COPY No.
     
 
This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer
 
     
     
     
 
C.B.  4051 (32)
 
   
     
 
 
 
"U 111"
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interrogation of Survivors
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
 
November, 1941
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

 
 

   
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
     
     
     
     
 
SECRET
  
     
          This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.  
     
          It is intended for the use of the recipients only, and for communication to such Officers under them (not below the rank of Commissioned Officer) who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties.  The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due care and caution.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
     
   
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
C.B.  4051 (32)
 
     
     
 
 
 
"U 111"
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interrogation of Survivors
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
 
November, 1941
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
     
     
     
     
  NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,  
  ADMIRALTY, S.W.1.  
     
  N.I.D. 08409/43.  
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
          The following report is compiled from information derived from prisoners of war.  The statements made cannot always be verified; they should therefore not be accepted as facts unless they are definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
3
  
     
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
_______
 
 
 
       
Page
I.
   Introductory Remarks
5
II.
  Crew of "U 111"
5
III.
 
Early History of "U 111"
7
IV.
   First Cruise of "U 111"
7
V.
   Second and Last Cruise of "U 111"
9
VI.
   Sinking of "U 111"
13
VII.
   Details of "U 111"
15
 
(i)
   General Remarks;  (ii)  Engines;  (iii)  Electric Motors;  (iv)  Rudders;  (v)  Torpedo Tubes;  (vi)  Internal Telephone;  (vii)  Badge;  (viii)  Adoption of "U 111"
16
VIII.
   Other U-Boats
16
 
(i)
   Location of various U-Boats;  (ii)  "U 67";  (iii)  "U 68";  (iv)  "U 107";  (v)  "U 112" to "U 120";  (vi)  "U 205";  (vii)  "U 999 to "U 1000"; (viii)  "U 570"
17
IX.
  
U-Boat Bases and Depôt Ships
19
 
(i)
   Kiel;  (ii)  Pillau);  (iii)  Lorient;  (iv)  La Pallice;  (v)  Bordeaux
20
X.
  
Technical Remarks
20
   
(i)
   Bow Design;  (ii)  Refuelling at Sea;  (iii)  Torpedoes;  (iv)  Transfer of Torpedoes from U-Boat to U-Boat;  (v)  Wiping;  (vi)  W/T;  (vii)  Listening Gear
21
XI.
  
General Remarks on U-Boats
22
   
(i)
   U-Boat Tactics;  (ii)  Torpedo Attacks;  (iii)  Echo-Sounding Gear;  (iv)  Identification of British Submarines and German U-Boats;  (v)  Opinion on British Convoy Tactics;  (vi)  Practice Diving Depths;  (vii)  Advance Information as to Areas of Operations;  (viii)  Training of U-Boat Captains;  (ix)  Training of U-Boat Telegraphists;  (x)  Pay of U-Boat Telegraphists;  (xi)  Sick Bay Attendants in U-Boats;  (xii)  Difficulties of "Wolf Pack" Tactics;  (xiii)  Sabotage to U-Boats;  (xiv)  Dakar;  (xv)  Establishment of Friendly Relations with the German Army
24
XII.
  
Other Ships
24
 
(i)
   Cruiser Admiral Hipper;  (ii)  Cruisers Karlsruhe, Königsberg and Blücher; (iii)  Exchange of the Cruiser Lützow;  (iv)  Training Ships Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein;  (v)  German E-Boats in the Mediterranean;  (vi)  Gunnery School Vessels;  (vii)  S.S. Bremen
25
XIII.
  
General Remarks
25
   
(i)
   Attacking of U.S. Ships;  (ii)  Scuttling Charges in German Merchant Ships;  (iii)  Alleged Capture of British Code Books from a Merchant Ship;  (iv)  New German Charts;  (v)  Bismark's War Diary; (vi)  Grand Admiral Raeder;  (vii)  Fraudulent Transactions of Naval Officers;  (viii)  Periods of Naval Service;  (ix)  New Naval Penal Establishment;  (x)  Ill-treatment of Naval Recruits;  (xi)  Discontent of Regular Ratings;  (xii)  Quarrel between U-Boat Personnel and the Königsberg Police;  (xiii)  Execution of German Deserter;  (xiv)  Death Penalty for Losing Secret Documents;  (xv)  Fracas between Gestapo and U-Boat Personnel;  (xvi)  General Admiral Saalwächter; (xvii)  New Rank Distinction of Fregattenkapitän;  (xviii)  Invasion Exercises in Holland;  (xix)  Call-up of German Women;  (xx)  Mistrust of Germans residing abroad;  (xxi)  Opinion on Italians in Africa;  (xxii)  German Expectations of Reprisals;  (xxiii)  German Fear of Inflation;  (xxiv)  Prohibition of Mention of Goebbels' Scandals;  (xxv)  Captured Petrol Supply in Crete;  (xxvi)  Shortage of Beer, Spirits and Cigarettes;  (xxvii)  Opinion on British Road Defences;  (xxviii)  Herr Severing;  (xxix)  Meteorological Observations;  (xxx)  Requisitioning of Boats from Liners;  (xxxi)  Ex-Merchant Service Officers in German Navy
29
 
     
 
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APPENDIX
  
 
 
 
List of Crew of "U 111"
 
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                      B*  
     
     

 

 
 
 
5
  
 
 
 
INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS  OF "U 111, " A 740-TON U-BOAT, SUNK
                 AT 1023 ON 4th OCTOBER, 1941, IN APPROXIMATE POSITION  
 
               27 ° 15' N. AND 20° 27' W.
 
     
______________________
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
 
     
          The sinking of "U 111" by H.M.S. "Lady Shirley" was the first occasion on which prisoners of war have been captured from a U-Boat operating in the South Atlantic.  Survivors claimed that "U 111" was the first U-Boat to be lost of those operating in that area.  
          As this report indicates later, the crew of "U 111" put up a poor fight and surrendered speedily to their much less powerful adversary.  This fact, taken into consideration in conjunction with the circumstances of the capture of "U 570" and the sinking of "U 501," shows that all three crews gave in quickly when real and obvious determination was encountered.  The previous high morale was, in each case, apparently artificial morale based on propaganda assurances and not on real confidence in the reliability of the men themselves.  
          This inability to surmount a crisis is an encouraging fact and of psychological interest in the examination of Nazi education and naval training.  
     
 
II.  CREW OF "U 111"
 
     
          The complement of "U 111" consisted of four officers, three chief petty officers, fourteen petty officers and thirty ratings; an officer under instruction as a prospective U-Boat Captain was carried in addition, bringing the total up to 52 men.  
          The Captain, the First Lieutenant, the Junior Officer and five ratings were killed in the action with H.M.S. "Lady Shirley."  
          Prisoners stated that, although there were 52 men in "U 111," the normal complement intended for a U-Boat of that size was 43, including officers.  
          The Captain, Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Wilhelm Kleinschmidt 34 years of age and a native of Oldenburg, joined the navy in 1932, but was given two years seniority on account of having formerly served for seven years in the merchant service.  In 1936 and 1937 he served in motor torpedo boats, and in the latter year was promoted to Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant), and commanded a boat of the 1st M.T.B. Flotilla.  Later he served in the cruiser "Königsberg" and as Torpedo Officer in the cruiser "Nürnberg."  He was stated to have been promoted to Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) at the outbreak of war.  He is believed to have transferred to U-Boats some time in the autumn of 1940, and to have taken a U-Boat course of two, or at the most, three months at Pillau; it is presumed, but could not be confirmed, that he went under instruction on a war cruise in another U-Boat.  He was appointed to "U 111" while she was in the final states of construction.  He was killed in the action which resulted in the sinking of his U-Boat.  He was described as having been a most careful U-Boat Captain, and had never before attacked so small a ship as the "Lady Shirley."  His petty officers considered him to have been too old for his job.  
          The officer who acted as Junior Officer on "U 111's" last cruise was Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Friedrich Wilhelm Rösing, about 23 years of age, who was the brother of Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Hans Rösing, formerly the Commanding Officer of the 3rd U-Boat Flotilla.  He was appointed to "U 111" for her last cruise, as the former First Lieutenant, Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Göllnitz, was injured shortly before "U 111" left Lorient; but owing to his complete lack of U-Boat experience Rösing acted as Junior Officer, despite the fact that he was senior to the officer who became First Lieutenant for the last cruise.  Rösing joined the navy in 1936, and was later transferred to the air force; he had been recalled to the navy fairly recently.  It could not be ascertained what U-Boat training this officer had received as he was killed.  
          The First Lieutenant, Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Helmut Fuchs, aged twenty-four years, joined the Navy in 1937.  This officer also lost his life in the action with the "Lady Shirley", and particulars of his U-Boat training could not be obtained.  It was established, however, that "U 111" was the  
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                       B*2  
     
     

 

     
     
 
6
     
  first U-Boat in which he had served, and that he took part in her first cruise as well.  For this reason he was made First Lieutenant, despite his juniority, for "U 111's" second cruise, in place of the former First Lieutenant.  
          The Engineer Officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) (Engineer-Lieutenant) Gunter Wulff, aged twenty-eight years, joined the Navy in 1935.  In 1937 he served in the pocket battleship "Admiral Graf Spee," and later in the cruiser "Königsberg."  He was the most experienced U-Boat officer in "U 111," although he had only made two cruises in a previous U-Boat, and was thus on his fourth cruise when captured.  According to a petty officer survivor, Wulff said that it would have been possible to extricate "U 111" from the action with "Lady Shirley," and that the U-Boat should have been able to make good her escape.  
          The officer under instruction, Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Hans-Joachim Heinecke, aged thirty-four years, was also made prisoner; he joined the Navy in 1936, and specialised in gunnery.  In 1936 and 1937 he was attached to the naval coastal artillery, and in 1938 he served as gunnery officer in the cruiser "Königsberg."  He stated that he volunteered to transfer to U-Boats, and it was established that he took a four-weeks U-Boat course, followed by a "U-Boat Captain's" course of about three weeks, after which he joined "U 111" for her last cruise.  He had expected to be given command of a U-Boat on his return, and believed that he would probably have been appointed to a new U-Boat in the final stages of construction.  
          Of the chief and petty officers and men of "U 111," only five had any previous experience of U-Boats before joining "U 111"; these were the Chief Quartermaster, 1st Class (three cruises in "U 37" and "U 26"), the Chief Mechanician, 1st Class (several previous cruises), the P.O. Telegraphist, 1st Class (one cruise in "U 124"), a Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class (eight cruises in "U 30") and the P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class, in charge of torpedoes (two cruises in "U 100").  Of these five men the P.O. Telegraphist, 1st Class, was not in "U 111" on her first cruise; in fact, only two of these men would have been considered experienced by the standards which obtained in the U-Boat branch of the Navy in the early months of the war.  
          Several ratings were on their first cruise when "U 111" was sunk.  
          Most of the junior ratings had had three or four months' U-Boat training after their initial "infantry" training, but several of them had received no U-Boat training whatsoever.  
          Many men had joined the Navy during the war, the most junior as recently as January, 1941, and had been drafted without option to U-Boats.  
          The morale of the crew was apparently high, but speedily collapsed when a real crisis arose and the Germans realised that they were up against a determined and brave enemy; most of "U 111's" crew gave way to panic, and only the officers, a few petty officers and some ratings showed sufficient courage to put up a strenuous resistance.  
          The Boatswain's Mate, 1st Class, captain of the after gun, was stated to have refused to man his gun and was later bitterly reproached by other petty officers.  This man was pessimistic about the outcome of the war for Germany, and expressed strong criticisms regarding the lack of training and inexperience of the crews manning U-Boats at the present time;  he was formerly in the merchant service, and transferred to the Navy in 1936; his opinion may, therefore, be considered of interest.  
          After the capture of "U 111's" crew, the Boatswain's Mate, 1st Class, counted only twenty-eight men as members of "Lady Shirley's" complement; as the Germans outnumbered the British, this petty officer tried to organise a plan to storm the adjoining quarters of the British crew and to capture the ship; he then intended to sail her to Spain.  But all except one of his companions refused to take part in this plan, which was therefore abandoned.  
          Doubts as to the outcome of the war were expressed more freely and more often than hitherto.  The bogey of a post-war court-martial seems to occupy the minds of prisoners with greater frequency and increasing menace.  There are some signs that fear is gradually replacing loyalty in the attitude of the more thoughtful men towards the Nazi régime.  A few of the more religious prisoners are coming to the conclusion that a war against the churches might mean the end of Germany.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
7
     
 
III.  EARLY HISTORY OF "U 111"
 
     
          "U 111" was a type IXA U-Boat of the 740-ton class, and was the last of the series "U 103" to "U 111" built by the Deschimag Yard, Bremen.  
          She is presumed to have been laid down soon after "U 110," probably early in 1940, and early in November, 1940, the first members of her prospective crew were drafted to stand by the U-Boat in the final stages of construction.  
          Prisoners said that "U 111" was taken from Bremen to Kiel shortly before Christmas, 1940, and was commissioned at Kiel just before New Year, 1941, about two months later than "U 110."  
          She then proceeded to do trials in the Baltic, and was stated to have been based mainly on Gotenhafen and Danzig, but also to have visited Pillau.  She was at Danzig towards the end of February, 1941.  
          Attacks on convoys were practised in conjunction with other U-Boats in the Baltic; but no refuelling from ships at sea was ever carried out there.  
          Prisoners stated that "U 111" returned to Kiel at the end of March, 1941, remained there for one night, and then proceeded through the Kiel Canal to Wilhelmshaven.  A refit of three weeks was carried out at this port; the six torpedo containers on the upper deck were removed during this period.  The U-Boat was then said to have carried out further trials.  
     
 
IV.  FIRST CRUISE OF "U 111"
 
     
          Prisoners stated that "U 111" sailed from Wilhelmshaven during the second week of May, 1941, on her first cruise, proceeding through the North Sea, but not calling at any Norwegian port, the North of the Faroes and Iceland, using deep channels where it was believed that no mines could be laid.  Fourteen torpedoes were said to have been carried, of which six were in the tubes, four under and two above the floor plates forward, and the remaining two in the bilges aft.  Survivors added that "U 111" travelled only at night.  Some drifting mines, however, were sighted.  
          It was claimed that "U 111" sank about 20,000 tons of shipping in the first two or three weeks of her cruise, and after that had no further success.  Many conflicting statements were made on this subject, and it appears that two ships were sunk, and a third damaged if not sunk.  
          The first victim, a steamer estimated at 8,000 tons and proceeding independently, was said to have been sunk during the U-Boat's second week at sea, presumably some time towards the end of May, 1941.  This ship was described as having been torpedoed at a range of 800 metres (875 yards), and it was added that the torpedo was heard to detonate exactly 75 seconds after being fired.  It was stated, but not confirmed, that "U 111" had previously fired a torpedo at this ship, but had missed.  
          Some days later "U 111" and two other U-Boats attacked a convoy of 12 ships off the coast of Greenland, according to prisoners.  They stated that their Captain had made all the necessary calculations, and was about to give the order to fire a torpedo from periscope depth at a 12,000-ton tanker in the middle of the convoy, when this tanker was torpedoed by another U-Boat.  As the following ships was a 10,000-ton tanker on the same course, it was decided to attack her; but Kleinschmidt sighted through his periscope two destroyers approaching from his starboard side; he calculated that he only had half a minute in which to carry out his attack.  Fortunately for the Germans their prey had increased speed, so "U 111" fired a torpedo and dived at once to a considerable depth.  Prisoners believed the angle of diving as being very steep, and added that the forward tanks were flooded, the hydroplanes set, and the motors run at full speed in order to take the U-Boat as deep as possible in the shortest possible time.  Prisoners stated that soon afterwards they heard the explosions of about twenty depth charges, which they believed to have been set to explode at too shallow depths; they assumed that the British could not have believed it possible for the U-Boat to have dived so quickly in such a short space of time.  
          The Germans claimed to have heard the detonation of their torpedo less than a minute after it had left the tube, and they professed to be able to distinguish the explosion of a torpedo from that of a depth charge.  
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                       B**  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
8
     
          Later "U 111" surfaced, and her Captain was stated to have told his men that the torpedoed steamer had not yet sunk, but was on fire.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  This may refer to the attack on Convoy H.X. 126 on 19th and 20th May, 1941.)  
          Prisoners stated that soon afterwards orders were received that all U-Boats in the vicinity were to retire, but that "U 111" was to maintain contact with the convoy, and to give D/F bearings to enable approaching German major units to locate and destroy the entire convoy.  Prisoners claimed that "U 111" continued to transmit D/F bearings as long as she could keep the masts of the ships in sight.  
          It was stated that the battleship "Bismark" and the cruiser "Prinz Eugen" should have carried out this plan, but instead came into contact with, and sank H.M.S. "Hood."  
          Survivors of "U 111" claimed that their U-Boat was then working on the same wave-length as the "Bismark," the "Atlantikwelle" (Atlantic wave-length), and that they therefore intercepted the battleship's signals.  They said that Captain of "Bismark" asked Gross Admiral (Grand Admiral) Raeder for aircraft assistance, and that Raeder signalled back to the effect that aircraft were being sent, and to hold out in the meantime.  
          A later signal was intercepted, according to prisoners, to the effect that the battleship would fight to the last shell, and finally a fragmentary signal that "Bismark" was sinking.  Immediately all the U-Boats in the vicinity were ordered to close the position and search for survivors.  
          Prisoners described having seen hundreds of lifebelts floating about, torn by the rough sea from the bodies of the battleship's crew, and numbers of bodies of men tied to rafts in an attempt to survive.  
          Prisoners confirmed the rescue by another U-Boat of three men (see C.B. 4051 (27), Section 7, paragraph 12), and added that these were young sailors who had joined the Navy in 1940.  
          According to her crew, "U 111" had neither torpedoes nor adequate oil fuel left, and therefore met a tanker from which she received oil.  Prisoners stated that they were told that the tanker was to be recognised by the fact that three sailors without caps would be standing in the bows of the ship.  Some men believed that this tanker was formerly Norwegian, but no definite information was available.  The refuelling was described as having been carried out during daylight hours in a calm sea very far to the North, the tanker proceeding at slow speed, followed by the U-Boat, with the refuelling pipe connecting the two ships.  
          According to a somewhat unreliable account, this tanker was later interrupted by a British submarine in the act of refuelling another U-Boat; the latter dived and the British submarine sank the tanker.  The U-Boat was alleged to have surfaced again when the British had departed, and to have picked up survivors from the tanker.  
          After being refuelled, "U 111" was stated to have patrolled very far to the West, prisoners mentioning Newfoundland and Labrador, and another six weeks were spent at sea, during which time she was employed as a weather reporting ship in the North Atlantic.  The men complained of having spent weeks in a series of fogs, and without sighting any ships.  
          It was stated that on her homeward-bound journey to Lorient "U 111" intercepted a signal from another U-Boat which had sighted a convoy.  
          "U 111" was said to have used almost her last reserve of oil fuel in getting to the position indicated only to find another dense fog; it was therefore decided to proceed to Lorient without further delay.  
          Prisoners stated that "U 111" usually proceeded at full speed while in the "danger zone of aerial reconnaissance," but at other times economised on fuel as much as possible.  
          "U 111" was said to have reached Lorient on a date during the second week of July, 1941, after a cruise of eight or nine weeks.  Half the crew was sent on leave to Germany for two weeks, and, on their return, the other half followed suit; many of them also spent a few days at Carnac.  
          On arrival at Lorient a polar bear and iceberg were painted on the conning tower of "U 111" as a sign that she had been operating in Northern Waters.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
9
     
          "U 111" was placed in dry dock at Lorient for overhaul, and during this time four upper deck torpedo containers were replaced, two forward and one each side of the conning tower.  
          Prisoners regretted that new machinery was not required by their U-Boat, as otherwise the period in dock would have been extended to three months.  
          The day before "U 111" left on her second and last cruise, the First Lieutenant, Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Göllnitz injured his finger so badly that he could not take part in the cruise, and was therefore succeeded by the Junior officer, Fuchs, whose duties were undertaken at short notice by the totally inexperienced Rösing.  
          As late as 15th August, 1941, it was generally believed by the crew that "U 111" was to carry out a cruise to the North; but on the morning of 16th August, 1941, it was announced that "U 111" would cruise to the Azores.  This order, however, was cancelled two hours before the U-Boat was due to sail, and various provisions already taken on board had to be exchanged for others required for a cruise to the tropics.  
     
 
V.  SECOND AND LAST CRUISE OF "U 111"
 
     
          Prisoners stated that "U 111" left Lorient on her second and last cruise on 16th August, 1941.  On the first night out the fine weather gave way to rain; it was pitch dark, according to the petty officer on watch, when "U 111" just escaped being hit by a torpedo.  The Captain ordered the helm to be put over to hard-a-starboard only just in time.  
          "U 111" proceeded to the vicinity of Freetown, and then westwards to the area off the mouth of the Amazon.  Prisoners claimed to have reached a position 500 miles south of the Equator.  
          The U-Boat was said to have carried on this cruise eighteen torpedoes, of which six were in the torpedo tubes, four in the bilges and two on the floor plates forward, two in the bilges aft, and four in the upper deck containers.  
          Prisoners claimed to have sunk two ships on this cruise, the first being described as a ships with a Dutch name, of about 10,000 tons, proceeding independently, torpedoed during the day; it was added that four torpedoes were fired, two of which hit the target.  The ship was described as having sunk very rapidly, the crew barely had time to launch their boats.  
          Prisoners said that "U 111" then surfaced, closed the boats, and gave the survivors provisions, including chocolate, cigarettes and brandy.  
          Although the ship had a Dutch name, prisoners did not believe that she was in point of fact Dutch.  They stated that this ship was sunk about 10 or 12 days before their second victim.  As the identity and date of sinking of the latter is known, the date of sinking of the Dutch ship should be between 8th and 12th September, 1941.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The Dutch S.S. "Marken," 7,719 tons, was sunk at 2053 on 10th September, 1941, in position 01° 36' N. and 36° 55' W.  She was bound from Cardiff to Capetown via Trinidad and carried aircraft.)  
          The next ships sunk was described as a fairly fast British ship of about 8,000 tons, proceeding independently and bound for England.  Prisoners stated that two attacks were made on this ship.  During the first attack three torpedoes were fired all of which missed and about five hours later a second attack was made.  Two torpedoes were fired, both of which hit the target; the ship was described as having sunk very quickly.  Both attacks took place at night, and it was very dark.  Later the U-Boat closed a raft carrying survivors, gave them some provisions and asked what their cargo had been.  Prisoners said that they were told that machinery parts had been carried and that the ship had been bound for Great Britain.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  This was the British S.S. "Cingalese Prince," sunk on 20th September, 1941, in 02° S. and 25° 30' W.)  
          Prisoners said that no other ships were sighted and "U 111" with only sufficient oil fuel to return to her base, was ordered by the Vice-Admiral U-Boats to rendezvous with "U 68," Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Merten, and to transfer torpedoes to the latter; this meeting was to take place off the  
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                       B**2  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
10
     
  island of San Antonio, in the Cape Verde group, and the U-Boats were ordered to be at the position indicated, with only their periscopes visible at first.  Later, apparently on the next evening after meeting "U 68," "U 111" was to rendezvous in the same place with "U 67," Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Mueller, believed to have been outward bound for an extended cruise, in order to transfer from the latter, for passage to the base, a P.O. Telegraphist suffering from V.D.  
          The meeting with "U 68" occurred as arranged about 200 metres from the shore.  According to an unconfirmed account given by a boatswain's mate, 2nd Class, who might have been on duty on the bridge, a very dark-skinned man rowed out in a boat and asked if they were Americans; on receiving a denial the man rowed ashore but returned with a sealed envelope; he was then sent away again.  "U 111" then transferred the four torpedoes in her upper deck containers to "U 68," the operation taking about two hours, and being accomplished only with the greatest difficulty.  One and a half hours were occupied in rigging a derrick, which was stowed near the containers on the upper deck.  The transfer of the torpedoes from the interior of the U-Boat proved too difficult, and, in any case, Kleinschmidt wished to retain some torpedoes for any victims he might meet on his homeward cruise.  
          "U 111" was said to have cast off from "U 68" at 0300 and to have proceeded to leave the bay; after an interval "U 111" stopped and waited for "U 68" as the two U-Boats were supposed to leave at the same time.  
          As "U 68" did not join her within a short time, "U 111" proceeded; Kleinschmidt, Rösing and the boatswain's mate, 2nd class, mentioned above, were on the bridge.  According to the latter they saw a shadow which they thought might be a Portuguese destroyer, and then made out a large British submarine estimated at 1,800 tons, the submarine then glimmered white, and was in fact described by a prisoner as showing up "snow-white" and very clearly indeed.  
          "U 111" was stated to have been heading straight towards the submarine, and Kleinschmidt appeared not to have known what to do, to have lost his head and ordered his boat to crash-dive; the boatswain's mate thought this course particularly dangerous as the opening of the vents inevitably causes so much noise.  
          H.M. Submarine "Clyde" had arrived in position 20 miles off West Point, San Antonio, at 1400 N. on 27th September, 1941.  To avoid any possibility of being sighted it had been decided to approach land submerged.  "Clyde" accordingly dived, steered towards Tarrafal Bay and surfaced at dark 7 miles west of the bay.  There was fairly bright moonlight, but a remarkably thick haze, and  the visibility towards the land was exceptionally poor, while that to seaward was good against a light horizon.  It was at once obvious that the bay could not be approached for examination without great risk of "Clyde's" being seen long before she could see anything that might have been in the bay.  It was therefore decided to patrol between West Point and South Point until moonset and then to investigate the bay close inshore.  
          Faint flickering lights were observed more or less continuously all along the shore of the bat and at higher levels and were assumed to come from fishing boats and huts.  Nothing resembling signalling could be seen.  It was noted with surprise that the light on West Point was not being exhibited.  
          This light is unwatched and remained unlit throughout "Clyde's" patrol.  
          Moonset was at 0024 and at 0030 "Clyde" stopped in a position three miles to seaward of the bay pointing towards it and keeping a hydrophone watch.  Hydrophone effect was reported on the starboard bow drawing aft and 224 revolutions were counted.  Almost immediately a U-Boat was sighted just clearing South Point and "Clyde" went ahead to turn to the firing course for a bow salvo.  Interrogation of survivors of "U 111" indicated that this U-Boat was most probably "U 68" leaving the bay.  About a minute later another U-Boat, which proved to have been "U 111," was sighted close on the port beam with "Clyde" 30° on her starboard bow.  
          "Clyde," being in an extremely vulnerable position both the torpedo fire and ramming, was compelled to break off her attack on "U 68" to attend to "U 111."  It was assumed by "Clyde's" Captain that the latter U-Boat would be in doubt as to whether "Clyde" was a hostile of a friendly craft; "Clyde's" wheel was put hard to port and she went full speed ahead to ram, and ordered gun action.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
11
     
          A few seconds later, however, at the moment when it became evident to the British that "Clyde" could never get round in time, "U 111" altered course away and her main vents were seen and heard to be opened.  
          It was this crash dive which "U 111's" experienced petty officers subsequently criticised so severely.  
          "U 111" was seen to dive at a speed which astonished the Captain of "Clyde."  As the bow of the British submarine passed over "U 111," the wash of the U-Boat's conning tower was seen on one side and the wash of her propellers on the other.  It was estimated by "Clyde's Captain that the keel of his submarine missed the U-Boat by a matter of inches.  
          "U 111" had disappeared before "Clyde's" gun could be brought into action.  "Clyde'" bow caps and watertight doors had been shut as she was turning to ram "U 111."  
          The survivors of "U 111" while appreciating that thy had had a close shave, did not realise how nearly they were rammed or that "Clyde" passed immediately over their U-Boat.  
          "Clyde" then turned back to follow "U 68" of which she had lost sight, and sighted her to the Westward steering North-West.  
          The U-Boat seemed to be trying to make a signal but her light was very dim and quite unreadable.  "Clyde" steadied on a firing course and at 0037-1/2 fired a bow salvo of six torpedoes on a 130 track at a range of about 1,400 yards.  As the second torpedo went, "U 68" was observed altering course away, so "Clyde" altered slightly to port an fired the remainder fanwise, the last torpedo being straight at the U-Boat.  
          "Clyde's wheel was then put hard to port to bring the stern tubes to bear, "U 68" turned at least 180° after which she disappeared completely and was presumed to have dived.  
          At 0048 "Clyde" dived to reload torpedoes and tried in vain to establish contact; neither were submerged signals between U-Boats nor any H.E. heard.  
          Eighteen and twenty-one minutes respectively after "Clyde" had fired her first torpedo, two moderately distant explosions were heard.  
          It was established by interrogation that no torpedoes were fired by any German U-Boat in the area on that occasion.  Survivors of "U 111" firmly denied that their U-Boat had fired any torpedoes, and they claimed to have intercepted signals on the following day from "U 68" and "U 67" to the Vice-Admiral U-Boats to the effect that neither of these U-Boats had fired any torpedoes.  
          It would appear that the suggestion made by the captain of "Clyde" is correct, namely that the explosion may have been his torpedoes exploding on the bottom, having sunk in about 800 fathoms.  Survivors of "U 111" stated that, after their narrow escape from "Clyde," their U-Boat made off submerged for about two hours, then surfaced and proceeded as far to the West as possible.  
          Having reloaded torpedo tubes and not having established contact, "Clyde" surfaced at 0215 .  
          At 0315, with two hours of darkness left, a charge was necessary and was started.  
          At 0330 "Clyde" was four miles West of the position in which the first encounter took place, steering 280° at 10 knots, charging.  
          The sky was overcast and the night had become pitch dark; there was a strong wind blowing and some sea.  
          A streak of white foam was seen broad on the starboard bow and the wheel was put hard to starboard towards.  A few seconds later the conning tower of a U-Boat was sighted and her course was estimated to be similar and parallel; it was evident that she had only just surfaced.  "Interrogation of survivors of "U 111" established the fact that this U-Boat was "U 67," whom "U 111" was to have met on the next night.  "Clyde's" telegraphs were put to full speed ahead and gun action ordered.  As the ship began to swing to starboard it was seen that the U-Boat was on a much more converging course than had at first been estimated and that she was turning towards "Clyde" and closing very rapidly.  
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                       B**3  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
12
     
          It immediately became obvious to "Clyde's" captain that he could never get round in time to ram the U-Boat and that he would be rammed amidships himself unless he could dive fast enough.  The wheel was put amidships, the gun's crew and all hands were ordered below, and the captain was about to press the Klaxons, when he realised that a collision could not be avoided and that his ship would stand a better chance on the surface with the engines kept at full speed.  
          "U 67" struck "Clyde" right aft on No. 7 torpedo tube.  Her sloping bow rode up slightly, but she very quickly went ahead again and passed under "Clyde's" stern.  As she did so, her main vents were heard to open and she was soon lost to sight.  
          "Clyde's" captain subsequently greatly regretted having previously ordered his gun's crew and Lewis gunners below, as it was not possible to get them closed up again in time to open fire before the U-Boat disappeared.  
          Five minutes later, after it had been ascertained that the damage sustained was not serious, "Clyde" dived to endeavour to regain contact.  She continued to patrol submerged and to sweep for U-Boats for the next eight hours; she steered to seaward in the hope that they would be doing the same thing and might surface to proceed away on their engines.  
          No contact was made, however, and at 1120 "Clyde" transmitted an enemy report, as her presence was already known to the enemy, and as a report on the situation was considered more important than the maintenance of W/T silence.  
          Prisoners from "U 111" intercepted the following day a signal from "U 67" to the Vice-Admiral U-Boats, reporting:  "Rammed a British submarine while taking avoiding action."  This or a subsequent signal also reported that "U 67" had suffered considerable damage to her bow which had become twisted and that the caps of her forward torpedo tubes had been buckled; prisoners deduced from the report that the British submarine had not been seriously damaged.  As ordered "U 111" reported 24 hours after her rendezvous with "U 68" that she had completed the operation successfully; the also reported the mysterious explosions which they had heard.  
          Shortly afterwards the Vice-Admiral U-Boats asked how many torpedoes "U 67," "U 68" and "U 111" had left.  Reports were made, after which "U 68" having intercepted that torpedoes and particularly fuel oil be transferred from "U 67" to "U 68."  
          Survivors from "U 111" stated that this transfer was also carried out; they added that, as "U 67" was obliged to return to her base, it was no longer necessary for "U 111" to rendezvous with her to receive the sick P.O. telegraphist.  The officer under instruction in "U 111" claimed that he heard from intercepted signals, a day or two before his boat was sunk, that is to say about 2nd or 3rd October, 1941, that "U 67" had met "U 68" close in to the coast of French Morocco and had successfully transferred torpedoes and oil fuel.  
          The captain of "U 111" was stated to have heard that a 9,000-ton ship, damaged by torpedo, was lying 400 miles West of Las Palmas, and that a tug had been sent to her assistance.  He decided to sink the damaged ship if he could find her, as she lay more or less on his homeward route.  
          Prisoners stated that during 2nd-3rd October, 1941, "U 111" cruised up and down looking for this ship.  
          On the night of 3rd-4th October, 1941, "U 111" sighted a dim shadow, but did not pause to investigate, and proceeded.  
          (N.I.D. Note. This was probably "Silver Belle" torpedoed in Convoy S.I. 87 on 22nd September, 1941, in position 25° 31' N. and 23° 47' W.  As no assistance appeared to be forthcoming she was abandoned on 29th September, but it was expected that she would remain afloat for several days.)  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
13
     
 
VI.  SINKING OF "U 111"
 
     
          At 0840, 4th October, 1941, H.M. Trawler "Lady Shirley's" masthead lookout reported an object bearing green 30 right on the horizon.  The officer on watch went to the crow's nest to examine this object and thought that it might be a merchant ship's funnel from behind the horizon.  But as it was considered possible that the object might be a U-Boat's conning tower at a distance of about ten miles, course was altered from 270° to 360° to close and investigate.  The object disappeared after a short time, but course 326° (N.20W.) was continued on the off chance of it being a U-Boat which had dived.  
          The Captain of "U 111," with the idea of the reported 9,000-ton damaged ship still uppermost in his mind, was subsequently considered by his crew to have mistaken the approaching "Lady Shirley" for a much bigger ship at a greater distance, and dived too late.  
          At 1004 "Lady Shirley" obtained an echo, classified as submarine, bearing Red 30, range about 1,600 yards.  Action stations were immediately rung, and course altered to N.50W., the bearing of the echo.  Ship's position was then 27° 15' N. and 20° 27' W.  
          The range rapidly shortened, inclination closing being noted, target moving slowly left.  Course was altered to N.60W.  Target then remained steady for a short while, then moved slowly right.  Course was, therefore, altered back to N.50W., and remained steady on the bearing during the remainder of the run.  Chronoscope and stop-watch had been obtained, and the rapidly closing range was noted at 1200, 800, 600, 200 and 100 yards.  The stop-watch was then started and firing of pattern was done from stop-watch.  
          In "U 111" the sounds of "Lady Shirley's" propellers were heard, and Kleinschmidt at first estimated that the British ship was about 5,000 metres (about 5,467 yards) distant.  
          The Junior Officer and the man at the listening gear were stated to have expressed surprise and to have queried Kleinschmidt's estimate, as they were of the opinion that their enemy was much closer.  
          A little later Kleinschmidt estimated that the British ship was 3,000 metres (about 3,280 yards) distant.  The man at the hydrophones at once questioned this statement as he thought that the distance was about 500 metres (547 yards) only; but Kleinschmidt somewhat irritably repeated his estimate of 3,000 metres.  It was emphatically stated that Kleinschmidt looked through the periscope just before making this statement; prisoners assumed that either something was wrong with the periscope or Kleinschmidt clung to his conviction that his adversary was a much larger ship at a much greater distance than was actually the case.  
          A few moments later the explosions of depth charges were heard.  
          The pattern dropped by "Lady Shirley" was first and third, set to explode at 350 feet, the second and fourth to explode at 150 feet, the throwers having been adjusted to 250 feet, the last charge, however, jammed in the rails, and did not drop.  
          Prisoners stated that not much damage was done in "U 111," said to have been at a depth of only about 13 metres (43 ft.); the lighting was not affected, but some water was stated to have entered aft.  
          Kleinschmidt appears to have lost his head, and first to have ordered the U-Boat to surface, and the guns' crews to man their guns.  The Diesels were started, but almost immediately ceased to function and the engine room filled with dense smoke; this was attributed to the rise of the water entering aft.  Kleinschmidt was informed that the Diesels were out of action, and then without waiting to confirm or assess the alleged damage to the Diesels, he ordered the U-Boat to dive again.  But this order came too late as the U-Boat had surfaced and was being shelled.  So Kleinschmidt threw open the conning tower hatch, and hastily clambered out, followed by Rösing, Fuchs, the petty officer who was to man the 20 mm. (0.79 in.) machine gun on the bridge, and the crew of the forward 10.5 cm. (4.1 in.) gun.  Prisoners stated that apparently Kleinschmidt, underestimating "Lady Shirley's" prowess, now intended to keep her at a respectful distance by gunfire, if he could not sink her, while "U 111's" Diesels were got into action, and then to make good his escape on the surface.  
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                       B**4  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
14
     
          As the U-Boat's periscope was seen rising just clear of the water disturbed by the explosions of the depth charges, "Lady Shirley's" wheel was put hard to port to enable her 4 in. gun to bear, and, if necessary, to enable her to ram the U-Boat.  The Telegraphist was ordered to send out an enemy report.  
          As "U 111's conning tower rose "Lady Shirley" opened fire with her 0.5 in. gun and Hotchkiss at a range of about 500 yards; her 4 in. gun then opened fire.  
          "U 111" opened fire with her 20 mm. (0.79 in.) machine gun, and killed instantly "Lady Shirley's" gunlayer, who was hit in the stomach by an explosive bullet; his position was at once taken over by Sub-Lieutenant French, R.N.R., and the 4 in. gun never faltered in its fire.  
          The Captain of "U 111's" forward gun's crew was the first man to jump down off the conning tower on to the deck, with the intention of manning his gun; he was followed by the rest of the gun's crew.  
          Prisoners stated that "Lady Shirley's" first founds fell 40 to 50 metres (about 43 to 53 yards) short, but that several direct hits were scored afterwards.  
          Apart from the damage caused by machine-gun bullets, prisoners knew of only two hits by shell-fire.  One struck before and below the conning tower, exploded, but did not penetrate the pressure hull.  The second shell struck the base of the periscope in the conning tower and twisted the torpedo hatch cover.  It was this shell which killed members of the crew in the conning tower.  The Germans passed shells to the forward gun's crew through the hole torn in the side of the conning tower.  But the first round placed in the forward gun could not be rammed home and was jammed; prisoners assumed that it had been damaged while being passed up through the conning tower and out through the hole torn by the British shell.  
          Failure to load the forward gun was reported and the uninterrupted and effective fire kept up by "Lady Shirley" hit two men of "U 111's" forward gun's crew, prevented ammunition being passed out, and sent the remaining three men scurrying back; of the two casualties, one man had a leg blown off and the other was less seriously wounded.  
          The petty officer manning "U 111's" machine gun on the bridge had fired fifty rounds at this juncture, and was firing the second clip of ammunition handed to him by Kleinschmidt himself, when the latter, together with Rösing and Fuchs, was killed by a direct hit on the conning tower; the above petty officer was the only man left alive on the bridge out of the eight who had been there.  He stated that Kleinschmidt, on being hit, fell forwards into the open conning tower hatch on to the platform below, where his body lay sprawled across the opening into the control room.  
          Just before he was killed Kleinschmidt had called to Heinecke, the officer under instruction, to come up on the bridge, but Heinecke was in the engine room where an attempt was being made to get the Diesels working; this was only partly successful, and the Diesels were said to have been started and to have reached 500 revolutions, when they ceased to function, and the engine room filled with dense smoke; prisoners attributed this state to the rise of water entering aft.  Prisoners did not know whether a shell had penetrated the engine room, it was suggested that the smoke in the engine room may have been produced by the Diesel, and could not escape since the exhausts were closed.  They added that "U 111" never recovered level trim after the depth charging.  Many survivors later severely criticised the crew of the after gun, who were stated to have been ordered to man their gun at an early stage of the action, but who never attempted to carry out this order; the captain of this gun's crew was said to have feigned indifference to the entire proceedings, and his attitude was interpreted as cowardice.  An ominous forecast was made regarding his fate at the hands of the inevitable German court-martial expected after the end of the war.  
          A state of panic existed inside the U-Boat, and after the initial failure of the Diesels, Heinecke ordered the crew, who had already donned their lifebelts, to abandon ship.  The remaining men on deck threw up their hands and cried out that they surrendered.  
          "U 111's" Engineer Officer was said to have opened the vents to ensure the sinking of the U-Boat.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
15
     
          At the same time it was evident to the British that the U-Boat was losing speed and rapidly sinking by the stern.  "Lady Shirley" therefore ceased fire, and the remainder of "U 111's" crew came out on deck at 1019.  
          Four minutes later "U 111" sank stern first, the crew taking to the water.  
          The whole action had lasted only nineteen minutes from the time "Lady Shirley" obtained the echo at 1004 until "U 111" sank at 1023.  
          Whilst survivors were then picked up, one of whom, the man whose leg had been blown off, died that evening; of the remaining forty-four, two were seriously and two were slightly wounded.  
          Of "Lady Shirley's" crew, in addition to the gun-layer who was killed as stated above, Signalman J. H. Warbrick on the bridge was hit and his thigh-bone broken, and Seamen S. Halcrow and W. Windsor were also hit, but fought their Hotchkiss guns until the action was over, when they had to be carried below.  The ship herself sustained some damage, which was, however, not serious; a steam pipe forward on the well deck was hit, and caused steam to fly everywhere forward; the supply from the engine, however, was cut off quickly.  A number of steam and water pipes were burst, and a fire was started by incendiary bullets in the provision store; this was put out after the action.  Two depth charges were penetrated by bullets, and had to be thrown over the side.  Numerous other minor items of damage to glass, woodwork, fittings and boat were sustained from bullets, but did not effect the seagoing efficiency.  
          At 1130A "Lady Shirley" shaped course to return to Gibraltar.  
     
 
VII.  DETAILS OF "U 111"
 
     
  (i)  General Remarks  
          Since "U 111" was of the same type as "U 110," the particulars given in C.B. 4051 (23) on page 12 apply to both boats.  
          According to the survivors of "Clingalese Prince," "U 111" appeared to be painted grey, and the paintwork was in good condition.  Prisoners stated that no attempt had been made to camouflage the U-Boat.  
          It was stated that "U 111" had no special armament against bombing attacks.  
          The wooden deck was said to have been covered with tin in some places.  
          The life-saving arrangements consisted of a folding dinghy and an inflatable raft.  
          It was denied that "U 111" carried a telephone-buoy.  
     
  (ii)  Engines  
          "U 111" was stated to have been fitted with two 9-cylinder 4-cycle M.A.N. Diesels.  The surface cruising speed was given as twelve knots.  
     
  (iii)  Electric Motors  
          The Electric Motors were stated to have been built by Siemens, and developed 500 h.p. each.  
     
  (iv)  Rudders  
          It was stated that "U 111" had twin rudders, although these are not always fitted to U-Boats of the same class.  Prisoners had seen several similar U-Boats in dry dock; some of these had a single, but larger, rudder.  
     
  (v)  Torpedo Tubes  
          It was stated that "U 111's" torpedo tubes had been built by Pinsch.  
     
  (vi)  Internal Telephone  
          It was stated that "U 111's" internal telephone was operated without the use of batteries.  
     
  (C43393)                                                                                                                       B***  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
16
     
  (vii)  Badge  
          "U 111" had a black heart painted on the conning tower.  It was known that similar recognition marks are painted on U-Boats exercising in the Baltic, and survivors confirmed that this device had not been painted out, or replaced by another badge, as it was considered a particularly suitable emblem by the Captain of "U 111" who had recently become engaged, and had expected to marry on his return from the last cruise.  On arrival at Lorient after the first cruise, a polar bear and iceberg were painted on the conning tower, as a sign that she had been operating in Northern Waters.  
     
  (viii)  "Adoption" of "U 111"  
          Prisoners stated that "U 111" had been "adopted" by the town of Oldenburg.  
     
 
VIII.  OTHER U-BOATS
  
     
  (i)  Location of various U-Boats  
 
U-Boat.
Date.
Remarks.
"U 43"
August, 1941
Left Lorient for cruise during first half of August.
"U 75"
1941
 Exercising in Baltic with "U 111" during first three months.
"U 105"
July, 1941
Arrived Lorient end July, 1941.  Still there in the middle of August.
"U 106"
10th August, 1941
Left Lorient on a cruise.  Due to return during 2nd weeks of October, 1941.
"U 108"
August, 1941
In Lorient between middle of July, 1941, and middle of August, 1941.
"U 109"
1941
 Doing trials in the Baltic during first three months of 1941.
"U 125"
July, 1941
Under repair in dock at Lorient about end of July or early in August, 1941.
"U A"
July, 1941
Said to have been in Lorient in July or August, 1941.
"U 201"
August to October, 1941
 Stated to have been operating between 16th August and early October, 1941.
"U 271"
"
"
"U 402"
"
"
or
"U 434
"
"
"U 553"
"
"
"U 557"
"
"
"U 559"
"
"
"U 573"
"
"
 
     
  (ii)  "U 67"  
          The Commanding Officer of "U 67" was stated to be Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Müller, who had formerly been at the Torpedo School at Flensburg.  One of the other officers was Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Siegfried Keller.  
          The encounter of "U 67" with H.M.S. "Clyde" was mentioned earlier in this report.  
     
  (ii)  "U 68"  
          The meeting of "U 68" with "U 111" was mentioned earlier in this report.  
          Prisoners from "U 111" stated, however, that not long before the rendezvous with "U 111" "U 68" had attacked a convoy coming from Gibraltar, and had fired two torpedoes; it was claimed that she sank 25,000 tons of shipping on that occasion.  
          "U 68" was stated to have the coat of arms of Danzig painted on her conning tower; these arms are known to consist of a red shield bearing two gold Maltese crosses surmounted by a gold coronet.  It was added that "U 68" had another badge as well.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
17
     
  (iv)  "U 107"  
          This U-Boat is known to be commanded by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Hessler, who, according to prisoners, is the son-in-law of Vizeadmiral (Vice-Admiral) Dönitz, commanding U-Boats.  Prisoners claimed that Hessler was one of the few U-Boat commanders who had achieved a very high total of tonnage sunk on a single cruise, having sunk 92,000 tons on one cruise.  This claim may refer to the statement made by the German radio on 30th June, 1941, to the effect that, within a period of almost three and a half months, Hessler had sunk fourteen ships totalling 90,272 tons; other German accounts described these sinkings as having been very far to the South and a long way from home.  (See C.B. 4051 (27), page 13).  An earlier German claim of 1st May, 1941, presumably also refers to the same cruise.  (See C.B. 4051(23), page 28).  
          It would thus appear that "U 107" left soon after the middle of March, 1941, on an extended cruise to the South Atlantic, and returned at the end of June, 1941, having achieved the alleged sinkings of over 90,000 tons of shipping on this cruise.  
          The broadcast of 30th June, 1941, giving Hessler's grand total of sinkings as eighteen ships, totalling 111,272 tons, indicated that he had sunk four ships amounting to 21,000 tons on a previous cruise or cruises.  
     
  (v)  "U 112" to "U 120"  
          Prisoners believed that this series comprised a new type of large U-Boat of which at least one had been completed, and resembled "U.A.", the 1,000-ton ex-Turkish "Batiray."  It was stated that prospective Captains for two of these large U-Boats were Korvettenkapitäne (Commanders) von Schmidt and Hans-Werner Neumann.  
     
  (vi)  "U 205"  
          The German High Command communiqué of 15th November, 1941, claimed that two U-Boats commanded by Kapitänleutnante (Lieutenants-Commander) Reschke and Guggenberger had attacked a formation of British warships in the Western Mediterranean, and had sunk the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal," and so severely damaged the battleship "Malaya" that she had to be towed into Gibraltar harbour.  Other British units were said to have been hit by torpedoes.  
          Reschke is known to command "U 205."  
          Gruggenberger is believed to have been on his second cruise as a U-Boat Captain at the time, but it is not known which U-Boat he commands.  
     
  (vii)  "U 999" and "U 1000"  
          "U 999" and "U 1000" were mentioned as being large U-Boats built at Bremen; the captains were said to be respectively Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Henne, and Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Hebestreit.  
     
  (viii)  "U 570" (H.M.S. "Graph").  State of the Boat when abandoned  
          (Report by Commanding Officer)  
          (i)  Damage attributable to Depth Charges  
                  (a)  Hull  
                         The hull has not yet been examined in dry dock, but it is known that there is a split about 2 in. in length in the port side amidships (opening into No. 3 tauchzelle - an internal main ballast tank); the bow casing is crumpled slightly on each side; the there are holes in the forward main ballast tank.  There are also minor leaks from the seams of internal oil fuel tanks into the submarine.  Most of the Kingstons are damaged or strained, but whether by depth charges or by grounding is not known.  
                  (b)  Batteries  
                          In the forward tank 21 cells out of 62 are cracked, all the damage being on the starboard side.  In the after tank 26 cells are cracked, the damage being mainly on the starboard side and in the two corners of the port side.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
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                  (c)  Supply to Lighting and Auxiliaries  
                          These circuits are fed from two pairs of 500 amp. fuses (one pair being on each of the two battery supply switches).  The concussion had broken one fuse holder on each supply, allowing the fuse to drop out; this at once cut off all the lighting and deprived every auxiliary machine of its power.  
                  (d)  Supply to Main Motors  
                          The battery supply switches to the main motor switchboards jumped off, but were undamaged.  
                  (e)  Other Damage  
                          Remaining damage by the depth charges was slight and consisted of:     
                                  Several broken gauge glasses to trimming and fresh water tanks.  
                                  Several lights broken.  
                                  Some of the more delicate electrical gear broken (automatic voltage regulators, etc.).  
                                  About four fuse boxes sprung open and porcelain heads of fuses broken.  
                                  A few minor bracket welds sheared.  
                                  A shallow depth gauge in control room damaged.  
                                  In engine room many glass domes over oil strainers broken.  
          (ii)  Summary of Damage  
                  There is nothing in the hull damage which would make it impossible, or even difficult, to dive the U-Boat.  Similarly the cracked cells in the batteries, although they would have caused a lot of trouble later, would not at the time have prevented the U-Boat from diving.  
                  None of the other damage is of a nature to interfere with the diving of the U-Boat  
          (iii)  Steps taken by Crew to Overcome Damage  
                  The German crew appear to have taken no steps whatever to cope with the situation caused by the depth charges.  
                  The supply to the main motors could have been restored at once by re-making the battery supply switches.  This was not done.  
                  The supply to the lighting and auxiliaries could have been restored:  
                  (a)  In a few minutes by lashing up the broken fuse holders, and then replacing the fuses.  This was done by P.O. Patterson and his repairs answered admirably.  
              or (b)  In a few seconds by operating the change-over switches which give these circuits an alternative supply from the main motor switchboards.  (To do this the battery supply switches must first be made.)  Apparently no attempt was made to do this.  
                  The secondary lighting hand-lamps had been switched on and left run down.  
                  No attempt had been made to put the steering or 'planes in hand.  
                  H.P. air had been so lavishly used that only 30 atms. remained in three (out of six) groups.  
                  The German crew reported that the after part of the U-Boat was full of chlorine gas and they had in fact shut off the after control room bulkhead and ventilation valves.  No trace of gas was noted, nor was there reason to suppose that there had ever been salt water in the after battery.  (It is possible that the Germans merely "invented" the gas as an inducement to the British to rescue them quickly.)  
          (iv)  Steps taken by the Crew to Sink their Ship and Destroy Gear  
                  No scuttling charges were placed.  
                  In the engine room the cover had been removed from a strainer in the circulating water system so that, by opening the main inlet, the engine room would have rapidly flooded.  It is possible that some flooding was carried out by this means for there was a large quantity of water in this compartment; on the other hand this may have been entirely due to a leak caused by the muffler valves being unseated by concussion (the muffler valve drains being open).  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
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                  There was no other evidence of an attempt to sink the U-Boat.  
                  Considering that the crew remained on board for over 24 hours after surrendering they succeeded in doing remarkably little damage to the U-Boat.  
                  The sabotage was chiefly in the wireless room, where many valves were smashed as well as the panels of the sets.  The hydrophone panel in the control room was also smashed but not completely.  
                  The attack instrument (fruit machine) in the conning tower was damaged by hammer blows on the dials.  
                  The Anschutz was damaged by unscrewing the pivots of the gimbals and allowing the compass to fall to the bottom of its casing.  The damage was easily repaired in "Halca."  
                  The dials of the deep diving gauges in the control room and conning tower were defaced and damaged; the deep gauges in the fore and after ends are similar but were untouched.  
                  The forward periscope was lowered into its well and the well filled with water and oil.  A binocular attachment on this periscope was removed and thrown overboard.  
                  No other damage has been discovered.  
          (v)  Maintenance of the U-Boat by the German Crew  
                  Although the U-Boat was practically brand new there were already signs that the crew had not been skilful in upkeep and maintenance work.  These points are here summarised:  
                  (a)  The engines were found to be considerably out of tune.  
                  (b)  The Junkers Diesel air compressor had several defects and was not in running order.  
                  (c)  The slip to release the towing pendant has a wire pull to operate it from the bridge; as rigged this wire would not have released the slip.  
                  (d)  The eye piece on the towing pendant was deplorable.  It was spliced as a soft eye with only one tuck, then slipped over the thimble and seized up close with seizing wire to make it look convincing.  
                  (e)  One cell in the after battery was not strapped up.  Of the five straps each side the studs had been left off from three on one side and two on the other.  The bad contacts so caused had melted the bolts and straps.  
                  (f)  The main batteries were poorly maintained.  The strap terminals were not vaselined, and cells needed wiping over.  
                  (g)  The spare torpedoes in the crew space were not properly secured, and the four lower torpedoes had slipped forward against some grease drums stowed in the "trenches" and stove in the drums.  
          (vi)  Conclusions  
                  It would appear that the Germans surrendered their ship under the impression that she was more badly damaged then she in fact was.  The fact that all the lights went out, the main and auxiliary motors stopped, and water rushed into several compartments (from gauge glasses), may well have caused a most discreditable panic.  
          It is however very difficult to understand why (when the crew had at least four hours of lying on the surface guarded by one Hudson aircraft which was then armed only with machine guns) no attempt was made in slow time to assess the actual damage, repair is, dive, and escape.  
     
 
IX.  U-BOAT BASES AND DEPÔT SHIPS
 
     
  (i)  Kiel  
          Two bombs were stated to have fallen in the diving tank at Kiel in April, 1941, during a British air raid, and to have caused more amusement than damage.  
          A prisoner who was in M.V. "Ahrensburg," a former fruit ship of the Flensburger Line, stated that the following ships were employed in practice attacks by U-Boats on convoys in the Baltic:  "Wilhelm Bauer,"  "Saar," "Lech," "Waldemar Kopphammel," and one other ship whose name the prisoner had forgotten.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
20
     
  (ii)  Pillau  
          At the U-Boat school in Pillau Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Ibbeken was said to be still in command of the whole establishment, with Korvettenkapitän (Ing.) (Engineer Commander) Zerpka in charge of the technical instruction and Korvettenkapitän Paul Büchel of the the navigational and practical training in U-Boats.  
     
  (iii)  Lorient  
          A petty officer, believed to be more reliable than other prisoners, stated that the organisation Todt had 15,000 men in Lorient working on U-Boat shelters; he added that these men were usually drunk every night.  
          The normal procedure of building a shelter was described as follows:  a small bay is chosen, which is then hollowed out and drained off.  Reinforced concrete side walls are erected, and further divisional walls added.  A 3-metre thick roof is built over the top, consisting of steel girders, corrugated iron and concrete.  The roofs are well camouflaged and described as sloping gently from a central apex.  The water is allowed to enter when the building is completed.  Several U-Boats can lie in one shelter and all repairs carried out after it has been drained.  Three are said to be finished, and another five under construction.  From the date of the prisoner's visit to Lorient it may be assumed that the remaining five are also complete by now.  
          It was stated, but not confirmed, that the French naval yard had one battle cruiser and two destroyers on the stocks, and that the French were continuing work on these constructions.  The Germans expressed the criticism that these were not being built solidly enough to be of any striking value.  
          Little progress was stated to have been made with the dredging of the harbour, larger ships still have to wait for the tide.  
          It was stated that little damage had been done by the frequent air attacks.  Some prisoners remarked that they thought the anti-aircraft barrage was too weak to put up any effective resistance, and that it ought to be strengthened.  
          The U-Boat personnel at Lorient are waited on by French girls, who are friendly during working hours, but cut the Germans in the street.  
          A few officers, including Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Heinrich Fischer, commanding the 2nd U-Boat Flotilla, and believed to be in command of the U-Boat base, were stated to live in the officers' home (Offiziersheim), while other officers lived and had meals at the former Préfecture of Police.  Many prisoners complained of all the buildings in Lorient being infested with bugs.  
     
  (iv)  La Pallice  
          Italian prisoners also related having seen work progressing on shelters at La Pallice, which were said to be nearing completion.  
     
  (v)  Bordeaux  
          Italian prisoners stated that about 20 of the 30 Italian U-Boats had been sent back to Italy, as the Germans were making increasing use of the base.  It is reported that only 10 Italian submarines are left in Bordeaux.  Some confirmation f this statement was given by another Italian prisoner, who claimed to have seen two German U-Boats in the Grionde.  
     
 
X.  TECHNICAL REMARKS
 
     
  (i)  Bow Design  
          It was stated by several members of the crew that "U 111" shipped a lot of water when proceeding at high speed.  For this reason the new 750-ton class have had their bows altered.  It was claimed that trials had proved the new design to be a considerable improvement.  
     
  (ii)  Refuelling at sea  
          As already mentioned earlier in this report "U 111" took in oil fuel from a tanker south of Iceland.  The refuelling was done by means of a hose with the U-Boat taken in tow by the tanker.  The speed maintained during the operation was stated to be just sufficient to keep steerage away.  It was stated that the refuelling took over 8 hours and was carried out in calm weather by daylight.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
21
     
  A floating type of rubber hose about 100 metres long (328 ft.) and of diameter estimated at 12-15 centimetres (4.7 to 5.9 in.) was coupled to a special fitting amidships on the U-Boat.  The whole length of the hose between the tanker and the U-Boat was made fast to the tow-rope and the ends were thickly wrapped round with waste.  The hose was stated to have been made of a special rubber composition lighter than water.  It was stated that special hoses are necessary for the transfer of fuel from one U-Boat to another; such a transfer was never carried out by "U 111."  Prisoners had never heard of a U-Boat proceeding under her own power and keeping station during the process of refuelling from a tanker.  In very calm weather, however, U-Boats were said to go alongside to refuel.  
     
  (iii)  Torpedoes  
          Torpedo ratings stated that electric torpedoes were in covers painted red and green; these were removed in order to allow a cable to be inserted.  
          The torpedo angling gear appears to have been similar to that of "U 570," namely angling by degrees from 0°-180°, with a spread of 20°.  
          It was stated that "U 111" was designed to carry 14 torpedoes, but a greater number was carried and that, by sacrificing accommodation and adding more upper deck containers, considerably more could have been carried.  
     
  (iv)  Transfer of Torpedoes from U-Boat to U-Boat  
          It was stated that the transfer of torpedoes from the interior of "U 111" to "U 68" proved impracticable, so prisoners could give no information on this matter; but they made some remarks about the transfer of torpedoes from the upper deck containers.  
          A derrick was erected on the forward deck of each U-Boat.  It was added that the erection and subsequent removal of these derricks took a long time, and great care had to be exercised as the least damage to the gear would result in difficulty in stowing after use, due to its accurate fit into the stowage space; this accurate fitting was designed to avoid any noise while underway.  
          To remove a torpedo from the container the after end of the container was raised by means of a worm-gear, and the torpedo was drawn out; it was then transferred by means of the derricks in both U-Boats.  
          The transfer of each torpedo was said to take one hour.  
          One end of the container is raised by means of a bottle-screw contrivance, and the torpedo is hauled out.  A special davit is erected on the forward deck.  The base socket is a very accurate fitting designed to eliminate any noise.  Its construction is said to be so accurate that even the slightest misuse will make future transfers awkward.  A torpedo weighs about a ton and it is stated that with two efficient crews the transfer of each torpedo from one U-Boat to another, should not take more than an hour.  The reverse process is adopted by the U-Boat receiving the torpedo.  
     
  (v)  Wiping  
          The first "wiping" (Entmagnetisierung) of "U 111" was stated to have been carried out at Wilhelmshaven.  The U-Boat was described as having proceeded slowly through a basin, alongside of which were wooden posts, probably with cables round them.  The process was alleged to have been repeated at Lorient.  
     
  (vi)  W/T  
          It was stated that when a U-Boat reports her position, her Captain can give either his name or the number of the U-Boat but not the call-sign.  In code messages the first and last groups were stated to be identical and to consist of four letters.  The key changed daily, according to a telegraphist prisoner.  
          A U-Boat proceeding on a war cruise was said to be given the code "keys" for the expected duration of the cruise.  Everything appertaining to codes was written in ink soluble in salt water.  The officer under instruction in "U 111" expressed the opinion that it is possible for the English to fix the U-Boat's position from her short wave transmissions from a range of 100 miles.  
     
  (vii)  Listening Gear  
          A leading telegraphist stated that the listening gear was a copy of the British instrument, and was not generally proving satisfactory.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
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XI.  GENERAL REMARKS ON U-BOATS
 
     
  (i)  U-Boat Tactics  
          When hunted by a single ship evasive tactics are used in preference to an attempt to torpedo the pursuer.  These prisoners did not believe that these tactics had been modified.  
          When sighting an aircraft at a great distance the U-Boat always submerges, since the possibility that the aircraft has not observed the U-Boat must be taken into consideration.  Should, however, an aircraft suddenly come out of the clouds in close proximity to the U-Boat, offensive action by the latter may have to be taken.  These prisoners had never heard of deliberate U-Boat attacks on flying boats, nor are they particularly apprehensive on account of the heavy depth charge loads which flying boats may carry, as both of these prisoners were of the opinion that, provided the U-Boat can attain a reasonable depth before depth charges are dropped, she is comparatively safe.  
     
  (ii)  Torpedo attacks  
          Torpedo angling gear is operated by the Boatswain's Mate in the conning tower and not by the rating at the tube.  In the case of salvo-firing the torpedo angles are set simultaneously, by means of the angling gear, from the conning tower.  The Captain estimates the enemy's speed, the distance of the enemy and his position, and the "fruit machine" indicated the angle at which torpedoes have to be set.  This angle is than read off by the Boatswain's Mate, and the torpedoes are set accordingly.  As a rule the angles are very small, for, it was stated, the greater the angle, the greater the possibility of error.  The best result is obtained by aiming the U-Boat at the target.  
          Torpedoes are always set and fired from the conning tower, not from the control room.  
          Prisoners had never heard of double-headed torpedoes.  
          When "U 111" transferred her torpedoes to "U 68" the operation took about 1-1/2 hours to fit the crane or derrick, which was kept near the torpedo containers on the upper deck.  
          When "U 111" sank she still had three torpedoes in her forward tubes and two in her after tubes.  
          "U 111" made two attacks on the "Cingalese Prince."  During the first attack she fired three torpedoes, all of which missed, and about five hours later she attacked again and fired two torpedoes, both of which hit.  Both attacks took place at night, and it was very dark.  Four torpedoes were fired at the "Marken."  
     
  (iii)  Echo-Sounding Gear  
          U-Boats use echo sounding gear, but only for verifying depth.  The Boatswain's Mate said that when in "U 6" before the war and when close inshore, echo-sounding was also used for fixing the U-Boat's position.  
          In connection with echo-sounding gear small explosive charges, shaped like small torpedoes, are used.  They are about 25 centimeters long, 3 centimetres being their greatest diameter, their weight is about a pound.  
          These prisoners had never heard of a number of explosive charges being thrown overboard by surface vessels when hunting submarines.  
     
  (iv)  Identification of British submarines and German U-Boats  
          Discussing the identification of friendly U-Boats and enemy submarines, a petty officer prisoner stated that the more obvious points were that the German guns were mounted on the upper deck while those of the British were enclosed in the conning tower shield; also that the periscopes of British submarines are higher than those of U-Boats.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
23
     
  (v)  Opinion on British Convoy Tactics  
          Describing his voyage from Gibraltar to England aboard a British warship accompanying a convoy, a petty officer prisoner stated that the evading tactics adopted by the ships were so effective that it would have been almost impossible to torpedo one of them from a U-Boat which was not in an exceptionally favourable position to attack.  The ships were keeping to a zigzag formula which required them to alter course every few minutes through as much as 60 to 80 degrees.  The ships were traveling so fast that no U-Boat could ever have kept up with them under water.  Escort aircraft made surreptitious approach impossible.  Even where a U-Boat well placed, it would be probable that, by the time the Commander had made his calculations for angling, speed of enemy and state of sea, the ships would again have altered course before he could fire a torpedo.  
     
  (vi)  Practice diving depth  
          A prisoner stated that the normal depth for the practice dives of U-Boats was 60 to 45 ft.  
     
  (vii)  Advance information as to areas of operations  
          According to one prisoner, U-Boat captains at Lorient are told three days before sailing whether they are to make a cruise to the North or to the South Atlantic.  
     
  (viii)  Training of U-Boat Captains  
          One prisoner stated that course of training for U-Boat Commanders was the following:  Four weeks' course of "adaptation" training from surface vessels to U-Boats; three weeks' course at the U-Boat Captains' School; one war cruise under instruction in a U-Boat, commanded by a more experienced U-Boat officer.  A prospective U-Boat captain was then appointed to command a new U-Boat in the final states under construction, after which came the trials of the new U-Boat before the first war cruise was started.  
          The course for watch-keeping officers was four weeks' "adaptation" training from surface vessels to U-Boats, having completed which they were at once sent to their U-Boats, while these were still under construction.  
     
  (ix)  Training of U-Boat Telegraphists  
          Describing the training of telegraphists, a telegraphist stated that he had been one of 300 youths of about 18 years old taking a course at Aurich from October, 1940, to April, 1941.  They were divided into classes of ten.  After having learnt the morse code they were first taught to receive and then to send.  They were also instructed in the maintenance of the apparatus.  The prisoner claimed that after completing his training, he was able to send and receive 60 letters per minute.  Watches in "U 111" were alternating periods of four hours and two hours, a typical routine being 0800 to 1200; 1800 to 2000; 0400 to 0800; 1600 to 1800.  
     
  (x)  Pay of U-Boat Telegraphists  
          A telegraphist prisoner stated that his pay amounted to 195.50 Rm. (the value of approximately £10) per thirty day month.  This was made up of 110 Rm. pay, plus additional daily allowances of 1.50 Rm. for military service (Wehrsold), 1.00 Rm. diving allowance and 0.35 Rm. for technical qualifications.  
     
  (xi)  Sick Bay Attendants in U-Boats  
          According to a prisoner, U-Boats destined for abnormally long cruises carry a Chief Petty Officer Sick Bay Attendant.  
     
  (xii)  Difficulties of "Wolf Pack" Tactics  
          Two officer prisoners hinted that there were difficulties in employing "Wolf Pack" method of attack.  Operations could not be directed from sea and were, controlled directly by the Vice Admiral U-Boats.  When stationed for intercepting convoys, the U-Boats were spread over a wide area and it was not always practicable for the U-Boat first sighting the convoy to wait for reinforcement before attacking.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
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  (xiii)  Sabotage to U-Boats  
          Two chief petty officers stated that a sack filled with either sand or flour was discovered in one of "U 111's" diving tanks in Lorient at the end of the first cruise.  On the second cruise a long copper bolt was found in the hydroplane machinery, and it was suspected that it had been maliciously placed there.  The first of these two prisoners also alleged that 80 men of the naval guards in Lorient had disappeared during 1941.  The second added that several U-Boats had had to change their fuel pumps as they had been found to be mysteriously blocked by sand.  
     
  (xiv)  Dakar  
          According to one prisoner, U-Boats do not use the Vichy French port of Dakar.  U-Boats operating off the west coast of Africa had had considerable difficulties with fuel supply owing to the number of supply ships sunk or captured by the British Navy.  
     
  (xv)  Establishment of Friendly Relations with the German Army  
          According to a prisoner, "U 111" had friendly relations with the 30th Alpine Regiment stationed at Fuessen (Austria).  The crew had been invited to Fuessen as guests of the regiment and some of the soldiers had visited the U-Boat.  Similar exchanges of cordialities had been made with the 30th Infantry Regiment stationed at Görlitz.  
     
 
XII.  OTHER SHIPS
 
     
  (i)  Cruiser "Admiral Hipper"  
          It was stated that the cruiser "Admiral Hipper" had not so far been damaged in action.  The first Commanding Officer had been Kapitan zur See (Captain) Heye, but the present Captain was Kapitan zur See Meisel.  The reason for the change in command was attributed to differences of opinion alleged to have occurred between the German Operations Directorate and the Propaganda Ministry.  It was stated that Kapitan zur See Heye had made disparaging remarks about the Operations Directorate in his ship's "War Diary," which had apparently later been exploited by unauthorised persons.  It was the opinion of an officer prisoner that Heye's remarks were to some extent justified, but at the same tim some part of of his indiscretion was due to the fact that his nerves were gravely disordered.  
     
  (ii)  Cruisers "Karlsruhe," "Königsberg" and Blücher"  
          An officer prisoner stated that the cruiser "Karlsruhe," sunk in Christiansand during the Norwegian campaign, and been struck by two torpedoes fired by a British submarine, and was now lying in 300 ft. of water.  The cruiser Königsberg" was also stated to be lying in 300 ft. of water, and the cruiser "Blücher" in 1,800 ft.  
     
  (iii)  Exchange of the Cruiser "Lützow"  
          One prisoner alleged that before the Russo-German hostilities, Germany had agreed with Russia to exchange the cruiser "Lützow for 12 U-Boats.  The U-Boats had never been delivered.  It was added that the "Lützow" had been towed to Leningrad in a half finished condition.  The superstructure had still to be built and gun turrets fitted.  The Germans believed that this cruiser would again fall into the hands of the Germans when they took Leningrad, and with it they would capture a number of Russian warships, provided they had not been sunk or scuttled.  
     
  (iv)  Training Ships "Schlesien" and Schleswig-Holstein"  
          An officer prisoner stated that the two obsolete German battleships "Schlesien" and Schleswig-Holstein" had been stationed in the Sund in order to prevent any Russian attempt to break out of the Baltic Sea.  Both ships had again been manned.  It was added that gunnery officers had been appointed, the two officers mentioned in this connection being Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Fischer and Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Euling; it is believed that the former officer is Korvettenkapitän Horst Fischer.  It was stated that the two ships were lying in 30 ft. of water, so that they could not sink far.  The prisoner thought that either might easily blow up if hit by shell or torpedo, owing to their obsolete design.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
25
     
  (v)  German E-Boats in the Mediterranean  
          According to one prisoner, losses on the supply line from Italy to Libya had been so heavy, that convoys were now being protected by German E-Boats.  This prisoner described the Italians as a "detestable" people, both officers and ratings being too "chicken-hearted."  
     
  (vi)  Gunnery School Vessels  
          An officer stated that two German training ships, apparently used for gunnery exercises, were named "Ochs" and "Drache."  These two ships were in commission before the war, and upon them, in peace time, merchant navy officers had been given fortnightly periods of training.  
     
  (vii)  S.S. "Bremen"  
          A petty officer stated that when the "Bremen" was burnt out in Bremerhaven sabotage was suspected, and the whole crew was arrested.  Previously the interior of the "Bremen" had been reconstructed to accommodate tanks.  "Flaps" in the sides had been fitted up to enable easy disembarkation during invasion.  In another ship the bow had been readapted to allow it to fall outward, providing a "bridge" to facilitate landing of tanks and troops.  
     
 
XIII.  GENERAL REMARKS
 
     
  (i)  Attacking of U.S. Ships  
          A prisoner stated that German warships were still reluctant to attack U.S. ships, but, should they themselves be attacked by such ships, they had no option but to defend themselves.  
     
  (ii)  Scuttling Charges in German Merchant Ships  
          According to a prisoner, the normal charges used for scuttling German merchant ships weigh between 58 and 60 English pounds.  Four such charges could sink an average-sized cargo vessel in sixteen minutes.  If two charges were used the time of sinking would be prolonged to approximately one hour.  
     
  (iii)  Alleged Capture of British Code Books from a Merchant Ship  
          A prisoner who had served in Raider 16 stated that that ship had captured the code books of a British vessel.  He alleged that this code changed on the 6th or 7th of esch month, but once in possession of one code it was possible, with its aid, to decipher following ones.  With this code the Germans were able to pick up Admiralty warnings to British shipping and adapt their tactics accordingly.  
     
  (iv)  New German Charts  
          According to one prisoner, the German Admiralty has issued new charts which must be read in conjunction with code books.  
     
  (v)  "Bismark's" War Diary  
          One prisoner stated that at the sinking of the "Bismark," "U 73" picked up the battleship's war diary and two survivors.  It was established by the interrogation of survivors of "Bismark" that the battleship's war diary was lost in an aircraft which crashed while being catapulted from the disabled ship.  It is considered that the allegation of the saving of the war diary may be in process of being spread, in order to give authority to German versions of the sinking of "Bismark."  
     
  (vi)  Grand Admiral Raeder  
          The officer who had been under instruction in "U 111" considered that the achievements of the German Navy in this war were chiefly due to the knowledge and perspicacity of Grand Admiral Raeder.  Referring to Raeder's part in the decision to attack Norway, prisoner alleged that Raeder had urged this policy might be forestalled by Great Britain, and that then German shipping yards and bases would be lamentably exposed to British bombing attacks.  After repeated urging, Hitler finally agreed.  The prisoner stated that Raeder had been criticised as too old a man for his position, but he personally had no doubt that he was an  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
26
     
  exceptionally clever man.  He could not be considered as energetic as Goring, nor had he many of the qualities that made Goring so popular, but he had great political foresight and was well trained in strategy.  At the same time he was a poor judge of men, and this accounted for the fact that there were too many "square pegs in round holes."  
     
  (vii)  Fraudulent Transactions of Naval Officers  
          The officer-in-charge of the naval canteen at Lorient was stated by one prisoner to be a Lieutenant-Commander.  This man was responsible for the acquisition of supplies for the canteen and bought up chocolate, coffee and other goods which were particularly difficult to obtain.  When these goods were finally off the market in Lorient the officer sent lorries to scour the French countryside for them.  Of the total goods collected, one third was allocated to the canteen and two-thirds were appropriated by the officer, who sent them to Germany in official naval transports and re-sold them at his own profit.  
          On one occasion the officer protested to U-Boat crews that they were stealing goods from the French and sending them back to Germany, and that he, for one, would be ashamed after the war to have to admit having acquired anything whatsoever in France.  
          The same prisoner also stated that the Germans appeared to consider it quite legitimate for them to annex the furnishings from any billets, chateaux and other places where they happened to be stationed and send these goods back to Germany.  
          The Vice-Admiral U-Boats had commandeered an hotel in Paris and requisitioned everything, including the cellar containing more then 100,000 bottles of champagne.  These bottles were sold officially to U-Boat officers at only 1 Rm. 20 Pfgs., (about one shilling and sixpence) each, and unofficially to U-Boat ratings as well.  Quantities were also sold to non U-Boat personnel at 6 Rm. 50 Pfgs. (about six shillings and sixpence) per bottle.  
          The prisoner stated that on the occasion of his engagement he bought 20 bottles of champagne and presented them to his family who became overcome with surprise and champagne.  He had also bought ten pairs of silk stockings each for his mother and sister, and 20 pairs for his fiancee.  There was much discontent on the lower deck that both naval and  Air Force officers return from Germany to Occupied Francée with vast quantities of paper marke mostly of Rm. 100 denomination.  The officers changed these into French currency with the help of friends managing canteens and other official concerns and then used the French money to buy up everything they could lay their hands on.  The goods bought were sent in crates by naval transport to Kiel by the naval officers.  Ratings, not being able to obtain so much loose currency, were very jealous.  The prisoner added that stocks of many goods were depleted or exhausted in France, especially brandy, butter, coffee, soap and liqueurs, silk stockings were now rationed in France, but could be obtained by backdoor methods.  German officers had done a roaring trade by buying up enormous quantities of furs in France, and sending them back to Germany for resale.  
     
  (viii)  Periods of Naval Service  
          According to one prisoner those serving in the German Navy for two years become known as "Professional soldiers."  Should they then become Petty Officers within the next two and a half years they as compelled to sign on for a further period of 7-1/2 years.  The Petty Officer course which formerly lasted six months, now lasts only 12 weeks.  
     
  (ix)  New Naval penal establishment  
          According to one prisoner another naval penal establishment has been created at Schilling near Wesermünde.   
     
  (x)  Ill-treatment of naval recruits  
          One prisoner stated that in 1935 an Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Brutzer was in charge of the training of recruits at Wilhelmshaven.  This man stated to have twisted the ears and pulled the noses of recruits to such an extent that many of then had to be taken to hospital.  After repeated complaints, this man was transferred to the German Air Force where he was immediately made a Captain and subsequently distinguished himself in Spain and elsewhere.  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
27
     
  (xi)  Discontent of regular ratings  
          A prisoner stated that German naval reservists were keener than regular sailors who were always grumbling about having to serve for so many years.  
     
  (xii)  Quarrel between U-Boat personnel and the Königsberg Police  
          According to one prisoner, he and other sailors had trounced members of the Hitler Youth in the Tiergarten at Königsberg when a quarrel broke out over members of the Hitler Girls Organisation.  The Police belatedly intervened.  The prisoner's U-Boat was not permitted to put into Königsberg for many months.  
     
  (xiii)  Execution of German deserter  
          A prisoner alleged that one German soldier had deserted six times, but was finally recaptured.  He was a married man with three children.  He was tried and condemned to be shot, but was not personally informed of his sentence.  His company was instructed to provide ten "volunteers" to form a firing squad.  The man himself did not know that he was to be shot until the last moment when he found himself facing his executioners.  
     
  (xiv)  Death penalty for losing secret documents  
          One prisoner stated that a chief petty officer telegraphist had been shot in Wilhelmshaven because he had lost his documents and his book of signals.  
     
  (xv)  Fracas between Gestapo and U-Boat personnel  
          According to one prisoner the crew of one U-Boat had had a fist fight with Gestapo agents outside the Café Wolke in Danzig.  An officer of the U-Boat crew, dressed in civilian clothes, had been jostled by Gestapo agents outside the café, and had struck out and severely blacked the agent's eye.  The crew hastened to the aid of their officer, and there was a short fight which ended when the Gestapo men drew revolvers.  The sailors were all arrested and taken to the nearest police station, where there was an enquiry into the incident.  The matter was cleared up and the officer was asked to apologise.  This he refused to do.  Proceedings were, however, terminated.  The prisoner stated that had any man fired a shot the sailors would have struck him dead.  
          Speaking of decorations, one prisoner stated that, besides special badges for U-Boat personnel, other badges have now been introduced for those serving in mine-sweepers and auxiliary cruisers.  
     
  (xvi)  General Admiral Saalwächter  
          A prisoner stated that General Admiral Alfred Saalwächter was now in Norway.  
     
  (xvii)  New Rank Distinction of Fregattenkapitäne (Senior Commanders)  
          One prisoner alleged that Senior Commanders in the German Navy wear new rank distinctions.  They bear three stripes only on their sleeves and can be identified by the stars above the stripes.  
     
  (xviii)  Invasion Exercises in Holland  
          One chief petty officer prisoner stated that there had been invasion exercises on the Zuyder Zee.  Because of the lack of naval personnel, barges had been manned by soldiers and many accidents had occurred.  
     
  (xix)  Call-up of German Women  
          According to an officer prisoner a large number of women have been called up in Germany.  They were working in the Red Cross, in munitions factories, and in Welfare Institutions.  A very large number of children had been evacuated from North to South Germany.  
     
  (xx)  Mistrust of Germans residing abroad  
          One petty officer prisoner stated that a current saying in the German Navy was:  
                                          "Save me from storm and wind, O Lord!  
                                           And from my countrymen abroad!"  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
28
     
  (xxi)  Opinion on Italians in Africa  
          It was stated by one prisoner that the Italians in Africa had lost all voice in the proceedings.  Entire charge had been taken over by the Germans who believed that, had they one division in Abyssinia, they could retake that country from the British.  
     
  (xxii)  German Expectations of Reprisals  
          Discussing the future course of the was and post-war Europe, one prisoner stated that he believed it to be the British intention to lay waste the Ruhr district.  Berlin had already suffered heavily.  He believed that at the close of the war Prussia would be divided into four districts.  An enormous number of Germans would be sterilised, and for this purpose Great Britain had already mustered and schooled 20,000 doctors.  Germany had invited this vicissitude because of the manner in which she had sterilised so many Polish workmen, quite apart from the large number who had been shot.  Those who had might on their side could inflict such measures on any nation, including Germany.  As regards France, this prisoner admitted that a large number of German sentries had been shot, and that the policy of shooting scores of hostages as a reprisal measure might finally whip the French to fury, and cause the annihilation of a number of German garrisons.  
     
  (xxiii)  German Fear of Inflation  
          One prisoner said that there was a wave of spending in Germany.  He assumed that this was due to the fear of inflation.  
     
  (xxiv)  Prohibition of Mention of Goebbels' Scandals  
          One prisoner stated that the Storm Troop authorities had forbidden all mention of a scandal in which Dr. Goebbels was involved with Lida Baarova, the German film actress, and her husband, the actor Gustav Frölich.  All members of the armed forces were ordered to report any persons whom they hear gossiping upon the topic, who would then be punished.  The scandal is alleged to have occurred in the autumn of 1938.  It was rumoured at the time that Frölich, having returned home to find Goebbles in bed with his wife, had blacked the Doctor's eye, thus preventing him from attending a State reception at which Admiral Hortly, the Regent of Hungary, was the guest of houour.  
     
  (xxv)  Captured Petrol Supply in Crete  
          According to one prisoner the German Army, on occupying Crete, discovered a petrol dump, which was sufficient to supply the whole German Air Force for one month.  
     
  (xxvi)  Shortage of Beer, Spirits and Cigarettes  
          One prisoner alleged that it was now impossible to obtain beer, spirits and cigarettes in country districts in Germany.  Wine could still be obtained in large towns.  
     
  (xxvii)  Opinion on British Road Defences  
          Prisoners stated that they were forced to laugh at the puny road defences they had seen in Scotland when they were being conveyed from Glascow to Edinburgh.  They thought that one well-directed shell would be enough to clear a passage.  
     
  (xxviii)  Herr Severing  
          According to one prisoner, Herr Severing, former Prussian Home Minister, was now living at Bieleleld where he had bought a house.  He had never been placed in a concentration camp and was drawing a pension.  The prisoner thought that while holding office as a member of the Social Democratic Party, Severing had, in fact, been an agent of the National Socialist Party.  
     
  (xxix)  Meteorological Observations  
          Describing meteorological experiments in which he took part, an engineer officer prisoner stated that the normal meteorological balloon in use in Germany had a diameter of between 4 and 10 ft.  It carried a small short-wave transmitter, which gave out two separate tones, one of which was employed for barometer and  
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
29
     
  one for thermometer readings.  The tones varied as the balloon rose higher, enabling calculations to be made.  The ceiling of these balloons was given as approximately 40,000 ft.  Observers on the ground picked up the transmitted signals which were recorded on wax records.  
          To minimise the danger of damage to the transmitting a silk parachute was fitted to it which came into operation should the balloon burst.  In point of fact balloons burst very frequently and naval officers competed with each other to salvage the parachutes, which they used as silk scarves.  
          Smaller balloons were used on occasion for rough observations of wind strengths and, at times, when none were available, inflated rubber goods were used in their stead.  
     
  (xxx)  Requisitioning of Boats from Liners  
          A reservist officer prisoner captured from a ship taken in prize by Germany, who had served in the S.S. "Bremen" in pre-war days, stated that the ship's boats of a large number of liners had been conscripted at the beginning of the war by the German Navy.  "Bremen" had provided thirty-eight boats.  The prisoner calculated that each boat could carry 140 men, and suggested that a fleet of such boats might be used to land a formidable invasion force.  
     
  (xxxi)  Ex-Merchant Service Officers in German Navy  
          An officer formerly in the merchant service expressed a wish to remain in the regular German Navy at the end of the war.  He had attended a four-months Reserve Officer Cadet's course at Murvik, with 125 other merchant navy officers.  Only six men of this number had been granted commissions.  He stated that many merchant navy officers were now serving in the regular German Navy as ratings.  One such officer was serving as an ordinary seaman on board Raider 16.  His knowledge of navigation was far greater than that of a Chief Quartermaster, 1st Class, and finally the Captain of the Raider had promoted him to the rank of Acting Quartermaster, 2nd Class.  
          An officer prisoner of "U 111" stated that he also knew a case of an experienced engineer officer who had served in S.S. "Europa" joining the navy and being given the rating of a stoker.  The man had served 28 years at sea.  His case was taken up, and finally he was given the rank of Acting Lieutenant (E).  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 

 

     
     
 
30
  
     
 
APPENDIX
  
 
 
 
List of Crew of U "111"
 
     
 
Name.
Rank.
English Equivalent.
Age
Heinecke, Hans Joachim Korvettenkapitän Commander 34
Wulff, Günther Oberleutnant (Ing.) Engineer Lieutenant 28
Fuest, Klemens Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class 27
Voigt, Max Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class 27
Job, Engelbert Obersteuermann Chief Q.M., 1st Class 26
Hartig, Gerhard Oberbootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 1st Class 28
Feldges, Wilhelm Oberfunkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 1st Class 27
Gedrat, Hermann Bootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class 24
Haberstroh, Hubert Bootsmannsmaat der Reserve Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class, (Naval Reserve) 27
Rethmeier, Willhelm Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 25
Kuchenbecker, Georg Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 25
Klimsa, Josef Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 27
Schulte, Walter Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 27
Schmidt, Andreas Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 23
Holthöfer, Walter Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 26
Horst, Jakob Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 24
Krull, Hans Gunther Steuermannsmaat Q.M., 2nd Class 26
Plaumann, Friedrich Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class 24
Plambeck, Hans Mechanikersmaat P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class 24
Kühneweg, Heinrich Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 22
Bux, Benno Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 22
Klühn, Karl Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 20
Hinz, Josef Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 23
Möller, Friedrich Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 21
Hoffmann, Dietrich Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 21
Lehky, Karl Ernst Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 22
Jörchel, Reinhold Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 22
Finkbeiner, Siegfried Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 23
Grüneberg, Paul Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 22
Fischer, Johann Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 20
Schönthier, Kurt Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist 21
Tenne, Hans Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 20
Bittner, Walter Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 20
Blott, Willi Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 21
Jäger, Karl Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 19
Wick, Fritz Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 21
Znottka, Hans Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 23
Lüsch, Hans Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 22
Zober, Rudi Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 18
Tretow, Hans Joachim Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20
Körkel, Hermann Funkgefreiter Ordinary Telegraphist, 1st Class 19
Reimann, Heinz Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class 21
Schmidt, Hans Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class 21
Harm, Alfred Matrose Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class 21
 
     
 
Officers
2
Petty Officers
17
Men
25
 
44
 
  The following did not survive:  
 
Kleinschmidt, Wilhelm Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant Commander 34
Rösing, Friedrich Wilhelm Oberleutnant zur See Lieutenant 23
Fuches, Helmut Leutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant 24
Steffeck, Heinz Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class  
Pühlhorn, Simon Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class  
Diepold, Korbinian Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class  
Gross, Heinz Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class  
Ruskens, Hans Mechanikergefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class  
 
 
(Buried on board)
 
                                          Total  
 
Officers
3
Men
5
 
8
 
                                          Total Crew  
 
Officers
5
Chief and Petty Officers
17
Men
30
 
52
 
     
  (C43393)    B25     2/43  
     
     

 

 

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