Secret. |
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2. Aubretia, Hollyhock and Nigella sailed from Hvalfdord at 2000, 6th May, escorting S.S.Cardium. They were joined at 2200 off Reykjavik by St Apollo escorting two merchant ships. They were ordered to join O.B.318.. Bulldog, Amazon Broadway sailed at 0200, 7th May, escorting H.M.S. Ranpura who was ordered to join O.B.318.. Daneman, who was delayed by a boiler defect, sailed at 0445, 7th May. |
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3. Bulldog, Amazon, Broadway and Ranpura met O.B.318 at 1800, 7th May, in position (see para.5) Bulldog communicated with Westcott, Senior Officer of the escort, and obtained details of the convoy. Westcott left for Iceland at 1945 with the destroyers of his group leaving Primrose, Nasturtium Marigold, Auricula, Dianthus, Angle and Rochester with Convoy. |
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They had orders to remain till 1600, 8th May. Daneman joined the escort at 2050, 7th May. |
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4. Westcott had stationed the escorts in the following positions on Diagram 12. Angle C, Primrose E, Marigold R, Rochester F, Dianthus Q, Auricula D, Nasturtium B. I left them in these positions when I took over the convoy at 1945 and stationed Bulldog at A, Amazon at T and Broadway at . At 2055 Daneman was ordered to a position inside the convoy between the port wing and next inner colunm. |
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5. At 1550, 7th May, a signal was received from Admiralty saying that a first sighting report had been made of a convoy, probably O.B.318, by a U-boat at 1357, 7th May. The convoy which had been steering 2900 was ordered to alter course to starboard, (see Signal A). I estimated that course would be set to 3300 at 1630 and altered course to intercept it accordingly. The rendezvous was timed for 1800. The convoy was sighted at 1745 ten miles to the southward, only having altered to 3180 at 1645. I did not consider the alteration to be sufficient. Ranpura was of the same opinion and said he would inform the Commodore. (See Signal B) The convoy, however, continued to steer 3180. Ranpura took station between colunms four and five. The convoy consisted of 38 ships in nine colunms. |
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6. Westcott reported that his group had been chasing whales or temperature gradients all day and had not seen much of the convoy. (See Signal C) |
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7. At 2058, 7th May, Bulldog obtained a contact 200 yds ahead. It was lost before it could be classified and the ship turned 1800 degrees on opposite course to the convoy and endeavoured to regain contact. Hothing was heard, however, and the ship passed down between the 8th and 9th colunms at 8 knots. |
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Note: Ranpura was a 10,000-ton former liner serving as a merchant cruiser
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| At 2115, when abreast the fourth ships of the colunms, I saw the rear ships of the 3rd and 4th colunms hit by torpedoes almost simultaneously. Large colunms of water appeared abreast the starboard quarter of each ship. It instantly occurred to me that the torpedoes must have been fired from very close to Bulldog or Rochester, i.e. that the submarine must be either inside or astern of the convoy. I therefore dropped a depth charge immediately and ordered Rochester to do the same. Neither ship was in contact. It subsequently appeared from the plot that Bulldog's depth charge must have been very close to the submarine and may account for the fact that no more torpedoes appeared to have been fired. Still supposing myself to be close to the U-boat, I turned up inside the convoy and searched what free space there was. | ||
| At this time I ordered Daneman to close the ship which was burning fiercely and Marigold to close the second ship in which fire had not broken out. Daneman was quickly on the spot picking up men who had jumped into the sea. Credit is due to Daneman in that he rescued every man from S.S. Ixion. Meanwhile Amazon was coming down the port side of the convoy. I ordered him to join Rochester and counter attack. Broadway had turned away to search on the port quarter of the convoy. He went about two miles out and came back but failed to obtain contact. I ordered him to proceed with the convoy. | ||
| 8. Two minutes after the ships had been hit, the Commodore ordered a 400 turn to port together. This was awkward for Bulldog who was inside the convoy, and I spent a hectic few minutes extricating myself. | ||
| 9. At 2122 Rochester reported sighting a periscope ahead. Her attack did not seem to develop till 2141, by which time Amazon had already attacked. Bulldog became disentangled from the convoy at about 2132 and joined Amazon in the hunt. The two ships from the A/S striking force of the 3rd Escort Group. Broadway was left in charge of the convoy. It was decided to keep Rochester with the A/S striking force as she was in contact with the submarine. She was ordered to rejoin the convoy at 0015, 8th May. It would have been satisfactory to have kept back another ship of the 3rd Escort Group, but it was thought essential to leave one destroyer with the convoy, and the corvettes of the group had not yet joined from Reykjavik. A seperate report on the U-boat hunt is attached. | ||
| 10. R/T was used extensively during the hunt. Communication between Bulldog and Amazon was excellent and never failed during the four hours hunt. It took some time to get Rochester on the air, but once established, communication was good. That advantages of good R/T communication in the group are undoubtedly very great. Not only did the hunt work smoothly on account of each ship knowing what the others were doing (this of course held good equally by night as by day) but it was also possible to give orders to the escort of the rapidly disappearing convoy at the same time. A headphone and mouthpiece would be much more convienient than the handset on the bridge. | ||
| 11. S.S. Nailsea Manor turned back shortly after the torpedoing of the two ships of the convoy took place. She was observed with boats in tow acting as rescue ship. Her action is to be commended. | ||
| 12. Daneman was ordered to rejoin the convoy at 2230 by which time all rescues had been effected. | ||
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Note: U-94 made this submerged night attack firing four
torpedoes - the 10,300-ton British freighter Ixion and the 5,658-ton Norwegian
freighter Eastern Star sank - U-94 escaped with heavy damage |
| had been effected. | ||
| 13. Marigold had picked up survivors of the Eastern Star and asked whether a tug could be sent. The ship had settled considerably aft but it appeared as though she might be salvable. | ||
| I ordered Marigold to remain in the vicinit, meaning to take the vessel in tow at the end of the U-boat hunt. However, at 0254, 8th May, she suddenly sank. Ixion had blazed furiously till 0227 when she sank. Marigold was ordered to rejoin the convoy at 0300, 8th May. | ||
| At 0015, when it seemed that the contact had faded out for good, Rochester was ordered to rejoin the convoy. Bulldog and Amazon searched the area till 0930, 8th May, then proceeded to rejoin the convoy, which was caught up at 1600 on 8th May. Rochester had not rejoined by this time. | ||
| 14. The corvettes of the 7th Escort Group were detached at 1800 8th May to proceed to their next rendezvous. This left the following of the 3rd Escort Group with the convoy: Bulldog, Amazon, Broadway, Aubretia, Hollylock, Nigella, Daneman, St Apollo and Ange. | ||
| 15. They took up night dispositions at 2230, occupying positions A1, A3, B1, B2, C1, C2, D2, P and S on 3rd Escort Group diagram P.3. Amazon and Broadway were sent off to search to 10 miles on the beams before taking up A.S.V. positions. Bulldog took station in Position D2 astern. It is interesting to note that from records captured in U.110, She was actually shadowing us at this time from about 15 miles on the starboard bow. Even if a searching destroyer came close enough to a shadowing submarine to put her down and make her lose sight of the convoy, It only requires the simplest form of Vignont search to ensure the submarine finding the convoy again. By his plot U.110 evidently did lose sight of the convoy for some time that night, but he quickly found it again the next morning despite the convoy alterations of course. We have been inclined to delude ourselves into thinking that a submarine can be shaken off. I am now prepared to state as a fact that s determined submarine commander cannot be shaken off by an 8 knot convoy in the present conditions of light and weather ruling in the North Atlantic. Now what may be called "Suicidal" U-boat attacks have been re-started, I believe the entire escort should remain with the convoy constantly and ships should only leave their stations if actually in contact. A determined U-boat commander is going to attack no matter what evasive action is taken by an 8 knot convoy, provided he has collected enough of his pals to co-operate. The only answer is to have a big enough escort disposed as an efficient asdic screen. Asdic conditions are good. | ||
| 16. The night of 8/9th May was uneventfull. At 0500 the escort took up positions on 3rd Escort Group diagram P.1. as follows: A3 to 7 Amazon, Hollyhock, Bulldog, Nigella, Broadway, Angle B2, Aubrettia C2, Daneman D1, St Apollo D2. Ships in A3 to 7 were spread 2000 yds apart, Bulldog as guide being 300 yds ahead of the convoy whose frotage measured as 4400 yds. The formation was designed so that a submarine at visibility distance (10 miles) would have to pass through the screen to get in an attack. In case he succeeded in getting through without contact being made, wingers should pick him up from positions B2 and C2. Long range attacks from the quarters were considered so unlikely that no counter measures were taken. The more possible event of a submarine actually getting into the convoy was dealt with by stationing ships at D1 and D2. They would be in a good position to judge if this had actually occurred and would also be in a favorable position for rescue | ||
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| position for rescue. | ||
| work in case they were not required for counter attack. | ||
| 17. At 1201 No. 71 in the convoy was torpedoed on the starboard side. A few seconds afterwards a ship in the starboard wing colunm was also torpedoed. It appeared to me that the attack had developed from between Broadway and Aubretia. I directed Amazon to take charge ahead of the convoy, turned to the supposed position of the submarine and ordered Hollynock to remain ahead of the convoy. Shortly afterwards Aubretia was in contact and very soon Broadway was in contact as well. Aubretia attacked with a full pattern at the position I expected the submarine. Broadway followed. Bulldog was also in contact and was investigating when the conning tower of a submarine broke surface at the position she was expected. The story of her subsequent capture is contained in a seperate report. | ||
| 18. The U-boat sank at 1100 on 10th May. Bulldog proceeded to Hvalfiord at 20 knots arriving at 0100, 11th May. | ||
| 19. Amazon handed over the U-boat prisoners at 0630, 11th May. Bulldog sailed immediately for Reykjavik where I made report to F.O.I.C. Iceland and received instructions to proceed to Scapa Flow. Bulldog sailed at 1030 and received instructions to proceed to Scapa at 25 knots, Arriving at 1830 on 12th May and securing to an oiler. | ||
| 20. Lieutenant. Bacon.R.N.V.R. from A.C.O.S. came onboard shortly afterwards and having examined the books and documents captured, removed them ashore for photographing. Lieut. Bacon flew with the most important books to the Admiralty on 13th May. | ||
| 21. Berth was shifted to Long Hope at 2345. | ||
| 22. The prisoners were taken away at 0830, 13th May, except for two wounded who left the ship at 1530. | ||
| 23. I had long conversations with R.A.(D) and with the Commander in Chief Home Fleet, and told both of them the whole story. While on board H.M.S. King George V I had a telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Western Approaches, and agreed verbally with him to sail for Reykjavik as soon as I could get all reports written. I explained the datails of the hunts and U-boat tactics as far as we knew them, to the staff of C in C.H.F. Both R.A.(D) and C in C.H.F. are therefore in possession of all facts and of the theories I have formed as a result of the experience of the 3rd Escort Group. | ||
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| Commander (D). | ||
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Note: U-110 fired three torpedoes (the fourth was a misfire) and sank the 4,976-ton British freighter Esmond and the 2,609-ton British freighter Bengore Head in this attack |
S E C R E T |
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REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD ESCORT GROUP WITH |
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CONVOY O.B.318. |
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The Commander (D) 3rd Escort Group's letter No.X/51 of 13th May, 1941. |
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II. |
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| No.4622/191. | ||
| THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, WESTERN APPROACHES. | ||
| (Copy to: | ||
| The Commander (D) 3rd Escort Group. ) | ||
| Forwarded. The observations in paragraph 15 are of particular interest. | ||
| 2. Whilst the loss of Merchant Ships in Convoy O.B.318 is regrettable, it is considered that Commander (D)3 and his Group are to be commended for the manner in which they dealt with the many and varied situations which arose, and more particularly for the offensive measures taken against the enemy. | ||
| 3. With reference to paragraph 10, it is intended to try a headphone and mouthpiece in H.M.S. BULLDOG for trial. | ||
| 4. A full collated report on the attack on C.B.318 will be forwarded as soon as records from all escorts are received. | ||
| 5. The Commander (D)3's report on operation "Primrose" is forwarded herewith. | ||
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| CAPTAIN (D) | ||
| GREENOCK. | ||
| Naval Offices, | ||
| Albert Marbour, | ||
| GREENOCK. | ||
| 2nd June, 1941 | ||
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