This record was kindly provided by the generous assistance of Tony Cooper.

 
 

   
                                                                                                                 COPY No. 14
     
 
This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer
 
     
     
     
 
C.B.  04051 (18)
 
   
     
 
 
 
"U70"
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interrogation of Survivors
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
 
April, 1941
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

 
 

   
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
     
     
     
     
 
CONFIDENTIAL
 
     
          This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.  
     
          It is intended for the use of the recipients only, and for communication to such Officers under them (not below the rank of Commissioned Officer) who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties.  The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due care and caution.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
 
CONFIDENTIAL
 
     
 
Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the
 
Official Secrets Acts
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
C.B.  04051 (18)
 
     
     
 
 
 
"U70"
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interrogation of Survivors
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
 
April, 1941
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
     
     
     
     
  NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,  
  ADMIRALTY, S.W.1.  
     
  N.I.D.  
                                                                                                                                             A  
     
     

 

     
     
 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
          The following report is compiled from information derived from prisoners of war.  The statements made cannot always be verified; they should therefore not be accepted as facts unless they are definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
 
3
 
     
     
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
_______
 
 
 
         
Page
I.
  Introductory Remarks  
5
         
II.
  Crew of "U 70"  
5
 
     
III.
 
Early History of "U 70"
 
7
 
     
IV.
 
First and Last Cruise of "U 70"
 
7
         
V.
  Sinking of "U 70"  
10
         
VI
  Details of "U 70"  
11
 
(i)
  General  
11
 
(ii)
  Engine Revolutions and Speed  
11
   
(iii)
  Tank Capacity  
11
   
(iv)
  Maximum Diving Depth  
12
   
(v)
  Torpedoes  
12
   
(vi)
  W/T  
12
   
(vii)
  Device  
13
           
VII.
  Food Conditions on Board U-boats  
14
         
VIII.
  Results of the Escape of German Prisoners of War  
14
         
IX
  Tactics Employed for Diving  
15
         
X.
 
Flooding Controls
 
15
       
XI.
  Scuttling Charges  
16
     
XII.
  Tallies in U-boats  
16
     
XIII.
  Net Cutter in U-boats  
16
 
     
 
APPENDICES
 
     
 
I.
  Translation of a document captured from "U 70."  Menu for 42 days.
   
II.
  List of Survivors of "U 70."
 
     
                                                                      PLATE                                             facing page 11  
     
     
     
     
                                                                                                                                       B*  
  (C41049)  
     

 

 
 
 
5
 
     
  INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS OF "U 70" SUNK AT ABOUT 1315
           ON FRIDAY, 7th MARCH, 1941, IN POSITION APPROXIMATELY  
           60° N. AND 14° W.  
 
_____________
 
     
 
I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
 
     
          "U 70" was sunk on Friday, 7th March, 1941, and "U 100" and "U 99" were both sunk on Monday, 17th March, 1941.  The interrogation of the survivors of "U 70" was still being carried out when the survivors of the other two U-boats arrived, and the interrogation of all three U-boats was carried out concurrently.  
          For the sake of clarity and continuity, all general information has been collated under headings and will be published in the last of the three reports.  The report on the interrogation of the survivors of "U 70" contains matter referring to "U 70" only, except for some general information obtained from subsequent interrogation of various prisoners after the publishing of the report on "U 31" in December, 1940 (C.B. 4051 (16) ).  
     
 
II.  CREW OF "U 70"
 
     
          The complement of "U 70" consisted of 6 officers, 15 petty officers and 24 ratings, totalling 45.  
          The surviving officers were the Captain, the Engineer Officer and two midshipmen under instruction; the First Lieutenant and the Junior Watch-keeping Officer lost their lives.  
          Six of the Petty Officers were rescued and nine were drowned.  
          Of the ratings, fifteen survived and nine were lost.  
          The morale of both officers and men was high, and the usual undigested propaganda was repeated verbatim and ad nauseam.  There was no sign of war weariness.  
          It was interesting to note that the German High Command had instilled into the Petty Officers and ratings an astonishing amount of incorrect and exaggerated "information" regarding the prowess and vast expansion of the U-boat branch of the navy; the authors of these "facts" rely on the British Interrogating Officers to extract much of this misleading information.  Some of the ratings were extremely distressed when they realized that they had been trapped into disclosing this information, which they firmly believed was accurate and confidential; they refused to be convinced that the information was frequently far from the truth.  Several of the crew honestly believed that British convoys were unprotected, that it was an easy matter for a U-boat to attack a convoy and that the risks they ran were small.  
          "U 70" was on her first cruise, and her crew had been in Germany for some time, and had left Kiel on their first cruise as recently as Thursday, 20th February, 1941; their general health compared favourably with that of the crew of "U 99," who had been in Lorient for some time.  Even so, the Captain of H.M.S. "Arbutus," who sank "U 70" and picked up the survivors, considered that their endurance in the water was of a very low order.  
          The survivors of "U 70" were the most security-conscious prisoners captured up to date, and frequently refused to give simple information of no significance.  The reason for this attitude is indicated later in this report.  
          The average age of the Petty Officers was 26-1/2 years; a number had undergone adequate training and were reasonably experienced men, but, as usual, several lacked experience, initiative, training and general intelligence.  
          The average age of the ratings was 21 years.  The proportion of men with little or no U-boat training was high, and included men who had joined the navy after the outbreak of war.  
          There was very little criticism of their officers, and only slight grumbling at the hard conditions of their service.  
     
  (C41049)                                                                                                                      B*2  
     
     

 

     
     
 
6
 
     
          According to their own accounts, everyone behaved very well during the attack on, and the sinking of "U 70."  
          The Captain, Kapitänleutnant Joachim Matz, joined the navy in 1932, went round the world in the cruiser "Köln," was promoted to Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) on 1st January, 1936, and after qualifying as a W/T officer, transferred to U-boats.  In 1937 he served in "U 14," a 250-ton U-boat of the older type, and in 1938 was given command of a 250-ton U-boat of the School Flotilla, probably "U 6," as he is known to have been in command of "U 6" in September, 1939.  
          It is presumed that he achieved some success during the first few months of the war, as it is known that he was subsequently ill for some time and only went to sea again in "U 70" on her first cruise.  In "U 70" he professed to have sunk about 35,500 tons, and that this figure brought his total to over 100,000 tons of shipping sunk; he thus implied a claim to have sunk about 7,000 tons or more in his earlier U-boat, probably "U 6."  
          His period of ill-health, due to the kidney trouble so prevalent among U-boat officers, seems to have begun early in 1940, and he acted during this time as Adjutant to the U-boat Flotilla "Emsmann" in Kiel.  
          He was married on 7th July, 1940, since when his health has been good.  
          Later he was appointed to "U 70" while she was still under construction.  
          He gave the impression of being a conscientious and efficient officer, but lacking in initiative and imagination.  He was polite, not to obviously Nazi, and easy to talk to except for his extreme cautiousness and palpable fear of divulging information.  He spoke some English.  He had recently taken a flat in Kiel.  
          The First Lieutenant, Oberleutnant zur See Ehrhardt Wengert, and the Junior Officer, Leutnant zur See Edgar von Seidlitz, did not survive.  
          The Engineer Officer, Leutnant (Ing.) Wall, aged 34, formerly served on the lower deck, and had been in U-boats since 1935.  He was granted a commission in the early summer of 1940, after sixteen years' service in the German Navy.  During this period of service he had been in cruisers, torpedo-boats and minesweepers, as well as U-boats.  Wall maintained that there was considerable rivalry between technical officers and non-technical officers in large warships, but stated that in U-boats, where the crews were smaller, this was not so evident.  There was however, a movement afoot, he added, to have technical officers offered the right to become U-boat Commanders.  He was extremely observant, astute and wary in his contacts with the British, but became easier to handle if approached by means of preliminary conversation on personal and family matters.  In his heart he deplored the war between Germany and Great Britain, but his sense of duty would make him fight again in U-boats, had he the chance to do so.  He expressed the opinion that the U-boat arm could not prove decisive in this war.  
          Like all the officers and men of "U 70," he was enthusiastically grateful for the kind treatment received in H.M.S. "Arbutus."  
          The two midshipmen, both aged 20, joined the Navy as volunteers at the outbreak of war, and received at Stralsund a short course of military training which included physical training and rifle shooting.  This was followed by five months as cadets in the training ship "Schlesien," and a course of six months at the naval school at Flensburg.  
          One of these midshipmen then went to a shore station at Ostend and the other to a harbor patrol-boat at Le Harve; the former would have preferred to serve in E-Boats, but volunteered, as did the latter, for U-Boats, where there were better prospects.  
          They were transferred provisionally to the U-boat branch in December, 1940, and had not yet received any special training for this service; they were sent on their first cruise in "U 70" to ascertain their suitability before undergoing specialised U-boat training.  
          They were both quite good types of the better middle class German, well-disciplined, polite, and behaved well when "U 70" was attacked and sunk.  They both spoke some English.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
7
 
     
 
III.  EARLY HISTORY OF "U 70"
 
     
          "U 70" was laid down at the Germania Yard, Kiel, in March, 1939, as one of a series of seven 500-ton U-boats comprising "U 66" to "U 72."  
          In July, 1940, the first members of her crew, including the Engineer Officer, were drafted to stand by "U 70" during the final stages of her construction; further men were drafted to the U-boat during the following months, and the date of completion was given by one prisoner as 13th November, 1940.  No explanation was forthcoming as to the reason for the unusually long time (over one year and eight months) taken to build this U-boat.  
          Prisoners admitted that they had been especially warned not to divulge any information on this point.  
          The torpedo ratings joined "U 70" on 20th November, 1940, and were among the last members of the complement to arrive.  She was attached to the 7th U-boat Flotilla, based on Kiel.  
          The U-boat left Kiel at the end of November and carried out trials in the Baltic; these lasted seven or eight weeks, and "U 70" was based on Danzig during this period.  Special tests as to resistance to depth charge explosions were made in a particularly deep part of the sea near Danzig.  Apparently six depth charges were dropped to test each U-boat.  During this test "U 70's" forward hydroplanes were damaged, and a number of connecting rods were smashed; inside the U-boat most of the wires, instrument glasses, lights and switches were smashed, and much minor damage done.  "U 70" then returned to Kiel about the middle of January, 1941.  
          From an entry in a note-book it was established that she left dockyard hands on 16th February, 1941.  
          Stores were taken on board on 17th February, 1941, and further stored, including cigars, cigarettes and wines, were received on 19th February, 1941.  
     
 
IV.  FIRST AND LAST CRUISE OF "U 70"
 
 
(All times are B.S.T., i.e., one hour in advance of G.M.T.)
 
     
          "U 70" left Kiel on the morning of Thursday, 20th February, 1941, and proceeded through the Kiel Canal to Brünsbüttel, where she remained for the night before continuing her journey to Heligoland, where she arrived about 1500 on Friday, 21st February, 1941.  An air raid on the island was described as having taken place on the night of 21st/22nd February, and the U-boat's crew thought that they seemed to be the main target.  Two British aircraft were claimed as having been brought down.  After the air raid the U-boat men went up to the shelters of the anti-aircraft gunners and got drunk.  
          On Saturday, 22nd February, as "U 70" was about to leave Heligoland, one member of the crew became ill and was sent to hospital; a further cause of delay was the fact that "U 70" was noticed to be showing oil trace.  The leaking fuel tank had to be emptied, made tight and refilled.  The U-boat then spent her second night at Heligoland, and left unaccompanied on the following day, Sunday, 23rd February, on her first and last cruise.
          She had on board menus for meals for 42 days, numbered consecutively from 1 to 42, the first day being 23rd February.  Numbers 1 to 12 were ticked with a pencil, presumably indicating the number of days which had been completed, namely Sunday, 23rd February to Thursday, 6th March.  Opposite menu number 15 was written "Sunday," which would be Sunday, 9th March.  From the number of days for which menus had been made it was apparently considered possible that the U-boat might remain at sea for 42 days.  
          "U 70" was described as having proceeded on the surface as much as possible during both day and night, and to have submerged only when forced to dive to avoid being spotted by aircraft.  Orders were mentioned according to which U-boats were to crash dive at once if aircraft were reported, without waiting to ascertain the nationality of the aircraft.  For this reason only a few members of the crew were allowed short spells on deck.  It was stated that "U 70" dived on occasions to 50 metres (164 ft.).  
     
  (C40149)                                                                                                                     B*3  
     
     

 

     
     
 
8
 
     
          No really bad weather was experienced, seas being only 6 and 7, but the U-boat shipped many seas; while proceeding on the surface the conning tower hatch was kept partially closed, one hand attending it to close it in case of need.  Some water, however, always entered the U-boat.  
          "U 70's" first attempt at attack on a convoy during this cruise appears to have been abortive; but prisoners maintained that at one moment they were forced to stop and to go astern on both engines to avoid ramming a destroyer - described as "one of the Americans" - that they could have thrown hand grenades on board, had they had any.  The Germans expressed amazement at not having been spotted.  
          Survivors of "U 70" stated that on Saturday, 1st March, 1941, shortly after reaching the Atlantic, they were about to attack a heavily laden tanker, estimated at 12,000 tons, when they were forestalled by another U-boat.  A torpedo rating of "U 70" described this attack; he said that the tanker was set on fire.  Shortly afterwards some depth charges were heard some distance away.  Later the burning tanker was sunk by another torpedo from the attacking U-boat.  
          (N.I.D. Note:  The tanker "Cadillac," 12,063 tons, in Convoy HX 109, was torpedoed at 2301 on Saturday, 1st March, 1941, in position 60° 20' N., 12° 18' W.  Her cargo of gasoline caught fire and was still burning at 0230 on 2nd March.  The weather conditions were:  Wind E., force 2, visibility 6, sea and swell 12.  
          At 2309 on 1st March H.M.S. "Mallow" attacked a doubtful contact in the vicinity of "Cadillac."  H.M.S. "Malcolm" also dropped depth charges at this time.  Five seriously injured survivors of the tanker were picked up by H.M.S. "Malcolm," but no further trace of "Cadillac" was found by other ships, nor by H.M. tugs "Seaman" and "St. Olaves" detailed to search for her.)  
          No admission was made by survivors of "U 70" of any attacks made on them at this time.  
          S.S. "Merchant," however reported having just missed ramming a U-boat in approximately this position at 2330 on 1st March and to have fired 60 machine-gun bullets into the conning tower and hull.  At the same time S.S. "Negala" claims to have hit a U-boat with her fourth shell, which was not seen to explode; the U-boat remained on the surface for a quarter of an hour afterwards.  
          None of the survivors of "U 70" knew anything whatever of the sinking of S.S. "Pacific" in the same convoy at 2345, some miles to the northward.  
          It would thus appear that a second U-boat was operating in this area, sank S.S. "Cadillac" and S.S. "Pacific," and was herself attacked by S.S. "Merchant" and S.S. "Negala."  It is even possible that a third U-boat was present.  
          According to prisoners, U 70" went almost as far north as Iceland.  
          On the morning of Friday, 7th March, 1941, there was a northerly wind blowing, force 4, a moderate sea, and it was dark but clear with very good visibility.  
          A W/T rating stated that "U 47," Kapitänleutnant Prien, had located a convoy by listening gear, and reported to the Admiral Commanding U-boats; the crew of "U 70" knew that their ship had then received orders from the Admiral to attack the convoy; they assumed that these orders were addressed to any other U-boats in the vicinity.  "U 70" proceeded at full speed on the surface for about two hours, stopped, dived, adjusted her listening gear, and listened.  By good luck and good judgment they had arrived at a point just ahead of the convoy, and picked up at once on their listening gear the sound of many ships.  Unexpectedly soon they found themselves in the middle of the convoy.  They surfaced and looked for the biggest ships.  Prisoners thought that the small silhouette of their U-boat allowed them to adopt this procedure with impunity.  
          Conflicting statements were made as to the number of other U-boats which took part in the attack on Convoy O.B.293 in the early morning of Friday, 7th March, 1941, but it was established that "U 99," Kapitänleutnant Kretschmer, and "U 47," Kapitänleutnant Prien, were present.  
          The survivors of "U 70" claimed to have sunk four ships with four torpedoes fired at short intervals; displacements of these ships were given as about 12,000 tons, 10,000 tons, 7,400 tons, and 4,000 or 5,000 tons; thus the total claimed was about 35,500 tons.  Some men estimated the total as high as 38,000 tons.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
9
 
     
          The first ship to be torpedoed was the tanker "Athelbeach," 6,570 tons, at 0430.  
          At about 0450 S.S. "Delilian," 6,423 tons, was torpedoed on the starboard side, and her crew abandoned ship.  
          (N.I.D. Note:  The damage to S.S. Delilian" was not serious.  The crew returned to their ship, which reached port safely.)  
          "Athelbeach" and "Delilian" may have been two of "U 70's" alleged four victims, but the prisoners had no idea of the names of the ships they professed to have sunk, and the German's statements as to the tonnage are of no assistance in assessing what ships were accounted for by "U 70."  "U 70" was said to have reloaded four of her torpedo tubes, and the time given for this job was about one hour and ten minutes for the actual reloading operation.  
          At 0510 H.M.S. "Wolverine" dropped a pattern of depth charges on a doubtful contact astern of the convoy.  These distant explosions were heard by the crew of "U 70."  
          Prisoners stated that "U 70" fired three torpedoes at S.S. "Terje Viken," having picked her out as one of the largest ships in the convoy, and that all three torpedoes missed; as they were about to fire a fourth they were forestalled by another U-boat, which succeeded in torpedoing the large ship.  "Terje Viken" was hit for the first time by two torpedoes at about 0605.  
          (N.I.D. Note:  "Terje Viken," 20,638 tons, was, before the war, a whale factory, and was the largest vessel of her kind in the world.  During this war she was in use as a tanker, but was in ballast on this voyage.  At about 0650 on the same day she was hit by a third torpedo, believed to have been fired by "U 99."  At 1725 she had to be abandoned; at 1755 she capsized and was then shelled by a salvage tug.  No further trace was seen of her.)  
          At 0625, in position 60 31' N., 13 52' W., the Dutch tanker "Mijdrecht," 7,493 tons, when approaching a lifeboat to pick up members of "Delilian's" crew, who had abandoned their ship, was hit by a torpedo fired by "U 70," on her starboard side, about six feet forward of the engine room bulkhead.  The explosion was described as a sharp crack, but there was no flash.  The damage caused the ship to sink about 9 ft. by the stern.  The tanker's Captain saw a periscope, or the "feather" of a periscope, two points on his starboard bow, and turned his helm hard to starboard.  A minute later, doing 7 knots, she rammed the "U 70."  The tonnage of "Mijdrecht" was fairly accurately given by some survivors as about 7,400 tons.  
          According to the survivors of "U 70" the coning tower was badly dented aft, the bearing disk (Peilscheibe) was carried away, both periscopes were put out of action, and everything on the bridge was smashed; nevertheless, no internal damage was caused, but a stream of water, over 2 in. in diameter, entered the boat through the broken off rod of the bearing disk; the lighting system was not affected.  The crew described the U-boat as having rolled over on one side, as though struck by a huge wave.  "U 70" went down slightly by the stern, and submerged to a depth stated to have been 20 metres (53.6 ft.).  
          The Captain of "Mijdrecht" stated that he felt three distinct shocks when his ship struck "U 70" and that the U-boat passed underneath his ship and came up on his port side almost alongside; the U-boat's stern was described as protruding for a moment about 15 ft. from the water.  
          (N.I.D. Note:  Subsequent examination of the "Mijdrecht," on her return to port, showed 40 ft. of grey paint from the U-boat adhering to her hull.)  
          "U 70" surfaced so close that "Mijdrecht" could not get her gunsights on to her, so the tanker's Captain ordered full-speed ahead.  About one minute later "Mijdrecht" opened fire with her fourth gun, and claimed to have obtained a direct hit on "U 70's" conning tower with her third shell.  
          The tanker then proceeded at full speed ahead, and was able to return to port.  
          The Germans emphatically denied that they had been hit by "Mijdrecht's" gun-fire.  
     
  (C40149)                                                                                                                              B*4
     
     

 

     
     
 
10
 
     
          The U-boat's conning tower hatch was then opened to a limited extent, and, with difficulty, after plugging the broken off rod of the bearing disk, the Captain decided to dive to 30 metres (98.4 ft.), according to prisoners, in order to find out whether the pressure hull had been damaged; but this proved to be watertight, except for the broken-off rod of the bearing disk which still let some water into the U-boat.  
          "U 70" then surfaced and tried to escape on the surface at full speed.  
     
 
V.  SINKING OF "U 70"
 
     
          At 0843 on 7th March, 1941, H.M.S. "Arbutus" received a signal from H.M.S. "Camellia" to the effect that the latter had sighted a U-boat on the surface, but that her Asdic had failed.  "Camellia" carried out an attack by eye when the U-boat dived.  "Arbutus" closed the position and obtained an echo at 0925.  
          At 0927 she fired a pattern of six depth charges, settings 500, 250, 350 - 500 - 350, 250.  
          At 0937 "Arbutus" fired a second pattern with the same settings and dropped a calcium flare.  
          At 0945 "Camellia" carried out an attack.  
          According to the Germans, the earlier depth charges were some distance away and did no damage.  
          At 1123, 1134 and 1146 "Arbutus" carried out further attacks with the same depth charge settings as previously.  
          According to prisoners the U-boat maintained a depth of 80 metres (262 ft.).  Her crew thought that "U 70" had an air leak, and that bubbles of air rising to the surface were giving away their position to the British.  
          The depth charge attacks caused more and more damage, water began to enter the U-boat, and when this became serious four men were detailed to work the hand pump; they pumped for a while whenever depth charges were dropped, and not during the intervals, as they feared that the noise of the pumping might be heard by the hunting craft.  
          In order to save electricity all lights were extinguished except those vitally necessary.  
          Prisoners denied that the electric motors or batteries suffered damage.  
          The U-boat went to 90 metres (295 ft.), and then to 100 metres (328 ft.).
          More and more water entered.  It was realised that to escape by increasing speed was out of the question, and an attempt was made to lie motionless until evening, when there might be a chance of escaping in the dark on the surface.  
          After rising to 80 metres (262 ft.), the U-boat found herself 10 minutes later as deep as 120 metres (393 ft.), where she managed to remain for some time.  She then apparently got out of control.  She sank deeper and deeper, the indicator hand of the depth gauge showed an increasing depth down to 200 metres (656 ft.), the deepest limit marked, and then went on until stopped by the check.  
          Ominous cracking sounds were heard, the paint flaked off the sides, and the crew thought that the hull would be crushed by the tremendous pressure of water.  
          The supply of compressed air was by that time reduced to 25 kilograms; this was used in a last attempt to rise; the U-boat had gone down by the stern, and was now at an angle of 45 degrees.  Most of the instruments had been smashed and the damage was described as amounting to almost complete wreckage of the interior of the U-boat.  A considerable quantity of water had also entered through the hull abaft the conning tower, where the U-boat had been damaged by the ramming.  The crew were huddled together in the forward compartment.  The U-boat came slowly on to an even keel.  
          A desperate attempt was made to hold her level, both electric motors were set at full speed ahead, and all tanks were blown.  
          At 1244 "Arbutus" made her seventh attack with her four remaining depth charges, settings 350-500-350, 500.  "U 70" was then trying to rise and the depth charges exploded above her; she succeeded, however, in surfacing.  
     
     

 

     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
11
 
     
          The Captain opened the conning tower hatch and six men were said to have been thrown out by the tremendous excess pressure inside the U-boat.  
          H.M.S. "Arbutus" opened fire and claimed to have hit the base of the conning tower with 4-in. H.E.  Well-directed pom-pom fire prevented any attempt on the part of the Germans to man their gun.  
          Prisoners denied that "Arbutus" fire hit "U 70."  
          "Arbutus" turned to ram the U-boat, but found ramming unnecessary, as the Germans were jumping overboard.  She just missed "U 70," dropping two Carley floats near the crew, and closed the U-boat which was still proceeding with her forward hydroplanes up.  
          The Petty Officer Telegraphist admitted that it was not possible to send any signal announcing their fate.  He added that the German Naval Authorities would assume from the cessation of signals that something had happened to "U 70."  
          The Germans maintained that they made sure of the sinking of their U-boat by opening the vents before they abandoned ship.  
          "U 70" sank at 1318; she still had five torpedoes, having fired seven of her total of 12.  "Arbutus" picked up 26 survivors who included the Captain and three other officers; two officers and 18 men were lost.  
          Prisoners stated that "U 70" was to have ended her cruise at St. Nazaire.  
     
 
VI.  DETAILS OF "U 70"
 
     
  (i)  General  
          "U 70" was said to be a standard 500-ton U-Boat.  From her tank capacities it seems that she was slightly smaller than "U 49," a 500-ton U-Boat completed at the same yard in August, 1939.  
     
  (ii)  Engine Revolutions and Speeds  
          At utmost speed submerged revolutions were stated to have been between 300 and 350, but some E.R.A.'s thought that 350 revolutions had never been attained.  Half speed on the surface was given as 200 revolutions.
          Her utmost speed was given as not more than 17.5 knots on the surface.  
     
  (iii)  Tank Capacity  
 
Tank.
Capacity, Cu. M
  Ballast tank (Tauchzelle) 1   32.3
  Ballast tank (Tauchbunker 2, starboard   11.4
  Ballast tank (Tauchbunker) 2, port   11.4
  Ballast tank (Tauchzelle) 3   47.75
  Ballast tank (Tauchbunker) 4, starboard   13.4
  Ballast tank (Tauchbunker) 4, port   13.4
  Ballast tank (Tauchzelle) 5   25.3
  Watertight compartment aft (wasserdichtes Heck)   4.25
  Watertight compartment forward (wasserdichtes Back)   8.0
  Trimming tank aft (Trimmzellw hinten)   3.55
  Trimming tank forward (Trimzelle vorn)   3.60
  Torpedo tank 1 (Torpedozelle)   2.35
  Torpedo tank 2 (Torpedozelle)   5.75
  Torpedo tank 3 (Torpedozelle)   5.75
  Torpedo tube 1 (Torpedorohr)   1.74
  Torpedo tube 2 (Torpedorohr)   1.74
  Torpedo tube 3 (Torpedorohr)   1.74
  Torpedo tube 4 (Torpedorohr)   1.74
  Torpedo tube 5 (Torpedorohr)   1.74
  Compensating tank (Regelbunker) 1, starboard   4.7
  Compensating tank (Regelbunker) 1, port   4.7
  Compensating tank (Regelzelle) 2, starboard   7.85
  Compensating tank (Regelzelle) 2, port   7.85
  Negative buoyancy quick-diving tank (Untertriebzelle) starboard   2.15
  Negative buoyancy quick-diving tank (Untertriebzelle) port   2.15
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
12
 
     
 
Tank.
Capacity, Cu. M
  Drinking water tank (Trinkwasserzelle) 1   2.625
  Drinking water tank (Trinkwasserzelle) 2   0.465
  Drinking water tank (Trinkwasserzelle) 3   0.705
  Washing water tank (Waschwasserzelle)   0.485
  Washing water ready-use tank (Waschwasser Verbrauchsbehälter)   0.030
  Dirty water tank (Schmutzwasserzelle) 1   0.760
  Dirty water tank (Schmutzwasserzelle) 2   0.485
  Distilled water tank (dest. Behälter) 1   0.149
  Distilled water tank (dest. Behälter) 2   0.199
  Distilled water tank (dest. Behälter) 3   0.153
  Oil fuel tank (Treibölbunker) 1   37.900
  Oil fuel tank (Treibölbunker) 2   32.800
  Oil fuel container (Triebölhochbehälter)   0.700
  Motor oil storage tank (Motölvorrtank) 1, starboard   3. (illegible)
  Motor oil storage tank (Motölvorrtank) 2, port   3.230
  Motor oil drain tank (Motölsammtank) 1, starboard   0.720
  Motor oil drain tank (Motölsammtank) 2, port   0.800
  Dirty oil drain tank (Schmutzölslammeltank)   0.790
  High-pressure air flask (Hochdruckluftfl)   3.325
  Oxygen flask (Sauerstoffflasche)   0.050
 
     
  (iv)  Maximum Diving Depth  
          The maximum diving depth guaranteed by the building yard for "U 70" was given as 135 metres (428 ft.), but it was claimed that she dived to more than 200 metres (656 ft.) during the attack in which she was sunk.  
     
  (v)  Torpedoes  
          "U 70" was described as having five torpedo tubes, and as usually carrying twelve torpedoes.  But prisoners added that there were two containers for torpedoes one forward and one aft.  Of these twelve torpedoes, five were in the tubes, four under and two above the floor plates in the forward compartment, one aft as spare for the stern tube; the containers on deck were empty on this cruise.  
          The reloading of torpedoes inside the U-Boat was usually done submerged; this work was more difficult on the surface owing to the movement of the U-Boat.  Prisoners said it took twenty minutes to reload a torpedo tube under favorable conditions.  
          When torpedoes are housed in watertight containers on deck they were described as lying in as greased trough formed of about eight wooden blocks.  To remove the torpedo to the interior of the U-Boat, the tail of the torpedo was attached to a small crane and lifted, and the torpedo was then slid head first into the open hatch of the forward or the stern compartment; the torpedo was lowered down a slide, and then loaded into the torpedo tube.  The operation was said to take about 1-1/2 to 2 hours for each torpedo, and to be extremely dangerous.  It could only be carried out in very calm weather.  Six men were required to do this job.  
     
  (vi)  W/T  
          (a)  R.D/F Apparatus in U-Boats.  A Petty Officer Telegraphist gave the following information regarding R.D/F apparatus in U-Boats:  
          The cage is a rectangle, the top and bottom being 1 m. wide and 30 cm. deep.  The height is 1 m. 50 cm.  
          The back of the cage is covered with wire netting.  
          From the middle point of the bottom to the middle point of the top runs the vertical aerial, which is, therefore, 1 m. 50 cm. in length.  
          At right angles to the vertical aerial and fixed to it are horizontal aerials.  Each horizontal aerial is about 40 to 45 cm. in length; they extend across the breadth of the cage.  These horizontal aerials are attached to the vertical aerial at alternate points, i.e., first an aerial extending to one side, then lower down is fixed an aerial extending to the other side and lower down again an aerial extending to the first side and so on.
     
     

 

     
     
 
13
 
     
          All the aerials have a diameter of about 1 cm.  
          There is no reflector.  
          The wire netting at the back of the cage is made of ordinary wire.  
          The whole cage is fitted to the interior of the side of the conning tower and can be projected above the conning tower just sufficient to clear it and to enable the cage to be rotated.  
          The R.D/F apparatus is referred to as an "Elektrische Entfernungsmessgerät," E.E.M.G. (electrical range-finding apparatus), or possibly also by the letters D.T.  This Petty Officer Telegraphist said that this apparatus was operated by means of what he described as a "Braun'sches Rohr" (Cathode Ray Tube), and, in addition, there are 46 valves.  By means of this they were able to send a parallel beam which could thus determine the precise angle.  He described the method of judging distance as being marked off on the following image of the Cathode ray tube of the Braun'sches Rohr.  Objectives seen by this apparatus were shown by a blip in the spark, fairly small for a ship and much bigger for an aircraft.  In this way they were able to differentiate between ships and aeroplanes.  They could also get the precise height, but he did not know exactly how this was done.  He said that another instrument was used for it.  
          They had no method of deciding whether any aircraft approaching were hostile or friendly.  
          This apparatus was used both by the Navy and the Air Force, and he seemed to think that, as regards height, distance and direction, it was of extreme accuracy.  
          No R.D/F apparatus was fitted in "U 70."  
          (b)  Listening Service.  The listening service in U-boats is called "B Dienst" (Beobachtungsdienst or Reconnaissance Service).  "W Dienst" is called "Wetterdienst" (Weather Reporting Service).  
          U-boats are not given any weather reports, as they do not need them, but are frequently requested to give weather reports, for which purpose they surface.  The reports are wirelessed direct to the B.d.U. (Vice-Admiral U-boats), who passes them on to the German Air Force.  
          (c)  General.  Apparatus in the wireless cabinet consisted of a:  
          Short Wave Transmitter;  
          "Rundfunk" (W/T receiving, not sending, apparatus);  
          U/T (Submarine Telephone);  
          G.H.G. (Gruppenhorchgerat or listening gear).  
          It was stated that G.H.G. enabled U-Boats to hear ships which were below the horizon, estimated at a distance of 12 miles, and that the U/T (Submarine Telephone) was effective up to a maximum distance of five miles.
          All wireless messages were transmitted on a short wave.  The sender could not be used for waves lower than 70 m.  Weather forecasts and position reports were sent on the same wave length and at no fixed time.  On sailing a list was provided giving the wave length to be used at various dates during the cruise.  
          "Kurzmeldungen" (short wave signals) are made in connection with weather reports on the same wave length as for other messages, but they only consist of a few letters.  U-Boats are also instructed to report any urgent information, such as movements of convoys.  
          During this cruise "U 70" did not communicate with, nor receive messages from, any U-Boat or aircraft, although it was known that other U-Boats were in the neighbourhood, for the B.d.U. (Vice-Admiral U-Boats) had warned them that other U-boats were operating in the vicinity.  
          "U 70" had also been warned by the B.d.U. of the approach of convoys.  Detailed information had been provided of the estimated time of arrival, course, number of ships, and escorts.  
     
  (vii)  Device  
          A mailed fist was painted on the conning tower.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
14
 
     
 
VII.  FOOD CONDITIONS ON BOARD U-BOATS
 
     
          Food conditions on board U-Boats seem on the whole to be exceedingly good.  Translation of a document captured from "U 70" showing the menu for 42 days is given in Appendix I.  This U-Boat had left Heligoland on 23 February and had been at sea for twelve days when she was sunk 7th March.  
          Survivors from "U 100," which had also come from Germany, stated that the food supplied to U-boats was of the very best.  The commander, who was training for the command of a U-Boat, said that it was better than he had had in the "Scharnhorst" and ashore.  Fresh fruit, oranges, lemons and apples were liberally supplied for the crew.  
          This boat had been at sea for nine days when she was sunk.  
          On the other hand a medical report on the survivors of "U 99," which had come from Lorient and had been at sea for 24 days when she was sunk, indicated that the food was not so good as in the other two U-Boats.  
          The medical report was as follows:  "I examined today 33 other ranks.  I found their state of health to be poor.  General nutrition was poor.  A large percentage of the men were suffering from and infected with gingivitis and an appreciable number were anemic (five out of 33 markedly so, to a clinical degree).  Eight out of 33 had marked oral sepsis.  
          I conclude that the men have been on a very poor diet, markedly defective, especially in protein, fat and fresh fruit, vegetables and similar sources of vitamin "C."  
                                                                                   Signed:  R. SCOTT  
                                                                                            Captain, R.A.M.C."  
     
 
VIII.  RESULTS OF THE ESCAPE OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR
 
     
          The caution and suspicion of the crew of "U 70" regarding interrogation was markedly more extreme than in the case of any batch of prisoners hitherto examined.  On many occasions survivors of "U 70" stated that they had been strongly cautioned generally and specifically regarding certain subjects.  
          It was obvious that an increased security-consciousness had been systematically instilled into these men.  
          This development is believed to be due to the fact that prisoners of war interrogated some months ago have escaped and have passed on to the German authorities details concerning the British interrogation methods, centres and personnel.  
          This is confirmed by the fact that the German Government has recently made a request to the Swiss Legation in London to pay an official visit to the camp where interrogations are conducted.  
          In September, 1940, a Petty Officer who had been captured on 25th February, 1940, at the sinking of "U 63," and who had been interrogated by naval officers, escaped from a transport ship in the St. Lawrence River.  On the voyage from Great Britain he trained for this escape in the ship's swimming bath.  He swam ashore, procured the necessary clothing, and reached the United States, where he placed himself under the protection of the German Consul, who subsequently sent him back to Germany via Japan and Russia.
          It is obvious that the escape of this man was assisted by other prisoners of war who will have primed him with all the details and complaints they may have nursed; he will certainly have been most thoroughly examined on his return to Germany by naval intelligence officers, to whom he could have given much valuable information about the fate of "U 63," the subsequent interrogation of the crew, and their imprisonment.  
          It seems obvious that the German Naval Authorities would not neglect to warn U-Boat and other personnel of the details and pitfalls of British interrogation.  
        This escaped prisoner recently broadcast an account of his experiences, in which he made a number of untrue accusations against the British treatment of prisoners of war, and the conditions in prison camps.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
15
 
     
 
IX.  TACTICS EMPLOYED FOR DIVING
 
     
          While at sea only four men of the crew are allowed on deck at one time, so that there is no delay occasioned by the men entering the U-Boat in the event of a crash dive having to be made. While the crew are on deck the conning tower hatch is kept open, but in bad weather it is partly closed to prevent sea water entering the boat.  In a rough sea a man is stationed at the conning tower hatch in order to close it temporarily in case of need.  
          The orders given by the Commanding Officer are:  "Boot klar zum fluten" (Ready for diving), followed by "Fluten" (dive).  On receiving this order the Mechanician Petty Officer on watch opens the flooding vents in the control room, unless ordered to do so from other flooding positions.  The Commanding Officer remains in the conning tower and the crew take up their diving stations.  While diving some hands remain in the bow and serve the torpedoes, others are in the control room for the hydroplanes, and the engine-room ratings take up their stations at the motors, one man being at the Diesel engines.  The Engineer Officer, two Petty Officers and four engine-room ratings are in the control room.  
          If the sea is calm and the boat is not in danger, the boat usually dives to periscope depth, and the motors are set at slow speed to ensure that good listening is possible.  
     
  Crash Diving  
          When crash diving, the conning tower hatch is secured internally by the Commanding Officer by hand by means of a wheel fitted to the hatch cover.  The escape hatches are closed in a similar manner.  
          The Officer of the Watch calls out "Alarm," the bells are rung and the Engineer Officer then takes charge in the control room.  The U-boat usually dives to a depth of 30 metres (98 ft.), which depth is reached in less than a minute.  The course is not altered before this depth has been reached.  The time taken to dive to a depth until the conning tower is submerged is from 20 to 25 seconds.  
     
  Crash Diving in Heavy Seas  
          U-Boats can crash dive in any sea.  If there is a following heavy sea the time to dive would be about twice that taken under normal circumstances, and only half the normal time if the sea is head on.  
     
 
X.  FLOODING CONTROLS
 
     
          The Engineer-Lieutenant controls the blowing and venting of tanks.  One Petty Officer (Centralmaat), who has a seat on the starboard side of the control room, controls the hydroplane wheel fitted to the starboard side and also the blow and vent valves fitted on the same side but abaft the hydroplane wheel.
          All ballast tanks in the fore and after compartments can be flooded separately at their respective stations, but as a rule the flooding of all tanks is done by the master valve in the control room.  
          There are also two emergency flooding stations, one in the bow, the six vents being on the bulkhead which separates the Petty Officers' quarters from the bow compartment, and one in the stern, the six vents being on the cross bulkhead, just abaft the motors.  There is no master flooding vent.  
          There is a flooding vent on each tank, but these are inaccessible.  
          The tanks can be blown from the control room, and, if necessary, from the bow and stern emergency flooding stations.  The blow vent in the control room, called the "Hauptventil," is on the starboard side, those in the bow and stern are next to the flooding vents.  Neither flooding nor blow vents are tallied.  
          The "Hauptstutzen" (Master valve), which is connected to the air bottles, serves for furnishing air pressure when required to any part of the machinery.  There are six "kleine Stutzen" (small valves) in the control room which are used to blow the tanks separately.  The "Hauptstutzen" (Master valve) can blow all tanks simultaneously.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
16
 
     
 
XI.  SCUTTLING CHARGES
 
     
          Explosive scuttling charge are under the control of the Engineer Officer.  They are placed in all three compartments, bow, control room, and after compartment.  Their exact location could not be ascertained.  A kind of Brickford cord is attached to these explosive charges and this cord is ignited by pulling an electric ignition.  The Engineer Officer explodes these charges before leaving the boat.  
          On return of the U-Boat to her base the explosive charges are immediately removed and are only re-issued when she is ready to put to sea.  
     
 
XII.  TALLIES IN U-BOATS
 
     
          The only tallies which the existence could be definitely ascertained are the following:  
          (a)  "Flutventil"  (Flooding vent).  
          (b)  "Hochdruck"  (High pressure).  
          (c)  "Niederdruck"  (Low pressure).  
          (d)  "Fluten"  (Flood).  
          (e)  "Lenzen"  (Blow).  
          (f)  "Voras"  (Ahead).   On the Diesel engine.  
          (g)  "Zuruck"  (Astern).      "         "         "  
   
 
XIII.  NET-CUTTER IN U-BOATS
 
     
          Information has been obtained from various prisoners of war that the net-cutter from the bow of German U-Boats has been discarded.  It was not considered to be of any use.  
     
     
 
 
     
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
17
 
     
 
APPENDIX I
 
 
 
 
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT CAPTURED FROM "U.70"
 
     
 
Menu for 42 Days
 
     
 
Breakfast:               Coffee, cocoa or soup, jam or butter or honey and an egg on dam and.
Sunday    
23 Feb 1 Liver, cabbage, potatoes, fruit
    One kipper, liver sausage, butter, bread, coffee.
24 Feb 2 Black or liver sausage, sour cabbage, mashed potatoes, fruit
    Sandwiches, butter, bread, tea.
25 Feb 3 Beef Steak, cauliflower, potatoes, fruit
    Herring salad, sausage, butter, bread, tea.
26 Feb 4 Pigs' trotters (Eisbein), sauerkruat, mashed peas, potatoes, fruit
    Sausage, Edamer cheese, dripping, bread, tea.
27 Feb 5 Roast beef, French beans, potatoes, fruit
    Potato salad, fresh sausage, butter, bread, coffee.
Friday    
28 Feb 6 Sausage, cabbage, potatoes, fruit
    Fresh sausage, Camembert cheese, butter, bread, coffee.
1 March 7 Rissoles, mixed vegetables, potatoes, fruit
    Tongue sausage, Emmentaler cheese, butter bread, tea.
Sunday    
2 March 8 Chops, red cabbage, potatoes, fruit
    Liver cheese, sausage, butter, bread, cocoa
3 March 9 Roast beef, brussels sprouts, potatoes, fruit
    Grilled herrings, butter, sausage, bread, coffee.
4 March 10 Roast pork, cauliflower, potatoes, fruit
    Sausage, two eggs, butter, bread, coffee.
5 March 11 Ribs of beef, green cabbage, potatoes, fruit
    Fillet of mackerel, fresh sausage, dripping, bread, tea.
6 March 12 Meat soaked in vinegar (sauerbraten), macaroni, potatoes, stewed fruit
    Sausage, pickled cucumber, Camembert cheese, butter, bread, coffee.
Friday    
7 March 13 Potato soup, sausage, fruit
    Sausage, one egg, cheese, butter, bread, tea.
8 March 14 Beef goulash, mushrooms, potatoes, fruit
    Sardines in oil, Twilit cheese, dripping, bread, cocoa
Sunday    
9 March 15 Ham, asparagus, potatoes, fruit
    One tin of fish, one egg, butter, bread tea.
10 March 16 Spinach, two eggs, potatoes, fruit
    Sausage, Edamer cheese, butter, bread, coffee.
11 March 17 Peas and bacon, one sausage, fruit
    Boar's head, sardines in oil, butter, bread, coffee.
12 March 18 Ribs of beef, green cabbage, potatoes, fruit
    One tin of sausages, Camembert cheese, butter, bread, tea.
13 March 19 One tin of ox tongue, red cabbage, potatoes, plums
    Ham, sardines, butter, bread, cocoa
Friday    
14 March 20 Macaroni and bacon, stewed fruit
    Matties herrings, bacon fat, potatoes in their jackets, dripping, bread tea.
15 March 21 Beans, mutton, fruit
    Sausage, Emmentaler cheese, butter, bread, coffee.
Sunday    
16 March 22 Boar's head, green cabbage, roast potatoes, fruit
    Sausage, sardines in oil, pickled cucumber, butter, bread, tea.
17 March 23 Curried vegetables, one pickled cucumber, stewed plums
    Corned beef, herring, dripping, bread, coffee.
18 March 24 White beans, one tin pork,compote
    Bacon cutlet, radishes, cheese in tubes, butter, bread, tea.
19 March 25 Ham, mixed vegetables, mashed potatoes, fruit
    Liver sausage, lentil soup, butter, bread, coffee.
20 March 26 Latskaus, sardines, compote
    Smoked bacon, tinned ham, butter, bread, cocoa
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
18
 
     
 
APPENDIX I - continued.
 
     
 
Friday    
21 March 27 Macaroni goulash, fruit
    Sausage, sardines in oil, dripping, bread, coffee.
22 March 28 Pigs' trotters, sour cabbage, mashed potatoes, compote
    Sausage, Emmentaler cheese, butter, bread, cheese.
Sunday    
23 March 29 French beans, mutton, stewed prunes
     
24 March 30 Spinach, two eggs, potatoes, compote
    Peasant's breakfast (bauernfrühstück), pickled cucumber, dripping ersatz, bread, coffee.
25 March 31 Beef goulash, mushrooms, one pickled cucumber, potatoes, compote
    Sausage, Edam er cheese, butter, bread, tea.
26 March 32 Ribs of beef, mixed vegetables, potatoes, stewed fruit
    Rice pudding with cinnamon, strawberries, dripping, bread, cocoa
27 March 33 Peas and bacon, sausage, fruit
    Ham, cheese, butter, bread, tea.
Friday    
28 March 34 Tinned ham, asparagus, mashed potatoes, compote
    Sausage, sardines in oil, pickled cucumber, butter, bread, coffee.
29 March 35 Cooked bacon, sour cabbage, potatoes, stewed prunes
    Bean soup, one sausage, butter, bread, coffee.
Sunday    
30 March 36 Corned beef, turnips, potatoes, fruit
    Cooked ham, bacon, one pickled cucumber, dripping ersatz, bread, tea.
31 March 37 Egg-flip (hoppel-poppel), pickled cucumber, compote
    Tinned sausages, salt fish, butter, bread, tea.
1 April 38 Lentils and bacon, one sausage, stewed fruit
    Sausage, cheese, butter, bread, cocoa
2 April 39 Buttered egg, mushrooms, potatoes, fruit
    Supper according to provisions available.
3 April 40 Cooked bacon, French beans, potatoes, compote.
4 April 41 Vegetable curry, one pickled cucumber, potatoes, stewed fruit.
5 April 42 Cabbage with beef, compote.
 
     
          N.I.D. Note.  The dates have been inserted in the N.I.D.  "U 70" left Heligoland on Sunday, 23rd February, and was attacked on the morning of Friday, 7th March and sunk at 1300 on that day.  The numbers up to and including 12 were ticked off in pencil and opposite 15 was written the word Sunday in pencil.  It is thus safe to assume that number 1 refers to Sunday, 23rd February, and that provisions were taken for 42 days, though the two meals after the 38th day would have been very meager.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
19
 
     
 
APPENDIX II
 
 
 
     
 
List of Survivors of "U 70"
 
     
 
Name
Rank
English Equivalent
Age
       
Matz, Joachim Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant-Commander 27
Wall, Gerhard Leutnant (Ing.) Engineer Sub-Lieutenant 33
Vogler, Otto Fähnrich zur See Midshipman 20
Jörgensen, Christoph Fähnrich zur See Midshipman 20
Borchert, Jurgen Obersteuermann Chief Q.M., 1st Class 31
Seegitz, Karl Obermaschinenmaat Mechanician, 1st Class 25
Herrmann, Heinrich Obermaschinenmaat Mechanician, 1st Class 27
Ballenthin, Claus Bootsmannsmaat Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class 23
Hasse, Gerhard Mechanikersmaat P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class 26
Bruhn, Hermann Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class 22
Maleska, Hans Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 20
Stoll, Gerhard Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 20
Dorn, Kurt Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 20
Richter, Heinz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 23
Reiboldt, Helmut Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 22
Kollmann, Paul Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 22
Piotrowski, Hans Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 22
Krengel, Walter Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist 23
Andresen, Günther Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist 21
Jurgens, Wilhelm Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 21
Hupertz, Alions Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 18
Ullrich, Wolfgang Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20
Schröder, Hans Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class 21
Wagner, Johann Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class 20
Zeb, Siegfried Matrose Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class 18
 
     
 
Officers, 4;  Petty Officers, 6; Men, 15.    Total, 25.
 
     
 
"U 70"
 
     
          The following did not survive:  
     
 
Name
Rank
English Equivalent
Wengert, Ehrhardt Oberleutnant zur See Lieutenant  
von Seidlitz, Edgar Leutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant  
Weybe, Ernst Obersteuermann Chief Q.M., 1st Class  
Hampel, Alfonz Oberbootsmannsmaat Chief Bo'sun's Mate, 1st Class  
Hosbach, Horst Obermachinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class  
Scholz, Werner Obermachinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class  
Wittig, Alfred Bootsmannsmaat Chief Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class  
Brinkmann, Wilhelm Obermaschinenmaat Mechanician, 1st Class  
Jahn, Werner Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class  
Mönnich, Rudolf Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class  
Wrodarczyk, Alfred Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class  
Kampf, Richard Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Steuber, Karl Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Zöller, Franz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Breiter, Heinz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Höhna, Heinz Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Hitzenberger, Ludwig Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class  
Lehmann, Herbert Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class  
Zdunek, ----- Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class  
Schlausz, Robert Mechanikergefreiter (T) Artificer, 2nd Class (Torpedo rating)  
 
     
  (C41049)    B10      4/41  
     
     

 


 

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