U-boat Archive - U-162 - HMS Pathfinder Report



	SECRET	H.M.S. "Pathfinder".
	Ref. No. 237/25
	5th September, 1942.


	Sir,

	I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings from the time of being detached by H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth" at 0515 on Monday 31st august, in position latitude 24⁰.00' North, longitude 40⁰.00' West, until arrival at Port of Spain, Trinidad at 1400 on Friday 4th September, this report includes the hunt for and destruction of German Submarine U.162.

	2. I was detached with "Vimy" and "Quentin" in company under orders to reach Port of Spain A.M. 4th September. Throughout the passage destroyers were spread on a line of bearing thrown back 103 and forward 77 from the mean line of advance so as not to give away the mean line of advance, distance apart 1-1/2 miles by day and 1 mile by night, and zig-zagging throughout in the hope that any submarine sighting the destroyers would find itself unable to escape round the flanks of the destroyers.

	3. At about 1805 on 3rd September, in position latitude 12⁰ 21' North, longitude 39⁰ 29' West, ships being spread from left to right in the sequence "Quentin", "Pathfinder", "Vimy", and carrying out a broad zig-zag, "Pathfinder" obtained a contact port and hoisted the appropriate investigating signal.

	4. My First Lieutenant, Lieutenant C.R. Halins(?), Royal Navy, was Officer of the Watch when at this time Henry W. Harkins(?), Ordinary Seaman, D/Ja.283413(?), the A/S operator on watch, obtained the contact at about 1800 yards range. Lieutenant C. W. Halias(?), impressed by the contact, turned at once to counter attack, but on my arrival on the bridge I at once stopped the ship to complete the investigation and make a considered attack if necessary. Whilst investigating, H.X. from a torpedo was heard ahead and a torpedo broke surface ahead and, running on the surface, circled widely to port and narrowly missed "Quentin". At about this time submarine contact was firm at a range of about 600 yards ahead and I attacked. "Full ahead both" was initially ordered to give the ship the necessary acceleration (the engine room having been warned by telephone), half speed and revolutions for attacking speed being ordered as attacking speed was reached by Chernikoof log (which is accurate). It appears that the submarine also went full speed ahead on hearing "Pathfinder" propellers start up, for the contact at once began to give closing doppler which first grew very marked and then decreased as the target began to draw rapidly left (the plot shows submarine's movements at this time very clearly). The submarine was, however, comfortably outside "Pathfinder's" turning circle and there was no difficulty in delivering an apparently accurate attack. Assuming the submarine to be dipping after firing its torpedo I used medium depth settings on the Depth Charges (light charges 150 feet and heavy charges 300 feet and fired a ten charge pattern at 1815. Contact was regained after passing over the target, lost during the depth charge detonations, and then regained firmly, and "Pathfinder" was preparing for a further attack when "Quentin" hoisted the attacking signal. The attack was left to "Quentin" who eventually fired a six charge pattern at 1829.

	5. After "Quentin's". . .



	Page Two.

	5. After "Quentin's attack, contact was lost and all three destroyers were formed up to the westward of the attacks and at 1910 commenced a search to the Eastward. During this search "Vimy" gained contact at about 1930, and whilst her investigations proceeded "Pathfinder" and "Quentin" closed her. "Vimy" fired a fourteen charge pattern at 1938 after which contact was again lost.

	6. The plot plainly showed the submarine so far to have been on a North Easterly course and as contact was not regained after "Vimy's" attack destroyers were formed up for a further search, moving off to the eastward at 2015, and shortly afterwards turning to the northward by the signal E. 1.(?).

	At about 2100 course was altered to the westward by signal E. 1.(?) and at 2115 to the southward by the same signal. During the run to the southward I was not quite happy that we had not passed over the submarine. I cannot now remember the circumstances but I think one or more destroyers had brief investigations during this southerly run, and at 2140 destroyers were turned 180⁰ to port together to re-sweep this area. At about 2200 course was again altered to the eastward by signal E. 1.(?). It was now nearly two and a half hours since an attack had been delivered, and it appeared to me that unless the submarine had been so damaged as to have her movements greatly restricted she might have surfaced some time before and might by now be a long way away.

	I decided that at the appropriate moment I would leave "Vimy" in the vicinity of the depth charge attacks to deal with the submarine during the night or at daylight if the submarine was damaged, while "Quentin" and I carried out an extensive search for a submarine escaping on the surface. I considered that a submarine wishing to escape on the surface would choose the most direct course for the open ocean, this course being about 090⁰, up till now the night was very dark but clear except for a few rain squalls which had come down since reaching the neighborhood of Barbados and Tobago; the moon was due to rise at 0050 on a bearing of 076⁰. I decided that on detaching "Vimy" I would proceed with "Quentin" at 30 knots on a course of 090⁰ so as to reach a position ten miles astern of the submarine's probable furthest book position by moon rise, spread to maximum visibility distance at moonrise, and sweep to the eastward at 30 knots until 0300 then turn northward and return to "Vimy" on a course of about 250 or 260⁰. Until it was time to make this move I decided to make a cast to the southward, since "Vimy" informed me that he estimated the submarine to have been steering a south easterly course when he ("Vimy") attacked. Course was altered to the southward by signal S. 1.(?) at about 2890. I decided to detach "Vimy" at about 2300, and at 2250 turned all destroyers together to a course of 315⁰ so that "Vimy" might cover an obvious gap which I could see from the plot had been left in the search.

	Having seen "Vimy" act on this course of 315⁰ I hauled off to the northward with "Quentin", stationed "Quentin" one mile on a bearing 000⁰ from me, and made two big turns together to fill in the remaining few minutes until 2330 which was the time that I wished to increase to 30 knots.

	7. At 2327 I observed a red pyrotechnic signal to the westward followed almost at once by one or two gunflashes, another pyrotechnic signal, a search light, and a species of rocket which I had never seen before which I later discovered to be a snowflake. I turned at once to close with "Quentin" in company and increased to 30 knots, it was plain to me that either "Vimy" was sinking the submarine of the submarine was sinking "Vimy" - I was not at all sure which.

	On closing "Vimy" I found she was picking up survivors

	from the submarine . . . . . . .



	Page 3.

	from the submarine, whose ship's company had abandoned ship. "Vimy" attacked and was in collision with the submarine at 2930. "Vimy" informed me that he had observed submarine sinking, and from the quantities of men seen swimming, and of German voices crying out, from the water all around, and from the absence of any A/S contact in the vicinity, it seemed fairly certain to me that the submarine had in fact sunk, and "Pathfinder" and "Quentin" stopped to assist in the rescue of survivors.

	"Vimy" informed me that an officer was picked up and gave the submarine's complement at 51; this was confirmed by the Captain of the submarine when I picked him up. By 0100 47 survivors had been recovered. I was aware of the damage to "Vimy's" port propeller and abaft (caused by collision with the U-boat and I decided that I would take the destroyers slowly up to windward (eastward) while "Vimy's" steaming capabilities were tested. This resulted in the recovery of two more survivors, one each by "Pathfinder" and "Quentin".

	The plot does not give an accurate picture of this part of the proceedings, for the destroyers were blowing down to leeward (eastward all the time rescue operations were going on, and the two extra survivors picked up at about 0115 during the easterly sweep, were of course in the position where the submarine had sunk, although the plot shows them to have been a mile and a half to the windward.

	On again moving off to windward "Vimy" reported a small R.D.F. echo astern of "Quentin" to closed to investigate. I held on the the eastward with "Quentin" long enough to avoid fouling "Vimy" and then turned back with "Quentin" to sweep over the area with A/S, a sweep which "Vimy" joined, her R.D.F. contact having been lost. Due to drift, the plot again gives a false picture, for "Vimy's" R.D.F. obtained by Type 271 was roughly in the position of the sunken submarine. As the contact appeared to be bobbing about in the waves the Captain of the "Vimy" gave it as his opinion that it was one of the two rafts which he threw overboard to the survivors and neither of which was recovered.

	This brief R.D.F. contact influenced matters nevertheless. I had it from the Captain of the submarine as well as from "Vimy" that the submarine's complement was 51, and the destroyers had recovered 49; the submarine had been very heavily depth charged three times, and on being found on the surface at 2330 had made no attempt to dive; and had been in collision with "Vimy" and violently with "Vimy's" moving port propeller, and that at least 49 men abandoned ship. She had been seen in an apparently sinking condition by "Vimy", being last seen with only about two feet of her conning tower showing; but I had no absolute proof that she had not in fact still sufficient men on board to take her down and make her escape, and the area of "Vimy's brief R.D.F. contact was searched by A/S slowly and extremely carefully by all three destroyers. No contact of any sort was obtained.

	At this time I finally formed the opinion that the submarine had undoubtedly sunk, and, "Vimy" being holed below water in the N.R.A.'s(?) Mess(?), being reduced to one engine, and being extremely short of fuel and still 200 miles from Port of Spain, I shaped course with all three destroyers for Port of Spain at about 0207 at "Vimy's" best speed; but to make assurance doubly sure I detached "Quentin" at 0335 to return to the vicinity of the sunken submarine, remain there, and search it at full daylight. On "Quentin" rejoining from this search she reported nothing in sight but about two square miles of oil on the water, in point of fact I think this oil came from the bilges of my own bearing Boom which has to have two or three tons pumped out of it every night due to a serious leakage from an adjacent tank.

	8. "Pathfinder", "Vimy" and "Quentin" entered the Dragon's Mouth at about 1430 4th September, transferring prisoners of war to Motor ?/? Boats when inside the Boca de Pavice(?).

	9. Following . . . . . . . .

9. Following numbers of prisoners were rescued:

"Pathfinder"	-	Captain, 1st Lieutenant, 3 Petty Officers and 8 others.
"Vimy"	-	1 Officer, 11 Petty Officers and 20 others.
"Quentin"	-	1 Petty Officer and 3 (three) others.

Information gained by my officers and by a German speaking rating borne in "Pathfinder" is forwarded as an enclosure.

I also had a conversation with the German Captain and I have formed the following opinions. I think there is no doubt that the submarine was the German U.162. She undoubtedly sighted either "Quentin" or myself (Tripod Mast) at a range of about 10 miles early in the evening of 3rd September, but I am not certain whether or not he was aware that three destroyers were in company. His decision to attack at about 1800 was undoubtedly spirited, and if he was aware that other destroyers were in the vicinity was undoubtedly bold. He made the astonishing statement which is difficult to believe, that when he fired the torpedo at "Quentin" he thought she was alone. His decision to attack has made me doubt the wisdom of my stopping my First Lieutenant's initial counter attack; but after much thought I still think I was correct. I feel that such tactics by a submarine are improbable, and that except when screening, it is the job of destroyers gaining contact to make a considered attack and of consorts to turn bore(?) on.

In spite of most contradictory statements by prisoners in the three ships I am certain that the depth charge attacks were most damaging and/or quite demoralizing; prisoners in "Pathfinder" have stated that the first attack ("Pathfinder's") was the most destructive (wrecking amongst other things the listening gear) but I understand from "Quentin" that her prisoners gave her a similar testimonial, and I trust the same can be said for "Vimy" whose fourteen charge pattern was of a violence new to me. After "Pathfinder's" attack there was a prolonged period when marked whistle effects were heard from the submarine, and I then formed the opinion that she was already in trouble. Although some prisoners have said and no doubt will continue to say that the depth charges were not effective, the following are facts beyond dispute.

(i) A German sailor recovered by "Pathfinder" climbed aboard beside a depth charge thrower, saw the depth charge, smacked it, and said "Schweinehund".

(ii) U.162 was on the surface and saw the three destroyers turn back towards her to the course of 315 at 2230, and yet she did not dive. Her Captain told me that he knew it was the end for he could not dive again, but I am not certain whether it was the submarine or her crew which could not stand another dive.

U.162's Captain ordered his ship's company to abandon ship when he saw "Vimy" turn to ram and ordered his Engineer Officer to scuttle U.162, - as far as I can make out half his ship's company jumped overboard before the collision with "Vimy" and half afterwards; though I cannot make out why they were not all killed by "Vimy's" final depth charge.

It appears that the Captain of U.162 still feared boarding by "Vimy" after the collision, for he says that he sent his Engineer Officer below again to expedite the scuttling; when he found U-162 sinking quickly he called down the conning tower hatch for his Engineer Officer, but the latter had not quite reached the top of the hatch before the sea broke in over the conning tower and threw him back. It appears from this that the Captain remained on the conning tower until U.162 sank under him - - The Engineer Officer was not saved.

There is no . . . . . . . .



	Page FIVE.

	There is no doubt that U.162 was surprised to find destroyers in the vicinity. From the frequent references to U.162's escapes from corvettes due to her superior surface speed, and the frequent references to air bombings she had experienced, and the Captain's statement that when he found he was being hunted by three destroyers he knew it was too much for him. I have formed the opinion that this was the first time U.162 had been depth charged from the sea.

	The Captain was a pleasant spoken man of 41, which seems to me to be old for command of a submarine. The ratings recovered by "Pathfinder" were not good physical specimens, some being distinctly seedy - - According to my Medical Officer, two were suffering from heart trouble.

	There is no doubt at all about the gallantry of her Captain's attack on "Quentin", even if he really did think that she was alone; but I am not just sure that this gallantry may not have been tempered by ignorance of the consequences, even though her Captain told me he knew it might be his last attack.

	I have nothing really tangible to support this theory, but I am of the opinion that U.162, who claims to have sunk about 90,000 tons of shipping, was a somehow at "C 3" submarine.

	10. The following enclosures are forwarded herewith:

	Enclosure 1. Nominal list of survivors. Information given from them
	Enclosure 2. Form 3. 1200 (Four copies).
	Enclosure 4. Recommendations for honors and awards.
	Enclosure 5. Reports from . . . "Vimy".
	Enclosure 6. Reports from . . . "Quentin".

ENCLOSURE 1.

Nominal list of survivors - Information obtained from them

The following survivors were picked up by "Pathfinder":

WATTENBERG.		Fragatten Kapitan.
BEHREN		Ober. Lieut

Erich Decker.	U.N. 451/36T	Ober. Maat.
Rudolf Dziuba.	40.2274/38T	Masch. Maat.
Heinrich Griese.	U.N. 1334/37S.	Ober. Maat.
Heinz Simon.	U.N. 12069/40S	Matrosen Gefreniter.
Helmuth Reebe.	U.N. 12365/40S	Matr. Gef.
Josef Gerstner.	U.N. 12526/40S	Matr. Gef.
Helmuth Krosse.	U.N. 7128/40T	Masch. Gef.
Freidrich Mogel.	U.O. 16041/41S	Matr. Gef.
Walter Hartmann.	U.O. 6258/41S	Mech. Gef.
Paul Hetzelt	U.N. 11988/40S	Matr. Ober. Gef.
Paul Eisebraun.	U.N. 11964/40S	Matr. Gef.

Fragatten Kapitan WATTENBURG. This officer is 41 years old, and married and with two children, his home being at Lubeck. He is a "big ship" officer who has turned over to the submarine service since the war began. He is a regular Naval Officer, is very pro-Hitler, is not a member of the Nazi Party because he is an officer, thinks of the Italians as his friends, and "knows" that Germany is going to win the war in six months or a little longer. He was not treated with great respect by the German ratings who did not stand up when he had occasion to pass them on the upper deck. I do not think he had a high opinion of his First Lieutenant, but I think this feeling was mutual.

He was very much on his guard against giving away important information. He sighted the mast of at least one destroyer (believed "Javelin" Class) approaching early in the evening of 3rd September and decided to attack; he saw his torpedo running on the surface. He underestimated our speed by some four knots.

After first saying that the first depth charge attack was quite good he later said that the boat was not damaged by any of the attacks, but subsequently said that after surfacing the boat became more and more unseaworthy; he then became very confused and said it was hopeless to try and escape with three destroyers in sight. To escape from corvettes would have been different because of U.162's superior surface speed, but this statement cannot be quite reconciled with the fact that U.162 was running on the surface on motors and not diesels.

He was mush concerned about the possible capture of his boat and twice sent his Engineer Officer below (while "Vimy" was attacking at about 2330) to see about the scuttling of the boat. The Engineer Officer was in sight coming up the conning tower hatch from his second visit below when the sea broke into the conning tower and U.162 sank.

On learning that other prisoners had said the boat was not seaworthy he at once volunteered the information that his crew were not in possession of all the facts. When asked what would have happened if the destroyers had not found U.162 at about 2330, he shrugged his shoulders and indicated that she would just have sunk.



	ENCLOSURE 1 (continued).

	Information obtained from survivors of U.162.

	Ober Lieutenant BEHREN. This officer is 27 years old, married, and an active service destroyer Officer, who has voluntarily turned over to submarine service during the war. He smiled at the suggestion that his Captain might be the equal of Prien or Schepke.

	He had been in the water about two hours when rescued, and when being warmed at the top of the Engine Room hatch immediately after rescue said that the first depth charge attack had smashed all the submarine's instruments including the listening gear. (I understand from the Captain of the "Vimy" that when U.162 surfaced, she did not "hear" "Vimy" coming up astern, and that he (Captain of the "Vimy") attributed this to U.162's own propeller noises). Later, when he was more revived, he said that he was not convinced that the boat was damaged, but he could only speak for the forward section where he was stationed.

	He confirmed the Captain's story of the first sighting of the destroyers, and confirmed the Captain's opinion that escape from three destroyers already in sight was impossible.

	He said that the second officer fired the two red pyrotechnic signals to draw attention to the fact that U.162 was sinking. He did not give away U.162's operational base, but had a poor opinion of Lorient as a port, and considered Bordeaux quite good.

	It was U.162's fourth or fifth war cruise, but it was his first cruise with his present Captain. He said the crew contained some inexperienced men. He would not give away the number of the boat but when presented with the number U.162, (obtained from "Quentin") he indicated ascent.

	There were only two watchkeeping Officers on board but apparently a rating (?coxswain or Quartermaster) took sights and kept watch. He, liked the Captain, was very surprised to find three British destroyers in the area.

	Ship's Company. Information from U.162's ships company was obtained from Charles A. Roberts, Ordinary Seaman, D/Jx.322166, of "Pathfinder" who speaks German.

	They seemed to be quite glad to be out of the war. They did not show any particular respect for the Captain or First Lieutenant.

	They indicated that the submarine had been at sea for two months, and the torpedo fired at "Quentin" was the fourth attack made in this time. They stated that the first depth charge attack had smashed U.162's instruments including the listening gear. They thought she might have escaped on the surface had she still had listening gear with which to tell her where the destroyers were.

	They indicated by holding their hands over their ears, the unpleasantness of Depth Charge attack.

	They indicated, by making signs of choking, that the air in the boat was foul after the depth charge attacks and this was one reason why they had to surface.

	One rating as he climbed on board smacked a depth charge and called it a "Schweinehund".


	General None of. . . . . . . .



	ENCLOSURE 1 (continued).

	Information obtained from survivors of U.162.

	General. None of the prisoners picked up by "Pathfinder" wore anything except bathing shorts and life saving gear, and had no documents or anything upon them.

	My Medical Officer examined five of the rating prisoners, all of whom he found anemic, and two of who he found to have heart trouble. This anemia and heart trouble he believed to be due to mal-nutrition in youth rather than to conditions of the service. In his opinion seven of the eight ratings (other than Petty Officers) picked up by "Pathfinder" were still in their 'teens.

	I understand that one of the German ratings said that the Captain of U.162 ordered "Stand by to abandon ship" immediately after the first depth charge attack. This information may not be accurate as it was conveyed in broken English.



	ENCLOSURE 4.

	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONORS AND AWARDS.

	For Decoration

	1. Lieutenant Commander Henery Graham Dudley le Chair, R.N. Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Vimy". Whose cooperation throughout the hunt and whose handling of the situation at all times was admirable.

	2. Lieutenant Commander Allen Herbert Percy Noble, D.S.C. R.N. Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Quentin" Whose cooperation throughout the hunt and whose handling of the situation at all times was admirable.

	3. Sub Lieutenant Courtney Reginald de Burch Harris, R.N.R. This officer ran "Pathfinder's" plot throughout the hunt. The contribution he gave and accuracy of the plotting, was most valuable, and was I think largely responsible for the final destruction of U.162.

	--- Remainder of this page was unreadable ---

H.M.S. "VIMY".

4th September, 1942.

Record of Prisoners of War taken by H.M.S. "VIMY" at sea in position 12⁰ 12' N. 55⁰ 33' W. from German U-boat on 3rd September, 1942. - U-Boat 162.

__________________________________________________________________________

NAME.	NATIONALITY.	RANK.	NUMBER.

Walther HOLTZ	German.	Obermechanikasmaat.	UO 171/37S.
Hanz SCHOBEL	"	Machninmaat.	UN 31/38T.
Wolf MIZGALSKI	"	Seemaat.	UN 3419/36S.
Lothar BOHN	"	Obermachinist.	UN 621/34T.
Rudolf SMYOZEK	"	Bootsmaat	UO 2842/37S.
Peter OLDHABER	"	Obermachinmaat.	UN 2517/37T.
Alfred SCHWERENDT	"	Machinmaat.	UN 3049/38T.
Rudolf SCHNEIDER	"	Machinmaat.	UN 2443/36T.
Franz HOX	"	Oberstenermann.	UN 405/28S
Hans SCHMIDT	"	Funkmaat.	UO 1057/39.
Heinz SCHUTZE	"	Obermachinist.	UN 20/32T.

Horst PEIPMANN	"	Obergefreiter.	O 12501/40S.
Horst LOBLICH	"	"	O 3375/40T.
Christof DORING	"	"	N 4067/40S.
Rudolf WEBER	"	"	UN 12449/40S.
Georg KITTEL	"	Gefreiter.	18140/140T.
Walther KOZUR	"	"	7126/41T.
Heinz CHMILEWSKI	"	"	17151/41T.
Sigfried KRETSCHMAN	"	"	N 6893/40T.
Johan KHEMER	"	"	N 6894/40T.
Walther JAGER	"	"	6867/40T.
Alfred DIETRICH	"	"	6510/40T.
Bruno BISCHOFF	"	"	74107/40B.
Erwin DIDSZUN	"	"	6813/40T.
Rolf HEINECKE	"	"	6853/40.
Alfred HILLER	"	"	6856/40T.
Gunter PETZOLD	"	"	17330/140.
Ringfried PAWLOWSKI	"	"	3045/140.
Gunter WESTPHAL	"	"	16460/40S.
Kurt FROMLICH	"	"	47025/N41.
Georg BINIAS	"	"	1713/N40.

Leutnant Barndt von Malther und CRONECK, See Offizer 1938.

_______________

SHIP: All taken from German U-Boat 162 sunk 3rd September.

All received onboard 3rd September, 1942.

Date and Place, etc., Disposal: 4th September, 1942, Port of Spain, Trinidad.

None wounded, and none have since died.

Lieutenant Commander

In Command.



	REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH GERMAN PRISONERS
	3RD SEPTEMBER, 1942.
	_____________________________________________________

	Report of talks with Lieutenant Barndt von Walther und Croneck
	(No. Seeoffizier 1938), survivor from U.162 -

	His home address is Silesia,
	Kaymtschutz bei Obernick
	Bezaugt Breslaw.

	He said he was the 2nd officer on board and when rescued said he thought the Captain and First Lieutenant had been drowned as they swam in another direction. He said there were 51 in the ship's company including 3 officers and one engineer officer. The latter stayed in the boat to scuttle her.

	As soon as he was rescued I asked him whether the U Boat had gone down - he said "yes" (he spoke fair English). It was not by our Depth Charges but by a "mistake in their machine". He then said they were not damaged and I asked him how it was they were ready to abandon ship when we sighted than. To this no satisfactory answer. He was quite sure the Engineer Officer opened flood valves after they left. He said they were damaged by our shell fire and fired red pyrotechnic as signal to abandon ship.

	Next day he said it was a mistake firing one torpedo at a destroyer and he had apparently said so to the Captain. He was also most insistent that 80 meters was the best depth to be at when depth charges were dropped.

	His political opinions were not violently Nazi and he was cool and polite the whole time on board. He thawed a good deal after some sleep and next morning over a glass of beer.

	(Sgd) W.K. Macfarlane.
	LIEUTENANT, R.N.V.R.

	Conversation with Lieutenant Walther und Croneck -

	Officer is in the regular navy. He was on the training ship "George Foch" (or similar name - sailing ship) in 1939 when she carried out a cruise to Madeira, Trinidad, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Scapa Flow.

	Earlier this war he was in a ship which picked up 1 officer and 3 other survivors of H.M. Ships "Ivanhoe" and "Esk" off the coast of Holland after they had been adrift four days.

	The sinking. Officer said he saw gunflash and immediately after explosion below in U-boat and thought shell had hit abaft bridge. Said depth charge did not drop close. Said when "Vimy" was following in U-boat's wake hydrophone effect could not be heard - only occasional transmission of the Asdic.

	Officer had never seen an R.A.F. leaflet.

	Considered Germany would not require colonies after Caucasus had been taken. Thought Germany would want to stop war when she had Caucasus oilfields.

	Said the loss of one U-boat did not make slightest difference - they were built with such speed.

	(Sgd.) J.B.
	Lieutenant.



	Page 2.

	REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH GERMAN PRISONERS
	3RD SEPTEMBER, 1942.
	_____________________________________________________

	A.B. PERCIVAL - Conversation with Prisoner of War.

	Germans thought we were American at first. Did not expect British destroyer in West Indies vicinity. Expected Japanese to beat America easily.

	Several asked when we were going to arrive at Trinidad or Barbados.

	When asked why they were so sun burnt the Prisoner of War replied they had plenty of time to sunbathe.

	Thought they took on too much by attacking three Destroyers.

	Thought Germany would win the war this year. British beaten in the first year. One said he enjoyed life in Germany before the war.

	A.B. DERBY - Conversation with Prisoner of War.

	One Prisoner of War said he counted 20 depth charges. One asked if ship was running between America and England.

	A.B. CLEWER - Conversation with Prisoner of War.

	Prisoner of War said U-boat sank Panama ship two days before sinking.

	Curacao was mentioned several times between Prisoners of War.

	Ordnance Artificer HOLT - Conversation with Prisoner of War.

	Petty Officers said majority of them were over the side half an hour before "Vimy" appeared. They asked why we rammed the submarine when she was helpless. Question "Why was she helpless?", they answered "No magazines left".

	They were under the impression that we were running them down in the water and didn't think we should pick them up. They know we dropped 12 charges. One man came from Marienburg in Danzig. We asked why they had so much water in their lungs and they said they had been in the water half an hour (this is doubtful). Apparently there was someone left in the submarine whom they worried about. The majority of Petty Officers could speak a little English and Holtz could speak quite good English. They would not say how many ships they had sunk.

	One man was in Kiel when "Newcastle" or a Tern class cruiser of similar name came there in 1937.

	They asked why we rammed them and we said just to make sure the submarine went down and wasn't lying in wait for us with a gun. This is where they said they had no ammunition left.

Page 3.

REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH GERMAN PRISONERS

3RD SEPTEMBER, 1942.

_____________________________________________________

They didn't know how we knew where the submarine was in the dark. They asked whether we heard them or saw them. Holtz spoke most as he knew some English but they were all well drilled about talking on service matters.

Asked about conditions in Germany, they all praised Hitler and said they had enough to eat. They said they fire one torpedo at 2200 hours which was our 1800 (we verified about the times when arranging times for washing on board next morning).

Verified by W.K. Macfarlane,

Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.

The following points arose from conversations with Walther:

His U-Boat was sunk.

The ship had a complement of 51 men.

He alleged that she had not been damaged by our attacks but in a previous engagement.

He had counted some 13 charges.

I suggested that it was rather dangerous to attack three destroyers. He was astounded for he had seen only one. They had fired a torpedo but it had run along the surface and missed.

Asked why they had fired a rocket he replied that it was an indication that they were helpless and also that it was a signal to the crew to abandon ship.

In later conversations he showed himself a typical Nazi in his outlook. He professed great admiration for the Japanese but had a poor opinion of the Italians. He gave his opinion that it would be impossible for Allied forces to land in France and for Germans to invade England. He would not believe that 1000 British bombers had raided German cities in one night.

He had traveled widely in Europe - Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Poland. Had called at English ports and had visited America as a schoolboy in an exchange scheme. He expressed the greatest contempt for Poland and Russia whom he described as uncivilized and seemed to regard them as the real enemy. He had done a training cruise in West Indies waters before the war.

He stated that there were 6,000,000 Russian prisoners in Germany and that the whole of the Russian Western Army had been wiped out. He estimated German losses as follows -

In Russia	300,000.
In France and Low Countries	30,000.
In Norway	2,000.

The following points of interest arose from conversations with ratings:

The name of the Captain - WALDENBERG. Confirmed by asking several prisoners if the had seen "Captain Waldenburg" after they had abandoned ship.

Chumlewski, a newcomer to the ship, revealed that she was in Germany a month and a half ago and that his last leave had ended in June. Pawlowski, a Westphalian, disclosed that he had

last . . . . . . . .



	Page 4.


	REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH GERMAN PRISONERS
	3RD SEPTEMBER, 1942.
	_____________________________________________________

	last seen his native land last Christmas and had been two months in the ship.

	Many of the engine room ratings had rashes which they said they had had for a fortnight.

	It seems that the submarine was taken by surprise, for some, including Weber and Kremar, said they were asleep at the time and had only just time to scramble out and swim for it.

	(SGD.) R.B. VENABLES.
	Sub-Lieut. R.N.V.R.


	Lieutenant Walther said he was sorry that we were not an American ship as they did not think much of them and considered that they would not have been caught.

Quentin.

A P P E N D I X I.

INFORMATION FROM RESCUED MEMBERS OF THE U-BOAT'S CREW. (U.162).

---oOo---

Four in all were picked up, three at 0045/4th, who were all remarkably fresh in spite of some time in the water, one discarding his lifebelt and swimming to the side, and all three climbing the "life saving" nets with ease.

The 4th man was picked up at 0120, and was much more exhausted.

NAME.	RATING.	NUMBER.	AGE.

AUGÜFE TLY.	Ober Maut.	N2563/36T	25

ERNST WALDAÜ.	Masch Gaft.	O.U. 16809/40S.	20

HELMUT KUNGLER.	Masch Gaft.	U.N. 6883/40T.	21

GÜNTER BOSSE.	Masch Maut.	U.N. 2266/39T.	22

All 4 Prisoners were wearing bathing slip shorts only, and a search produced nothing.

Preliminary investigations were carried out on the first three while they were smoking and drinking cocoa, and all were very non-committal, having apparently quite recovered their composure.

GÜNTHER BOSSE, interrogated similarly, and under the impression that he was the only survivor on board, volunteered the number of his craft, as U.162, and described her as of 750 tons, armed with 6 torpedo tubes and 1 Q.F. Gun. Complement of 4 officers and 50 men.

He stated they were operating alone, and confirmed that 1 Torpedo was fired, after which their vessel was attacked three times. He said the second pattern cause damage to hydroplanes and rudders, in addition to making a leak in the engine room, where he was at the time. He was thrown against the side and shaken. He gave the time of surfacing and abandoning as 2400 G.S.T.

They had left a French port in July, and expected to return in mid-October, or earlier if their torpedoes were all used. He did not know exactly where they were.

They stated that all fuel and stores for voyage were embarked before sailing.

---oOo---