This record was kindly provided by the generous assistance of Tony Cooper
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U 413, U 1209, U 877 and U 1199 |
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Interrogation of Survivors |
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| This report is forwarded for information. As it has been compiled from information derived from prisoners of war, the statements made, unless definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources, should not be accepted as facts. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2. It is not intended to issue this report in the C.B. 04051 series. A summary of U-boat information, derived from interrogation of prisoners, collated with information from other sources, up to June 1944, was issued in C.B. 04051 (103). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3. Subsequent reports on interrogation of prisoners have been issued in the Series NID 1/ PW/REP/1-18 and NID 1/PW/TEC/1-9. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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C O N T E N T S |
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| REPORT ON THE INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM U 413, U 1209, TWO 500-TON U-BOATS, U-877, A 740-TON U-BOAT, AND U 1199, A 500-TON U-BOAT SUNK ON 20 AUGUST, 18TH DECEMBER, 27TH DECEMBER, 1944 AND 21ST JANUARY, 1945, RESPECTIVELY. | ||
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS |
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| (i) U-413 | ||
| U 413, a 500-ton Type VII C U-boat, belonging to the First Flotilla and based at Brest, was sunk at about 1000 on the 20th August, 1944, by the destroyers "FORESTER", "VIDETTE" and "WENSLEYDALE", jointly while on anti-submarine patrol, in approximate position 50° 21' N. 00° 01' W. | ||
| The Commanding Officer was Oberleutnant zur See SACHSE (believed to be Dietrich SACHSE, of the 1939 term). | ||
| Only one member of the U-boat's crew survived, the Engineer Officer Oberleutnant (Ing.) Karl HÜTTERER, who was very security-minded and a confirmed Nazi. HÜTTERER, who is on the active list in the German Navy, had spent most of his time in U-boats, and had served in the Baltic, North Sea, Norway and Atlantic. Before joining U 413, in February, 1944, he had served in "U-PIETSCHMANN", which ran on a reef off Norway and was then sent back to Memel. | ||
| (ii) U 1209 | ||
| U 1209, a 500-ton Type VII C U-boat, was sunk at about 1100 on 18th December 1944; she struck the rocks in the neighbourhood of the Wolf Rock and sank shortly afterwards. | ||
| She carried a complement of fifty-one if whom forty-two survived. The Commanding Officer, Oberleutnant zur See HÜLSENBECK, died of a heart attack on board H.M.C.S. "MONTREAL". | ||
| At the time of her sinking U 1209 was stated by prisoners to be pursuing an aircraft carrier; there was, however, apparently no Allied aircraft carrier in the vicinity. | ||
| (iii) U-877 | ||
| U 877 was a 740-ton Type IXC/42 U-boat belonging to the recently formed 33rd Flotilla, Flensburg. She was sunk on her first patrol, on 27th December 1944 in position 46° 25' N. 36° 36' W., by H.M.C. Ships "EDMUNDSTON" and "ST. THOMAS". | ||
| The whole complement, which numbered fifty-five at the time of sinking, was rescued. This included the Commanding Officer, Kapitan Leutnant FINDEISEN and four other officers. The Commanding Officer and the Coxswain were injured at the sinking and were taken to hospital in the U.K. They were not available for interrogation at the time of writing this report. | ||
| During this patrol U 877 received a signal stating that U 1209 had grounded on the Cornish coast and had been lost and that losses of this nature could not be tolerated in the present circumstances. | ||
| (iv) U 1199 | ||
| U 1199, a 500-ton Type VII C U-boat, operating from Bergen and probably belonging to the Eleventh Flotilla, was sunk at 1620 on 21st January, 1945, by H.M.S. "ICARUS" in position 074 degs. Wolf Rock four miles, having been previously attacked and severely damaged by H.M.S. "MIGNONETTE." | ||
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| The boat had a complement of forty-seven of whom only one man, the Chief Petty Officer Navigator, survived. | ||||||||||||||||||
| U 1199 was attempting to enter the Channel on her second patrol when she was attacked and sunk. | ||||||||||||||||||
| (v) Equivalent Ranks | ||||||||||||||||||
| The following are the Royal Navy equivalents to German Navy ranks used in this report: | ||||||||||||||||||
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| The suffix "(Ing.)" after a German rank in place of zur See denotes an Engineer Officer. The suffix "der Reserve" denotes a Reserve Officer. | ||||||||||||||||||
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DETAILS |
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III. LAST PATROL AND SINKING OF U 413 |
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| (i) U 413 proceeds to her operational area | ||
| U 413 sailed from Brest on 2nd August 1944 to operate against shipping on the Allied convoy route between Southern England and the Baie de la Boine, after which she was to proceed to Norway. | ||
| (ii) Successes | ||
| It was claimed that U 413 had torpedoed and sunk two merchant vessels during this patrol in the convoy route area, totalling 8,000 tons. | ||
| (iii) Sinking of U 413 | ||
| At about 0900 on 20 August, there were indication that U 413 was being pursued. She proceeded on her motors, at about 30 metres depth. The first series of depth charges fell wide of its target, but the second series was accurate, and water entered the U-boat aft and in the control room. Those of the crew who were in the control room immediately rushed to the bow compartment and closed the W/T doors behind them. The U-boat sank out of control and bottomed. The lights went out and the crew were soon up to their waists in water. | ||
| The Engineer Officer opened the forward hatch, through which he escaped. He did not know what happened to the rest of the crew. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: At 0807 on 20 August, an asdic contact was obtained by H.M.S. FORESTER", while on anti-submarine patrol with H.M.S. "WENSLEYDALE" and "VIDETTE". At 0515, "FORESTER" attacked with depth charges set to 150 feet, without result. "VIDETTE", being the only ship present at that time with any salvoes of bombs remaining, was then ordered to close and carry out Hedgehog attack, and at 0934 she attacked, the bombs being observed to fall on the centre bearing of the target from "WENSLEYDALE". Bubbles and Diesel oil came to the surface and one survivor was picked up by "WENSLEYDALE". At 0952 "WENSLAYDALE" made another depth charge attack, which was considered to have finished off the U-boat and left the area. Doubt was then expressed by "FORESTER" as to whether the U-boat was completely destroyed, as only a small amount of wreckage had come to the surface, which it was thought might have been fired from the torpedo tubes, as a ruse. After a further attack by "FORESTER", with the same results, the position was left. | ||
| "WENSLEYDALE" reported at 1325 that she had one uninjured prisoner on board and that the U-boat was U 413, of the First Flotilla.) | ||
IV. SOLE PATROL AND SINKING OF U 1209 |
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| (i) Departure from Kiel | ||
| U 1209 left Kiel at about 0830 on 14th November 1944 and was given a send-off by the Senior Officer of the 5th Flotilla. He gave a short address to the crews of U 1209 and U 1020, a 500-ton U-boat which left port in company with U 1209. | ||
| (ii) Schnorkel Trials at Horten | ||
| U 1209 proceeded on the surface from Kiel to Horten which she reached on 16th or 17th November. She remained in Horten for about five or six days carrying out Snorkel trials. On completion of these trials she sailed in company with another 500-tonner and proceeded surfaced to Kristiansand S. where she arrived on about 23rd November. | ||
| (iii) Departure from Kristiansand S. | ||
| At 1605 on 24th November, U 1209 left Kristiansand S. accompanied by another 500-tonner, possibly U 1020, and some patrol boats. She proceeded surfaced until 2400 when she dived. She set course between the Faeroes and | ||
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Scotland instead of following the usual passage through the Rosengarten. |
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| (iv) Position of Allied Convoys reported | ||||||||||||||
| While U 1209 was off the north coast of Scotland, a signal was received from Control reporting the exact positions of two Allied convoys escorted by heavy surface units. Although U 1209 was in position to attack, HUELSENBECK being disinclined to attack signalled that he was nowhere near the position of the ships reported. Prisoners said that they were very near one convoy and could hear the noises of ships on their hydrophones. | ||||||||||||||
| One Telegraphist stated that signals were received warning U-boats of an area in which British Fleet units were operating. U-boats were ordered to avoid this area. They were also ordered not to attack independent ships. | ||||||||||||||
| (v) Passage to the Channel | ||||||||||||||
| After passing the Faeroes U 1209 proceeded south of Rockall, from Rockall she crossed and made the Irish coast at a point opposite Donegal Bay and from there proceeded down the west coast of Ireland, close inshore, and throughout most of the journey, submerged. U 1209's timetable for using Schnorkel was given as follows by one prisoner: | ||||||||||||||
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| It was stated that a special signal from DOENITZ was received ordering the U-boat to stay close inshore because of the better chance of intercepting convoys there than in mid-ocean. | ||||||||||||||
| During this period two signals were received which the Telegraphists believe gave U 1209 her operational areas, but these could not be decyphered as HUELSENBECK had left the cypher books for the Commanding Officer's cypher behind in Kiel. HUELSENBECK, however, pretended that he had understood the signals and acknowledged them because he did not dare admit that he had forgotten the cypher books. | ||||||||||||||
| (vi) An aircraft Carrier Reported | ||||||||||||||
| About six days before her sinking U 1209 proceeded to an area in which Allied aircraft carrier had been reported. One prisoner stated that U 1209 followed an aircraft carrier from Donegal Bay down the coast and sighted her again at a point approximately off Black Sod Bay. She turned into the Channel and south of Queenstown sighted three merchant ships. These ships were not attacked as U 1209 was still following the aircraft carrier. This prisoner stated that the aircraft carrier was seen for the last time off Milford Haven. For the last three days before she was sunk she remained submerged at about 130 ft. patrolling off Land's End. (N.I.D. Note: No Allied aircraft carrier was operating in the area patrolled by the U-boat at this time. | ||||||||||||||
| (viii) Sinking of U 1209 | ||||||||||||||
| Early on 18th December a steamer was sighted and the U-boat was about to attack when an argument took place between the Commanding Officer and the Navigating Chief Petty Officer. The C.P.O. argued that the boat was heading straight for the Wolf Rock, but HUELSENBECK was convinced that they were well to the west of it. At the height of the argument U 1209 struck bottom. She grated along and was thrown off the rock and back again by the swell. | ||||||||||||||
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| (N.I.D. Note: At 1030 16th December Wolf Lighthouse reported a U-boat washed up on the rocks, and immediately afterwards signalled that the U-boat had slipped off and was under way proceeding westward with one man on the conning tower). Finally she was badly holed aft and water began to rise in the diesel and motor rooms. The U-boat soon became stern heavy and she surfaced with the air pressure down to 30 atmospheres. HUELSENBECK found it impossible to open the conning tower hatch and the U-boat submerged again. Fuel oil had to be pumped out before she surfaced again. This time the conning tower hatch was opened and the Commanding Officer was already on the bridge before he gave the order to abandon ship. | ||
| The Engineer Officer, who was the most popular officer on board, was the only officer to stay below. He scuttled the boat and was blown out of the conning tower hatch shortly before the boat sank. He died later in hospital. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: At 1045 the U-boat was reported on an eastward course sinking fast. Crew was abandoning ship. At 1101 the lighthouse signalled that the U-boat had sunk. At 1238 H.M.C.S. MONTREAL signalled that the U-boat had sunk in 155° 1-1/2 miles Wolf Rock). | ||
| A signal was made to Control reporting the sinking condition. | ||
| One prisoner stated that HUELSENBECK threw a rating off his raft so that he could get onto it himself. HUELSENBECK himself died later of a heart attack on board H.M.C.S. MONTREAL. | ||
| Forty-three of the crew of fifty-one were picked up. | ||
V. SOLE PATROL AND SINKING OF U 877 |
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| (i) Departure from Kiel | ||
| U 877 left Kiel at midnight on the 11th November 1944, escorted by two R-boats and two armed trawlers. Before leaving Kiel a G.B.T. was slung beneath her keel amidships. The escort vessels had G.B.T. fitted to a spar from the bows and streamed about 20 m. (67 ft.) astern. All U-boats leaving Kiel have G.B.T. fitted until they reach Horten. | ||
| (ii) Lying at Anchor in Kattegat | ||
| Soon after leaving Kiel the weather deteriorated and seven or eight days were spent off Kalundberg and Frederikshaven. After about five days U 297 (ALDEGARMANN) joined her and about ten or fifteen merchant ships lay in the vicinity, all waiting for the weather to clear. One prisoner stated that, apart from the weather, the reason they lay off Denmark on the way to Horten was because the channel was not clear of mines. | ||
| (iii) Schnorkel Exercises at Horten | ||
| U 877 arrived at Horten on 19th November and there carried out Schnorkel exercises and also made one deep diving test. A measured mile was also covered. Six days were spent in Horten, during which time U 877 lay at Pier 19 (See C.B. 4416 Plan No. 23). | ||
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| (iv) Departure from Kristiansand and Attack by Aircraft | ||
| From Horten U 877 proceeded with U 297 (ALDEGARMANN) and one other Type VII C boat without escort to Kristiansand S. arriving about 0200 on 26th November. They lay at the pier marked 6 (see C.B. 4416 Plan No. 38). At about 1600 on the same day she sailed with the other two U-boats in convoy. The convoy, consisting of a few merchant ships, was escorted by a Sperrbrecher and four escort vessels. At 2000 to 2200 that evening two twin-engined aircraft approached the convoy, which was proceeding up the coast, and were contacted on the "Hohentwiel". The aircraft were engaged but succeeded in dropping two "bombs" some 500 to 1000 yards off U 877's port quarter. (N.I.D. Note: H.Q. Coastal Command Narrative for 27th November 1944 reports that attacks were carried out by Beaufighters P and F/489 Squadron and U-boat sightings made by S and F/489 Squadron between 2053 and 2059 on 26th November). U 877 then dived, but before the C.P.O. Telegraphist could unship the mattress aerial, which had jammed; consequently the set was out of action for the rest of the patrol. Immediately after this attack the U-boats left the convoy and U 877 proceeded for one hour at full speed on the surface. After one hour she submerged to Schnorkel depth. | ||
| (v) Passage through the Rosengarten | ||
| For the next twenty days U 877 proceeded by day submerged and by night at Schnorkel depth. She set course for approximate position 65° N., 07° W. and then the course followed was through the Rosengarten. On passage from Kristiansand U 877 averaged between 60 and 100 miles per 24 hours. When Schnorkelling her speed was six knots and on her motors two and a half to three knots. During the patrol the boat surfaced regularly at night, usually for about half an hour at a time, depending on G.S.R. contacts. There were, however, so many aircraft contacts that on no occasion did they surface for longer than half an hour. | ||
| (vi) Weather Reporting | ||
| On arrival in approximate position 55° N., 30° W. U 877 endeavoured to make her report but discovered that it was impossible to transmit. U 877 remained in this area for some time, surfacing three times a day, from 0200 to 0400, 0600 to 0700, and 2030 to 2130. In the area in question U-boats consider themselves fairly safe from aircraft attack, and U 877 neither sighted an aircraft nor had any G.S.R. contact. When in the northern part of this area she was ordered to proceed to a position approximately 50° N., 32° W. to act as a weather reporting boat over an area 200 miles radius from the centre of the position allotted to her. The importance of these weather reports was stressed by a later signal, addressed to U 870 (HECHLER) stating that their weather reports had played an important part in enabling the Germans to choose a suitable moment to begin their offensive. U 877 reached her new position some five days before she was sunk and spent about three days in this area, during which period she remained a considerable time on the surface and once spent a whole day without submerging. In this area she proceeded at half speed on one diesel, and charged batteries with the other. | ||
| (vii ) C.O. Operates at his own Discretion | ||
| U 877 started out on the W/T wave-band of "Kuste" and then went over to "Ireland". Finally they went over to "Diana" but were instructed to keep a constant watch on "Ireland" as well. Because U 877 could not transmit there was a period of some twelve days before 27th December, when she was unable to report to Control, although she received all signals addressed to her. After a number of days, COntrol reckoned that U 877, at first believed lost, might not be signaling on account of difficulty with her transmitter, and accordingly a signal was made ordering the C.O. to operate at his own discretion. It was decided that U 877 should operate somewhere off the American coast and the officers subsequently held a conference to decide on one of the following areas of operation: off New York, off Halifax, off Philadelphia or off Boston. Course was set in a westerly or south-westerly direction and a decision had not been reached when contact with Allied forces was first made. | ||
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| (viii) Sinking | ||
| On 27th December 1944 U 877 was proceeding surfaced in daylight for the third time since leaving Kristiansand, when a contact was received on the "Fliege" and the boat dived. Screw noises were reported in the vicinity on the hydrophones. These warnings were, however, disregarded by the C.O. who considered that the G.S.R. warning must have been an aircraft one and that the hydrophone noises were from the boat itself. The first contact was about 0700 and about two hours later the first depth charges were dropped. These were estimated to have been at a depth of 60 m. (197 ft.) and fairly far astern of the U-boat, which was at 20 m. (66 ft.). No damage was done, except to the lamps in the P.O.'s Mess. One prisoner stated that the hatch over the Diesel room had not been properly secured during the dive, and water had entered the Diesel room. | ||
| The U-boat had reached a depth of 80 m. (262 ft.) when a second pattern of depth charges fell, causing a leak aft, which began to flood the stern compartment and the boat sank at an angle of 40° - 45° to a depth of 340 to 350 m. (1115 to 1148 ft.) | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: At 0600 on 27th December H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON obtained a contact, held it for ten minutes and then gave it up as being non-sub. At about 0615 H.M.C.S. ST. THOMAS obtained a contact, and after some hesitation because of fish noises classified it as submarine. At 0630 she fired squid set to 100 ft. Asdic gave the boat's depth as 520 ft. At 0700 contact was regained and an attack was made with squid at 6 knots, the U-boat's depth being established as 400 ft. Contact was lost after the attack and never regained). | ||
| After this attack a great excess of pressure developed in the boat and the pumps were out of action, but tanks were blown and both motors put to full ahead. The boat rose to about 160 m. (524 ft.) and the C.O. ordered the Engineer Officer to reduce to dead slow and to keep her at that depth. However, this was not possible and she started to slide back again. The blowing of all tanks and the assistance of three quarter speed brought the boat violently to the surface. The Captain was thrown out on deck through the conning-tower hatch, severely injuring his head, and the C.P.O. Navigation also was injured. | ||
| The C.O. at first ordered the crew to man the 37 mm. guns, but apparently his order was never carried out and the next order was to abandon ship. One prisoner said that two destroyers were in sight when he got on deck, and that they fired over the U-boat before the crew abandoned her. | ||
| The last to leave was the Engineer Officer, who scuttled the boat by opening the vents. The crew were for two hours in one-man dinghies before being picked up. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: At 0800 the U-boat surfaced, the ship's company abandoned her and she settled by the stern). | ||
VI. LAST PATROL AND SINKING OF U 1199 |
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| (i) Departure from Bergen | ||
| U 1199 sailed from Bergen on 31st December, 1944, unaccompanied and carrying provisions for about nine weeks. | ||
| (ii) Course of U 1199 | ||
| U 1199 proceeded through the Rosengarten and off the west of Ireland, the last position noted by the sole survivor, a Chief Petty Officer (Navigator) being somewhere to the south-west of the Scillies as they were approaching the Channel from the Atlantic. | ||
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| This prisoner declared that he had never been allowed to plot their course on the chart, but took his orders from the Commanding Officer, who himself acted as navigator and gave him bearings by observing lights at periscope depth. He remembered that the Commanding Officer had sighted the Wolf Rock lighthouse from a distance of about 5 miles, half an hour before the engagement. | ||
| (iii) A Convoy is sighted and attacked | ||
| On 21st January a convoy was heard and the U-boat came to periscope depth. The Commanding Officer sighted about sixty ships and a spread of torpedoes was fired. The prisoner believed that they hit one 10,000 ton and one 8,000 ton ship. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: S.S. GEORGE HAWLEY in TBC.43 torpedoed in position 180° Longships 4' at 1448/21st January. Ship holed in engine room, taken in tow by tug ALLEGIANCE, arrived Falmouth 0530A/22nd.) | ||
| (iv) U 1199 is damaged | ||
| The U-boat bottomed and shortly afterwards experienced the effects of the first depth charge attack, which caused a small leak in the bow compartment, which subsequently became a large inrush of water; the main motors were put out of action. The attack continued for several hours, successive patterns of depth charges causing still further damage; the magnetic compass was smashed, and rotary converters dislodged. The after control room bulkhead was closed and the prisoner was ignorant of what happened aft. In the forward compartment the water was rising rapidly, and when it had risen three feet above the floor-plates, the Commanding Officer ordered the crew to don their life jackets. The prisoner said that he put the mouthpiece of his life jacket into his mouth and ascribes of the rest of the crew to the fact that they failed to do this and were suffocated by chlorine gas, which was by this time forming. He saw men collapsing one by one. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: At 1320/21st January, 1945, H.M.S. MIGNONETTE, escorting Convoy HXA.331 closed to 3000 yards on the starboard side of GEORGE HAWLEY and commenced Observant, dropping single depth charges. At 1355 contact was gained at 600 yards and immediately attacked with depth-charges. | ||
| At 1416 a Hedgehog attack was made on a stationary target in the vicinity of the first contact, followed by a second depth-charge attack. A second Hedgehog attack was made at 1447 and about 20 minutes later a contact was re-established and depth-charged. | ||
| (v) The end of U 1199 and Escape of Survivor | ||
| A final pattern of depth charges tore a hole in the wardroom, and the forward part of the boat began to fill even more rapidly with water. The Commanding Officer ordered the prisoner to open the conning tower hatch, which, though stiff at first, suddenly flew open and the prisoner was blown up through it into the water. There was no time to help any of the others who were in the conning tower. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: H.M.S. ICARUS obtained contact at 1618/22nd January, 1945 and carried out one Hedgehog and two depth charge attacks. Wood wreckage, oil and large air bubbles were observed and when turning for the third attack a survivor was picked up. The U-boat was believed to have been sunk at 1620A/21st in position 074° Wolf Rock 4'). | ||
| (vi) Possible raising of U 1199 | ||
| The prisoner stated that all the high pressure air bottles were full at the time of the sinking and he believed that the after part of the boat was not flooded, in which case it would be possible to raise U 1199 without much difficulty. | ||
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VII. U-BOAT TRAINING IN THE BALTIC |
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| (Note: The following information regarding the working-up routine if U-boats and their Training Flotillas in the Baltic was obtained from various prisoners taken from U 877 and one who, prior to joining U 877 in Stettin in June 1944, served in U 804 during working up.) | ||
TRIALS AND WORKING-UP ROUTINE |
||
| (i) Silent Running Tests (Schleichfahrtproben"). | ||
| Silent running tests, which are carried out as a part of the acceptance trials (U.A.K.) at Kiel or Danzig, normally last only one day. U-boats carrying out acceptance trials at Kiel usually do their silent running tests at Sönderborg, and those at Danzig to theirs at Rönne on Bornholm, U 804, however, proceeded from U.A.K. at Kiel to Rönne. | ||
| At Sönderborg U 877 arrived early one morning, being met by a patrol vessel and was subsequently joined by a small wooden trawler-type vessel fitted with hydrophone. U 877 then proceeded submerged at different speeds, first on one propeller and then on the other and finally both together, in order to determine the most silent running speed. The exercises were completed by 1600. The area of these tests was a large octagonal in a sheltered part of the harbour marked out by buoys. There are never more than one or two U-boats at a time either at Sönderborg or Rönne. | ||
| At neither Sönderborg nor Rönne was there any aircraft protection and no minesweeping was carried out, as it was considered unnecessary. | ||
| (ii) Training of Ship's Company ("Eigenausbildung") | ||
| This training takes about eight days and is done at Pillau by groups of about ten boats at a time; they are attached to the 19th Flotilla while there. | ||
| Every other day groups of seamen, leading seamen, petty officers, etc., receive instruction ashore in the forenoon. The rest of the time is occupied in exercises at sea. The U-boats enter harbour at dusk and lie at the pier, one man from each boat standing guard on the pier. Each watch sleeps alternate nights on board or in hutments situated outside the city. | ||
| There is no protection against air attack or mines. The Radar and G.S.R. are not used and only the W/T and G.H.G. are manned. In the event of an air raid it is stated that the U-boats would dive if at sea and, if alongside the pier, those on watch would remain below and the rest would proceed to the shelters. | ||
| (iii) Active Service Training "Agrufront") | ||
| Groups of from fifteen to twenty U-boats spent four to six weeks doing "Agrufront" exercises at Hel, during which period an Engineer Officer from the staff of the "Agrufront" remained on board to test the efficiency of the ship's company. In the case of U 877 this officer was Klt. (Ing.) RULAND, who has since been transferred to the position of Flotilla Engineer of the 4th Flotilla and then to the O.K.M. | ||
| These exercises consisted of crash diving and evolutions. A standing order for protection against mines not only for the "Agrufront" but for the whole of the Baltic, was that a U-boat must not dive deeper than 30 m. (98.4 ft.) from the bottom. Some eight or twelve U-boats lay at night alongside the pier in the harbour. | ||
| As far as prisoners knew neither regular air patrol nor mine-sweeping was carried out. Radar and G.S.R. was manned at night when at sea, but not during the daytime or when in harbour. | ||
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| (iv) Pre-Tactical Trials ("Vortaktische Übungen") | ||
| After the "Agrufront" U-boats normally returned to Pillau for pre-tactical trials, which lasted from eight days to two weeks. A group of about six boats remained together during these trials and were attached to the 20th Flotilla, Pillau. | ||
| Groups proceeded from Pillau to an area near Memel, remaining at sea the whole time and anchoring off Memel at night. Exercises consisted of manoeuvering in formation ad sighting targets. On the last two days the boats dived to periscope depth and exercised sighting the auxiliary target vessel ("Begleitschiff") "LECH" or "ISAR", both of which were attached to the 20th Flotilla for this purpose. | ||
| No escort and no air cover wa provided during these trials. | ||
| (v) Torpedo Firing Practice and Trials ("Torpedoschiessen" and "T.E.K.") | ||
| Torpedo firing formerly took place off Libau, but about the end of June 1944, were conducted off Pillau. Here groups of six to eight U-boats at a time spent two weeks or more and were attached to the 26th Flotilla, Pillau. | ||
| Torpedoes were fired on the surface and at periscope depth. Most of the firing was done during the day, and night firing was practised on five or six occasions. In the case of U 877 sixteen practice torpedoes were fired during the day and thirteen at night. When not firing the group of U-boats spent the night at the pier. The boats in each group always remained together and never proceeded independently. | ||
| The Radar and G.S.R. was not manned, but only the W/T and G.H.G. | ||
| (vi) Tactical Exercises ("Taktische Übungen") | ||
| These exercises normally lasted twelve days and were carried out together by a group of six U-boats, attached for the time to the 27th Flotilla at Gdynia. U 877 did not do her tactical exercises, but this was an unusual case (see Appendix "C"). | ||
| The U-boats exercised attacking a merchant ship, then at sighting targets and on the last two days attacking a convoy of four or five merchant ships protected by one aircraft. These exercises were all carried out in the open sea, and on about five occasions U 804 lay at night off a Danish island probably Bornholm. | ||
| During these exercises the guns were not manned. The Radar and G.S.R. were manned as part of the exercises. No minesweeping took place and there was no air cover. | ||
| (vii) Organisation of Baltic U-boat Training Units and Flotillas (as at end of September, 1944.) | ||
| (b) U.A.K. (U-bootsabnabmekomando) | ||
| C.O.: Korvettenkapitän von SCHMIDT. | ||
| (b) Agrufront | ||
| C.O.: Kapitan zur See (Ing.) HEINZ, with headquarters at Hel. | ||
| Auxiliary Ships: "SWAKOPMUND" and "ODIN" | ||
| (c) 19th U-boat Flotilla at Pillau | ||
| C.O.: Korvettenkapitän Josef METZLER | ||
| This was the flotilla for harbour training and training of U-boat crews. To this flotilla were also attached U-boat C.O.'s in training who had been transferred from surface ships. | ||
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| (d) 20th U-boat Flotilla at Pillau | ||
| C.O. : Kapitanleutnant Ernst MENGERSEN | ||
| This was the Pre-Tactical Flotilla (see section (iv) under "Details of Working-Up Routine"). | ||
| (e) 21st U-boat Flotilla at Pillau | ||
| C.O.: formerly Korvettenkapitan Otto SCHUHART, until September 1944. | ||
| Successor unknown. | ||
| Auxiliary ships: "DONAU" and "UBENA" | ||
| (f) 22nd U-boat Flotilla at Gdyna | ||
| C.O.: formerly Kapitan zur See Wolfgang LÜTH, until July 1944. Successor unknown. | ||
| School flotilla attached to the 22nd U.L.D. Gdynia. | ||
| Tender: "WEICHSEL". | ||
| (g) 23rd U-boat Flotilla at Danzig | ||
| C.O.: Korvettenkapitan Otto von BÜLOW. | ||
| School flotilla for U-boat Captains. | ||
| Auxiliary Ships: "GENERAL STEUBEN" and formerly also "DEUTSCHLAND". | ||
| (h) 24th U-boat Flotilla at Pillau | ||
| C.O.: Korvettenkapitän Karl Friedrich MERTEN. | ||
| Torpedo firing flotilla for U-boats proceeding on active service. | ||
| Target ships: "WILHELM BAUER" and "WALDEMAR KOPHAMBL" | ||
- 16 - |
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VIII. GENERAL REMARKS ON U-BOATS |
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| (i) W/T Reception in U-boats | ||
| The following information was given by various 500-ton U-boat officers. | ||
| All messages can be read on either long or short wave. On long wave they can be read completely submerged with the D/F aerial just beneath the surface. If the U-boat is very far from base she may have to surface. Only "programme time repeats" are transmitted on long wave, whereas short wave transmissions also carry immediate signals. Transmissions from other boats in the vicinity on short wave can also be intercepted. | ||
| All Commanding Officers prefer short wave reception if possible, especially if sighting reports are to be expected, and in practice only use long wave programme time to pick up serial messages which have been missed on short wave. Traffic on short wave is almost continuous, the most likely time for picking up important messages being in the first few hours after dusk. | ||
| Short wave transmissions can only be received submerged on the drum-shaped aerial on the schnorkel, and to avoid missing groups spray must be kept from the aerial as far as possible; Commanding Officers who especially wish to listen to a short wave broadcast will therefore risk showing too much schnorkel. | ||
| Short wave reception on the drum-shaped aerial is usually louder, clearer and more reliable than long wave reception on the D/F aerial. | ||
| In U 971 the D/F aerial was not watertight at the point where the Fleige G.S.R. aerial had been fixed, and she was forced when submerged to receive all messages on short wave. | ||
| It is an advantage to combine schnorkelling with W/T reception and U-boats often listen to both long and short wave transmissions simultaneously when schnorkelling. | ||
| In U 877, which was a 740-tonner, all routines were read on long-wave using the D/F aerial, the drum-shaped aerial only being used for broadcast reception of music, news, etc. The Jumping wire aerials could also be used for long-wave reception in an emergency, but were less satisfactory. Short-wave reception was never seriously attempted mainly because of the necessity of trimming the boat rather higher in order to keep the aerial dry. | ||
| Times of Schnorkelling were always made to coincide with long-wave programme times, and as the Commanding Officer insisted on coming up only a very short time before the transmission began, the Engineer Officer had to adjust the trim, engine speeds, etc. very hastily, at the same time seeing to the raising of the D/F aerial and keeping it at the right depth while starting the Schnorkel. | ||
| The U-boats maximum depth for reading successfully on D/F aerial was 20 metres (65 ft.) | ||
| (ii) W/T Procedure | ||
| Since operational area are now left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer, he need not send W/T transmissions at all, even if his position is requested, unless he considers it necessary. He must, however, come up to listen to routines. | ||
- 17 - |
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| (iii) Cuba IIIA Pressure-tight Aerial | ||
| A prisoner, who worked with M.N.B (Naval Communications Equipment Office) at Bordeaux until its evacuation, said that the Cuba IIIA pressure-tight aerial first became available in June 1944, and that several U-boats had been fitted at Bordeaux. | ||
| He believed it covered a waveband of 6 - 10 cm; it consists of four pairs of dipoles, 10 - 12 cm. long and 5 - 6 mm. in diameter. The two dipoles in each pair are mounted back to back 5 cm. apart; the pairs are 10 -15 cm. apart. There are four leads - one from each pair of dipoles - is mounted in a special plastic. The whole array is protected by an oblong box-shaped mesh covering of the same plastic. The plastic material used in this aerial is translucent but not transparent, and looks like foam. | ||
| It is an excellent insulator and of high dielectric constant; also being used for making radio valve holders. | ||
| The aerial is not completely successful and the prisoner thought that it had been put into service before it was fully developed. Individual diploes were very apt to break off, due perhaps to unequal expansion of the plastic and the metal dipole, since the two are in rigid contact. The down-lead cables are also apt to develop faults. | ||
| (N.I.D. Note: As far as is known Cuba IIIA has never been used operationally.) | ||
| (iv) U-boat Navigation by Elektre-Sonne Because | ||
| The Elektra-Sonne W/T beacons give coverage for U-boats in the Atlantic as far as the south of Iceland. The First Lieutenant of U 877 who gave this information thought that the transmitters are now all in Norway, so sited as to give good conditions for fixes along the route from the Norwegian ports and through the Faeroes/Iceland passage to the Atlantic. The First Lieutenant had never made use of the network himself and had no idea of the degree of accuracy. | ||
| When a bearing is received, special gnomonic charts are consulted; they have the transmitters marked, each with a different coloured compass rose on which the lines of bearing are curved and which extend as far as the south of Iceland. Thee lines of bearing are corrected for convergence etc. and are usually spaced 05° of bearing. The navigator interpolates between the lines to get the exact fix, which is then read off in terms of latitude and longitude and transferred to a normal chart. | ||
| (v) Navigational Aids in U 877 | ||
| One gyro sextant and several bubble and horizon sextants were carried in U 877. The gyro sextant is a development of a French patent, a small gyro producing a thin horizontal line of light which serves as the horizon. The gyro must be started with the sextant held comparatively upright; the sextant must then be handled carefully or the gyro is liable to be knocked off its balance. | ||
| The Petty Officer (Navigator) normally used the gyro sextant and the officers took simultaneous observations with horizon sextants. If the position need to be worked out urgently the "Zeisshöhenrechner" was used. This is an optical instrument in which engraved plates with various curves inscribed on them are inserted. By turning knobs and previously making an approximate calculation of hour angle, a fix from three stars can be produced in 8-10 minutes. The accuracy is said to be 3 miles. In U 877 the results were always checked subsequently from nautical tables. | ||
- 18 - |
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| The "Zeissrechnergerät"", a computer which could evaluate a fix from three stars to an accuracy of half a mile in about 15 minutes, was also carried. Tables, known as "F" tables, with which three stars could be evaluated in about thirty minutes were also carried. The Commanding Officer was particular to see that a simultaneous fixes were taken by at least three people, if possible, and the working checked by using at least two methods, one of which had to be by nautical tables. | ||
| (vi) Use of Periscope at Schnorkel Depth | ||
| (a) 500-ton U-boats | ||
| The following information was given by the commanding officers of U 871, and U 672 (see NID,1P/W/REP/6/44). | ||
| Only the attack periscope can be used at Schnorkel depth in Type VII C boats as the forward air observation periscope is too short (12.2 m. = 40 ft.). The Commanding Officer of U 971 had no difficulty with periscope vibration at any speed or in any condition of sea, but there was an occasional slight shuddering with the movement of waves. | ||
| The Commanding Officer of U 672 had experienced periscope vibration sufficient to cause some blurring when at 7 knots on motors. The attack periscope has two powers - 1.5 and 6 - giving a field of view from +30° to -10°. The line of sight cannot be elevated. Standard practice was to sweep once on magnification 1.5, and then twice on magnification 6. The Schnorkel exhaust only produces a very small blind spot and sometimes none at all. The attack periscope can be raised 20 cm. higher than the top of the Schnorkel. | ||
| (b) 740-ton U-boats | ||
| In U 877 either periscope could be used at Schnorkel depth. If both were raised together, the after one suffered severely from vibration, but the forward one remained completely rigid at all speeds and in all seas. Either could be used separately perfectly satisfactorily. In practice the forward air observation periscope was always used. Normally one sweep was made with the horizon visible in the bottom of the glass and a second with the line of sight rather more elevated. There are two magnifications - 1.5 and 6: the field of view is fro +90° to -15° in elevation in both cases, 8° in azimuth for magnification 6, and 30° in azimuth for magnification 1.5. The Schnorkel spray gave a blind sector between 40° and 80° in width on the starboard beam so that it extended from green 50 to right astern. Periscopes clear very rapidly and spray or waves obscure the view only momentarily. | ||
| (vii) Supply of Fuel when using Schnorkel | ||
| A standing order states that when using Schnorkel U-boats may only use fuel from the external tanks. Fuel is pumped from the internal tanks by using diesel cooling water, the pressure varying with the depth of the boat; if the boat is at 14 metres (46 ft.) the pressure is 1.4 atmospheres. If fuel is pumped from the internal tanks with cooling water at this pressure the tanks are subjected to a pressure greater than that for which they are designed. | ||
| By approximate and experienced handling, however, ("cracking" the appropriate valve) fuel can be pumped from the internal tanks, but accidents are likely to occur and this may have been the reason for the order. | ||
| (viii) Deck Containers for Rubber Dinghies in VII C U-boats | ||
| VII C U-boats are now fitted with four pressure tight containers on deck, three forward and one aft, each containing one 13 ft. rubber dinghy. These containers project about 6 inches above the deck. | ||
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APPENDIX "A" |
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EARLY HISTORY OF U 413 |
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| Very little information was elicited as to U 413's early history and previous patrols. It was stated that she used Schnorkel on her pre-penultimate patrol, which took place on the British convoy route in the Channel off the Scillies, where the U-boat had orders to attack anything suitable. During this patrol the sinking of two destroyers and the torpedoing of a cruiser were claimed, for which her Commanding Officer, Kapitänleutnant Gustav POEL, was awarded the "Ritterkreuz". | ||
| Prisoners from other U-boats stated that U 413 had been concerned in the following events: | ||
| Attack on convoy S.C.104, October 1942, with U 353. | ||
| Sinking of "WARWICK CASTLE" on 14th November 1942. | ||
| Arrival in Brest 5th May 1943. | ||
| Departure from Brest 25th June 1945. | ||
| POEL was relieved by Oberleutnant zur See SACHSE for U 413's last patrol. | ||
APPENDIX "B" |
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EARLY HISTORY OF U 1209 |
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| (i) Building and Commissioning | ||
| U 1209 was built at the Schichau Yards in Danzig and was commissioned on 13th April 1944. | ||
| (ii) Working-up | ||
| The boat carried out a normal working-up programme in the Baltic. In July 1944 she was at Hela for "Agru-front" exercises. In the first week in September 1944 U 1209 entered the Schichau Yard at Königsberg where she carried out final adjustments and the Schnorkel was built in. | ||
| On 25th October she left Königsberg and proceeded to Kiel where the boat embarked torpedoes, oil, ammunition and stores. | ||
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APPENDIX "C" |
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EARLY HISTORY OF U 877 |
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| (i) Building and Commissioning | ||
| U 877 was built at Deschimag, Bremen, and commissioned on 25th March 1944. During the last stages of building the crew was quartered in the Lloydheim in the centre of the city. | ||
| (ii) Trials and Working-up | ||
| On commissioning, U 877 proceeded to Kiel for one week's "U.A.K." trials and thence to Sönderborg, where one day was spent doing silent running trials. U 877 then proceeded to Hela for six weeks "Agru-front" exercises which was interrupted for one week over Whitsuntide when the boat went to Gdynia and entered for a further two weeks at Hela. | ||
| From the Agru-front the U-boat proceeded to Pillau where about twelve days were spent in torpedo firing and "Vortaktische" exercises. Seventy or eighty G7a torpedoes were fired. Tactical exercises proper were not undertaken, according to one prisoner owing to the threat of Russian surface craft in the Baltic during the occupation of Finland. Another reason given for the omission of tactical exercises was that U 877 had completed her "Vortaktische" exercises more speedily than the other U-boats, and she was, in fact, considered to be the most efficient U-boat in the Baltic at the time. It was probably considered that further exercises were unnecessary. | ||
| (iii) Final Overhaul at Stettin | ||
| The final overhaul of U 877 took place at the Oderwerke Stettin, lasting about four months, until 25th October 1944. At the beginning of August the ship's company went into two watches on fourteen days leave each to the Rest Camp at Glücksburg. | ||
| During the period at Stettin Schnorkel and a fuel supply system which dispensed with the use of the fuel pump (see Section II (xii)) were fitted. Also during this period, some time in October, the crew proceeded in groups of about ten to Swinemünde for anti-aircraft courses. | ||
| Two heavy R.A.F. raids on Stettin on the night of 16th/17th August and 29th/30th August caused widespread destruction and disorganization in the yards, but no U-boats were sunk. Due to these two raids the final overhaul, normally lasting about one and a half months, was prolonged to four months. U 877 escaped with only superficial damage caused by incendiaries. During the first raid the boat was lying alongside the Brodower Worder, between the second and third floating docks (see C.B. 1818 Plan No. 11). On the occasion of the second raid it was lying alongside in a small inlet at the Brodower Worder between the first and second floating docks. U-boats do not man their anti-aircraft guns in these circumstances. | ||
| (iv) Anti-Aircraft Firing Practice and Fitting Out | ||
| By 25th October the final overhaul at Stettin was completed and U 877 proceeded to Swinemünde for four days anti-aircraft firing practice. | ||
| The boat then sailed for Kiel, where she spent two weeks fitting out before sailing on her sole patrol. | ||
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APPENDIX "D" |
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EARLY HISTORY OF U 1199 |
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| (i) Building and Commissioning | ||
| U 1199 was built at the Schichau Yard in Danzig. She was commissioned in December 1943. The officers at the time of commissioning were: | ||
| Commanding Officer: Kapitänleutnant Rolf NOLLMANN | ||
| First Lieutenant: Leutnant zur See HELMS | ||
| Second Lieutenant: Obersteuermann WINTERFELD | ||
| (ii) Working-up | ||
| Pre-tactical exercises were carried out at Pillau. The boat also did manoeuvre practices here before proceeding to Hela for about seven weeks "Agrufront" training. During the Agrufront Leutnant zur See SCHMITZ replaced WINTERFELD as Second Lieutenant and WINTERFELD became Third Watch Keeping Officer. While the boat was at Hela she spent sixty days at sea with Engineer Officers under instruction on board. | ||
| U 1199 then proceeded to Libau for torpedo firing and then returned to Hela for an additional three weeks as NOLLMANN considered that the ship's company needed extra training. She then proceeded to Swinemünde for A.A. firing practice, which lasted about a week. She then carried out ten days tactical exercises off Gdynia. At Gdynia Leutnant zur See HELMS left the boat and Oberleutnant zur See FUESSLEIN succeeded him as First Lieutenant. | ||
| At about the beginning of July 1944 U 1199 entered Howaldts Yard at Kiel, where the Schnorkel was fitted. Final adjustments were completed by the beginning of September 1944 and by mid-September fitting out at Kiel was completed. | ||
| (iii) First Patrol of U 1199 | ||
| U 1199 sailed from Kiel to Horton, where she did Schnorkel trials. From Horton she proceeded via Kristiansand S. to Bergen. She left Bergen on her first patrol at the end of September. The patrol lasted about eight weeks and during this time the boat did not carry out any attacks nor was she herself attacked. She returned to Bergen at the end of November, and went into dock for four weeks. | ||
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APPENDIX "E" |
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COMPLEMENT OF U 413 |
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| (i) Sole Survivor: | ||||||||||||
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| (ii) Total Crew: Unknown. | ||||||||||||
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COMPLEMENT OF U 1209 |
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| (i) Survivors: | ||||||||||||
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| (ii) Casualties: | ||||||||||||
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| (iii) Total crew: | ||||||||||||
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COMPLEMENT OF U 877 |
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| (i) Survivors (total crew): | ||||||||||||
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COMPLEMENT OF U 1199 |
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| (i) Sole Survivor: | ||||||||||||
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| (ii) Total crew: | ||||||||||||
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