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permits these boats to achieve good successes in a very short time (without long hunting), it will be worthwhhile operating in this area. |
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This hunting close inshore when anti-submarine measures are still only moderately effective, is an excellent schooling for the actions they will later have to fight against convoys. |
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V. |
Reports of Success: |
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U 96 reported 2 ships, totalling 10,836 BRT, sunk. |
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U 432 reported 1 ship, 10,000 BRT sunk. |
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U 578 reported 1 ship, 10,000 BRT and 1 warship sunk. |
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U 156 reported 3 ships, totalling 12,685 BRT, sunk. |
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(signed) Dönitz |
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COPY OF COMMENTS BY NAVAL WAR STAFF ON B.d.U. WAR DIARY |
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(16 - 28.2.1942) |
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1) |
25th February, Para. VI General: |
There is no doubt that every ton of shipping sunk reduces the ene,y's chance of launching overseas operations. But Naval War Staff considers that despite the sinking of enemy merchant shipping already achieved, he still has sufficient tonnage to invade Norway. To transport some 100,000 men of all branches for this task would require about one and a quarter million BRT. The re-inforcements and supplies would require about 20 to 50,000 BRT per month. |
As all enemy shipping is taken up by civilian and military duties, fresh demands for shipping space can be met only by diverting it from other tasks. |
If the enemy considers a landing operation has good chance of succeeding he will accept a temporary reduction in civilian shipping movements. Thus, even if heavy sinkings continue off the coast of America, he will still be able to operate against Norway, unless he feels constrained to use all available tonnage for other military needs, such as reinforcements for the Near and Far Middle East. |
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2) |
27th February, Para. VI General: |
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It may well be that a submarine can cause convoys, single ship, or even naval forces, to veer off, if it sends radio messages, but there is, as yet, no evidence for this assertation. If, for example, the enemy did not attack submarines that used their radio while following courses off the convoy routes, it may be that he did not whish to scatter his escort forces. |
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Previous experiences show that the enemy probably gains information about refueling positions or rendezvous from messages passed by submarines in areas with little traffic. It is not certain that the enemy makes such deductions, possibly a striking radio silence in certain sea areas may lead to the same result. |
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