COMPOSITE SQUADRON EIGHT
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
     
  ENCLOSURE (A)  
     
  NARRATIVE  
     
          The 0700 flight of 2 FM-2 aircraft was launched as follows: Lieutenant Wolffe W. Roberts, A-V(N), USNR, in F-7 at 0655 and Ensign John W. Cadle, Jr., A-V(N), USNR, in F-1 at 0656. The flight was flown according to plan and without incident until 1111. At 1111, Task Group 22.3 was on a course of 000° True. F-1 was orbiting CVE-60 having just checked in after five (5) loops of Plan 15. F-7 was one mile off the port beam just preparing to check in from his fifth loop.  
     
          At 1113, U.S.S. CHATELAIN having reported a sound contact about three (3) miles from the carrier, F-1 and F-7 were ordered to the spot. At 1116 F-1, Ensign J. W. Cadle, on a course of 000° spotted the submarine 30° off his port bow. It was submerged below periscope depth. The sun was at 058°-30' elevation and directly behind F-1. F-1 radioed directions to the DE and marked the submarine by shooting a burst of .50 Caliber into the water directly above the Conning Tower which was clearly visible. THe nearest escort, the CHATELAIN, appeared to be on a course which would not take her over the submarine so F-1 again transmitted directions and again marked the submarine with a burst of gunfire. The CHATELAIN then changed course and made a depth charge run dropping directly over the submarine.  
     
          At 1121 both F-1 and F-7 saw disturbances in the water and F-1 transmitted that the submarine was surfacing. As the submarine surfaced F-1 made a strafing run immediately followed by F-7. They made nine (9) runs each concentrating their fire on the Conning Tower and after gun positions. The runs were made singly with as short an interval as possible between each plane. The submarine was in a tight turn to starboard throughout the entire action. The first run made by F-1 and F-7 encountered no anti-aircraft fire. The second and third runs were opposed by anti-aircraft fire which seemed to pass under and to the side of each of them. The shells seemed to burst as low as 500 feet. After the third run both Lt. Roberts and Ensign Cadle noticed no more anti-aircraft fire between runs the crew of the submarine poured out the hatches both fore and aft and began abandoning the ship inflating rubber life rafts.  
     
          No attempts were made to strafe men in the water but runs were continued on the Conning Tower and gun positions until "cease firing" order was given at 1127.  
     
          Lt. Roberts and Ensign Cadle, assisted by Ensign Robert E. Switzer, A-V(N), USNR, in T-21 (TBM-1C) and Lieutenant Isaac S. Best, A-V(T), USNR, in F-4 (FM-2), who had taken off to assist, set up a circle of runs over the submarine to cover the boarding party which was approaching the submarine. However no opposition was encountered by the boarding party so no shots were fired.  
     
          F-1 landed at 1154 and F-7 at 1156 both planes having reached their P.L.E. T-21 and F-4 circled over the submarine until it was taken in tow by CVE-60.  
     
     

 


ENCLOSURE (B)


 

 
 

   
COMPOSITE SQUADRON EIGHT
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
     
  ENCLOSURE (C)  
     
 
DAMAGE TO U BOAT
 
     
          Inspection of the U-505 immediately after its capture disclosed the following facts:  
     
          1.     Of the four 20 MM guns set in twin mounts on the #1 or upper Bandstand, three had been rendered completely inoperative by .50 Calibre projectiles which had penetrated the breech mechanisms.  
     
          2.    The Conning Tower contained one dead crewman who had been shot several times by .50 Calibre projectiles.  
     
          3.    The Conning Tower itself had been considerably damaged by the 50's.  
     
                  a. The splinter shield had been penetrated in several places. These penetrations appeared to have splintered the projectiles and the shield itself resulting in a shrapnel effect.  
     
                  b. The periscope mount was penetrated in several places.  
     
          4.    It was the opinion of the boarding party that fragmentation in the Conning Tower was caused by .50 Calibre projectiles. Further it is the opinion of the boarding party that the 20 MM mounts were never manned due to intensity of .50 Calibre fire.  
     
          The Commanding and Executive Officers of the submarine and one seaman were wounded by fragments. These wounds rendered the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer hors de combat.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
     

 


 

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