U-boat Archive - U-357 - Interrogation Report

This record was kindly provided by the generous assistance of Tony Cooper

REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM "U.357," A 500-TON

U-BOAT, SUNK AT 2140 B.S.T. ON 26th DECEMBER, 1942.

________________

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

"U 357," a 500-ton U-Boat of the series beginning "U 351," was sunk in approximate position 57° 10' N., 15° 40' W. (some 70 miles south-west of Rockall) at 2140 B.S.T. on 26th December, 1942, by H.M. Ships "Hesperus" and "Vanessa," while attempting to attack Convoy H.X.219.

It was her first operational patrol. She contacted the convoy by chance while en route for her operational area in the North Atlantic. This is believed to have lain further to the south-west.

There were only eight survivors of her complement of forty-four. Three were not available for interrogation owing to wounds; none are well-informed.

The features of this report are:

(1) The extreme inexperience of the ship's company. Only four of them, less than 10 per cent. had been on a previous operational patrol. (See Appendix "B".)

The following are the British equivalents of German naval ranks used:

Korvettenkapitän	Commander (Junior Grade).
Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant-Commander.
Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Leutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant.
Oberfähnrich sur See	Midshipman (Senior Grade).

The suffix "Ing." in parentheses after a rank denotes "Engineer."

II. DETAILS OF "U 357"

(i)	Displacement	500 tons.

(ii)	Type	VIIC.

(iii)	Building Yard	Flensburger Schiffsbau Gesellschaft, Flensburg.

(iv)	Armament	Guns. One 88 mm. (3.46 in.) forward.
		One 20 mm. (.79 in.) on bridge.
		Mountings for four M.G.s on conning-tower.
		Torpedoes. 14 carried, whereof 12 electric below decks and 2 Air in upper-deck containers.
		Tubes. Four forward, one aft.

(v)	D/F Loop	Fitted.

(vi)	Search Gear	G.S.R. "U 517" type aerial fitted forward on centre of conning-tower. Metox Receiving Set.
		S-Gear. None.
		K.D.B. None.
		Hydrophones. G.H.G.
		R.D.F. None.
		Echo-Sounder. Fitted.
		"Electrolot." Carried.

(vii)	Communications	W/T Sets. Believed to carry normal equipment, i.e.:
		(1) 40/70-watt emergency H/F transmitter.
		(2) 150-watt M/F transmitter.
		(3) 200-watt H/F transmitter.
		(4) One H/F; one H/F and L/F; one D/F and two broadcast receivers.
		R/T. None. Removed during final adjustments.
		U/T. None. Removed during final adjustments.

(viii)	Propulsion	Diesels. Two G.W. 6-cylinders, 4 stroke Diesels.
		Supercharger. "Kapsel" type, mechanically driven.
		Motors. Manufactured by A.E.G.
		Compressors. (1) Junkers. (2) Electric.

(C48635) B* 2

(ix)	Diving	Diving Depth. Tested to 100 metres (328 ft.), but it seems probable that she submerged much deeper at the time of her sinking. The depth-gauges registered up to 200 metres (656 ft.).
		Crash-Diving Time. Survivors said she took 32 seconds to reach 30 metres (98 ft.). (N.I.D. Note. Most 500-tonners can reach this depth in between 30 and 26 seconds.)
		Diving Angle. Maximum of 45° was experienced on Agru-Front trials. The diving angle gauge registered from 0° to 65°. (See also Appendix "A" (v).)

(x)	Badge	A black raven with red bill and claws, holding a black umbrella in one claw.

III. SOLE PATROL OF "U 357"

(i) Departure from Kiel

"U 357" sailed from Kiel-Wik about 1100 on Tuesday, 15th December, 1942. She was in company with "U 525," a 740-tonner, whose Commanding Officer survivors did not remember, and had an escort of one or two patrol-boats. There was no air escort, but "U 357" kept her conning-tower M.G.s mounted in case an aircraft should be sighted. The Senior Officer of the 5th U-Boat Flotilla at Kiel, who prisoners said was Kapitänleutnant Topp, bade them farewell.

The route northwards was via the Great Belt, Kattegat and Skagerrak to Kristiansand S. She and the other boat remained on the surface throughout, proceeding at speeds between "Slow" and "Half," using only one Diesel.

(ii) Call at Kristiansand S.

"U 357" arrived at Kristiansand S. in the evening of 16th December, 1942, and made fast alongside the 740-tonner, which lay alongside a quay. (N.I.D. Note. This is probably the quay at Solyst, where U-Boats are known to refuel when visiting this port.)

Here she topped up with fuel and replenished her supplies of lubricating oil and fresh water. The whole ship's company spent the night on board. While maneuvering alongside, "U 357" was rammed forward by a patrol-boat, but damage was negligible.

She sailed from Kristiansand S. at 0800 on 17th December, still accompanied by the 740-tonner and escorted by one patrol-boat.

(iii) Call at Egersund

The group of which "U 357" formed part hugged the Norwegian coast northwards during the whole of 17th December, and in the evening made Egersund, where "U 357" lay alongside a quay. Some of the ratings were detailed to spend the night in a barracks on the quayside, while the rest remained on board. Short shore leave was granted to all. The officers slept the night on board.

"U 357" called at Egersund because during the previous day, a number of floating mines had been sighted and the Captain. Kellner, thought it wiser to make fast for the night, as the mines were difficult to detect in the dark.

(iv) Passage of Rosengarten

"U 357" sailed from Egersund in company with "U 525" and one patrol-boat about 0800 on 18th December. She hugged the coast northwards until in the latitude of Vaagso, where she parted company with her escort and "U 525" and altered course to 300° to make the passage of the Rosengarten.

She first dived on the morning of 19th December and remained at periscope depth throughout the day. From this stage until 24th December, she proceeded at periscope depth by daylight and on the surface at night. Soon after leaving the Norwegian coast, "U 357" received a signal from the Admiral ordering her to a given area of operation.

Survivors were not certain whether they made the passage of the Rosengarten by day or night, but one man said they frequently altered course in that region. They were not themselves aware of the presence of British minefields, though they could not speak for the officers and quartermaster.

After leaving the Norwegian coast, a serious leak developed in the Diesel cooling system. At the same time the auxiliary bilge pump aft became defective, with the result that from that moment onwards there was an unusually large volume of water in her Diesel bilges. Water was also entering the Diesel compartment through the inner exhaust cut-out and a lead from the control-room distributor was not functioning properly. Despite these defects, Kellner decided to continue his patrol.


	7

	(v) Passage to Operational Area
	After passing through the Rosengarten, "U 357" received another signal from the Admiral U-Boats canceling her original orders and allotting her a new operational area some 200 miles to the south-west of the point at which she was sunk. She therefore, altered course to 200° and proceeded at slow speed to her new area. Survivors were not certain of the exact whereabouts of this area, but they thought it lay south-west of the position of their sinking.
	It was not until 24th December, probably one or two days after completing the passage of the Rosengarten, that Kellner thought it prudent to proceed on the surface in the daytime.
	At 1545 on 24th December the lookout sighted aircraft, and "U 357" submerged for a short while. No attack developed.
	Christmas Eve was celebrated in as traditional a style as circumstances permitted, the Commanding Officer making a short speech to the ship's company.
	At 1010 on 25th December, the Quartermaster was washed overboard while taking sights and drowned. A heavy sea prevailed. At the same time the stem of the G.S.R. aerial snapped. Attempts were made to repair it with wire, but it subsequently gave no satisfactory results and was removed altogether.
	Towards 1700 "U 357" made a signal to the Admiral U-Boats reporting the loss of the Quartermaster. No other signals were made on this patrol.
	At 1800 the lookout starboard side forward sighted three torpedo-carrying two-engined monoplanes crossing "U 357s" bows eastwards at a range, according to one man, of only 500 yards. They did not appear to sight the U-Boat, which immediately submerged.

	IV. SINKING OF "U 357" (All times B.S.T.)

	At 0800 on 26th December, 1942, "U 357" was proceeding at about 6 knots on approximate course 200° in approximate position 57° N., 15° W., en route for her operational area to the south-west. The bridge lookout reported plumes of smoke. As no survivor was on watch at the time, it has not been possible to determine the range and bearing of the smoke sighted. Survivors agree, however, that this smoke emanated from the same convoy whose escorts later sank their boat.
	Kellner immediately decided to follow up the convoy with a view to attacking at dusk, though he had not expected to encounter any convoys in this area.
	He therefore submerged to periscope depth, altered course and shadowed the convoy, partly on the surface and partly submerged, until the afternoon. By about 1730, Kellner judged himself in a favourable position to attack a destroyer which was closing him astern of the convoy. He accordingly fired one torpedo at her from his stern tube at periscope depth and immediately dived deeper. One man said Kellner had ordered three S.B.T.s to be fired soon after submerging.
	(N.I.D. Note. First D/C Attack. (1734). In the afternoon of 26th December, 1942, H.M.S. "Hesperus," escorting Convoy H.X.219, obtained HF/DF bearing 252° under 20 miles. H.M.S. "Vanessa" was ordered to investigate, and shortly before 1730 reported a U-Boat on the surface and closed at 23 knots. At 1730 "Hesperus" joined "Vanessa" and a box-sweep was organized. At 1734 "Hesperus" sighted a periscope at 150 yards on her port beam and fired a 14-charge pattern with shallow settings, since it appeared that the U-Boat was about to fire torpedoes at "Vanessa".)
	Survivors said it was impossible to ascertain exactly whether this torpedo had found its target since they were immediately afterwards attacked with depth-charges and the possible detonation of the torpedo could not be accurately distinguished from those of depth-charges. None of the depth-charges caused any damage to "U 357," who immediately dived deeper. (N.I.D. Note. This attack was purely harassing to prevent the U-Boat firing any torpedoes at "Vanessa".)
	(N.I.D. Note. Second D/C Attack. (1739). After a U-Boat periscope had been sighted by "Hesperus," "Vanessa" dropped a 10-charge pattern set to 50 ft. and 140 ft. in "Hesperus' " wake, about 20 ft. ahead of the disturbance caused by "Hesperus' " pattern fired at 1725.
	Third D/C Attack. (1751). "Vanessa" then gained contact at 2,500 yards bearing 280°. During her run-in to attack, doppler ranged from "slight opening" through "no doppler" to "slight closing." During the last 800 yards of the run-in, the target started to move right and threw off 20° to starboard. When range was reduced to 550 yards the U-Boat started to move rapidly left. "Vanessa" altered course 30° port and fired a 10-charge D/C pattern at 50 ft. and 140 ft. at 1751. Contact was regained at 600 yards bearing 140°.
	Fourth D/C Attack. (1800). "Vanessa" then opened to 1,400 yards and altered course to port. During her run-in, there was no doppler evident. The U-Boat moved slightly to the right at 700 yards and "Vanessa" altered course from 097° to 102°. Contact was lost at 300 yards, when H.E. was heard, and a 14-charge pattern was fired at 1800, depth-settings 150 ft. and 385 ft. This was considered a good attack.
	In the hours that followed, "U 357" submerged deep, frequently altered both course and speed and several times used her S.B.T. After submerging, she was attacked on several occasions by patterns of D/Cs and constantly heard the sound of asdics. Survivors insisted that only slight damage was


	8

	caused inside their boat and that both officers and men preserved the greatest calm in what was realised to be an awkward situation. Soon after submerging water entered through the stern gland beneath the Junkers compressor. Some men were ordered forward to keep trim. By 1830 the after bilges were already three-quarters full.
	They said that in one of the many D/C attacks they noticed a particularly heavy explosion, which caused their boat to move violently sideways. This was followed by the sound of falling debris on the upper deck, a phenomenon which they had not learned to expect in such an attack. They said this might have been caused by splinters falling from the D/C. Survivors commented that from now onwards the attacks became more accurate.
	(N.I.D. Note. Fifth D/C Attack. (1925). At 1915 "Hesperus" obtained a firm asdic contact bearing 277° at 1900 yards. The bearing at first moved slowly right and then steadied at a range of 1,000 yards. Speed was increased to attack, the bearing remained steady as the range closed and contact was finally lost at 600 yards. Initial D/C settings were "D" (C.B. 4097), but these were altered to "F," as it was considered that the U-Boat had gone deep. A 14-charge pattern was fired at 1925 and contact was regained astern. This attack could be only described as fairly accurate owing to the poor firing trace. Numerous non-sub echoes were obtained in the vicinity of the D/C explosions. There is a possibility that she may have discharged a S.B.T. in this area. If such was the case, it produced a decided non-sub echo.
	Sixth D/C Attack. (2007). At 2005 "Hesperus" obtained a submarine echo at 305° 900 yards. In the early stages of the attack the target moved slowly to the right, but directly the ship increased in her attacking speed the doppler changed to marked low. For the last 300 yards before losing contact, however, the bearing remained steady. It is obvious from the information available that the U-Boat had altered course directly away. Contact was lost when the range had decreased to 450 yards. On this information and in knowledge of the previous attack, extra deep settings (350, 385 and 550 ft.) were used. A 14-charge pattern was fired at 2007 and the attack is thought to have been accurate.
	Seventh D/C Attack. (2017). Asdic conditions were now good, with echoes easy to hold. Range was opened to 800 yards before "Hesperus" altered towards target. During the run-in there was no doppler, but target moved very slowly to the left. Course was altered slightly to head off the U-Boat, but it was again noticed that when speed was increased to attack, the target took violent avoiding action. In the comparatively short distance of 400 yards, the doppler was heard to change from slight to marked low. Contact was lost at 300 yards. Deep settings were again used, this time in conjunction with one Mark "X" D/C set to 215 ft. Since the 14-charge pattern and the Mark "X" exploded simultaneously, due to a slight discrepancy in firing time, the effect on the U-Boat is thought to have been severe.)
	Although the damage in the boat herself was of a minor character, survivors admitted that they were experiencing great difficulty owing to excess of water in the after bilges (see Section III) and the imperfect functioning of the auxiliary bilge pump. This was causing their boat to lose trim and necessitated frequent blowing of Number 3 diving tank in order to prevent her sinking too deep. Air pressure, which was at 170 kilogrammes per cubic centimetre (2,418 lbs. per sq, in.) before submerging. had been reduced to only 30 kilogrammes (426 lbs. per sq. in.) The Control Room petty officer added that it had been part of Kellner's policy, in taking avoiding action frequently, to alter the depth at which his boat lay, a procedure which also proved costly in air pressure. Others said that the batteries were beginning to run low, as "U 357" had had little opportunity of recharging during the same day. Kellner appears to have realised the hopelessness of his position, for after the third D/C attack he gave the order to blow tanks and attempt to escape on the surface in the darkness.
	(N.I.D. Note. Eighth D/C Attack. (2026). The contact remained firm. "Hesperus" decided to do a constant speed attack at 16 knots in the hope that the U-Boat would not know when the attack was to develop. Range was opened to 1,500 yards. During the run-in the U-Boat moved very slowly to the right. A throw off of 15° was made when the range had decreased to 1,000 yards. At 600 yards the target commenced to move slowly right again. The throw-off was thereupon increased another 10°, when the target remained steady, and then started to move slowly left, when contact was lost at 250 yards "Hesperus" fired a further pattern of 14 charges at 2026 with setting "F." The U-Boat appeared to take no further avoiding action. This attack was considered perfect. Contact was not regained astern.
	Ninth D/C Attack. (2100). "Vanessa" obtained contact bearing 046° at 1,500 yards when ship was on full port wheel. Course was steady on 102° range 1,600 yards. At 800 yards target was moving left, with no doppler evident. Course was then altered to 085°, speed 18 knots. An echo astern was then noticed at 1,000 yards. Echo ahead was lost at 600 yards and a 14-charge pattern, set to 500 ft. and 550 ft., was fired at 2100.)
	On surfacing, Kellner found he was only a few hundred yards distant from two destroyers and survivors were not surprised when they found their boat raked with gunfire, which they described as very accurately aimed at their conning-tower.
	Kellner, who had gone on the bridge, was wounded and the rest of the lookout killed. Others then took their places, only to be killed or wounded themselves.
	Though "U 357" was proceeding at the highest speed she could muster, she did not appear to be gaining on the pursuing destroyers, and Kellner, realising the hopelessness of the situation, ordered his men on deck preparatory to abandoning ship. This order does not appear to have been properly understood in the engine room, for "U 357" continued ahead at emergency speed. Some prisoners suggested that it was because of this misunderstanding that their boat was rammed and all on board lost, instead of being allowed to scuttle themselves and be saved.


	9

	The few men who had managed to find their way on to the upper deck were washed overboard and were the only ones to be picked up.
	"U 357" was then rammed twice by the attacking destroyers and sank with all on board. One man said that Kellner himself was washed overboard and drowned.
	(N.I.D. Note. Tenth D/C Attack and Ramming. After completing her D/C attack at 2100, "Vanessa" ran on for 3-1/2 minutes, then turned to port. Contact was later obtained bearing 299° at 2100 yards. "Vanessa" ran in at 10 knots, the target's bearing meanwhile moving right. When steady on 263°, the U-Boat was sighted ahead at 900 yards zig-zagging at full speed. "Vanessa" increased speed to full and rammed her at 2130, without appearing, however, to cause much damage. She threw one D/C from her thrower as the U-Boat passed down her starboard side. A short chase ensued, "Hesperus" finally ramming the U-Boat at right angles at the base of her conning tower, causing her to break in two and sink at 2140.)
	Prisoners said-Kellner's tactics during this attack were to wait until the destroyer H.E. became louder, presumably just before attacking, then to make off at full speed. This was very costly to his batteries, which had already been used greatly while shadowing the convoy submerged, and finally led to their exhaustion and his being compelled to surface.
	(N.I.D. Note. It is interesting to note that "U 357's" tactics in D/C attacks closely resembled those employed by "U 517" while operating in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. (See C.B. 04051 (55), Section X (xviii).)
	The last survivor to leave "U 357" said that Kellner intentionally gave no order to stop the Diesels in order to avoid the British boarding his boat.

	V. SURFACE CRAFT

	"Graf Zeppelin"
	The aircraft-carrier "Graf Zeppelin" has been towed from Gdynia to Kiel, where she is now lying, being fitted with her armament.

	VI. BASES AND TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

	A. Poland

	Gdynia
	Kapitänleutnant Reinhard Hardegen, previously in command of "U 123," is said to be an instructor on the staff of the 23rd Flotilla, based on Gdynia. It is his duty to sail in one of the target ships forming dummy convoys during U-Boat tactical exercises and advise on attack methods.

	Danzig
	The 8th U-Boat Flotilla is based on Danzig, where it acts as a torpedo-firing flotilla.

	B. Germany

	Kiel
	Several prisoners said that Kapitänleutnant Topp, lately in command of "U 552," is now Senior Officer of the 5th U-Boat Flotilla based on Kiel. (N.I.D. Note. This statement should be accepted with reserve until confirmation is forthcoming. The Captain of "U 353" (see C.B. 04051 (53) ) said that Kapitänleutnant Oskar Möhle was Senior Officer in September, 1942. Topp is, however, believed to have relinquished command of "U 552" and to have a staff appointment.)





	______________________


	10

	APPENDIX "A"

	_________

	EARLY HISTORY OF "U 357"

	(i) Launching and Commissioning
	"U 357" was launched from the yards of the Flensburger Gesellschaft at Flensburg in April/May, 1942. Members of her future complement began to be drafted to her from then onwards. Survivors admitted that it was the practice of the Flensberger yard to take great pains in constructing the few boats that the yard turned out every year.
	She was commissioned on 18th June, 1942, when an official celebration was held in the naval barracks on the Ostseebadweg, where her ship's company had been accommodated during the period of building. She was attached to the 5th U-Boat Flotilla, based on Kiel.

	(ii) U.A.K. Trials
	"U 357" left for her U-Boats Acceptance Command (U.A.K.) trials about 23rd June. These lasted for about one month, during which time she lay mostly at Kiel-Wik, with an occasional visit to the yards locally, once to enter the pressure dock at the Deutsche Werke, where she was tested to the regulation equivalent of a depth of 100 m. (328 ft.) On leaving Kiel, she was transferred to the 8th U-Boat Flotilla, based on Danzig.

	(iii) Silent-Running Tests
	"U 357" left Kiel about 24th June for Rönne, where she did the usual silent running tests, remaining for two days.

	(iv) Torpedo Tube Testing
	On 27th July, she arrive at Gdynia for torpedo tube testing with dummy torpedoes. This lasted for about four days.

	(v) "Agru-Front"
	"U 357" arrived at Hela for her "Agru-Front" exercises about 1st August and remained there for one month. Prisoners explained that a number of Engineer Officers boarded her for training during this period. (N.I.D. Note. Survivors from other recently-sunk U-Boats have made similar statements. It seems that the importance of Hela as a training centre is increasing.)
	The Commanding Officer of the "Agru-Front," Kapitänleutnant (Ing,) Suhren, and his second-in-command, Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Müller, both boarded "U 357" during this period.
	Her steepest dive during the "Agru-Front" trials was said to have been at an angle of 45°.

	(vi) Torpedo-Firing Trials
	About 2nd September, "U 357" proceeded to Danzig, where she did three weeks' torpedo-firing trials. A total of about 70 torpedoes was fired.

	(vii) Tactical Exercises
	About 26th September, "U 357" transferred to the 23rd U-Boat Flotilla at Gdynia, from which port she did her tactical exercises in the Baltic for about three weeks.
	Survivors said that Kapitänleutnant Reinhard Hardegen came on board their boat here and accompanied her in one of the target ships forming the dummy convoy on tactical exercises.

	(viii) Final Adjustments
	On her way back to complete final adjustments at Flensburg, "U 357" called at Kiel-Wik for a day.
	She then returned to the Flensburger Schiffsbau Gesellschaft yards for final adjustments, which lasted until about 7th December. The ship's company were given leave in watches. A Midshipman (E) attached to the Flensburger yards here joined "U 357" for training. He was named Oberfähnrich (Ing.) Köwing, and was a "Silberling," the name given to officers of the technical branch, wearing silver instead of gold braid.
	During final adjustments the boat was given a fresh coat of paint, the engines and periscopes were overhauled, the R/T and U/T were removed and the S.B.T. was built in.
	On 8th December, "U 357" sailed for Kiel, where she lay in the Wik harbour. Here she embarked her full outfit of torpedoes, provisions, and was fitted with German Search Receiver. While at the Wik, her ship's company were accommodated on board the depôt ship "St. Louis."


	____________________


	11

	APPENDIX "B"

	_________

	COMPLEMENT OF "U 357"

	(i) Composition
	"U 357's" complement totalled 44, of which five were officers, three C.P.O.'s, 11 P.O.'s and 25 other ratings. Of the ratings, 16 were seamen, four telegraphists and 19 engine-room personnel.

	(ii) Captain
	The Commanding Officer was Kapitänleutnant Adolf Kellner, of the 1935 term. His early career is unknown, apart from the fact that he was under instruction as a U-Boat officer in February, 1941, and put to sea on an operational patrol on 1st November, 1941.
	Survivors said that he had served as First Lieutenant in another U-Boat commanded by a relatively unknown officer.
	Kellner does not appear to have been very experienced or competent, but was popular with his ship's company, who said they admired his coolness when things went wrong. Kellner was married, had one child and lived at Flensburg. He wore the Iron Cross, 2nd Class, and the U-Boat Badge.

	(iii) First Lieutenant
	The First Lieutenant was Oberleutnant zur See Hans Meyer-Storck, about whom little is known. It was his first operational U-Boat patrol. He came from Berlin.

	(iv) Second Lieutenant
	The Second Lieutenant was Leutnant zur See Dornseifer, who was a Rhinelander. Little is known about him.

	(v) Engineer Officer
	The Engineer Officer was Oberleutnant (Ing.) Wilhelm Petersen, stated to be aged over 30 and to be of a more excitable temperament then his brother officers. He was promoted from the lower deck.

	(vi) Midshipman
	"U 357" carried a Midshipman (E) named Oberfähnrich (Ing.) Köwing who joined her during final adjustments at Flensburg. He was of the "Silberlinge" attached to the Flensburg yards, and was carried to gain experience of a Flensburg boat's performance at sea. Survivors said he was heartily sick most of the time and little was seen of him.

	(vii) General
	All survivors said that the atmosphere on board was good. The relationship between officers and men was described as satisfactory.
	A noteworthy feature of this ship's company was its almost complete inexperience. Of the officers, the captain was the only one to have had any previous operational U-Boat experience. Of the ratings, only three of the C.P.O.s and P.O.s had ever served in an operational boat.
	Two new E.R.As, both without any previous U-Boat operational experience, joined "U 357" during final adjustments.





	____________________

APPENDIX "C"

___________

Ship's Company of "U 357"

(i) Survivors:

Name.	Rank.	English Equivalent.	Born.
Fetz, Rudolf	Bootsmannsmaat	Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class	31. 3.19
Kessler, Wilhelm	Maschinenmaat	Mechanician, 2nd Class	19. 2.21
Kasch, Harald(*)	Funkmaat	P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class	12.10.21
Ströder, Rudolf	Mechainkerobergefreiter	Artificer, 1st Class	23.2.22
Thiele, Herbert	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	23. 4.20
Striehn, Heinz	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	5. 2.23
Dohrmann, Kurt	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class	22. 4.23
Lehmann, Gerhard	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class	27. 3.23

(*) Subsequently died in hospital.

Officers	. .	nil
Chief and Petty Officers	. .	3
Men	. .	5
Total		8

(ii) Casualties:

Kellner, Adolf	Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant-Commander.
Meyer-Storck, Hans	Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Petersen, Wilhelm	Oberleutnant (Ing.)	Lieutenant (E).
Dornseifer	Leutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant.
Köwing	Oberfähnrich (Ing.)	Midshipman (E) (Senior Grade).
Wildenhof	Obersteuermann	Chief Q.M., 1st Class.
Böde, Helmut	Obermaschinist	Chief Mechanician, 1st Class.
Hunn, Richard	Obermaschinist	Chief Mechanician, 1st Class.
Gieras, Josef(*)	Bootsmannsmaat	Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class.
Hutterer, Otto	Bootsmannsmaat	Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class.
Volkmann, Wilhelm	Maschinenmaat	Mechanician, 2nd Class.
Iszdonat, Bruno	Maschinenmaat	Mechanician, 2nd Class.
Prange, Heinz	Maschinenmaat	Mechanician, 2nd Class.
Felke, Josef	Maschinenmaat	Mechanician, 2nd Class.
Lehmann, Erich	Funkmaat	P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class.
Heck, Ludwig	Mechanikersmaat	P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class.
Mahnken, Karl-Heinz	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class.
Brodda, Günther	Mechanikerobergefr.	Artificer, 1st Class.
Reichwein, Wilhelm	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Tausendfreund, Arthur	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Müller, Günther	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Stumm, Hans	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Veit, Günther	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Walter, Rudi	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Wagner, Gerhard	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class.
Grünberger, Josef	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Klingbeil, Horst	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Maul, Peter	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Lüling, Hermann	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Schmidt, Hans	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Hirschfeld, Paul	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Treffke, Erwin	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Nehmzow, Rudi	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Riebenstahl, Kurt	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class
Wilhelm,	Funkgefreiter	Ordinary Telegraphist, 1st Class.
Killberg,	Funkgefreiter	Ordinary Telegraphist, 1st Class.

(*) Died and buried at sea.

Officers	. .	5
Chief and Petty Officers	. .	11
Men	. .	20
Total		36

(iii) Total Crew:

Officers	. .	5
Chief and Petty Officers	. .	14
Men	. .	25
Total		44

(C48635) 423 3/43

Click the icons to view the associated records

Return to the British Interrogation Reports page