U-boat Archive - U-546 - USS Block Island Report

CVE21/A9 U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND Of10/Bn.

(0027)

S E C R E T 29 June 1944

From:	The Commander Task Group 21.11 (CO USS BLOCK ISLAND).
To:	The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject:	Action Report on the Operations Concerning the Loss by Enemy Action of the U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND on 29 May 1944.

Reference:	(a) Article 841, U. S. Navy Regulations.

Enclosure:	(A) Action Report of Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND concerning the loss by enemy action of that vessel on 29 May 1944.

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is submitted

F. M. HUGES

Copies to:

ConFair, Nfk

Cinclant

Cominch

ACTION REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS CONCERNING THE LOSS OF U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND on 29 MAY.

Task Group 21.11 was formed by Cinclant's secret dispatch 160543 of April 1944 and was composed of U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND with four 24-knot "black oil" destroyer escorts, U.S.S. AHRENS (ComCortDiv60), U.S.S. BARR, U.S.S. BUCKLEY and U.S.S. EUGENE E. ELMORE, and with Squadron VC-55 embarked in BLOCK ISLAND. The task group departed Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, at 1700, 22 April 1944 with orders to relieve the CROATAN group west of the Cape Verde Islands and to operate offensively against enemy submarines in that area. Enemy submarine action in this locality indicated the presence of a refueler and accordingly the main object of the task group was to locate and destroy this refueler.

The task group set course via Bermuda for the operating area, exercising both surface craft and aircraft enroute for training and indoctrination. At 1555 on 29 April 1944, the CROATAN task group was sighted in latitude 19° 10' North, longitude 38° 13' West and, after obtaining tactical information on the operating area via VHF, Commander Task Group 21.11 (BLOCK ISLAND) relieved Commander Task Group 21.15 (CROATAN) on station. Day and night air search operations were conducted starting from the point of the CROATAN's last action. On the morning of 1 May at 0200 the course was altered to a position in which Cominch reported a submarine within one hundred fifty miles, position having been obtained by HF/DF in a submarine's transmission. About midnight of 1 May, a search plane picked up a radar contact sixty miles south of the task group and made a depth charge attack shortly afterwards with apparently negative results. The task group then started intensive hold-down tactics which continued for the next five days in which around-the clock air and surface operations were conducted. These operations resulted in one aircraft depth charge attack the first night when the submarine was fully surfaced, the results of which were negative but which drove the U-boat down and aircraft radar contacts on the second and third nights which continued to keep him down. These radar contacts were developed by sonobuoys and depth charge attacks and enabled the task group to keep a continuous plot of the submarine's track. The above contacts indicated the submarine was on a course of 100°(T).

On the fifth day, the decision was made to send two DEs (AHRENS and ELMORE) along the projected track of the submarine sixty miles ahead, and the BLOCK ISLAND and two DEs (BARR and BUCKELY) were to remain behind on the projected track. On the fifth night, at 2122, in position 16° 55' North, 32° 06 West, BLOCK ISLAND, with BUCKLEY and BARR as escorts, picked up a strong surface radar contact five thousand yards on the starboard quarter and contact was held for four minutes. The first plot indicated target closing at 18-1/2 knots. Evasive action was immediately taken and BUCKLEY ordered to attack contact. Search planes were vectored to the area where BUCKLEY was unable to pick up radar or sound contact. Later on that night, at 0220, one of the search planes picked up a definite radar contact bearing 330°, eighteen miles from BUCKLEY and sixty-six miles north of BLOCK ISLAND. The plane closed and sighted the submarine on the surface maneuvering violently. As the plane was an unarmed,

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	all-night search plane, the pilot directed BUCKLEY into the attack. The submarine was destroyed in this action and thirty-six prisoners were taken, details of which are covered in BUCKLEY's action report. Information obtained from the prisoners of war indicated that contact with refueler submarine was expected to be made that night and also that the submarine was about to make a torpedo attack on BLOCK ISLAND when the evasive action was taken on the radar contact.

	Air search was immediately started to locate the refueler. Due to the damage suffered by BUCKLEY, the two DEs ahead were ordered to rejoin at full speed and escort BUCKLEY. The BLOCK ISLAND and the AHRENS continued to conduct air search for refueler. About noon the two DEs joined BUCKLEY and took cruising station escorting latter at eight knots toward the task group. Shortly afterward, ELMORE made sound contact while BUCKLEY proceeded toward BLOCK ISLAND at 10 knots. The ELMORE delivered fourteen depth charge and hedgehog attacks, bringing the sub up to periscope depth after the fifth attack and obtaining underwater explosions after the sixth hedgehog attack. Aircraft assisting ELMORE reported large oil slick brought up by this attack.

	After this action, BUCKLEY was refueled alongside BLOCK ISLAND and relieved of her prisoners. Before coming alongside, she was given a rousing welcome by the entire task group for her gallant performance the night before. Commander task group received complete estimate of BUCKLEY's damage and reported by dispatch to Cinclant. For the next twenty-four hours task group operated around BUCKLEY as latter ship could only make ten knots. At midnight on the seventh, in accordance with orders from Cinclant, after determining BUCKLEY was able to proceed independently to the United States, commander task group directed her to proceed independently to the Navy Yard, New York, via Bermuda, and to make the required movement reports enroute.

	During this time, the task group conducted position hold-down air and surface tactics in order to make sure that the U-boat, thought to be the refueler, was sunk. These tactics were intensely carried out with around-the-clock operations for six days without making any further contact with the attacked submarine. This positively indicated that the U-boat was sunk during the first attack by Hedgehog explosion.

	On 12 May the task group operated in search for a south-bound Japanese submarine with negative results.

	On 13 May 1944 task group was relieved on station by Task Group 22.2 (BOGUE) in position 19 48' North, 33 55' West, after the DEs were refuelled from the BOGUE, receiving 85,000 gallons. This was necessary as BLOCK ISLAND had remaining sufficient oil for only two days steaming beyond reaching Casablanca. Also, the only gasoline remaining aboard was in the five planes on deck, the squadron having flown approximately 1,800 hours, consuming 91,000 gallons of gasoline during the thirteen days of operation; the greater part of the flying was done at night with only part moon coverage. Despite this all-out operating schedule, the squadron had only two minor barrier crashes and one plane was lost due to spinning in while approaching carrier to land - no personnel were lost.

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On 15 May the task group proceeded to Casablanca, arriving on the morning of 18 May with the ROBERT I. PAINE, which had joined the task group enroute as replacement for the BUCKLEY. The task group remained at Casablanca for five days for recreation, refueling and re-gassing. The thirty-six prisoners aboard were delivered to the Commander Moroccan Sea Frontier Forces.

On 23 May 1944, in accordance with Cinclant's directive, task group departed Casablanca, objective being to operate against southwest bound submarines east of the Azores. At this time Cominch's submarine estimate carried two submarines in this area heading on a southerly or southwesterly course. To intercept these subs, course was set to pass south the the Madeira Islands and then search northward to make interception. The task group arrived in the area southwest of the Madeira Islands on the night of 25 May and launched an air search. From the 25 to the 28 of May, day and night air search operations produced negative results. During this time Commander Task Group 21.11 received a dispatch from Cinclant directing that when search in area appeared no longer productive the task group was to proceed and conduct operations against submarines in the area 35° to 45° North and west of the Azores. Accordingly, the decision was made to conduct a night search on 27-28 May and if no contact was made, to proceed north the following morning. Shortly after midnight on the 28th, a search plane made initial radar contact approximately sixty-four miles north of the task group. The pilot evaluated the target to be a surfaced submarine, indicated distance four miles. The submarine submerged before an attack could be delivered. The task group proceeded to the area and commenced immediate hold-down tactics. This started the action in which the BLOCK ISLAND was sunk, the BARR damaged and the enemy U-boat sunk. In order to bring out clearly all points connected with the action from this contact on, a detailed account follows in chronological order:

28 May 1944

In general area 32° 58' North, 22° 40' West.

0038	Changed course to 190° (T).

0050	A regular TBM search plane made radar contact in area 33° 30' North, 21° 05 West, sixty-four miles north of the task group on target evaluated to be a submarine, target distance four miles. Pilot began attack approach but plane's ICS went out preventing operator from coaching pilot on. Pilot apparently passed over submarine's position before he could sight it. Submarine apparently submerged as pilot was unable to regain contact. Additional planes directed to scene of contact started square search. One plane picked up radar blip and held contact intermittently for one hour. Due to darkness and low ceiling, plane was unable to actually sight submarine (plane was flying on top of overcast).

0055	AHRENS and PAINE ordered to proceed full speed to point of contact and conduct retiring search upon arrival.

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0615	AHRENS had sound contact in area of aircraft radar contact.

0654	AHRENS fired 24 hedgehogs on sound contact, results negative. AHRENS and PAINE commenced square search. The plan at this time was to keep an air cover over the entire area with the DEs conducting a retiring search throughout the day. No contact was obtained during the day.

2045	Launched six night search planes plus one fighter - latter to be used as VHF relay plane along projected course of submarine, 190°(T), to cover a 125-mile sector. Three of these planes were all-night unarmed search planes and the other three were fully armed but carried no rockets. This necessitated landing the three armed regular TBMs at 0230. The weather at this time was eight tenths cloud cover in the vicinity of the carrier but out in the sector areas it was completely overcast and very dark.

2230	Search plane in forward port sector reported radar trouble, that radar was only good for one mile. As this was thought to be the most productive sector a swap was made sending plane with good radar into that sector.

29 May 1944

0230	Commenced preparations to launch three armed TBMs plus one fighter to relieve planes in air.

0255	A TBM unarmed night search plane in the forward port sector picked up a strong radar contact bearing 200°, a distance of seventy-eight miles from the task group. Moon was down and there was a solid overcast from 2000 to 6000 feet. Task group was on course 190°(T). This position was one hundred twenty miles, bearing 215°, of sighting the previous night. As launching was now in progress, two fully-armed TBM were vectored out at once to point of contact. Without difficulty they joined up on top of the overcast, the first contact plane maintaining contact on the submarine. Due to poor radar reception, one of the newly arrived planes was unable to pick up contact and accordingly cleared the area. A coordinated attack was decided upon with the plane one (the plane making radar contact) dropping flare and plane two (newly arrived armed plane) going in for the attack. Both planes entered the overcast at 6000 feet and let down together, plane one keeping in contact. At 2500 feet they broke clear, plane two continuing down to 1000 feet. They maneuvered until plane two was as close as possible over the submarine. Then plane one dropped a Mark VIII flare which gave reasonably good illumination of area. Plane two scouted two minutes before he saw wake of submarine showing quite clearly against black water, turned to course of wake and let down to 1-- feet, opened bomb bay door and started in for depth charge attack. He then sighted dim bulk of submerging U-boat ahead of wake not more than 800 yards distant when all of a sudden flare went out. Blinded by sudden darkness and dangerously close to the water, the pilot had to go on instruments at once to pull out. Number one plane lost radar contact

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	at that time. Both pilots believed U-boat, alerted by the flare, submerged. Nevertheless, plane one illuminated the area once more with negative results. Several more planes were vectored out in the meanwhile and established a five-mile and a twenty-five mile square, respectively, around the contact area. After daylight, the squares were expended to thirty miles and fifty miles, respectively. No further contacts were obtained. At this time, the task group was sixty miles north of the contact point and all of the DEs needed oil. This prevented sending the surface ships to assist the aircraft during the night. Accordingly, between 0800 and 1200 BLOCK ISLAND refueled the ELMORE and BARR, the two ships having the lowest quantity of oil remaining. The task group was then headed 215°, which was the estimated course of the submarine from the two plotted previous contacts, with the idea of running a sonar sound search along this track during the afternoon. (We felt positive the submarine would continue to make good his previous course.)

1518	As no contact yet had been made, it was decided to backtrack north to search area between the submarine's estimated advance and his last plotted position.

1700	Launched six fighter planes to fly sector searches a 100 mile distance to make sure submarine was not running away on the surface.

1725	Launching and retrieving completed, set course of 215° to again cover area of plotted submarine position.

1800	Weather started closing in and planes in western and southern sectors reported lowering ceilings, rain and a general frontal condition. The weather map indicated a weak front had developed in this area and indications pointed to bad flying conditions for the night. At this time the plan for night operations was to launch at 2100 a six-plane 125-mile sector search (three armed and three unarmed all-night search planes) plus one fighter to remain over carrier for VHF relay. The weather continued to get heavier and planes were reporting 1000 feet ceiling in their sectors. The weather was watched continuously and planes were advised to return to base if conditions seemed unsatisfactory. In the meantime, it became apparent that the night air search plan could not be carried out. Accordingly, at 1930 it was decided to launch two all-night search planes at 2030 in order to give the pilots an opportunity to look at the weather by daylight and decide whether it was feasible to conduct the regular fifty-mile abeam and ahead all-night search. In the event that the decision was negative, this plan would enable landing the two planes before darkness set in. It was also determined at this time to conduct a sonar sound and radar search through the area with the task group. As it was realized that if the task group did not stay over the U-boat and be in a position to make radar surface contact, that with no air search overhead the sub could make a whole night's run on the surface and make good his getaway.

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1955	Word was sent out to the fighters aloft to return to base; that they would be landed immediately after launching two night search planes. As the task group had proceeded a little too far to the south where the submarine could have been left astern, it was decided to backtrack to the north until after the launching and retrieving operations so as to include this hour and a half advance (approximately twenty-five miles) in the night's search to be conducted by the task group. Changed course to 020°. This course brought the task group directly into the wind and preparations were made to launch the two night-search planes.

2001	The task group was steady on new course, standard speed fifteen knots, screen in positions as follows (from port to starboard): Port beam, #4 PAINE; Port ahead, #2 AHRENS (slightly out of position); Starboard ahead, #1 ELMORE; starboard abeam #3 BARR. Eight TBM and one FM were spotted on the flight deck (these were the planes originally intended for the night search.)

2013	Without warning of any kind, a torpedo struck BLOCK ISLAND forward. At the time of the first explosion, I was just leaving radar plot where I had been waiting for a last-minute weather report from the fighters aloft. Approximately three seconds later, a second torpedo struck the ship with a shattering explosion. I made my way to the bridge as quickly as possible. Enroute I noticed the port side of the flight deck curled back about ten feet and the forward part of the flight deck covered with oily water. I noticed the general condition of the ship and knew we had been pretty badly hurt. At the time it was impossible to tell accurately on which side we had been hit. Upon arriving on the bridge I sounded general quarters immediately and found the tactical watch officer, Commander Henry Mullins, Jr., USN (ComCortDiv60), and the O.O.D., taking action. Flank speed had been ordered and hard left rudder applied. Shortly afterwards the pit log indicated six knots. The engine room informed the bridge that the low pressure turbine had blown up, that all motive power was gone and that the engine room was taking considerable water through the break in the low pressure turbine. Also, water was leaking through the shaft gland from the shaft alley. Steering engine room reported the steering engine wrecked and the rudder jammed. Ship gradually came to a stop in a left turn. About this time, most communications were lost on the bridge and the ship settled about nine feet by the stern, but on an almost even keel with a slight list to port. Up to this time I had not received any word from damage control and could not find out how badly we were damaged. But with the ship dead in the water without means of moving, the rudder jammed, left engine room flooding and with a live submarine about, I felt certain that we were going to get hit again any minute. The word was passed for all hands who did not have particular jobs to go topside. Simultaneously, the executive officer was clearing the hangar deck of everyone not having a specific job. This did not get through effectively and noticing a great number of people without life jackets, I had the word passed to prepare to abandon ship but not to abandon; to take stations on the forward starboard side of the flight deck and equip with life jackets. (In this manner, the explosion areas were cleared of excess personnel. This action is believed largely responsible for the small

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number of casualties.) About three minutes before the third explosion, approximately seventy-five men belonging to the hangar deck handling crews were ordered topside by the executive officer from the area where a thirty-five foot hole was blown in the hangar deck by the third torpedo hit. Due to the executive officer's action, only two men were in the vicinity at the time of the third explosion and one of them was killed and the other suffered severe leg injuries. Shortly afterward, a periscope was reported bearing 340°. This was completely in error and I have never found out from where the word came. Battle Two reported a periscope six hundred yards off the starboard quarter. The gunnery officer was told to open fire but guns reported not being able to see target. A few seconds later the third torpedo hit the ship aft with a tremendous shock. It could not be determined which side it hit but a geyser of water was seen in the vicinity of frame 135 on the port side. The ELMORE off my starboard quarter sighted the periscope at the same time and immediately headed into attack, dropping depth charges shortly after we were hit. The port five-inch gun was reported knocked out. At this time all communications became dead. The ship started to settle fast by the stern and began to part at the after expansion joint; the flight deck from the expansion joint aft sagged considerably. There were no reports of fire or any noticed up to this point or afterwards and the breaking of the ship in two was the main problem to face. Because of my inability to communicate with the screen due to loss of power and lighting, I could not get word as to whether the submarine had been sunk. I was therefore expecting another hit at any moment. At this time I noticed the BARR about 1400 yards off the port beam as being the nearest destroyer. A big cloud of water and smoke suddenly appeared off her stern. This I thought was from a depth charge attack. Cheering went up from the flight deck as it was thought that she had located the submarine, but as the situation cleared it was evident that she also had been hit. Shortly afterwards, the chief engineer came on the bridge and reported that he had had the engine room abandoned and estimated that we had about ten minutes more afloat as flooding was increasing at a rapid rate through the shaft gland and through a rupture in the low pressure casing, and that the sea chest had given away. He further reported that he could not close either the main injection or the overboard discharge valves as they both were both cut in but could not be closed more than three quarters of the way; that power and lighting were completely lost and that no pumping was available, even from the diesel emergency generator. A thought was given to the forward emergency diesel generator but as this generator was for energizing emergency lighting forward and fire control circuits only, the idea was given up. At this time I received word from the damage control officer that the third hit had blown through the galley into the hangar deck and had blown a thirty foot hole through the hangar deck. As this rupture was directly in the area of the after expansion joint, I connected it with the increased sag in the after part of the ship which had increased to such an extent that t general break appeared imminent.

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There was an opening of about eighteen inches clear across the flight deck and down the side to the hangar deck. The executive officer reported that the ship was settling faster. With only forty-five minutes of daylight remaining and deciding the possibility of the ship staying afloat as hopeless, I decided that nothing could be gained by keeping all hands aboard and thus incurring the additional hazard of night abandonment. All salvage steps that could be taken were taken, to no avail. Furthermore, there was the ever-present additional danger of getting another torpedo which might hit the bomb magazine where 142 depth charges were stored or in the gasoline tanks where 65,000 gallons of aviation gasoline were carried. There was nothing the ship could do at this time to fight back or to prevent the above hazards which would unquestionably result in a large loss of life if either or both had occurred. With these thoughts in mind, I made the decision at about 2040 to abandon ship on the starboard side forward, this being the windward side. We had thought of jettisoning the planes on the flight deck to lighten the load topside but the full gas tanks would have ruptured upon striking the water. With no motion on the ship, this would have allowed raw gasoline to collect on the surface around the ship, setting up a serious fire hazard. The abandonment was orderly, with officers directing the men over the side and clearing the ship. All life rafts on the port side were towed around to starboard. The ARENS was off our starboard bow and I signalled her by hand flashlight to stand over and pick up the crew when conditions warranted. It was out of the question to bring her alongside with the live submarine still around. She immediately stood over to about five hundred yards off my starboard beam and stood by until the survivors swam to her. I cannot speak too highly of the excellent control the officers and petty officers maintained over the men during this operation. They kept all of the crew together in groups and did not permit stragglers; the life rafts were bunched together and only injured or exhausted men were put on them. The poor swimmers pushed and towed them. There were no reports of panic or confusion even alongside the DEs where the tired condition of the men became evident in their attempts to climb the sides. Six hundred seventy four survivors were finally taken aboard the AHRENS and 277 aboard the PAINE. These included eighteen injured. That not one man was lost in this operation, in which some people were in the water over two hours well after darkness had set in and during the underwater explosions, etc., speaks well for the discipline and control maintained. In the meantime, about 2100, the officers and men remaining on board continued checking by inspection just how the ship was holding out. This group consisted of myself; the executive officer, Commander Delos E. Wait, U.S. Navy; Commander Jasper L. Custer, MC-V(S), U.S. Naval Reserve; Lieutenant Commander William A. Hood, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant Commander Frederick A. Ballard, A-V(S), U.S. Naval Reserve; Lieutenant Commander Robert S. Knowles, D-V(G), U.S. Naval Reserve; Lieutenant Alan V. Dennison, D-V(G), U.S. Naval Reserve, Lieutenant Harry L. McElhaney, D-V(G), U.S. Naval Reserve, Lieutenant Gorden A. MacInnes, ChC-V(S), U.S. Naval Reserve; Chief Carpenter Clarence M. Bailey, U.S. Navy; Chief Boatswain's Mate Arthur Price, U.S. Navy; and a number of hospital corpsmen and C & R

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men belonging to repair parties. The damage control officer reported the amount of flooding aft that was indicated by inspection and that all watertight doors that could be were closed; that at the present rate of settling some of the compartments reported dry would flood through drain opening or seepage or through ruptures. This would naturally increase the rate of breaking at the after expansion joint. I hastily inspected the hangar deck and observed a hole about thirty feet in diameter blown through in the vicinity of the galley, with the complete opening clear down as far as could be seen into compartment 402-L. Water and oil in this compartment were about at the level of the water line. With the structure of the ship blown away to this extent and the sagging increasing in this area, it was felt certain that nothing could save the ship from breaking in two. At about 2130 the ship had settled about twenty feet by the stern, held for a while and we thought by some miracle the watertight integrity still existing would hold her up. However, shortly after this something must have given way aft because she started going down rapidly by the stern. At about 2140, with the after end of the flight deck about in the water, I ordered all hands to leave the ship. A party consisting of the ship's doctor, Commander Custer, Lieutenant Commander Ballard, Lieutenant Barnett, Chief Carpenter Baily and several hospital corpsmen had been engaged in trying to free a man whose leg was caught between the forward catwalk and the ship's structure. Due to the spring in the catwalk, it was impossible to free the man by cutting away the metal, because after each cut was made by the acetylene torch the catwalk continued springing into the side of the ship. As the ship was settling at such a rate that it was imperative for all hands to leave immediately, it was necessary to amputate the man's leg at the knee in order to clear him. This was completed just at the last moment but the man died as he was placed in a stretcher and his body was left aboard. An outstanding feature connected with this incident was Chief Carpenter Bailey's conduct. He climbed over the wrecked port side and with the aid of two pharmacists's mates, worked untiringly for about an hour attempting to free the man. His disregard for his personal safety and tireless efforts were an inspiration to all hands. When it looked as though the ship would sink before the party could clear the man they declined to leave until the doctor had amputated the man's leg with a sheath knife and they had succeeded in clearing him. The remaining people on board then abandoned the ship, some getting into a whale boat from the port sponson; other went down the starboard side and swam to a whale boat lying off. The Commanding Officer, after inspecting to see that the safe containing secret documents was locked, abandoned the ship from the starboard sponson, swimming out to a waiting lifeboat. About 2150, when both boats were about two hundred yards clear of the ship, the flight deck reached about a sixty degree angle, which was sufficient to cause planes to part lashings and roll toward the stern and overboard. All Mark 54 depth charges had been set on safe; nevertheless, they exploded about two minutes after the panes went overboard. About the time the depth charges had exploded, the ship had reached a vertical position with about one third of the forward part above water. The explosions from the depth charges

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were the coup de grace for the BLOCK ISLAND for the bow remained completely vertical for a few moments and then slowly disappeared from sight at 2155. Depth charges were still exploding as occupants of both boats boarded the AHRENS. Explosions were very violent and I had grave fear that the DE would be severely damaged. I ordered the AHRENS to depart the area immediately and right afterward a terrific explosion occurred. It was so violent that many on board the AHRENS believed that she had been struck by a torpedo. The last explosion was believed to have been torpedoes in the after end of the hangar deck which were set off by the depth charge explosions. When I arrived on board the AHRENS I was notified by the Commanding Officer that the ELMORE had reported a definite kill on the enemy U-boat earlier. In order to play safe, the AHRENS and PAINE, with such a large number of personnel aboard, stood clear of the area after making sure all personnel had been picked up for the night, and returned after daylight in the morning. The ELMORE was directed to stand by the BARR during the night. The next morning the area was thoroughly covered in a search for any possible additional survivors, bodies, or any floating material, by three DEs, a Liberator and a Fortress. After a search over a ten-mile area, nothing was sighted but life rafts, two motor whale boats and a medicine ball. Accordingly, at 0930, Task Group 21.11, less BLOCK ISLAND, departed area for Casablanca with ELMORE towing the BARR.

F. M. HUGHES

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	ENGINEER OFFICER'S OFFICIAL REPORT ON LOSS OF BLOCK ISLAND

	1. At approximately 2013 a torpedo hit was received on the starboard bow, followed by a second his on the port side aft at about frame 175, approximately ten seconds later. A third torpedo hit was received about eight minutes later on the port side near frame 145. These hits will be designated number one, two and number three respectively.

	2. The sequence of events and the damage to engineering department equipment was as follows:

	(a) Hit #1, no apparent damage to engineering equipment.

	(b) Hit #2, fires were extinguished in number one and number two boilers due to shock operating the solenoid quick-closing fuel oil valves.

	(c) Number two boiler was immediately lit off and steam generation resumed. The steam pressure had dropped to 300 pounds.

	(d) The forward end of low pressure turbine casing in way of the astern element, carried away, shattering the turbine pedestal, Kingsbury thrust bearing and journal and condenser. The condenser tubes in the main condenser ruptured, allowing circulating sea water to pour into the low pressure turbine and out into the engine room bilge. A ring of fire was observed from the dummy piston and astern impulse wheel from the speed of the motor rubbing against the casing.

	(e) Number one and number two condensate pumps were torn from their bases and severed the electrical leads.

	(f) Bilge and ballast pumps were jarred out of line.

	(g) Drains and circulating lines from main condenser were carried away.

	(h) Main low injection sea chest was ruptured at the tank top.

	(i) Main low injection and overboard discharge valves from main condenser were damaged so that they could not be closed more than about seventy-five percent.

	(j) Floor plating and supports twisted, buckled and dislodged in area around main circulator.

	(k) Engine room making water badly through the shaft stuffing box in bulkhead 122.

	(l) Propeller shaft bent, resulting in heavy damage to reduction gearing and main thrust.

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	(m) Shaft RPM indicator indicated a jump from standard speed to 100 RPM when the overspeed trip operated, closing the governor valve.

	(n) Port and starboard steering rams twisted from base. Trick wheel damaged.

	(o) Grating and floor plates in upper and lower level of engine room badly buckled and twisted.

	(p) Overhead deck plates in forward end of diesel engine room buckled to a depth of about seven inches.

	(q) Reach rod operating main steam stop to number one boiler jammed.

	(r) Main thrust housing broken.

	3. The diesel generators were put on line immediately and the electrical load was transferred to the forward board, restoring full power and lighting throughout the ship.

	4. As sea water was coming into the engine room from the main condenser through the low pressure turbine casing, immediate orders were given to close the main injection and overboard discharge valves. The stream coming from the main condenser and turbine was estimated to be the amount of discharge from a twelve inch pipe. Because of damage by hit two, the valves could not be closed more than approximately seventy-five percent. A man was sent for wrenches to use in further closing these valves.

	5. The bilge pump and ballast pump were started. Both pumps out of line, would not pick up suction.

	6. At approximately 2023, hit number three occurred with the following additional damage:

	(a) Total loss of electrical power.

	(b) Forward board tipped inboard about six inches.

	(c) Due to failure between the forward board main bus and the forward board main circuit breakers, power could not be restored on the forward board even though the diesel generators continued to generate 240 volts, as indicated on the voltmeters. It is believed that this failure was caused by rupture of the circuit breaker contacts or to severance of the leads from the circuit breaker to the bus.

	(d) Fires in number two boiler extinguished by operation of solenoid quick-closing fuel oil valve.

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	(e) Water in bilges up to floor plates at time engine room was abandoned. Due to total loss of electrical power, engine room in total darkness - water pouring into engine room from shaft alley, main condenser, and ruptured sea chest, together with jammed sea valves. The engine room was ordered abandoned after every effort was made to stop or control the flow of water. About ten minutes after leaving the engine room I reported to the Captain on the bridge that the engine room had been abandoned. It appeared at that time that the ship probably would not remain afloat more than ten minutes.

	8. Throughout the duration of the casualties, there were no steam leaks in the engine room spaces; the boiler, main and auxiliary steam lines remained intact.

	9. During the torpedoing of the vessel, there were no casualties to engine room personnel. However, at this time nothing is known of the personnel in after diesel fire pump room and after gyro compass room.

	10. It is my opinion that the damage due to hits number two and three were of such severity and distribution that the ship could not possibly have been saved.

	11. No man in the engine room left his station until the order to abandon engine room was given.

	12. It is desired to commend the engineering department personnel on their cool-headedness and their splendid efforts in trying to save their ship in the time available.







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	FIRST LIEUTENANT AND DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER'S REPORT ON
	ACTIONS TAKEN

	At the time the action occurred which resulted in the sinking of U.S.S. BLOCK ISLAND on 29 May 1944, the ship was in material condition Baker with all "X" and "Y" fittings below the main deck secured. The damage control watch had been stationed at 2000 with three men forward in Repair II, three men aft in Repair II, and two men and an officer in charge at Central Station.

	At about 2013, two explosions occurred, spaced only a few seconds apart. These explosions caused an immediate rush of all hands from below decks areas to battle stations. Central Station and all repair parties were manned within one or two minutes of the explosion. Phone contact was established with all stations except Repair I and Repair II. Condition Affirm was ordered set by all repair parties in communication with Central Station. A messenger was dispatched to Repair II to get information regarding damage forward.

	Both Repair II and Repair III were held back from immediate patrol of their areas by noxious fumes in the neighborhood of the explosions. These fumes were probably caused by the explosive used and required the use of oxygen breathing apparatus and gas masks. Patrols were sent out from Repairs II, III and V to Central Station and some of which were not, due to lack of phone communications.

	A hit, probably by torpedo, had been incurred somewhere within twenty frames of the bow forward. The holes caused by this hit were later seen on both port and starboard sides at about frame 14, approximately ten feet above the keel, with rough edges bent inward. Concussion from the hit caused destruction of the port forward corner of the flight deck. An athwartship tear took place at frame 23, running from the outer edge of the deck into the catapult track. The section of deck forward of the fracture was folded up to a vertical position. This fore and aft fold was approximately ten feet in from the port edge of the deck and on the catapult track. The port catwalk was distorted and folded upward back to frame 28. Water and oil were thrown up from the port side onto the well deck. Within the ship, bunks and general material were thrown about in confusion. However, no noticeable distortion of decks or bulkheads was reported by Repair II patrols except for a buckle in the deck on the second platform at about frame 83 near the starboard side. A fire main riser was found to be broken in compartment A-301 1/2-L and was cut off. There was no water in view in the chain locker, in crew's berthing compartment A-301 1/2-L, compartment A-404-A, nor in the forward diesel fire pump room. Compartments A-506-E, A-403-A and A-401-A were not opened for inspection, but the trim of the ship by the stern after the explosions would obviate the possibility of compartment A-506-E being flooded. Small detonations, probably of 20MM and 40MM shells exploding in the forward magazines, were heard by patrols. Condition Affirm was not set by Repair II due to lack of communications and number of people moving through the ship.

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	A hit, assumed to be a torpedo, had been incurred aft somewhere below berthing compartment C-302-L. The damage control watch at Repair III reported a flash coming from the port hatch leading into berthing compartment C-301-L which remains unexplained. Personnel in compartment C-302-L at the time of the explosion reported the deck torn in mess attendants' berthing area with water coming into the entire compartment immediately after the explosion. Patrols reported three feet of water above the first platform and noxious fumes in this compartment. The shaft alley and after magazine area were flooded within three of four minutes of the explosion, by eye-witness account. The ship was down at least eight feet by the stern shortly after this explosion.

	Patrols sent out from Repair III made partial reports prior to the third hit. Area below compartment C-201-L was reported all secure. Area below compartment C-203-L was inspected and found secure except for a small amount of water on deck near aft bulkhead. Area below compartment C-202-L was reported all secure. No bulkhead pr pipeline breaks were observed. The area below compartment C-204-L was inspected and found to contain water and gas as noted above. The fire main riser was broken in crew's head C-204-1L and the cut-off valve was secured. The watch in the steering engine room noticed that the bulkhead near door 3-182-1 was buckled and the bottom dog broken; air escaped here, followed by water. Condition Afirm was partially set by Repair III, but the occurrence of the third hit hindered its competition.

	From the above information, it may be concluded that the first hit aft occurred on the port side between frames 165 and 180 between ten and fifteen feet above the keel. The shaft alley, the after magazine area, compartment C-510-F and compartment C-302-L were immediately opened to the sea. Progressive flooding occurred in the steering engine room and in compartment C-302-L as the ship settled by the stern.

	Patrols sent out from Repair V found no water in compartments inspected, and no fire. Disorder of loose gear was general, however. The second deck was buckled at about frame 100 to a depth of six inches. The second platform deck was buckled at about frame 100 to a depth of six inches. The second platform deck was buckled at about frame 90 to a depth of seven or eight inches. Buckling in both instances was observed only on the starboard side. The hold deck in the diesel generator room was buckled at about frame 95. Condition Affirm was set outside the engine area, steam was cut off on broken lines, and a party of eight men and an officer was sent to aid Repair III. This party never arrived due to the confusion resulting from the third hit. Repair V remained on station after the third hit until communication was lost. Watertight integrity was checked and the area was abandoned five to ten minutes after the third hit.

	After the first two explosions, the engine room reported to Central Station that the turbine had blown up and water was entering the engine room. It was also reported that the shaft alley was flooded and the steering engine out of commission. No orders were given to the engine room by Central Station and no further reports were received from there until it was abandoned after the third hit. Damage in the engine room and damage control measures taken there can be better described by the Engineer Officer.

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	After all the above action had been taken or started in the damage control organization, another explosion occurred in the after area of the ship. This explosion knocked out lighting and power throughout the ship. Power and lights had been on throughout the ship until this time. Lights were never restored and power was not again available after the third hit.

	This third and last explosion was seen to throw a column of water above the flight deck on the port side aft. The explosion caused an opening up through all decks to the hangar deck, making a hole about thirty feet square in the hangar deck midships between frames 137 and 148, the edges of which were bent downward. Smoke and steam poured out of this hole resembling fire below; however, no fire is believed to have been started. The diesel oil tank under the refrigeration machinery space in compartment C-401-AE was ruptured with an immediate flow of diesel oil; and water into the compartment. The sea chest of the forward port corner in the engine room was cracked from the skin of the ship. The five inch gun aft on the port side was knocked out of line on its base and was not operable by hand thereafter.

	From the above information regarding damage caused by the third explosion, it may be assumed that a torpedo hit the ship somewhere between frames 135 and 145 at about the level of the second platform deck, port side. The hit definitely caused the immediate loss of all integrity below compartment C-202-L, the crew's galley, and probably caused slower flooding in compartments below C-401-AE. It also caused increased flooding in the engine room, leading to its abandonment shortly after the hit.

	In the repair II area patrols were sent out after the third hit, but no damage was noted. The word to abandon ship was received by word of mouth about fifteen minutes after the third hit. Repair II personnel aided in the evacuation of wounded from sick bay and left the ship with the exception of four men and the repair party officer. These men then worked until the ship was completely abandoned trying to cut an injured man out of the port flight deck catwalk. All watertight doors were closed forward of the engine room. All berthing compartments were searched for injuries by various men and officers and none were found.

	The repair III area was badly shaken by the third hit with resultant confusion. Communication was lost with Central Station immediately. Repair party evacuated to the hangar deck and abandoned ship within ten minutes of the third hit. No action was taken by Repair III after the third hit.

	Patrols in the after area of the ship secured all watertight doors within twenty minutes of the third hit. Water rose in the after elevator pit as the ship settled by the stern. Water filled the steering engine room through the broken door from the shaft alley escape prior to the time that the stern went under. Compartment C-301-L had water four or five feet deep in it on last inspection about forty minutes after the third hit. The source of this water

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	is unknown but may have come through small ruptures in the bulkheads. Compartment C-202-L and the area below it could not be inspected. However, water rose in the area as the ship settled and it may be assumed to have opened to the sea. The ruptures in the diesel oil tank under compartment C-401-AE were observed by the watch in this area. However, about twenty minutes after the third explosion, observation showed no water or oil in the second platform deck in compartment C-401-AE. Inspection about forty minutes after the third explosion showed water about four feet deep in compartment C-201-L. This varied condition may be explained by the theory that the explosion caused a great volume of water and oil immediately, but that later flooding was slow. The first volume of water went to stores areas below the second platform and slow flooding later filled these area and C-410-AE.

	From the above, it can be stated that the condition of the ship was as follows. Flotation was fully lost in the magazine area forward, in the shaft alley, below C-202-L, below C-204-L, and in the steering engine room. Slower flooding took place in the area below C-201-L, below C-203-L and in the engine room. Under these conditions after the third hit it is felt that damage control measures which could have been carried out could not have been effective in saving the ship. It is felt that even in these compartments aft in which flooding was slow, the facilities for pumping would have had little or no effect. The ship received severe strains throughout its length and showed a tendency to bend down at the stern as compartments filled. At last inspection, the after flight deck expansion joint was open at least two feet all across the deck and the aft end of the flight deck was down about five degrees and this maximum list was to port. The ship's roll became very sluggish prior to the time she was abandoned.

	The repair parties below decks functioned well prior to the third hit, considering the surprise of the attack and the natural effect of the explosions on mental coordination of men and officers. After the third hit, word reached the repair parties to abandon ship and they did so with the exception of a few men and officers. These few deserve commendation for their efforts, but those who abandoned ship do not deserve censure.








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Click this text to view appended drawings of damage from torpedo hits

Click this text to view appended track charts from CTG 21.11 Cruise Report