F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 April 1940

PG30263

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	K r i e g t a g e b u c h.   B. d. U. - Op.             16. - 30.4.       1940     16.4.           At 0410 a report was received from U 47 that she had found the transports at anchor in Bygden (Vaagsfjord).  4 misses!  U 65 had already fired a double shot (most probably at close range therefore) without success.  I am now beginning to suspect that even the use of impact firing is not preventing torpedo failures.  Either the G7e is keeping a much greater depth than hitherto known or the pistol does not arm.  A second report from U 47 confirms this idea:  in a second attack on the transports another 4 torpedoes failed to fire.  This means a total of 8 unsuccessful shots by our best U-boat commander.  It is quite clear to me that these failures are responsible for the commanding officer's lack of success.           I requested immediate assistance from C-in-C Navy by telephone and made a corresponding T/P to Supreme Command of the Navy, giving a list of failures during the last few days.  I requested the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate to come to Wilhelmshaven tomorrow for a discussion.  U 47's reports shows that it was right to leave the boats in the Vaagsfjord in spite of the high risks.  It was only in the south of the Vaagsfjord that they were able to regain contact with the transports.  But now that U 47's attack has failed and will be followed by a corresponding anti-S/M activity on the part of the enemy.  It is necessary to get the boats out of this witches' cauldron and dispose them at the entrance to the Anden fjords.           Reports from U 25 and U 46 confirm my view that things are very difficult for the boats in the fjords, as they have no means of attacking destroyers; an "AZ" shot passes under the destroyers, and "MZ" shot detonates prematurely.  The short, light nights and a sea as smooth as glass add to their difficulties.  I am therefore withdrawing the U-boats from the Namses and Romsdale fjords as well as from the Vaagsfjord to positions off the fjords.                 In reply to her radio message 2100/15/4, received 0948/16/4, U 46 has been ordered to return.                   The Trondheim position, which was not occupied yesterday, is occupied again.                     U 46 and U 51 are interrupting their return passage and have been given new positions as they still have torpedoes left.                   Group FOELLA has joined the groups mentioned yesterday, between Lofoten and Narvik.   U 57 has been ordered to the position off Scapa and further U-boats are to go there.  After Kristiansand was occupied, I sent Lieut.(s.g.) Windler, the Flotilla Engineering Officer, with additional personnel, cypher material etc., to fetch U 21.  U 21 is now fit to proceed and dive and can sail from Kristiansand today.  Lieut.(s.g.) ROESING has inspected the Norwegian S/M's and reports that they are unfit for use either operationally or in the U-boat school.  Further details remain to be seen; I have made the organization department responsible for finding and requisitioning Scandinavian S/M's.  U 13 reported the sinking of a Tribal class destroyer N. of the Shetlands, so the "MZ" has worked in this area. This points to Zone setting O being being responsible for premature detonators.                   U 26 and U 43 are to be converted for patrol transport when they get back.  U 32, UA, U 101, U 122 are already being adapted for this purpose.
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	17.4.           It becomes increasingly obvious that the failure of the torpedoes is the cause of our lack of success.  On 15.4:  U 48 reported misses and failures at destroyers.  U 65:  one double miss at a transport (Vaagsfjord).  U 47:  4 misses at transports lying at anchor (Vaagsfjord).  U 47:  1 G7a failure, 3 electric torpedoes failed to fire (Vaagsfjord), probably also at transports.         These reports from the Vaagsfjord and Westfjord boats are depressing.  The hopes that things would be improved by switching over to "AZ" have proved unfounded. I have placed the most capable commanding officers at these vital points for the operation.  From their reports and from what is known of their personal qualities and abilities, there can be no doubt that they made determined efforts and tried everything possible.  I can only accept part of the shots as misses.  A large part were undoubtedly failures of torpedo or firing unit.           Results have shown that it was a mistake to go over to "AZ".  The essential conditions were that the torpedo should not keep a depth more than 1.75 meters below that set and that impact firing should work for certain.           These conditions are clearly not fulfilled.  The reason for the failures must be either that the torpedo runs considerably deeper and the targets are undershot or that, for some reason, the pistol does not fire or does not arm.  This suspicion of mine is increased firstly by the fact that the information which I have received from the responsible authorities on depth-keeping has varied considerably with time, so that I have the impression that there is no certainty on this point, and secondly by the fact that already in October and November odd reports were received from boats which indicated that shots had hit without an explosion following.           This partly confirmed by information from the Torpedo Inspectorate.  U 65 and U 48 were fitted out with pistols with 4 bladed propellers.  It appears that these pistols are liable not to arm.  They too have been issued to the boats without adequate trial.           The Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate visited me today with some of his assistants to discuss the failures during the last few days and the possible causes and remedies.     The results of the conference were: 1) 10% failures to arm must be expected with 4 bladed pistols.  Due to an oversight, improvements which had already been recognized as necessary, were not made to these pistols.  This is a fresh, quite unjustifiable source of failures and it remains to be seen who is responsible. 2) The Torpedo Inspectorate does not consider it possible that the pistol fails to arm when switch setting "A" is made. 3) According to information given to the Torpedo Inspectorate by the hydrographer, magnetic influences on the pistol must be expected in the fjords.  But this influence need only be feared close inshore.  It could only be present in the open sea area if there are hitherto undiscovered layers of ore below the sea bottom and then only in depths
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	of water up to 100 meters. 4) The Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate is doubtful of the advisability of using impact firing with switch setting "A" as he does not trust the torpedo's depth keeping, and he strongly advised a return to "MZ". 5) Experiments with torpedoes with adapted depth-gear have been satisfactory on the whole so far.  Variations in depths were between plus or minus 0.5 meters.  Sufficient experiments have not yet been made, however, to give a final judgment.         As a result of the conference the following instructions were given to the boats, in agreement with the Torpedo Inspectorate: a) The G7e probably runs more than 2 meters below the depth set. b) Boats in zone O are therefore no longer to use switch setting "A", but to fire with "MZ" except inside narrow fjords.  Danger of premature detonation is greater in these. c) No fans with time switches are to be fired with "MZ", but multiple shots according to fire control memorandum or improvised fans with 8 second intervals. d) With "MZ", set depth to equal draft, 4 meters against destroyers, 3 or 4 meters against S/M's. e) With "AZ" set 4 meters, 3 meters in good weather.         These instructions are so complicated that I would never give them to operational boats except in present circumstances.   18.4.           Following Naval War Staff's new instructions 4654, boats are being distributed as follows:   A) Small boats:   The following will go to the U-boat School as soon as possible:   U 1 - 7, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20 and 21 - 13 boats   The following will remain off Bergen until their supplies are exhausted:   U 14, 17, 23, 24 - 4 boats   Total 17 boats   The following will remain for operations:   U 13, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62. B) Large boats:   1) U 25, 38, 49, 65 will remain in the Lofoten area until they have used all their torpedoes.
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	2)  U 30, 34, 50 will remain in the Trondheim area.   3)  U 47, 48 37 are on their way back.   4)  U 29 is on her way out.   5)  U 46, 51, 52 are being recalled.   6)  U 28 is under repair   Total:  15 boats.        The following are intended for transport to north Norway:   U 26, 32, 43, 101, 122, UA - 6 boats.         These will patrol up and down the NOrwegian coast at the same time.  Of these only U 26 is at sea, about to enter Trondheim.         With these preliminary arrangements there will be:   8   small boats   15   large boats   23   U-boats   left for the main operation by the beginning of May, and the 6 transport boats will only be available to a limited extent.               U 47, which was recalled owing to engine defects, is ready again and she has been ordered to the area west of the Shetlands-North Minch.  U 26 entered Trondheim.               U 13 and U 61 have been ordered to put in to Bergen to refuel.  They are to operate again with U 57, 58, 59 and the first wave of the remaining small operational boats.         U 37 has returned from patrol.  This boat also had premature detonators in zone O, but nevertheless sank 3 steamers, totaling about 18,600 tons, and a warship, probably a cruiser, with switch setting "A" or south of zone O.                   U 51 reported a double shot at a Southampton class cruiser, no success.                     Reports from U 52 and U 65 show again under what difficulties the boats are operating in the fjords:   almost no darkness, strong anti-S/M activity at times, reloading only possible by moving away.                   It is therefore correct to withdraw the boats in the Namsos fjord to positions further out.  U 34 and U 50 have been ordered to waiting positions off Folla, near the island of Kya.         19.4.           All operational and tactical questions are again and again colored by the intolerable state of the torpedo arm.  The problem of where to operate the boats depends not only on the usual conditions, but in every case the question: "Will the torpedo work?" has to be considered.  The torpedo situation today is as follows:           On 18.4 U 37 reported on her return that she had 2 prematures detonators in the area between the Shetlands and Iceland and had then scored successes with switch setting "A".  This is further proof of the fact that premature detonations do not only occur
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	near the coast:  plainly the magnetic influence exercised on the pistol in zone O are not explained.  So far no premature detonators have been reported from the southern zones, on the other hand there have been 2 successes (hit on English S/M by U 3, hit on Tribal class destroyer by U 13).         Torpedo Inspectorate informed us by telephone that investigations had shown that a further 7 boats were issued with the pistol with 4 bladed propeller from which 10% failures to arm are to be expected.  The boats are U 38, 43, 50, 52, 57, 61 and 62.  We will therefore have to take further failures due to non-arming into account without being able to do anything about it.  Efforts will be made to exchange the pistols in U 61 when she puts into Bergen to supply.  Arrangements are being made to fly the pistols to Bergen.           On 19.4 in the morning the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate telephoned that the results of trial firing showed that the G7e when set at 2 meters, kept a depth of 3.5-4.7 meters, i.e. up to 2.7 meters below set depth.           My suspicions and the doubts expressed by the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate on 17.4 on the torpedo's depth-keeping have thus proved well-founded.  I have therefore decided to let the boats leave the Vaagsfjord and Westfjord, as their operation there can no longer be justified.  Conditions are very difficult for those boats with the short nights (practically no darkness) and the narrow operations area, making it almost impossible for them to move away and the constantly recurring premature detonations mean great danger.  But in the light of this fresh information on the torpedo's depth-keeping it is no longer possible to go over the switch setting "A" as no targets with a draft of less than 5 or 6 meters could be torpedoed (the shallowest possible depth setting is 3 meters in good weather).  In effect, therefore, the boats are unarmed.           During the night 19/20/4 U 47 reported 2 torpedoes fired at "Warspite" in square 5446 (about latitude of Namsos), which failed to detonate.  Range - 900 meters, depth 8 meters, zone minus 4, one end-of-run detonator.  U 65 reported a G7e premature detonator after 22 seconds at the cruiser "Emerald" in square 9741 (approach to Vaagsfjord).  In zone O (north of 62.5 degs. N), of 22 shots fired during the last few days at least9 have been premature detonators, which in their turn have caused other torpedoes fired at the same time to explode prematurely or to miss.  These premature detonators have occurred not only close to the shore but to a large extent, also in the open sea area.  The use of "AZ" with switch setting "A" is barred for reasons given earlier.           At present, therefore, the Navy has no torpedo which can be used in the area north of latitude 62.5.  I am therefore, withdrawing the boas remaining in this area (off Andalsnes) in order to operate them to better effect in a suitable area south of this danger zone.  For shots against destroyers and submarines I have ordered a depth setting of 3 meters, which according to present knowledge and experience is the shallowest depth setting which leaves any certainty that the torpedo will not break surface.           I was somewhat reluctant at first to take the Torpedo Inspectorate's advice and order a depth setting of 2 meters in good weather.  It is based on the fact that, with the 30 test shots mentioned, not one broke the surface when set at 2 meters, but these test shots were fired from an underwater tube from a depth of 4 meters and it
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	is questionable whether the torpedo will not break the surface if it is fired from a tube at 10 meters depth (depth of discharge tube when boat is submerged) with a depth setting of 2 meters, and what happens if the boat is down by the stern, which is not always avoidable when firing?  A surface runner, by day at least, is even more dangerous for the boat than a premature detonator.  On the other hand everything possible must be tried to eliminate under-firing.  I therefore, ordered U 30 to fire 2 test shots immediately from periscope depth with electric torpedoes, with a depth setting of 2 meters, one with the boat on an even keel, the other 30 stern heavy, and to report the result, giving the seaway.  The result was satisfactory, neither of the torpedoes broke the surface in a head sea 3.  I therefore gave the following order for depth setting of torpedoes:  Radio message 0103/21/4:   In "MZ" shots, depth to equal draft minus 1 meter, against destroyers, submarines and steamers under 4,000 tons: depth 3 meters, in good weather 2 meters.  For "AZ":  depth 3 meters against all targets, 2 meters in good weather.           The torpedoes fired by U 47 at "Warspite" on 19.4 which failed to detonate, are still unexplained.  I think it improbable that, with a depth setting of 8 meters, the torpedoes could have run under the firing field of a battleship, even if they actually kept a depth of 11 or even 12 meters.           If these shots were not misses (which is highly unlikely in view of the commander's unmistakable report of failure to explode and the short range of 900 meters and a double shot), then it must be assumed that there was a degaussing effect.           I consulted Professor Cornelius and Professor Gerlach by telephone and they consider that it would be extraordinarily difficult to fit D.G. gear in battleships and that it is therefore very unlikely in such ships at present.           I am not quite convinced.  We have definite information that the English have fitted many of their merchant ships with D.G. gear for sometime past.  They will attach the greatest importance to the protection of their most valuable ships and make every effort to achieve it.  But for the few cases where a boat manages to fire at a large warship I would like, as far as lies in my power, to exclude the smallest chance of failure.  I therefore ordered, at midday on 21.4 a depth setting of 5 meters for shots at battleships.  Then, even if the torpedo runs 3 meters deeper, i.e., at 8 meters, impact firing may still take effect.  At the same time I restricted the use of the 2 meter shot to the G7e, as, with the G7a, there is still the danger of surface-runners.  During the last few days the boats have been overwhelmed with a large number of orders on the use of torpedoes, type of firing unit and depth-setting.  Resetting the pistols always means long re-loading jobs, which cannot always be carried out.  THe commanding officers are burdened and restricted by the frequent contradictory orders.           I was forced to give these orders because of the constant fresh failures and the conclusions drawn therefrom, but, above all, by the almost daily new discoveries made by the Torpedo Inspectorate of the defects of their torpedo.  It now appears that the Torpedo Inspectorate had no reliable information on any aspect of the G7e.           I had to do everything possible to prevent further failures when the causes of failure became known and especially to prevent as far as possible unjustifiable risk of the boats.
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	It is monstrous that B.d.U. should have to be burdened with lengthy discussions and investigations of the causes of torpedo failures and their remedy.  This is the business of the technical inspectorates and departments.  But as long as these authorities are slow to do what is necessary, I am forced to take action.         The most urgent requirement now is to improve the depth-keeping of the torpedo:   1) The influences affecting the "MZ" pistol are not yet fully understood, a remedy cannot therefore be expected for the present.  The situation gets more confused with each day instead of better. 2) The danger of the enemy using D.G. gear is increasing daily.  We will then be reduced to using impact firing only for the present, until another form of firing is really ready for operational use.           The first trial shots with the adapted depth-keeping gear are very promising; it is to be hoped that we shall find our way out of the maze of errors along this narrow path.           I find myself forced to withdraw the U-boats from zone O because of the torpedoes.  As the England/Norway area has still to be guarded, they will operate west and east of the Orkneys and Shetlands, in the hope of intercepting the traffic to north Norway.       U 3, 5, 6 and 48 entered port.         Orders to the boats for re-grouping:   0930   To vaagsfjord boats and U 25:  New waiting position west of the Shetlands.  Move off in the direction of square 1200 AN.  Attack according to Standing War Orders.   0905   To U 26 and U 43:  Return after delivering supplies.  Report when leaving.   2125   To U 52:  Freedom of action to operate west of the Shetlands and Orkneys in accordance with Standing War Orders.  Report intentions by short signal.   2125   U 23 to occupy an operations area east of the Shetlands as far as 03000 E.  Attack according to Standing War Orders.
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	EXTRACT FROM INVESTIGATION OF TORPEDO FAILURES
	Most Secret M83 s/42 third issue of 9.2.42.
	6)  B.d.U.'s view, expressed in his reports and in his War Log, that defects in the torpedoes and their pistols were particularly apparent during the Norway operation and had a decisive effect on the results, must be amended, insofar as there cannot be said to have been a particularly noticeable increase in torpedo failures during the Norway operation as compared with the results of U-boat warfare before this time.  Lack of success during this period is rather mainly to be attributed to explained misses, which amounted
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	to 41.8%.  They were largely due to the unusually difficult conditions for U-boat operations during this undertaking (longer ranges, small fast targets, strong escort, short light nights, unheated torpedoes, unaccustomed lighting conditions).
	Historical Department will incorporate the above text in B.d.U.'s War Log of the Norway operation and will annotate the relevant passages in the War Log accordingly.
	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
	(signed):  Raeder.
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	20.4           U 34 reported convoys yesterday and today, but had no success with a double shot.             U 47 managed to shadow a convoy.  The boats which previously in the Vaagsfjord and U 25 can operate against this.In the open sea, far off the coast, they will probably be able to make their attacks without constant interference from a/c.  Whether or not the torpedoes will detonate remains to be seen!               This morning alone there have been reports of 12 unsuccessful shots!               U 9 reported the sinking of an ex-Polish destroyer.  South of zone O!                 U 23 has been given a new position east of the Shetlands.  U 57, U 58 and U 59 can transfer their operations areas 70 miles in direction 350, as in their present positions they are restricted by strong anti-S/M activity at present.                   U 13, which has refueled in Bergen, has been ordered to a position west of Pentland Firth.                     U 38 reported, among other things, that she could not maintain a high continuous speed owing to consumption of lubricating oil.  It is not desirable to judge from here what effect technical defects are having on the boat.  The commander will have to decide himself what to do.                   U 48 entered port.                   U 21, which left Kristiansand on 16.4, released from internment, entered Kiel.               I am withdrawing U 30, 34, 50, which are still north of the Trondheim Fjord, to the southwest.     21.4           U 47 has pursued the convoy which she reported yesterday and has brought up U 65 and U 38.                   U 61 has arrived at Bergen and will take over oil and exchange pistols.  Different pistols have been sent for her by air.  She is then to proceed off the Minch.
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	There have been no reports for some days from the following: U 1: last sailing report 6.4 from Nordeney.  U 1 is in the inner position off Stavanger. U 25: last report 16.4 Ofotfjord. U 49:         "      "  13.4 square 3510 AF. U 50:         "      "  6.4 leaving Nordeney.           There is a radio intelligence report of 19.4 of the landing of 40 U-boat prisoners-of-war in Scotland and the sinking credited to a trawler.  No conclusions can be drawn.               Observations covering the last 5 days show that the convoys from England to the Lofoten Islands and Tromsoe sail from off the North Minch and proceed via square 7500 AF.  U 13, 52, 30, 34, as "western boats", will therefore occupy the area around the Shetlands:  .     U 13 square 1500 AN U 30 square 1300 AN and 7700, 3400 AM       U 52 square 3500 and 3600 U 34 square 1100 and 1200 AM.                Because of Y-reports received, all boats were warned of S/M danger in square 3700 and 3500 AN.               U 51:  was fired on unsuccessfully in square 3751.  There is danger of mines and S/M's off approach route "GRUEN"; this route has been used for a long time.  It is necessary to change to route I.                     U 7 and U 10 entered port.         22.4.           U 47, 65 and 38 were still shadowing the convoy reported by U 47 on 20.4.  U 38 attacked unsuccessfully.  Contact was lost late yesterday evening in spite of bright moonlight.  The wind was NNW 6 and there was a swell; from time to time the convoy steered a course N.  The boats therefore had difficulty in following and hauling ahead.  It would be useless to try to regain contact in this weather and it is also very doubtful if the torpedoes would fire.               This morning at 0230 I therefore gave the order for these boats to move off to square 1200 AN, if they had lost contact, and to report their stocks of torpedoes by short signal.                   U 59 reported very light nights.  It was hardly possible to operate close to the coast.         23.4.           U 25 reported again.  (Her transmitter was out of order).  U 29 at last put into Trondheim.               There have been so many radio messages that it had to be investigated whether the boats are not being requested to make too many reports.               Enemy reports are already limited to battleships, cruisers and troop transports, and these are essential if a picture is to be formed of the situation in the operations area and a/c or other boats are to be sent out.  The only possibility is to use short signals more.  Whether or not these can be D/F'd must be tested by our own D/F network with the next boats to sail.                   U 65 again reported battleships and destroyers.  She should arrive in the area west of the Shetlands tomorrow together with U 25
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	and also U 61, coming from Bergen.  It will then be necessary to re-dispose the "western boats" in this area.  Although during the short time that boats have been there since the occupation of Norway no successes have been achieved, it must nevertheless be assumed that the main route for English supply lies through this area.         A scattered disposition is best for anti-S/M activity at this time of year, at least for the larger boats, while the 2 small boats on the western side can approach closer to the coast and the starting points (Scapa and Loch Ewe).               Relevant boats have been informed of the assembly points at Sullom Voe and Luna Ness reported by radio intelligence and a/c.  They themselves will have to find out what opportunities these offer.               U 43, 9, 19, 46 entered port.               U 43 (Lieut.(s.g.) Ambrosius) took 35 tons ammunition to Trondheim and several times sighted cruisers and destroyers, with out being able to attack.                   U 46 (Lieut. (s.g.) Sohlen) was operating in the Westfjord and the Ofotfjord and was chased by destroyers.  An attack on Warspite failed, because the boat hit a rock when about to fire.  A double shot at a French "Albatross" torpedo cruiser, at close range ran under, although the depth set was 3 meters.  In spite of her best efforts this boat achieved no success.  The Commanding Officer, to whom no blame attaches, will have to be relieved because of nervous exhaustion.                   U 9 probably sank a large or Jervis class destroyer; the ship could no longer be heard in the hydrophones after the shot.  The sinking is not absolutely certain however.                     For the rest, there is nothing particular to mention about these small boats.                   Mines are suspected in the Elbe.  Arrangements have been made with F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses for the next boats to have mine escort.  Losses due to mines in our own waters must be avoided at all costs and it should be perfectly possible to avoid them.       24.4.           Boats in the operational area, excluding those on their way back or on transport trips, are now distributed as follows:     U 14, 17, 24 off the approaches to Bergen   U 23, 57, 58, 59 east of the Shetlands and Orkneys   U 13, 61, 25, 30, 34, 65 west of the Shetlands                        and Orkneys or on their way there.   U 49, 50 doubtful.  Loss probable.           No reports have yet been received from their area west of the Orkneys etc.  U 30 and 34 reported by short signal that there was little traffic or patrol.     25.4.   English attacks on Bergen and consequent chances of success for the boats there are no longer to be expected.  These boats
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	are therefore being disposed northeast of the Shetlands where prospects are likely to be more favorable, especially as U 59 reported a convoy east of the Shetlands             U 26 entered Wilhelmshaven, having transported ammunition etc. to Trondheim.  She sank a transport.  Otherwise the trip was without incident.     26.4.           U 17 has succeeded in rescuing the crew of an a/c which made a forced landing between the Orkneys and the Shetlands.               U 34 attacked the 20,000 ton "Franconia" north of the Minch.  The ship's course had been obtained by Radio Intelligence Service.  No success.  End-of-run detonator.  Probably a miss at long range.  Nevertheless it shows that it is possible to attack in this area.  U 34 is returning as she has used all her torpedoes.                 U 56, 60 and 62 returned from patrol.  These boats were operating off Bergen and between the Shetlands and Norway, temporarily also in the area north of Stadtlandet.  They had no opportunities to attack, but sighted numerous enemy forces (destroyers).                   The commanders of U 51 (Lieut.(s.g.) Knorr) and U 64 (Lieut.(s.g.) Schulz, W.) reported on their operation in the Westfjord.             In spite of difficult conditions (short light nights, calm sea, no chance of taking avoiding action) there were possibilities of success which could have had a decisive effect on operations in the north if the numerous torpedo failures had not caused every attack to fail.               U 64 was to have provided outward escort for the auxiliary cruiser ship 36, but she did not find her and afterwards operated off Narvik.  After heavy D/C attacks she put into Narvik for repairs and changing and was sunk by air attack in the Herjangsfjord on 13.4.  The crew was saved except for 8 ratings.         27.4.           Lieut.(s.g.) Prien reported on U 47, which entered Kiel on 26.4.  He was operating against the transports entering the Vaagsfjord and was stationed in the southern sector of the fjord, where the transports could be expected to unload.  He twice attacked cruisers and destroyers lying at anchor in the Vaagsfjord (Bygden).  If the torpedoes had not failed this would have meant a success which would have changed the whole situation in the Narvik area.                   U 38 entered port.  She too made unsuccessful attacks on "Warspite" in the Vaagsfjord and on a cruiser in the Andfjord.  On her way back she made contact with a convoy, which U 47 had shadowed in a masterly fashion, but was forced to dive before she could attack and depth charged.               Naval War Staff issued the following new directions for U-boat operations:   1) Orkneys-Minch area to be occupied constantly. 2) As strong a disposition as possible in the Atlantic. 3) For the present further supplies to Trondheim.
	- 43 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	4) if necessary operation for case "GELB". 5) U-boat training.         On the other hand no further action is required in the Norwegian coast area.           It is not at present possible to fulfill the 2 main requirements, occupation of the Orkneys-Minch area and operation in the Atlantic, simultaneously.           The small boats which are now E and NE of the Shetlands will have to return within the next few days.  The 8 small boats which remain for operational purposes will need long rests before they can put to sea again.  They have carried out 2 and even 3 patrols with only very short intervals between them.  U 13, 61, 25, 30, 34 and 65 are still in the Orkneys-Minch area and west of the Shetlands.  These too will have to return soon without being relieved.  They too will need some time after their return before they can operate again.  I have decided to leave them there until they have exhausted their supplies.  It is not yet proven that there are no opportunities to attack, but every ton of enemy supplies sunk there has a greater value than a ton sunk in the Atlantic.           Later the small boats can operate in the Orkneys-Minch area and the large ones in the Atlantic.           The requirements can only be met with the few boats if they are concentrated and used to best effect.  The lack of every boat which is detached for subsidiary operations makes itself felt.  It is therefore regrettable that 5 boats are still engaged on transport.  U 32 and UA will sail for Trondheim today with ammunition and petrol.     28.4.           Nothing to report.         29.4.           U 101 left for Trondheim with ammunition and petrol.  U 29, which is on her way back from Trondheim and was first to have patrolled the English supply routes, has been ordered to return directly, so that she can leave for the Atlantic as soon as possible.  It was only intended to use this boat for one transport trip.                   U 17, 23, 61, 30 have started on their return passage.           30.4.           U 13, 14 and U 30 started on their return passage.  The following are thus left in the operations area:             U 25, U 65 NW and W of the Shetlands.             U 24, 57, 58, 39 NE and E of the Shetlands and Orkneys.                 U 65 reported a convoy; she did not manage to attack, but this is nevertheless an indication of traffic in this area.               U 13, 17, 34 and 52 entered port.
	- 44 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	U 34 was first off Trondheim, then off the Follafjord and finally west of the Shetlands.  She sighted numerous targets off the Follafjord, but only seldom managed to attack because of strong anti-S/M forces.  Certain success against a cruiser and a destroyer was frustrated in each case by torpedo failures.  She attacked "Franconia" north of the Minch.  See 26.4.             U 52 penetrated into the Foldafjord as far as Andalsnes without encountering anything except a torpedo boat, which chased her.  For the rest of the time she was in the area from the Romdalfjord to the Shetlands and had no opportunities to fire.         The following points were made:   1) Torpedo situation.  Most urgent requirement:  to master the depth keeping of the torpedo. To create a sure impact firing unit.  The problems of torpedo failures were already known and C-in-C Navy has ordered most urgent steps to be taken to solve them.   2) Small number of boats makes concentration necessary.  Secondary duties must be abandoned.  Training necessary, otherwise the boats cannot be manned after 1.9.  Request that transport operations be cancelled.  C-in-C Navy decided that 2 U-boats should be withdrawn from transport at once (U 32 and U 101).   3) Analysis of numbers of U-boats up to 1.1.41, taking into account new construction and losses.  C-in-C Navy's decision for large boats:  Atlantic warfare.   4) Anti-S/M situation.  B.d.U. emphasized that the development of a counter-measure to Asdic, which had already been stated in peacetime to a most urgent requirement, was essential to the success of future U-boat warfare.  B.d.U. again requested that the best sonic technicians, chemists and physicists, be set to evolve a countermeasure.  C-in-C issued orders accordingly.   5) B.d.U. reported that his opinion of the Norway operation, even after the event, was:     a) that the operational and tactical disposition was correct.     b) that anti-S/M activity was very strong, and weather conditions unfavorable (short nights, smooth sea).     c) that, of course, the slow boats have less chance of success against fast, escorted warships than against merchant ships, but that nevertheless the numerous opportunities to attack show that chances of success were not unfavorable.     d) that torpedo failures cheated the boats of certain successes, even after all doubtful shots and misses had been subtracted.                                           (signed):  Dönitz                                             Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
	- 45 -

 

	Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.   0000 - Radio signal 2330 from U 23:  Warning.  Enemy S/M in square 3186, course NE. 0035 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0035:  C-in-C Home Fleet to Flag Officer in Aurora and S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron:  Proceed to Kirkenes (Tromsoe area) in Devonshire and Berwick with one destroyer. 0054 - Radio message 2130 from U 14:  Double miss at "Enterprise" unescorted. 0057 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0015:  S.O. 18th Cruiser Squadron 12.4 to Admiralty:  after inspection and intelligence, consider a landing in Tromsoe very. . . . . . . . 0205 - Radio message from U 65:  Enemy landing unit left Andfjord, 2200. 0230 - Radio message 2140 from Narvik:  . . . . . . . . destroyer patrol off Narvik . . . . . . . . 0410 - Corrupt radio message without T.O.O. or signature:  Troop landings with fishing smacks in . . . . . . . . transports at anchor at the southern end of Bygden, 4 misses. 0418 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0400:  Battery Chrobry was with transport Chrobry on 15.4 . . . . . . . .  Cruiser "Glasgow" in control of operation. 0418 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0410:  Aurora and Southampton due to arrive in Skelfjord at 2000 on 14.4. 0627 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0545:  Enemy situation sea area Bergen to Narvik.  Namsos areas:  Glasgow, Chrobry, destroyers.     Unidentified port:  Botory Westfjord:  Warspite, Penelope, Curlew, destroyers.  Vaagsfjord:  Southampton, Aurora, destroyers.  Fransoe-Kirkenes:  Furious, Devonshire, Berwick, presumably C-in-C Home Fleet, S.O. 18th Cruiser Squadron. 0713 - Radio massage 0458 from Flying Corps X:  Early morning reconnaissance 0445 3 English destroyers square 6494 AF.  0530 square 811 Norwegian destroyer, course SW.  Evening reconnaissance 15th:  2 English destroyers square 6492 AF.  1930 Norwegian destroyer square 8298 AF. 0813 - Radio signal from U 19:  2 destroyers square 7984 AF, medium speed, NE course. 1215 - Radio intelligence report 1200:  English unit reported at 0430 German U-boat square AF 5634 or 5334. 1215 - Radio message 1229 from Flying Corps X:  One a/c carrier and one cruiser in Namsosfjord on 16.4. 1438 - G.I.S. report:  "Ark Royal" left Gibraltar eastbound 0830/16.  0930 passed Bearn Straits, course east.
	- 46 -

 

	1445 - Radio message from G.O.C. Air Forces West:  A/c A 208 attacked English S/M in square 6166, believed sunk. 2620 - Radio intelligence report 1535:  Destroyers Jupiter, Punjab received orders from Admiralty 1400/16/4 to proceed to Andalsnes at maximum speed. 1635 - Radio signal from M 8:  U-boat warning square 1659 (Oslofjord) left center. 1715 - Radio intelligence report 1625:  Unidentified a/c reported 1529 air attack in square 7891 AF. 1800 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1710:  Cruiser York intended to leave Scapa early on 16.4. 1840 - Radio intelligence report:  1802 AD made a radio message from square 5510 AF to C-in-C Home Fleet and Admiralty. 1850 - Radio message 1547 from Group 506:  According to information here there is no a/c carrier in Namsosfjord. 1910 - Radio signal 1655 from U 19:  Enemy destroyer square 7941, course 700, medium speed. 1914 - Radio signal 1845 from U 51:  Light cruiser in Westfjord Moskenesoe, NE course, medium speed. 1920 - Radio message 1706 from Narvik:  2 enemy destroyers off Narvik went close inshore near Skomnes towards midday, towards 1500 evaded German bombers to the west. 1923 - Telephone call from Group Command:  English a/c reported at 1845 enemy S/M square 2977.  Dropped 2 bombs, no hits. 1940 - Situation report from Group Command:  Flying Corps X reported that a/c had sunk an English cruiser 15.4 in square 8134.  16.4 an He-111 attacked an English S/M, Spearfish class in square 6166.  Sinking unlikely. 2014 - Radio signal 1945 from U 51:  Enemy out of sight, bearing 450. 2040 - Radio message 1743 from Group West:Square 3659 AF 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers sighted stationary.  Presumably unloading. 2050 - Radio message 1701 from Group West:  A/c reported 3 troop transports in square 3889 AF, one of them with three funnels, about 25,000 tons.  In the Siorafjord 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers.  Passed Vega eastbound at 1000. 2112 - Radio signal 2100 from U 30:  One light cruiser square 8516 AF, course 20 degs., medium speed. 2330 - Radio message 2112 from U 13:  One tribal class destroyer sunk.   2230 - Radio message 2050 from U 51:  . . . . . . . . little patrol in the Westfjord.  1 destroyer off Moskensoy.
	- 47 -

 

	Enemy Situation on 17.4.1940.   0000 - Radio message 2210 from U 52:  Romsdalfjord reconnoitered, no enemy sightings. 0100 - Radio message 2244 from U 3:  Miss at S/M square 3510 AN. 0100 - Radio message 2205 from U 46:  Slight patrol only in Westfjord. 0210 - Radio intelligence report (X) of 0055/17/4:  Trawler "India Star" received orders from S.O. 18th Cruiser squadron at 1847/16/4 to operate in the Namsos area under the orders of cruiser "Glasgow". 0500 - Radio message 2131 from Narvik:  2 British destroyers patrolling off Narvik. 0505 - Radio message from Group 506:  Afternoon reconnaissance:  4 destroyers square 6277, SSW, high speed, 1530/16/4.  No enemy forces in Namsos fjord.   Radio message 0023 from Group 26 Stavanger:  Action report 1600/16/4:  square 3252 AF:  2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2 transports.  Square 3232:  3 cruisers, 2 transport-ships.  1546 Harstad:  2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 transport ships.  1600 Bygden:  2 cruisers, 3 transports.  1530 Narvik harbor:  7 transports.  1700 N. of Stasmer:  2 transports, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers. 0820 - Intelligence report (X) 0430/17/4:  Furious reported to 1st Cruiser Squadron at 0755/16/4:  arrived Tromsoe 0430. 0914 - Radio intelligence situation report of 0800/17/4:  N. Trondheim:  2 cruisers with destroyers of the 6th and 4th Destroyer Flotilla detached to the Harofjord 0315/17/4 to take over patrol of the fjord.  8 trawlers transferred to the Namsos fjord and will arrive there probably 23.4.  Cruiser Penelope seems still to be in the Westfjord with several destroyers. 0956 - Radio message 0800 from U 46:  3 troop transports with destroyer escort in 66 degs., 20 min. N, 11 degs., 40 mins. E, course SW. 1049 - Radio message 0815 from U 34:  Constant air patrol.  0600 2 Southampton class cruisers putting to sea, course west.  0700 5 destroyers, varying courses, disappeared to the NW.  Position square 6479. 1051 - Radio message 0913 from Narvik:  Destroyer patrol off Narvik to Rombaken fjord.  Otherwise situation unchanged. 1124 - U 46 1019:  Enemy in sight 65 degs. 55 mins. N, 10 degs. E. 1140 - U 46 1115:  ENemy out of sight 65 degs. 50 mins. N, 10 degs. E. 1245 - Radio message from a/c K2/106:  3 English cruisers and destroyers course west, high speed.
	- 48 -

 

	1245 - Radio intelligence report 1040:  A/c carrier Glorious is probably being transferred to the northern area. 1250 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1225:  Cruiser Effingham was in 70 degs., 02 mins. N, 19 degs., 19 mins. E, course 115 degs., speed 27 knots at 0300/17/4. 1410 - Radio message from a/c K21/106:  The enemy forces reported consist of:  2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers. 1655 - Radio message from Group 506 1330:  Result of morning reconnaissance 0502/17/4:  1 light cruiser, 6 destroyers, square 6484, 2600, medium speed; 2 light cruisers, 5 destroyers square 6477, 2400, medium speed. 1753 - G.I.S.:  Report from Belgium:   1) According to English pilots another landing attempt near Namsos is imminent.     2) 40 miles south of Scapa there are 60 units with troops for Scapa. 1915 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1755:  4 French ships arrived Harwich PM 17.4 from Cherbourg. 2120 - Radio message 1916 from Narvik:  Situation 1900/17:  Patrol by 2 destroyers from 1700.  Bombarded 10 cm. battery position.  Framnes etc., 2134 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2110:  Position of battle cruiser Repulse 1800 in square 2650 AN. 2239 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2200:  Cruiser Suffolk requested tug assistance from Scapa at 1540. 2319 - Group Narvik 2115:  1700 - 1710 2 English destroyers bombarded position in Framesodden etc., 2333 - Radio message 2237 U 23:  MTB's and English S/M's off Korsfjord.  Evaded 2 attacks by S/M.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 18.4.1940.         0005 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2355:  Tug Buccanneer was ordered at 1852 to proceed to square AN 2663 right top to assist Suffolk. 0017 - Radio message U 52 2200:  Yesterday night during hunt with D/C's and hydrophones. . . . . . . . by torpedo boat near Hovdems. . . . . . . .  Operation in Romsdalsfjord doubtful owing to inadequate visibility and restricted space. 0035 - Radio message U 7 0002:  French destroyers and S/M's patrolling off Iselenfjord.  Accurate hydrophone hunt.  D/C attack etc., 0300 - Radio message from Narvik 2202:  1 a/c carrier, 2 cruisers off Narvik town.  2005 . . . . . . . .  landed.  1830 2 English destroyers east of Viga.
	- 49 -

 

	Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.   0335 - Radio message from S.O. 15th M/S Flotilla 0220:  S.S. Hamm torpedo hit square 4220 right center. 0425 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0400:  Suffolk was in square 1464 at 2225/17/4, speed 12 knots.  This position was given to tugs St. Mellons and Buccaneer. 0830 - Radio message U 19 0810:  4 light cruisers square 7943, course 20 deg., medium speed. 0830 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 0800:  There are cruisers of the 2nd (Glasgow) and 18th Cruiser Squadrons in the area of the Indrefjord and N and S of this.  Battle cruiser "Repulse" was 30 miles SE of the southern tip of the Shetlands at 1800.   Heavy cruiser "Suffolk" was badly damaged in yesterday's bombing attack.  She was 50 miles E of Fair Island at about 1900.  Already at 1540 she had urgently requested tug assistance.  At about 2300 Suffolk was off Fair Island, course 256 degs., speed 12 knots.  Tugs Buccaneer and St. Mellons were sent to her assistance P.M. 0955 - Radio messages from Group "Weiss" 2202, 2132:  2050 army landed in Dorax.  Reported 1535 06 E 5350 2 battleships, 1 cruiser, course S.  1838. . . . . . . . 1 a/c carrier, 2 cruisers, 9 merchant ships off Narvik town.  1830 3 English destroyers E of Vigra. 0955 - From Supreme Command of the Navy, Main Radio Intelligence Department:  According to press reports (via attache) a USA cruiser "Trenton" and 2 destroyers have been ordered from Lisbon to Norway to protect USA citizens there. 1000 - Radio message Narvik 0842:  Situation 0900/18/4 unchanged.  No destroyers off Narvik. 1204 - Group West 1150:  According to a report from an a/c, about 10 watching mines were observed off Lindesnes in square 5329 and square 3537. 1230 - Radio message U 10 1200:  Enemy in sight, 1 light cruiser, course 2200, slow speed. 1242 - Radio intelligence report 1205:  Ark Royal left Gibraltar westbound during the night 16/17/4.  Is in radio communication with Channel bases.  Probably on passage home. 1303 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1235:  Early on 17.4 the following destroyers left Dover for Scapa:  Busilisk, Beagle, Wren, Witch, Antelope, Wolverine, Vansittard and 2 unidentified.  18th Cruiser Squadron was ordered at midday 15.4 to proceed to Lilles Jona (about 66 degs. N, 13 E, near Indrelet). 1355 - Radio message a/c E 3/406 1217:  English cruiser square 2246, course 2300, medium speed.  Am shadowing enemy forces. 1425 - Radio message from Group Narvik 1215:  Enemy reported to have landed in Salagen and Lavangen.  So far no results of own reconnaissance received.
	- 50 -

 

	1540 - Radio message from a/c D2/406 1325:  Square 2610 English cruiser, 200 degs., slow speed. 1540 - Radio message from a/c K6/EL 1400:  Cruiser course 230 degs. 1543 - Radio message from a/c A2/406:  square 2189 1 English battle cruiser, course 230 degs., medium speed. 1543 - Radio message from a/c K2/406 1435:  4 cruisers, 5 destroyers in line ahead, high speed, course 3100, square 2645. 1605 - Radio intelligence report from Naval Communications Officer Elbe-Weser Radio Station:  Daventry 1520:  Air Ministry announces among other things:  1 German U-boat successfully attacked at low height, 1 hit observed.  Admiralty announced losses in S/M "Thistle": 5 officers, 48 ratings.    1815 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 1700/18/4:  Damaged cruiser Suffolk in Scapa.  The following French forces are in north Scottish waters:  Cruiser"Emil Bertie", 2nd Flotilla Leader Division, Battleships "Dunkerque" and Strassburg" possible.  An unidentified ship was torpedoed on 18.4 north of the Shetlands. 1851 - Radio intelligence report Naval Communications Officer Elbe-Weser Radio Station.  1600:  Admiralty announces British losses during the Norway operations as 4 destroyers, 1 S/M. 1936 - 1 S/M in 59 degs. N, 15 degs. E.  No further positions reported. 2000 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1830:  French minelayer cruiser "Emil Bertie" was in 62 degs. N, 02 degs. W at 0900/18/4. 2325 - Radio message U 65 2041:  0330 light cruiser or large destroyer entered Andfjorden, 1630 one ship type Emerald left.  Practically no darkness.  Have to move off to reload, position thus unoccupied for hours.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 19.4.1940.         0007 - Radio intelligence (X) report 2345:  1213/18/4 S.O. 18th Cruiser Squadron transmitted to Admiralty General Wiart's report of landing carried out in. . . . . . . . (remainder unresolved). 0139 - Radio intelligence report 0125 Naval Communications Officer Elbe-Weser Radio Station:  Daventry 0110:  1) British S.S. "Swainby" 4,936 tons, torpedoed yesterday off coast of north of Scotland.  38 members of crew today landed in a north Scottish port.  2) 40 U-boat prisoners-of-war landed at a NW Scottish port this evening. 0147 - Radio message Admiral West Coast of Norway 2152:  Situation report:  1730 Norwegian time S 21, 23 in action with a Norwegian torpedo boat in Hardanger fjord. 0400 - Radio message Trondheim 2348:  Unidentified a/c, apparently destroyer, 2210 west of Agdenes inshore, sighted for a short time.
	- 51 -

 

	Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.   0515 - Radio messages Group 506, 2215 - 2316 - 2342:   1) Reconnaissance results 1415/18/4 L2/506 square 8542 one cruiser 270 degs. and 1425 square 8288 left heavy cruiser circling.   2) 1645 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers SW 67 degs. 55 mins. N, 1305 E, bombed at 800 meters, result not observed.  Heavy flak defense. 0902 - T/P from Flying Corps X:  0753 in square 06E 7684 left English light cruiser, course 300 degs., high speed. 1257 - Radio message from U 1 1235:  2 light cruisers square 8250, W. course, medium speed. 1311 - Radio message from U 40 1204:  Enemy in sight, 1 battleship square 5596 AF, SE course, medium speed. 1350 - Radio message from U 9 1330:  2 light cruisers, square 8250, W course, medium speed. 1505 - Radio intelligence report 1425:  S/M Sealion and others informed at 1830/18/4 that 3 French S/M's had left Harwich. 1807 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1750:  Battleship Resolution had left Portsmouth midday 11.4 and arrived in the Clyde P.M. 12.4. 1939 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1845:  Flak cruiser "Cairo" and destroyer "Zulu" left Skelfjord 1600/18/4 to join 18th Cruiser Squadron.  At 1300/18/4 S.O. Destroyers of the Home Fleet ordered destroyer "Basilisk" to proceed to an area approximately 60 degs. N 0020 W at maximum speed. 2035 - Radio message from Narvik 1702:  Heavy ship landed from boats off Bogen. 2035 - Radio message from Narvik 1858:  3 destroyers and 1 heavy ship approaching Narvik. 2110 - Radio message from Narvik 1931:  Enemy ships left west-bound.  Target for bombers from Trondheim. 2110 - Radio message from U 51 1656:  Double shot at "Southampton" class cruiser, both probably end-of-run detonators square 8182 AF.  Patrol by 2 cruisers.  NW 3, overcast, snow. 2120 - Radio message from Group Narvik 1927:  Enemy battleship and 3 destroyers in Ofotfjord, latitude of Bogen.  Motor boat traffic between warships and Bogen. 2200 - Radio message from Trondheim 1907:  1853 a/c report light cruiser at anchor square 8615. 2240 - Radio message U 34 1832:  2 battleships, 3 troop transports, 2 light cruisers.  Enemy zigzagging.  Enemy steering southerly course, medium speed. 2240 - Radio message from Narvik 2103:  Enemy warships in Ofotfjord, latitude of Bogen.  Lively boat traffic to Bogen.
	- 52 -

 

	Enemy Situation on 20.4.1940.   0006 - Radio message U 57 1500:  York entered Pentland.  Yesterday hydrophone target. 0028 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2355:  Unidentified French units were ordered at 1900 to rendezvous in AF 6473 at 2000.  Course 310 degs., 22 knots. 0028 - Radio message U 59 2309:  Strong destroyer and trawler patrol in operations area, with echo-ranging gear, as far as 2 degs. W.  Mostly forced to dive deep by day.  Sea 4 NE wind 4, position square 1640. 0150 - Radio message U 47 1553:  Square 5446 AF 2 torpedoes at Warspite.  Failed to detonate 900 depth 8 zone minus 4.  One end-of-run detonator.  Two electric torpedoes left. 0220 - Radio message U 65 2112:  Triple fan without success at "Emerald" square 9744 AB 2040.  Center shot premature detonator.  Leaving.     Situation:  Warships entering and leaving between 3 and 7, 1800 and 2200. 0250 - Radio message U 38 0103:  Quadruple fan at type Frobisher, long range, detonation after 9 minutes.  Hit not observed, as submerged.  Failure not probable.  1 bow, 4 stern torpedoes remaining. 0440 - Radio intelligence report (X):  France.  One high-ranking Flag Officer afloat assembled units subordinate to him at 2135/19/4.  2315 he was ordered to Sullom Voe (Shetlands).  The unit mentioned in radio intelligence report 2355 received the same order at 2345.  Additional:  the warships reported by U 34 at 1832 were probably French. 0555 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0540:  S.O. of Naval Forces off Narvik ordered S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron to join him, in a radio message 2235/19/4. 0600 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0525:  S.O. 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 1700/19/4 that cruisers "Galathea" and Arethusa" were leaving for Rosyth. 0640 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0555:  Unidentified unit was at 0215 given a starting point for 0700 in square AF 6473. 0640 - Radio message U 47 0530:  Enemy in sight, 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, square 4961, course 20 degs., medium speed. 0655 - Radio message U 47 0615:  Enemy convoy in sight, consisting of 10 vessels, escorted by destroyers, square 4937, steering northerly course, medium speed. 0819 - Radio message U 47 0812:  Enemy convoy in sight square 4931, NE course, am shadowing, am SW of convoy. 0820 - T/P from Flying Corps X:  0507 6 transports in Namsos fjord, 6 transports leaving.
	- 53 -

 

	0851 - Radio message U 47 0838:  The convoy reported is escorted by 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, square 4698 left bottom, 8 knots. 0905 - Radio message U 26 0625:  1 Afridi and 2 Albatross 80 degs., square 6479. 0942 - Radio message U 65 0800:  1 battleship, 1 troop transport square 3169 AF, zigzagging, steering 50 degs., medium speed. 1016 - Radio message U 47 1045:  7 torpedo boats square 4696 right top. 1145 - Radio message U 38 1110:  Enemy in sight, 1 battleship, 1 troop transport, square 3223 AF, steering NE course, medium speed. 1223 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1210:  battle cruiser "Renown" informed 2300/19/4 by C-in-C Rosyth that lights and boom had been ordered.  Accordingly she intends to enter Rosyth. 1238 - Radio message U 47 1219:  Enemy convoy square 5472 left top. 1240 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1210:  S/M "Sunfish" intended 19.4 to put into Harwich.  "Ursula" intended to arrive Rosyth 1100/20/4. 1345 - Radio message U 47 1321:  Square 5449 center bottom, 650, 7 knots. 1500 - Radio message Narvik 1321:  Cruiser "Penelope"bombarding Narvik railway station. 1545 - Radio message U 47 1435:  Enemy convoy in sight, square 5457 left center. 1800 - T/P from Flying Corps X 1130:  1035 Andalsnes 1 light cruiser, 1 transport ship. 1800 - Radio message U 34 1448:  Double shot "AZ" at cruiser, depth 3 meters, range 7 hectometers, no success.  Situation:  Warships, transport, entering and leaving morning and evening.  Otherwise constant patrol by destroyers and a/c.  Leaving square 6476. 1800 - Radio message U 30 1520:  Leaving west of Anlesund.  Patrol by destroyers and a/c.  Hydrophone hunt with D/C's.  Fired on by S/M on 17th. . . . . . . . 1805 - T/P from Flying Corps X.I 1145:  1 destroyer in 06 E 5332 1045, one in 06 E 4327.  Course 120 degs., medium speed. 1825 - Radio message Group Narvik 1314:  English cruiser bombarding N. beach of Narvik from direction of Rombaken light. 1830 - Radio message U 47 1753:  Enemy convoy in sight square 5453 upper half center. 1923 - Radio message U 47 1911:  Enemy convoy in sight, left center, enemy making 7 knots.
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	2110 - Radio message U 47 2054:  Enemy convoy in sight square 5432. 2145 - Radio message Group Narvik 1929:  Cruiser Penelope and destroyers off Narvik and Rombaken 1230-1600 cruiser sank a Rombaken ferry and damaged the ore railway bridge near Forsnesht, repair possible.  Some casualties.  Warship off Bogen. 2245 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2210:  England:  Following decyphered 1940 from radio message from unidentified English unit 2 JGQ to Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands, T.O.O. 1300/20:  Namsos in flames.  Forces under my command constantly bombed by enemy a/c since 1100. 1 trawler hit and drifted onto the coast, others very short of ammunition.  Request assistance, am taking up position agreed whenever possible.  The same unit reported with T.O.O. 1730/20, intercepted 2000:  Situation now desperate, request immediate assistance.  Am being bombed constantly. 2319 - Radio message U 47 2226:  Enemy convoy in sight square 5277 left center, course 50 degs., enemy making 7 knots.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 21.4.1940.         0128 - Radio message U 47 0058:  Enemy convoy in sight square 5272 right center. 0412 - Radio message U 47 0328:  Enemy convoy in sight square 5258 left top. 0655 - Radio message U 47 0510:  Enemy convoy in sight square 5255. 0810 - Radio message U 47 0605:  Square 5261 center top. 0845 - Radio message U 47 0802:  Square 5235 main enemy force in sight. 0845 - Radio message U 65:  Send beacon signals every 30 minutes 0900 out of order, perhaps 0952 between beacon signals report distance and bearing of reported enemy forces by radio signal.  (T.N.: this is a literal rendering of the text, including punctuation or lack thereof.  It is unintelligible to the translator) 0910 - Radio message U 47 0856:  Enemy convoy square 5239 left top. 0920 - Radio message U 65 0904:  Enemy in sight square 5237. 0925 - Radio message Admiral West Coast 0135:  Danger of mines W of Leroe and between northern tip of Lule Sorta and Faroes.  Own minefields W and N Byfjord.  Hieltefjord not checked.  Danger of S/M's at all approaches.  Permanent pilot service around Boern-Stangen etc. 1145 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0930:  S.S. "Balmaha", joining 21st and 23rd anti-S/M Flotillas, was on her way to Namsos on 20.4 and was re-directed to Skielfjord in late evening.  21st and 32nd (T.N. : sic) anti-S/M Flotillas were already on passage north and anchored probably at 2000 in 6515 N 1335 E (Ranenfjord).  S.S. "Black Heath" mentioned in same connection.  This ship still making for Namsos.
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	1145 - Radio intelligence report Daventry 1000:  2 British steamers, "Hondy", 5,000 tons (not registered) and "Uersy", 1,037 tons, sank yesterday off SE coast of England.  Cause not mentioned. 1200 - Radio message U 47 1128:  Square 5312 right top enemy convoy in sight. 1246 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1215:  Unidentified English unit reported sighting a surfaced U-boat at 0700.  She had attacked the U-boat with D/C's, after the latter had crash-dived, until 0745 and had then lost contact in square 3253 AM right top. 1325 - Radio message U 30 1315:  Enemy convoy in sight square 7815 AF.  Enemy steering southerly course, speed 12 knots. 1409 - Radio message U 47 1340:  Square 2984 enemy convoy in sight. 1422 - Radio message U 30 1340:  Enemy convoy in sight square 7845 course 190 degs., 13 knots. 1542 - Radio message Narvik 1412:  1 cruiser, 1 destroyer 4 miles west of Narvik.  Request action. 1634 - Radio intelligence reprt (X) 1610:  "Furious" informed 0150/21/4 that there was an enemy base in Halmlaoe in 68 degs. N, 1715 E. 1700 - Radio message U 47 1635:  Have lost contact square 2950. 1800 - Radio message U 38 1634:  Position square 5313,  Heavy D/C's when attacking.  NNW 5, swell.  Am trying to haul ahead. 1843 - Radio message U 65 1800:  Enemy convoy in sight, square 2997, steering NE course, speed 7 knots, am shadowing, an SW of convoy square 5325. 1920 - Radio message U 65 1901:  Square 2991 AF enemy steering northerly course. 2045 - Radio message U 65 2015:  Enemy convoy square 2967 northerly course. 2105 - Radio message Narvik 1833:  Evening report:  Cruisers and destroyers around Narvik since 1430.  Ore railway bridge demolished by cruiser.  Live boat traffic from warships and trawlers in the direction of Bogen etc. 2205 - Radio intelligence (X) report 2145: Flotilla leader "Tigre" informed at 1450 that, according to unreliable radio D/F bearing, a U-boat had been fixed in 6030 N about 0200 W and was ordered to search for U-boats in this area. 2320 - Radio message U 51 2205:  Fired on unsuccessfully in square 3751 by enemy S/M.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 22.4.1940.         0840 - Radio intelligence report 0740 Naval Communication Officer West:  1 S/M in 170 degs. 10 miles off AF 7523. 0915 - Radio message Group Narvik 0721:  Enemy destroyers passing up and down all the time, presumably covering enemy unloading
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	in Boyen Bay or approach of enemy transports etc. 1118 - Flying Corps X 1000:  0835 06 E 6346 1 destroyer and 1 transport ship course 260 degs., slow speed.  0829 06 E 6326 1 destroyer. 1133 - Radio message U 30 0948:  Enemy battleship in sight square 7527.  Enemy steering SW course, medium speed. 1220 - Radio message U 30:  Yesterday convoy from square 7870 AF at night with 3 ships to square 7523.  There today sighted by a/c while attacking "Royal Sovereign" and forced by destroyer to remain submerged. 1525 - T/P from Head of B.d.U. Org.:  France:  from Army report 18.4 P.M.  The wreck of the German U-boat which was attacked by Avisos a few days ago and the sinking of which was not certain and not officially announced by the French Admiralty, was today found by divers at great depth and identified. 1622 - Supreme Command of the Navy, Main Radio Intelligence Dept.:  Y-positions 0700/22/4.  One unidentified, 1 unidentified Swordfish, Sterlet and 1 unidentified in area Skagerrak and Kattegat.  Sterlet proceeded to Harwich P.M.  1 unidentified each near the following positions:  Square 2922 AN, 3122, 3841 AN, 3841 AN, N of Teseel.  Area of E Frisian Islands.  Seawolf and Shark square 3547 AN on passage to "Harwich" "Triad" in square 3473 AN, 1 unidentified square 4835 AN.  Both on passage to Rosyth.  "Ursula" left Blyth 1100 for Tyne.  Triton and Trident left Rosyth A.M. for Skagerrak area.  Additional:  Some of the unidentified S/M's are French. 1730 - Radio message U 62:  Square 3748 AN fouled with mines.  U 62 1745 - Radio intelligence situation report 1700/22/4:  According to a report from a British a/c a U-boat was bombed at low level in the Bristol Channel at 1335. 1931 - T/P from Flying Corps X:  1550 1 battleship, 3 cruisers in square 4349 o6 E.  Note:  were attacked unsuccessfully by 2 a/c. 1931 - T/P from Flying Corps X:  1500 S/M diving square 05 E 7849, course NE. 2036 - Radio intelligence report Reuter 1935:  Norwegian S.S. "Bravore", 1,458 tons, sank today off the SE coast of England after an explosion.  4 survivors landed at a SE coast port. 2100 - Flying Corps X Ic:   1605 3 destroyers W of Aalesund                                        1536 1 transport Storfjord                                        1635 1 destroyer 06 E 5316 2105 - Radio message U 26 1930:  Square 2373 AN left top drifting mines, believed German.6,000 ton supply steamer in convoy sunk square 8196.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 23.4.1940.         0035 - Radio message Narvik 2224:  English destroyers patrolling in immediate vicinity around Narvik.  No further bombardments.
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	Enemy Situation on 16.4.1940.   0118 - Radio message U 57:  Large enemy cruiser in sight and 1 destroyer square 2623, NE course, have lost contact. 0902 - Radio intelligence situation report of 0800/23/4/40:  1 English a/c attacked a U-boat unsuccessfully at 1800 in square AN 4922 right top. 1030 - Radio message Narvik 0750:  Quiet night.  English warships are bombarding railway installations on Rombaken.  Shot down 1 English a/c yesterday afternoon. 1230 - Radio intelligence report 1210:  Battle cruiser "Hood" may be in the area of the west coast of England. 1232 - Enemy situation Group West 1220:  S/M's sighted:  Square 4157 AO, 7156 AO, 4955 AN, 3671 AN. 1315 - Group West T/P 1310 - Small motor sailing vessel slightly damaged by explosion position Elbe 3, being towed in.  Necessary to close Elbe. . . . . . . . 1430 - Radio message U 65 1257:  Enemy convoy 8114 AF, NE course, medium speed. 1757 - Radio intelligence (X) report 1700:  Cruiser "Vindictive" is probably controlling net-laying operations on the Norwegian coast.  1 a/c attack 1 German U-boat at 0745 in square 1142 AN without success.  It continued to shadow and at 1845 another a/c of the same unit was ordered to attack the U-boat. 1959 - Radio message U 26 1643:  S/M heard in hydrophones square 4984. 1959 - T/P G.O.C. Air Forces Baltic 1910:  Submerged S/M square 4129. 2012 - Radio message patrol vessel 810 1915:  German S.S. "Sege" struck a mine in square 8335 right top.  Am proceeding to Borkum with survivors and wounded. 2101 - Radio message T 155 1955:  S/M warning square 4185.  2 tracks. 2119 - Radio message Narvik 1857:  1 Afridi, 1 Grom, 2 Hardy constantly off Narvik-Rombaken.  P.M. Penelope bombarded ore railway.  Division expects major attack. 2215 - Radio message Stavanger 1943:  According to a/c report submerged S/M 60 degs., 9 mins. 18" N., 5 degs., 9 mins., 30" E.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 24.4.1940.           Radio message U 65 2254:  Enemy in sight:  battle cruiser, destroyer square 7358, southerly course, medium speed. 0443 - Enemy destroyer got away in square 3625. 0500 - Radio message S.O. 7th Patrol Vessel Flotilla 0420:  Action with enemy destroyers. 0500 - Radio message S.O. 7th Patrol Vessel Flotilla 0423:  Require assistance urgently, have been hit.
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	0525 - Radio message S.O. 7th Patrol Vessel Flotilla 0453:  Was in action with 3 Cossack class enemy destroyers.  Guns out of action, wounded on board. 0700 - Radio message S.O. 6th S-boat Flotilla 0500:  S-boats report 3 Fantasque square 3625, course SW, high speed. 1005 - Radio message a/c 1/406 0950:  Have sight of 2 cruisers in square 4697, 2700, high speed. 1020 - Radio message a/c A1/406 1011:  The enemy forces reported by radio consist of 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers.  Enemy zigzagging around a main course 2300.  A/c A1/406. 1102 - Radio message a/c A1/406 1057:  Cruiser, believed French torpedo cruiser, very high speed. 1425 - Radio message a/c M 7 BK 1300:  Reported enemy forces in sight, consisting of one cruiser, 2 destroyers square 4985. 1450 - T/P Flying Corps X:  1 English cruiser at anchor off Andalsnes     1210 (Flak cruiser)     1135 one transport ship off Jondal and one off Ulvik in Hardangerfjord. 1458 - Radio message U 30 1446:  Am in operations area ordered. Little traffic, action very well possible. 1527 - Radio message U 34 1449:  Am in operations area ordered, little traffic, action limited owing to weather, medium patrol. 1722 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1700:  1 a/c carrier expected to leave Scapa for Namsos area. 2011 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1935:  At 1548 the French Admiralty informed Admiral North and Admiral West that there had been a U-boat in square BF 2617.  At 1800 a flying boat from Landeve-Poulmic base landed in this position, presumably air reconnaissance was flown for the U-boat. 2013 - Radio message Naval Communications Officer Narvik 1848:  The following took part in today's bombardment:  "Warspite", "Queen Elizabeth", "Enterprise", "Penelope", 7 destroyers including one Pole, 2 armed trawlers. 2227 - Radio intelligence report (X) 2210:  A/c carrier "Furious" was ordered by Admiral Narvik at 1053/24/4 to proceed immediately to Scapa. 1722 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1700:  S.S. "Franconia", 10,175 tons, is at present on her way to the Clyde, off the north coast of Norway.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 25.4.1940.         0058 - Radio message U 59 0003:  Enemy convoy in sight, steering NE course.  Have lost contact. 0600 - Radio message MT IL 0537:  Attacked S/M in square 3892.  Bombs.
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	0830 - Radio intelligence report (X) situation report 25.4:  "Glorious" is off the NOrwegian coast.  She was in the sea area west of Aalesund towards midday.  Cruiser "Galatea" has not yet arrived in Rosyth for short overhaul, but was attacked by German a/c at about 1900 N of the Shetlands. 0830 - Radio intelligence report (X) 0800:  S.O. Andalsnes reported to Admiralty 0830/24/4:  S.O. 2nd Cruiser Squadron in "Galatea", cruiser"Glasgow", destroyer "Ivanhoe", "Impulsive", "Vansittard", "Witch" have left.  Landing of troops and material completed. 1145 - Radio message Narvik 0915:  Quiet night, close patrolling destroyers.  At present only 3 destroyers off Narvik. 1147 - Radio intelligence report, Daventry 1110:  2 German Naval Officers were landed as prisoners-of-war in Scottish ports yesterday, including Captain Oskar Scharf of Alster. 1210 - Radio message Narvik 1210:  Successful attack in progress since 0430 against Norwegians (about 150 men) which took up position 2 km E of Elvenes on 24.4.  Destroyers patrolling off Narvik and Rombaken. 1225 - Radio message Narvik 1015:  Since about 0900 a Hardy destroyer has been bombarding positions in the E approach to Narvik.  3 white rings on her funnel.  Polish Bursa No. H 3 1 also there. 1225 - Radio message Narvik 1048:  1030 bombardment by "Enterprise". 1348 - Y-positions:  4 unidentified (French), Trident, 7 unidentified in Skagerrak-Kattegat area Swordfish square 3603   Sterlet square 3577   Shark square 6161     Seawolf square 6781   All on the way to Harwich.  1 unidentified 0700/25/4 to Harwich.  Unidentified left Blyth for Firth of Forth     3 unidentified left Harwich 1530 for the areas:  1 to N of Teseel, 1 to area E Frisian Islands (W sector), 1 to area E Frisian Islands (center sector).  All S/M's operating in the North Sea area picked up. 1400 - T/P:  1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser 1100 Harstad.  1 destroyer, course 3000, off Landfjord 0545. 1718 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 1700:  A/c carrier Glorious in sea area off the central Norwegian coast. 1750 - T/P Flying Corps X 1645:  1540 battle cruiser "Hood" with 2 destroyers in square AF 7893, course 2750. 1800 - Radio message Narvik 1545:  2 light cruisers and 2 destroyers have been bombarding harbor installations since 1000.  So far no damage of importance.  Request bombers. 1830 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1810:  A radio message, not completely intercepted mentions mines in an area bounded by the following positions:       5117.30 N 0144 E       5117.30 N 0210 E       5115.30 N 0210 E       5115.30 N 0144 E
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	2135 - Radio message Trondheim 1821:  Air recce results:  Namsos 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser.  Andalsnes 1 light cruiser leaving.  Bombing attacks on cruisers without result. 2231 - Radio intelligence report Daventry 2205:  Following an announcement by the French Navy Minister Campinchi in a speech, Paris reports that a French destroyer recently sank 2 German torpedo boats, 1 MTB, and 1 750 ton U-boat in the Skagerrak.  The action is said to have taken place within the last 48 hours. 2325 - Radio message U 47 2235:  Several suspicious fishing vessels immediately off western approach to route I.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 26.4.1940.         0030 - T/P 2223/24/4 F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses informs:  Mine explosion near patrol vessel 802 1.3 miles off West Ems southern buoy bearing 3000, channel still suspected of mines. 0045 - Radio message U 38 2310:  Apparently trawler patrol at NW corner of extended declared area. 0330 - Radio intelligence report 0105-0304:  Landsend radio to all:  SSS Franconia Latitude 59.48 N Longitude 5.59 W attacked 0105/26 - 600 M square 3427 AN (T.N.:  text partly quoted in English). 0518 - Radio intelligence report Naval Communications Officer Elbe-Weser:  English S.S. "Cree" GOGP 4,791 tons to all:  SSS at 0315 at Smiths Knoll Buoy S.S. Cree mined - 600 M (T.N.:  Text mainly in English amended). 0825 - Radio message U 34 0610:  0245 square 3419 AN double shot at Franconia, no explosion (8 letters corrupt) were not taken off.  No torpedoes.  Starting return passage. 0830 - Radio intelligence (X) situation report 0800:  S/M Truant, which on 25.4 was on her way to Songnefjord, has broken off and intends to dock P.M. 25.4. ? - Radio message N.O.I.C. Trondheim 1050:  2 enemy destroyers, one each in square 5995 and square 8334, varying courses. 1446 - Radio message Flying Corps Trondheim:  0430 convoy in square 5675 course E 0715 convoy with 1 heavy cruiser, square 7382, course E. 1520 - N.O.I.C. Trondheim 1310:  1207 square 5689 convoy course 2000. ? - Bomber Group 506 1720:  0707 square 8321 4 destroyers 160 degs., very high speed. 1600 - Radio message Bomber Group 506 0410:  0513 convoy square 5675 3 destroyers, 3 merchant ships, 800.  No shadower. 1832 - Radio intelligence report (X) 1805:  F.O.I.C. Andalsnes requested MTB's on 25.4.  They are urgently required for communication between Molde (and presumably Andalsnes).
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	2010 - Group West:  Situation 26.4 evening.  Narvik again bombarded until 1645.  Heavy losses were inflicted by our troops on an enemy infantry regiment which had landed north of Salangen.  Bergen is supporting the Army operation against Voss.  In the sea area north of Trondheim 2 convoys with destroyer escort were sighted by air recce in squares 5689 and 7382, both course E.  2 destroyers were sighted in Frohavet and 2 in Drontheimslela.  One cruiser in the Sogne Fjord off Kirkeboe at midday.  No report from ship 26 and 37. 2215 - Radio message G.O.C. Air Forces Trondheim:  1750 square 5699 convoy, 3 destroyers, 3 merchant ships, course 300.  1805 square 5998 right bottom 2 destroyers, square 8332 bottom center 2 destroyers course SW. 2224 - Radio message N.O.I.C. Trondheim 1825:  1130 square 6732 one light cruiser.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 27.4.1940.         0208 - Radio message U 23 2200:  Double miss at heavy cruiser square 2182. 0718 - Main Radio Intelligence Department 0715:  Y-positions:  S/M Swordfish, which was in the sea area N Hanstholm, received orders at 1930/26/4 to return to Blyth.  The S/M is to pass the line 5726 N 0550 E to 5543 N 0100 W within 10 miles either side. 0810 - Radio intelligence situation report (X) 0800:  Several French units, which were in the Irish Sea on the evening of 25.4, have arrived in Brest. 0805 - Radio message Coastal a/c Group 506 0632:  0354 square 8326 2 English destroyers course NE, slow speed.  0520 square 8223 English convoy consisting of 3 destroyers, 4 merchant ships.  Course SW.  0600 course S. 1452 - T/P Flying Corps X 1410:  Recce results of Recce Group Stavanger:  0825 square 6743 3 transports with 1 escort ship, slow speed.  Course NE.       0850 square 5634 8 transports, high speed, course NE.     0855 square 5569 2 light cruisers, high speed, course 30 degs.     0915 square 5734 2 cruisers, 350 degs.     0915 square 5554 2 a/c carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, several destroyers, 30 degs. 1910 - Radio intelligence report 1800:  A troop convoy was reported off Portsmouth at 1630/27/4.  The following French troops passed the Channel off Dungeness in French ships towards 0200/26/4:  5 battalions of Alpine troops, Colonial Infantry Regt. 43, 1 battalion of the regiment, 2 of the Foreign Legion. 2309 - G.I.S.:  3 Polish S/M's fitted out with fuel and ammunition in Stockholm by night on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.  S/M's are reported to be going to Maelarsen presumably through the canal to Gothunburg.  Note:  According to Weyer the S/M's draft is 4.2m.  According to information here lock depths in the Goeta Canal will not take this draft.
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	Enemy Situation on 26.4.1940.         0305 - (G.A.F Station) Trondheim 2358:   1) According to sighting report there were 2 a/c carriers, 1 heavy cruiser and several destroyers 250 km NW of Trondheim at 1400/27/4.  Course NE, could not be attacked as dive bombers had not arrived.     2) 2 destroyers cruised off the Trondheim fjord all day 27.4.     3) a/c reported 2100/27/4 1 transport 15,000 tons, 1 cruiser and several destroyers off the Namsos fjord. 0405 - Radio message Bomber Group 0105:  Situation report 27.4 evening:  2 destroyers square 8326 and 2 5896.  Convoy of 3 destroyers, 4 merchant ships square 8221 SW 1520.  2 destroyers square 5996.  1600 recce for Army towards Stoeven. 0805 - T/P Flying Corps X 0710:  0620 Namsos fjord 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers, 5 transports. 0828 - Radio intelligence situation report 0800:  English S.S. "Scottish American" (7,000 tons) torpedoed off Cape Wrath during the night 27/28/4. 1447 - Radio intelligence report:  English a/c reports:  1331 U-boat in AN 1673, course 320 degs. 1650 - Radio intelligence report:  At 1616 from Wick Radio to all merchant ships in the Home area - from Admiralty.  Reference Admiralty message AD position of F Cape Wrath 2336/27th April 0329/28 (T.N.:  text in English.  Unammended). 1740 - Flying Corps X 1515:  1130 Aarstadt 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 destroyers.  Square 6963 3 transports, 2 destroyers AD 2260, square 7953 1 destroyer.  All plus 16 E.     1520 - 1335 Molde fjord 1 cruiser, course W.  1315 AN 06 E 5432 one carrier, probably the one first reported 0746 in square 6441.     1620 - 1450 square 9550 (5936 AF) French destroyer, 180 degs., medium speed. 2215 - Radio message S.O. 1st M/S Flotilla 2109:  AO center                                                                  2206:  S/M warning, with Asdic, square 4461 AO center.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -        Enemy Situation on 29.4.1940.         0715 - G.I.S.:  Report from Spain:  At 1100/28/4 British Admiralty ordered all warships and merchant ships in harbor to be ready to sail within 4 hours. 0717 - T/P Group West 0630:  Following radio message received here:  0332/3 Admiral West Coast:  According to radio intelligence report enemy S/M in Bjoerne Fjord.
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	0815 - Radio intelligence situation report 0800:  North Sea:  Between 1700 and 1730 several units were attacked by German a/c in the area about 75 miles NW of Namsos.  At 1530/28/4 English S/M's at sea received information about transport ships which had sailed early on Sunday.  One hour later there was a similar message, which mentioned Bjoerne Fjord and presumably a S/M stationed there. 0825 - Radio intelligence report 0810:  English unit reported 0700/29/4 from the Trondheim area that she was being bombed. 0928 - Radio intelligence report 2205/28/4 Cleethorpe's broadcast 2025 the following mine warning:     Norway Westfjord and approaches:     A) Mines have been laid in the Westfjord N of a line from Vaeray Island Light in 67 degs., 39 mins. N, 12 degs., 43 mins. E, bearing 126 degs. to mainland. 1140 - Radio intelligence report 1130:  It is reported from Stockholm that a Swedish 3,000 ton steamer struck a mine in the sound and sank.  Name and time not mentioned. 1145 - Radio intelligence report 1140:  1045 a/c E269 reported enemy U-boat in AN 2736, enemy course 340 degs.  U-boat dived. 1406 - Radio intelligence (X) report 1340:  A/c carrier Glorious intended to arrive Scapa 1700/28/4 with 6 destroyers, including "Grenade".  Cruiser "Arethusa" was off Scapa AM 28.4.  She also intended to put into Scapa. 2042 - Radio intelligence (X) report 2020:  A partly decyphered radio message of P.M. 24.4 shows that flak cruiser "Curacao" was damaged in engine and boiler rooms. 2226 - Radio intelligence report Daventry 2200:  British Air Ministry announces:  A sunderland Flying Boat
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