UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET |
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ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT |
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150 CAUSEWAY STREET |
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BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS |
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A16-3(3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Serial 0486 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4/jmr | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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1. Following is the identifying data covering the subject attack: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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2. This attack was delivered after radar contact made while the plane was flying above scattered cumulus clouds. Visibility was unlimited and the pilot found himself in ideal position for attack when the U-boat was sighted visually. Surprise of the U-boat was apparently complete. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3. The hypothesis advanced in reference (b) that the second bomb stuck in the deck and was carried to set depth where explosion occurred is reasonable and is strengthened by the possibility that the explosion of the first bomb lifted the stern and caused submergence at a greater angle than usual which would account for part of the stern being visible at the time of the second explosion. The only other possibility appears to be that the bomb rolled off the deck, sank to set depth and exploded directly under and very close to the U-boat. In either event, it is believed that damage must have been fatal and this attack is, therefore, regarded as having resulted in a sure kill. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4. The pilot's report is unusually complete and was accompanied by excellent sketches which assist greatly in evaluation. Several points in this report require comment: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
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ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT |
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150 CAUSEWAY STREET |
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BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS |
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A16-3(3) | ||
Serial 0486 | ||
4/jmr | ||
Subject: Aircraft Anti-Submarine Attack. | ||
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(a) The emphasis laid upon the size of the U-boat in the pilot's report. | ||
Several large supply submarines are believed to be used by Germany. Bermuda is a likely area for them to be used to service smaller submarines. It is highly probable that this was a submarine of the supply type. | ||
(b) It is notes that the attacking plane and the relief plane circled the area for six and one-quarter hours after the attack. | ||
(c) The report mentions that pictures were obtained of the "large mass of air" which broke surface 4 minutes after the explosion of the second depth bomb. These photographs were not included with the report. It is considered that they might be of value. | ||
(d) Attention is invited to the recommendation that armor is needed in front of pilots and bomber. This is a matter which is believed to require careful consideration prior to approval. | ||
(e) It is noted that the second depth bomb was seen to explode while the plane was approaching to drop the two bombs remaining which failed to release on the first drop. It is not apparent whether the remaining two bombs again failed to release or whether the pilot withheld them upon seeing the explosion of the second bomb. |
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(f) The question of failure of bombs to release and jamming of machine guns is a matter of such vital importance that it will be covered in separate correspondence. | ||
6. It is considered that this attack was successful and the U-boat was destroyed. | ||
T.L. LEWIS | ||
Copy to: | ||
CominCH | ||
Comdt NOB Bermuda | ||
ComPatRon 74 | ||