U-boat Archive - U-110 - 3rd Escort Group Report of Proceedings with convoy C.B.318

9th May 1941

Report of Attacks on U-boats. All times G.M.T.

ATTACK No. I

1)	H.M.S. AUBRIETIA.
2)	1206 9th May 1941.
3)	Position 60⁰ 31' N 33⁰ 10' W.
4)	Wind WSW 4. C6 Sea 3 Swell 2.
5)	Nil.
6)	1400 Fathoms.
7)	Asdic contact followed by periscope being sighted.
8)	1000 A/S. 800 Sighting.
9)	(a) Not known.
	(b) NO.
	(c) To right.
	(d) Counter attack. Poor echo obtained.
10)	300
11)	Estimate of range and time.
12)	NO.
13)	Not immediately.
14)	Very good.
15)	(a) Mk VII
	(b) 50
	(c) 6 from Rails; 4 from Throwers.
	(d) A (Light 100 feet
	(Heavy 225 feet.
	(e) Yes.
16)	Not applicable.
17)	Not applicable.
18)	(a) -
	(b) -
	(c) -
	(d) Doubtful but consider U.Boat damaged. See evidence regarding signaling and John Wolf.
19)	Attached.
20)	Not applicable.

ATTACK No. II

1)	H.M.S. AUBRIETIA.
2)	1223 9th May 1941.
3)	Position 60⁰ 31' N 33⁰ 10' W.
4)	Wind WSW 4. C6 Sea 3 Swell 2.
5)	Nil.
6)	1400 Fathoms.
7)	A/S contact at 1700 yds.
8)	1700.
9)	(a) Slightly opening.
	(b) Nil.
	(c) Yes to left.
	(d) Attached U.Boat from Port Quarter. Pattern fired late. U.Boat was steering towards sinking ships.
10)	400
11)	Recorder.
12)	Broadway in contact but it is not known whether it was the same U.Boat.
13)	No Attack damaged A/S set.
14)	Very good.
15)	(a) Mk VII
	(b) 50
	(c) 6 from Rails; 4 from Throwers.
	(d) C (Light 150 feet
	(Heavy 385 feet.
	(e) Yes.
16)	Not applicable.
17)	Not applicable.
18)	(a) No.
	(b) No.
	(c) No.
	(d) Yes.
19)	Attached.
20)	Bulldogs Report.

ATTACK No. III

1)	H.M.S. AUBRIETIA.
2)	1443 9th May 1941.
3)	Position 60⁰ 31' N 33⁰ 10' W.
4)	Wind WSW 4. C6 Sea 3 Swell 2.
5)	Nil.
6)	1400 Fathoms.
7)	Asdic contact.
8)	1800.
9)	(a) Nil.
	(b) No.
	(c) No.
	(d) Nil.
10)	300
11)	Fired by Recorder.
12)	Yes. H.M.S. BULLDOG H.M.S. BROADWAY.
13)	Yes.
14)	Good
15)	(a) Mk VII
	(b) 50
	(c) 4 from Throwers, 3 from Rails.
	(d) C (Light 150 feet
	(Heavy 385 feet.
	(e) Heavy charges jammed in the Rails, and were not fired. Others Yes.
16)	Not applicable.
17)	Not applicable.
18)	(a) No.
	(b) Too much oil in area from first U.Boat and H.M.S. BROADWAY.
	(c) No.
	(d) Doubtful.
	(e) -

ATTACK IV

1)	H.M.S. AUBRIETIA.
2)	1523-1/2 9th May 1941.
3)	Position 60⁰ 31' N 33⁰ 10' W.
4)	Wind WSW 4. C6 Sea 3 Swell 2.
5)	Nil.
6)	1400 Fathoms.
7)	Asdic contact
8)	1800.
9)	(a) No.
	(b) Reported by H.M.S. BROADWAY.
	(c) No.
	(d) Nil.
10)	250
11)	(a) Recorder.
12)	Yes H.M.S. BROADWAY.
13)	Yes but fainter.
14)	Good
15)	(a) Mk VII
	(b) 50
	(c) Throwers 4 Rails 6.
	(d) C (Light 150 feet
	(Heavy 385 feet.
	(e) Yes.
16)	Not applicable.
17)	Not applicable.
18)	(a) No.
	(b) Yes much oil in area.
	(c) No.
	(d) Doubtful.
19)
20)

Click this text to view a diagram of H.M.S. Aubrietia's attacks

H.M.S. Aubrietia Narrative 9th May 1941

G.M.T.

1200	Lat 60⁰ 31' N Long 33⁰ 10' W. Wind WSW 4. C.6. Sea 3 Swell 2. Visibility 5 miles.
	H.M.S. Aubrietia was stationed on the starboard beam of the convoy, zig-zagging independently. Convoy steering 220⁰
1201	Steering 190⁰ at 10 knots and distant 800 from No 9 Column, abeam of No 92.
	Ships No 91 a 41 were torpedoed.
	Speed increased to 13 knots and course altered to starboard intending to drop one charge.
	The torpedoes were heard by the S.D. on watch and a report was made by R/T that the attack was from the starboard side
1203	A contact was obtained bearing 335⁰ dist. 1000 but was not held probably due to ship being under helm. Aubrietia was steadied in 340⁰ and engines stopped in order to regain contact.
1204	Periscope was sighted bearing 000⁰ traveling from port to starbd. distant 800 (approx). Course was altered to 030⁰ at Full Speed and a counter attack carried out.
1204-1/2	Faint trace obtained on recorder.
1206	First attack completed. Full pattern fired set to 225 feet and 100 feet. Time to fire obtained by watch.
1206-1/2	Speed 9 knots o/c 050⁰.
1210	Altered course to starboard.
1210-1/2	Stopped engines. Steadied on 205⁰. Endeavouring to regain contact.
	Bulldog and Broadway were also joining in the hunt and Broadway reported contact on her starboard side.
1212-1/2	Course 205⁰ Speed 4 knots.
1215	Contact was obtained on a U.Boat bearing 236⁰ 1000

1216	Speed 9 knots Course 235⁰.
1220	Commenced attack. Course 210⁰ U.Boat steering towards damaged ships.
1222	Course 220⁰.
1223	Attack completed. Full Pattern fired. Settings heavy 385 feet. Light 150 feet.
	This attack put A/S set out of action temporarily and Aubrietia proceeded clear to allow Bulldog and Broadway to hunt and closed boats of S.S. Esmond to pick up survivors.
	These were rescued at 1239 by which time Bulldog and Broadway were in action with U.boat on the surface.
	On closing Bulldog orders were received to pick up U.Boat survivors.
1322	A/S set was repaired.
1430	34 prisoners taken from the water, two of whom died later.
1432	Bulldog reported contact. Aubrietia proceeded to join Broadway in the hunt.
1435	Broadway attacked
1437	Contact bearing 120⁰, 1800.
1441	Proceeded to attack. Range 900. No doppler.
1443	Attack completed. Full pattern ordered at settings C Heavy 385 feet. Light 150 feet. but heavy charges in rails jammed and were not fired.
1452	Broadway attacked.
1519	Contact bore 020⁰ 1100
1520	Attacked Range 1000
1523-1/2	Attack completed. Full Charge settings C Heavy 385 feet Light 150 feet. Fired correctly.

	After this attack the contact became weaker.
1538	Broadway attacked.
1545	Proceeded to close contact listening
1550	Closed contact.
	Contact faded and could not be relocated. Proceeded to screen Bulldog until ordered to close Amazon and transfer prisoners.

Remarks
	It appears probable that the first two attacks were made on two different U.boats although this was not realized until the attacks were analysed.
	The first counter attack may have damaged a U.Boat which was at periscope depth two minutes before and this may have been the U.Boat attacked by Broadway and Aubrietia in the afternoon.
	A statement made by a prisoner was to the effect that they heard the first D/C attack but it was a long way to the left of them, they were, however, in S.S.T. or similar communication with another U.Boat until that attack when, as he put it, 'the other boat went dead'.
	Two prisoners died on board and one was identified as Joher (or Johan) Wolf - Mechanician and was recognised by only one rating who stated that he had known the man in Hamburg but that he was not a member of the same U.Boat's crew.
	No other prisoner, officer or rating, could identify him and he had no papers or identification disc.
	He was wearing escape apparatus.
	This man was buried at sea on 10th May 1941.

	Throughout all attacks Able Seaman W. Rutledge TX 147777 displayed complete coolness and skill in holding contact and when the A/S set was damaged by shock after the second attack, he carried out repairs in very quick time.

	Sub Lieutenant Gene R.N.V.R. in control of throwers and rails showed coolness and judgment throughout all attacks and with the exception of the heavy charges in the rails during Attack No 3 full patterns were fired correctly.

	Able Seaman T. Jakeuter ON. is commended for the armed firing of all charges and for initiative in clearing the starboard rails.
	The failure in the starboard rails was due to one of the lifting rings failing to drop as the charge rolled over in the rails and the ring then jammed between the charge and the rail.

	V. FUNGE SMITH



	COPY
	STATEMENT

	May 11th 1940

	I John Frederick Iredale was present at the identification of two deceased German ratings aboard H.M.S. AUBRIETIA.
	A German officer was able to identify one of the said ratings as one of his crew but of the other he knew nothing.
	I called upon a German rating who was prisoner aboard the above mentioned ship and he was able to identify the same rating that the officer had identified as one of his crew.
	He also identified the other rating as John Wolf (Mech), and declared in broken English that he knew the rating in Hamburg, but had not seen him since.
	The rating identified as John Wolf appears to have died from excessive pressure applied to his body as may have been caused by escaping by Davis apparatus, or Depth Charge explosion.
	The above statement is to my belief the truth.

	May 11th 1940.
	Sgd. J. F. IREDALE.



	COPY

	During my conversation with the Sub Lieutenant of the "U" Boat he stated that our first pattern of D/C was a good way to the left of them, and did them no damage but that the second pattern stopped their engines put out the lights and the submarine started to take water; and as he put it, it was the finish for them.

	Sgd. J. JAKEMAN.



	H.M.S. AUBRIETIA.
	Sunday 11th May 1941.

	Statement made by O.Cook. James O'Brien.
	This rating spoke to two of the prisoners on the fore mess deck, after they had been rescued.
	Prisoner No 1. Wireless Operator, stated that the complement of the submarine was 47. He gave no further information
	Prisoner No 2. O'Brien spoke as if he did not like the English to encourage the prisoners to speak. This prisoner stated that:
	Before the war he had been a journalist on a paper (of which the translated title was Southern Gazette). When the war began he was a driver in a motor transport unit.
	After the collapse of France he volunteered for submarine service.
	During a discussion on papers the theatre, films he said he had seen the film "Mon Ami" in Paris LAST SUNDAY.
	Regarding the war, he said that the German troops were going on from Tobruk to Alexandria to cut the road to India. He further stated that Boulogne had been badly bombed, and had been partially evacuated.
	As to the attack the prisoner said that we were in contact with another submarine which did not surface!
	He admitted that he came from U 110 and that all the prisoners on the fore mess deck were from the same submarine.
	O'Brien also spoke with the 3rd Officer of the submarine; this officer stated:
	That he was stayed in the hotel in Lorient; where the French people in charge of the hotel were anxious for a relative of theirs in England.
	He was afraid to go to England or Canada because the former was going to be more heavily bombed than ever before during May and the voyage to Canada was dangerous on account of the number of German submarines in their vicinity at the time of the attack.
	Invasion: he did not think this likely just yet because Hitler on the 5th May had said that Britain was to be bombed first until she was tired of it. The war might end some time after the end of this month.
	O'Brien asked him what he had had for lunch, supposing that it would be tinned



	food. "Oh no, the officer replied, "we had fresh food."



	H.M.S. Aubretia
	11th May 1941.

	After the second attack had forced the submarine to the surface, we stood by to pick up enemy survivors. Some fifteen to twenty were picked up on the starboard side and the remainder in ones and twos on the port side.
	There were one or two life saving apparatus floating by, about 1/2 cable on either beam. During the rescue work it was noticed that few were wearing the special apparatus the majority wore inflated life jackets. Of those which came sufficiently near the ships side for heaving lines to be thrown, about two were obviously dead, and made no motion even when lines were dropped on their heads or hands.
	When the last of those near the ship had been taken inboard, I went up on to the bridge and reported to the Captain that all those displaying any signs of life had been got in board; and that two visible on the starboard quarter we had judged as dead, they having made no movement at all. The captain said he would turn to starboard so as to pass close to these men, and to make certain that they were lifeless.
	On the ship being brought about, and maneuvered close to the floating men it was obvious that they were lifeless. At the same time I sighted four or five other men astern to starboard; as these were approached I could see that they were all wearing their life saving apparatus; there were floating in an upright position their heads sunk forward between their arms, which were raised chest high and bent at the elbows. One man passed under our stern as the ship hove to, and somehow managed to catch a rope around him so that we could heave him un board. He was wearing the apparatus but the face piece was not adjusted so that he must have swallowed a good deal of water.



	He was obviously suffering from severe shock and died a short while later.