U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30295

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 31 August 1941

PG30295

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

16.8.

Positions at 0800:

U 84	-	AD 87	U 96	-	AK 37
U 38	-	AK 21	U 71	-	AK 38
U 501	-	AK 22	U 73	-	AL 17
U 553	-	AK 24	U 46	-	AK 02
U 105	-	AK 33	U 77	-	AK 03
U 567	-	AK 34	U 751	-	AL 19
U 568	-	AL 13	U 101	-	AL 01
U 129	-	AK 35	U 559	-	AL 62
U 563	-	AK 36	U 83	-	AL 65
U 43	-	AL 15	U 204	-	AL 68
U 206	-	AL 16	U 75	-	CD 68
			U 205	-	CE 11
Outward bound:			U 124	-	CE 36
U 202	-	AL 55	U 126	-	CF 15
U 82	-	AD 89	U 123	-	CF 16
U 569	-	AL 11
U 106	-	BE 29
U 201	-	BF 41
U 111	-	BF 76
U 125	-	CG 14

Returning to base:
U 371	-	CF 23
U 93	-	CF 31
U 109	-	BF 75
U 331	-	BF 73
U 94	-	BF 64
U 79	-	BF 64.

Ready for operations by 31 August:

U 108, 141, 562, 66, 552, 95, 98, 69, 561, 558, 143, 752, 571.

The convoy from Gibraltar has not been contacted again. The boats allocated were given freedom to maneuver in relation to the state of their fuel. They were ordered to operate against the Lisbon traffic of whose movements we were well informed by the Communications Service.

U 331, 109 and 123 are returning to base. U 124 and 126 remain in the area.

U 79 put in to Lorient, U 94 to St. Nazaire.

U 565 is outward bound for the operational area, from Brest.

17.8.

U 109 put into Lorient.

- 141 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					U 143 put out from Kiel for a long distance cruise.

					At 1100, the Air Reconnaissance assigned to the N.W. area for the immediate future, reported a convoy on course 270⁰, west of the Porcupine Bank. After receiving several bearings on beacon signals from submarines, the convoy position at 1200 was calculated as AM 7143.
					The aircraft observed yet another alteration of course to 230⁰ and then had to return to base. The observation post suspects a Gibraltar convoy. While the boats S.E. of Greenland (the Greenland Group) received orders to remain where they were, the remaining boats were ordered to operate against the convoy if within range. They consisted of: U 201, 204, 106, 564. U 201 established contact in AL 9379 at 2131.

		18.8.			U 201 maintained contact until 0203 in AL 9537, but at 0330 reported: "contact lost". Mean course is S.W.

					At 1115, the Air Reconnaissance established contact, and reported the convoy in BE 3143. At 1200, bearings were received from U 106, 201, 204, and 559, and according to a good cross bearing, the convoy was in AL 9893, proceeding at 8 knots, by dead reckoning. The boats have been operating against a supposed south-westerly course, whereas the convoy was actually proceeding south, 40 - 100 miles off. The Reconnaissance, consisting of several Junkers 88, reported the convoy in BE 2265 at 1735 and sent beacon signals which could only be used as an indication because of the sharp angle if intersection.

					U 552 put out from St. Nazaire on a long distance cruise.

					At 1808, U 201 established contact.

		19.8.			U 201 maintained contact until 0055, and then was driven off. At 0055, U 204 reported the convoy in BE 2644, at 0608, U 559 reported it in BE 2914 and at 0728 in BE 2944. The bearings from the boats are obviously different.

					At 0925, U 201 again established contact, maintained it until 1658 in BE 5345 and was then driven off. At 1740, the submarine reported the enemy in BE 5349. The Air Reconnaissance flew over the area, and one of the G.A.F. aircraft, reconnoitering for the planned operation, transmitted beacon signals, the directions of which were reported by U 123.

					U 204 reported that she was returning to base because of lack of fuel.

					1 Afridi class destroyer and 2 steamers totaling 14,000 GRT were sunk from this convoy, and on 5.8., 2 direct hits were scored on a 14,000 GRT passenger ship.

- 142 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					U 559 reported 4 direct hits on 3 steamers in the convoy. At 2126, U 201 again established contact in BE 5631, course 160⁰, and at 2258 reported the convoy in BE 5657. Then contact was broken off. U 106 lost sight of the enemy at 2215. If the independent searches made by the boats meet with no success, a diverging search patrol consisting of U 201, 564 and 559 is to be made in sector 160 as far as 220⁰.

					Report made by the Captain of U 79: Length of trip: 21.7 to 16.8. Operated against the convoy proceeding to Gibraltar, as from 24.7, and torpedoed 5 steamers in this convoy, 3 of which were definitely sunk. Then took part in the operation against the convoy outward bound from Gibraltar. Was the first to report the convoy. She was attacked with depth charges and developed oil traces which made it necessary for her to return to base. An exceptionally well organized and successful cruise.

					Reports made by the Captain of U 94: Length of cruise: 12.7 - 16.8. The boat was detailed first to the Southern area, where she observed nothing, and was then ordered to proceed off Gibraltar where she took part in an attack on an outgoing convoy. No successes, as she was driven off almost immediately by destroyers. Impossible to push on, owing to lack of fuel.

					Report made by the Captain of U 109: Allocated first to the Azores area, then after refueling at Gata, was sent to the Southern area. She was recalled from there, as the enemy are obviously avoiding this area for the time being, and she was finally sent to the Gibraltar convoy route. Ceased operating because she developed oil traces, and other damage. No successes.

		20.8.			The search for the south going convoy, in the sectors laid down, met with no result. U 559 reported that she was returning to base from BE 9110 and abandoning further action against the convoy.

					One aircraft of the Air Reconnaissance contacted the convoy again at 1359, and transmitted beacon signals. All boats within range of the convoy are taking bearings and reporting. All the same, the D/F bearings did not produce any useful position. The aircraft itself reported the convoy in BE 8326 on course 225⁰, speed 8 knots.

					As Operational Control was unable to form any clear picture from this information, the position reported by the aircraft was considered as doubtful. The convoy might easily be to the south of this position. As no contact has been made up till 1900, the boats received orders that if they met with no result from individual searches, to make a further search in this order: U 201, 564, 106, starting from the given position in BE 5990 at 1500 and working out in sector 160 as far as 200⁰. U 124 and U 126 were given freedom to maneuver within this sector.

					At 1956, U 106 reported as follows: The following boats are proceeding at 13 knots from the rendezvous BE 8364. U 126 - 100⁰, U 564 - 120⁰, U 106 - 140⁰, U 201 - 160⁰,

- 143 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					from 1800 until 2100.

					The boats have collected at this point from the south and north, so the convoy cannot be in this area. According to this message, the boats are searching further to the S.E. If this is unsuccessful as well, the convoy can only be to the north which means it must have been proceeding slower than was estimated. The boats were ordered to make a further search after 2100, in the sector ordered by B.d.U. We must now reckon with a convoy speed of less than 7 knots.

					Radio Intelligence confirmed an air escort over a submarine in AK 2221, a sign that someone is proceeding in that area. Boats in the vicinity were ordered to operate on that area, but met with no success.

		21.8.			Our boats did not contact the south going Gibraltar convoy. The only clue to the existence of the convoy in the area is the message transmitted by U 564, of a Sunderland in BE 9718.

					The Air Reconnaissance on its return flight contacted the convoy at 1730. Operational Control only received the message at 1850, because of a W/T delay, so there was no point in getting a bearing from the submarine. The aircraft reported the convoy in BE 9585, course 150⁰, at 11730. The boats received orders to operate against the convoy at full speed ahead, report position, and if further operations became impossible, to report "No". According to these messages, the following boats are operating against the convoy:
					U 201, 552, 106, 564, U 108 recently joined.

					U 126 and U 75 report "No". U 124 started to return to base and has so far met with no success. At 1750, the boats were disposed in order U 108, 201, 564, 106, 552 in BE 9585 on the mean course 150⁰ to 190⁰, going out from the convoy position. At the first light, these boats should be on the arc which the enemy would reach if proceeding at 9 knots. The boats should then advance towards the convoy.

					Air Reconnaissance is to fly over the area from 1000 on 22.8.

					No contact with the enemy has been made in the area occupied by the Greenland Group. Presumably traffic must have ceased in this area, otherwise at least one contact would have been made, with such a large number of boats in the area. It looks as if the enemy were by-passing us, by using a type of far reaching location gear. This is not very likely, however, as with the extraordinarily good visibility there is at the moment, the boats would have at least observed mast-tops of the first ships and the destroyers. I decided to transfer the entire group to the east, to have a disposition to the south and the southeast of Iceland in case no contact was made with the enemy.

					The boats were ordered to proceed on course 70⁰ with a day's run of 150 miles, as from 1800 on 21.8. U 75 reported from BF 9747, that she had observed ship 36, but had been unable to maintain

- 144 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					contact, as her engines were damaged. She reported that she would arrive in BF 85 on 22.8. U 75 is operating against the south going convoy.

					The Captains of U 371 and U 331 put in to make reports.

					Lt.(s.g.) Driver, the Captain of U 371 has operated recently against the north going and the south going Gibraltar convoys, and has sunk 2 ships totaling 14,500 GRT.

					Lt.(j.g.) von Thiesenhausen, the Captain of U 331, met with no success in this first trip made by the boat. He made several mistakes while operating against the north going Gibraltar convoy reported by U 79. The mistakes can be put down to his inexperience. We hope he will meet with the necessary success when he has more experience.

		22.8.			No contact was made with the enemy during the night. At about 0130, U 75 and U 552, reported having seen star shells in CG 1110. This was quite probably an attempt made by the enemy to mislead us, so only these two boats are to operate, as boats are only to operate, as ordered, on 10 degrees higher mean courses.

					U 126 reported that she was returning to base.

					The Air Reconnaissance again made contact with the convoy at 1050, and transmitted beacon signals. U 564, 552, 75, 108, 557, 106 took bearings and reported, placing the convoy in CG 1380. The convoy therefore must have proceeded even further to the S.E., and thus further into the area under German Air Reconnaissance. The star shells probably were fired by the enemy in order to mislead us.

					C.-in-C. G.A.F. Atlantic is organizing the detailing of fighter bombers. An aircraft which had made contact, transmitted continuous beacon signals. The D/F bearings reported hourly by the boats, enable us to calculate a new position every time.

					At 1130, aircraft reported the convoy in CG 1357, course 170 degrees, and at 1230, an alteration of course to 140⁰. At 1520, U 564 made contact with the convoy in CG 1645 and continuously transmitted shadower messages according to which the convoy was proceeding southwards on course 140⁰.

		23.8.			At 0122, U 552 reported that her port Diesel had been out of order for 8 hours, and it would take 2 days to repair it. In these circumstances, there was obviously no point in her continuing to operate. She was therefore ordered to proceed to the north, where we intend to allocate her an attacking area within the Northern group. At 0115, the shadower messages from U 564 ceased. The boats were ordered to press on.

- 145 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

At 0447, U 201 reported 6 steamers totaling 37,000 GRT, including one 12,000 GRT and one 8,000 GRT tanker. Submarine requested permission to return to base, as her Junkers compressor was out of order.

At 0530, we received a W/T message from U 564: 11 hits with single torpedoes, of which 8 were direct hits. 4 craft, probably including a destroyer observed to sink. Returned to base.

U 201 was forced to return to base as her compressor was out of order. U 564 was ordered to press on, and U 106, 75 and 108 were ordered to try and make contact again.

At 0918, U 108 made contact with the convoy in CG 5137, and reported that the enemy was making for the Portuguese coast, as her ships were damaged by the sea. At 1852, the submarine had observed 8 partly damaged ships. We requested position reports from all the boats operating against this convoy, and judging from these, it was useless to continue operating, as the convoy had reached the Lisbon territorial waters before the arrival of the submarines.

At 1853, U 552 reported: "have sunk steamer "Spind" (2,129 GRT) from the convoy, by gunfire.

U 75 and U 564 returned. U 108 proceeded to the south. U 106 was ordered to proceed into the Azores operational area.

The following report was made on the total of ships sunk and damaged:

U 559	2 ships sunk	17,000	GRT
204	2 ships sunk	14,000	GRT
201	6 ships sunk	37,000	GRT
564	4 ships sunk	20,000	GRT
552	1 ship sunk	2,129	GRT
Total	15 ships sunk	90,129	GRT

U 204 and U 564 also sank a destroyer each.

As well as above, the following were damaged:

U 564		4 ship		20,000	GRT
559		1 ship		9,000	GRT

The totals estimated by Captains cannot be regarded as completely reliable, as some of them were made by night from considerable distances.

The group of Greenland boats, were detailed into a loose disposition from AE 72/73 to AL 15/16, consisting of lines about 100 miles wide.

The Captains of U 93, 204 and 559 put in to make reports. U 93 - Lt.(s.g.) Korth began operating in the south and was then ordered back and detailed off Gibraltar, because of the nonexistence of enemy traffic. She met with no success. The Captain, who had

- 146 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					formerly been considered very capable, gave the impression of being run down, and was relieved.

					U 204 (Lt.(s.g.) Kell), and U 559 (Lt.(j.g.) Heidtmann) operated in the North Atlantic. They both operated against a south-going Gibraltar convoy, and made successful attacks. U 204 sank 2 ships totaling 14,000 GRT from the convoy, and one single ship of 14,000 GRT, as well as Afridi class destroyer. U 559 sank two ships totaling 17,000 GRT from the convoy, and damaged one ship of 7,000 GRT.

		24.8.			U 125, 111 and 108 en route for the south, received orders to occupy DG 57, DG 58 and DG 63 on the 27.8. They are then detailed from there to the sea area west of 30⁰ West, which the Naval War Staff have allocated for submarine warfare.

					U 106 was sent to grid square 68 to intercept the motor vessel Anneliese Essberger on the 3.9. The submarine is to wait in that square until 6.9, and then return to base if she has not contacted the motor vessel by then.

					U 552 was unable to repair her engine trouble on board, and was ordered to return to base at St. Nazaire.

		25.8.			U 570 and U 652, recently arrived in the operational area, were incorporated in the disposition S.E. of Iceland.

					New attacking areas to the W. of the North Channel, were allocated to the following boats:
					U 101 - AM 19; U 751 - AL 03; U 561 - AM 42; U 557 - AL 66; U 69 - AM 44; U 95 - AM 45.

					U 141 and U 83 had no restrictions in attacking areas to the west of the North Channel, but the focal point was in the east.

					U 129 and U 69 received orders to return to base at full speed ahead, as one man in U 129 and the Captain of U 69 were very ill. Diphtheria was suspected in U 129, and there was consequently danger of infection.

					U 652 reported an enemy band in AE 5995 consisting of one auxiliary cruiser, one cruiser and 2 destroyers, on course S.E.

					The Captains of U 123, U 126, U 124 and U 205 put in to make reports.

					Lt.(s.g.) Hardegen, the Captain of U 123 operated in the south. He first attacked a convoy and sank an auxiliary cruiser and 3 ships. Later he sank a single ship and observed heavy neutral traffic off Freetown.The Captain behaved very skillfully throughout the operation and used his opportunities for attacks to the utmost.

- 147 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					He sank one auxiliary cruiser, one tanker and four ships, totaling 33,866 GRT.

					Lt.(s.g.) Bauer, (the Captain of U 126) has recently arrived from a home base. He was thoroughly successful in making contact with and attacking the enemy, and sank 4 ships and one sailing vessel, totaling 22,171 tons.

					U 124 (Lt.(s.g.) Schulz, William) started on the Southern operation, but ceased owing to the cessation of enemy traffic. The submarine met with no success west of Gibraltar, while following the Gibraltar convoy which put out on 9.8.

					U 205 (Lt.(s.g.) Reschke) was detailed to pick up ship 36, after a short operation in the North Atlantic, and concluded this escort duty.

					U 124 put into Lorient, U 75 to St. Nazaire, U 201 to Brest.

					U 558 put out from Brest, U 562 from Lorient, U 433 from Bergen, U 432 from Trondheim.

		26.8.			U 207 took over from U 129, the attacking area in the North area, with freedom to attack.

					At 1555, U 141 contacted a convoy in AM 4796, proceeding on course 270⁰ at 7 knots. Boats west of the North Channel received orders to operate against it. Boats north of 58⁰ N. are to maintain their position. At 1756, U 141 lost contact in AM 4878 and was attacked by aircraft.

					U 557 made contact at 1907 with the destroyer escort in AM 4785, and then with the convoy itself, and maintained this contact. To prevent this area from being deserted, as the boats west of the North Channel were operating against this convoy, the boats north of 58⁰ N. were told to proceed on course 190⁰ to this area. As past experience shows, if one convoy passes through an area, it is usually followed by a second or a third.

					The boats operating in the south received the following W/T message: As from 28.8, boats in the area south of 30⁰ N., between 30⁰ and 35⁰ W., are given freedom to attack. In this line, the following are operating to the south: U 125 in the west, U 111 in the east, U 108 in the center, behind them both.

					It has so far been impossible to make the area west of 30⁰ W. free for attack, for submarines owing to our own and Italian traffic. It looks as though even heavier traffic is proceeding through this area, since enemy traffic was transferred from the Freetown area.

					U 552 put in to St. Nazaire.

- 148 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



		27.8.			According to a Radio Intercept, an incoming convoy was in AE 7590 at 1719 on 26.8. Boats north of 58⁰ N. received orders to stop proceeding south and to operate against the convoy. They should proceed at about 5 - 8 knots and search on the following convoy routes.

					U 570, U 38, U 82, U 202, U 652, from 60⁰ - 90⁰;
					U 501, U 569, U 84, U 567, U 553, U 207 on 90⁰ - 120⁰;
					U 452, U 105, U 96, U 563, U 568 from 120⁰ - 150⁰.
					The remaining boats are free to maneuver.

					At 1357, U 570 made the following wireless message in plain language: Am not clear to dive and am being attacked by aircraft. AE 7698. The boat has interference in the reception, and it is therefore impossible to communicate with her. Boats in the vicinity were ordered to help her.

					No further messages were received from the Northern area, and none of the boats made contact with the convoy. Presumably the information received from radio intercepts, was inaccurate, and the boats sent out must have passed by the convoy. Boats north of 58⁰ N. (except U 143) received orders to proceed S.W. if they had made no contact with the enemy by dark. I intend to move them later to an attacking area S.W. of Iceland.

					In the areas occupied until now, the air patrols proved stronger than we had thought, and numerous submarine warnings ensued. Freedom of operation was an impossibility. U 557 made further contact with the convoy, to the west of Iceland. The convoy is now proceeding on 240⁰. U 557 reported sinking 4 steamers totaling 17,000 GRT, one a possibility.

					Air Reconnaissance contacted the convoy at 1052, and transmitted radio beacons.

					Judging from the messages received from U 577 and U 571, the convoy was proceeding on a more southerly course, and there was probably another convoy en route for Gibraltar.

					The Captains of U 75, U 564, U 201, U 552 put in to make reports.

					U 75 (Lt.(j.g.) Ringelmann) sank 2 ships totaling 12,000 GRT from the north going Gibraltar convoy, on 5.8. She was then ordered to escort Ship 36.

					U 201 (Lt.(j.g.) Schnee) and U 564 (Lt.(j.g.) Suhren) operated against a south going Gibraltar convoy soon after putting out. They inflicted heavy damage on the enemy convoy in skillful, short operations lasting 11 and 12 days. U 201 sank 4 ships totaling 20,000 GRT and torpedoed 3 ships totaling 20,000 GRT. U 564 sank 3 ships and a corvette or small steamer and torpedoed 4 ships.

					U 552 (Lt.(j.g.) Topp) also operated against the convoy which U 564 and U 201 attacked, but was unsuccessful owing to engine trouble, and had to break off the operation early on.

					U 564 and U 69 put in to St. Nazaire. U 81 put out from Trondheim.

- 149 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

28.8.

During the night, U 557 reported further shadower messages, the last at 0336 in AL 9374, according to which the convoy was proceeding on course 250⁰. Air Reconnaissance was detailed for this area for 0930. The convoy was not contacted in spite of good visibility. Boats operating against the convoy reported their positions in brief signals, by order. The search for the various routes is to be continued in the sectors as ordered.

At 1714, U 71 reported the convoy on course 270⁰, in AL 9561. U 577 reported destroyers twice, and at 2333 reported an acoustic bearing on 260⁰, from AL 9557. Contact was not re-established during the night. Air reconnaissance tomorrow is to consist of 4 aircraft.

The following new attacking areas are allocated to the boats in the Northern group:

U 652	-	AD 8539	U 452	-	AL 1189
U 105	-	AD 8589	U 43	-	AL 1258
U 432	-	AD 8679	U 202	-	AL 1444
U 38	-	AD 8892	U 82	-	AL 1439
U 84	-	AD 8959	U 207	-	AL 1621
U 81	-	AL 1142	U 569	-	AL 2388
U 501	-	AL 1214	U 433	-	AL 1696

U 501 and U 73 were both attacked and bombed by aircraft. U 73 was so heavily damaged that she was forced to return to base. U 206 reported taking on board 2 officers and 4 Petty Officers from an English aircraft. She reported that several low flying aircraft were searching.

U 82 has not succeeded in finding U 570, and reported:"Air patrols flying over all day".

U 85 put out from Trondheim.

29.8.

The outgoing convoy was not contacted again. Air Reconnaissance confirmed an incoming convoy on course 60⁰ about 100 miles to the west of the southern most point of Iceland (HG 71 according to later information from Radio Intercepts). It was impossible to detail submarines against this convoy owing to its distance, and the area.

The submarines were ordered to make a further search in a S.W. direction for the outgoing convoy, in patrol lines from AL 8591 to BE 2239. At the same time Air Reconnaissance is to fly over the area in which the enemy should be if proceeding on a mean course south.

U 67 put in to Lorient.

30.8.

The outgoing convoy was not contacted.

As there seemed to be no point in operating further against this convoy without locations, I decided to break off the operation at dark,

- 150 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					and detail the boats to proceed northwards in order to divide them up between Groups Kurfuerst and Markgraf, according to the state of their fuel.

					At 2300, U 143 reported that at 1710 she had sighted a convoy in AM 3551, proceeding west, but was then forced to submerge for several hours.

		31.8.			U 101, from BE 2458, reported an acoustic bearing of 165⁰ on a convoy, and at 1505, from BE 2486, a bearing of 180⁰. The convoy was probably steering a southerly course. U 101 has engine trouble and has to return to base. No further messages were received from the operation area.

					U 98 put out from St. Nazaire.


					(Signed): DÖNITZ.

- 151 -