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In practice, however, experience shows that individual boats find convoys but that, with one exception, convoys have never been detected by a patrol line, unless there were a previous report on the enemy by an individual boat. |
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The reason for this is not yet clear. Coincidence it cannot be - coincidence cannot always be on one side, and experiences extend over 3 to 4 years. |
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A likely explanation would be that the British, from some source or other, gain knowledge of our concentrated dispositions and deviate thereby encountering perhaps boats proceeding singly. This knowledge could be gained by the enemy: |
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By disclosure. Everything that can be done has been, by disguise of squares, limitation of radio personnel and our own U-boat codes. The circle of personnel "in the know" is so small that there can be hardly any possibility of disclosure. |
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By deciphering our radio messages. This matter is being continually examined by the Naval War Staff and is considered as out of the question. |
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By a combination of radio traffic and reports of sightings. This possibility can, of course, not be investigated as it is not known what information can be gained by the enemy from sighting reports and radio traffic (particularly accuracy in bearing). This question forms the basis of continual discussions with B.d.U. In many cases it has been shown that the enemy has not drawn the conclusions to be expected from data which certainly became known to him. This may be due to the fact that the slowness of a huge organization does not permit of rapid action, as well as the fact that he may have, apart from that known to us, further information which influences his decisions. In any case, it has not been possible up to now to see into his train of ideas and the conclusions arrived at. Attempts to do this constitute a continual problem. |
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In order to deal with this problem, a closer cooperation with the Intercept Service may perhaps help. I intend, to this end, to request the trial posting of an experienced Intercept Service Officer to the Staff of B.d.U., which should serve generally to investigate further possibilities of gaining intelligence on enemy measures, particularly of convoy control. |
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By location (DeTe = radar) and consequent deviation. There is no evidence on this up to now. |
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All these possibilities do not suffice, however, at present to explain the lack of success by concentrated disposition, as proved by experience.This experience, however, must be taken into account. Therefore, loose dispositions will be adopted, in which the boats are assembled in Groups so that when one boat of a Group makes contact the other boats are able to come up comparatively quickly and, in addition, cooperation of the Groups amongst each other is still possible. I intend that these Groups shall not remain stationary but that they shall be continually on the move in order to make it more difficult for the enemy to deviate. |
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