarily for BE 70 as waiting area.
	c)	1)	Boats positioned at the U 488 supply group U 402 - 603 - 584 - 378 were left to decide on further operations or return transit, because the boats have already been at sea for 7 weeks. In the case of return transit, they should report supply situation and position passing the longitude of BE 4560. If boats supplement for further operations they should extend the patrol line of Group "Siegfried" in southeast direction, distance 10 nm, in the order of supplying.
		2)	After supply the flak-boat U-271 heads for the center of the patrol line.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.













- 25 -

23.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FG 16	U 260	-	BF 67	U 441	-	BE 64	U 603	-	BD 53
	91	-	AJ 96	262	-	BF 73	448	-	BE 28	608	-	AJ 90
	103	-	ET 73	267	-	AJ 90	450	-	BE 78	641	-	BE 69
	123	-	DG 43	271	-	BD 53	455	-	BD 53	642	-	BF 79
	129	-	CF 22	274	-	AK 03	466	-	BE 69	648	-	BD 62
	154	-	DS 51	275	-	BE 48	488	-	BD 53	707	-	BF 81
	155	-	Op(FB 10)	280	-	AE 59	505	-	CF 26	709	-	BD 18
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	281	-	AJ 90	516	-	CG 82	714	-	AE 87
	170	-	Op(FQ 20)	282	-	AE 59	518	-	Op(DB 97)	731	-	BD 53
	188	-	Op(LC 30)	306	-	BE 58	530	-	BF 74	732	-	CG 12
	183	-	LD 82	309	-	AJ 90	532	-	LC 31	758	-	BE 47
	190	-	DH 11	333	-	BF 58	533	-	Op(MF 20)	762	-	AJ 90
	193	-	BE 79	340	-	BF 77	536	-	Op(BB 75)	842	-	AJ 90
	196	-	BF 93	343	-	AF 59	537	-	Op(AH 25)	843	-	AE 85
	211	-	BE 57	373	-	BD 14	538	-	AF 87	848	-	EH 25
	212	-	AK 67	378	-	BD 53	539	-	BF 61	849	-	AL 42
	214	-	DB 37	402	-	BD 53	542	-	AN 35	952	-	BF 68
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	405	-	BD 37	552	-	BC 39	953	-	Op(BE 83)
	219	-	AE 67	413	-	AJ 90	566	-	BE 79	963	-	AK 84
	220	-	BD 53	420	-	BD 37	575	-	BC 39	966	-	AL 10
	226	-	BD 17	424	-	AF 58	584	-	BD 53	967	-	Al 01
	231	-	AJ 30	426	-	AJ 90	586	-	AE 47	969	-	AK 82
	256	-	BD 53	437	-	AJ 90	592	-	BD 17

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 260 - 275 - 448 - 455 - 539 - 641 - 731 - 758 - 952.
	Entered Port: U 539 - Lorient; U 952 - La Pallice; U 196 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 228 - Brest; U 712 - 391 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 26 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 214 Caribean situation: Aruba-Windward Passage independent and convoy traffic. Aruba-Mona patrol group, day and night air patrol. Off Colon at all times regular independent traffic partly protected by patrol vessels, untrained land and sea location. After radio messages sent on 21.10. day and night air, 22.10. in DF 6178 an independent of 7000 GRT sunk, course 300°.
		2)	U 271 which was to have been the first flak boat on a convoy (Group Siegfried), was attacked on 21.10. in the latitude of the U 488 supply group by carrier aircraft and 4 Catalinas. Boat has heavy damage from aircraft bombs and moved off to the east. It received orders to remain in the area (BD 60) after utilization of all repair possibilities. (The presence of 4 Catalinas at the same moment suggest that SC 143 was positioned nearby at the reported time)
		3)	U 170 sank a freighter of 4,500 GRT in GA 3857, course 340°.
	b)	No ship sightings.
	c)	1)	Enemy units were located in BE 6860, BF 4290, AK 3861, BE 3470, AL 6670, BE 5330, AL 674.0
		2)	U-boat sightings: AK 0347, BF 7918, and 2 others in undetermined positions.
		3)	Boat had or was attacked in BC 1129.
		4)	SSS-report from an English steamer from LN 1330.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	For the outbound boats presently in the Bay of Biscay U 306 - 466 - 262 - 707 - 333 and 3 flak boats U 211 - 953 - 441 operation is planned in the evening on the next run of the northbound Gibraltar convoy (MKS 28) in the evening of 27.10., possibly in CF. 34, 25, 37, 38 according to previous accurate airborne reconnaissance. The flak boats have orders to stop to the north and northeast of this area remaining on the surface by day, the other boats




- 27 -

		should head for this area and remain unseen. If U 333, the furthest behind, does not reach the attack area in time, it will head for BE 80.
	b)	Once special tasks are executed, U-537 will occupy square BB and eastwards of it, U 103 the Guinea Bay sea area.
	c)	No report from U-488 supply group.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 214 1 ship 7,999 GRT.
	U 170 1 ship 4,500 GRT.

VI.	General:
	The Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine gives the "Siegfried" boats the following message:
	"The convoy battle of Group "Leuthen" was a complete success. The battle of Group "Schlieffen" was a setback. The next operation must again lead to success. By tight positioning, the fast and simultaneous strike of of many boats is made possible, conditions are established for this. I am sure that there will be enough of you".













- 28 -

24.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FG 28	U 260	-	BF 50	U 437	-	Op(BC 33)	U 603	-	BD 53
	91	-	Op(AJ 99)	262	-	BF 72	441	-	BE 91	608	-	Op(AJ 99)
	103	-	ET 83	267	-	Op(BC 32)	448	-	BE 53	641	-	BF 48
	123	-	DG 26	271	-	BD 65	450	-	CG 43	642	-	CG 22
	129	-	CF 13	274	-	AK 64	455	-	BD 53	648	-	BD 29
	154	-	DS 49	275	-	BF 49	466	-	BE 92	707	-	BF 72
	155	-	Op(FB 10)	280	-	AE 83	488	-	BD 53	709	-	Op(BC 39)
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	281	-	Op(BC 33)	505	-	CF 51	712	-	AO
	170	-	Op(GA 39)	282	-	AE 83	516	-	DG 21	714	-	AL 31
	183	-	LD 95	306	-	BD 81	518	-	Op(DB 60)	731	-	BD 53
	188	-	LC 30	309	-	Op(AJ 99)	530	-	BE 95	732	-	CG 18
	190	-	DG 38	333	-	BF 81	532	-	LC 39	758	-	BF 64
	193	-	BE 77	340	-	CG 18	533	-	Op(MF 30)	762	-	Op(AJ 99)
	211	-	BE 85	343	-	AF 57	536	-	Op(BB 75)	849	-	Op(BC 36)
	212	-	AK 83	373	-	Op(BC 39)	537	-	Op(AH 25)	843	-	AE 84
	214	-	DE 79	378	-	BD 53	538	-	AF 76	848	-	EH 56
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	391	-	AO	542	-	AN 29	849	-	AL 72
	219	-	AE 59	402	-	BD 53	552	-	Op(BC 36)	953	-	BE 86
	220	-	BD 53	405	-	BD 25	566	-	CG 22	963	-	Op(BD 33)
	226	-	Op(BC 36)	413	-	Op(BC 33)	575	-	Op(BC 36)	966	-	AL 10
	228	-	BF 55	420	-	BD 25	584	-	BD 53	967	-	AK 63
	231	-	Op(AJ 99)	424	-	AF 57	586	-	AE 69	969	-	AJ 99
	256	-	BD 53	426	-	Op(BC 36)	592	-	Op(BC 36)

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 275 - 448 - 455 - 641 - 731 - 758.
	Entered Port: U 758 - Lorient; U 260 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.
	1)	Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
	2)	Reconnaissance against England - Gibraltar traffic.

- 29 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 168 situation in the Gulf of Oman: From MF 98 -61 convoy and single traffic in fits and starts. On 21.10. salvo of two failed in MP 2536 on an empty tanker. End of run detonation. Contiunous air by day over the entire steamer route. Boat requests transit to Penang to supply due to nervous exhaustion of the Commander.
			Supply from Brake was originally intended for U-168 and 533 possibly in KU 27. Now that U 168 has asked to go to Penang, supplying both boats (all monsoon boats) in Panang is under consideration. U 168 has orders to set off to the southeast until final resolution.
		2)	U 441 reports, the fact that it was approached a total of 4 times by aircraft specifically every time after turning on the bearing receiver for very low frequency program time.
			Additionally: am currently running investigations on whether there is radiation from the direction finding receiver and at what distance a bearing can be taken.
			For now it is thought that the aircraft taking the bearings must have been very close to the boat.
	b)	Own aircraft sighted a convoy at 1140 in BE 6588 consisting of 30 ships, 5 escorts, course 210°, speed 7 knots and at 1106 1 merchant ship in BE 5913 without speed.
	c)	1)	Enemy units were located in BF 4630, BF 3990, Al 84.
		2)	U-boat sightings: BF 4751, BD 9453, 1 sighting in undetermined position.
		3)	SSS-report from an English steamer from LN 1220 (shot and on fire).
	d)	1)	There are no clues concerning the expected HX 262.
		2)	MKS 28 departed Gibraltar on 23.10. at 1700. This is the next run of the Gibraltar convoy which should be fought on 27.10.







- 30 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	The expected HX 262 was not caught by Group "Siegfried". Because no weather repots have been received from the area, there is a possibility that the convoy has been delayed.
		Group "Siegfried" was radioed that it should monitor their reconnisance area particularly well. From dawn on 25.10. normal behavior in the patrol line, i.e. in general remain on the surface.
	b)	U-505 and 530 received new objective = DP 40. For both boats operation is planned in the Caribbean
	c)	On request U-271 reported remaining casualties: air mast, main ballast tank 1, torpedo tube 3, and Ju-compressor out of service. Boat received orders for return transit.
	d)	The Spanish Naval Attache reports by teletype, U 566 was sunk by aircraft in about CG 2839. The entire crew was rescued by a Spanish fishing trawler and brought to Vigo, because this is a question of the shipwrecked. (U 566 was in transit to the Mediterranean).

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.

VI.	General:
	Order of the day!
	Soldiers of the U-boat Force!
	Today the Führer has presented to Commander Lüth after he returned from his 15th war patrol the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross awarded to him with Swords and Diamonds. With this one of the oldest fighters from your ranks becomes the first officer of the Kriegsmarine to receive the highest German decoration for bravery.






- 31 -

	Continuously in U-boat operations from the first day of the war, he proved himself absolutely in all phases of the U-boot war, in the fierce battle off the English coast, in the bitter struggle of the convoy battles and hunting in the vastness of the Atlantic and Indian oceans.
	His dogged toughness, his lightning grasp and his determined spirit embody the exemplarily attitude and performance of the German U-boat men


















- 32 -

25.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	FG 38	U 256	-	BD 28	U 425	-	Op(BC 36)	U 586	-	AE 68
	91	-	Op(AJ 99)	262	-	BF 47	437	-	Op(BC 33)	592	-	Op(BC 36)
	103	-	ET 96	267	-	Op(BC 37)	441	-	BE 49	603	-	BD 28
	123	-	CE 98	271	-	BD 65	448	-	BE 69	608	-	Op(AJ 99)
	129	-	CE 33	274	-	AK 83	450	-	CG 49	641	-	BF 49
	154	-	DS 78	280	-	AE 85	455	-	BD 38	642	-	CG 25
	155	-	Op(FB 10)	281	-	Op(BC 33)	466	-	BE 94	648	-	BD 24
	168	-	Op(MP 90)	282	-	AL 22	488	-	BD 28	707	-	BF 74
	170	-	Op(GA 30)	306	-	BE 88	505	-	CF 45	709	-	Op(BC 39)
	183	-	LD 93	309	-	Op(AJ 99)	516	-	DG 45	712	-	AN 35
	188	-	Op(LC 30)	333	-	BF 76	518	-	Op(DB 60)	714	-	AL 24
	190	-	DG 64	340	-	CG 42	530	-	BE 97	731	-	BD 28
	193	-	CE 33	343	-	AE 49	532	-	LD 45	732	-	CG 42
	211	-	BE 89	373	-	Op(BC 39)	533	-	Op(MF 30)	762	-	Op(AJ 99)
	212	-	CF 32	378	-	BD 28	536	-	Op(BB 70)	842	-	Op(BC 36)
	214	-	DE 85	391	-	AN 35	537	-	Op(AH 25)	843	-	AE 87
	218	-	Op(EB 90)	402	-	BD 28	538	-	Bergen	848	-	EH 94
	219	-	AE 82	405	-	BD 13	542	-	AN 23	849	-	AK 99
	220	-	BD 28	413	-	Op(BC 33)	552	-	Op(BC 36)	953	-	BF 33
	226	-	Op(BC 36)	420	-	BD 13	566	-	CG 28	963	-	Op(BC 33)
	228	-	BF 57	424	-	AE 49	575	-	Op(BC 36)	966	-	AL 10
	231	-	Op(AJ 99)	275	-	BF 57	584	-	DB 28	967	-	AE 67
										969	-	Op(AJ 99)

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 275 - 448 - 455 - 641 - 731.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 33 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 306 detected 7 Naxos detections in BF 45 and 46, the enemy searches about one minute, then 1-2 minute continuous detection, with approaching searchlight at 800 meters range.
	b)	Own aircraft sighted: 0845 in BE 8464 the convoy sighted the day before, 0945 in DJ 1259 convoy of 60 steamers, 6 escorts, 1 cruiser, speed 9 knots, course 300°, 1040 in CG 8459 convoy of 20 ships probably landing craft, 2 escorts, course 350°, speed 15 knots, 1145 in BE 3937 convoy of 8 merchant ships, 2 destroyers, course 240°, speed 10 knots.
	c)	1)	Enemy units were located: BE 6540, AM 7880, BF 1640.
		2)	U-boat were attacked in DC 1449 (U 518) and BB 8156.
	d)	At 1213 received a radio message to the expected HX 262 of 79 groups from Admiral Liverpool , which was not decoded.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Group "Siegfried" gains another 6 boats. These extend the patrol line as follows: To the northwest U 420 - 405 and 212, to the southeast U 648 - 967 and 274.
		U 91 received orders to proceed to supply in the evening of 26.10.. With this Group "Siegfried" consists of 24 boats.
		At 1840 U 413 reports from the patrol line of Group "Siegfried" loud and exact bearing on convoy voice frequency bearing 213°T.
		Because from previous experience exact medium frequency direction finding should be possible only up to 100 nm, it can be assumed that the expected convoy, if it is associated with the bearing steers a typical course just to the south of the patrol line.
		Therefore, Group "Siegfried" receives orders to set off on course 220°, speed 5 knots. This ensures that 1.) the convoy will still be caught during the night, 2.) for the convoy, an evasive movement to the north or south is complicated.






- 34 -

		At 2141 U 413 reported receicing a bearing at 205°T from BC 3347. If this bearing is correct, a meeting with the convoy must take place about 0400 on 26.10. However, up to 0800 no contact with the enemy takes place.
	b)	1)	U 168 (Monsoon boat), which had set off to the south, goes to Penang. Transit route and behavior as for U 188 and U 532.
		2)	U 516 - 505 - and 530 receive new objective EC 40. Operation in the Caribbean is intended for these boats.
		3)	Operations area for U-190 is the same as for U 155 and U 154 (north coast of Brazil).
	c)	1)	There is no information from the U 488 supply group, it is ordered that the first returner, on moving off 200 nm position from the supplier, report who has supplied and who is still with the supplier.
		2)	U 537 has set out the weather station on the island in AH 2550 and is proceeding to operations area = BB
	d)	U 966 has not given his passing report on entering AL. With normal transit this would have happened on about 21.10. The boat was requested to report position two times in vain. The loss of the boat must be assumed, there are no clues as to the cause of the loss.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.











- 35 -

26.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	Op(FH 40)	U 256	-	BD 28	U 426	-	Op(BC 36)	U 592	-	Op(BC 36)
	91	-	Op(AJ 99)	262	-	BE 98	437	-	Op(BC 33)	603	-	BD 28
	103	-	EU 75	267	-	Op(BC 32)	441	-	BE 94	608	-	Op(AJ 99)
	123	-	CF 75	271	-	BE 49	448	-	BE 69	641	-	BF 57
	129	-	CE 23	274	-	AK 88	450	-	CG 73	642	-	CG 29
	154	-	EH 14	275	-	BF 58	455	-	BD 28	648	-	Op(BC 39)
	155	-	Op(FA 20)	280	-	AE 97	466	-	BE 85	707	-	BE 98
	168	-	MF 98	281	-	Op(BC 33)	488	-	BD 28	709	-	Op(BC 39)
	170	-	Op(GA 30)	282	-	AL 25	505	-	CF 72	712	-	AN 29
	183	-	LD 90	306	-	CF 34	516	-	DG 70	714	-	AL 18
	188	-	LD 41	309	-	Op(AJ 99)	518	-	Op(DB 60)	731	-	BD 28
	190	-	DG 82	333	-	BF 77	530	-	BE 79	732	-	CG 48
	193	-	CE 23	340	-	CG 48	532	-	LD 58	762	-	Op(AJ 99)
	211	-	BE 49	343	-	AF 48	533	-	Op(MF 30)	842	-	Op(BC 36)
	212	-	AK 75	373	-	Op(BC 39)	536	-	Op(BB 70)	843	-	AL 31
	214	-	DE 59	378	-	BD 28	537	-	Op(AH 25)	848	-	ER 33
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	391	-	AN 29	538	-	AF 79	849	-	BD 38
	219	-	AE 85	402	-	BD 28	542	-	AF 79	953	-	BE 33
	220	-	BD 28	405	-	AK 78	552	-	Op(BC 36)	963	-	Op(BC 33)
	226	-	Op(BC 38)	413	-	Op(AJ 97)	575	-	Op(BC 36)	967	-	AK 87
	228	-	BF 49	420	-	AK 78	584	-	BD 28	969	-	Op(AJ 99)
	231	-	Op(AJ 99)	424	-	AF 47	586	-	AE 67

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 275 - 448 - 455 - 641 - 731.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 764 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.
	1)	Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay and
	2)	Attack on Gibraltar - England convoy traffic.

- 36 -














			Flyleaf to the K.T.B. of 25 October.
			Paragraph IVd.
			Loss assumption was incorrect. Boat proceeded further without FT - report (probably transmitter failure) and was blown upon 10.11. after several aircraft attacks southeast Punta Estaca 2 nm from shore. (North-west corner of Spain). See K.T.B. from 11 and 12 November 43.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U-193 on outbound transit from BF 49 - 47 made a total of 4 short detections with Naxos.
		2)	U 129 sighted a passenger steamer of 20,000 GRT, in CE 1331, course east, high speed. No attack possible.
		3)	U 967 was forced to submerge in AK 5858 by two patrol vessels.
		4)	U 488 was bombed by aircraft a total of 4 times in the last days and on 26.10. in BD 58 was pursued by a search group and heavily depth charged. Boat set off to the southwest for repairs.
		5)	U 183 situation: On 19.10. in LC 32 salvo of three and a single miss on an independent and escort. 23.10. in LD 43 salvo of three miss on 14,000 tonner, 24.10. in LD 46 miss on an independent. No defense noted. Boat proceeding to Penang.
	b)	MKS 28 and SL 138, both proceeding together were not found.
		Instead, another convoy with course 350° was reported at 1040 in CG 4511, probably landing craft.
	c)	1)	English warship units located in BE 3734, further enemy units were located in BF 4140, 5454, CG 7150, BB 2940.
		2)	U-boat sightings: BC 3216, BC 3243, further 1 sighting in an undetermined position, probably BF 14.
		3)	On 25.10. at 1213 the following was transmitted for HX 262 and stragglers:
			Stragglers 40° West, which can no longer reach the convoy meeting place should return to Halifax, stragglers between 40 and 25° west which can no longer reach the meeting place go directly to Horta.
			In the same radio message a straggler route was deleted and the following route









- 37 -

			substituted: via BD 9369 - AM 4743 to AM 5433.
			On 26.10. at 0050 this instruction was also cancelled and ordered under suspension of all operations the following stragglers route: BC 9974 - BD 9136 - AL 8789 - AM 4759 - AM 5433. Operational evaluation see paragraph IV a).

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Around 1000 Group Siegfried received orders to proceed from position line reached at 1100 on course north, speed 7 knots. It is thereby intended, after plotting to attack ON 207 possibly in BC 36.
		However, after a message from U 413, the boat in BC 3526 takes bearings on convoy voice traffic in direction 132°T and operates to the east, Group Siegfried receives orders to head, at highest speed, course 110°. Assumption is that convoy has already passed him or avoided closely to the south.
		U 762 reported around 1200 in BC 3138 detections and active sonar as well as propeller sounds. Around 1215 an aircraft attack on U-91 took place in the same area.
		At 1409 U-413 took bearings on convoy voice frequency from BD 1458 in 305°T.
		From the incoming Radio Intelligence (X) report (see paragraph III d) in the afternoon it also emerges that the convoy must have run substantially to the south as expected. Therefore, a pursuit in a southeasterly direction can hardly lead to the detection of the convoy, particularly as the air reconnaissance has become stronger again. Two boats were attacked by aircraft namely U 608 in BC 3255, U 212 in BC 3214.
		The operation on HX 262 was broken off for the stated reasons about 1800.
		U 762 is proceeding to the supplier, U-309 is to proceed direct to western France without supply. Have requested position from attacked boats U 608 and U 212, the same is pending from U 91.
	b)	1)	Operation on slow eastbound convoy (SC 145) is intended for Group Siegfried on 29.10.






- 38 -

			Orders:
			Former Group Siegfried was separated into 3 groups.
			U 967 - 212 - 405 - 420 - 231 - 405 - 969 form Group Siegfried 1,
			U 267 - 281 - 413 - 963 - 437 - 426 - 552 form Group Siegfried 2,
			U 842 - 575 - 226 - 373 - 709 - 648 - 274 form Group Siegfried 3.
			In named order these groups occupy from 29.10. at 1000 the following patrol lines:
			Group 1 from BC 3612 to 3967,
			Group 2 from BC 6631 to 6992,
			Group 3 from BC 9635 to 9995.
			Distance between boats 15 nm.
			U 592 joins Group Siegfried 2 and occupies position 50 nm west of the gap between patrol line 2 and 3 = BC 9256.
			Boats should remain unseen while approaching at all costs. Proceed submerged by day surfaced at night.
			The expected convoy can arrive in the evening of 29.10 according to plotting. Clues from Radio Intelligence (X) are still not present.
		2)	To operate on MKS 28 - SC 138 detected by aircraft on 25.10. in DJ 1259 were the following boats: U 466 - 953 - 306 - 211 - 262 - 441 - 707 - 333 together forming Group Schill.
			Boats should adjust course and speed so that the group can be in a patrol line from BE 8878 to 8989 in named order on 28.10. at 1900.
			Position of the patrol line will be improved based on the expected aircraft report.
			Aircraft headquarters have ordered convoy reconnaissance daily for now.
		3)	Further objective for U 843 is BD 41. The boat may be assigned to Group Siegfried.
	c)	Messages received after repeated requests from U 220 and U 488 provide the following situation:




- 39 -

		U 220 has supplied U 603 for return transit. Except for U 266 has found no other boats at the meeting point in BD 2819.
		So far U 488 has supplied U 731 and U 378 for economical return transit. In addition there are no boats at the tanker.
		Therefore, U 402 - 584 and 455 are missing, have no clue about their whereabouts. There is still the possibility that U 402 and 584 have supplied from U 455 and have started return transit. Boats were asked to report their position passing the longitude of 25 - 31° West
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.















- 40 -

27.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	Op(FH 50)	U 256	-	BD 28	U 426	-	Op(BD 46)	U 592	-	Op(BD 46)
	91	-	Op(BC 31)	262	-	CF 35	437	-	Op(BD 46)	603	-	BE 43
	103	-	EU 88	267	-	Op(BD 42)	441	-	CF 33	608	-	Op(BC 32)
	123	-	CF 57	271	-	BE 58	448	-	BF 72	641	-	BF 58
	129	-	CE 14	274	-	Op(BD 46)	450	-	CG 87	642	-	CG 52
	154	-	EG 63	275	-	BF 47	455	-	BD 28	648	-	Op(BD 46)
	155	-	Op(FA 20)	280	-	AL 24	466	-	CF 31	707	-	BE 54
	168	-	MR 14	281	-	Op(BD 42)	488	-	BD 58	709	-	Op(BD 46)
	170	-	Op(GB 10)	282	-	AL 17	505	-	CE 95	712	-	AF 87
	183	-	LE 84	306	-	CF 34	516	-	DF 69	714	-	AK 63
	188	-	LD 58	309	-	BD 36	518	-	Op(DB 60)	731	-	BD 28
	190	-	DG 79	333	-	CG 13	530	-	CF 13	732	-	CG 76
	193	-	CE 16	340	-	CG 76	532	-	LE 57	762	-	BC 11
	211	-	CF 32	343	-	AF 47	533	-	Op(MF 30)	764	-	AO 47
	212	-	Op(AJ 99)	373	-	Op(BD 46)	536	-	Op(BB 80)	842	-	Op(BD 46)
	214	-	DE 65	378	-	BD 28	538	-	AF 72	843	-	AK 65
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	391	-	AF 24	538	-	AJ 47	848	-	ES 41
	219	-	AE 87	402	-	BD 28	542	-	AF 72	849	-	BD 68
	220	-	BD 28	405	-	Op(BD 18)	552	-	Op(BD 46)	953	-	CF 39
	226	-	Op(BD 46)	413	-	Op(BD 42)	575	-	Op(BD 46)	963	-	Op(BD 42)
	228	-	BF 47	420	-	Op(BD 18)	584	-	BD 28	967	-	Op(AK 84)
	231	-	Op(BD 18	424	-	AE 69	586	-	AE 83	969	-	Op(BD 18)

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 271 - 275 - 309 - 378 - 448 - 455 - 532 - 603 - 641 - 731.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 415 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.

- 41 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	None,
	b)	Own aircraft sighted a convoy at 1255 in CF 9179 of 56 merchant ships, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 4 patrol vessels, course 360°, speed 9 knots. (expected convoy for Group "Schill").
	c)	1)	Enemy units were detected in BE 2740 and AL 63.
		2)	U-boat sighting in BD 9142 (U 849?) and one in an unidentified position.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Repeated checking and comparison with OKM-radio reconnaissance about departure dates of previous SC convoys and the last ONS convoy shows that SC 143 will arrive one day later in the patrol line than was first thought.
		Therefore, Group "Siegfried" is positioned about one half a day's run farther to the west and occupies the following patrol lines up to 29.10. at 1000.
		"Siegfried" 1 from BC 3438 to 3849,
		"Siegfried" 1 from BC 6522 to 6883,
		"Siegfried" 1 from BC 9522 to 9882.
		U 608 and 592 belong to group 1 and 2 respectively and occupy a position 50 nm west of the gap between the individual patrol lines (U 608 = BC 6141, U 592 = BC 9146).
		On 29.10. these boats shall remain on the surface by day, perhaps to gain an impression about aircraft reconnaissance.
	b)	1)	Further objective for U 282 and U 280 = BD 33, boats should still be set on the expected convoy.
		2)	Outbound U 288 heads for BE 8670. Intended to become part of Group "Schill".
		3)	U 537 is informed of favorable operational possibilities during the new moon period in the sea area off Saint Johns.
	c)	1)	U 762 and 91 should have supplied from U 220 in BD 4318 on 29.10. at 1600.


- 42 -

			However, after U 584 urgently requested fuel, a new supply meeting place is ordered for all named boats in BD 2819.
		2)	U 488 is moved further to the southwest for fuel delivery and should provide fuel to U 214 for economical return transit in CD 7331 from 31.10.at 1600.
			The outbound IX C boats U 129 193 - 505 and 530 were to join in the same square to be filled up.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.




















- 43 -

28.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	Op(FH)	U 262	-	Op(BE 89)	U 426	-	BD 45	U 592	-	BD 69
	91	-	BD 60	267	-	BD 41	437	-	BD 45	603	-	BE 55
	103	-	EU 98	271	-	BE 91	441	-	Op(BE 89)	608	-	BC 38
	123	-	CF 53	274	-	BD 71	448	-	BF73	641	-	BF 64
	129	-	CD 38	275	-	BF 68	450	-	CG 89	642	-	CG 86
	154	-	EG 91	280	-	AL 16	455	-	BD 60	648	-	BD 75
	155	-	Op(FB)	281	-	BD 42	466	-	Op(BE 88)	707	-	BE 82
	168	-	MR 51	282	-	AK 39	488	-	BD 79	709	-	BD 74
	170	-	Op(GB)	306	-	Op(BE 88)	505	-	CE 85	712	-	AN 24
	183	-	LE 67	309	-	BD 16	516	-	DF 94	714	-	AK 55
	188	-	LE 67	333	-	Op(BE 89)	518	-	Op(DB 60)	731	-	BE 47
	190	-	DS 25	340	-	CG 88	530	-	CE 32	732	-	CG 88
	193	-	CE 17	343	-	AE 68	532	-	LE 67	762	-	BD 16
	211	-	Op(BE 88)	373	-	BD 74	533	-	Op(MF 30)	764	-	AN 26
	212	-	BC 36	378	-	BE 48	536	-	Op(BB 80)	842	-	BD 71
	214	-	DE 36	391	-	AF 87	537	-	AJ 74	843	-	AK 83
	218	-	Op(BD 90)	402	-	BD 60	538	-	AF 48	848	-	ES 48
	219	-	AL 22	405	-	BD 11	542	-	AF 47	849	-	BD 94
	220	-	BD 28	413	-	BD 44	552	-	BD 48	953	-	Op(BE 88)
	226	-	BC 71	415	-	BF 55	575	-	BD 72	963	-	BD 41
	228	-	BE 92	420	-	BD 11	584	-	BD 27	967	-	AK 79
	231	-	BD 14	424	-	AE 68	586	-	AE 84	969	-	BD 17
	256	-	BD 28

	On Return Passage: U 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 271 - 275 - 309 - 378 - 448 - 455 - 532 - 603 - 641 - 712 - 731 - 762.
	Entered Port: U 275 - La Pallice; U 641 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: For Group "Schill' against northbound convoys MKS 28 and SL 138.

- 44 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 190 was surprised by sea patrol and attacked with flak weapons on 23.10. in DH 1229. No location.
		2)	U 256 reported aircraft attack from BD 4520. The boat was stationed for anti aircraft protection with tanker U 220.
	b)	1)	Expected convoy was sighted at 1100 in CF 5368 with northerly course and speed 8 knots. A total of: 54 ships, 1 cruiser, 5 escort vessels, of these 2 destroyers. Convoy drove in 11 columns each of 5 ships.
		2)	Convoy of landing craft was positioned in CF 3360 at 1200.
	c)	Aircraft attack on boat in 46° 11' North, undetermined latitude. In question are U 603 - 378 - 731 - 271.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Group "Siegfried" positioned in ordered patrol line from 29.10. at 1000. Meeting with SC 145 is expected in the evening.
			To deceive the enemy about the location of the boats, it is ordered that U 714 proceed at high speed to AJ 63. On the way there it should send out short signals or radio messages and, in addition, use different transmitters and frequencies.
		2)	No operation is intended against the landing craft reported by aircraft. However, U-boats should use attack opportunities.
		3)	Own air reconnaissance sighted the expected convoy for Group "Schill" with course north and speed 8 knots in CF 5368.
			In order to catch the convoy possibly in the middle of the patrol line, it is required to move the patrol line to the west. Therefore, Group "Schill" receives orders to be in previously named order in the patrol line from BE 8721 to BE 8823 on 29.10. at 0800.
			Fliegerführer Atlantik intends reconnaissance against the convoy on 29.10. again in the morning and one more time to catch him as far as possible shortly before dusk.




- 45 -

			Contact keeper of the evening reconnaissance should send bearing signals immediately. Boats submerge during the day on 29.10 until 1800 and then surface for bearing reception. The convoy must also arrive at the line at about this time.
	b)	1)	New objective for U 586 is BG 33. Boat should join Group "Siegfried" if possible.
		2)	U 219 should wait for further orders in AK 80. It is a large boat which is equipped as a tanker.
	c) and d)		None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.


















- 46 -

29.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	Op(FH 50)	U 256	-	BD 51	U 426	-	Op(BC 68)	U 592	-	Op(BC 91)
	91	-	BD 62	262	-	Op(BE 88)	437	-	Op(BC 68)	603	-	BE 64
	103	-	Op(EU 90)	27	-	Op(BC 65)	441	-	Op(BE 38)	608	-	Op(BC 61)
	123	-	CF 37	271	-	BE 93	448	-	BF 82	642	-	CG 90
	129	-	CD 53	274	-	Op(BC 98)	450	-	CG 90	648	-	OP(BC 98)
	154	-	EQ 23	280	-	AK 03	455	-	BD 62	707	-	Op(BE 88)
	155	-	Op(FA)	281	-	Op(BC 65)	466	-	Op(BE 87	709	-	Op(BC 98)
	168	-	MR 83	282	-	AK 56	488	-	CD 35	712	-	AN 24
	170	-	Op(GB)	306	-	Op(BE 87)	505	-	CE 76	714	-	AK 42
	183	-	LF 44	309	-	BD 28	516	-	BF 88	731	-	BE 45
	188	-	LF 44	333	-	Op(BE 88)	518	-	Op(DB 30)	732	-	CG 90
	190	-	DS 78	340	-	CG 90	530	-	CE 25	762	-	BD 27
	193	-	CD 61	343	-	AE 91	532	-	LF 44	764	-	AN 36
	211	-	Op(BE 87)	373	-	Op(BC 95)	533	-	Op(MF 30)	842	-	Op(BC 95)
	212	-	Op(BC 34)	378	-	BE 45	536	-	Op(BB 80)	843	-	AK 85
	214	-	CD 78	391	-	AF 59	537	-	BC 17	848	-	ES 79
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	402	-	BD 62	538	-	AE 69	849	-	CE 22
	219	-	AL 17	405	-	Op(BC 34)	542	-	AE 69	953	-	Op(BE 87)
	220	-	BD 43	413	-	Op(BC 65)	552	-	Op(BC 68)	963	-	Op(BC 65)
	226	-	Op(BC 95)	415	-	BF 49	575	-	Op(BC 95)	967	-	Op(BC 35)
	228	-	BE 66	420	-	Op(BC 38)	584	-	BD 28	969	-	Op(BC 28)
	231	-	Op(BC 38	424	-	AE 59	586	-	AK 39

	On Return Passage: U 91 - 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 271 - 309 - 378 - 402 - 448 - 455 - 532 - 603 - 712 - 731 - 762.
	Entered Port: U 712 - Bergen.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.
	1)	Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
	2)	Reconnaissance against England - Gibraltar traffic.

- 47 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 405 repelled a swordfish in BC 3536 (position in "Siegfried" patrol line). Boat return transit because of serious illness of the Engineering Officer. It receives orders to go to the U 220 supply place BD 2819.
		2)	U 842 was detected by an aircraft in position in the "Siegfried" patrol line.
	b)	Search for convoy for Group "Schill" (MKS 28 and SL 138) remains unsuccessful.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DC 1454, CG 17, CG 8188, CG 8357, CA 2874.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	From the Group "Siegfried" line U 608 reports at 1339 2 carrier aircraft and at 1613 several sea planes.
			BdU believes that this concentration of aircraft is not a normal sea reconnaissance, but rather that the aircraft must be related to the expected convoy. Because U 608 is positioned at the gap between groups 1 and 2, this gap is closed and the 3rd group is moved to the north. With this the boats are positioned:
			Group 1 as before,
			Group 2 from BC 3882 to 6552,
			Group 3 from BC 6648 to 9318.
			U 592 remains in the previous area. U 608 searches at its own discretion.
		2)	Boats of Group "Schill" are informed that aircraft reconnaissance had not found the convoy in the afternoon and evening and that passing of the same must be expected from sunset.
			At 2250 U 262 reports several sound bearings from 0-50°. The group is set on this sound bearing at highest speed. However, in spite searching for quite some time the convoy is






- 48 -

			not found. Around 0410 the sound bearing is lost in BC 8524.
			U 262 suspects that this was approximately 3-4 steamboats and 1 destroyer. Now it must be assumed that the convoy is either still behind or has has made an evasive maneuver to the west.
			Therefore, from 0630 the boats search in a northwest direction and submerge when it gets light.
	b)	1)	U 714 has executed his task (deception radio traffic in the area AK 40) and now heads for AK 78.
		2)	U 533 receives orders, to go Penang for supply after combat power of the boat is exhausted.
		3)	U 168 is on return transit to Penang, however, it will remain as long as possible in the U 532 operations area (southern tip of India).
	c)	U 218 has executed mining task at Trinidad.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	None.














- 49 -

30.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	Op(FH 50)	U 231	-	Op(BC 38)	U 420	-	Op(BC 38)	U 584	-	BD 28
	91	-	BD 60	256	-	BD 28	424	-	AE 83	586	-	AK 56
	103	-	Op(EV 70)	262	-	Op(BE 88)	426	-	Op(BC 68)	592	-	Op(BC 91)
	123	-	CF 36	267	-	Op(BC 65)	437	-	Op(BC 68)	603	-	BE 65
	129	-	CD 57	271	-	BF 71	441	-	Op(BE 88)	608	-	Op(BC 61)
	154	-	EQ 53	274	-	Op(BC 98)	448	-	BF 58	642	-	CG 90
	155	-	Op(FA)	280	-	AK 64	450	-	CG 90	648	-	Op(BC 98)
	168	-	MR 99	281	-	Op(BC 65)	455	-	BD 60	707	-	Op(BE 88)
	170	-	Op(GB 10)	282	-	AK 81	466	-	Op(BE 87)	709	-	Op(BC 98)
	183	-	LF 50	306	-	Op(BE 87	488	-	CD 53	714	-	AJ 69
	188	-	LF 50	309	-	BD 65	505	-	CD 83	731	-	BB 46
	190	-	DF 99	333	-	Op(BE 88)	516	-	DR 12	732	-	CG 90
	193	-	CD 55	340	-	CG 90	518	-	Op(DD 85)	762	-	BD 28
	212	-	Op(BC 34)	343	-	AE 83	530	-	CE 43	764	-	AN 29
	211	-	Op(BE 87)	373	-	Op(BC 95)	532	-	LF 50	842	-	Op(BC 95)
	214	-	CD 73	378	-	BE 46	533	-	Op(MF 30)	843	-	BD 15
	218	-	Op(ED 90)	391	-	AF 58	536	-	Op(BB 80)	848	-	FD 25
	219	-	AL 17	402	-	BD 60	537	-	Op(BB 30)	849	-	CE 51
	220	-	BD 28	405	-	Op(BC 36)	538	-	AE 68	953	-	Op(BE 87)
	226	-	Op(BC 95)	413	-	Op(BC 65)	542	-	AE 68	963	-	Op(BC 65)
	228	-	BE 68	415	-	BF 48	552	-	Op(BC 68)	967	-	Op(BC 35)
							575	-	Op(BC 45)	969	-	Op(BC 38)

	On Return Passage: U 91 - 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 271 - 309 - 378 - 402 - 448 - 455 - 518 - 532 - 663 - 731 - 762.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay and reconnaissance in support of Group "Schill".

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III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 415 was attacked in the Bay of Biscay by a land-based aircraft, received bomb hits and must start return transit. Aircraft was shot.
		2)	U 586 sighted a carrier aircraft in AK 5825. Probably serving as an escort of ONS 21.
		3)	U 405 reported at 1012 in BD 1647 3 steamers and 2 destroyers on southerly course. He fired a Fat-single shot and heard 2 detonations after 12 minutes. Afterwards contact was lost. Probably a sharp turn to the east. Boat continues transit to the supply place.
	b)	Expected convoy detected at 1040 in BE 8442, course 0°, speed 6 knots.
	c)	1)	English units were located in AL 6970 and BE 7390.
		2)	U-boat sightings: DN 8787, GB 2426 (U 170), CG 9821 and CG 9715 (U 340 - 642 - 732?).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 46 (Group "Schill")
			To determine, so as far as is possible, for what reason the convoy was not detected on Friday, Flieger Führer Atlantik starts again with a BV and with it sights the expected MK 28/SC 138 at 1040 in BE 8442, course 355 - 0°, speed 6 knots.
			Dead reckoning shows an average speed of 6.5 knots, contrary to the normally assumed speed of 8.3 knots. The unsuccessful search on Friday is thereby explained. On this day Flieger Führer had 4 FW 200 for detection which unfortunately could only search the sector for 7-9 knots enemy speed. If the Flieger Führer had had at his disposal more FW 200s or another BV for the operation, the convoy would certainly have been detected on Friday and the prerequisites for successful combat would have been established.






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		Therefore, it is determined that the failure of the operation is directly due to the low number of aircraft available.
		After receiving the sighting report "Shill"-boats which are currently still submerged, on surfacing to operate on the convoy at highest speed and if there is no contact at the expected meeting point, to search 6-8 knots convoy speed with large legs to the north.
		The first boat sighting the convoy should immediately send bearing signals on its own. During the day, however, no more contact results. For the night boats receive instructions that if a boat has contact, they are to remain on the surface when it gets light and continue to operate, in the other case, boats should dive and set off to the west, however utilizing opportunities for attack. Up to 0800 no message is received. Operation continues.
	2)	Group "Siegfried" receives orders to dive at dawn, yet ensure very low frequency reception.
		The expected convoy (SC 145) was not found. According to plotting it must have passed or bypassed the line. However, apart from the aircraft report from U 608, no clues are present on that point.
		Because the previous deployment area - thus from BC 3560 - BC 9340 - is compromised by several U-boat sightings, it cannot be expected that the next - HX-convoy expected in the evening of 31.10. - will run through the area. Group "Siegfried" is therefore dissolved. The boats are to separate in the course of the night at high speed to the north and south and receive the following order:
		U 714 - 212 - 967 - 420 - 231 - 969 - 267 - 281 - 413 - 963 - 843 - 282 - 586 - 280 position on 31.10. at 1000 as Group Körner in a new patrol line from AJ 9519 to BC 3563, U 437 - 426 - 552 - 842 - 575 - 226 - 373 - 709 - 648 - 274 at the same time as a Group "Jahn" in patrol line from BC 9349 to CD 2325. U 608 occupies square BC 3785, U 592 = square BC 6722. Boats should dive when it is getting light and surface again in the evening to continue transit. This disposition places the boats on the supposed evasive courses of the expected convoy namely






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			HX 263, ON 228 and ONS 21. The possibility of detection only appears low, however, it must be attempted under the given circumstances, because another attempt is not possible.
	b)	None.
	c)	None.
	d)	1)	U 220 and U 256 were attacked by carrier aircraft on 28.10. in BD 2773. Afterwards U 256 reports it has not found U 220 again. Messages requesting position remain unanswered.
			Therefore, the loss of U 220 which was used as a tanker must be assumed.
		2)	U 402 was attacked by an aircraft on 13.10. on march at the supply meeting place in BC 2685 and BC 2923. Since then the boat has not reported any more. He neither arrived at his meeting place or answered requests for position. Because the fuel supply of the boat is now exhausted, loss must be assumed.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 415 1 aircraft.
	U 405 1 ship torpedoed.













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31.October 1943.

I.	U 68	-	Op(FH 50)	U 256	-	BD 28	U 426	-	Op(BC 62)	U 586	-	AK 81
	91	-	BD 60	262	-	Op(BE 70)	437	-	Op(BC 62)	592	-	Op(BC 91
	103	-	Op(EV 70)	267	-	Op(BC 38)	441	-	Op(BE 70)	603	-	BF 44
	123	-	CG 12	271	-	BF 48	448	-	BF 50	608	-	Op(BC 50
	129	-	CD 73	274	-	Op(BC 94)	450	-	CG 90	642	-	CG 90
	154	-	EQ 57	280	-	AK 82	455	-	BD 60	648	-	Op(BC 69
	155	-	Op(FA 20)	281	-	Op(BC 62)	466	-	Op(BE 70)	707	-	Op(BE 70)
	168	-	LC 13	282	-	AK 79	488	-	CD 57	709	-	Op(BC 69)
	170	-	Op(GB 10)	306	-	Op(BE 70)	505	-	BE 98	714	-	AK 74
	183	-	LF 60	309	-	BE 44	516	-	DQ 35	731	-	BE 54
	188	-	LF 60	333	-	Op(BE 70)	518	-	DD 91	732	-	CG 90
	190	-	DR 23	340	-	CG 90	530	-	CE 66	762	-	BD 28
	193	-	CD 73	343	-	AE 85	532	-	LF 60	764	-	AF 79
	211	-	Op(BE 70)	373	-	Op(BC 69)	533	-	Op(MF 20)	842	-	Op(BC 66)
	212	-	Op(BC 34)	378	-	BE 54	536	-	Op(BB 70)	843	-	BD 41
	214	-	CD 73	391	-	AF 57	537	-	Op(BB 60)	848	-	FD 56
	218	-	Op(EO 10)	405	-	BC 15	538	-	AE 68	849	-	CE 57
	219	-	AL 25	413	-	Op(BC 62)	542	-	AE 67	953	-	Op(BE 70)
	226	-	Op(BC 69)	415	-	BF 47	552	-	Op(BC 65)	963	-	Op(BC 62)
	223	-	BE 94	420	-	Op(BC 38)	575	-	Op(BC 66)	967	-	Op(BC 35)
	231	-	Op(BC 38)	424	-	AE 85	584	-	BD 28	969	-	Op(BC 38)

	On Return Passage: U 91 - 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 309 - 378 - 402 - 448 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 532 - 603 - 731 - 762.
	Entered Port: U 183 - 168 - 532 - Penang.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance:
	Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay and reconnaissance against England - Gibraltar traffic.

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III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 488 was detected on 26.10.at 2200 entering the Bay of Biscay in BE 6549 by a U-boat hunting group and hunted with star shells and artillery fire. The boat shot one bow and one rear Zaukönig torpedo and sank two destroyers from observation and sinking sounds. With subsequent diving neither sound or depth charge pursuit.
		2)	U 68 sank a corvette on 22.10. in EU 4762 and shot afterwards 7 misses on an escorted tanker of 3000 GRT with course 305°, speed 8 knots. Afterwards tanker fired at with artillery and burning and sinking abandoned. On 31.10 in EW 7199 sank steamer "Troilus", 7,422 GRT.
	b)	Aircraft sighted a destroyer on course 210°, 20 knots at 1732 in BE 3243.
	c)	1)	English units were located in ED 9910, BE 4960, BE 8970.
		2)	U-boat sightings in the Strait of Gibraltar see paragraph IV d).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 46 (Group "Schill").
		At 0806 U 262 sighted the expected convoy in BE 5719. A short time later get U 707 also gained contact. No other reports arrive in the course of the day. It is likely that all boats were forced to submerge by the expected strong aircraft reconnaissance. According to radio messages sent by the boats between 2000 and 2400 the following picture arises:
		U 466 also gained contact in BE 4666 on the convoy, however, was detected and pursued for 6 hours by sound and depth charges. On surfacing at 1620 the boat sighted 3 smoke trails by an aircraft in BF 4682, course north. It assumes a U-boat hunting group.






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			U 262, in a submerged attack at 0925 in BE 5715 shot 3 single and 1 Zaukönig torpedoes at 4 large ships. He heard 4 detonations, at the same time probably a destroyer broke-up.
			U 707 was forced off by the attack of a destroyer and pursued for a long time by sound and depth charges.
			U 333 also attacked the convoy at 0942 and sank a destroyer in BE 5714.
			Apparently the rest of the "Schill" boats have not reached the convoy any more, including all 3 flak boats. During the night the boats which are still in a favorable positive position should use attack opportunities, the rest move off to the west.
			Because no further messages arrive in the morning, the operation is concluded. For final conclusions consideration see KTB of 1.11. Another attempt on a Southbound convoy is intended with group "Schill" possibly on 3.11. in BF 80.
	b)	1)	Group "Körner" and "Jahn" were ordered to maintain radio silence. Because no supply is possible, boats should start return transit with 30 cbm without reporting.
		2)	U 542 - 538 and 391 should send passage report entering AL.
		3)	Further objective for U 343 and U 424 is BC 31. Boats should be set on expected convoy traffic.
	c)	U 455 filled U 584 with 20 cbm on 29.10. and stared return transit to western France.
		U 91 met briefly with U 584, however, reports again that the boat was lost after and aircraft attack. U 91 requested supply from U 405 and suggested meeting place in BD 2399. Furthermore had also met U 256 and U 584 on 31.10. at 0900 in BD 2819.
		To guarantee the supply of named boats after the failure of U 220, use of a combat boat (U 586) is required as a tanker.
		Order: U 256 give U 584 in BD 3855 enough fuel so that both boats can start return transit.
		U 405 supply U 762 which has only 4 cbm of fuel, in BD 2826 also for economical return transit.






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			U 586 is to meet U 91 on 3.11. in the evening in BD 2399 and give him 25 cbm of fuel. All boats should be submerged by day. Fuel delivery should be executed so far as is possible at night or during twilight.
	d)	The boats detached for the Mediterranean U 340 - 642 - 732 were detected and attacked with a successful outcome during the breakthrough of the Gibraltar Strait according to Radio Intelligence (X) report specifically at 1330 by a patrol vessel in the Gibraltar Strait, and at 2213 by a unit in CG 9583. The latter sighted a stopped U-boat on the surface. By another message of 2222 the submarine had disappeared, however, survivors were probably swimming in the water.
		0034 sighting of a surfaced U-boat in CG 9494, course 40°, speed 10 knots.
		Boats were informed of these messages. They received orders to set off to the west if breakthrough appears unfavorable.
		U 450 reported position in CH 7277 at 0135 and was therefore the first boat to pass through the Gibraltar Strait.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 448 2 destroyers
	U 68 1 corvette
	2 ships 10,422 GRT
	U 262 1 destroyer
	1 ship 7,000 GRT
	1 ship torpedoed
	U 333 1 destroyer

VI.	General:
	During October the boat currently lying in Vigo U 760 was interned by Spain. U 760 had gone to Vigo on 8.9. because of severe engine trouble. However, it had to be towed the last distance by Spanish fishermen, because both diesels were out of service and the battery was empty.
	In the justification for internment the fact of the towing was particularly emphasized, as in the other case, the boat would have had to be abandoned earlier. This


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	view is contestable.
	At the internment a strong pressure was applied on Spain from English side.












		(Signed): GODT.
		Chief of Operations Department
		for B.d.U.

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