C O N F I D E N T I A L                                                                                  22 April, 1942.
  Dear Riheldaffer:  
          Since my arrival here, the end of March, the only P/W at Cock Fosters Camp were a few retained of a group captured from several U-boats and one S-boat who had been taken in to Gibraltar and transferred to Cock Fosters over a month later.  In view of this delay in transferring the P/W to Cock Fosters, little information of value was obtained from them.  A few who were willing to talk were kept at Cock Fosters, and it was upon the continued interrogation of three or four of these P/W that I assisted.  But as these interrogations were with respect to P/W who would talk, I have not yet seen demonstrated the interrogation techniques that have proven satisfactory by experience at the center.  
          Thus, most of my time has been spent in talking to everybody who is willing to talk to me.  I have also been to Latimer and Beaconsfield, the sites of the two new centers, and I have just returned from Scotland where, together with a number of naval officers who had not yet had the opportunity of inspecting the ship, I spent some time on  board H.M.S. Graph (Ex U-570).  
          Outside of observing the actual interrogation technique as developed by the R.N., I have a pretty good opportunity of observing practically everything else.  Combining with this, our thorough study of the problem in Washington (which I believe has been altogether on the right track insofar as our knowledge went at that time), I feel that the material is gradually crystallizing in my mind.  I have therefore reduced some of my thoughts to writing, and I send along the enclosed preliminary memorandum at this time for what it may be worth.  
                                                           Sincerely yours,  
                                                           Ralph G. Albrecht,  
                                                           Lt. Comdr., USNR.  
  Lt. Comdr. J.L. Riheldaffer, U.S.N., (RET),  
  Office of Naval Intelligence,  
  Navy Department  
  Washington, D.C.  



                                                                                                                     London, England.
                                                                                                                     April 22, 1942.
          On the basis of our studies in Washington of the problem of interrogation centers, and on an appraisal of the present set-up in England, and the facts given me and opinions expressed by various officers connected with the Admiralty, my mind is gradually shaping up somewhat as follows:  
          As presently constituted, and as expressed by its name "C.S.D.I.C." (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center), the camp at Cock Fosters is for the joint use of the Royal Navy, the R.A.F. and the Army.  The Army furthermore has the responsibility for guarding the camp and providing for the messing, clothing, etc. of the P/W.  As far as I can observe and in the opinion of various officers of the Admiralty this arrangement works "fairly" well.  It is not an ideal set-up.  While the Army cooperates with the Royal Navy in most instances, there are constantly recurring situations where the actions of the Army would seem to indicate to me that the underlying and sole purpose of the camp is lost sight of.  It would seem to me to brook no argument that there should be no deviation from or interference with this underlying purpose of an interrogation center.  That purpose may be briefly stated to be:  to provide a location and certain specialized facilities for the use of interrogators who have found by experience that only in a place so constituted can a really effective job be done in interrogating P/W.  On the other hand the sole purpose of the Army guards or warders is to guard and provide for the P/W.  If therefore the purpose of the camp is kept in mind there cannot be any interference by the Army guard with whatever use the interrogators wish to make of the place or with whatever plans they may have in mind with regard to the P/W.  There must not be questioning by Army guards of what an interrogator may wish to do with P/W within or without the confines of the camp.  



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        As presently constituted Cock Fosters camp contains a small organization of R.N. and R.A.F. interrogators.  There are 6 R.N. interrogators and 2 clerks, all in one room.  The R.A.F. has 30 or more interrogators and a clerical staff of 8-10.  All other work on the premises, particularly that going on all day and all night in the "M" room, is done by Army officers.  This Army staff (not including the warders or guards) consists of approximately 80 officers.
          Certain objections to such a personnel set-up, from our viewpoint, are at once apparent.  It would seem to be altogether undesirable for the  
          (1)  listening in.  
          (2)  the transcribing and  
          (3)  the editing of recorded conversations of Naval P/W to be done by other than Naval officers.  Keeping in mind also the necessity for the training of adequate officer personnel that will be undoubtedly required in increasing numbers, as additional interrogation centers are called for in other parts of the Western Hemisphere, or in locations even farther away, such a set-up as in Cock Fosters Camp, or for that matter as also contemplated for the new interrogation centers, would seriously prevent the adequate training of officers.  
          Colonel Trench recalls that during the last war there was no combined services interrogation.  The R.A.F. and the Army did their own interrogation in France.  The Royal Navy did not, therefore, turn over any naval P/W to the Army until the R.N. had completed its interrogation of them.  At that time the R.N. maintained a center in London and funds were available to enable the R.N. to feed and clothe P/W that were in its custody.  In the opinion of Colonel Trench who has had a larger familiarity with this subject than anyone else, there is no question of the desirability of the R.N. again having its own set-up, as in the last war, so that it could carry on its work of interrogation without any restrictions, or interference on the part of the Army.  



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        It seems to me that all of this necessitates a definite query whether in view of our experience with the Army in connection with the acquisition of "Swannanoa" it wouldn't be better if all the factors of the situation were re-examined once more with a view of deciding anew (no joint interrogation center being in operation even though the United States Navy was agreed in all particulars by December 1941) whether it wouldn't be advisable for the Navy to set up and operate a center of its own.  I made a similar recommendation last February and I remember Captain Heard's objection to the same that it would upset too many existing directives.  The more I see of the situation the more I feel that it will cause fewer headaches in the end and will produce a much smoother and more efficient interrogation center insofar as the Navy is concerned if the Navy proceeds on its own and without being subjected to any interferences or even lack of cooperation by the Army.
          It is admitted over here that the two most effective means for obtaining information from P/W is, (1) by listening and recording and, (2) by the employment of S/P or "Gun Dogs".  The least effective method is that of direct interrogation.  The latter is of course, important because it is only upon interrogation that it is possible to get the mind of a P/W on a particular subject on which he usually converses on his return to his cell.  Furthermore, any doubtful points that arise can often be cleared up by interrogation.  
          We must postulate in this connection that the center for the interrogation of P/W, operated by the British, has been highly successful and that the work done there has been to everyone's satisfaction.  I fully agree with the appraisal.  I feel that the R.N. have done a magnificent job.  However, the big questions in my mind are (1) whether the employment of "Gun Dogs" could not be further exploited, and (2) whether the interrogation method cannot be made more effective.  



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        At Cock Fosters Camp all "Gun Dogs" are trained by the Army, that is, all except one U-boat P/W who has been prepared by the R.N.  "Gun Dogs" are, of course, difficult to get.  Furthermore no "Gun Dog" has ever been tried out with an officer P/W.  The one Naval P/W "Gun Dog" has been most effective.  Query, therefore, whether this means of getting information should not be pursued much more thoroughly than is done at present.  It is admitted by the R.N., after all, that it is a very fruitful method, and I personally have had occasion to observe from transcribed records, how thoroughly a subject has been gone into by a P/W in answer to the leading questions of the "Gun Dog".  Many more "Gun Dogs" could be used most effectively, and in my opinion a determined effort should be made to develop a number of these men, and also to use them in connection with officer P/W.  While officer P/W may be assumed to be much more security conscious than the men, and undoubtedly more indoctrinated with the current political philosophy in Germany, these facts should not by themselves be sufficient to dispense with other methods of getting information out of them.  Even a fanatical Nazi, if kept alone for a while, will be glad to talk -- even to a "Gun Dog", and even though he may be on his guard against "Gun Dogs".  The crux of the situation then merely is how plausible the latter's story is, and how plausibly he can carry out his part.
          In connection with the interrogation method it must be recognized that various techniques for eliciting information upon questionings have been developed (and recognized as sound today), depending on the education, experience and training of the questioner.  Such techniques must be closely studies by and known to officers used as interrogators, the limited nature of whose experiences previously would not readily suggest to them proven methods learned in other pursuits.  If one method proves unsuccessful with a P/W, then another may be more effective.  I feel strongly, therefore, that the techniques suggested by psychologists, by lawyers and newspapermen, and by others with practical experience, such as the R.N. interrogation at Cock Fosters,  



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should be seriously considered as possible methods and techniques that may be useful to us.  I would suggest, therefore that in an effort to make the interrogation method more effective:
          (1)  A study be made of all known techniques and proven methods of interrogation.  
          (2)  A thorough outline of this information be prepared and that all interrogators be trained in these techniques.  
          (3)  A much larger officer personnel be trained than we have been presently allowed for the interrogation section.  (I believe it is 45 or 46).  
          If the matter of interrogation techniques is gone into more thoroughly, it must follow that a considerably larger number of interrogators will be required than are presently used by the R.N.  This is so, because, e.g. as the matter of interrogation of P/W is gone into more thoroughly, first employing one method and then another, a greater amount of time with each P/W may be required.  To cite an example:  the methods of breaking down a witness used by lawyers may be slow and time consuming, and to really be effective an interrogator should not be under the pressure of finishing with one P/W to get at another, or of finishing with the latter because another captured crew is en route to the center.  
          Certainly a lawyer examining a witness can rarely tell beforehand whether his interrogation of him will take an hour, a day or even a week.  It seems to me then that we are wholly on the right track in asking for as many officers for the interrogation as we can get.  Particularly when the training factors of an interrogation center are considered, I do not believe that a requirement for 150 officers would be other than conservative.  



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          Since the death of Commander Groghan no progress has been made in setting up another center at Gibraltar.  No other subsidiary center is functioning at present except the one at Cairo Egypt.  It is a fact, however, that Cairo has a no time produced anything comparable with the information obtained at C.F. Camp.  The principal reason for this appears to be the fact that it is far away from the Admiralty in London and that there are therefore the insuperable difficulties of geography that prevent the checking of information gained from P/W and the prompt pursuit of possibly fruitful leads.  Query, therefore, whether Gibraltar would have proven any more effective as an interrogation center.  Even if a fairly complete naval staff of experts were available at such places, they could only be experts of the local situation rather than of the larger all-inclusive picture.  
          How does this proven ineffectiveness of Cairo apply to us?  It would seem to me that if another interrogation center were established in California it would still be possible for such center to be as effective as any center on the East Coast.  Overnight air connection between such a center and Washington could make possible prompt access to the experts in the department.  But what if other centers should be contemplated for other locations not readily accessible to Washington?  What if Iceland, Alaska, New Zealand or Australia should be selected?  If the British experience is any guide, then it would seem that unless the distances involved could be readily overcome by air transportation, then they would lose their importance in direct ratio to the distance separating then from Washington.  But perhaps when these bridges have to be crossed, other solutions will present themselves.  But we should, meanwhile, be thinking of such possible solutions.  



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