EASTERN SEA FRONTIER

WAR DIARY

JUNE 1942

CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN MINE FIELDS

        On June 13th, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier sent out a letter informing all activities under his command that "recent information indicates that enemy submarines before proceeding to the United States are loading mines."  This information appeared to bear out the opinion held for some time by Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier "that as attacks on merchant shipping become markedly less successful, an effort would be made to mine the sea lanes and the approaches to the principal ports."  These words of warning were accompanied by a recommendation that "every possible effort should be made, in addition to sweeping the approaches, to make exploratory sweeps of the coastal lanes giving particular attention to those areas where well defined landmarks might well be used by the enemy for the laying of mines across the lanes traversed by vessels proceeding along the coast."

        The recent information of which the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier spoke in his letter has been accumulating during the past few months.  In April, Army Intelligence had reported that in all probability mining operations were about to be undertaken by the enemy on our east coast.  Plans, in fact, had been made by the German High Command, so the Army stated, to begin work in March but they had miscarried for some reason and the project was understood to be postponed until some time in May.  Surprisingly detailed overlays of the mine fields accompanied this report which had been made by an agent whose previous predictions had usually

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been borne out by events.

        May passed, however, without incident and early June brought no indications of German action.  On the 9th, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations informed all activities on this coast that the enemy submarine command in France was believed to have received a supply of magnetic ground and magnetic acoustic mines.  "These mines," he added, "may be encountered in Atlantic coastal waters in the near future.

        The next day, June 10th, an ALUSNA was sent out from Santiago, Chile, stating that the following report had been received from a high official in the C. S. A. V. line.  The Nazi Ambassador, it was said, had secretly informed the foreign minister of Chile to keep all Chilean vessels away from New York harbor since it would shortly be mined by German submarines.  On the 12th, our own newspapers carried the information that the C.S.A.V. ships would thereafter use New Orleans as the port of entry for the United States.  THis innocent news story lent color to the information received from Santiago.

        All these stray bits of evidence when put together enabled the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier to reach the conclusion contained in his letter of June 13th.  But his opinion could be based not only upon a logical estimate of the present situation but also upon sound precedent.  During 1918, German submarines had laid 57 mines along the Atlantic Coast of the United States from Fire Island to Wimble Shoals.  These mines were laid in groups of six or seven off the entrances to our more important harbors.  One field at Cape Henlopen had threatened the traffic using the Delaware Bay while another, placed a few miles to the south and west

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of Buoy 2 CB, endangered the entrance to the Chesapeake.  Seven ships including a light cruiser and a battleship had been either sunk or damaged by the 57 mines sowed along our coast.  What the German had done with success 25 years ago it was reasonable to assume he would do again.

        It was against such a background of past and present that the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier sent out his directive of June 13th that "every possible effort should be made to sweep the approaches to our principal harbors and to make exploratory sweeps of our coastal sea lanes."

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        Early on June 15, the Commodore of KN 109 reported that his convoy would reach Chesapeake Bay about 1700.  At 1650, the 12 ships with their six escort vessels arrived off Cape Henry.  No local craft were in sight, but on the horizon near the Cape Henry sea buoy, two pilot ships were visible.  As the Commodore in the EMPIRE SAPPHIRE brought his convoy in closer to the channel one of the pilot vessels reversed its course and proceeded to Lynnhaven Roads.  The other lay dead in the water.  Six miles off on Virginia Beach, a summer crowd of bathers, brightly colored against the shore line had gathered to watch the impressive parade of big ships.

        Fifteen hundred yards on the starboard beam of the EMPIRE SAPPHIRE there was a whistle buoy, painted red and marked in white with the characters 2CB.  In time of peace, this buoy dancing in the shallow water, marks the entrance to Chesapeake Bay.  In war, it stands at one corner of the swept channel that runs from the sea through our own mine fields into the vital waters surrounding Hampton Roads.  The northern

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extremity of this channel which is called Point Z M lies at the position of the old Chesapeake light vessel.  From thence it runs southwest to Buoy 2 CB where it turns sharply into the bay at a 90⁰ angle.  At 1655, the Commodore of KN 109 was waiting for pilotage to take him through the channel from this place of entrance for northbound vessels at the whistle buoy.

        He found himself in "an embarrassing situation" without pilots and without information as to the time and place the pilots might be expected.  Up ahead of him was the dangerous area of an American mine field while behind him were the ships of the convoy strung out in a formation "that was very vulnerable to submarine attack."  At 1658, he slowed to five knots, then headed the vessel toward the single pilot ship that remained stationary in the water.  The convoy proceeded slowly in the direction of Cape Henry.

        At 1702 the quiet of the summer evening was shattered by a loud explosion somewhere down the line that was following the EMPIRE SAPPHIRE.  Looking astern from his flagship, the Commodore saw the tanker ROBERT C. TUTTLE, the fifth ship, list sharply to starboard before she fell out of column.  The vessel had been struck near her No. 2 tank on her starboard side about 100 feet from the stem.  As the vessel swung to port her engines stopped and her forward compartments flooded rapidly.  Ten minutes later at 1714 she went down by the head.

        The remaining ships of the convoy were thrown into temporary confusion by the accident to the TUTTLE.  Moments passed before the Commodore could close up the formation and proceed as rapidly as possible

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to the pilot vessel.  About 1725, the EMPIRE SAPPHIRE picked up a pilot.  Then in rotation all but one of the following members of the convoy picked up their pilots and followed the flagship into Hampton Roads.

        This one ship was the ESSO AUGUSTA carrying the Vice Commodore.  After the explosion in the TUTTLE, she broke out of column to shipboard, hoisting signals for the rest of the ships to zigzag, as she did so.  Full speed was immediately ordered on this tanker as her crew went to General Quarters.  For one-half hour the ESSO AUGUSTA maneuvered in the vicinity of Buoy 2 CB trying to find a place she could enter the bay without running into our friendly mine fields.  At 1733 she was one-half mile due south of the red painted whistling buoy.  At that hour there was a loud explosion at her stern as a shudder ran through her frame.  Investigation revealed that the damage, though great, was not enough to sink the ship.  HMS LADY ELSA, an armed trawler attached to the escort group, made three attempts to tow the injured tanker into port.  After the line parted on each occasion the work was abandoned.  The ESSO AUGUSTA then asked for assistance from the shore.

        All this time planes had been circling overhead while the escort vessels of KN 109 were making a search for the enemy.  None of the six warships was successful until about 1818 when the BAINBRIDGE obtained what she believed to be a mushy contact.  A pattern of eight charges was dropped.  Minutes later a second much firmer contact was obtained and again attack was made with a pattern of eight charges.  Following this, there were nine distinct explosions.  The force of the last one spread out over a considerable area of water and shook the racing destroyer

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from stem to stern.  The time was 1827.  A mile or two off to the southwest, the ESSO AUGUSTA was having at this time troubles of her own.  After the attempt to tow her in had been given up by the LADY ELSA, the tanker lay in the water waiting for help.  It had not arrived by 1827, nor yet by 1900.  A Coast Guard vessel was sent to protect her while she waited, and at the same hour another Coast Guard boat was sent off to warn the KINGSTON CEYLONITE that the water around Buoy 2 CB was dangerous.

        The KINGSTON CEYLONITE was a trawler on her way up the coast with the SS DELISLE in tow of the tug WARBLER.  THe Coast Guard vessel set out to carry the word to this tiny convoy, but it carried its message too late.  At 1915, 2-1/4 hours after the ROBERT C. TUTTLE had been hit, the KINGSTON CEYLONITE went up in the gathering darkness.  She sank in two minutes.  One hour and twenty minutes later, at 2035, the tug KESHENA reached the ESSO AUGUSTA.  Within the next two hours, two more tugs arrived.  Throughout the night efforts were made to tow the tanker into port.  At 0645 she arrived in Hampton Roads.

        This in very general terms is what apparently happened when the convoy KN 109 ran into a mine field planted near Buoy 2 CB by a German submarine.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to give more than a general description of the events which happened on this summer night because the narrative must be built up from three or four different accounts, none of which can, even with charity, be considered to agree with any of the others.  It may well be of interest to consider the dissimilar natures of the reports given by the convoy commodore, the escort commander, the survivors of the two injured tankers, and the Commanding Officer of the

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BAINBRIDGE and the Operations Intelligence Officer.

        In the first place there are small discrepancies in such minor matters as the state of the weather, the condition of the sea, and the direction of the wind at the time of the accident.  In the second place, although most of the accounts agree on the general position of the convoy at the time of the accident, there are minor divergencies in each and one report is a full degree, or 60 miles, at variance with the others.  In the third place, there is a startling disagreement on the formation of the convoy at the time it entered the German mine field.  To begin with the Commanding Officer of the escort vessel who gave the fullest report stated that there were thirteen ships in the convoy.  The Operations Intelligence Officer confirms this figure while the convoy Commodore is authority for the fact that there were only twelve.  It is the convoy commander also who reported that the vessels had just formed up in a single column in preparation for passing through the swept channel.  The Operations Intelligence Officer and the Commanding Officer of the BAINBRIDGE, on the other hand, maintained the first eight were in single column while the last five were in double column.  Survivors from the TUTTLE and the ESSO AUGUSTA testified that the ships were formed up in two columns abreast of each other.  According to the convoy commodore, the TUTTLE was the fifth and the ESSO AUGUSTA was the seventh ship in the single column, but the survivors of both these vessels agree that the ESSO AUGUSTA was the lead ship and the TUTTLE the last ship in the port column of two.  In the fourth place, on the question of the attack times, one discovers wide differences of opinion.  The convoy commodore states that between 1701 and 1702:30

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there were four distinct explosions.  One of these was on the TUTTLE and the other on the ESSO AUGUSTA.  This would indicate that the whole incident was over in a minute and a half.  The Operations Intelligence Officer in his version says that the AUGUSTA was not hit until one-half hour after the TUTTLE was injured and that the AUGUSTA struck a mine while she was "swinging left to clear the W. C. TUTTLE."  (ROBERT C. TUTTLE.)  The survivors of both vessels agree that the AUGUSTA was struck half an hour after the TUTTLE.  But they testify the accident occurred nine minutes after the TUTTLE went down and about three miles away from the spot where the TUTTLE sank.

        The other account, that prepared by the Mine Warfare Organization Research Group, contains two statements at variance with information on which all other previously cited authorities are in agreement.  In the first place it is said in reporting that the mine explosion under the BAINBRIDGE occurred on June 14th.  This does not agree with the account of the Commanding Officer of the destroyer which gives the date as the 15th and in addition the Organization Research Group analysis places the position of the explosion at least six miles away from that given by the BANBRIDGE.

        Many of the conflicting elements contained in the various reports of the incident are certainly unimportant.  Some as obviously the inevitable result of human witnesses testifying about a rapidly developing and surprising turn of events.  Disagreement also occurs chiefly on questions of detail.  The general picture of what happened is probably clear enough, but it should be noticed that errors of insignificant detail

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can lead to erroneous conclusions of great significance.  For example the convoy commodore alone of all the witnesses to the event maintains that his ships were in single column, and that he heard four explosions within the space of 1-1/2 minutes during which time both AUGUSTA and the TUTTLE were damaged.  From this evidence he is permitted to reach his conclusion that his convoy was attacked by a submarine which fired a spread of four torpedoes, two of which passed through the single column of the convoy and missed their mark while the other two hit the tankers.  This opinion was, in the absence of other evidence, at first accepted.  On the night of June 15th-16th, Com 5 sent a dispatch to Cominch stating that definite information from the convoy commodore indicates submarine attack on convoy KN 109."  So sure was the commodore of the correctness of his views and observation that he is at particular pains in his report to demonstrate why the KN 109 could not have run into an enemy mine field.  In this conclusion he is supported by the Navy gun crew of the ESSO AUGUSTA.  Such actually was not the case.  Beyond peradventure or doubt, the convoy did enter an enemy mine field.

        The purpose of entering into a consideration of the conflicting evidence in the various accounts is to reveal a significant aspect of anti-submarine warfare training that may have been overlooked.  Much of our doctrine is built up on the basis of the evidence presented by men who have had combat experience.  If the doctrine is to be sound, the evidence must be true.  Much time is spent in training officers and men in the operation of weapons, the handling of ships, and the technique of attacks.  Equally important is the training of officers and men in

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accurate observation and explicit narration, without which it is impossible to obtain information on which to build sound anti-submarine doctrine.

*  *  *  *

        At 1900 on June 15th, one and one-half hours after the AUGUSTA was hit and fifteen minutes before the KINGSTON CEYLONITE was blown up, the Commander of the Inshore Patrol, Fifth Naval District notified the Commanding Officer of the Little Creek Section Base that "maximum sweeping operations" would begin around Buoy 2 CB at daylight June 16th.  Sweepers from the Navy Mine Warfare School at Yorktown and the Service Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet were at the same time given orders to report as soon as possible to the Section Base to decide upon the methods of sweeping and to mark out the boundaries of the area that was to be swept.  Plans were made first to conduct a thorough search of the regular swept channel.  Then an area roughly ten miles by seven miles was laid out around the buoy which was placed approximately in the center of the rectangle.  This whole area was divided into three sections labeled "A," "B," and "C."  (See Chart in Appendix.)

        At daylight the next morning, the sweepers attached to the Section Base left Little Creek and began work in Area A, which lay south and west of Buoy 2 CB.  Ships working in pairs began to sweep with magnetic gear.  All day long they shuttled back and forth making all eleven runs.  Five mines were found and exploded.  On the basis of this experience, it could be fairly well established that the mines had been,

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as was assumed, magnetic ground mines laid at an average depth of fifty feet.

        About the middle of the day, sweepers from the Fleet arrived and began work on clearing the swept channels.  By evening their operation was finished, but no mines had been found.  At 1230, the sweepers from the Navy Mine Warfare School appeared on the scene.  They were instructed by visual signal to sweep in Area B for magnetic and acoustic mines.  Apparently these instructions were misunderstood since the YMS 21 and the BULLFINCH streamed "O" type gear.  This fact was not immediately recognized by those in charge of the work and was in fact not discovered until about 1800 when the YMS 21 reported that she had picked up a heavy object with her gear.  Investigation revealed that her catch was an old fashioned type anchor.  Orders were then changed and before the work was finished on the evening of June 16th, three sweepers from the School made two runs in Area B and one in Area C with magnetic gear.  No mines were found.  The whole swept area was then reopened for shipping.

        The next day, June 17th, early in the morning, the regular south-bound convoy left Hampton Roads for Key West.  One of the ships was the SS SANTORE bound for Cristobal with 11,095 tons of coal in cargo.  At 0740 she was maneuvering for position in the convoy which had just left the swept channel at Point X M.  The SANTORE was about 1-1/4 miles bearing 50⁰ true from Buoy 2 CB.  She was proceeding through waters enclosed by what the mine sweepers of the day before had called Area B.  At 0748 the ship was ripped open by a terrible explosion.  She sank immediately after hitting a German mine.

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        The enemy, in all, had planted nine mines in the vicinity of Buoy 2 CB.  In the space of 48 hours, this small field had caused the disruption of coastwise shipping, the employment of a large number of ships and men in sweeping activities, and the sinking of three vessels with severe damage to a fourth.  From the German point of view, this had been a highly successful venture at a relatively cheap cost.

        Questions that could not be left unanswered were raised by the events of these 48 hours.  Why, in the first place, had the incident occurred at all?  Buoy 2CB, as has already been said, lies at the sharp angle of the swept channel where it turns into the Chesapeake.  The shallow water in this vicinity makes submarine activity difficult if not impossible but is ideal for minelaying operations as the Germans discovered in the First World War.  Vessels that entered the channel at Point X M where the Chesapeake light vessel used to lie, could avoid this dangerous area.  Why then should ships in convoy seek to enter at this most dangerous point?  This obvious question was, by implication, raised in a dispatch from Cominch on June 18th in which he said "am I to infer that swept channel has not been used heretofore?"  This inference was only half correct since, as has been seen, ships entered the channel at the Chesapeake half way down its length at Buoy 2 CB.  This had been done in accordance with the routing prescribed by Cominch in MACRI.  On the 16th, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier sent out a directive that all coastwise shipping should thereafter enter the swept channel at Point X M.

        Other questions are raised by the events which followed fast upon the sinking of the TUTTLE.  Why was the KINGSTON CEYLONITE not warned of

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the dangerous area sooner?  Why was it not immediately recognized that the sweepers from the Mine Warfare School has misinterpreted the signal for magnetic mines and how could the SANTORE go down in an area that had been swept before?  Questions of this nature were the basis for the inquiry which shortly followed.  Into all the findings of the Investigation Board it is unnecessary to go, but a few of their conclusions are worth attention.  This Board reported that:

                1.  Sweeping operations on the whole were unsatisfactory.

                2.  The entrance and departure of convoys from the Virginia Capes was poorly coordinated and managed, particularly considering the presence of enemy forces.  Specifically, it was noticed in the report of the Board that there were no inshore patrol vessels on duty to guard the entry of KN 109 into port, that there were no pilots immediately present to board the vessels, and that after the accident the southward bound convoy overtook and passed the mine sweepers that were intended to protect it.

                3.  Faults of administration and personnel contributed to the difficulties arising from the accident.

        There was no tendency on the part of the Investigating Board to deal in euphemy in discussing these faults.  The Commandant of the Fifth Naval District was directed to overhaul his organization, while it was stated that one officer "had showed a lack of definite knowledge of operations underway in the situation" and it was recommended that another be "definitely and sharply indoctrinated as to his main object in life at the present time."

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        Any reflections upon the men involved can hardly be of immediate concern here, nor should they conceal the fundamental issue that was laid bare in the report of the Investigating Board.  The nature of that issue was clearly defined in a report written at the end of May by the Inspection Board for Naval Districts.  In discussing the organization of the Fifth Naval District, this report had stated that the "system of administration has not been modified for war or changed to distribute the heavy staff work brought about by the immense increase in activities.  The business of the District Headquarters, the report continued, is so extensive, so vital to the war effort, that it is believed to be beyond the power of a single Chief of Staff to supervise efficiently.  The Inspection Board believes a fault of organization exists in that everything that is done must 'wire draw' through a vertical organization with a single Chief of Staff controlling operations and District administration.

        These words embody a familiar principle.  On April 8th, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier stated that the Frontier organization "does not meet present war conditions" because "Commandants of Naval Districts are so occupied with other district activities that they can give little attention to military and Frontier matters."  In effect the military authority of the Frontier Commander was transmitted through a subordinate whose duties were not exclusively military in nature.  This is a violation of the sound principle of naval administration which suggests that military responsibility and authority should be clearly defined and separated from the authority and responsibility of services of supply.

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The fact that a Frontier Commander acts through a Commandant does not mean that the chain of command is broken, because a Commandant is concerned with other duties, it does mean that a vital link in the chain is weakened from excessive strain.

        It can be argued that the system of organization proposed by the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier in April was a violation of another great principle of military administration; the decentralization of administrative machinery that permits the "initiative of the subordinate" to operate.  That principle holds only insofar as the subordinate is assigned duties and responsibilities, differing perhaps in degree, but similar in nature to those entrusted to his immediate superior.  The initiative and effectiveness of the commandant cannot be guaranteed simply by directing him to consider his military duties as primary if he is at the same time cumbered with secondary duties of a conflicting nature.

        The truth of this proposition was asserted by the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier in April, by the Report of the Inspection Board for Naval Districts in May and by the Report of the Board of Investigation in June.  It would seem to have been satisfactory demonstrated by the events which followed upon the entry of KN 109 into an enemy mine field in June.

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