U-boat Archive - U-873 - Naval Inspector General Report

Report of the Naval Inspector General

Regarding Irregularities Connected with the Handling of Surrendered German Submarines

	UNITED STATES FLEET
	HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
	NAVY DEPARTMENT
	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25	19 June 1945
Serial : 01783

From:	The Naval Inspector General.
To:	The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
	and Chief of Naval Operations

Subject:	Irregularities Connected with the Handling of Surrendered
	German Submarines and Prisoners of War at the Navy Yard,
	Portsmouth, New Hampshire - Investigation of.

Reference:	(a) COMINCH and CNO Top Secret despatch to Commandant, Navy
	Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, dated 22 May 1945.

Enclosure:	(A) Facts and Discussion of Facts in subject investigation.

1. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, by reference (a), directed the Naval Inspector General to conduct a thorough investigation into the allegation of certain irregularities connected with the handling of surrendered German submarines and German prisoners of war at the Navy Yard and Naval Prison, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Although the directive on which this investigation is based is classified as Top Secret, the Naval Inspector General has, in order to facilitate the preparation of the report and to expedite its passage through the routine channels, changed the classification of the report itself to Confidential.

2. The Naval Inspector General has completed his investigation and herewith submits his report.

CONCLUSIONS

3. The Naval Inspector General concludes that:

	(a) That the serious irregularities reported in the handling of German prisoners at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, were caused by the failure of responsible authorities at the Navy Yard to exercise effective military command in the premises and by the flagrant disregard, by the representatives of Op-16-Z Section of ONI, of the provisions of the Chief of Naval Operations' directive of 19 May 1942, Serial 01227316, which is in conformity with the Geneva Convention, and which particularly prohibits the taking of souvenirs. (Facts 3(a), (b); 4(a); 5; 9(c), (d); 10; 12, 13(c), (d) and Note, (f); 15(b), (c)).

	REFERENCE (a)

	UNITED STATES FLEET
	HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
	NAVY DEPARTMENT
	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25	19 June 1945
Serial : 01783

Subject:	Irregularities Connected with the Handling of Surrendered
	German Submarines and Prisoners of War at the Navy Yard,
	Portsmouth, New Hampshire - Investigation of.

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	(b) That the Commandant of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Rear Admiral Withers, U. S. Navy, was derelict in his performance of duty in that he failed to recognize and accept his command responsibility and to issue clear, concise instructions to his subordinates with regard to receiving, securing, safeguarding, and stripping U-boats surrendered at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and to safeguard the persons and property, both private and public, of German prisoners of war who were in his custody. He further failed to take effective action when violations of the Chief of Naval Operations' order and the Geneva Convention were brought to his attention. (Facts 3(a), (b); 4(a), (b), ; 9(a), (b) and note).

	(c) That the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Captain C. H. Roper, U. S. Navy, was derelict in his performance of duty in that he, as executive for the Commandant for military matters in the Yard, failed to issue information and instructions to the officers, offices and Navy Yard divisions, and the surrender group under Commander Kimmel, ComSubForLant, Training Command, with regard to receiving, safeguarding, and securing U-boats, and safeguarding the persons and property of prisoners of war as well as seeing that they were properly processed for delivery to their next destination. (Facts 5; 7(a); 9(b)).

	(d) That there is evidence of looting of U-805, the first U-boat to arrive at Portsmouth, by various persons including Marines and naval enlisted men, the extent of which cannot be determined. Thereafter looting of the U-boats appears to have been stopped by the Marine guard by reason of effective action taken by Colonel Patchen, USMC. (Facts 6(c); 8(c)).

	(e) That there is evidence that U-boat intoxicating liquor stores were breached by persons unknown, but there is no confirming evidence of drunkenness of guards, either naval enlisted men or Marine, on board the submarines. (Facts 6(b); (17).

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	UNITED STATES FLEET
	HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
	NAVY DEPARTMENT
	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25	19 June 1945
Serial : 01783

Subject:	Irregularities Connected with the Handling of Surrendered
	German Submarines and Prisoners of War at the Navy Yard,
	Portsmouth, New Hampshire - Investigation of.

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	(f) That the surrender group under Commander Kimmel, ComSubForLant Training Command, performed its function in a satisfactory manner in receiving, safeguarding, securing and stripping the submarines at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, considering that there was a failure on the part of the Yard authorities to properly inform Commander Kimmel of what was required. (Facts 7(a), (b), (c)).

	(g) That the Industrial Division of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, performed in a satisfactory manner the receiving, safeguarding, and stripping of U-boats turned in at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, after the boats were turned over to them for that purpose. (Facts 8(a), (b).

	(h) That a civilian interrogator, Mr. Jack Henry Alberti, wearing a naval uniform while performing the duty of an interrogator, greatly exceeded his authority and functions, when he practically took over the examination and processing of prisoners of war at the Naval Prison. Mr. Alberti had prisoners' decorations stripped off. He distributed looted decorations and personal and public property to Prison personnel as he saw fit. He caused the Commanding Officer of a surrendered U-boat to be slapped by an enlisted man. (Facts 3(a), (b), (c); 9(c); 10; 11; 12; 13(b); 13(f); 15(a), (c); 16).

	(i) That Mr. Alberti's actions are in direct violation of the Geneva Convention and the Chief of Naval Operations' directives, and that as far as the enemy is aware, he is an American Naval Officer, and his acts were concurred in by the Naval Command. (Facts 3(a), (b); 11; 12, 13(d) and Note 13(f); 15(a)).

	(j) That the supine attitude of the Commanding Officer of the Naval Prison, Colonel Rossell, USMC, and of Lieutenant Commander Hatton, USNR, Office of Naval Intelligence, in permitting Mr. Alberti to conduct himself in the manner which he did, with the German prisoners of war, is most reprehensible. (Facts 9(c); 13(c)).

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	UNITED STATES FLEET
	HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
	NAVY DEPARTMENT
	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25	19 June 1945
Serial : 01783

Subject:	Irregularities Connected with the Handling of Surrendered
	German Submarines and Prisoners of War at the Navy Yard,
	Portsmouth, New Hampshire - Investigation of.

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	(k) That the baggage, the property of German prisoners of war and also public property, was looted in the Prison entrance lobby and in the cell blocks with the active participation of the Field Officer of the Day, Major Mehrlust, USMCR, and that Captain Hines, (MC), U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Bromberg (MC), USNR, as well as other officers and enlisted men participated in this looting. (Facts 10; 11; 13(g); 15(b)).

	(l) That it was feared that important Intelligence material may have been lost by the looting described above, so that Mr. Alberti prevailed upon the Commanding Officer of the Prison to permit him to recover such material by the humiliating method of bargaining with the looters, both commissioned and enlisted. (Facts 13(c)).

	(m) That this complete lack of appreciation of his command responsibilities on the part of Colonel Rossell, and the evidence of complete failure of discipline in the Prison Command, is considered most reprehensible. (Facts 9(c), (d), and Note; 13(c).

RECOMMENDATIONS

	4. The Naval Inspector General recommends:

	(a) That appropriate administrative or disciplinary action be taken in accordance with the Conclusions in the cases of Rear Admiral Thomas Withers, U.S. Navy, Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Captain Clifford H. Roper, U.S. Navy, Captain of the Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Colonel J. A. Rossell, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding Officer of the Naval Prison, Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Captain Clifford G. Hines, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Senior Medical Officer, Naval Prison, Portsmouth New Hampshire; Lieutenant Commander Walter Bromberg, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve, Psychiatrist of the Naval Prison, Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Major J. P. Mehrlust, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Field Officer of the Day, Naval Prison, Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Lieutenant Commander S. R. Hatton, U. S. Naval Reserve, Op-16-Z Section, Office of Naval Intelligence.

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	UNITED STATES FLEET
	HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
	NAVY DEPARTMENT
	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FF1/A17-25	19 June 1945
Serial : 01783

Subject:	Irregularities Connected with the Handling of Surrendered
	German Submarines and Prisoners of War at the Navy Yard,
	Portsmouth, New Hampshire - Investigation of.

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	(b) That the Director of Naval Intelligence be directed:

	(1) To take appropriate action in the case of Mr. Jack Henry Alberti, Senior Interrogator in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

	(2) To overhaul the directives under which his special agents are operating.

	(3) To so indoctrinate and curb them to the end that the activities of his subordinates conform to the directives of the Chief of Naval Operations, and do not discredit the naval uniform.

5. The testimony which was taken in this case is exhaustive and voluminous, covering 381 pages of the record of the investigation. This record is retained in the Office of the Naval Inspector General and is available to those who are authorized to have access to it by higher authority.

/s/ C. P. SNYDER

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FACTS AND DISCUSSION OF FACTS REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES INVOLVING THE HANDLING OF THE PRISONERS, EXTENSIVE LOOTING BY OFFICERS AND MEN ATTACHED TO THE NAVAL PRISON, DRUNKENNESS AMONGST THE GUARDS ON THE SUBMARINE, LOSS OF VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS AND POOR SECURITY MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECEIPT OF GERMAN PRISONERS AND U-BOATS AT THE NAVY YARD, PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Related Information.

1. The following personnel have an interest in connection with the surrendered German submarines and their personnel:

	(a)	Navy Yard, Portsmouth:

		Rear Admiral Thomas Withers, USN, Commandant.
		Captain C. H. Roper, USN, Captain of the Yard.
		Captain S. E. Dudley, USN, Manager.
		Captain Homer Ambrose, USN, Production Officer,
		Supervisor of surrendered submarines.
		Lieutenant Commander H. S. Knerr, USNR, Progress
		and Scheduling Officer, in charge of work on board submarines.
		Lieutenant Commander J. C. Ives, USNR, Intelligence Officer.

		Colonel F. G. Patchen, USMC (Ret.), Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks.
		Captain R. S. Beckham, USMCR, Commanding Officer,
		Barracks Detachment, Commanding Officer Submarine Guard.
		Captain W. G. Spragg, USMC, Barracks Detachment,
		Commanding Officer, Submarine Guard.

	(b)	Naval Prison, Portsmouth:

		Colonel J. A. Rossell, USMC, Commanding Officer, Naval Prison.
		Major C. A. Johnson, USMCR, Executive Officer, Marine Detachment.
		Major J. P. Mehrlust, USMCR, Field Officer of the Day, 19 May.
		Captain J. M. Schroeder, USMCR
		Warrant Officer L. N. McGraw, USMCR)
		Warrant Officer A. Stancisco, USMCR ) Marine
		Warrant Officer, P. A. Stone, USMCR ) Detachment
		Gunnery Sergeant P. J. Supina, USMC )

		Private first class Sol Leventhal, USMC) Marine
		Private first class J. A. Durkin, USMC ) Detachment

		Captain C. G. Hines (MC), USN, Senior Medical Officer.
		Lieutenant Commander W. Bromberg (MC), USNR, Senior Psychiatrist.

	(c)	Submarine Training Activities, Portsmouth:

		Commander T. K. Kimmel, USN, Officer in Charge,
		Commanding Officer of the relief prize crews.

ENCLOSURE (A)

	(d)	Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department:

		Captain J. L. Riheldaffer, USN, Op-16-Z.
		Lieutenant Commander S. R. Hatton, USNR, Op-16-Z, Interrogator.
		Lieutenant L. P. Ewald, USNR, Op-16-Z, Interrogator.
		Lieutenant W. C. Maxwell, USNR, Op-16-Z, Interrogator.
		Mr. J. H. Alberti, Op-16-Z, Senior Interrogator.

2. The dates and times of arrival of the various U-boats at the Navy Yard are as follows:

	Harbor	Yard	Tonnage	Escort

U-805 arrived	15 May	1155, 16 May	825	OTTER DE 210
U-873 "	16 May	1255, 17 May	1320	VANCE DE 387
U-1228 "	17 May	1945, 17 May	825	NEAL A SCOTT DE 769
U-234 "	19 May	1445, 19 May	1952	SUTTON DE 771

3. Instructions and directives regarding handling prisoners of war and captured enemy vessels which are applicable are:

	(a)	Geneva Convention:

		"Article 1. The present Convention shall apply, without prejudice to the stipulations of Title VII (1) To all persons mentioned in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, of October 18, 1907, and captured by the enemy. (2) To all persons belonging to the armed forces of belligerent parties, captured by the enemy in the course of military operations at sea or in the air, except for such derogations as might be rendered inevitable by the conditions of capture. However, such derogations shall not infringe upon the fundamental principles of the present Convention; they shall cease from the moment when persons captured have rejoined a prisoners-of-war camp.

		"Article 2: Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but not of the individuals or corps who have captured them. They must at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited.

		"Article 5: Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, or else his regimental number. If he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed. No coercion may be used on prisoners to secure information relative to the condition of their army or country. Prisoners who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind, whatever. If, because of his physical or mental condition, a prisoner is unable to identify himself, he shall be turned over to the medical corps.

		"Article 6: All effects and objects of personal use - except arms, horses, military equipment and military papers - shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, as well as metal helmets and gas masks. Money in the possession of prisoners may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer and after the amount is determined. A receipt shall be given. Money thus taken away shall be entered to the account of each prisoner. Identification documents, insignia of rank, decorations and objects of value may not be taken from prisoners."

"Article 6: All effects and objects of personal use - except arms, horses, military equipment and military papers - shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, as well as metal helmets and gas masks. Money in the possession of prisoners may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer and after the amount is determined. A receipt shall be given. Money thus taken away shall be entered to the account of each prisoner. Identification documents, insignia of rank, decorations and objects of value may not be taken from prisoners."

(b)

CNO and CominCh directives:

(1)

"C-1-42--Instructions for Interrogation of Prisoners of War.

"CONFIDENTIAL. Op-16-F-9, A16-2(4), (SC)A16-2(3), Serial 01227316, 19 May 1942.

"Action: All Ships and Stations.

"(Ref.: (a) C.N.O. Serial 0901116 dated 5 Dec. 1941 (same subject).)

"(Enc.: (A) Vice C.N.O. Serial 01226416 dated 11 May 1942.)

"1. Reference (a) is hereby canceled and all copies will be destroyed. Enclosure (A) to reference (a) will be retained for use with this letter.

"2. The following instructions for the handling and interrogation of prisoners of war captured by vessels of the United States Navy are based on the practical experience of the British Navy during the present war. It is imperative that all officers be familiar with these instructions and that they be strictly adhered to if information of value to the service is to be obtained.

	"PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR

	"(a) Immediately, as they are received on board, prisoners shall be segregated into three groups -- officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men -- and placed under armed guard.

	"(b) These groups shall be kept separated from each other at all times.

	"(c) Under no circumstances shall a prisoner officer be permitted to give orders to or talk with any prisoner except those in the officer group. Likewise noncommissioned officers and men shall only be permitted to talk with members of their own group.

	"(d) All prisoners shall be segregated from the ship's company, under armed guard. No fraterhizing or conversation between prisoners and members of the ship's company, other than those

	regularly detailed as interpreters, shall be permitted.

	"(e) Prisoners shall be minutely searched and special care will be taken to prevent anything, of whatever nature, from being thrown overboard or otherwise disposed of. EVERYTHING MUST BE TAKEN FROM THE PRISONERS except necessary clothing. Everything taken from them shall be made up into separate bundles and clearly marked with the name, rank and service number of the owner. A receipt may be given if demanded.

	"(f) The provisions of (e) provide an excellent opportunity to obtain the name, rank and number of every prisoner, as it holds out their only hope of having their personal possessions returned to them.

	"(g) In making the search NOTHING MUST BE OVERLOOKED. Scraps of paper, ticket stubs, receipts, personal letters, photographs, etc., may have great intelligence value with the necessary background knowledge to properly interpret the hidden meaning.

	"(h) AFTER being segregated and searched, prisoners shall be cared for physically; i.e., given warm clothing, fed, given medical attention, cigarettes, etc. Our first interest is in obtaining all information of value to us and any humanitarian considerations must be subordinate to this interest.

	"(j) To the list of prisoners should be added any pertinent remarks which may be of value to the interrogator at a later date.

	"(k) Although some prisoners may be taken who are eager to talk under the stress and shock of action, capture and possible exposure, there shall be no attempt made to conduct a formal interrogation on board except as noted below. If a prisoner captured is suffering from wounds or exposure to such a degree that he cannot be expected to survive until interned an interrogation may be undertaken. In such a case the Questionnaire (Enclosure (A) to reference (a)) may

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	be used as a guide, that part being used which is applicable to the technical information the prisoner may be presumed to possess.

	"(l) After a prisoner has been so interrogated he will be kept away from all other prisoners and must not be permitted to talk with any other prisoner.

	"(m) Upon arrival in port the prisoners will be turned over to the representative of the Commandant of the Naval District or other proper authority, together with a statement of the action, list of prisoners, the prisoners' personal possessions, and any other material which may have been collected. The Naval District, or other authority, will immediately notify the Division of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, by despatch, and request instructions as to the disposition of the prisoners and their effects.

	"(n) NO SOUVENIRS OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER ARE TO BE RETAINED.

	"(o) In consideration of the natural and understandable desire for souvenirs of any action with the enemy the Division of Naval Intelligence will undertake to set aside such articles received as have no technical or intelligence value to be returned to the Commanding Officer of the forces involved for distribution to such of the personnel as he may deem fit.

	"(p) When conditions permit, floating papers and other debris of possible intelligence value should be collected and retained for delivery to the proper authority upon making port.

"3. On every ship or station there can probably be found some among the officers and men with a knowledge of the language needed. One or more should be selected to act as interpreters in dealing with the prisoners. These so detailed should be men of great patience and forbearance and with a considerate and sympathetic manner. The men so detailed should be the only members of the ship's company permitted to hold any conversation with the prisoners.

"4. Officers and men detailed as interpreters should be present with the prisoners during meals and during their periods of exercise or relaxation. From conversations overheard or from casual conversation (NOT INTERROGATION) with the prisoners some information may be gained.

"5. If sufficient men with language qualifications are available, one or more additional may be detailed to assist the prisoners or as part of

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the guard. These men should not divulge their knowledge of the language to the prisoners and should never speak in the prisoners' language in their hearing. They may, in this way, pick up information of value from conversations overheard between prisoners.

"6. A complete written record of such information should be made and copies included with the personal possessions and papers turned over to the shore authorities.

"7. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Although the instructions contained therein apply primarily to shore activities it will explain and clarify the reasons for the instructions contained therein and emphasize the necessity of strict compliance in order that our "team work" may carry through to a successful conclusion.

"8. While the provisions of this letter are primarily applicable to operations in or adjacent to the costal waters of the United States, where there will be the least delay in bringing ashore prisoners of war, they are set forth as a model for the handling of prisoners of war by all commands. Experience has shown that most favorable results can be gained through this procedure and it should be adhered to in operations in more remote areas so far as circumstances will permit.

"9. The necessity for strict adherence to these instructions is well illustrated by an incident which recently occurred. After successfully sinking an enemy submarine, the commanding officer and a large number of crew were rescued by the engaging vessel. When the prisoners were on board the captain of the enemy submarine was permitted to address the prisoners and took advantage of this opportunity to harangue them on the necessity of maintaining silence on all matters of interest to their captors. When his harangue was understood by members of the capturing vessel's crew he was restrained from continuing. However, the damage had been done and a well disciplined, security conscious company of prisoners arrived ashore. During the passage to port there was also a large degree of fraternizing between prisoners and crew members which further assisted in building up enemy morale and in making the interrogators' task most difficult if not impossible.

---OpNav. F. J. Horne."

Enclosure (A), Vice C.N.O. Serial 01226416 dated 11 May 1942 referred to above is as follows:

	(2)	"C-5-42--Recovery of Information From Enemy Submarines.

		"CONFIDENTIAL. Op-16-F-9, (SC)L11-1, L11-1/SS, SS/EF&$, Serial No. 01226416, 11 May 1942.

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"Action: All Sea Frontier Commanders.

All District Commandants (Less 9 and 16).

"(Ref.: (a) CNO Serial 0574016 dated 6 Mar 1942 (same subject and file).)

"1. Reference (a) is hereby superseded.

"2. In view of the present enemy submarine operations close to American shores, the possibility of sinking an enemy submarine must be reckoned with. Under favorable conditions an enemy submarine so sunk would present an opportunity for the recovery of documents, personal effects and equipment of the highest intelligence value to our forces in the conduct of anti-submarine warfare.

"3. It must be realized by all members of our armed forces that if knowledge of the recovery of such material reaches the enemy immediate steps will be taken to offset the advantage we may have gained. Furthermore, much information painstakingly compiled from other sources would be jeopardized, if not completely nullified, by such enemy countermeasures.

"4. The following instructions are issued for guidance of Commanders of Sea Frontiers and District Commandants:

	"(a) The office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department is charged with the collection and evaluation and dissemination of all Intelligence Information.

	"(b) The Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, must be informed immediately, by despatch, whenever an action takes place which may afford a reasonable possibility of recovering any materials, of any nature whatsoever, from an enemy submarine, or in which such materials have been recovered.

	"(c) The Office of Naval Intelligence will immediately furnish a trained officer, familiar with the layout of enemy submarines and with the language of the enemy country, to report to the Commandant of the Naval District or Commander Sea Frontier involved.

	"(d) Where salvage operations are to be undertaken, facilities will be afforded the representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence to be on board the salvage vessel during recovery operations so that his knowledge of enemy submarine construction and the internal arrangements for security may be available to the officer in charge.

	"(e) All documents and all other materials and equipment, without exception, may be of great value. This will be understood to include

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	everything of any nature whatsoever recovered either by divers or otherwise. No souvenirs of any kind are to be retained by anyone. Floating scraps of paper or other wreckage should be carefully collected.

	"(f) All documents, materials and equipment, without exception, will be delivered to the representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence for transmission to the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence. Materials recovered should pass through as few hands as possible to insure security, avoid damage, and permit complete examination with the minimum of delay.

	"(g) The advice of the representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence will be taken as to the order of precedence to be given articles to be recovered.

	"(h) Divers entering a sunken submarine will be provided with a waterproof bag in which papers or documents can be placed for removal, as important enemy papers are often soluble in salt water.

	"(i) Only Navy divers should be used in any attempt to enter a sunken enemy submarine. Secrecy can only be maintained by using service personnel throughout.

	"(j) Upon receipt of documents, materials or equipment, in the Navy Department, the Office of Naval Intelligence will be responsible for their distribution to the cognizant Bureaus or Divisions within the Department.

	"(k) It is recommended that a suitable and plausible story be prepared which can be circulated, if necessary, to explain any diving operations carried out within sight of persons outside the service. Recovery of documents or other materials should always be denied.

"5. In consideration of the natural and understandable desire for souvenirs of any action with the enemy, the Office of Naval Intelligence will undertake to set aside such articles received which have no technical or intelligence value to be returned to the Commanding Officers of the forces effecting the sinking and recovery for distribution to such of their personnel as they may deem fit.

"6. It is not expected that the recovery of materials from any one submarine will yield a complete picture of enemy operations. However, any material of whatever nature may prove to be of great value when considered in conjunction with other information assembled from other sources.

---OpNav. F. J. Horne."

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(1) Commandant, First Naval District's Confidential letter DIO/B/WHE/mcl, serial 04121500, dated 12 April 1945, to Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., and other addresses--Subject: Prisoners of War - Handling of in the First Naval District.

"Ref: (a) CNO conf. ltr. to All Ships and Stations, Serial No. 01227316, dated May 19, 1942.

(b) ComOne conf. ltr. to various shore stations, 1ND, same subject, DIO/B/RWH/mmg 250815, dated 8 Jan 1943.

"1. Reference (b) outlined in detail the procedure for handling Naval prisoners of war who might arrive in First Naval District.

"2. Reference (c), being a despatch from Cinclant to Allant of 10 April 1945, is quoted for convenience as follows:

'Surrender Procedures: Provide special parties for boarding German submarines in cases of surrender. Utilize German speaking personnel to maximum.'

"3. The commanding officer, or senior line officer present, at the port to which German Naval prisoners may be brought shall in the first instance, under reference (b), take custody of prisoners, their documents, their personal effects and of any vessel or its gear that may be involved. Such officer shall have the immediate duty of notifying ComOne (DIO), who will, as quickly as possible thereafter, assume responsibility and take all necessary action in compliance with references (a) and (b). In the interim, the provisions of reference (b) should be carefully followed.

"4. Attention is invited to the possibility that, if a vessel is involved in the surrender, it might be scuttled or be equipped with demolition charges or be booby trapped. Appropriate precautionary measures should be taken.

"5. The foregoing is forwarded for information and guidance.

"By direction of the Commandant, First Naval District:

/s/ Edmund F. Jewell,

Captain, USNR.

"cc - C/S

Assistant Comdts.

DCGO

All Heads of Divisions, Hdqtrs., 1ND

Hdqtrs. Duty Officer".

(NOTE: Reference (a) appears under paragraph 3(b) (1) of this report.)

(2) Commandant, First Naval District's Confidential letter DIO/B/RWH/mmg, serial 250815 Q November, dated 8 January 1945, to the Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and other addresses, subject: Prisoners of War - Handling of in the First Naval District.

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"Ref:

(a) AlNav 14.

(b) CNO Confidential ltr. to All Ships and Stations, Serial No. 01227316, dated May 19, 1942.

"Encl.

(A) Instructions for handling prisoners of war.

"1. Enclosure (A) prepared in accordance with reference (a), (b) and (c), is issued for the information and guidance of the addressees.

"cc:	All Heads of Divisions	/s/ John S. Barleen
	Asst. Comdt.	John S. Barleen,
	Cdr. Northern Air Patrol	Captain, U.S.N.,
	Cdr. Northern Ship Lane	Chief of Staff
	Cdr. Naval Local Defense Force."

Enclosure (A) referred to in above letter, is as follows:

"HANDLING OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

Brief Index of Duties Performed by:

The Commandant will:

(1) Designate the Command which will receive and have custody.

(2) Inform the Command of number of prisoners to be received.

(3) Inform the Command when to transfer custody to Army.

"II

The Commanding Officer of the Station designated to receive prisoners of war will:

(1) Effect custody of prisoners.

(2) Forward prisoners' documents to District Intelligence Officer.

(3) Effect safekeeping of prisoners' personal effects.

(4) Process prisoners.

(5) Deliver prisoners to Army when so directed by the Commandant.

"III

The District Intelligence Officer will:

(1) Inform Office of Naval Intelligence, giving number of prisoners and other pertinent information.

(2) Accept custody of prisoners' documents.

(3) Make arrangements with Army to accept custody when requested.

"IV

The Director of Naval Intelligence will:

(1) Send special personnel to take entire charge of interrogation, when considered necessary.

The Army (Commanding General, First Service Command (Provost Marshal)) will:

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	(1) Take custody of prisoners of war when requested by Commandant.

	"INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR
	FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

I. General

	"1. Although all prisoners of war and other persons in the protective custody of the Navy Department will ultimately be placed in the custody of the War Department, all such personnel will first be retained in naval custody at or near the port where disembarked until transfer to and transportation in Army custody can be arranged.

	2. In view of the lack of or limited facilities available in the Naval Commands of the First Naval District for safekeeping of prisoners of war for any considerable period of time, it is to be assumed that transfer to Army custody will be effected at the earliest practicable moment and that such transfer would ordinarily be completed within several hours of the receipt of the prisoners.

	"3. The headquarters Duty Officer in the absence of or at the direction of the Chief of Staff will inform the Commanding Officer of the Station which will receive custody of prisoners.

	"4. In each case the Commanding Officer of the Station which receives prisoners of war from a vessel will designate (a) the place of custody in his command, and (b) the officer having charge of the custody of such prisoners. In usual cases, the officer taking custody will be the Senior Line Officer having military jurisdiction, such as the Captain of the Yard.

II. Reception of Prisoners

	"1. The District Medical Officer shall be made cognizant and shall designate the nearest medical unit to examine those requiring medical attention. Prisoners will be carefully examined on reception, and those requiring medical attention will be given proper care. Hospital cases will be transferred as soon as practicable to the Naval Hospital, Chelsea, Massachusetts, if available; otherwise to a hospital designated by the Commandant.

	"2. Suitable guards will be provided for hospitalized prisoners to insure that they do not escape.

"III Personal Effects of Prisoners

	"1. All documents, i.e., all written or printed matter, personal letters, notebooks, photographs, sketches, etc., belonging to prisoners will be delivered to the District Intelligence Officer immediately upon the arrival of the prisoners.

	"2. This inventory will be entered in the space provided on the reverse side of the Basic Personnel Record (Form WD-PMG #2). Each copy will bear the signature of the prisoner whose personal effects are inventoried thereon on the line provided for this purpose.

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"IV. Custody of Prisoners

	"1. Prisoners shall be segregated into groups consisting of (a) officers, (b) non-commissioned officers, (c) other enlisted men, (d) civilians.

	"2. Prisoners will be confined for safekeeping, but will not be placed in cells, except as punishment deemed necessary by the officer responsible for their custody.

	"3. Prisoners will be kept under adequate guard at all times, day and night.

	"4. No fraternizing or conversations between prisoners and their guards will be permitted.

	"5. No attempt shall be made to interrogate prisoners, except by personnel specifically designated for this purpose by either the Commandant or the Navy Department, and no person other than such designated interrogators shall be present during the interrogation of a prisoner, except one officer who may be designated by the District Intelligence Officer.

	"6. If persons familiar with the language of the prisoners are available, these may be detailed as guards but they shall be careful not to disclose their knowledge of the enemy language. They shall not converse with prisoners. Their only purpose shall be to collect and report any information of value which they may overhear.

	"7. Prisoners will be aired and exercised as weather and other circumstances permit.

	"8. Prisoners will not be permitted to have possession of or access to newspapers or any other periodicals containing news of the war or of enemy countries.

	"9. No radio equipment of any kind will be permitted in the custody or use or within the hearing of a prisoner.

"V. Food and Clothing of Prisoners

	"1. Prisoners requiring clothing may be outfitted with such articles as are not distinctly Naval uniform. Clothing issued from small stores' stock will be charged to 'Miscellaneous Expenses.' Civilian clothing will be procured by sundry purchase. All articles issued to or retained by prisoners will be stamped or stenciled with the name or internment serial number of the prisoner.

	"2. Messing facilities for the prisoners should conform to Navy standards as closely as possible. In connection therewith, the following standards are required:

	(a) Commanding Officer's order giving the names of the prisoners and dates subsistence was furnished.

	(b) A certification by the issuing officer that subsistence was issued.

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	(c) A certification by a prisoner having authority to sign for group, or by individual prisoners as required, that the subsistence was received.

	"Articles 874(5) and 1824, Navy Regulations, provide for the subsistence of prisoners of war. Article 1340-2(e) (3), Bureau of Supplies & Accounts Manual provides applicable accounting instructions.

"VI Access to Visitors

	"1. No person not specifically detailed for the purpose will have access to or communicate with the prisoners of war.

	"2. No person will be permitted to visit a prisoner, except by written authority of the Commandant, First Naval District.

	"3. No person other than Military or Naval photographers shall be permitted to photograph any prisoner, and photographs shall be made by Naval or Military personnel only in connection with the official identification of prisoners.

	"4. Any person, except those authorized by the Commandant, attempting to interview or photograph prisoners will be placed under arrest and an immediate report made to the Commandant, First Naval District. Photographic apparatus used by any such person will be confiscated and held for further disposition as directed.

"VII. Processing

	"1. The term 'processing' as used herein includes the following:

	(a) Assignment of 'Internment Serial Numbers'.
	(b) Photographing.
	(c) Preparing Basic Personal Records (Form WD-PMG #2)
	(d) Handling of personal effects.

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"(2) An 'Internment Serial Number' will be assigned to each prisoner. This will consist of two components: the first to be '1' (indicating the First Naval District) followed by the initial of the prisoner's nationality; the second to be a serial number followed by the symbol 'Na', indicating capture by the Navy. The following blocks of serial numbers are assigned:

"Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth	1-999,	incl.
Commandant, Navy Yard, Boston	200-399,	incl.
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport	400-599,	incl.
Commander, Portland Section	600-799	incl.
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Argentia	800-999,	incl.

"(Thus, the first German prisoner of war received by the Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Argentia, will be assigned the serial number 1G-800Na.)

"3. Prisoners will be photographed in two positions, full face and profile, in both of which positions the subject's internment serial number will appear. The size of the photographs will not exceed 2" x 2". Five sets of photographs are required. The Public Relations Section of the District Headquarters will furnish photographers, equipment and supplies for this purpose, if desired by the processing station.

"4. Basic Personal Records (WD-PMG, form #2) will be accomplished in quintuplicate. Each copy of the form will be complete.

"5. Fingerprint records will appear on each copy of the Basic Personal Record. The roll method of fingerprinting will be employed. The Public Works Division of District Headquarters id prepared to make photostatic copies of these forms if desired by the processing station, in which case only one set of fingerprints of each prisoner will need to be taken.

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"VIII. Transfer of Custody of Prisoners to the Army

	"1. As soon as may be practicable, requests for transfer of custody of Naval prisoners of war to the Army will be made in duplicate by the Commandant, First Naval District, to the Provost Marshal General, U. S. Army, with copy of such request to Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy, providing , however, that specific instructions to the contrary have not been received from the Director of Naval Intelligence in accordance with Reference (b). This request will include the number of prisoners whose transfer is desired, by sex and nationality, the place at which they are located and the number, if any, who will require immediate hospitalization.

	"2. The Provost Marshal General will designate to the Commandant of the Naval District concerned the place at which the transfer of custody will be effected, informing the Judge Advocate General of the Navy thereof.

	"3. If the place of transfer so designated is different from the place where prisoners are held in Naval custody, transportation will be effected in Naval custody.

	"4. Promptly upon the departure of prisoners under Naval custody the Naval Commanding Officer effecting transfer will notify, by despatch, the Commanding Officer of the Army Station of Destination the hour of departure and the probable hour of the arrival of such prisoners.

	"5. The cost of such transportation shall be charged to 'Miscellaneous Expenses.'

	"6. Transfer of responsibility for the charge and safekeeping of prisoners will take effect upon their delivery to the custody of the Army.

"IX. Transfer of Prisoners' Basic Records and Personal Effects

	"1. The Naval Officer in Charge of escort of prisoners shall carry four copies of Basic Personal Records (form WD-PMG #2) for each prisoner.

	"2. The Army Officer receiving custody of prisoners will check each record against the prisoners delivered and receipt for each prisoner in prisoner in space provided on each of four copies of Basic Personal Record, noting on each copy the date and place of transfer and the place from which transferred.

	"3. The Naval Officer in Charge of escort will deliver prisoners' personal effects to the Army Officer receiving prisoners. The personal effects of each prisoner shall be packaged separately. The Army Officer receiving custody will sign for such effects by initialing in the space provided on each copy of the Basic Personal Record.

	"4. The Army Officer receiving prisoners will retain three copies of the Personal Record.

	"5. The Naval Officer in charge of escort will retain one copy.

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"PRISONER OF WAR TEAMS

	"1. Teams shall consist of:

	S-I Officers
	Medical Officer
	Interpreter
	Guards, if necessary.

	"2. Tentative arrangements shall be made with other activities to obtain such personnel as is required to make up the team.

	"3. Transportation of the Team to any possible place of arrival of POW's, by air, surface or road, whichever may be most desirable under the circumstances, shall be tentatively arranged in advance of any arrival.

	"4. The POW's shall be segregated according to their classification, that is - officer, petty officer and enlisted - so that no intermingling will be possible.

"DUTIES OF TEAM

	"1. When any information is obtained concerning arrival of Naval POW's, notify DIO Duty Officer immediately.

	"2. Collect Team and proceed to location of prisoners. Report to CO or Senior Naval Officer Present, and inform him that O-in-C of Team is ready to assume responsibility and take all action necessary, as set forth in Reference (a).

	"3. Determine and report to DIO Duty Officer number, with breakdown of classification, time and place of arrival, and health of POW's.

	"4. All personal papers, including orders, identification, etc., should be taken from the POW's at once. If this has already been done, secure them from the CO or Senior Naval Officer Present. Those papers should accompany the POW's in the custody of the O-in-C of the Team.

	"5. Hold POW's in custody pending instructions from DIO as to transportation to Boston and processing.

	"6. If POWs' vessel is accessible, take all necessary steps to secure vessel, papers, gear, and equipment. See Naval Regulations, Art. 874, Par. 4."

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(d)	Documents regarding handling of surrendered U-boats:

	(1) COMINCH Confidential despatch, 112318 to COMEASTSEAFRON for action and for information to CINCLANT, COMSUBLANT, VCNO, Com 1, Com 3, Com 4, dated 12 May 1945, reads as follows:

	"AS CONVIENENT DELIVER 1 EACH TYPE SURRENDERED U BOAT TO NAVY YARD PORTSMOUTH REMAINDER TO CINCLANT FOR SUB BASE NEW LONDON. SAFEGUARD AS NECESSARY TO PERMIT DETAILED INSPECTION BY SUBMARINE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. GUARD AGAINST STRIPPING OF MATERIAL FOR SOUVENIRS."

	(2) Deputy CominCh-Deputy CNO Restricted Serial 4256, FF1/S3-1, 16 May 1945, Memorandum for Vice Chief of Naval Operations, subject: Surrendered U-boats - Inspections of:

	"1. There will be in the Portsmouth Navy Yard starting on approximately 20 May 1945, a 1600 ton, 1200 ton, and 740 ton surrendered German U-boat, available for authorized inspection by technical personnel. It is desired that the Vice Chief of Naval Operations inform interested activities and coordinate inspections so that maximum benefit may be derived from the opportunity offered by the availability of these craft.

	"2. It is anticipated that after detailed inspections there may be additional questions not covered in the original interrogation of the surrendered officers and crews. In order that this information may be obtained, it is desired cooperative officers and key men be retained for further questioning after the first interrogations.

		R. S. EDWARDS
		Deputy CominCh-Deputy CNO
	"Originated by F-4253 (Capt. D. C. White) 5/16/45"

	(3) Headquarters Commander Northern Group Eastern Sea Frontier Secret letter C-A16-3(VDHMB), no serial, 5 May 1945, to Commandant, U. S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Hew Hampshire, subject: Surrender of German Submarines -- Assistance and facilities for, reads as follows:

	"Ref. (a) Verbal instructions of CESF, 4 May 1945.
	(b) Telephone instructions from ComOne to Comdt., Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., 5 May 1945.

	"1. Reference (a) assigned to the Commandant, FIRST Naval District, the responsibility of making necessary arrangements with the Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for such assistance and facilities as may be necessary to carry out the plan for acceptance of surrendered enemy submarines at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

	"2. Confirming reference (b), the Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, is requested to take the following action:

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	"(a)	Provide Marine Guard of one officer, one sergeant, and twenty men (include one German-speaking, if available) on 24-hour availability.

	"(b)	Establish or designate facilities for receipt of prisoners - Portsmouth - under Naval cognizance.

	"(c)	Assume custody of German submarines after inspection by SUBLANT party.

	"(d)	Maintain tug on 24-hour availability for transport of SUBLANT party and Armed Guard.

	"(e)	Recommend to the Commandant, First Naval District, at the earliest practicable moment, coordinates for mooring buoy to be established in lower Portsmouth Harbor for tying up and examinations of submarine before being taken elsewhere for berthing or anchoring.

"3. The District Coast Guard Officer has been directed to lay the buoy at the position designated by the Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth. A Coast Guard vessel with buoy will depart Boston today, en route to Portsmouth.

FELIX GYGAX,

Rear Admiral, U.S.N.(Ret.)"

(4) Commandant, U. S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, SPECIAL ORDER No. 15-45, dated 22 May 1945, subject: Security Measures ex-German Submarines, reads as follows:

"1. All existing security measures with regard to ex-German Submarines U-234, U-805, U-873, and U-1228 remain effective, with the modification that beginning at 0800, Wednesday, 23 May 1945, Yard workmen under direct supervision of Captain H. Ambrose or Lt. Comdr. H. S. Knerr will be permitted to board the U-234 for work on the topside only. These Yard workmen are not to be permitted to enter the hull of the U-234.

T. WITHERS,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Commandant."

"Distribution:

A - F"

4. (a) The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, did not issue written instructions regarding the handling at the Navy Yard of prisoners of war or captured U-boats.

(b) The Commandant did hold conferences at which were present the Manager, Captain S. E. Dudly; Captain of the Yard, Captain Homer Ambrose; Commanding Officer Marine Barracks, Colonel F. G. Patchen; Commanding Officer of the Prison, Colonel J. A. Rossell.

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5. The Captain of the Yard, the Commandant's executive for military matters, stated in effect that he was not assigned specific duties with regard to handling surrendered U-boats, but he understood that he was to aid in every respect. He took no measures to see that the Commandant's verbal instructions were further disseminated through his subordinates. He took steps to have the detail for taking over submarines ready on "one hour's notice". He was familiar with the document on interrogation of prisoners of war, and with the Geneva Convention. He did not go below decks in any of the submarines. He did not visit the Naval Prison while the prisoners of war were there and had no first-hand knowledge of how the prisoners of war were being treated.

6. Colonel Fred G. Patchen, USMC, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., stated in effect that:

	(a) Admiral Withers, on 12 May, directed him to have an officer, one leading non-commissioned officer, and twenty men ready to go with the surrender group via the tug leaving early on Tuesday the 15th, to take over the U-805.

	(b) Practically all of his orders came through Captain Roper, but the Commandant during the last few days has called him in and has several times showed him the operation order and invited his attention to it. The Aide actually gave it to him. The Commandant did not bring to his attention the basic instructions from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to which the Naval Inspector General referred, that is, the letter of May 19, 1942, but he is familiar with it, as most of it is included in the "Rules for Land Warfare" with which Marine officers are equipped. He was glad to know that the charge against Marine guards for drunkenness has been withdrawn. It had to be a mistake because there wasn't a single case. He interviewed twenty-five officers at this yard in this regard.

	(c) He had seen none of the Marines carrying any souvenirs ashore, though they may have carried some ashore. Every Marine coming out of the submarines is searched; but possibly on the first day there may have been some souvenirs carried ashore. This is the original order issued when the first boat, U-805, came in: "Allow no property of any kind to be removed from U-805 unless passed by the Naval officer in charge of working operations."

	7. Commander Kimmel, ComSubLant's representative, stated in effect that:

	(a) Neither ComSubLant nor the Commandant at Portsmouth or any officers there or anywhere had called his attention to the order of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 19 May 1942, which is still effective. He was not aware of the pertinent parts of this directive which are underlined and capitalized for emphasis. He did, however, tell his men (submarine operating crew) not to molest the Germans unless they started something, nor to take anything. In preparation for bringing in the submarines, he had held classes with the men that were available. He had divided them into three sections available to go out and board the boats. He used prints of German submarines to instruct the men. He also got instructions from a couple of officers from the THIRD Naval District on booby traps, torpedoes, and mines. He also had the men instructed and given a chance to shoot 45-calibre pistols, but no measures were taken to instruct the men in how they should conduct themselves in handling German prisoners throughout the whole operation. That was left to Intelligence personnel. He didn't see that this was his job, and he didn't do it.

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	(b) All of this information concerning the surrendered U-boats was secret. That didn't appear logical to start with, but all of it went down to confidential after a while; and he was rather handicapped in giving his men information on all the secret and confidential stuff, when he couldn't see any reason for it being secret or confidential.

	(c) It was very confusing to know who was the boss of all this business. After much milling around, he finally decided that the Commandant was running the show, which was not immediately evident in the beginning. He felt the whole thing lacked a coordinator, but he didn't see the whole picture. In other words, there obviously was nobody up there who knew much about handling German prisoners.

	8. The Industrial Manager stated in effect that:

	(a) The U-boats came in with the compartments littered with all sorts of material. The prize crews or others that had been aboard prior to their arrival at the Navy Yard, in their search of the ships, had gone through the lockers and furniture, and had dumped all the contents right in the central passageway. He considered it a very distinct hazard that some of this was clothing and bedding, which was becoming oil-soaked and a fire hazard. Furthermore, he was concerned about the possibility of scuttling, and had that occurred, litter in the compartments would have proved most embarrassing for any salvage operation, inasmuch as it would have clogged pumps and probably prevented the closing of compartments; and was a very distinct hazard on those ships.

	(b) The ships as they came in were in command of a detail under Commander Kimmel and Commander Hartman, who also were assigned the task of getting the torpedoes out of the first boat. It soon was apparent that even the task of removing the torpedoes was beyond their capacity in that weight-handling facilities had to be provided and that the Industrial Department would very soon be called in to do the job; so he called on Admiral Withers to find out where his duties were to begin on this job. After some discussion, it was decided it would probably be better for security measures, to have submarine details do the work on board, rather than permit civilians on the boats. The outcome was that Commander Kimmel furnished the enlisted people and that the Industrial Department furnished the technical officers to identify important equipment that be taken off the ships for safeguarding. That includes documents such as information booklets and anything that would be of use in operating the ship. He also detailed competent officers to learn how to safeguard the principal systems on the ship, and then put a barge alongside, into which could be loaded all of the dunnage and get the ship cleared in order to rid her of the hazards which he mentioned.

	(c) He was at the dockside when the first boat was delivered, and observed that nearly every sailor or Marine on board had what he thought was a German helmet in his hand. Many of them were packed full of articles, some of which looked like packages of cigarettes and things like that, many nick-nacks. He also observed many bulging pockets. At that time he was not concerned with the ship. That was simply an observation of what he saw. He noted this irregularity and determined to take corrective action.

	9. Colonel Joseph A. Rossell, USMC, Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Prison,
Portsmouth, stated in effect that:

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(a) He was called to the office of the Commandant perhaps two weeks ago and found there assembled the Commanding Officer of the Naval Hospital; Captain Spaulding, and the Public Works Officer; Captain Roper, Captain of the Yard; and Colonel Patchen. It was there that he was verbally informed he was to take care of the prisoners when they were received. No written instructions were received. The Commandant himself informed him and stipulated that he was to keep the officers separate from the non-coms and in turn the non-coms separate from the crew. They were to be segregated in that section of the prison which was prepared for that purpose.

(b) No written directives from the Commandant or anyone else in authority in the Yard were received nor were copies of the directives with regard to prisoners of war, received by the Commandant from the Navy Department and the First Naval District, routed to him for information, except a bulletin issued by the Bureau of Navigation which was something in this regard.

(c) With regard to the officers from the Office of Naval Intelligence who were present in connection with processing and handling of German prisoners, he asked which was the senior of the group so that he might do business with him and he learned that the fellow dressed as a Lieutenant Commander was not a member of the armed forces but a civilian dressed and that the Lieutenant Commander Hatton was the senior; but apart from that and because he had discussed it, he looked to Commander Ives, the local Intelligence Officer, for whatever he wished the prison to do in aiding him. He was present and saw produced in the Commandant's office and in the Commandant's presence certain credentials of Mr. Alberti, and it was then stated that Mr. Alberti was a civilian and not a naval officer.

(d) He stated he was familiar years ago with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, that he understood they were not to follow in detail the provisions of that in that the prisoners were not yet prisoners of war in so far as they at the Prison were concerned, since they were simply detaining them until arrangements could be made to take them to Boston where they could come within the full rights of the Geneva Convention. The sole function of the Prison was to hold those fellows until the Naval Intelligence Officers could process them and get them off their hands.

(Note: Colonel Rossell, in his report to the Commandant states in effect that Mr. Alberti assumed leadership of the Washington (ONI) party. He also admitted that looting of baggage, etc., took place in his Prison Command.)

10. Major J. P. Mehrlust, USMCR, Field Officer of the Day at the Naval Prison on 19 May, stated in effect, under oath, that he had one German dagger which he had accepted from Sergeant Supina and had permitted the taking of souvenirs while he was Field Officer of the Day. He was only doing what other officers were doing; for example, an Intelligence Officer from Washington even had one of the Marine Officers (Warrant Officer Stone) tear some gear off one of the German officers (he had some medals on him which the Intelligence Officer wanted). He admitted having various other articles such as an epaulet, a bottle of brandy, drafting triangle, coordinate square, and a slide rule taken from German prisoners' belongings and he knew this was an infraction of regulations.

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11. Warrant Officer P. A. Stone, USMC, stated, in effect, that he, by orders of "Commander" Alberti, had stripped the uniform of the Commanding Officer of the U-805 of its decorations, that Alberti had desired them as souvenirs; that Alberti told him he could keep as souvenirs an officer's hat and a naval sabre (dagger) that came out of the luggage that was from the officers on board the U-234 (General Kessler and his party). Major Mehrlust was present at this time.

12. Warrant Officer McGraw, USMC, stationed at the Naval Prison, stated, in effect, that he was permitted to take a leather handbag and a Bessa camera by Naval Intelligence Officer, Commander Hatton, as souvenirs. When he said to Mr. Alberti, "Some of the prisoners are complaining about their watches being taken, "Mr. Alberti said, "To hell with it; don't pay any attention to it!"

13. Lieutenant Commander Ives, Yard Intelligence Officer, stated, in effect, that:

	(a) His instructions were the written instructions issued by the FIRST Naval District with regard to prisoners of war, and verbal instructions from the Commandant, Portsmouth. The prisoners of war, and verbal instructions from the Commandant, Portsmouth. The prisoners came in amidst considerable confusion from the press and photographers. They were landed by the surrender unit of the Eastern Sea Frontier. They were held at the pier while photographs were taken, etc.

	(b) The actual interrogating of the prisoners was a function of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which sent three special men who were skilled in the language, skilled in the methods of handling prisoners, and skilled in the German submarines, to ask questions. Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Operations addressed many directives to them by name, not to him or to Admiral Withers -- some of which, he added, he was certain he didn't see. They weren't for his knowledge; but he knew of many he did see. Lieutenant Commander Hatton, one of these interviewers, had no written orders but explained that he was an interviewer from ONI. Admiral withers asked to see his identification; and all that Hatton was able to produce was his regular Navy identification; he didn't have the usual ONI agent's badge. Mr. Hatton was finally accepted by Admiral Withers. The other ONI representatives; one was a civilian named Alberti, who, however, appeared at Portsmouth in the uniform of a Lieutenant Commander. The third ONI man, Lieutenant Maxwell, arrived on the night of the 14th with Lieutenant Edwards from the FIRST Naval District. Mr. Alberti was found to have the usual very broadly worded orders of ONI, simply ordering him to Portsmouth for Intelligence duties. He also had a regular agent's pass on which was recognized the signature of Captain Keisker. In view of these proofs, this group was accepted as a team.

	(c) On 20 May, the Intelligence Officers discovered that the pictures of General Kessler had been distributed around. It appeared quite possible and perhaps probable that the General's baggage had been left behind and looted. The Intelligence Officers had a conference and it seemed that the best way to make some immediate progress (this was a discussion between Alberti and himself) to get articles of Intelligence value, and they were after something in particular, he didn't know what, would be to ask every one who had any kind of a souvenir, whether it was a piece of paper or a beautiful wrist watch, to bring it in and let the Intelligence Officers from ONI look it over on the agreement that if it was not of Intelligence value, the Intelligence Officers would not take

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it away. This interview with the Marine enlisted men was stage-managed so that Lieutenant Commander Ives was not present but one of his Warrant Officers was, and the Interrogators from ONI ostentatiously requested that he leave the room, and then said to the Marines, "We don't know you and we haven't your names and aren't going to take them, but we must recover anything of Intelligence interest that may be taken. Will you please go to your room or your sack or wherever you have it and bring us that, so that we can see it." This was to approximately 50 enlisted men who happened to be on duty on Sunday. On Monday, when Admiral Withers was informed of this, he said, "All right, go ahead. I don't like it but, once you have finished, let me know -- then I will take steps."

(d) The Marines on the first three boats had been most interested in souvenirs. If he had one request, he had a request per man and more, and they said, "We are giving no individual anything now. Once everything has served its purpose for the Intelligence officers, then if there is anything that is in my control, I will ask the Admiral to ask competent authority as to whether or not distribution can be made, to include not only the Naval Prison but the Marines and the Coast Guard crews that brought these boats in, and any party of interest." He did accumulate such things as buttons and hundreds of articles of that kind that could have been given out. He believed that to be the practice once the material has served Intelligence purposes.

(NOTE BY THE NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL: There followed testimony indicating that nothing would be given out without being properly released. However, it was testified, Mr. Alberti has given, personally to several enlisted men, articles, and we knew Mr. Alberti and other people from ONI who interviewed these men know, that these people have in their possession things which they have made no attempt to get -- hence they are in collusion with those people in holding these souvenirs.)

(c) He would like to make a distinction between official custody and personal custody. The items he holds are in official custody. He made reports from day to day to the Admiral; and on an earlier occasion when the Admiral was called to Boston, to Captain Roper, that he was holding souvenirs. The valuable items mentioned include the Knight's Cross, the Leica camera and blood pressure instrument and the dental case and the surgical instruments which were collected by Mr. Alberti from naval commissioned personnel when they were secured Monday morning. He showed Admiral Withers what they were. They weren't given up by naval personnel until they were surrendered to Mr. Alberti in accordance with his agreement.

(f) Mr. Alberti, according to his own statement, found the 10th member of the General's party among the prisoners in the cell block and told him to come along with him. This German said, "They have just taken my wrist watch." Alberti turned to the Marine with him and said, "Did you take it?" -- and by some means or other recovered the wrist watch that had just been taken away from the passenger. Then as he walked along the line, nine other prisoners started talking and pointing to their wrists to show that their watches had just been taken, and a sergeant came up to him, to Mr. Alberti, with a pleading look on his face, (that is quoting Mr. Alberti), and said, "Do we have to?" And Mr. Alberti's own remark, quoted in his hearing, as well as he can recall it, in a low voice, was

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	this: "If I were you, I wouldn't worry about it." And he understood from Mr. Alberti that some of the officers made the Marines turn over the watches to them.

	(g) The officers who participated in looting were the Military Field Officer of the Day, Senior Military Officer in Charge, Major Mehrlust; Captain Hines, Medical Corps, Senior Medical Officer attached to the Prison; Doctor Bromberg, Psychiatrist of the Prison. Major Mehrlust stated he had three daggers. The doctor's loot was dental instruments, surgical instruments, Leica camera, blood pressure instruments, etc. He added that he had the general impression that every officer there at that time was mixed up in it and got something because the Senior Military Officer of the Day took no steps to prevent it.

14. Lieutenant W. C. Maxwell, USNR, Office of Naval Intelligence, who accompanied Commander Kimmel in boarding the German submarines as they were taken over, stated in effect that he was not familiar with the provisions of the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 19 May 1942, which is the policy letter currently in force regarding the procedure for handling prisoners of war.

15. Mr. Jack Henery Alberti, Chief Interrogator, Special Activities Branch, Op-16-Z, stated in effect that:

	(a) He at times wears the uniform of Lieutenant Commander of the Navy by special authority of the Director of Naval Intelligence. He has no written authority for doing so. (Captain Riheldaffer gave the permission). Also, Captain Riheldaffer had given him authority to assign and distribute as souvenirs collected material from captured submarines that has no intelligence value.

	(b) The processing of prisoners of war as done at the Naval Prison, Portsmouth, did not conform to usual practice and that material which should have properly gone into a prisoner's envelope and for which he should have been given a receipt, found its way into the pockets of the processors and included considerable amounts in Swiss francs, approximately 20,000.

	(c) Lieutenant Commander Steinhoff, Commanding Officer of U-873, was a very difficult prisoner -- adamant. Steinhoff was the only man that could supply certain information considered of primal importance, so he requested the Commandant of the Prison to assign to him a large, husky Marine, to stand by while he interrogated Steinhoff. He directed that Marine (Private First Class Sol Leventhal) to stand by outside the door. He interrogated Steinhoff two and one-half hours. It was a tough battle. He instructed the Marine that if he gave him the nod, to give the prisoner one slap with the back of his hand. This was done. The slap in the face he was given was not hard enough to be called real physical violence. It was used for insulting purposes, but resulted in Steinhoff's breaking down and giving the information that was needed. He admitted he would do it again if a similar condition arose, because a slap in the face or a threatening attitude toward a German by a guard is, to his mind, very little compared to what they were doing to our men.

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	16. Private First Class Sol Leventhal stated, in effect, in sworn testimony that he was a member of the special group of guards who were selected for the handling of prisoners who might appear to be difficult. These men were picked to do what they were told and keep quiet. Captain Steinhoff went into the room with Mr. Alberti, and he (Leventhal) was called in. Steinhoff was being questioned as to the movements of his submarine. Mr. Alberti indicated to him that he was to slap Steinhoff, which he did, two smart slaps -- one with the palm, the other with the back of his hand. They were not resisted. Steinhoff then gave the desired information. (He later committed suicide in Boston.)

	17. Neither Captain Ambrose, the Production Officer of the Industrial Department, in charge of the security, stripping and conditioning of the U-boats nor any of the officers who have visited these submarines at all hours of the day and night, have, at any time, observed any drinking or evidence of drunkenness on the part of any American service man on board these vessels.

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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

	18. The directives for handling prisoners of war applying in this case and which are made a part of it are to a considerable extent repetitious and give a confused impression on casual reading. They are never the less understandable, and in basic directives were further amplified by the Commandant of the FIRST Naval District, who definitely assigned tasks to be performed in carrying out these instructions so that any failure in compliance must be said to lay in the Navy Yard, POrtsmouth, Command, and in the Op-16-Z section of ONI, which appears to have disregarded provisions of the Chief of Naval OPerations directive of 19 May 1942, serial 01227316, which is in conformity with the Geneva Convention and particularly prohibits the taking of souvenirs.

	19. The failure in the Portsmouth Command fundamentally is the Commandant's failure, in that he did not recognize and exercise his command authority and issue clear and concise instructions to his subordinates with regard to carrying out the directives for handling German prisoners and captured U-boats which had been given him and when irregularities were brought to his attention, he failed to take positive steps to correct them.

	20. There was failure on the part of the Captain of the Yard at Portsmouth, Captain C. H. Roper, USN, as the Commandant's executive for military matters in the Yard, to exercise command authority and to issue the necessary information and orders to the various officers and departments of the Yard, and the Commander Surrender Group, Commander Kimmel -- ComSubForLant Training Command -- that were concerned with receiving safeguarding, securing and stripping the U-boats, and safeguarding and processing the German prisoners and their property. Neither the presence of Intelligence Officers from ONI, nor any other consideration, changed the fact that the responsibility for the U-boats and prisoners lay with the military command of the Portsmouth Navy Yard.

	21. There is unmistakable evidence of looting of the first submarine that came in, the U-805, by various persons, including both Marines and bluejackets.

	22. There is also evidence of stores of intoxicating liquor which was in the U-boats, being broached by persons unknown. There is no confirmed evidence of drunkenness on the part of the members of the guard or of enlisted men of the Navy on duty in the submarines.

	23. In general, the functions performed by the submarine surrender group under Commander Kimmel in receiving, safeguarding, securing and stripping the U-boats appear to have been satisfactorily performed; and, the Industrial Department of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, after it took over the boats, appears to have done and to be doing a workmanlike and satisfactory job of stripping and conditioning the captured U-boats. The guard functions being performed by the Marine guards under Colonel Patchen appear to be adequate.

	24. The testimony indicates that a civilian Interrogator, Mr. Jack Henry Alberti, wearing a naval uniform, while performing the duty of an Interrogator, practically took over the examination and processing of the

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	prisoners of war at the Naval Prison. The Commanding Officer of the Prison, Colonel Rossell, USMC, appears to have permitted this Mr. Alberti to handle the procedure about as he pleased. Mr. Alberti had prisoners' decorations stripped off. He distributed looted decorations and personal and public property to prison personnel as he saw fit; he caused the commanding officer of a surrendered U-boat to be slapped by an enlisted man. The other ONI Interrogators -- who were commissioned officers -- Lieutenant Commander Hatton and Lieutenant Maxwell -- appear to have fallen in with Mr. Alberti's actions and to have concurred in his doings. Mr. Alberti's actions are in direct violation of the Geneva Convention and the CNO Directives. As far as the enemy is aware, he is an American Naval Officer and his acts were concurred in by the Naval Command.

	25. Furthermore, at the Prison, baggage, the property of German prisoners of war and also public property, was looted in the entrance lobby and in the cell blocks with the active participation of the Field Officer of the Day, Major Mehrlust, USMCR. In this looting, in which Captain Hines, (MC), USN, and Lieutenant Commander Bromberg, (MC), USNR, as well as other officers and enlisted men, also appear to have participated, it was feared that important Intelligence material may have been lost, so that Mr. Alberti prevailed upon the Commanding Officer of the Prison to permit him to attempt to recover such material by the humiliating method of bargaining with the looters, both commissioned and enlisted.

	26. This complete lack of appreciation of is command responsibility on the part of Colonel Rossell, and evidence of complete failure of discipline in the Prison Command, is considered most reprehensible.

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