This record was kindly provided by the generous assistance of Tony Cooper.


                                                                                                                 COPY No.
This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer
C.B.  04051 (19)
"U 100"
Interrogation of Survivors
April, 1941



          This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.  
          It is intended for the use of the recipients only, and for communication to such Officers under them (not below the rank of Commissioned Officer) who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties.  The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due care and caution.  


Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the
Official Secrets Acts
C.B.  04051 (19)
"U 100"
Interrogation of Survivors
April, 1941


          The following report is compiled from information derived from prisoners of war.  The statements made cannot always be verified; they should therefore not be accepted as facts unless they are definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources.  


  Introductory Remarks  
  Crew of "U 100"  
Early History of "U 100"
Earlier Cruises of "U 100"
  Sixth and last Cruise of "U 100"  
  Sinking of "U-100"  
  Details of "U 100"  
  Other U-Boats:  
  "U 3"  
  "U 19"  
List of Crew of "U 100"


           ABOUT 0320 G.M.T. ON MONDAY 17th MARCH, 1941, IN POSITION  
           APPROXIMATELY 61° 04' N. AND 11° 30' W.  
          As stated in the Introductory Remarks to the Report on the Interrogation of Survivors of "U 70," all matters dealing with U-Boats generally are being included in the Report on "U 99."  This Report on "U 100" contains, therefore, only information obtained regarding the history, activities, and particulars of "U 100" and her complement.  
          Included are also some statements regarding "U 3" and "U 19" which were under the command of Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Schepke during the early months of the war.  
          This information should be regarded as a correction of statements made in the past by prisoners captured at earlier dates.  
II.  CREW OF "U 100"
          The complement of "U 100" consisted of five officers, 15 petty officers and 41 ratings, but an additional officer under instruction was carried on the last cruise.  This man, Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Siegfried Flister, was the only officer who survived; three petty officers and two ratings were also rescued.  
          Flister, now 35 years old, joined the German Navy in 1925.  He spent most of his career in small vessels, and specialised in mines; in 1938 he was Instructor and Commanding Officer of the Boom Defence School.  
          He was later appointed to the Battleship "Scharnhorst" and took part in the activities of that ship during the Norwegian campaign; he was also in her at the sinking of H.M.S. "Glorious" and the destroyers "Ardent" and "Acasta."  
          He was promoted Korvettenkapitän (Commander) in 1940.  
          Towards the end of 1940 Flister was transferred to the U-boat branch; although he did not volunteer for this section of the service, he did not object and was quite satisfied with the prospect.  He took a shortened course of about two to three months at Pillau, where there was a sufficiently large number of officers of approximately his seniority to warrant the establishment of a special group under going this training.  
          He was on his first cruise under instruction when "U 100" was sunk.  
          He was quite a pleasant little man, and, being older and remembering a more humanistic existence, he was a less extreme Nazi than most prisoners hitherto captured.  But on the subject of the Führer's infallibility Flister was convinced to the point of fanaticism; but he could not offer any explanation for the fact that the infallible Hitler continued to make the mistake of surrounding himself with men whom the better types of German, especially in the services, despised as unscrupulous opportunists and gangsters.  Flister was obviously ashamed of this sinister entourage, and tried to avoid discussion by reverting to naval topics.  He professed a profound admiration for the British Navy and worked himself up into an emotional state when describing the sinking of H.M.S. "Ardent" and H.M.S. "Acasta."  Flister seemed to be in many cases a more normal human being and a more typical naval officer than most earlier prisoners, and possessed less of the usual inferiority complex which has hitherto made many of his captured brother officers so sensitive of their dignity.  
          Flister is a bachelor and lived in Kiel.  
          The surviving petty officers and ratings of "U 100," who had all recently spent some time in Kiel, showed the same strong sense of security and alertness towards interrogation as did the survivors of "U 70," who were also in Germany for some  
  (C41136)                                                                                                                            B3  


  time shortly before being sunk.  Despite their terrible experience at the sinking of "U 100" these men showed high morale and the common unshakable confidence in a German decisive victory this year.  
          The three petty officers were well trained and highly experienced U-Boat men.  
          The officers who did not survive were the Captain, Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Joachim Schepke, the First Lieutenant, Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Maier, the Junior Officer, Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Boning, and the Engineer Officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) (Engineer Lieutenant) Eilers.  
          With the exception of the Captain, little is known of these officers.  
          Schepke was one of the three leading U-Boat captains of this war, his total sinkings being exceeded only by Kretschmer and Prien.  
          Schepke was born in Flensburg on 8th March, 1912, and was brought up in Kiel; he joined the Navy on 1st April, 1930.  As a naval cadet he went on a training cruise round the world in the cruiser "Emden."  After being promoted Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) in 1934 he transferred to U-Boats in 1935.  He was promoted Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) on 1st June, 1936, and in 1937 was an instructor at the Torpedo School.  In 1938 he commanded a U-Boat of the Training Flotilla, probably "U 3" (one of the oldest 250-ton U-Boats), as , at the outbreak of war, he was known to be in command of this boat.  
          His exploits in this U-Boat and later in "U 19" are included in Section VIII of this report under the headings "U 3" and "U 19."  
          As the German press has frequently published gruesome accounts of the sinking of British ships and the deaths of British seamen, it seems that such accounts are considered impressive in Germany.  
          The loss of Schepke, the grimm manner of his death, and the loss of most of his crew are thought likely to counteract to a considerable extent the propaganda for which he and his men were used.  
          "U 100" was laid down at the Germania Yard, Kiel, before, or very soon after, the outbreak of war, as she was sufficiently advanced for some members of her crew to be drafted in March, 1940, to stand by the U-Boat under construction.  According to prisoners, she was launched during the second week of April, 1940, and probably completed towards the end of May, 1940.  
          Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Schepke arrived to take command of "U 100" towards the end of April or early in May, 1940.  
          She then carried out preliminary trials in Kiel Bay, before proceeding to further trials at Memel and torpedo practice off Gotenhafen.  
          On Thursday, 27th June, 1940, just before or in the early stages of a three-day trial in which "U 100" was supposed to proceed in convoy, both her periscopes were damaged and she put into Danzig dockyard on Sunday, 30th June, 1940, for repairs.  The special trial was thus missed.  
          Shortly after this "U 100" was damaged while entering a narrow harbour at Memel; she had surfaced and had to turn to starboard; she was moving fast and the captain had underestimated the strength of the following current.  The U-Boat was swung against the landing stage, which fouled the port propeller.  The port hydroplane and the rudder were smashed and the port propeller was badly twisted.  "U 100" was forced to proceed to Kiel on the starboard engine.  
          On returning to Kiel in July, 1940, "U 100" was in the Germania dockyard for four weeks, and only left on her first cruise towards the middle of August, 1940.  
  (i)  First Cruise  
          "U 100" left Kiel on her first cruise on Tuesday, 13th August, 1940.  
          Very bad weather was encountered in the North Sea and most of the crew, of whom many were on their first cruise, were seasick.  
          Soon after reaching the Atlantic, "U 100" sighted an apparently new motor vessel proceeding alone and zig-zagging; she was described as being about 6,600 tons with new, shining paint and a bright deck, and seemed to be on the way to America.  


          The U-boat fired, submerged, a torpedo from a considerable distance.  As the ship did not seem to be sinking fast enough, a second torpedo was fired a little later.  Both these were said to have hit the ship, which then heeled over.  "U 100" surfaced, and the Captain started to climb out of the conning tower, followed by the Quartermaster, to have a closer look at their victim; survivors in one or more life-boats were mentioned.  For some unexplained reason the U-boat started to submerge, and the Captain pushed the Quartermaster down the conning tower hatch and slammed it shut, remaining himself on the bridge.  The water rose higher and higher, and the Captain had to hang on for his life to the periscope.  The U-boat then surfaced again and the crew were roundly cursed by the soaking wet Captain.  
          Another victim of "U 100" was described as a ship of 5,500 tons sailing independently, with a cargo of bananas.  (N.I.D. Note.  s.s. "Jamaica Pioneer," 5,471 tons, was attacked on the evening of Sunday, 25th August, 1940, in position 57° 05' N., 11° 02' W.; she was hit by three torpedoes, shelled and sunk.  This ship carried in her cargo a large quantity of bananas.  The position in which she was sunk was the area where "U 100" would have been operating at that date.)  
          A few days later, towards evening, "U 100," on coming up to periscope depth after being submerged, sighted a convoy of 15 ships, protected by zig-zagging escorting craft.  Some prisoners said that "U 100" had heard of this convoy from another U-boat and not as usual from the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-boats.  This statement was not confirmed.  
          There was a light wind and a calm sea with only a slight swell.  As soon as it was dark enough the U-boat fired two torpedoes; the Germans claimed that these hit two of the largest ships leading their respective columns at the same moment; these ships were said to have been sunk.  
          It is thought that these were s.s "Hartismere," torpedoed about midnight on 28/29th August, 1940, and s.s. "Dalblair," torpedoed a minute later in position 56° 03' N. and 12° 14' W.  These vessels were the leading ships of the third and fourth columns respectively in Convoy O.A. 204.  
          "Hartismere" was doing 7-1/2 knots and zig-zagging when she was hit on the starboard side about 150 ft. from the bow.  In spite of the damage caused, the ship managed to return to port.  
          "Dalblair" was hit amidships on the starboard side' she broke her back and sank within 10 minutes with her bow and stern in the air.  
          "U 100" wanted to attack other ships in the convoy, but was forced to turn away, as escorting craft seemed to be making for her.  
          After making further calculations an attack was about to be made on a steamer estimated at 3,000 tons.  Just as "U 100" was about to fire her torpedo, the ship turned towards and came straight at the U-Boat.  By a quick manoeuvre the U-boat managed to slip past the bows of the steamer and then lay stopped.  The stern torpedo was then said to have been fired and to have hit the steamer forward.  Her crew took to the boats and she went down by the bows; the stern projected from the sea for a short while and then disappeared.  
          This ship was thought to have been s.s. "Astra II," 2,393 tons, hit in the forward part about 60 ft. from the bow by a torpedo approaching from the starboard side; she subsequently sank.  
          "U 100" then made two more attacks, but the torpedoes missed.  
          "U 100" would have had to reload her tubes after this last attack, and, according to prisoners, she did reload at this juncture.  
          But it was claimed that the next torpedo, fired at close range, hit and sank a small steamer; the Germans felt that "U 100" must have been seen by this last ship as there was bright moonlight.  
          This ship seems to have been s.s. "Alida Gorthon," 2,373 tons, torpedoed at about 0225.  
          More ships came into sight, and a 5,000-ton ship was torpedoed, according to prisoners, and sank rapidly by the stern.  
          The account given by the survivors of s.s. "Empire Moose" agrees in several particulars with the German version of the sinking of "U 100's" fifth victim in Convoy O.A.204, and it seems probable that this is the ship claimed.  
  (C41136)                                                                                                                     B4  


          "Empire Moose" was hit on the port side about 335 ft. from the bow at about 0330.  About 10 to 15 minutes later her bow went up; she plunged right down by the stern and sank.  
          The escorting ships hunted the U-boat, and prisoners said that star shells were fired and that the convoy scattered.  
          The U-Boat escaped and, as she needed to replenish her supply of torpedoes, she made for port, arriving at Lorient, where she was received with musical honours, about the end of August, 1940.  
          On Thursday, 29th August, 1940, the German High Command claimed that Kapitänleutnant Schepke had sunk seven armed enemy merchant ships totalling 43,000 tons, of which five had been in convoy.  
          This increased Schepke's claim to 18 ships sunk with a total tonnage of 61,143 tons, of which 11 ships, amounting to 18,063 tons, had been allegedly sunk when he was in command of smaller U-Boats at earlier dates.  
          "U 100" was allowed only a short time, two weeks or less, in port before setting out on her next cruise.  
  (ii)  Second Cruise  
          On Wednesday, 11th September, 1940, "U 100" left Lorient on her second cruise.  The earlier days were described as being uneventful, until a signal was received from the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats reporting a convoy.  
          Prisoners stated that "U 100" attacked this convoy on the night of 20th/21st or 21st/22nd September, 1940, and sank eight ships totalling 61,300 tons within the space of three or four hours.  It was added that no other U-Boat took part in this attack.  
          The Germans estimated that the convoy consisted of about 60 ships escorted by seven destroyers.  The ships were described as in columns in close formation, only half a cable apart, an arrangement thought by the Germans to be most considerate.  
          The First Lieutenant of "U 100" is said to have fired four torpedoes in a fan shape, and it was claimed that the first and second torpedoes hit their targets and, after it had been assumed that the third and fourth had missed, the explosion of the third torpedo was heard 4-1/2 minutes after it had been fired.  This had been aimed at what the Germans called the "outside" column of ships.  (N.I.D. Note.:  The first ship to be hit in Convoy H.X.72 was s.s. "Canosea," in approximate position 55° N. and 18° 30' W. at about 2200 on Saturday, 21st September, 1940.  She was No. 52 in the fifth column of the convoy, which consisted of 37 ships in nine columns, protected by seven escorts.  She was struck on the starboard side and sank by the stern.  
          The second vessel torpedoed seems to have been s.s. "Torinia," second ship of the fourth column; she was struck on the starboard side about 270 ft. from the bow.  "Torinia" was not seriously damaged, but was again torpedoed on the port side about one and a quarter hours later, and subsequently sank.  
          s.s. "Broom Park," fourth ship in the first column, was torpedoed at about the same time.  
          Other ships torpedoed in this convoy were s.s. "Scholar," the tanker s.s. "Frederick S. Fales," s.s. "Simla," s.s. "Dalcairn," s.s "Blairangus," s.s "Empire Airman," and the M.V. "Elmbank."  
          The survivors of "U 100" all stated that their boat was operating alone and had sunk eight ships.  The German High Command announced on Sunday, 22nd September, 1940, that Schepke's U-Boat had sunk eight merchant ships of a total tonnage of 61,300 tons.  
          As "U 100" had no torpedoes left she returned to Lorient, arriving there on Wednesday, 25th September, 1940.  
          On this date the German High Command claimed that Schepke had up to that date sunk 26 ships, amounting to 122,443 tons.  
          He was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross, as he had passed the sinkings figure of 100,000 tons.  
          "U 100" stayed in port for a little while longer than on the previous occasion, probably between two and three weeks.  


  (iii)  Third Cruise  
          Prisoners stated that "U 100" left Lorient on her third cruise in the middle of October, 1940.  
          It was stated that "U 100" attacked a convoy on the night of 19th to 20th October, 1940, and that ?U 99," Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kretschmer also attacked on this occasion.  
          (This statement is incorrect, as on 19th October Kretschmer was some 200 miles away making an attack on convoy S.C.7.)  
          Survivors of "U 100 said that this convoy had been reported to them by the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats, but a German press account stated that it had been reported to "U 100" by another U-boat.  
          The crew of "U 100" had believed that they had sunk six ships, of which two or three were tankers, but heard on their return to Lorient that one of their victims had been able to reach port.  
          The only ship's name prisoners knew was s.s. "Loch Lomond," 5,452 tons, which was from one of the convoys they had attacked.  The following day they saw two empty lifeboats from "Loch Lomond."  
          s.s "Loch Lomond" was No. 94, the fourth ship in the starboard column of Convoy H.X.79, which consisted of 49 ships in nine columns, protected by nine escorts and one Dutch submarine.  
          From an analysis of the attack on this convoy it seems most likely that "U 100's" other five victims were:  
          s.s. "Matheran," 7,653 tons; s.s. "Bilderdijk," 6,856 tons; s.s. "Uganda," 4,966 tons' m.v. "Caprella," (tanker), 8,230 tons; m.v. "Sitala" (tanker), 6,218 tons.  
          "Mathernan," the leading ship of the eighth column, was hit, probably on the starboard side, at 2118 on Saturday, 19th October, 1940, in approximate position 56° 35' N. and 17° 15' W.  "Bilderdijk," and No. 92 in the convoy, was torpedoed on the starboard bow at 2125 and sank by the head about forty minutes after the explosion.  "Uganda," the ship astern of "Bilderdijk," and No. 93 in the convoy, was hit five minutes later, at 2130, on the starboard side.  
          Prisoners said that a tanker which had been torpedoed, not claimed by "U 100," was seen burning; the Germans stated that they saw an enormous cloud of dust against a sky lit up by the fire, and that when the dust disappeared the tanker had vanished.  
          In making for her next victims, "U 100" was said to have got close to the burning tanker and to have been clearly visible; the Germans attributed their extrication from this danger to the great sangfroid of their captain.  
          The burning tanker referred to was presumably the s.s. "Shirak," which was torpedoed by another U-boat at 2235 and set on fire, having become separated from the rest of the convoy.  
          "U 100's" next victims were said to have been two large tankers of about 10,000 tons each.  
          After an interval of one and three-quarter hours, the tanker "Caprella," 8,230 tons, the leading ship of the sixth column, was torpedoed at 2315 amidships on the starboard side and sank.  
          Three minutes later the tanker "Sitala," 6,218 tons, was hit on the starboard side and subsequently sank.  
          "Loch Lomond, having seen "Matheran" and "Uganda" torpedoed, picked up some survivors from the former and set off on a course of 110 at 13 knots, escorted by H.M.S. "Arabis," to rejoin the convoy which had been lost.  At 0300 on Sunday, 20th October, 1940, while "Arabis" was intercepting the tanker "Sandanger," "Loch Lomond" sighted a U-boat on her port quarter; she altered course to the southward and reported the U-boat by W/T.  "Arabis" closed the position and dropped two depth charges without gaining any contact.  
          After an interval "Loch Lomond" resumed her course of 110° and increased to full speed, bit at 0400 again sighted a U-boat, presumably the same one, which must thus have been following her.  
          The steamer again altered course to the southward for a short while, to bring the U-boat astern, and then resumed her course of 110°.  


          At 0455 she sighted the U-boat for the third time, and again altered course to the southward for a slightly longer period.  
          During all this time "Loch Lomond's" guns were loaded and the guns' crews were standing by, but no favorable opportunity of hitting the U-Boat occurred.  
          At 0630, in position 56° N. and 14° 30' W., after the steamer had again resumed her course of 110°, a vessel was dimly seen astern, and while the British were debating as to whether the vessel was a destroyer or a U-boat, "U 100" fired a torpedo which struck "Loch Lomond" on the starboard side about 100 ft. from the stern.  The steamer subsequently sank by the stern.  
          "U 100" returned to Lorient on or about Thursday, 24th October, 1940.  Prisoners said that "U 99" and a 750-ton U-Boat returned with them.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  This date agrees with the date of "U 99's" return to Lorient after her fourth cruise, as established from the interrogation of survivors of "U 99".)  
          On 21st October, 1940, the German High Command announced that Schepke had sunk on this cruise up to 21st October, 1940, 44,565 tons, which was made up of six ships and brought his alleged grand total up to 32 ships, amounting to 167,008 tons of shipping sunk.  
          "U 100" remained only a short time in harbour.  
  (iv)  Fourth Cruise  
          On Thursday, 7th November, 1940, "U 100" left Lorient on her fourth cruise.  
          Prisoners said that they attacked several convoys and sank a number of ships, but could not recall any of the names of their victims.  They estimated that they sank six ships on this cruise.  
          The first convoy encountered was met accidentally and without any report from the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats.  (N.I.D. Note.  Convoy SC 11 was attacked during the night of 22nd/23rd November, 1940, about 150 miles west of Bloody Foreland.  s.s. "Bradfyne," s.s "Justitia," s.s "Salonika," and s.s. "Leise Mearsk" were torpedoed and sunk.  The s.s. "Bruse," though also hit, was able to make port.  The s.s. "Bussum," in the same convoy, was torpedoed at 2005 on Saturday, 23rd November, 1940, in position 55° 39' N. and 8° 58' W.  As there were no other attacks on convoys at this tim, it seems likely that "U 100" was responsible for some, if not all, of the above sinkings.)  
          "U 100" was returning to Lorient when she received orders from the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats to search for an airman who had baled out of his aircraft in the English Channel, but failed to find the airman.  While in the channel they claim to have met a 300-ton U-Boat.  
          On Tuesday, 26th November, 1940, the German High Command announced that Schepke had sunk a further 41,400 tons of shipping.  
          It was established from prisoners that the U-boat returned on or soon after this date to Lorient, but stayed there for only about one week.  
          It is believed that Schepke's total claims of shipping sunk then amounted to 38 ships, totalling about 190,000 tons, and that the claim of the German High Command to 41,000 tons sunk in this fourth cruise is greatly exaggerated, the actual figure being about 19,000 tons.  This belief is supported by later announcements of the German High Command, which indicated that, at the end of this fourth cruise, Schepke's total sinkings amounted to less than 200,000 tons.  
  (v)  Fifth Cruise  
          "U 100" left Lorient on Monday, 2nd December, 1940, for her fifth cruise.  Prisoners stated that she had been instructed to send weather reports to the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats.  While in the Atlantic she was said to have sunk three ships, all of which were proceeding independently; the last of these was described as a refrigerator ship of about 12,000 tons.  
          The only ship answering this description, and in an area where "U 100" could possibly have been and, according to prisoners, was operating, was s.s "Orari," a refrigerator ship of 10,350 tons, torpedoed on the evening of Friday, 13rh December, 1940, in position 49° 50' N. and 20° 55' W.  She reached port, however, on Monday, 16th December, 1940.  


          Later on during this cruise, "U-100" presumably attacked and is believed to have sunk another ship about 18th or 19th December, because on Friday, 20th December, 1940, the German High Command claimed that Schepke had reported the sinking of his 40th ship, and that his personal total of sinkings up to that date amounted to 208,975 tons.  He was the third U-Boat Commander alleged to have sunk over 200,000 tons of shipping, being beaten only by Kretschmer and Prien.  
          On the same day the Germans announced that Schepke had been awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross.  Herr Hitler sent him the following telegram:  
        "In grateful appreciation of your heroic deeds in the struggle for the future of our people, I confer upon you, on sinking 200,000 tons of enemy shipping, as seventh officer of the German Armed Forces to receive this decoration, the Oak Leaves to the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross."
          Prisoners stated that "U 100" arrived at Brünsbüttel on Saturday, 28th December, 1940.  Later she proceeded to Kiel.  
          During January and February, 1941, she remained in Kiel, where she underwent a refit.   
          Schepke and his crew were féted, photographed, filmed, interviewed, given a winter sports holiday, broadcast and even serenaded.  They were used for propaganda purposes almost without a pause during their stay of 10 weeks in Germany, where they were invariably listened to by enthralled audiences, whom they urged to send male youth of the country to sea in U-Boats.  
          "U 100" left Kiel on the night of Sunday, 9th March, 1941, and proceeded through the Kiel Canal to Brünsbüttel.  A member of the crew had to put ashore there to undergo an immediate operation.  In addition, an engine defect caused further delay; this was said to have been a loose stud in one of the Diesel main bearings.  
          The U-Boat was delayed until the night of Wednesday, 12th March, 1941, when she finally left on her sixth and last cruise.  
          "U 100" carried only 12 torpedoes on this occasion, according to prisoners, instead of the usual 14.  The reason given was that the bad weather at this tim of the year made the reloading of the two torpedoes carried on the upper deck impracticable.  
          The early part of the cruise was said to be uneventful,. until orders were received by W/T to make for a convoy which had been reported by "U 99," Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kretschmer.  
          "U 100" was still in the North Sea when these instructions were received, and at once proceeded at full speed to the area indicated.  
          It was stated by some prisoners that the U-Boat passed through the Fair Island Channel, but this was not definitely established.  
          On the evening of Sunday, 16th March, 1941, "U 100" came up with the convoy.  It was established that in addition to "U 99" and "U 100" three or more U-Boats were in the vicinity.  
          According to prisoner's statements, at about 1900 or 2000 "U 100" sighted a destroyer astern.  The therefore dived at once, and remained submerged for about one hour.  When she surfaced again it was dark.  
          They also stated that later the same or another destroyer was sighted, and "U 100" crash dived; the depth charge attack which followed did not damage the U-Boat which subsequently surfaced astern of the convoy.  
          "U 99" had apparently reported that the convoy was escorted by three destroyers only, and survivors of "U 100" stated that; to their surprise and dismay, they found that the convoy was escorted by an auxiliary cruiser and eight destroyers.  
          Prisoners stated that the convoy made off accompanied by five of the destroyers, leaving three to deal with the U-Boat.  


          For the second time a depth charge attack was made on "U 100."  Prisoners said that the first pattern of four or five depth charges exploded close to the U-Boat.  The depth gauge was said to have been damaged, and a number of light bulbs were smashed.  
          It was stated that they suffered further depth charging, and that extensive damage was caused in the U-Boat; all the pumps were put out of action, the instruments were all smashed, and the supply of compressed air gave out.  The captain thought that the British would hear the air escaping.  The floor plates were wrenched loose, water entered the bilges, and it was feared that the hydroplanes were no longer functioning properly.  
          The U-Boat sank deeper and deeper, as low as 230 metres (750 ft.), according to prisoners; the crew felt very cold, and expected the hull to crash in at any moment.  
          The duration of these attacks were given as being about three hours.  It seems likely that the attacks referred to are "Walker's" attacks at 0137-1/2, with nine depth charges with deep settings, and at 0153, with eight depth charges with medium settings, and "Vanoc's" attack at 0157 with six charges set to 350, 250 and 150, also "Vanoc's" attack at 0232 with charges set as before.  After all these attacks a strong smell of oil was noticed, and after the last attack, a bubbling noise was heard in "Vanoc's" headphones.  
          Although the torpedo tubes were not quite ready for action, the captain had no option other than to surface.  He hoped that he would have the time and chance to torpedo a destroyer.  On surfacing, the Germans saw H.M.S. "Vanoc" at a distance which they estimated at about 500 metres (540 yards).  
          "Vanoc" after carrying out depth charge attacks in co-operation with "Walker," obtained an R.D/F. contact and then sighted "U 100," bearing green 10, steering from right to left.  As the destroyer's speed was considered sufficient to sink the U-boat the wheel was put over to ram.  
          The Diesels of "U 100" would not start, and it was found that they were not getting any fuel; then trouble was experienced with the electric motors.  The captain became flurried and gave a wrong order; he ordered astern on the starboard motor, whereas he should have ordered ahead on the starboard motor.  He quickly realised his mistake, but there was no longer time to correct it, and to turn the U-boat and fire a torpedo as the destroyer was approaching too fast, and by that time was too close.  According to German statements, torpedoes must run 150 metres (160 yards) before exploding.  For a moment Schepke thought that the destroyer would pass astern of "U 100" but quickly saw that this was not likely.  
          He shouted down to the crew to abandon ship, the men put on their life-belts and hurried up on to the bridge.  Realising that it would not be possible to get their 8.8-cm. gun into action, some men made as though to man the 20-mm. gun, but were at once dissuaded by their companions, who felt that they would have no chance against the destroyer, which might then have left them to drown.  The time was approximately 0318.  
          Five seconds before the collision, "Vanoc's" engines were stopped.  The destroyer struck "U 100" almost at right angles just forward of the conning tower' "Vanoc" was brought up all standing.  
          The side of the U-Boat's hull and conning tower were smashed in, and the captain was caught and crushed between the stove-in side of the bridge and the periscope; Flister, the officer under instruction, standing behind the captain, said that Schepke was jammed by the destroyer, and then dragged under by the sinking U-Boat.  Flister was also caught up in the twisted guard rail of the after part of the bridge and dragged under but managed to free himself and came to the surface.  He was picked up by "Vanoc" and was the only officer saved.  
          Immediately after the ramming of "U 100" "Vanoc" tried to pick up survivors, and managed to rescue six men.  
          At this juncture "Walker" carried out another attack about 1,000 yards away on a U-boat which proved to be "U 99."  
          At 0400, while "Vanoc" was being maneuvered to pick up the remaining survivors, "U 99" was sighted at about 1,000 yards.  The situation became very awkward and confused.  Survivors of "U 100" were swimming around "Vanoc's"  


  propellers, and the other U-Boat sighted might have been about to fire torpedoes; "Vanoc" could not shell this U-Boat because "Walker" was beyond "U 99" in the line of fire.  
          After reporting the U-Boat by R/T, "Vanoc" went ahead and turned away to port with the intention of giving "Walker" a clear field.  
          Unfortunately "Walker" also turned to port, and both ships had to stop to avoid collision.  
          "Vanoc" then went ahead, and both destroyers opened fire on "U 99" at 0354, but ceased two minutes later.  At this juncture reliable witnesses in "Walker" reported sighting a third U-Boat astern of her.  
          At 0400 "U 99" signalled that she was sinking, and "Vanoc" circled to give "Walker" protection, while the latter picked up "U 99's" survivors.  
          Only one officer and five men of the complement of "U 100" could be rescued.  
          It was established that "U 100" was to have ended this cruise at Lorient.  
  (i)  Device  
          "U 100" had a black panther painted on the conning tower.  
  (ii)  Detector Gear  
          Prisoners said that "U 100" was not fitted with detector gear (S-Gerät).  
  (iii)  Torpedoes  
          "U 100" was stated to have four bow tubes and one stern tube; she usually carried fourteen torpedoes, two being housed on deck, except on her last cruise, when the bad weather at the time of year would probably render impracticable the transfer of these torpedoes to the interior of the U-Boat.  
  (iv)  Diving Depth  
          The absolute maximum diving depth to which "U 100" was supposed to be allowed to go in especial circumstances was stated to be 200 metres (640 ft.).  According to prisoners she sank as low as 230 metres (750 ft.) during the attack after which she was rammed.  
  (v)  General Remarks  
          "U 100" was described as having a displacement of 517 tons, and as being an improvement on the "U 46" - "U 48" type.  The main differences were that "U 100" had Krupp Diesel engines instead of M.A.N. Diesel engines; the system by which orders were given and received, telephones, loudspeakers and microphones were all much better.  
  (i)  "U 3"  
          "U 3" was laid down in April, 1935, launched on 19th July, 1935, and completed on 6th August, 1935.  She was the third U-Boat of Germany's modern U-Boat fleet to be completed and had a displacement of 250-tons.  
          In 1936 "U 3" was commanded by Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Meckel, in 1937 by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Ernst-Günther Heinicke, and in 1938 by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Schepke, who was still in command at the outbreak of war.  Schepke carried out one war cruise in "U 3."  
          During the first month of the war "U 3" went out on anti-submarine patrol, but achieved no results of importance, according to the German press, except that on one occasion "U 3" was forced to remain submerged for fifty hours and the oxygen supply was almost exhausted.  


          On this cruise in "U 3," Schepke was said to have intercepted the Danish steamer "Vendia," which he shelled and sank, as he considered that the Danish captain was behaving rather too independently.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The Danish steamer "Vendia," 1,150 tons, was torpedoed and sunk off Hantsholm, Denmark.)  
          Soon after this incident Schepke was appointed to the command of "U 19."  
          Prisoners said that "U 3" was used as a training U-Boat during the early part of 1940, but was again used during the Norwegian campaign; she was mentioned in captured orders dated 10th March, 1940, and 30th March, 1940.  
          A chief pretty officer of "U 100" stated that "U 3" had sunk in Kiel harbour, but could give no details.  
  (ii)  "U 19"  
          "U 19," one of the older type 250-ton U-Boats, was laid down in July, 1935, at the Germania Yard, Kiel, and completed on 16th January, 1936.  
          She was commanded in 1936 by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Viktor Schütze, and in 1937 by Kapitänleutnant Meckel.  
          At the outbreak of war "U 19" belonged to the 1st U-Boat Flotilla "Weddigen."  
          According to prisoners captured earlier in the war the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats had intended to appoint Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Schonder to the command of "U 19," but appointed Kapitänleutnant  Schepke instead; this seems to have occurred about October or November, 1939.  
          From other sources "U 19" was known to have left on a cruise about 14th November, 1939.  As this type of U-Boat does not remain at sea for more than two or at the most three weeks, she would probably have returned to Germany about the beginning of December, 1939.  
          She seems to have left again on another cruise towards the end of December, 1939, as it is known that she returned to Germany on 11th January, 1940.  
          German broadcast statements claimed that "U 19," when commanded by Schepke during the early months of 1940, broke through the British "mine belt" in order to attack shipping within the area protected by the minefields.  Soon after the U-Boat reached the vicinity of the English coast an approaching convoy was sighted at dawn; the U-Boat dived and fired a torpedo which hit the leading ship in the convoy; the next ship was said to have passed astern of the U-Boat, but then to have altered her course, possibly because she assumed that the first ship had struck a mine.  This alteration of course brought the ship into the range of the U-Boat, which promptly torpedoed her.  A third ship of 800 or 900 tons, which came to the aid of the first two ships, was considered too small to be worth torpedoing.  
          "U 19" was then said to have gone closer inshore, in spite of the bright light of a full moon, and the presence of patrol craft.  Later, on surfacing further away from the coast to recharge her batteries "U 19" found herself confronted by a semi-circle of these patrol vessels which did not spot her, according to the Germans.  
          A convoy with many escorts was then sighted and "U 19" was said to have proceeded on the surface straight for this convoy, in the bright moonlight, and to have torpedoed and sunk a ship before the presence of a U-Boat was even suspected.  
          The Germans claimed that "U 19" then dived and sank another ship by torpedo; this was alleged to have happened only a mile from a British lighthouse.  
          "U 19" was not mentioned in captured German Orders dated 10th March, 1940, relating to the Norwegian campaign, but was included in Orders dated 30th March, 1940.  She left Wilhelmshaven on Monday, 3rd April, 1940, for her allotted position to the eastward of the Shetland Islands.  
          On one occasion during the Norwegian undertaking "U 19" was reloading her tubes and doing a short trial, according to a German account; she was forced by British patrol vessels to crash dive; the Germans added that one of the British ships had  


  tried to ram the U-Boat, but missed her by about half a metre and was heard to pass overhead.  Depth charges followed but did not damage "U 19" to any serious extent and she made good her escape "gently and quietly."  
          (N.I.D. Note.  It is considered that the above account refers to the attack on a 250-ton U-Boat carried out by H.M.S. "Zulu" at 1415 on Tuesday, 9th April, 1940, in position 59° 58' 45' N. and 00° 26' 00 W.)  
          The Germans also said that on another occasion during the Norwegian operations, four cruisers passed in front of "U 19's" tubes, but turned away just as the U-Boat was about to fire, and thus escaped.  "U 19" returned to Germany with five torpedoes on board on 23 April, 1940, and proceeded through the Kiel Canal to Kiel.  
          Schepke was then appointed to command "U 100."  The German High Command claimed that this officer had up to then sunk 11 ships totalling 18,063 tons.  
          The captain of "U 26" sunk on Monday, 1st July, 1940, stated that "U 19" had been lost.  Since "U 26" left Wilhelmshaven on 20th June, 1940, the loss of "U 19" must have occurred in May, or during the first half of June, 1940.  


List of Crew of "U 100"
English Equivalent
Flister, Siegfried Korvettenkapitän Commander 35
Blockus, August Obersteuermann Chief Q.M., 1st Class 33
Kuhn, Josef Bootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class 25
Oberle, Friedrich Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 25
Dahlmann, Kurt Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 20
Schmidt, Wilhelm Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 24
The following did not survive:
English Equivalent
Schepke, Joachim Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant-Commander (in command)  
Maler, Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant-Commander  
Böning, Oberleutnant zur See Lieutenant  
Eilers, Oberleutnant (Ing.) Engineer Lieutenant  
Wiskainis, Benno Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class  
Bayer, Johannes Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class  
Neumann, Arthur Bootsmann Chief Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class  
Brendecke, Hein Steuermannsmaat Q.M., 2nd Class  
Borutta, Bootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class  
Brix, Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class  
Apitz, Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class  
Lihs, Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class  
Thomalla, Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class  
Knoll, Mechainikersmaat P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class  
Holzmüller, Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class  
Seuerich, Gustav Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class  
Schaub, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Straszen, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Kasper, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Beichtbuchner Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Leissner, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Wimmer, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Koch, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Hüsch, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Wengler, Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman  
Schaper, Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Wirsing Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Pipprich, Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Samland, Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Chorus, Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class  
Rauch, Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist  
Michel, Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist  
Bergens, Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class  
Banke, Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class  
Avicius, Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class  
  Total crew:  
Petty Officers
  (C41136)    B9      4/41  

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