U-boat Archive - Raider"33"- Interrogation Report

This record was kindly provided by the generous assistance of Tony Cooper

COPY No.

This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer

C.B. 4051 (29)

Interrogation of Survivors from

Raider 33 (PINGUIN) and of

other Raider Prisoners

October, 1941

This Report is not to be considered accurate in all respects, having been prepared before complete information was available. It is therefore not to be taken as historically correct.















	SECRET

	This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.

	It is intended for the use of the recipients only, and for communication to such Officers under them (not below the rank of Commissioned Officer) who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties. The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due care and caution.









	Raider "10"










	Raider "16"







	(Frontispiece)


	SECRET

	Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the
	Official Secrets Acts.








	C.B. 4051 (29)






	Interrogation of Survivors from
	Raider 33 (PINGUIN) and of
	other Raider Prisoners





	October, 1941










	NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,

	N.I.D. 2437/41
















	The following report is compiled from information derived from prisoners of war. The statements made cannot always be verified; they should therefore not be accepted as facts unless they are definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

_______

			Page
I.	Introductory Remarks		5
II.	General statements by Prisoners regarding Raiders		6
	(a)	Numbers of Raiders available	6
	(b)	Building and Fitting Out of Raiders	6
	(c)	Raider Policy	6
	(d)	Minelaying Policy	6
	(e)	Raider Tactics	7
	(f)	Notification of the presence of British Ships	7
	(g)	Crews of Raiders	8
	(h)	Anchorages	8
	(i)	Fitting out of future Raiders	8
III.	Raider "33" - Ship's Company		9
IV.	Early History of Raider "33" - "Pinguin"		12
V.	Cruise of Raider "33"		13
VI.	Sinking of Raider "33"		20
VII.	Wireless and Communications		21
VIII.	Meteorology		23
IX	Life on Board "33"		24
X.	Ships taken in Prize by Raider "33"		25
XI.	Supplies and Supply Ships		26
XII.	Technical Details of Raider "33"		27
	(a)	General Remarks	27
	(b)	Armament	27
	(c)	Torpedoes	28
	(d)	Mines	28
	(e)	Ammunition Hoists	28
	(f)	Magazines	28
	(g)	Searchlights	29
	(h)	Engines	29
	(i)	Camouflage	29
	(j)	Aircraft	30
	(k)	Camouflage of the Aircraft	31
	(l)	Prisoner's Accommodation	32
XIII.	Raider "16" - Ship's Company		32
XIV.	Raider "16" - Early History, Fitting out and Trials		33
XV.	Cruise of Raider "16"		33
XVI.	Life on Board "16"		37
XVII.	Raider "16" - Technical Details		38
	(a)	Armament	38
	(b)	Engines	38
	(c)	Aircraft	38
	(d)	Camouflage	38
XVIII.	Raider "10"		39
XIX.	Cruise of Raider "10"		39
XX.	Raider "10" - Technical Details		40
	(a)	Armament	40
	(b)	Magazines	40
	(c)	Torpedo Magazine	40
	(d)	R.D.F.	40
	(e)	Rangefinder	40
	(f)	Aircraft	41
	(g)	Boats	41

(C42749) *2

TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued

_______

			Page
XXI.	Ship's Company of Raider "10"		41
XXII.	Raider "36" - Early History, Fitting Out and Trials		41
XXIII.	Cruise of "36"		42
XXIV.	Raider "36" - Technical Details		44
	(a)	Identity	44
	(b)	Name	44
	(c)	Appearance	44
	(d)	Disguises	44
	(e)	Engines	44
	(f)	Armament and Equipment	44
	(g)	Aircraft	45
	(h)	Accommodation	45
	(i)	Recognition	45
III.	Life on Board Raider "36"		45
IV.	Other Raiders		46
	(a)	General Remarks	46
	(b)	Raider "41"	46
	(c)	Raider "45"	46
	(d)	Raider "21"	47
	(e)	Unknown Raider	47
XXVII.	"Admiral Graf Spee"		47
XXVIII.	General Remarks		48

APPENDIX I
List of Prisoners ex Raider "33"

APPENDIX II
List of Officers and Ratings known to have lost their lives in Raider "33"

APPENDIX III
List of Prisoners from other Raiders

PLATES
I. Deck Plan of Raider "33." Facing page 27.
II. Deck Plan of Raider "16" ("Orion"). Facing page 44.

PHOTOS of Raiders "10" and "16" - Frontispiece.


	5

	INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM RAIDER "33" ("PINGUIN"),
	AND OF OTHER RAIDER PRISONERS

	__________

	I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

	This report is confined to the results of the interrogation of prisoners captured in recent months from raiders operating in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The majority of the prisoners, three officers and 54 ratings, are survivors from Raider "33," otherwise "Pinguin," which was sunk by H.M.S. "Cornwall" in the Indian Ocean on 8th May, 1941. The interrogation of these prisoners presented almost insurmountable difficulties. Interrogating Officers were of the opinion that, for the purpose of extracting information, they were among the worst prisoners yet captured in this war. This is explained by the fact that, during the eleven months they had been at sea, they had been subjected to intensive training in security-mindedness. They had been required to sign a fresh oath of secrecy each month, and they had been lectured at frequent intervals by their Captain and their Divisional Officers. Interrogation was not helped by the fact that it was over three months from the time of their capture to their arrival in England. During this period they had fully recovered their morale, and, according to the confession of an officer prisoner, they had plenty of time to decide exactly what they were going to say. Prisoners also stated that, before their final interrogation, they had already been closely examined about nine times and, to use their own phrase "They had come to know all the answers." One prisoner admitted that he had scribbled "Beware, the enemy is listening!" on the walls of each place in which he had been confined. The prisoners were, for the most part, studiously polite in their refusal to answer questions, and appeared unaffected either in health or morale by their long period at sea.
	A further four prisoners, who had seen over a year's service in Raider "16," were captured aboard the supply ship "Alstertor," where they were acting as prisoner's guards, when this vessel was intercepted by H.M. forces in the Atlantic on 23rd June, 1941. These four prisoners all denied that they were regular members of the crew of "16." They had concocted an alibi, according to which they had left Brest in January, 1941, aboard the supply ship "Alsterufer," had joined Raider "16" at the end of April, had left the raider again when she turned over British prisoners to m/v "Babitonga" about one month later, and had finally been transhipped to "Alstertor," when the two supply ships met in the Atlantic on 15th June, 1941. Interrogation was impeded for some time before this alibi could be broken down.
	A fifth prisoner, a rating captured from "Alstertor," had seen long service in Raider "36." His health had broken down in the raider and he was transhipped to "Alstertor," when the two ships met in the Indian Ocean on 10th April, 1941.
	An officer prisoner, captured from "Alstertor," had taken part in the cruise of the pocket battleship "Admiral Graf Spee" from the time the raider left Germany to her final destruction at the battle of the River Plate. This officer had escaped from internment in Montevideo and was trying to return to Germany in "Babitonga" and "Alstertor."
	One prisoner who had seen service in Raider "10," was captured from the supply tanker "Lothringen," intercepted by H.M. forces in the Atlantic on 15th June, 1941. This man had left Raider"10" on 14th September, when he was transferred to the prison ship "Rio Grande," which arrived in Bordeaux on 15th December, 1940.
	It should be pointed out that the accounts of Raiders "10" and "36" included in this report, are thought to be less complete and less reliable than those of "33" and "16," as they were obtained, in each case, from a none too trustworthy rating, and were not confined from any other German source, although most of his statements were checked by reference to reports from British prisoners of war.
	In the following report care has been taken to avoid facts already published, except where confirmation and amplification have been considered essential and desirable.

	(C42749) *3



	6

	II. GENERAL STATEMENTS BY PRISONERS REGARDING RAIDERS

	(a) Number of Raiders Available
	No prisoner suggested that Germany had more than six raiders operating, excluding Raider "33." Raiders known to exist are numbers "10," "16," "21," "36," "41" and "45." The existence of a Raider "46" has not been confirmed by any prisoner.
	It was confirmed that Raiders "10" and "21" have returned to Germany, but it was not denied that they might have left again. Prisoners thought it possible that Raider "36" had also returned to Germany or Occupied France. (N.I.D. Note. A reliable report has been received that this raider reached an Occupied French port in August.) Raiders known by prisoners to be operating at present are "16," "41" and "45."

	(b) Building and Fitting Out of Raiders
	According to prisoners, raiders are fitted out in the yards where they were originally built. It was stated that Raider"10," a former banana ship, was built and converted at the Blohm and Voss Yards, Hamburg, as also was "36." Raiders "33," "41" and "45" were stated to have been built and converted at the Deschimag Yards, Bremen.
	According to one prisoner, provision for conversion to raiders was made in the case of some of the later raiders, when they were originally built as freighters. Raider "41" was stated to be a case in point.
	Prisoners said that the raiders now operating formerly belonged to the Hansa and North German Lloyd Lines of Bremen and to the Woermann Line of Hamburg. A number of prisoners claimed that some German ships in Japanese ports are being fitted out as raiders, but this may merely be popular supposition. (N.I.D. Note. There is absolutely no confirmation of this. It is unlikely that the Japanese have agree to such a departure from neutrality.)

	(c) Raider Policy
	According to prisoners raiders are not primarily intended to sink a vast amount of British shipping, although this had become a matter of intense competition between rival raider Captains. The chief function of the raider is to strike unexpectedly in waters all over the globe. This has the object of dispersing H.M. warships and of delaying and dislocating movements of shipping generally, thus slowing down the British war effort. Prisoners claimed that this policy had obviously been successful, as latterly the raiders had had increased difficulty in detecting British and Allied ships, by reason of the fact that the latter were not hugging coast lines instead of taking direct routes from port to port. While this practice delayed British and Allied ships, it was at the same time a matter of some concern to raider Captains, who were reluctant to involve their ships in attacks near land in view of the danger of aerial reconnaissance.

	(d) Mine-laying Policy
	Prisoners stated that the surprise element was regarded as essential in the laying of mines in remote harbours. Now that "16" had laid mines off Cape Agulhas, "33" off Australia and Tasmania, and "36" off New Zealand, it was felt that the surprise element is no longer present anywhere and that the raiders themselves will no longer be risked in such enterprises. This may have been emphasised by the loss of "33," who, according to some prisoners' accounts, was about to mine Bombay, Karachi and the Gulf of Aden at the time she was sunk. There was evidence to suggest, however, that prize ships and auxiliaries may still be used for this purpose, particularly as the employment by "33" of the prize ship "Storstad" for minelaying off Australia was successful. "33" is believed to have loaded a small whale-catcher, which she had taken in prize, with mines, shortly before she herself was destroyed. According to one prisoner this whale-catcher had been give orders to lay the mines off Capetown.
	It was stated by prisoners that one raider, believed to be "45," was equipped with a fast motor launch which could carry and lay eight mines.



	7

	(e) Raider Tactics
	Raiders were stated to have had definite areas of operations allotted to them before the commencement of their cruise, and to this extent the whole cruise is pre-arranged. There are also "waiting" areas and "meeting" areas. It appears that raider Captains have freedom of movement within these limits, and that operations outside their areas are only undertaken upon express instructions from Berlin. It was stated that "33" was definitely outside her area, which was the Indian Ocean south of the Equator, when she was sunk.
	It would appear that if a raider is sunk or captured the code names for all areas are altered, though the areas themselves are probably not changed.
	It is believed that it is left to the discretion of the raider Captain to determine the length of a cruise. Limiting factors are damage sustained, the condition of the ship and, to some extent, the morale of the crew.
	Raiders have previously had considerable success in attacking ships in daylight, but when the Germans decoded Admiralty instructions to British merchant ships to alter course away from any unknown ship, the raiders adopted new tactics. The tactics at present employed are to locate vessels by daytime, to establish the speed and course of the victim, and to attack during the night or just before dawn.
	Vessels are either detected by their smoke, by the raider's aircraft, or by a consort ship which has been taken in prize. Both "16" and "33" successfully used prize ships to locate and shadow their victims.
	According to prisoners a main reason for the reluctance of raiders to attack by day is the fact that it is regarded as essential to avoid exposing the ship, in any guise, to a vessel which may prove to be a neutral, and may later give not only the position of the raider, but also a description of her. Prisoners are agreed that, once a raider's disguise is penetrated, her chances of survival are most seriously endangered. A prisoner from Raider "16" stated that, when his ship opened fire on a merchant vessel, they invariably trained their guns first on the wireless cabin. He added that the easiest method of spotting a British or Allied, as oppose to a neutral ship, was the gun mounted on the stern.

	(f) Notification of the Presence of British Ships
	Prisoners stated that they relied for their chief information regarding the movements of British shipping, in their wireless, and on signals received from the German Operations Directorate in Berlin. Constant watch was kept on the most commonly-used British wavelengths in the hope of detecting which shipping routes were being used at the moment. Prisoners from "33" alleged that some neutral ships deliberately gave RRR signals, when closed by British warships. They implied that these ships were Japanese, and stated that, on occasions, the signals had been most valuable in avoiding contact with H.M. forces. They alleged that on the day they were sunk they had received an RRR signal from a Japanese ship which had sighted H.M.S. "Cornwall." (N.I.D. Note. There is no confirmation of this statement.)
	Information was received from Berlin, classified according to its reliability. Notification of the movements of British ships supplied by German agents was invariably prefaced: "According to a V man. . . . " Prisoners stated that the appellation"V man" meant either "Vorpostenmann" (Outpost Man) or "Vertrauensmann" (Confidential Agent). Prisoners alleged that these men were posted in the British Isles, North and South America, Africa, Australia, and, indeed, throughout the world. They were particularly active in Spain from a point opposite Gibraltar. They reported not only the arrival and departure of ships, but their destinations and cargoes. They also gave the positions of neutral ships, in order that these might be avoided by the raiders.
	Prisoners added that it was particularly vital for the raiders to know the type of fuel being carried by specific tankers, so that they could be sure of keeping their own bunkers filled. They alleged that they received this information from Berlin. The British occupation of Irak and Iran, and the consequent curtailment of the activities of German agents in those countries, may thus afford an additional reason for congratulation.
	One prisoner from Raider "33" stated that the ship had learnt, from enemy agents in Australia, that Australian air reconnaissance was carried out to a distance of 100 miles off the coast. In the light of this information the ship's company was most anxious throughout their mine-laying operation.

	(C42479) *4



	8

	(g) Crews of Raiders
	Officers carried on raiders are invariably men of considerable experience. Many are former merchant service officers with a thorough knowledge of the waters in which their raider operates. Specialists, such as Meteorological Officers, are probably the best the German navy has at its disposal. The ratings are made up of in almost equal proportion of young recruits and experienced naval ratings, former merchant navy seamen and fishermen.
	The complement of raiders is constantly being diminished by the necessity of providing crews for ships taken in prize. Periodically, depleted complements are brought back to full strength by fresh drafts of men carried to the raiders by supply ships. Prisoners said that it was usually the sick and the "black sheep" who were singled out for prize crews.

	(h) Anchorages
	Prisoners stated that anchorages formerly used by raiders, such as Kerguelen Island and possibly Crossest Island in the Indian Ocean, would not be used again, now that it was known that they had been visited. All prisoners, however, expressed genuine astonishment when they were first questioned about these islands, and there is reason to believe that the Germans had not previously suspected the British Admiralty of being aware of the use of these islands by raiders.
	One prisoner from "33" believed that prize ships, particularly coal burners, would be laid up until the end of the war in Kerguelen and other islands, as it had become too risky to attempt to run them back to Germany. This statement is amplified in the section "Ships taken in prize by Raider '33'." The plan may have been abandoned after the sinking of "33," for it may be presumed that the German Admiralty have reckoned with the fact that the possibilities of Kerguelen Island are now known to the British. It is suggested that the laying of mines in Gazelle Basin, the only anchorage known to be used by raiders, would be a comparatively inexpensive means of ensuring that Kerguelen Island should be finally sealed to German warships.

	(i) Fitting Out of Future Raiders
	According to prisoners, "33" and "16" were old type raiders, and a number of defects had shown themselves which would be remedied in future designs. The following possible modifications have been suggested by the prisoners themselves:
	Ships selected for conversion will be smaller, with greater speed and manoeuverability. They will be dependent, to a greater extent than previously, on tankers for their fuel oil.
	Aircraft catapults are now regarded as essential following the loss of a number of aircraft in launching accidents. It was stated that the Captain of "33" asked his best engineer if he could construct a catapult for the ship's aircraft; this feat was impossible owing to lack of materials.
	Raider "45," and possibly Raider "41," are believed to be fitted with catapults over their focuses.
	Heinkel 114 seaplanes have proved less seaworthy than the Arado 196 type, and the latter may be used exclusively in future.
	Triple torpedo tubes are anticipated, and it is possible that these will be underwater. It was stated that such tubes, fitted in this manner, would take up less space in a smaller vessel.
	It is expected that all guns will, if possible, be mounted on the upper deck, as experience has shown these to be far more efficient than those mounted below decks. The guns will be more modern in type and should have a range of at least 18,500 yards.
	One or two E-boats may be carried to give greater protection against attacking warships. These will be fitted with torpedo tubes and may also be used to lay mines in coastal waters.
	It is believed that armour belts will be fitted in preference to double hulls filled with sand.

III. RAIDER "33"

Ship's Company

The complement of Raider "33" was made up of 20 Officers, eight Warrant Officers, 12 Chief Petty Officers, 50 Petty Officers, and approximately 260 ratings. About 80 men, including five Officers, who were brought from Germany aboard the supply ship "Alstertor" and transferred to "33" in March, 1941.

Survivors comprised three Officers, six ordinary deck Petty Officers, one Telegraphist Petty Officer, one engine room Petty Officer, one Writer Petty Officer, one non-commissioned aircraft pilot, one aircraft mechanic, 24 deck hands, six telegraphist ratings, three signal ratings and eight engine room ratings.

The ship's company comprised four divisions. These were:

Division I	}	Seamen
Division II	}	Seamen
Division III		Technicians.
Division IV		Engine room artificers.

An Officers list could only be compiled with great difficulty, owing to the reticence of survivors, but the following list is believed to be substantially correct:

Captain		Kapitan zur See (Captain) Ernst-Felix Krueder.
1st Officer		Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Max Scheinne.
1st Navigating Officer		Oberleutnant der Reserve (Lieutenant of German Naval Reserve) Michaelsen.
1st Divisional Officer		Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Kuester.
2nd Divisional Officer		Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Levit.
3rd Divisional Officer and Gunnery Officer		Oberleutnant zur See Rjeche.
4th Divisional Officer		Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) (Lieutenant-Commander (E) Kramer.
2nd Engineer Officer		Leutnant (Ing.) (Sub-Lieutenant (E) ) Voslow.
Torpedo Officer		Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Gabe.
Signals Officer		Oberleutnant zur See Stenner, or Oberleutnant zur See (W) Bruncke.
		(Note. It was not definitely confirmed that this position was held by Stenner; only one prisoner, however, mentioned Bruncke in this connection.)
Prisoners Officer		Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) warning.
Meteorological Officer		Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Dr. Ulrich Roll.
Medical Officers		Surgeon Lieutenants Werner Hasselmann and Wenzel.
Aircraft Observer		Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Mueller.
Special prize ship Officers		Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve (Lieutenant German Naval Reserve) Grau
		Leutnant zur See der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenant German Naval Reserve) Neumeier.
		Leutnant zur See der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenant German Naval Reserve) Hahnefeld.
		Leutnant zur See der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenant German Naval Reserve) Oskar Boettcher.
		Leutnant zur See der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenant German Naval Reserve) Scherer.
		(Scherer's presence in the ship was only partially confirmed.)

Kapitan zur See (Captain Ernst-Felix Krueder, who went down with his ship, was 44 years old. He joined the Navy in 1915, at the age of 18, and served as Able Seaman on board the Battleship"Koenig" at the battle of Jutland. He also saw service as Midshipman and later Sub-Lieutenant in the Light Cruiser "Breslau"



	10

	and in the Battle Cruiser "Goeben" in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. At the end of the Great War he fought with the Erhart Brigade against the Poles, in Upper Silesia, but later rejoined the German Navy, being given command of a minesweeper. He took part in a piece cruise aboard the Cruiser "Karlsruhe," and was then appointed Staff Officer to the Admiral Commanding Scouting Forces. On attaining the rank of Commander he was placed in command of a Minesweeper Flotilla. In 1937 he was appointed Staff Officer attached to the German Admiralty as an inspector of naval training establishments. At the outbreak of war he was promoted to Captain and given command of Raider "33." when the ship was still in process of conversion. He was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross on 29th December, 1940, it being claimed that his ship had then sunk 79,000 tons of shipping.
	He was regarded by prisoners of Raider "33" as a popular, efficient and painstaking officer. At the same time it was inferred from prisoners remarks that his theories of raider tactics were based on purely scientific principles and that he failed utterly to comprehend the human element in his opponents. For example, he appeared genuinely perplexed that poorly-armed and slow-speed merchantmen should dare to show fight, or try to escape out of range, rather than submit at once to overwhelming strength. Prisoners alleged that he made a point of questioning all captured British captains as to their reasons for resisting him, stating that, had he been in their place, he would at once have recognised superior force. According to prisoners he once received the reply: "You are a German and I am a Briton!"
	If prisoners' statements are to be believed, Kapitan zur See (Captain) Krueder was careful to prevent unnecessary loss of life. He was, however, ruthless, should any victim defy him, and ordered salvo after salvo to be fired, until his opponents' ship was blazing from end to end.
	(N.I.D. Note. On the whole this statement applies to all raiders.)
	It was alleged that on the occasion of one night attack, when resistance was offered by a ship which he wished to make a prize, Krueder trained his searchlights on the after gun of his victim and mowed down the crew with fire from his anti-aircraft guns. The Germans saw with intense admiration how, time after time, fresh British seamen sprang to replace their fallen comrades. Unfortunately, the name of this ship could not be obtained.
	Krueder was criticised by some prisoners as not being air-minded, and it was alleged that, after the loss of one of his two original aircraft, it was some time before he could be persuaded to use his second. One prisoner stated that the use of British or South African markings on these aircraft was against the Captain's wishes and was finally prohibited.
	A conclusion that can be drawn with some justification is that Krueder, although he obeyed his instructions to the letter, would have been happier in a proper warship.
	Kapitänleutnant Max Schwinne, the First Officer, was stated by prisoners to be the least popular officer. He was accused of being greedy and avaricious and to have appropriated for himself all the most valuable articles taken from captured ships.
	Oberleutnant Rieche, the Gunnery Officer, was, apparently, the best-liked officer. He was described as being extremely clever and it appears that he was largely responsible for arranging a system of direct fire control from the bridge, after the ship had left on her cruise. It had originally been intended that the 15 cm. (5.9 in.) guns should fire independently. Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Kramer was described by an expert engineer, who joined the ship in mid-ocean to effect repairs and who was among survivors, as a man of "mediocre" talent. The same engineer described Kramer's assistant, Leutnant (Ing.) Voslow, as "a mere child as far as engineering went."
	Oberleutnant der Reserve Michaelsen, the Navigating Officer, and the five prize officers were apparently all Merchant Service Officers before the war. They had had considerable sea experience in many parts of the world. Michaelsen, who was not among survivors, was said to have been formerly First Officer in the liner "Bremen."



	11

	Oberleutnant der Reserve (Lieutenant of the Reserve) Grau and Leutnant der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenant of the Reserve) Boettcher, had been Captain and First Officer, respectively, of the 14,000-ton passenger ship"Antonio Delfino" of the Hamburg-Südamerika Line. This ship was in Bahia at the outbreak of war, but managed to run the blockade back to Germany. On arriving in Hamburg, Boettcher who is now a prisoner, was given charge of the liner "Cap Arcona," which he took to Gotenhafen to be made ready, as he alleged, for the "Seeloewen Unternehmung" (Sea-lion Enterprise), a code word used to describe preparation for the invasion of England. When this enterprise was called off, in the autumn of 1940, Boettcher volunteered for service in raiders. Together with Grau, his former Captain, he was sent out to "33" in the supply ship "Alstertor," joining the raider in March, 1941.
	Prisoners were extremely loath to disclose either the names or exact rank of Oberleutnant Stenner, or Oberleutnant Bruncke. It appears certain that one of the two was Signals Officer. Efforts made to shield the Signals Officer may be due to the fact that he was alleged to have spent many years in England with his mother, who is believed to be still living here.
	The medical staff consisted of two doctors, one Petty Officer and three permanent sick bay attendants.
	Officers known to have survived are:
	Kapitänleutnant Dr. Ulrich Roll, the meteorologist, whose work is described in a separate chapter;
	Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant of the Reserve) Hans Boecttcher;
	Surgeon Lieutenant Hasselmann.
	The following Officers were mentioned with some uncertainty, as having been drafted to prize ships, and can only be described as; "Missing, possibly alive":
	Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Kuester;
	Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Stenner;
	Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve (Lieutenant of the Reserve) Scherer;
	Leutnant zur See der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenant of the Reserve) Neumeier;
	Leutnant zur See der Reserve Hahnefeld.
	The ratings on board were described as 50 per cent. youths between 18 and 24, and 50 per cent. men over 35 years of age. The older men appeared to be chiefly Fleet Reservists or conscripted merchant seamen; a large number of them were married.
	It was stated that no one was informed on drafting that he was needed for service in a raider, and that he might be away from his home for some years. This was alleged to be a precaution against desertions while the ship was still in Germany.
	The greater proportion of pay for all ratings was retained in Germany, and little more than the equivalent of one pound per month was allowed the men for purchases in the ship's canteen.
	The ship's company included a number of men who had previously seen service in U-Boats. These men believed that they had been included, in case it should be necessary to make up the complement of any U-Boats met during the cruise.
	A number of survivors confessed that they were not National Socialists, and it appears that, without exception, the ratings were heartily sick of the cruise. They had, however, entirely recovered their morale by the time they were brought to England. One prisoner, the non-commissioned aircraft pilot, appeared to have a particularly spirited disposition. He first described himself as a boatswain, but later admitted that he was an airman. He gave, as his reason for this deception, the explanation that he had already made two plans for escape, both of which involved the stealing of a British aircraft. He thought that, if he concealed the fact that he could fly, he might one day be given land work in the neighbourhood of a British aerodrome.
	Another prisoner, the expert engineer, was an Austrian who had suffered much at the hands of the Nazis. Formerly manager of an engineering works at Gratz, Syria, he had been discharged by the Gestapo soon after the Anschluss, as he was a member of Dr. Schuschnigg's Christian Socialist party. He was kept out of work



	12

	for eighteen months, but was finally "forgiven" at the outbreak of war, and worked for a short time in the B.M.W. and Junkers aircraft factories. As he had seen service in the German Navy during the last war, he was transferred to naval shipyards, where he acted as consulting engineer for the conversion of raiders. He also appears to have taken part in experiments with new types of mines.
	In July, 1940, he was told that he was to be sent out to the South Atlantic to repair any raider that might have suffered damage. He was particularly bitter that he was only given his last war rank of Obermaschinenmaat (Mechanician, 1st Class) and not the commission to which his qualifications now entitled him, and attributed this to spite on the part of the Gestapo. He added that he was convinced that he was handed what he termed a "one-way ticket," it being deliberately intended he should never return. This prisoner stated that he hated every minute he spent in the raiders and added: "Even though I was in the water the ship couldn't sink fast enough for me."

	IV. EARLY HISTORY OF RAIDER "33" ("PINGUIN")

	Raider "33" was stated by prisoners to have originally been a cargo vessel of 7,800 tons belonging to the Hansa Line, Bremen. There was much evidence to show that she was one of the "Fels" Class of cargo ships, but prisoners expressed genuine uncertainty as to her exact identity, stating that, for security reasons, great pains were taken to keep this information from them. Two prisoners, who appeared to be reliable men, stated that "33" was formerly "Kandelfels."
	(N.I.D. Note. "33" was certainly a vessel of the "Fels" Class, most probably the "Kandelfels.")
	Prisoners from Raider "16," captured aboard the supply ship "Alstertor," alleged, however, that "33" was the "Stolzenfels," a sister ship of Raider "16," which was originally the "Goldenfels," The names "Rheinfels" and "Tannenfels" were also mentioned in connection with German raiders, but were not definitely attributed to either "33" or "16."
	(N.I.D. Note. "Tannenfels" was a German merchant ship which escaped from Kismayu and was in company with "Raider "16" in February, 1941. She is believed to have reached Germany in safety.)
	At the outbreak of war, or shortly after, "33" docked at the Deschimag Yards, Bremen, for fitting out as a raider. Prisoners stated that it was the general practice for raiders to be fitted out at the yards at which they were built.
	Shortly after Christmas, 1939, when the conversion process was nearing completion, a considerable number of engine room Petty Officers and ratings were drafted to "33" for a course of general instruction.
	Raider "33" is believed to have been ready for sea by the end of January, 1940, and in early February, when enough men had been embarked to work the ship, she undertook a short cruise in the North Sea, visiting Bremerhaven and Hamburg before returning to Bremen.
	In March, "33"' embarked ammunition which included 30 torpedoes supplied by lighter, and proceeded to Kiel by way of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. Here the full ship's complement of approximately 320 was made up by a fresh draft of men.
	Then an extended period of trials began in the Baltic. The ship was tested for speed - and gunnery, torpedo and aircraft-launching exercises were carried out. It was stated that anti-aircraft gunners were given as targets gas-filled balloons, about 18 in. in diameter, which were released from the ship.
	In connection with these exercises, "33" put into Danzig, Gotenhafen, Memel and possibly other Baltic ports. On these occasions, according to prisoners, her main armament remained concealed and large guns, made of wood, were mounted on deck in order to confuse the observations of enemy agents. (This statement could not be confirmed.) As an additional security measure the ship's number was made known as "22" at this time, prisoners stating that all raiders have two numbers - one for exclusive use in home ports. (This statement should be treated with reserve.)
	Trials having been completed, "33" returned to Kiel.



	13

	V. CRUISE OF RAIDER "33"

	Raider "33" was stated by prisoners to have left Kiel on 8th June, 1940, for Gotenhafen where he took nearly 300 mines on board. This completed preparations for her war cruise and on 15th June, "33" left Gotenhafen and proceeded to the North Sea by way of the Kattegat and Skagerrack, escorted by two boom defence vessels. At this time "33" was disguised as the Russian ship "Pechowa," as it was realised that the majority of ships likely to be met in the far north Atlantic would be Russian. One prisoner stated that, besides flying the Hammer and Sickle flag, "33" was carrying complete ship's papers of the "Pechowa," in case she was challenged and stopped. He added that photographs of the ship flying the Russian flag had been taken in Germany and were kept on board.
	Parting company with her escort, "33" set course to the north and, having hugged the Norwegian coast, put into a lonely fjord. Here the wooden guns, which were still on board, were broken up and dumped over the side. After lying hidden for a night and a day "33" continued on her journey. Few details were forthcoming as to "33's" movements during the next two or three weeks, but it is probable that the ship sailed round the north of Iceland and reached the Atlantic proper after making the passage of the Denmark Straits, one prisoner having stated that this was, at the time, the invariable route chosen by raiders when running the British blockade. This part of the voyage did not pass off entirely without adventure. According to one prisoner at 0300 on the day after leaving Norway there was a sudden call to action stations. He ran to his post in the wireless cabin and heard that a British submarine had surfaced close to the ship. The Captain immediately turned the ship with her stern to the submarine and ordered full speed ahead. An extremely heavy sea was running and the submarine, which had taken up the chase, was soon left behind. When it was out of sight, the prisoner alleged, there were sudden cries from the look-outs and two torpedoes were seen to scrape past the ship, one to port and one to starboard. The prisoner stated that had either struck the ship no man could have survived in the seas.
	"33" is believed to have kept her disguise as "Pechowa" until nearing the Equator when after a day and night's readjustment of camouflage, she assumed the identity of the Norwegian ship "Tamerlane," a 7,000-ton cargo vessel belonging to the Wihelmsen Line of Oslo.
	The first confirmed appearance of "33" in the South Atlantic was on 21st July in position 06° 38' S. and 018° 32' W., where she met and sank "Domingo de Larrinaga," of Liverpool, by shelling, and finally torpedo.
	(N.I.D. Note. A distress message from "Domingo de Larrinaga" was received.)
	Prisoners stated that this, their first victim, was the result of a chance encounter. The Captain of "33," Kapitan zur See (Captain) Ernst-Felix Krueder, had been given strict orders to avoid all contact with other ships, until she reached his area of operations, which was to be the Southern Indian Ocean, south of the Equator. When the "Domingo de Larrinaga" hove in sight, however, the opportunity was considered too good to miss. Prisoners stated that the first ship they sank carried 15,000 tons of corn and there was keen disappointment, when it was found that their victim had too little fuel on board to justify the risk of sending her back to Germany as a prize. (It has not been ascertained whether "Domingo de Larrinaga" was the ship referred to.)
	Soon after this success, when steering due south, "33" was alleged to have met a U-Boat. According to one prisoner, who admits he was drunk at the time, the U-Boat Commander, a bearded man about 6 ft. 2 in. tall, came on board to visit Captain Krueder, and stayed for some hours. This prisoner alleged that the U-Boat then kept company with "33" for two days on her run south. It has proved almost impossible to confirm this story, but one other prisoner has made an obscure reference to a U-Boat which was supplied with food, torpedoes and fuel, "somewhere off Cape Town."
	Having reached the Indian Ocean "33's" raiding activities began in earnest. On the morning of 25th August her aircraft, which was out on reconnaissance at the limit of its patrol, sighted "Filefjell." The aircraft bore South African markings and flew over the ship without its disguise being penetrated. Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Mueller, the observer, who spoke excellent English, then scribbled out



	14

	a message stating that raiders were in the vicinity and ordering "Filefjell" to steer a certain course which in fact was to bring her to "33." This message was dropped squarely aboard "Filefjell" in a partially filled sandbag containing a tin canister, and was acknowledged by the Captain who flashed "Thank you very much" on an Aldis lamp. The aircraft then circled the ship for some time, to ensure that the instructions were being adhered to, before returning to "33." A second sortie was made by the aircraft during the afternoon, to make sure that the ruse was succeeding, and in the evening "Filefjell" was intercepted by "33" and sunk by time bomb in estimated position 26° S. and 49° E. after the crew had been taken off.
	Kapitan zur See (Captain) Krueder was stated by prisoners to have disapproved of the methods employed by the aircraft to effect this capture and even to have forbidden their use in the future.
	A day after this incident "33" lost her first aircraft through a launching accident, the circumstances of which are described under the heading "Aircraft" in Chapter VI.
	Raider "33" then proceeded to her next attack which resulted in the sinking by shelling and probably time bomb, of the tanker "British Commander" in 29° 37' S., and 45° 50' E., in the early morning of 27th August, 1940. A distress message was made. This attack has been confirmed by all prisoners persuaded to talk.
	"33's" next attack, resulting in the probable sinking of "Morviken" on 28th August, in estimated position 27° S. and 050° E., without a distress signal being made, was also confirmed.
	About this time, prisoners stated, trouble developed with "33's" refrigerating and cooling plant which could not be repaired by those on board. Accordingly a request was made by wireless to German Operations Directorate in Berlin for the assistance of an expert engineer who had been sent out to the South Atlantic from Bordeaux on 15th July, 1940, with a roving commission to visit any raider which had suffered damage or was in need of repair. This engineer, who is a prisoner, first asserted that he had sailed in the tanker "Nordmark," then masquerading as the American ship "Dixie" of California, and, after a journey of two to three weeks, had been transferred in mid-ocean to the cruiser "Admiral Hipper." After he had been two weeks on board the cruiser a South Atlantic rendezvous was arranged with Raider "10," which had been engaged by H.M.S. "Alcantara" on 28th July, 1940, and had suffered superficial damage to superstructure aft and to two dynamos. Prisoner stated that he was left in "10" by the cruiser and took about two weeks to effect repairs. During this time, in early September, orders were received from the Operations Directorate in Berlin that his services were needed in "33" and the two ships were instructed to rendezvous.
	When it was proved to the prisoner that "Admiral Hipper" could not have been operating in the Atlantic at that time, he told an even more fanciful story that he had, in fact, made the journey in stages, in "Nordmark," a U-Boat and another raider to "10." He was adamant that "10" had met "33," but added that, for security reasons, "10" and "33" were kept out of sight of one another and that he was ferried across the horizon in a motor-boat. He asserted that the rendezvous took place after the sinking of "Morviken" and before"33's" next attack, i.e., between 28th August, 1940, and 12th September, 1940. He thought it possible that "33" had sailed some distance to meet "10" and therefore that his transference took place somewhere south of Africa.
	"33" next attacked and sank by gunfire "Benavon," in estimated position 26° S., and 051° E., on 12th September, 1940. No distress signal was made, "Benavon's" radio officer being fatally wounded.
	According to prisoners, "Benavon" replied to a warning shot with three rounds, the first being short, the second over and the third a direct hit amidships. This round is reported to have entered one of the rating's mess-rooms, but it caused only slight damage, as it failed to explode owing to the non-removal of the nosecap of the shell. Fifty-nine shells were then fired in reply by "33" and twenty-four of "Benavon's" crew were reported killed.
	(N.I.D. Note. This statement has been confirmed by a British prisoner of war from another of "33's" victims who escaped to this country.)



	15

	Krueder was stated by prisoner to have been much up-set at this unnecessary loss of life and to have questioned survivors, as to why they presumed to engage a six-gun ship. It was stated that he received the reply that, as only one gun was visible in "33" it was not unnaturally assumed by the Captain of "Benavon" that he had been challenged merely by a one-gun ship. Krueder was then said to have given instructions that, in future engagements, the warning signal was to be a full broadside either short of, or over the target. It should be noted that prisoners praised the accuracy of "Benavon's" gunfire.
	On parting company, Raider "10" is believed to have doubled back to the South Atlantic while "33" set course E.S.E. Two days later, on about 17th December, 1940, "33" sighted, and captured without resistance, the Norwegian tanker "Nordvard" in estimated position 30° S. and 060° E. It was decided to make a prize of this vessel and a prize crew was put aboard, together with a number of prisoners not exceeding 200, of whom the majority were white. "Nordvard" was then sent back to France and was reported to be discharging cargo at Bordeaux in December, 1940.
	Raider "33" continued eastward and on 19th October, 1940, approximately, she captured a second Norwegian tanker, "Storstad," in the estimated position 36° S. and 114° E., again without resistance.
	After capture "Storstad" was deemed suitable to be made a prize, but as there were no further prisoners to be sent home, and as her cargo consisted of fuel oil which could be used by "33," it was decided to keep her in company for some weeks as a prison and supply ship.
	It was also planned that, as "Storstad" had been captured near to the Australian coast and before a distress signal could be made, she should take part in the laying of mines outside Australian harbours, an enterprise upon which "33" was now about to embark. It was thought that "Storstad," being bound for Melbourne, could play her part and escape undetected, before suspicions as to her true fate were aroused.
	A working party under the special engineer was put aboard "Storstad" and in less than a day the ship was adapted to act as a minelayer. 110 mines were transhipped and stowed on deck, a dangerous operation, as the motor-boat conveying the mines was small and in imminent danger of capsizing with each mine it carried. The transfer was, however, effected without mishap. "Storstad" was then taken over by a prize crew who disguised themselves in the clothes of Norwegian seamen.
	The two ships now parted company, "33" proceeding well south of Australia and round Tasmania to the latitude of Sydney. Here she turned about north of the harbour and, proceeding south at full speed, laid mines by night across the entrance. It was stated that these mines, which were laid from the trap at the stern, were dropped in groups at irregular intervals, it being thought that this method would render sweeping more difficult.
	"33" then ran into heavy weather for three days and turned off-shore eastward before returning to the eastern entrance of the Bass Straits, where further mines were laid. "33" continued south, but came close to land opposite Port Hobart, Tasmania, where more mines were sown. After this operation "33" headed once more for the Indian Ocean.
	Prisoners stated that in all approximately 200 mines, both moored and magnetic, had then been laid.
	Meanwhile, "Storstad" had approached Melbourne and the story told by German prisoners captured at earlier dates was again repeated to the effect that the Germans had seen people on the promenade and had heard a band playing. The tanker was allegedly challenged by a shore station and answered that she was a Norwegian ship. Mines were then laid across the harbour under cover of a quantity of washing which had been hung out along the deck to dry, this screen effectively hiding the mines from view. A similar operation was repeated outside Adelaide harbour and again in the Bass Straits, where it was alleged that "Storstad" was detected at night and swept by the beam from a lighthouse, but again made a plausible reply to a challenge. Prisoners also stated that, at one tin during this venture, "Storstad" nearly collided with what was taken to be an armed merchant



	16

	cruiser sent to intercept them. As there were still mines on board half the crew panicked and could scarcely be restrained from jumping overboard, until it was seen that the strange ship was making off without having become suspicious. Having emerged at the eastern entrance of the Bass Straits, and having laid all her mines, "Storstad" rounded Tasmania and made her way back to the Indian Ocean to rejoin "33."
	Prisoners described how they listened eagerly for weeks to Australian wireless stations hoping to hear the success of their enterprise. They were under the impression that they had sunk eight ships in all and claimed to have heard "mined area" warning broadcast over the Australian wireless up to 23rd April, 1941.
	(N.I.D. Note. The "Hertford" was mined in the Spencer Gulf on 7th December, 1940, but was towed safely to port. The "Cambridge" and the "City of Rayville" were mined and sunk in the Bass Straits on the 7th and 8th November respectively. No other sinkings have been reported in the mined areas and the successes were, therefore, three, and not eight ships.)
	Having rejoined in the Indian Ocean, "33" and "Storstad" set course approximately north-west after rounding Western Australia. At this time, or shortly after, "33" changed her disguise to that of a British merchantman. The hull was painted grey, and the superstructure brown, while the after 15-cm. (5.91-in) gun was exposed.
	"33's" next capture was the S.S. "Nowshera" in the early morning of 18th November, 1940, in estimated position 30° S. and 098° E. No distress signal was made. The raider lay alongside "Nowshera" for 12 hours, while the ship was thoroughly plundered. A large amount of stores and provisions was removed, including male and female clothing, cases of oranges, tobacco, tinned food and soap.
	Apparently "33's" refrigerating plant was still giving trouble, as the special engineer stated that he urged his Captain to give him time to remove the entire cooling plant from the captured ship. Kapitan zur See Krueder replied, however, that he dared not risk standing by the ship for the minimum of three days which this operation would take. Apparently the "Nowshera" was also inspected with a view to making her a prize, but it was decided that, including "33's" scanty supply, she would not have enough coal to bring her back to a German controlled port. Accordingly "Nowshera" was reluctantly sunk by time bomb, and was stated to have gone down quickly, as the bulk of her cargo was ore.
	The capture and sinking of "33's" next victim, "Maimoa," in position 31° 50' S. and 100° 21' E., on 20th November, 1940, was confirmed by prisoners, who added that again an aircraft was used. "Maimoa" first appears to have been sighted by the raider at night, the chase lasting until the following afternoon. Towards the end "33's" aircraft was launched and the pilot alleged that he flew over the ship and ordered her to stop. This the captain refused to do and a bomb was dropped in front of "Maimoa's" bows. The ship replied with machine-gun fire and it was confirmed by prisoners that the aircraft was hit and damaged. The aircraft then machine-gunned the ship without success. During one of its flights over the ship the aircraft's aerial was alleged by the pilot to have fouled that of the "Maimoa" carrying it away. It was stated that no special trailing hook device was used to cause this damage. Distress messages had previously been sent. As the afternoon drew on, "33" finally came within range and fired a full broadside across "Maimoa's" bows. The Captain of the merchantman then gave up the unequal battle as hopeless. According to prisoners the entire crew of "Maimoa" had reached a state of complete exhaustion when brought aboard the raider. It was disclosed that they had been stoking in relays in a frantic endeavour to increase the ship's speed. The general opinion aboard the raider was that "Maimoa" had made a most gallant attempt to escape.
	On the following night, 21st November, 1940, "33" encountered and sank, by shelling and time-bomb, the Port Line (Cunard Cargo Service) steamer "Port Brisbane" in position 29° 22' S. and 095° 36' E. Prisoners stated that the "Port Brisbane" was fired by the shelling and burned for an hour before a boarding party could extinguish the flames. A quantity of meat, butter, bacon and lard was removed before the ship, having been judged unsuitable as a prize, was sunk by time-bomb. "33" then steamed full speed for the rest of the night to get clear of the area before proceeding slowly south-westward.



	17

	Few details were forthcoming from prisoners as to "33's" next capture, "Port Wellington," but it was confirmed that she was shelled and sunk in estimated position 31° S. and 071° E. on 30th November, 1940. "33" is believed to have taken more meat from this ship, jettisoning her own supplies which were now going bad.
	(N.I.D. Note. During the whole of 30th November, 1940, "33" proceeded at full speed to attack and sink "Port Wellington" by shelling, approximately in the position stated. "Port Wellington" appears to have been reported and shadowed by "Storstad." It was reported that the wireless officer was killed before a distress signal could be made. A QQQ signal from an unknown ship was intercepted at 1300 hours, zone time, on 29th November, 1940' this might have been made by another vessel which failed to cancel it, or by the raider as a ruse, but no position was given.)
	The next incident of note in the cruise was a rendezvous with Raider"16," stated to be bearing the name "Robbe," which occurred on approximately 10th December, 1940, in estimated position 38° S. and 065° E. According to prisoners the two ships lay within half a mile of each other for one day, while Kapitan zur See Krueder paid a visit to Kapitan zur See Rogge in Raider "16" and the special engineer completed a rapid inspection of "16's" engines and electrical equipment. The two crews were kept apart. It is not known what was discussed between the two Captains, but it may be noted that; on parting company, "33" made straight for the far South Atlantic, where a Norwegian whaling fleet was operating. It is possible that Kapitan zur See Krueger was advised of the presence of this fleet by Kapitan zur See Rogge.
	At about this time "Storstad" proceeded away alone to the South Atlantic, presumably having as many prisoners on board from "33" and possibly "16," as she could manage. It has been stated that she had as many as 300 British prisoners on board from "33" alone, between 60 and 80 per cent. being whites. She also carried 50 cases about 100 tons, of Glimmer isolating material of which there was known to be a shortage in Germany, and some thousands of tons of wheat, all of which had been taken from captured ships. During the time she had been in company with "33" "Storstad" had supplied oil to the raider twice.
	(N.I.D. Note. "Storstad" had a rendezvous with "Admiral Scheer" on 6th January, 1941, in estimated position 17° S. and 017° W. On 7th January, 1941, she had a rendezvous with "Admiral Scheer," "Nordmark" and Raider "10," and was then sent back to Bordeaux.)
	Christmas was spent as "33" was still heading south. It appears to have been a remarkable festival. According to prisoners a general share-out of captured booty was arranged but, when it came to a division of the spoils, it was found that certain officers had already picked over the plunder and appropriated all the most valuable articles. It is alleged that the petty officers, as a protest, refused to accept anything and handed over their share for division among the ratings. These men were thereupon loaded with all manner of gifts, including civilian suits and clothing, electric razors and wireless sets, with special parcels of women's clothes and babies' layettes for the married. A mock auction was also held to decide ownership of articles of value, of which there were insufficient to go round. Cigars, tobacco, cigarettes, fruit cakes, sweetmeats and bottles of beer and whisky were distributed in abundance and the Christmas "party" ended in an hilarious carousal, during which ratings postured and capered about the decks clad in grotesquely padded brassieres and other articles of ladies underwear. Prisoners stated that the upshot of the irregularities in distribution was that Captain Krueder reprimanded his officers, forbidding a number of them to touch alcohol for a month.
	Shortly after Christmas a second mishap occurred which might well have had most serious consequences. Owing, as the special engineer prisoner stated, to "a gross piece of carelessness," a water main broke and flooded a generator which was working under a heavy load at the time. A serious short-circuit resulted and the generator was wrecked, depriving the ship of much of its electric power. It was thought that the generator was beyond repair, but it was taken to pieces,. special tools were made, and it was later completely rewound and brought to a usable condition. This repair too three and a half months and was regarded in the ship as a remarkable piece of engineering in the circumstances

	(C42749)



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	"33" continued south and was stated by prisoners to have nearly reached the Antarctic continent before turning west to intercept the Norwegian whaling fleet. This interception occurred on 14th January, 1941, the Norwegian ships having betrayed their presence by making radio signals. For this attack "33" was disguised as a Russian research ship, having a broad blue band bearing a red hammer and sickle device, painted round her funnel. According to prisoners, "33" first captured the whale refinery ship "Ole Wegger" and the whaler supply ship "Solglimt" in approximate position 59° S. and 002° 30' W., without a shot being fired. These two ships were tied alongside each other at the time of capture and were in the process of transferring supplies. A number of whale catchers were also seized and prize crews put aboard all these vessels. "33" then proceeded about 100 miles eastward and captured the whale factory "Pelagos" on 16th January. No distress signals were made during these operations and it is believed that only three catchers of the entire whaling fleet escaped.
	"33" stocked herself very plentifully from "Solglimt's" supplies, taking on board warm woolen jerseys, scarves and stockings, besides tinned food, apples and potatoes, which were described as being washed, wrapped in paper and packed like oranges.
	The Norwegian seamen were promised money, to be paid in Germany, and the fleet, now under German control, started north with "33" and probably passed just to the west of Tristan da Cunha. On about 17th February, 1941, they met the S.S. "Duquesa," then in German hands, in estimated position 20° S. and 017° W. "Duquesa" had been captured by the pocket battleship "Admiral Scheer" on 18th December, 1940. The ship was found to be loaded with eggs for the Argentine, and it was decided to put a prize crew of "Admiral Scheer" men aboard and to use the vessel as a stationary supply ship for any raider, or other German ship, which could rendezvous with her. Prisoners from "33" stated that they believe that raiders "10," "16" and possibly "41" all visited "Duquesa" to take off eggs, besides German supply ships. The "Admiral Scheer" is also believed to have visited "Duquesa" to take off eggs, besides German supply ships. The "Admiral Scheer" is also believed to have revisited "Duquesa" on at least one occasion.
	At the time of the rendezvous with "33," "Duquesa," a coal burner, had exhausted her fuel and all woodwork about the ship had been chopped up and consumed. The meat carried by "Duquesa" had also gone bad, owing to lack of fuel for the refrigerating plant, and it was decided that the best plan was to sink the ship. While preparations were being made "Duquesa's" prize crew broke open the remaining eggs and stated a battle royal, each man being armed with a quantity of eggs as ammunition. This battle came to an abrupt end when two men fell down a hold and suffered broken limbs and other injuries. The prize crew was then taken off and distributed among the Norwegian whalers to release a number of ratings from "33" for further duties in their own ship.
	While "33's" men were making arrangements to sink "Duquesa," a second accident occurred. It had been planned to dynamite a number of bulkheads inside the ship, in order to hasten sinking when the final scuttling charge was fired. One of these preliminary explosions proved far greater than anticipated, owing it was thought, to the fact that the air was thick with coal dust, and two ratings were severely burned. Prisoners stated that the scuttling charge was then fired electrically from a motor boat.
	"33" then left the whaling fleet to head north and doubled back to eastward. One whale-catcher was retained as an escort and was placed in charge of Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Stenner, who was given a crew of between 20 and 30 men. This escort vessel of about 100 tons was re-named "Adjutant" and was believed capable of 16 knots. The remaining ships of the whaling fleet, with the exception of two catchers, which were intercepted, were believed to have reached French ports. Prisoners said that they were told that the whaling fleet carried enough oil to supply Germany's margarine requirements for one year.
	Proceeding east, "33" passed at least 500 miles to the south of Capetown in order to avoid air patrols from land. The next vessel she met was the German supply ship "Alstertor" from which she was to receive ammunition, a new aeroplane and about 50 officers and ratings to make up her full complement again. This rendezvous took place in estimated position 48° S. and 055° W. at the beginning of March, 1941. The men were apparently transferred with ease, but



	19

	a heavy sea was running which made the transhipping of the aeroplane quite impossible. At 1900 that evening, while discussions as to the best course to adopt were going on, Raider "45" arrived, according to prisoners, and asked to be supplied also. This again presented a transfer difficulty. Prisoners stated that "45's" captain, who was senior to Kapitän zur See Krueder, insisted that "33" would take supplies from "Alstertor" and ferry them across to "45." Captain Krueder is alleged to have been furious at this request, but helpless. The situation was retrieved as the weather suddenly became much worse causing all operations to be abandoned. It was then decided that the three ships should run for Kerguelen Island, so that the supplies could be transferred in a sheltered bay. Two days later the ships reached Kerguelen and entered Gazelle Bay, where the transfers of ammunition and stores took place. It has been stated that "45" went alongside "Alstertor" first and was supplied with 750 15-cm. (5.91-in.) shells and 20-mm. (0.79-in.) ammunition. "33" followed and received one aircraft, 600 15-cm. shells and 20-mm. ammunition, four torpedoes and an Arado "196" seaplane. As a compliment Captain Krueder presented the Captain of "Alstertor" with 500 cases of eggs from "Duquesa." "Alstertor" also brought gifts from the German Comforts Fund and mail for "33," this being the last occasion upon which the raider's crew had word from home. The comforts appear to have been a general disappointment, one rating prisoner saying that the main item was two cases of green apples which, when shared out, came to exactly two apples per man.
	Raider "45" appears to have left Kerguelen almost at once after receiving supplies, but "33" and "Alstertor" remained together for some days, the two crews being allowed to mix freely. The two ships attempted to follow a precedent set by "16" during a previous visit and to take on fresh water by mean of a pipe-line from a waterfall in Gazelle Bay. It was found that "33" had not enough pipe-lines at her disposal for the ship to approach land with safety, and three days were spent ferrying water to the ship in three cutters. This was described by prisoners as a particularly heavy task. When the water was taken on board it was found to be brackish and full of water-fleas and every drop had to be filtered and tested by the ship's doctor before it was passed for consumption.
	While exploring the island ratings captured a number of penguins as mascots for their ship and these they kept in a pen on the upper deck, feeding them with tinned fish, until they died of heat when the ship subsequently neared the equator.
	After leaving Kerguelen towards the middle of March, "33" headed north and prisoners confirmed that they attacked and sank "Empire Light" on 25th April, 1941, in estimated position 02° S. and 061° E. No distress signal was made by the latter, the wireless cabins being wrecked by the first shell fired.
	"33" continued north, still accompanied by her consort "Adjutant," and, for the first time during the voyage, crossed the equator in the Indian Ocean. The ship was now approaching the busy shipping lanes leading into the Gulf of Aden, considered to be a particularly dangerous area by raiders, and the lower deck ratings became uneasy and depressed. It was rumoured that the Captain was disobeying his instructions and it is alleged that Oberleutnant der Reserve (Lieutenant of the Reserve) Michaelsen, the first Navigating Officer, remonstrated with Captain Krueger and refused to take further responsibility for keeping the ship out of danger. Krueder was popularly supposed by prisoners to have replied, that he had received orders to mine the Gulf of Aden, Bombay and Karachi, in company with another Raider (possibly "36," as she is thought to have been closing "33's" position at this time), "adjutant," and any other prize he could capture.
	On 25th April, 1941, "33" sighted "Clan Buchanan" in estimated position 05° 24' N. and 062° 46' E. and attacked at once. This ship was alleged to have had 200 tons of dynamite on board which was immediately put under water by the captain. Prompt shelling by "33" could not prevent "Clan Buchanan" from making distress signals and again spirits sank on board the raider.
	On 7th May, 1941, "33" closed the 3,600 ton tanker "British Emperor" in position 08° 30' N. and 056° 25 E. to make her final, most dramatic and most vicious attack on a British ship. Prisoners stated that it was the intention of Krueder to capture the tanker intact, for two reasons, firstly because he needed oil for his own ship, secondly because he considered the tanker suitable for use in

	(C42749) C2



	20

	mining operations. Accordingly he ordered that the first warning salvo should be well over the ship. This salvo did not, however, intimidate the Captain of "British Emperor," who ordered distress signals to be sent out. As the signals persisted, Krueder commanded that the ship should be sunk immediately by shell-fire, at the same time instructing his telegraphists to jam the distress signals and advise him when they had ceased. As soon as the signals were no longer audible "33" stopped firing, but, as soon as the shelling ceased, distress signals were again made and shelling began once more. This process was repeated for some time until the telegraphist on duty "became impatient," to use his won words, and told Krueder that "British Emperor" was continuing to send distress messages when, in fact, these signals had ceased some minutes before. This callous action on the part of the telegraphist must certainly have caused unnecessary loss of life. Nothing was now left of "British Emperor" but a blazing wreck, and she was finally sunk by torpedo.
	Prisoners stated that they knew for certain from the moment of this attack they could no longer escape detection, and that their doom was sealed. They commented bitterly on the fact that Fate could decree that it should be their smallest victim who should bring about their end.
	Following this attack Krueder decided to part company with "Adjutant," which is believed to have been sent south to join forces with another raider. According to one prisoner, who is not considered too reliable, "Adjutant" had taken mines on board which it was intended should be laid off Capetown.

	VI. SINKING OF RAIDER "33"

	When the report that "British Emperor" was sinking was received, H.M.S. "Cornwall" closed towards the position at high speed in accordance with orders from C.-in-C., East Indies. She carried out a vigorous search and at 0219 G.M.T. on 8th May, 1941, her aircraft, which was 60 miles away, reported a suspicious vessel.
	According to an entry in a diary belonging to a prisoner, "33" passed a large ship at 0200 on this day, but apparently Krueder had lost appetite for a further attack. "Cornwall's" aircraft appears first to have been sighted by "33" at 0400. By this time "33" had reassumed her disguise as "Tamerlane," hoisting the Norwegian flag. The aircraft - some prisoners believed there were two flying in relays - reappeared at intervals throughout the morning, "33" setting course at full speed away from the point of appearance of the machines. Each time aircraft approached the ship Krueder ordered the entire ship's company below decks. Many prisoners regarded this as a mistake. They stated that it would have seemed far less suspicious had some ratings remained on deck to wave at the aeroplanes, or even to open fire on them, in accordance with what was believed to be the recommended procedure, should a suspicious airplane approach too near a British or Allied ship.
	Distress messages were, however, sent out, as from the "Tamerlane," stating that the ship was being attacked by two suspicious aircraft. The aircraft was stated to have returned at 1000 and to have ordered the raider to steer a certain course. This order was obeyed as long as the aircraft remained in sight, but immediately it disappeared "33" again altered course. Shortly after, according to prisoners, a message was picked up from a Japanese ship in the vicinity, disclosing that she had been stopped by a cruiser. Ready use lockers were at once filled and all preparations made for battle. At 1100 a first alarm was sounded, smoke having been seen on the horizon. Krueder turned his ship away, maintaining his disguise, and again ordered a distress signal to be made. "Cornwall" now came rapidly onto sight and flashed a morse signal ordering the vessel to stop. This order was disobeyed, "33" continuing on her course at full speed. A warning shot was now fired, to which "33" paid no attention, but a second shot caused her to turn and fire two torpedoes shortly before the German war flag was broken, as prisoners have confirmed. "Cornwall's" aircraft were now circling the ship and prisoners alleged that they reported the course of the torpedoes.



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	Battle having been joined at a range of approximately 10,000 yards, "33" opened fast and accurate fire with four-gun broadsides. The first salvoes, according to prisoners, were fired at intervals of six seconds. Prisoners claimed that one of these salvoes straddled and hit "Cornwall" and they stated that they were afterwards told that one of their shells severed an electric cable, disabling "Cornwall's" "A" and "B" turrets and nullifying her degaussing gear, that another had burst a main steam pipe, rendering two engine rooms uninhabitable, that a third had wrecked "Cornwall's" catapult gear, and that a fourth had holed her below the waterline. This success appears to have unsettled "33's" gunners. According to an officer prisoner, they had gone into battle dispirited but steady enough. After the sudden change in fortunes they became over-nervous and shooting became wilder. In addition, according to prisoners, "Cornwall" had turned away to open "C" and "D" arcs and range was increasing. This rendered the further use of torpedoes out of the question.
	At about this time CO2 gas was released from steel bottles into No. 2 magazine, containing the aircraft bombs and petrol and the torpedo heads, besides ammunition, to prevent explosions in the case of fire spreading through the hold.
	At 1225 approximately, "Cornwall" straddled "33," three hits being registered. The first was said to have struck the foremost 15-cm. gun, slewing it round and wrecking it; the second landed just below the bridge and the third penetrated the mine room aft. There were still 140 mines on board at the time and there was a tremendous explosion, the ship breaking her back and vanishing within 30 seconds. Of the entire ship's company not a single man who was stationed aft is believed to have survived. A second salvo struck the ship as she was settling. Prisoners remember little of the final scenes on board. It was stated that, when action was joined, the doors of the two holds containing prisoners were unlocked and an armed guard placed outside each. These guards were told not to let a single man pass until the order was given by an officer. This officer is believed to have been killed before he could give the command, and it is thought that only 25 prisoners escaped out of the total number of 183 held in the ship. It is also stated that men in the foremost magazine became trapped as the hoist, which also served as the only escape hatch, jammed in its shaft.
	Krueder was last seen by prisoners on the bridge with blood streaming from a head wound. It is alleged that the majority of the officers survived the explosion but deliberately shared the Captain's fate and went down with the ship. At the time of the explosion code books had not been destroyed.
	Prisoners estimated that well over 100 men managed to leap over the side, but scores were either drawn down by the ship or killed by falling debris.
	It was stated that, during the battle, a radio message was sent out to the German Operations Directorate in code which ran: "Am in action against British heavy cruiser. We have sunk 150,000 tons." A warning message was also sent out to the supply ship "Alstertor" which, prisoners stated, had followed "33" to take off British prisoners and was only a day's sail away.

	VIII. WIRELESS AND COMMUNICATIONS

	Raider "33" was stated by prisoners to have carried six transmitting and ten receiving sets.
	Three of the transmitting sets were made by A.E.G. and were short-wave of 100 or 150 watt power. It was stated that these were in the ship when she was taken over for conversion by the German Navy. A fourth transmitter was a naval type 200 watt short-wave set made by Telefunken and was supplied during the ship's conversion. The fifth transmitting set was a long-wave, but according to prisoners, it was only used once, shortly before the ship was sunk, when distress messages were sent in order to deceive "Cornwall." The range of this set was stated to be only 600 miles. In addition a short-wave radio-telephone set was carried for use with the ship's aircraft. Medium wavelengths were never used.
	A staff of 15 petty officer telegraphists and ratings were on board, with a reserve of ten telegraphist ratings for transfer to prize ships.
	Watches kept were: 0800-1200, 1200-1600, 1600-2000, 2000-0200, 0200-0800.

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	22

	The system of six-hour night watches was criticized by prisoners as extremely arduous, one rating stating that during the whole of the cruise he never got a full night's sleep.
	Five men were on duty during a normal watch, ten men when the "first alarm" was sounded, and all fifteen when the ship went into action. In action, fifteen of the most commonly used British wavelengths were listened to. Normally two operators kept continuous watch on the German Home Service, while the remainder listened for the most part to English messages. These they could not read, but they claimed there was always a group which they recognized as indicating the urgency of the communication. They presumed "extremely urgent" groups to mean that their position had been located and the ship at once left the area. It was stated that the Wireless Officer spoke perfect English and had spent some years in England.
	According to prisoners, on the rare occasions on which they transmitted messages, 3 to 4 individual letter code groups representing whole sentences were used. It was added that only officers transmitted coded messages. Instructions received in code were first deciphered by petty officers and then passed to officers for final decoding.
	Prisoners stated that the messages they received from home were transmitted by Norddeich and Kiel short-wave stations and also by Nauen (long wave).
	The most suitable Norddeich wavelengths were 18, 36 and 40 metres. Approximately 2 metres next to each were the Kiel wavelengths. For the North Atlantic area a 54-metre wavelength was also used, but it was never listened to by "33" as the other wavelengths sufficed.
	It was stated that the wavelength most often used for communication with prize ships was 36 metres.
	Prisoners alleged that without possession of the code it was impossible to tell for which ships messages transmitted from Germany were intended.
	It was stated that a new message would first be given at 0215 and was then constantly repeated in order to ensure reception.
	The Nauen long-wave station is alleged to have been chiefly occupied in repeating messages. A repeated message would be preceded by a number and the date and time at which it was first sent, so that a continuous check might be made. Important messages were often repeated for as long as 48 hours. The most suitable wavelengths for transmission from the ship were given as 18, 24 and 36 metres. Atmospherics played a great part in the choice of wavelengths, and influences due to seasonable and solar variances were observed and noted. According to prisoners a mass of observations made was lost when the ship went down. They considered their loss a great misfortune, as the German Navy had only limited short-wave experience.
	Prisoners also said that they were at times troubled by what they imagined was deliberate jamming from a station situated in India.
	It was stated emphatically that "33" carried no R.D/F and that use of this apparatus in the German Navy was confined to battleships and battle cruisers.
	In "33" special masthead look-out watches were kept by officers stationed in the crow's nest. Range of vision from this point was 20 miles. Officers were used for this work, as intelligent observation of ships in the vicinity was regarded as absolutely essential for the raider. No carrier pigeons were carried by "33" for communication between ship and the aircraft, a practice which, it is believed, is being followed by some raiders.
	There was apparently no ban on listening-in to wireless broadcast programmes, which were frequently relayed by the ship's loudspeakers. Dance music from Australia was stated to be particularly popular.
	As regards training, a telegraphist said that he had taken a six months' course and had attained a speed of 80 to 90 words per minute. Nowadays this course had been reduced to three months, the speed required being 70 words per minute. A telegraphist with three years' service received 81 marks per month pay, 28 marks hard-lying money and 56 marks for allowances, a total of 165 marks, the equivalent of about £8 5s, 0d. Ratings of less service were paid 75 marks monthly, 21 marks hard-lying money and 39 marks for allowances, totalling 135 marks (£6 15s. 0d.).
	It was alleged that one Petty Officer Telegraphist in "33" could take down messages on a typewriter at the rate of 180 words per minute. All ratings are now being trained to type messages directly on to a machine.
	The average age of telegraphist ratings in "33" was 22, not including one leading telegraphist who was over 40 and had seen service in the last war.



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	VIII. METEOROLOGY

	"33's" Senior Meteorological Officer, Dr. Ulrich Roll, who bore the rank of Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander), was among the survivors, but it must be stated that his interrogation proved unsatisfactory. Dr. Roll, aged 31, was obviously a most intelligent man, with high qualifications and he knew well which questions to avoid and which not to answer. It appeared that he had been educated at Heidelberg, Göttingen and Gotha universities. He had specialized in mathematics and physics for four years, with a view to becoming a professional meteorologist, and subsequently spent a further three years in the study of meteorology alone.
	He accompanied the "Meteor" on her North Atlantic survey and, it is believed, on her South Atlantic expedition. Dr. Roll stated that the result of this latter expedition had been studied with great care, and had proved of very great value.
	The following information was obtained from Dr. Roll by a Naval Meteorological Officer at Durban, when "33" survivors passed through that city, and is included in this report because it was beyond the capabilities of unspecialized interrogating officers to improve upon it:
	(1) Owing to the small size of their navy, the Germans are probably able to carry a much more highly trained meteorological officer in each of their few surface-going warships and surface raiders than the Royal Navy can.
	(2) Owing to their training, their general knowledge of Southern Hemisphere conditions is fairly sound, and has been augmented by the study of, at least, South American and South African synoptic charts in German before the war.
	(3) From the rapidity with which he refused to discuss the question of the issue of synoptics from Germany, it was inferred that Dr. Roll did not receive them.
	(4) The issue of synoptics may easily have been irregular and incomplete. This was inferred from Dr. Roll's very genuine regret at not receiving any Union of South Africa forecasts ("experience") in the Indian Ocean, necessary on account of the very great distance between his (supposedly) only available synoptics - Madagascar and Manila.
	(5) Dr. Roll did not appear to be receiving synoptic information from Portuguese East Africa. He seemed genuinely mystified at the official silence over synoptics of Lourenco Marques radio.
	(6) His reference to "Fine weather areas" (a) between the South East Trades and the South West Monsoon, and (b) towards the centre of the Indian Ocean, Anticyclonic System might possibly suggest that these areas might be used for rendezvous, refuelling, etc.
	(7) His reference to the Agulhas Current in conjunction with the discussion of Southerly Lows and Fronts suggests that he may possibly have had some practical experience in that area.
	(8) His reference to the type of "bad weather front" between a Low and a High indicates some knowledge of the type of Front which was known to Naval meteorological officers at Simonstown and Port Elizabeth as a "Secondary Front" before the introduction of the "Discont" system.
	During interrogation in England Dr. Roll stated that for the first eight weeks of the cruise he received weather reports from Norddeich, Kiel and Nauen wireless stations. These reports were received at 0200, 0230 and 0400.
	In one conversation Dr. Roll mentioned the discovery of an island in the vicinity of Kruegelen Island by a German named Kraus, and then suddenly checked himself, as if he had said more than he intended. Dr. Roll could not be persuaded to clarify his remark and it is not known whether he referred to Crozet Island, or whether the island was used by raiders.
	Dr. Roll stated that he knew of Crozet Island from his previous experiences but that he had not heard of it in connection with raiders.

	(C42749) C4

IX. LIFE ON BOARD "33"

Life on board appears to have been bounded by a mass of petty restrictions intended to uphold discipline in the extraordinary circumstances of the cruise. A fresh list of "Don't's" appeared on the ship's notice board each month and one prisoner stated that, with time, this list became so formidable that it would have been more sensible to have posted up notices stating what was permissible for the ship's company rather than what was not.

Extreme measures were taken to ensure that there should be no leakage of information both before and throughout the cruise. Prisoners stated that they were required to sign a new "Security Charter" each month binding them to secrecy on all matters concerning the ship, the names of officers, the names of cargoes, was well as meetings with other German ships. Prisoners alleged that their own ship was first numbered "33" on sailing. Previously she had been known as "22". This change of number was intended to confuse enemy agents in German ports. It was also added that the ship's company did not know their ship was named "Pinguin" until they had been three weeks at sea.

For the amusement of the ship's company about 50 full length and short films were taken on the cruise and were shown twice weekly in an improvised cinema, which could hold 100 persons. Some prisoners said that after they had seen one film ten times, all bulbs for the projecting apparatus were used up and the shows came to an end. In addition to the cinema, concerts were arranged and sing-songs, at which the most popular song was a ballad glorifying piracy.

Food was stated to have been exceptionally good. "33" was adequately stocked with provisions and these were supplemented by delicacies and luxuries taken from captured ships. A typical menu was as follows:

0700	Milk soup, black bread, butter, jam, coffee, tea or cocoa.
0900	One egg, black bread (for men on early watches).
1230	Fruit soup, salad, ham, tinned fruit.
1830	Baked potatoes, corned beef, black bread and tea.

Beer could be bought in the canteen, the allowance being half a litre per man per day.

Besides the daily beer ration a number of the crew seem to have had other access to alcohol, as cases of drunkenness do not seem to have been infrequent. One prisoner, the aircraft pilot, stated that, on one occasion he was helplessly drunk for three days on end. Prisoners have also stated that they searched each ship they captured for whiskey.

Supplies of green vegetables were stated to have run out after the ship had been two months at sea and, from this time onwards, the Ship's Company was given chocolate-covered vitamin tablets as a safeguard against scurvy. These tablets were formed in a block about half the size of a 2d. bar of chocolate, divided into small squares. At least one tablet was supposed to be eaten each day. Prisoners stated that, during the three and a half months between their capture and their arrival in England, their health suffered through lack of the tablets.

The fresh water issue was stated to be tasteless but was improved by the addition of lime capsules. The general standard of health throughout the cruise was stated to have been good. There was one case of appendicitis and some cases of kidney trouble brought on by chills. Prisoners alleged that many men had found that their teeth were loosening as the cruise drew on and this may be ascribed to lack of calcium in their diet. A large number of sets of false teeth was carried on board. Frequent injections against typhoid, dysentery and scurvy were given

Kapitan zur See Krueder was apparently popular with his men and obviously took considerable pains to see to their comfort and welfare. His action in detecting and sending home ten Gestapo men who had been posted to the ship by the National Socialist Party authorities, without his knowledge, was especially commended. At the same time Captain Krueder's rule was firm and prisoners alleged that two who had been found guilty of treasonable utterances, were sentenced to death by special court-martial and shot. Prisoners stated that the news of these executions caused considerable perturbation at the Berlin headquarters of the



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	Operations Directorate and that special orders were issued that, in future, offenders were not to be shot, but were to be sent back to Germany for court-martial. It was stated that there were two cases of suicide on board.
	Throughout the eleven months of the cruise the Ship's Company was only on shore once - at Kerguelen Island, in MArch, 1941. On this occasion hunting parties were arranged and a number of hares shot.
	Apparently no restraint was placed on boarding parties, while they were examining captured ships, and there was keen competition to be included in these parties. Prisoners boasted that, as the crews on intercepted ships invariably left hurriedly, they were able to rifle cabins and collect large bundles of valuables.
	The Ship's Company was forbidden to have any intercourse with British prisoners, and talking to, or even staring at, women prisoners was strictly prohibited. This latter rule was not always observed and prisoners related with amusement, how one young woman prisoner came aboard the ship in pajamas and unconcernedly powdered her face and patted her hair before surrendering to her captors.
	During the cruise post was received only once in mail bags brought from home by the "Alstertor" in March, 1941. The Ship's Company was allowed to send letter home in each prize they made, and also in "Alstertor." "33's" code postal address was M.09450.
	Messages of good wishes from relatives and friends were received by wireless, interspersed in a musical programme broadcast by German stations at 2000 every Wednesday and Saturday. Some members of the crew received wireless telegrams informing them of the death of relations.
	Krueder was stated to have addressed the Ship's Company every six weeks, discussing with them world events and encouraging them to endure the long separation from their homes. It appears that, during each of the later talks, Krueder promised his men that they would be home within two months, and he was subsequently forced to make excuses.
	The four Divisional officers lectured their men on security each week.
	No church services were arranged in the ship on Sundays, but an evangelical service, picked from German wireless broadcasts at 1030 on Sunday mornings, was relayed to a special mess-room set aside for the purpose and could be attended by all who wished to do so. A large number of the Ship's Company were Catholics, but no provision was made for them to attend Mass.

	X. SHIPS TAKEN IN PRIZE BY RAIDER "33"

	Raider "33" captured "Storstad" on 15th September, 1940, and "Norvard" two days later. Both these ships reached German-controlled ports in France safely with Lieutenants Hahnefeld and Neumeier respectively, as prize officers, and carried a total of anything up to 600 British and Allied prisoners, besides cargo taken from captured ships, which included glimmer isolating material, wheat and hundreds of cases of tea.
	The Norwegian whaling fleet, consisting of two whale factories, one supply vessel and eleven whale-catchers, captured between 14th and 16th January, 1941, in the South Atlantic, also escaped interception with the exception of two catchers. This fleet was in charge of two prize officers from "33," whose names have not been disclosed, but it is thought that one may have been Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Kuester.
	The "Storstad" was regarded by prisoners as a particularly happy capture, having served in turn as oiler, minelayer and prison ship. After the minelaying enterprise off Australia the ship was renamed minelaying auxiliary, "Passat." Four hundred prisoners were shipped aboard her with a prize crew of 20. It was stated that the engines were badly in need of overhaul and that the ship could only manage 7 knots, with a full speed of 9 knots. The voyage home was so skillfully directed by Hahnefeld, in command, that scarcely a ship was sighted and no incident occurred. The route chosen has been noted by the German Operations Directorate and is now known as the "Passat Route."
	The "Storstad" is alleged to have reached Bordeaux on 18th December, 1940, and is now employed as a naval tanker retaining the name "Passat."



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	One prize ship captured by "33" is believed by prisoners to be still at large. This is a 100-ton whale catcher, seized when the Norwegian whaling fleet was intercepted. This vessel was kept in company with "33" until the day before the raider was sunk, when Captain Krueder had a premonition of approaching danger. The whale catcher, which had been renamed "Adjutant," was stated to be in charge of wither Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Scherer, or Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Stenner, and had a crew of 30 men.
	One officer prisoner alleged that "Adjutant" was under orders to rendezvous with the supply ship "Alstertor," but this rendezvous does not seem to have taken place. The officer added that the ship was capable of 16 knots and had been equipped with light machine guns and a short wave wireless set. She carried food for one month. She had also been loaded with mines which another prisoner alleged were to be laid off Cape Town.
	It was generally assumed by prisoners that "Adjutant" had now joined forces with another raider.
	(N.I.D. Note. Norwegian members of the whalers' crews have confirmed that "33" retained one whale-catcher).
	Prisoners expressed great disappointment that a large number of the ships they met were coal-burners which could not be sailed as prizes, owing to the impossibility of sending them back to Germany without replenishing bunkers on the way. Apparently this difficulty had been envisaged in part, for "33: carried 200 sacks of coal for use in captured ships. Prisoners stated that, while this amount might have been sufficient to fuel coal-burners from the Atlantic to German controlled ports, it was hopelessly inadequate for sending prizes home from the Indian Ocean.
	One prisoner stated that orders had been issued, or were impending, from the German Operations Directorate that prize ships were no longer to be sent back to Germany, but were to be laid up until the end of the war in rock-bound inlets at Kerguelen and similar islands. At Kerguelen Island, the prisoner added, they could be run into narrow fjords which could only be entered at high water, where they would be completely hidden from the sea, and could only be discovered from the air. It was alleged that only a few men could be left in these ships and that they would be instructed to build a hide-out in the mountains, whence they could scuttle the ships by electrically fired charges, should they ever be discovered by British or Allied ships. It was alleged that these hide-outs would be equipped with W/T apparatus. This prisoner also alleged that he had heard that prizes might be sent to Japan. Unfortunately it could not be discovered to what extent this prisoner's testimony was founded on facts, and how much was the product of his own imagination. His information is therefore reproduced with reserve.

	XI. SUPPLIES AND SUPPLY SHIPS

	According to prisoners, Raider "33" carried with her ample provisions for between nine months and a year when she left Germany. There was enough potato powder for half a year and enough tins of condensed milk for a possible issue of one tin per man per day for six months. A large quantity of live poultry was shipped in Kiel, also 30 pigs, which were kept in a pen on the upper deck. It was stated that the poultry were speedily killed, but that the pigs, which were fed on swill, were saved until Christmas, 1940, when a number was slaughtered to provide a suitable dinner. The remaining pigs were still alive, when the ship went down.
	Prisoners alleged that beyond the maintenance of a necessary reserve of food, the question of supply was of little importance, as they could live royally on the ships they captured. On one occasion at least they jettisoned their entire meat supply, because it was no longer fresh, and restocked from a British ship.
	According to prisoners they met only one German supply ship, the "Alstertor." They stated that the main purpose of the cruise of "Alstertor" was to bring them mail and comforts from home, including a large number of decorations, in order to show them they were not forgotten.



	27

	They alleged that ammunition and additional personnel carried in the "Alstertor" had merely been put in that ship for convenience. They reasoned that ammunition and extra personnel could be brought to raiders more safely, and with greater speed, by German warships. They inferred that, as the "Alstertor" had failed to reach Germany on her return cruise, it was unlikely that cargo ships would again be used to supply raiders. British prisoners might be sent back to Germany quite easily in prize ships.
	Prisoners stated that supply ships proceeding from Germany were no longer permitted to use the route by way of the Norwegian coast, north of England and Iceland and through the Denmark Straits. Instead they were ordered to sail through the English Channel at night, hugging the French coast as far as Brest, whence they could sail into the Atlantic.

	XII. TECHNICAL DETAILS OF RAIDER "33"

	(a) General Remarks
	Raider "33," formerly believed to have been the 7,800-ton Hansa Line cargo vessel "Kandelfels," was built in the Deschimag Yards, Bremen, in the year 1933. She was laid down for a speed of fifteen knots, but subsequent improvements during her last voyage increased this speed to a maximum of 17.6 knots. At the time of her sinking, when, including trials, she had been over a year at sea without having her bottom scrapped, it was not thought by prisoners that she can have been capable of more than 14 knots. It was stated by an engine room rating, who has assisted in the fitting out of three raiders, that ships are usually converted to raiders in the yard in which they were originally laid down. This was certainly the case with "33."
	Very little has been disclosed as to the structural alterations carried out during the conversion process which lasted three months. Two to three months were required to accustom the crew to their new ship, and to make good deficiencies which showed themselves during trials.
	"33" was degaussed and carried a large tonnage of sand which acted as ballast and as protection for the magazines and mine-hold. This sand was also intended to keep the ship well down in the water, presumably to render her loss vulnerable to gunfire. The arrangement of her armament and accessories is shown plainly in Plate I. Descriptions in detail follow under the appropriate headings. It should be emphasised that "33" was one of the earliest raiders to be sent out. Later types are known to have been considerably modified and to have greater striking power.

	(b) Armament
	Raider "33" carried six 15-cm. (5.9-in.) guns on fixed mountings. Two of these guns were mounted on the upper deck, one forward, the other aft. One 15-cm. gun was positioned on either side of "B" Deck abaft the upper forward gun, and the remaining two on port and starboard sides of "B" Deck, just forward of the rear 15-cm. gun. As the two guns on the Upper Deck could be trained to either beam, this arrangement enabled a four-gun broadside to be fired both to port and starboard. A four-gun salvo could not be fired within an angle of forty degrees off the bow. This proved to be a handicap to the ship when chasing victims by daylight and may be a main reason why day attacks were largely avoided.
	It has been established that when the ship left Kiel the guns could only be fired by local control.
	The Gunnery Officer, who was described by prisoners as an extremely ingenious man, spent some weeks during the cruise installing a system of lights which indicated when all the guns were ready, enabling them to be fired simultaneously from a central Fire Control position on the bridge. This system proved most successful and it was claimed that a salvo could be fired every 6 seconds.
	A 7.5-cm. (2.95-in.) gun was mounted right forward, and a 10.5-cm. (4.14-in.) gun between the aircraft hangar and the bridge. "33" also carried a twin 3.7-cm. (1.45-in.) anti-aircraft gun abaft the mainmast. In addition there were four 2-cm. (0.79-in.) guns, two amidships and two on the poop deck. Four light machine guns were mounted, one on either side of the bridge, and one on either beam just abaft the funnel. The two twin torpedo tubes



	28

	on port and starboard sides were controlled from the bridge and situated below it, about 6 ft. above the waterline. There were two stereoscopic rangefinders, between 18 and 22 ft. in length; one on the bridge and one just abaft the funnel. These were intended solely for low-angle fire.

	(c) Torpedoes
	There were more than 30 torpedoes on board, presumably various types, as provision was med for the ship to supply U-Boats. The ready-use torpedoes were stored in holds directly below the tubes on either side of the ship. The remainder were placed wherever it was found convenient about the ship. The war-heads were stowed separately in No. 2 magazine. It has been stated that "33's" twin torpedo tubes were of different types, those of the starboard side being of an older type projecting 1,600-kilogram (3,520-lb.) torpedoes. It was alleged that this arrangement reduced fighting efficiency as there was the possibility of confusion in the supply of torpedoes to the tubes. Both torpedoes could be fired simultaneously on either side of the ship. The time for reloading was given as six minutes.
	It has been stated that three vessels were sunk by torpedo including the first and last ships attacked. The last ship, "British Emperor," required three torpedoes, two having missed. One of the misses was seen to be caused by a fault in the torpedo mechanism which deflected it from its intended course. Two further torpedoes were fired at H.M.S. "Cornwall," both missing.

	(d) Mines
	Information obtained regarding the number of mines carried varies considerably, but it can be concluded that there were between four and five hundred mines on board at the outset of the cruise. Both moored and magnetic mines were carried, some of the latter reacting on a strong field and others on a weak one. It was claimed that some of the magnetic mines were suitable for the destruction of degaussed ships.
	On sinking there were still 68 torpedo mines (Type B) and eight horned mines in the after hold. It was stated that this was the cause of the tremendous explosion which followed the last salvo by H.M.S. "Cornwall." According to prisoners the mine hold was protected by a double hull in this part of the ship, the space between the two hulls, about 1 ft. in breadth, being filled with sand. The mines, which were stowed on "C" deck, were conveyed by a lift to two sets of rails, on "B" deck, which ran parallel to the fore and aft line to trap in the stern.
	It was stated that the general practice was to lay the mines in "W" formation in groups of twelve. The mines laid by the ship off the Australian and Tasmanian coasts were, however, dropped haphazardly in irregular groups. It was maintained that this system made sweeping more difficult and dangerous.

	(e) Ammunition Hoists
	The ammunition hoists were comparatively modern in design and were electrically powered. There was one hoist for the forward 15-cm. guns, and one for the after guns. These were large enough to accommodate a man, and it was alleged that between nine and twelve shells could be hoisted at a time. The hoists did not work on a rotary system, but had two containers so that while one was elevated the other could be replenished. It was claimed that this is a more efficient system.
	At the time of sinking the forward hoist jammed, causing the death by drowning of a number of ratings who might otherwise have been conveyed to the upper deck. From this statement it appears that the hoist was the only means of exit from the magazine.

	(f) Magazines
	There were two magazines forward, one being a permanent store, which was kept sealed in action, and the other, a smaller magazine, used for the ready-use ammunition. The forward magazine store (no. 2) was below the waterline and contained torpedo war-heads, bombs, explosive charges and petrol for the aircraft. There was a similar arrangement aft, except that the mine hold took the place of the No. 2 magazine store and was probably considerably larger. Magazines were invariably kept locked to exclude unauthorized persons.



	29

	During the action with H.M.S. "Cornwall" a mechanician, 1st class, is alleged to have requested the First Engineer Officer for permission to open a steel bottle containing CO2 gas and to enter the gas into the No. 2 magazine store, in order to minimise the danger of fire spreading through the hold. Apparently the store was fitted with twelve valves which could be used for this purpose. Permission was refused on the grounds that the entire contents of the store would afterwards have to be brought on deck and exposed to the sun for decontamination. It was claimed that the refusal was ignored and the gas infused, possibly preventing another disastrous explosion.
	It was stated that arrangements for this precaution to be taken are probably to be found in all raiders which have no special armour protection round their magazines.
	It is believed that 200 rounds of ammunition were carried for each 15-cm. gun. The quantities for the ship's secondary armament are not known.
	15-cm. shells were stated to have been either semi-armour-piercing or shrapnel.

	(g) Searchlights
	Two searchlights were carried, each with a diameter of 120 cms. (47.2 in.). These could either be mounted on the upper signal platforms of the fore and main masts, or on the upper deck as required. The effective range of the searchlights was approximately 5.0 miles.

	(h) Engines
	The main power unit consisted of two two-stroke 5,000 H.P. Diesel engines capable of 320 revolutions per minute. The reduction gear could propel the screw at 92 revolutions per minute.
	The main Diesel engines could be synchronised, or used separately, giving access to one engine for any necessary repairs. A great deal of work was done on the engines in daytime when the ship was in safe waters. Two piston linings were renewed and, at one stage, the compression was increased, adding about two knots to the ship's speed.
	"33" also carried six 500 H.P. auxiliary Diesel engines, four being built by M.A.N. and two by Breuer. These all drove generators which gave a maximum output of 1,500 ampères. Four of the auxiliary engines were usually run together. Light, heating, ammunition hoists and the water cooling system of the main engines were all electric. In tropical climates it was usually found necessary to run a fifth generator to increase the circulation of the cooling plant.
	Shortly after reaching the Indian Ocean, in August, 1940, the cooling plant broke down, and, even with the assistance of an expert engineer transferred from another raider, many weeks passed before it could be repaired. It was stated that the cooling plant was finally put in order by adapted spare parts carried for the Diesel engines. At one time, when repairs seemed likely to prove unsuccessful, it was thought that an entire cooling plant would have to be taken from a captured ship and built into "33."
	The maximum fuel capacity of the ship was 4,000 tons. Consumption at cruising speed was stated to be 36 tons per diem. The ship refuelled twice, and it was alleged that she still carried 2,800 tons when sunk.
	"33" was provided with a fresh water plant which could produce up to 15 tons per day. This was in excess of the ship's requirements which were estimated at approximately 10 tons per day.

	(i) Camouflage
	The changes in the identity of Raider "33" have been described, in Chapter IV, at the stages at which they took place during the cruise. The following details regarding disguise may be added.
	The four 15-cm. guns below decks were concealed by sliding gun ports which were high enough to allow elevation for a range of 15,000 yards.
	The bows of the ship were built up to conceal the foremost 15-cm. and the 7.5-cm. gun. To bring these guns into action hinged screens fitted along the railings were made to fall outboard.



	30

	The 15-cm. gun on the upper deck aft had a variety of disguises. At one time it resembled a ball ey, being covered by a superstructure decorated by realistically painted port-holes and surmounted by a small chimney which could be made to smoke. The muzzle of the gun, which protruded from this superstructure, was hidden by a number of barrels which, although fixed in position, could easily be rolled aside. To complete this deception, when the raider approached fresh victims, a seaman, dressed in a cook's cap and apron, was made to parade beside the "galley." To clear away the gun for action, the superstructure parted in the middle bringing the gun into view. The superstructure appears to have been a permanent fixture and it was stated that, being built of steel, it served as protection for the gun's crew. On other occasions it was painted to resemble a furniture van leaving "Sydney," or the name of some other plausible port of call, daubed across it in large black letters. In this case the depresses barrel of the gun was made to resemble the shaft of the van.
	A third method of camouflage was to disguise the superstructure as deck cargo, and to convert the barrel of the gun into the back of a double deck-bench.
	The twin 3.7-cm. gun was usually covered by a collapsible deckhouse.
	The 2-cm. machine guns were elevated into position by hydraulic lifts.
	The light machine guns were covered by packing cases which could easily be thrust aside.
	The whole process of converting the raider from the appearance of an innocent merchantman into a formidable ship of war was stated by prisoners to have been merely a matter of seconds.
	Samson posts were stated to be interchangeable and could be mounted in various parts of the ship to conform with the disguise of the moment. The positions of the lifeboats were frequently changed.
	The topmasts were telescopic, and could be altered to one half their original length.
	The funnel was so constructed that not only its height but also its shape could be changed. One day it would appear as a tall thin smoke-stack, the next as a squat streamlined funnel. Smoke producing apparatus, run off the galley, was fitted within the funnel so that , at times the ship might assume the appearance of a coal burner.
	A story was related how, on one occasion, the ship disguised herself as a three funnel cruiser for a night attack. Two dummy funnels were erected and the searchlights were mounted on the upper signal platforms of the fore and mainmasts. "33" approached her victim and fired a warning shot across her bows. She then switched on her searchlights which, while illuminating the merchant ship, also threw into relief her own three funnels. It was stated that the captain of the merchantman was completely deceived and surrendered without offering resistance.
	A white bow wave was painted on the ship in areas where attacks by British submarines were feared.

	(j) Aircraft
	Raider "33" carried two He. 114 aircraft, when she left Germany. These had folding wings and were housed in the cargo hold forward of the bridge. They were stowed one above the other, the upper aircraft being on an elevator platform which was raised and lowered by winches. When lowered into the hold the aircraft could be covered up. When the aircraft was being launched, the platform was raised level with the deck. The plane was then lifted by a crane, the cable of which was fastened to four eyes straddling the upper wing, and being the width of the fuselage apart. The aircraft was swung over the side and lowered to the water, the engine having been previously started. During the whole of the operation the aircraft was facing forward and could take off when released.
	The aircraft were fitted with 4 B.M.W. 132 engines having three-blade, variable pitch airscrews. They were originally fitted with a cannon in each wing, one machine-gun firing through the airscrew and one free dorsal machine-gun for the observer.
	Two 110 lb. bombs could be carried horizontally in the fuselage, and were released by the observer, who had no bomb sight.
	The fuel capacity was between 600 and 700 litres of petrol, and flights were restricted to about four hours. The cruising speed was normally 155 miles per hour.



	31

	One aircraft was lost after about five flights had been made. On 26th August, 1940, soon after "33" had reached the Indian Ocean, two 110 lb. bombs were loaded into the aircraft, for the purpose of carrying out target practice on a barrel thrown into the water. No such practice had previously taken place. The cannon and bombs proved too much for the aircraft which, in perfectly calm weather, was unable to take off. It rose a few feet in the air and then crashed into the sea with the engine on fire. The crew scrambled out and were rescued. As a result of this experience it was decided to take out the cannon and the front machine-gun from the second plane, in order to lighten it as much as possible. According to prisoners, the captain was not air-minded and, after this episode, refused for a long time to go to the trouble of manoeuvering the second aircraft from its position beneath the elevating platform to a position above this platform. In March 1941, the pilot, who is a prisoner, was much surprised to receive a new Arado 196 aircraft which was brought to Raider "33" by the supply ship "Alstertor." This aircraft was used in preference to the He. 114 and played a part in the capture and sinking of one of the last three of "33's" victims. It was alleged that, owing to the Captain's attitude, only 25 flights were made in all. In the case of the "Filefjell," whose capture and sinking on 25th August, 1940, is described in Chapter IV, a message directing the ship towards the raider was dropped aboard the merchantman in a partially-filled sandbag containing a tin canister. This ruse was the invention of the Observer, Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Mueller, who intended that the canister should give buoyancy if the sandbag missed the ship. Before this ruse was used on "Filefjell," pilot and observer had practised dropping the sandbag on "33" with success. According to prisoners, one hour elapsed from the time it was decided to make a flight until the aircraft was in the air. No set searching plan was laid down, but the area covered was roughly quadrilateral, one side being formed by the ship. The first leg was anything up to 130 miles, the second rather shorter, and the third between 100 and 130 miles back to the ship. These patrols were carried out between 500 and 1,500 ft., according to visibility conditions. A hand camera was carried, but was only used on one occasion.
	After the loss of the first aircraft, which was the only machine equipped with R/T apparatus, difficulty was experienced in communicating with the ship. The use of coloured rockets was finally resorted to, these being fired in groups of red or green up to five in number, giving the bearing and type of any ship sighted. There was great disappointment when the new aircraft arrived, and it was found that this, too, had no R/T apparatus.
	An engineer prisoner stated that a trailing hook device was used against ship's aerials by raiders. This consisted of a length of thick flexible wire wound round spirally with a thinner strand giving a serrated edge. The whole is contained in a box which falls with the wire. The box cannot be taken in again, so presumably the wire had to be jettisoned after use. In the case of the "Maimoa," captured and sunk by "33" on 20th November, 1940, when successful use of this device was reported, the pilot stated emphatically that it was his own aerial which carried away that of the ship, and not the special device. The aircraft's aerial was stated to be 40 yards in length and carrying a heavy lead weight on the end.
	The pilot of "33" appeared to be an exceptionally able and well trained man. He claimed that he had over one million kilometers flying to his credit. He was awarded the Iron Cross, 2nd Class, for his attack on "Filefjell."
	In addition to the observer the ship carried a "ground" crew of five mechanics, only one of whom was saved.

	(k) Camouflage of the Aircraft
	The aircraft were painted with usual German sea camouflage, the lower surface of the wings being painted light blue, the upper surface green, blue and black. During its attack on "Filefjell" the aircraft used markings similar to those of South African Air Force, namely, black, white and orange roundels.
	It was alleged by one prisoner that the Captain later forbade the use of these markings for attacks on shipping. The Arado 196 aircraft supplied by "Alstertor" bore the usual Balkan crosses on its wings.
	All "33's" aircraft had the same lettering - S.6.K.34 - painted on the fuselage.

(l) Prisoners' Accommodation

Captured officers were accommodated in cabins situated on either side of the aircraft hangar. There was a minimum of eight officers to a cabin.

The remainder of the crews were placed in a large hold just abaft the bridge. It was stated that during one period of the cruise, when this hold became overcrowded, additional space was provided in the mine hold after it had been cleared of mines.

Women prisoners were accommodated in the petty officers' mess, which had been very comfortably fitted with upholstered seats by the men, in their free time. A large stock of women's and babies' clothes was carried to meet any eventualities. On one occasion a new-born baby was picked up with survivors and a cot and baby-food were provided.

There was a sports deck abaft the bridge for the use of officers, and this was allotted for limited periods to the officer prisoners and to the women.

There is good reason to believe that microphones were hidden in the officer prisoners' quarters to obtain indirect information about the movements of British shipping. This fact was not definitely established.

XIII. RAIDER "16" SHIP'S COMPANY

According to prisoners the ship's company of Raider "16" consisted of approximately 300 men. It was stated that there were 25 officers and approximately 50 warrant officers, chief petty officers and petty officers on board. The size of the ship's company dwindled considerably during the cruise, owing to the number of ship's taken in prize, necessitating the transfer of officers and ratings, but the complement of "16" was made up in May, 1941, by a fresh draft of men sent from Germany aboard the supply ship "Alsterufer." The ship's company was detailed off among four Divisions, I and II being seamen, III technical officers and ratings and IV engine room personnel.

The Captain of "16" was confirmed by prisoners as being Kapitan zur See (Captain) Rogge. This officer is 42 years old and served in the cruiser "Emden" in 1930-31 as a Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) and in the cruiser "Karlsruhe" in 1935. He appears to have had considerable experience in sail and has been Commanding Officer of the two cadet sailing ships "Gorch Fock" and "Albert Leo Schlageter." He has taken part in yacht racing in Germany, Scandinavia and England.

He was appointed to Raider "16" at the end of 1939, before the conversion of the ship was complete.

On 10th December, 1940, he was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross, the German High Command claiming that his ship had sunk 94,000 tons of shipping, besides taking several ships in prize.

Rogge is apparently a strict disciplinarian and was feared by his men, who regarded him as a tyrannical martinet. It was stated that he hated to see anyone idle and would not allow lounging on deck, even on Sundays.

The names of some officers have been obtained from prisoners and are included in the following list. Complete accuracy of this list cannot be guaranteed.

List of Officers believed to be serving in Raider "16"

Captain	Kapitan zur See (Captain) Rogge.
1st Officer	Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kuehn.
1st Divisional Officer (Seamen)	Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Strecker.
2nd Divisional Officer (Seamen) and Gunnery Officer	Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kasch
3rdDivisional Officer (Technical)	-
4th Divisional Officer (Engine Room)	Oberleutnant (Ing.) (Engineer-Lieutenant) Kielhorn.
Navigating Officer	Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kammenz.

2nd Navigating Officer	Oberleutnant zur See (?) (Lieutenant (?) ) Piqerz.
Torpedo Officer	Oberleutnant zur See (?) (Lieutenant (?) ) Fehler.
Prisoner Officer	Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant), Mohr.
Pilot Officer (Aircraft)	Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Bauer.
Radio Officer	Leutnant der Reserve (?) (Sub-Lieutenant of German Naval Reserve) Wenzel.
Surgeon	Dr. Reil.
Assistant Surgeon	Dr. Spreng.
Paymaster	Larenzen.

The following officers were drafted to prize ships:

Leutnants der Reserve (Sub-Lieutenants of German Naval Reserve) Walbrun, Dehnel (both to "Durmitor"), Waldmann ("Tirranna").

It is believed that the officers reserved for ships taken in prize were all former officers of the German Merchant Service.

A second Torpedo Officer named Rodeck or Rodig is believed to have joined "16" from "Alsterufer" in May, 1941.

(N.I.D. Note. A Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Rodig is listed in the German Navy List of 1938.).

The aircraft crew consisted of five men in addition to Oberleutnant (lieutenant) Bauer, the names of three being Burghard, Rauschild and Mietsche.

According to prisoners the ratings in Raider "16" were either experienced merchant seamen or raw recruits, there being only a minimum of men who had seen long service in the German Navy, with the exception of the petty officers. The recruits included many men who had never been to sea before. One prisoner stated that there was an acute shortage of ratings for raiders in Germany. He himself was a chemist and had imagined that he would be exempted from war service. On his being called up, however, he was drafted to the navy by reason of the fact that he owned a sailing canoe on Lake Constance. He had never seen the sea before in his life.

XIV. RAIDER "16," EARLY HISTORY, FITTING OUT AND TRIALS

Raider "16" was stated by prisoners to be the former Hansa Line cargo vessel "Goldenels," of 7,800 tons, and to be a sister ship of Raider "33," sunk in the Indian Ocean by H.M.S. "Cornwall" on 5th May, 1941.

Raider "16" was converted to her present form at the Deschimag Yard, Bremen, soon after the outbreak of war. She is the first raider to have been completed, and prisoners stated that she has developed a number of defects which have been corrected in later types.

According to prisoners "16" sailed for the Baltic shortly after Christmas, 1939, for a period of trials which lasted approximately two months. During this time she used Kiel as her base and is believed to have put to sea on one or two occasions with Raider "36."

In March, 1940, "16" took on board provisions for a cruise of 14 months. The ship's company were told they were to be away for one year.

XV. CRUISE OF RAIDER "16"

Raider "16" sailed from Kiel on 11th March, 1940, via the Kaiser Wilhelm Kanal. She proceeded North and, according to one prisoner, was accompanied for some days by a U-Boat.

Raider "16" entered the Atlantic by way of the Denmark Straits, and her first attack was on "Scientist" on 3rd May, 1940, in 20° S. and 4 30° E. This ship was sunk by shellfire and torpedo.

Ninety-two mines, the total carried by "16" were laid off Cape Agulhas on about 12th May. One prisoner stated that it was originally planned to lay these mines three to four miles off Cape Town. He alleged that Kapitan zur See (Captain) Rogge had received information that a battle-cruiser and an aircraft carrier were

(C42749)



	34

	present in Capetown harbour. His intended plan was first to lay the mines and then to turn about and fire some torpedoes into the harbour. He had calculated that the two British warships would be mined when they took up the chase. This ruse failed, as it was found that the two ships had left the harbour before "16" arrived there.
	"16" then proceeded on a north-easterly course and captured "Tirranna" in 12° S. and 68° E. on 10th June. A prize crew was put aboard, and "Tirranna" was used to locate and shadow "16's" next three victims. "City of Baghdad," captured and sunk by time bomb in 000° N. and 090° E., on 11th July and "Tallyrand" in 030° S. and 49° 30' E., sunk on 2nd August. A prisoner stated that, when "Tallyrand" was captured, her Captain offered to sail the ship back to Germany. Rogge was naturally suspicious of this offer and after considerable discussion "Tallyrand" was sunk by time bomb.
	A large number of prisoners having been accumulated, these were put aboard "Tirranna" which was sent back to Bordeaux on 5th or 6th August. It was alleged that on the first day of her voyage this ship sighted a British warship, but was not seen herself. Prisoner confirmed that "Tirranna" was torpedoed by a British submarine when about to enter the Gironde.
	(N.I.D. Note. This attack was carried out by H.M.S. "Tuna" on 22nd September, 1940).
	Before "16" and "Tirranna" parted company, prisoners stated that Rogge ordered "Tirranna's" ship's bell, which was a particularly handsome one, to be removed and mounted in his own ship.
	Prisoners had no fresh information to impart concerning ships sunk or taken in prize between 2nd August and 21st October, 1940.
	(N.I.D. Note. During this period "16" sank "King City" by shellfire in 017° S. and 066° E. on 24th August, no distress signal being received; "Athelking" by shellfire in about 020° S. and 067° E., on 9th September, a distress message being received; "Benarty" in 018° 40' S. and 070° 54' E. on 10th December, a distress message being received, and "Commissaire Ramel" by time bomb in 028° 25' S. and 074° 23' E. on 19th September, a distress message being made.)
	After sinking the "Commissaire Ramel," "16" cruised very slowly for some time, but did not, as was previously believed, visit St. Paul's or Amsterdam Islands. No ships were sighted until on 21st October, 1940, "16" captured "Durmitor" in 008° 30' S. and 101° 30' E. A Prize crew, under Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Walbrun, was put on board, and the ships separated, meeting again on 26th October in 014° 30' S. and 101° 11' E., when all prisoners were transferred to "Durmitor." According to prisoners "Durmitor" then parted company for Mogadishu, Italian Somaliland. One prisoner, who was not with the prize crew, stated that the reception given to the Germans in Mogadishu was particularly frigid. There was a shooting affray with Italian harbour guards, and the German Consul refused even the slightest assistance. Had it not been for a few Italian civilians the Germans might well have starved. The prisoner added that, not until the members of the prize crew had appeared before the German Consul with drawn revolvers, could they obtain any satisfaction.
	(N.I.D. Note. While it is possible that some of the Germans reached Mogadishu, "Durmitor" grounded off Warshuk, and eventually put into Kismayu).
	Meanwhile "16" had continued her raiding activities, and prisoners confirm the capture of "Teddy" on the night of 8th/9th November, 1940 in 005° 30' N. and 086° 30' E.
	On 10th November "16" captured "Ole Jacob" in 006° 29' N. and 090° 16' E. and on 11th November she sank "Automendon" by shellfire in 4° 18' N. and about 90° E.
	(N.I.D. Note. Both these ships made distress signals, that of "Ole Jacob" being cancelled by the Germans.)
	According to one prisoner, when "Automendon" was captured, all the ship's papers and the mail which she was carrying fell into the hands of the Germans, owing to the Captain being killed at the beginning of the attack. This prisoner alleged that he was given the task of translating a number of these papers into German. They included, he said, various Foreign Office papers, destined for



	35

	Singapore (and possibly Tokio), concerning British foreign policy vis-á-vis Japan. These papers were entrusted to the Captain of the prize crew which was put on board the "Ole Jacob," and this officer took them back to Germany, via Siberia, when the "Ole Jacob" arrived at Kobe. It is believed that he was now rejoined "16" possibly by means of a supply ship sent out from Germany. The prisoner added that he understood that when "Ole Jacob" left Kobe, she went to the Pacific to supply the two German raiders which were then operating there. Their numbers were "36" and "45." This is confirmed by Stellberger.
	The "Ole Jacob's" original cargo consisted of petroleum, and this the Japanese willingly exchanged for fuel for fuel oil which was needed by the raiders.
	(N.I.D. Note. This is confirmed by a Prisoner of War from Raider "36.")
	After Raider "16" had parted company with "Ole Jacob" on 16th November, 1940, she proceeded in the general direction of Kerguelen Island at leisurely speed. About 15th December, 1940 she met Raider "33" in circumstances already described in the cruise of that ship. According to "16" prisoners, information regarding the presence of a Norwegian whaling fleet in the Antarctic Ocean was given by their captain to Kapitan zur See (Captain) Krueder of "33," who immediately acted upon it. Prisoners stated that the reason that Rogge did not keep the whaling fleet for himself was that he was tired and wished to celebrate Christmas. They added that the whaling fleet had been earmarked by the captain of the pocket battleship "Admiral Scheer," who was then out, for himself, and that this captain was furious when he learned that he had been forestalled by Krueder. Prisoners stated that the quarrel over the capture of the whaling fleet was a typical example of the rivalry existing among raider captains, who were jealously ambitions to out vie each other in tonnage sunk.
	After parting company with "33", "16" proceeded to Kerguelen Island. Prisoners stated that their ship was the first raider to use the island as an anchorage, and that Rogge's primary object in going there was to give the crew a rest and run ashore, after their long period at sea and out of sight of land. They entered Gazelle Basin, the best anchorage in the island. The entrance was very narrow and apparently the raider ran ashore and ripped two holes, 12 to 16 ft. in length, in her bottom. The inner skin was undamaged and the raider managed to effect repairs with cement. These repairs called for considerable use of the diver and, true to his reputation of working his men hard, Rogge kept this diver below from 0600 to 2200 every day, only allowing him up for coffee. In consequence the diver's health broke down and, later, he had to be sent back to Germany aboard the supply ship "Babitonga." More serious damage was found to have been sustained by "16's" shaft and bearings, and this took four weeks to repair. In the meantime the ship's company had explored the island, having first sent a landing party ashore in civilian clothes, in order to make certain that there were no inhabitants and no radio station there. An observation post was established ashore and, whenever weather permitted, the raider's seaplane, a Heinkel 114, was flown off twice a day for reconnaissance purposes. Ratings were not allowed ashore unaccompanied by officers, in case they should attempt to desert, and firearms for hunting purposes were issued to officers only.
	A successful attempt was made to supply the ship with fresh water from a waterfall in Gazelle Basin by means of a funnel and about 1,000 yards of pipe line.
	Raider "16" remained at Kerguelen until about 15th January, 1941. On leaving the island she proceeded north and attacked vessels in the Seychelles area. These were "Mandaser" sunk in approximately 04° S. and 061° E. on 24th January, 1941; "Speybank" captured about 31st January, north-east of Seychelles and "Ketty Brobig" captured in 04° 30 S. and 050° E. on 2nd February, 1941. It is possible that the pocket battleship "Admiral Scheer," which was known to have been in the vicinity, co-operated in these attacks, as prisoners stated that, at one period during their cruise, "Admiral Scheer" deliberately decoyed away searching British warships from the raider in order to give her a clear field. "16" certainly met "Admiral Scheer" at this time; one prisoner stated that the two ships lay 400 yards off each other.
	(N.I.D. Note. It is probable that the incident of "Admiral Scheer" decoying British warships away from "16" and her prizes was when "Admiral Scheer" was sighted by H.M.S. "Glascow" on 22nd February, 1941. "16" was at this time near Saya de Malha Bank.)



	36

	Prisoners alleged that on 28th February, 1941, "16" was in company with "Ketty Brovig," "Tannenfels" (which had left Kismayu about 31st January, 1941), "British Advocate" (captured by "Admiral Scheer" about 19th February in the Seychelles area, and "Speybank." On that day "Tannenfels" and "Speybank" were sent back to occupied France, and it is believed that both vessels arrived safely. Prisoners were not aware of the fact that "Ketty Brovig" had been intercepted by British warships, but had presumed that something of this nature had occurred as there had been no news of her.
	(N.I.D. Note. "British Advocate" was also reported to be returning to Germany, or German-occupied territory.)
	Raider "16" then proceeded into the Mozambique Channel where she remained for about ten days. During this time one, or possibly two, ships were sighted and stopped, but neither of these were British or Allied vessels and they were allowed to proceed. One of these ships was stated to be a 10,000 ton French tanker, escorted by, or escorting, two or three French submarines (this incident presumably occurred during the first ten days of March, 1941). Raider "16" then proceeded for 200 miles in a south-westerly direction, in sight of the coast, and eventually rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the South Atlantic. "16's" first attack in the South Atlantic was on the "Zamzam" on 17th April. On the afternoon of 16th April, 1941, "16" had met the German merchant ship "Dresden" and during the course of the evening sighted "ZAmzam." "Dresden" was sent off with orders to return later; "Zamzam" darkened ship at night and it was claimed, had not been showing her colours; she was attacked and sunk. "Dresden" was then sent back to occupied France with survivors from "Zamzam," arriving at St. Jean de Luz on approximately 21st May, 1941. Before parting company with "16" she had transfarred a W/T operator to the raider, whose name was stated to be Frolich, a survivor from "Admiral Graf Spee."
	Two American citizens, including a tobacco dealer named Ned Laughinghouse, who were wounded in the "Zamzam" action, were considered too ill to be transferred to "Dresden" and were retained in "16's" sick bay.
	On 27th April, 1941, and again about 3rd or 4th May, 1941, "16" met the German merchant vessel "Babitonga." This vessel had left Santos on 28th Marc,h 1941, after having declared to the Brazilian authorities that she was bound for Vladivostock. Prisoners believed that this was done owing to a Brazilian law, by which vessels of belligerent nations can only take on provisions sufficient to take them to their first port of call. As "Babitonga" had been instructed to supply "16," the longest possible voyage was chosen in order to obtain the maximum quantity of provisions. It was believed that, at the time of this rendezvous, "16" had been caught very short of fresh provisions and water. "Babitonga" was apparently ordered to remain in the same area, while "16" proceeded eastwards to sink "Rabaul," on 14th May, 1941, in 19° 30' S. and 4° 30' E., in the early morning. During the night of 17th May, 1941, while steaming on a northwesterly course, "16" sighted H.M.S. "Nelson" and H.M.S. "Eagle" in the light of the moon, on her starboard quarter. There was considerable excitement on board the raider, but she was not observed by H.M. ships and was able to cross their bows and alter course to the south-east. About 19th or 20th May, 1941, "16" met the "Alsterufer" (a sister ship of the "Alstertor") when food and stores and two Arado 196 aircraft, in cases, were transferred to the raider. In addition seven W/T operators, 25 sailors, 12 engine room hands, two signalmen and a torpedo officer named Redig or Rodeck, who were fresh from Germany, came on board. At this rendezvous two other ships were also present, prisoners alleged, namely the tanker "Nordmark" and another raider, possibly "41." It would therefore appear that "Alsterufer" also supplied these ships. Prisoners stated that "Alsterufer" has returned to Germany safely and has reached Hamburg.
	On the day following the meeting with "Alsterufer," "16" stopped the Greek ship "Master E. Kulukundis." As this ship was under charter to the Swiss Government, she was allowed to proceed. On 24th May, 1941, at about 1910 G.M.T., "Trafalgar" was attacked and sunk in approximate position 25° S. and 1° E.
	Raider "16" then proceeded to the westward and rejoined "Babitonga" in approximate position 20° S. and 15° W. on 30th May, 1941. The British prisoners were transferred to "Babitonga," in the evening, together with four German guards. These prisoners and guards were later transferred to "Alstertor"



	37

	which was intercepted on 23rd June, 1941, by H.M. forces. The four German guards, all regular members of "16's" crew, survived the interception and were captured, but they were naturally unable to give any details as to the raider's movements after 30th May, 1941, another stated that Rogge might endeavour to bring his ship home in September, 1941, another denied this, and stated that he was convinced that "16" would remain out until the summer of 1942, as Rogge was out to beat all records, both of tonnage sunk and days spent at sea. A third prisoner alleged that he had heard that "16" intended to operate off the Azores in June and expressed surprise that she had not been intercepted in this area; the fourth prisoner believed "16" would take the place of "33" in the southern Indian Ocean, or possibly that of "10" in the southern Atlantic.
	(it was alleged that "16" had never been damaged in action.)
	Prisoners stated that at one period of their cruise in "16," they cannot remember the exact date, the raider sighted the liner "Queen Elizabeth." They were unable to close range owing to the speed of the liner and they speedily abandoned the chase. This incident is alleged to have occurred in the Indian Ocean.

	XVI. LIFE ON BOARD "16"

	Prisoners stated that they found life in Raider "16" irksome, and at times almost unbearable. This, they said, was due the the attitude of the Captain who believed that hard work was the best remedy for boredom. Consequently they were kept on almost continuous fatigues, such as painting, scrubbing, breaking up and destroying the boats of captured ships. Ratings were deliberately made to do tasks over and over again, no matter how hard they worked. One prisoner stated that provisions intended for stowage aft, were invariably taken into the ship forward, so that they would have to be carried the full length of the decks. Rogge was likened by one prisoner to the notorious Captain Bligh, of "Bounty" fame, only that his temper , at times, was worse. It was stated that he drank a prodigious amount of beer and was only tolerable when drunk.
	There was no doubt about this officer's unpopularity, and one prisoner went so far as to say that he expected that one day Rogge would "disappear overboard."
	Morale in the ship was described by prisoners as extremely low. It was said that the ship's company had been promised that they would be not more than one year at sea. When the prisoners left the ship, the voyage had lasted nearly 16 months, and they were constantly being exalted and depressed by fresh promises of a speedy return, which never materialised. Mail had only been brought to the ship once, after 13 months at sea.
	Supplies of potatoes and fresh vegetables had long been exhausted and, in spite of vitamin tablets issued to the entire ship's company every day, there had been outbreaks of scurvy and similar diseases against which the doctors were powerless. Food was apparently bad; meat, which was at times putrid, and tobacco, were found to be covered in mildew, and had to be washed before consumption. Prisoners stated that there was only enough to go round after ships had been captured. Three litres of fresh water were issued to each man per day for drinking and washing purposes. It appeared from prisoners' statements, that a number of grumblers and slack workers had been singled out by the Captain and sent home in ships taken in prize. These "black sheep" would have to face court-martial in Germany, according to prisoners.
	There were usually only two cinema shows per week for ratings, the other days being reserved for officers. There were no cinema performances on hot nights. A number of films supplied to the ship by the German Propaganda Ministry were speedily scrapped, when some American films were discovered in a captured ship.

	(C42749)



	38

	XVII. RAIDER "16" - TECHNICAL DETAILS

	(a) Armament
	The following details of "16's" armament were given by prisoners. Right forward in the bow there was a 7.5-cm. (2.95-in.) gun which was very rarely used. At the break of the forecastle, one on each side, were 2-cm. (0.79-in.) pom-poms and on the main deck just abaft the foremast were four 15-cm. (5.91-in.) guns (two on each side) firing through concealed ports. Machine guns were mounted on either side of the bridge superstructure, at the after end of which was the wireless room. Between the bridge superstructure and the funnel, probably on main deck level, but possibly even lower, were four torpedo tubes, two on each side. It is believed that the director fire control was situated abaft the funnel, though this was not confirmed. Forward of the mainmast were two 2-cm. guns, one on each side, and it is possible that a second W/T room was situated low in the ship, just forward of the break of the poop. The two 15-cm. after guns were mounted on the poop and were concealed by dummy deckhouses. Right aft, in the stern, is a 3.7-cm. (1.46-in.) gun. Ninety-two mines were carried in a hold aft. It was stated that the 15-cm. guns were of old pattern and had a range of no more than 15,000 yards.

	(b) Engines
	The Raider's maximum speed was given as originally 17-1/2 knots, but, owing to the foul state of her bottom and the damage to her shaft bearings, sustained at Kerguelen Island, prisoners were doubtful if she could now exceed 14-1/2 knots. It was thought that Raider "16" might select some isolated area at sea in order to carry out a thorough overhaul of her engines. The engines were confirmed by prisoners as being eight cylinder double-acting M.A.N. Diesels and would, in any case, nee periodic overhauls. Such overhauls had frequently been carried out in the past at sea, and prisoners did not think that the raider would return to Kerguelen or go to any other island to effect repairs. The damage sustained by the ship at Kerguelen Island appears to have been repaired as satisfactorily as was thought possible, as the ship's driver was among the four guards transferred to "Babitonga." There was no evidence to show that he may have been replaced.

	(c) Aircraft
	The ship carried three Heinkel 114 aircraft with her, when she left Germany. These were housed in No. 2 hold and could be raised to deck level by a lift, on the port side, which was operated by winches. Apparently only one of these aircraft was armed; this having a 2-cn. (0.79-in.) cannon. Two of the original aircraft were lost at sea, but these were replaced by at least two Arado 196 machines which were brought to the ship by "Alsterufer." Prisoners stated that, when being launched, the aircraft were hoisted out on the leeside of the ship. The aircraft would taxi down-wind and then turn back facing the ship. The latter would then steam slowly ahead, turning down wind, so that the aircraft would have a calm patch of water from which to take off into the wind.

	(d) Camouflage
	Prisoners confirmed that "16" had a variety of disguises and was known at different times as "Atlantis," "Tamesis," "Willi," "Kakimaru" (when masquerading as Japanese with K on the funnel), "Kross" (Russian), "Griotesland" and "Coldmeil." At the meeting with "33" in December, 1940, she bore the name "Robbe."
	Prisoners stated that a number of ruses were adopted to alter the appearance of the ship. At times a dummy funnel was rigged between the real funnel and the bridge. The sides of the well deck could be filled in with painted screens and the length of the poop could be increased by additional superstructure. The funnel was telescopic and could also be made broader, if desired. During the raider's first attacks on shipping either the Dutch or Norwegian flag was hoisted as she approached her victims. The German war flag was only broken upon the ship going into action.
	Prisoners stated that the ship had now exhausted all her stock of disguises and could only repeat ruses she had previously used.



	39

	XVIII. RAIDER "10"

	The following details of Raider "10" have been supplied by a prisoner, captured when the tanker "Lothringen" was intercepted by H.M. forces in the Atlantic Ocean on 15th June, 1941. The prisoner had previously served from June, 1940, until November, 1940, in Raider "10."

	XIX. CRUISE OF RAIDER "10"

	According to the prisoner, Raider "10" left Kiel on the evening of 5th or 6th June, 1940. She proceeded to the South Atlantic by way of the Denmark Straits.
	Her first victim, "a fairly large Dutchman" named "Kertosono," was captured on 1st July, 1940, in 12° N. and 031° W. A prize crew, under Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Sander, was placed on board and the ship was sent back to Lorient.
	(N.I.D. Note. No distress signal was made by "Kertosono." The ship arrived in Lorient with a prize crew on 12th July, 1940.)
	Raider "10" proceeded further south, and on 5th July, 1940, sank "Delambre" in estimated position 04° S. and 026° W. The prisoner remembered this incident only vaguely. He thought that "Delambre" was blown up and that anything up to 50 prisoners were taken on board "10."
	Raider "10's" next attack was on "Wendover" in estimated position 00° S. and 025° W. about 8th July, 1940. The prisoner stated that a warning shot was fired, but "Wendover" continued to try to escape. "10" then opened fire with her 10-cm. guns on the merchantman, which surrendered after ten minutes. A boarding party was sent on board "Wendover" to sink the ship by time bomb. Two days later, on 10th July, 1940, "10" attacked "Bruges" in estimated position 04° S. and 028° W. A warning shot was fired and the ship surrendered immediately, to be sunk later by time bomb. About 30 to 50 Belgian prisoners were taken off. The next attack was on "Gracefield" in estimated position 13° S and 031° W. about 16th July, 1940. This ship was also sunk by time bomb, about 50 British prisoners being taken off. The prisoner stated that he could not recall the sinking of another ship "Tela" at this time, although this was possible.
	(N.I.D. Note. "10" attacked and probably sank "Tela" in estimated position 14° S. and 032° W. about 17th July, 1940. No distress signal was made.)
	On 28th July, 1940, "10" engaged H.M.S. "Alcantara" with four-gun broadsides from her main armament. The prisoner, who was stationed in a magazine, handed up about 40 to 60 15-cm. (5.91-in.) shells. He stated that the action lasted about one hour and that "10" then went on her way. According to the prisoner "10" was hit by one six inch shell from "Alcantara" which penetrated forward and entered a hold.
	For one month after this action, according to prisoner, "10" did not see a single ship. Another prisoner captured from "33" stated, however, that he was brought to "10" during this period by another raider, which he thought was "21" and that a rendezvous took place about 4 south of the equator. This prisoner claimed that he was a special engineer sent from Germany to effect repairs in any raider which had suffered damage. He gave the damage sustained by "10" as appreciably more than that stated by the first prisoner. He alleged that "10" was hit by at least six shells which damaged superstructure aft, and put two dynamos out of action. The engineer prisoner repaired the dynamos and was then taken south and transferred to "33" between 28th August and 12th September, 1940, in a position which was "somewhere south of Capetown."
	The first prisoner denied all knowledge of the engineer's visit and of the two rendezvous of "10" with other raiders. He confirmed the sinking of the Norwegian "Kosmos" in estimated position 001° S. and 011° W., about 16th September, 1940, a date which would only just have enabled "10" to run south to meet "33" and to return, if the story of the engineer prisoner is correct. The first prisoner stated that "Kosmos" was sunk by time bomb. Approximately 80 Norwegian prisoners were taken.

	(C42749) K2



	40

	On 8th October, 1940, "10" sank "Natia." According to a prisoner a warning shot was fired, the crew was fetched on board in boats, after which the ship was sunk by torpedo. Sixty British prisoners were taken off.
	(N.I.D. Note. According to a member of the "Natia's" crew, she was sunk by shellfire and torpedo after an hour's chase, during which about ten out of 100 shells scored hits, in 000° 50' N. and 032° 24' W. At this time "10" was disguised as the Yugoslav "Vir." A distress message was received.
	When confronted with the statement regarding "10's" disguised identity, the prisoner stated that she had been masquerading as "Vir" for some time. She had started her cruise under the name "Thor." On 14th November, 1940, "10" met "Rio Grande," a German ship from Rio Grande do Sul, from which she received food supplies. "Rio Grande" was carrying a cargo of long wooden planks destined for Germany. She had no armament and had been two weeks at sea. About 400 prisoners from "10" and a party of 16 naval ratings, including the prisoner, under Bootsmannsmaat (Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class) Zimmer, were transferred to this ship, "Rio Grande" arrived at Bordeaux on 15th December, 1940, having met no ship on the way and having travelled at eight knots.
	The prisoner then went on leave and, on reporting for duty later, was sent to join "Lothringen" at Rotterdam. This was in February, 1941, and the prisoner can give no further details as to the movements of Raider "10" after the date he left the ship in December, 1940. He did not know whither the ship was bound.

	XX. RAIDER "10" - TECHNICAL DETAILS

	According to prisoners from Raider "33," "10" was fitted out at the Blohm & Voss Yards, Hamburg. Prisoners confirmed that she is considerably smaller than the majority of the other raiders.
	Her speed was given as between 18 and 20 knots.

	(a) Armament
	According to prisoners, Raider "10" is fitted with six 15-cm. (5.91-in.) guns, disposed as shown in Plate I, facing p. 27. This arrangement enables her to fire a broadside of four guns. There are three 2-cm. (0.79-in.) guns on the boat deck. There are twin torpedo tubes on each side of the ship, just aft of the 'midships superstructure. About ten torpedoes are carried. The raider carries no mines and no minelaying apparatus.

	(b) Magazines
	Four magazines serve the 15-cm. guns. All of these magazines are situated on the centre line of the ship in the lower hold, below water, immediately above the bilges. The two forward magazines are connected to the upper deck by an electric hoist capable of carrying four shells at a time. The two forward magazines are served by two men each, and the two amidships by three of four men.
	The forward magazine hoist serves a point immediately abaft the forward gun. Number 2 hoist serves a point amidships,m abaft Number 2 hatch, both guns drawing ammunition from this point. Number 3 hoist serves a point immediately abaft the 'midships superstructure, both guns drawing from this point, and Number 4 hoist serves a point behind the breech of the after gun.

	(c) Torpedo Magazine
	This is a built-up deckhouse situated athwartships between the twin torpedo tubes.

	(d) R.D/F.
	The prisoner from "10" had no knowledge of R.D/F.

	(e) Rangefinder
	The rangefinder was said to be situated on the roof of the bridge, over the wireless and chart rooms. These two rooms are at the back of the flying-bridge, the wireless room being to port and the charthouse to starboard.

(f) Aircraft

One Arado seaplane was stowed in No. 1 hold. It could be raised by means of a hoist situated immediately abaft the hold. The plane could only be lowered to the water on the port side. The plane could not fly for longer than from one to one and a half hours at a time and was only used two or three times while the prisoner was on board.

(g) Boats

Lifeboats were slung on the after end of the boat deck, there being two lifeboats on the port side and one lifeboat and one motorboat to starboard. The capacity of the lifeboats was 50 men each, the motorboat holding between 20 and 30. The motorboat was used for boarding parties and, although the delayed action of time bombs was set very short, the boat had speed enough to get the men away in time.

"10" also carried 15 to 20 inflated rubber rafts about 6 ft. 6 ins. by 16 ft. in size. These could carry about 20 men each. They were stowed on top of the hatches and were permanently inflated.

XXI. SHIP'S COMPANY OF RAIDER "10"

The ship's company was detailed off among three Divisions. Divisions I and II were seamen divisions with about 80 men in each. Division III, Engineers' Division, also comprised about 80 men.

The following names of officers were given:

Captain	Kapitan zur See (Captain) Kacher.
1st Officer	Kapitan zur See (Captain) Jung.
Navigation Officer	Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Burkhardt.
1st Divisional Officer and Gunnery Officer	Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Baehnke.
2nd Officer of 1st Division	Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Maier.
2nd Divisional Officer	Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Jensen.
2nd Officer of 2nd Division	Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) schmidt.
Prize Officer	Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Sander.

XXII. RAIDER "36," EARLY HISTORY, FITTIING OUT AND TRIALS

Raider "36" was stated by prisoners to have been fitted out at the Blohm & Voss Yards, Hamburg, soon after the outbreak of war. The only prisoner who had formerly served in "36" said that he was posted to the ship in Hamburg in December, 1939, and that the raider then proceeded to Kiel.

A large porportion of the ship's company was then on board, the remainder arriving later.

"36" was ice-bound for some time, but was eventually able to work up in the Baltic and to carry out gun and torpedo trials. During this period "36" continued to use Kiel as her base, ice conditions rendering visits to other ports out of the question. The prisoner alleged that "36" was on one or two occasions accompanied on her exercises by Raider "16." He denied that any other raiders were present in Kiel at this time, but he admitted having seen the battle-cruiser "Gneisenau." "36" did not run any speed trials, whilst the prisoner was on board, nor were the aircraft flown off, although they were in the ship. These statements could not be confirmed.

(C42749) K3



	42

	XXIII. CRUISE OF "36"

	"36" left Kiel at the beginning of April, 1940, being escorted for the first few days of her voyage by aircraft and one small surface vessel. It was denied that escort by surface vessels was provided once the Kattegat had been passed, or that destroyers or other warships accompanied her up the Norwegian coast.
	After leaving the Norwegian coast, "36" proceeded through the Denmark Straits into the Atlantic. The prisoner denied that he knew anything of the supposed chase of "Jamaica Producer" on 20th April, 1940, but confirmed the raider's first attack was on "Haxby." This ship was sunk on 24th April, 1940, in position 31° 30' N. and 51° 30' W. The prisoner stated that he had no knowledge of minelaying off Freetown (the suspected laying of mines was, at one time, attributed to "36"). He added that, as far as he knew, the first laying of mines occurred when the ship reached the Pacific.
	This was on 12th June, 1940, off Auckland, New Zealand, where 86 anchored mines were laid in three hours.
	(N.I.D. Note. This is probably correct. It is now considered improbable that any mines were laid off Freetown. This apparently exhausted "36's" stock as neither she, "Kulmerland," nor "45" was responsible for later mining in Australian waters, which appears to have been carried out only by "33" and her prize "Storstad." About 90 mines have been located in one area and a further 15 mines some distance away. The prisoner's statement, therefore, is probably correct. It may be assumed that "36's" mines caused the loss of "Niagara" on 18th June, 1940.)
	The prisoner confirmed that the German tanker "Winnetau" was met about a fortnight after the sinking of "Haxby" and that they proceeded in company round Cape Horn.
	The prisoner claimed that, at this time, he contracted a tropical disease and spent about six months in the sick bay, caring little for what went on around him. It is believed that, in fact, the prisoner was ill for some time, but in reading statements regarding the movements of the ship from this date onwards it should be borne in mind that a claim to have been ill at critical periods is a favourite dodge, employed by German prisoners, to evade awkward questions and to give vague and unsatisfactory replies.
	The prisoner remembered the capture of the Norwegian "Tropic Sea."
	(N.I.D. Note. "Tropic Sea" was captured on 18th June, 1940, in 28° 48' S. and 160° 38' W. No distress signal was made. On 30th June, 1940, prisoners from "Haxby" were transferred to "Tropic Sea," which with her own and a prize crew, parted company from the raider. "Tropic Sea" rounded Cape Horn and was later intercepted and scuttled on the Bay of Biscay when making for Bordeaux. The crew of the "Haxby" and the majority of the crew of the "Tropic Sea" were rescued by British Forces. The remainder of the Norwegians and the German Prize crew succeeded in reaching the Spanish Coast.)
	In August, while he was recuperating, the prisoner stated that there was an aircraft alarm. He denied, at first, that the guns had been fired or that the aircraft had been brought down, but he finally admitted that an aircraft had been shot down by "36," although he could give no satisfactory evidence as to the fate of the crew.
	(N.I.D. Note. A Hudson of the R.A.A.F. was lost on the 12th August, 1940, off Moreton Island, Queensland, the fate of the crew remaining uncertain. A survivor from "Turakina," sunk shortly after this incident by "36," stated that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no Australian airmen on board the raider, though native survivors from the French ship "Notou," also sunk by "36", stated that a R.A.A.F. aircraft had been shot down and the crew picked up. It would appear more probable that the crew was not saved and that the airmen referred to by "Notou's" survivors were those who were taking passage in "Rangitane.")
	The prisoner vaguely remembered the sinking by "36" of "Notou," on 16th August, 1940, in approximate position 25° S. and 165° E. and of "Turakina" in 38° 27' S. and 167° 35' E. on 20th August, 1940. After sinking "Turakina," "36" did not proceed north, but went south, and appears to have searched for



	43

	shipping off the South Coast of Australia and possibly on the Australia-Cape route. Meeting with no success, she returned to the Pacific and attacked "Ringwood" in approximate position 3° N. and 166° E., on 15th October, 1940.
	The prisoner admitted that another raider, whose number he gave as "45," had been in company with "36" and the supply ship "Kulmerland" for about six weeks, from the end of September, 1940 to the beginning of November, 1940, but it is not clear whether these other ships were present, when "Ringwood" was sunk.
	The prisoner was extremely reticent about Raider "45" and said there was no contact between the two crews. He did, however, hear a rumour that "45" had not made any attacks on shipping before joining "36". Her Captain was senior to the Captain of "36" and, according to the prisoner, there was some friction which eventually led to the two ships separating.
	"Kulmerland" joined "36" about seven or eight days before "45," the prisoner confirming, after considerable hesitation, that she had come from Japan.
	The prisoner denied that any regular base had been established in the Marshall, or any other Islands, but it appears that one anchorage was used on more than one occasion, and it is possible that small huts were built ashore to accommodate some of the crews.
	The prisoner confirmed, with some uncertainty, the sinking of "Holmwood" on 25th November, 1940, in position 27° W. by S., from Duram point, Chatham Island, and, with rather more assurance, the sinking of "Rangitane" by shellfire and time bomb on 27th November, 1940 in position 37° S. and 176° W. The prisoner confirmed the sinking by shellfire, torpedoes and time bombs of the five phosphate ships "Triaster," "Triadic," "Triona," "Vinni" and "Komata" at, or near. Nauru Island on 6th, 7th, 8th December, 1940. He added that "36" parted company from "Kulmerland" and "45", after the latter ships had landed their prisoners at Emirau Island on 21st December. "36" did not herself land prisoners, it was alleged, because survivors from "Haxby" and "Tropic Sea" had broadcast false accounts of their ill-treatment on board "36," when they reached England.
	The crews of the three German ships had hoped to spend Christmas together, the prisoner said, but this was not permitted. "Kulmerland" was supposed to have departed for Japan, while "45" proceeded to bombard Nauru on 26th December, 1940. "36" was not present and the ship's company only learned of the shelling from the ship's newspaper which quoted Australian broadcasts. They realised that the attacker must have been "45."
	The prisoner stated that he recovered his health at Christmas and that, some time in January or early February, 1941, "36" met the "Ermland" (the merchant ship, not the fleet tanker) and a ship known to him as "Benno," which he later agreed was "Ole Jacob," a prize of Raider "16's." He stated that "Ermland" had come from Germany, and not from Japan. (It is known, however, that "Ermland" came from Japan.)
	"Ole Jacob" supplied "36" with oil and, according to prisoner, was only the second ship to do so, the first having been "Winnetau," who had not been seen since the beginning of July.
	(N.I.D. Note. "Ermland" is known to have proceeded south for two days in company with "36," and then to have rounded Cape Horn and entered the South Atlantic. Here she had a rendezvous with "Nordmark", early in March, 1941, and shortly afterwards with "Admiral Scheer." After taking over prisoners from the latter, she returned to Bordeaux, arriving on 7th April, 1941. The "Ole Jacob's" cargo consisted of petroleum, and, as she almost certainly refuelled "36," the report that the Japanese had accepted her cargo of petroleum in exchange for fuel oil would appear to be correct. "Ole Jacob" returned to German-Occupied France, arriving at Bordeaux in July, 1941.)
	The prisoner stated that "Ermland" took back to Germany a party of British airmen who had been captured from "Rangitane." These men had been passengers and were definitely not connected with the air attack on "36."
	"36" now continued south, until the weather was very cold, and then entered the Indian Ocean south of Australia. During this time no vessel was attacked, nor even sighted and, according to the prisoner, "36's" last attack was on the phosphate ships off Nauru.

	(C42749) K4



	44

	The prisoner asserted that "36" was now on her homeward voyage, but he also stated that, when he left the raider, he was told that she would not be back in Germany for three months.
	(N.I.D. Note. A reliable report has been received that this raider reached France in August, 1941, four months after this remark was made.)
	On 10th April, 1941, "36" met "Alstertor" in a position stated to be about 30° S, and 90° E. The prisoner, who was not fully recovered from his illness, was transferred to "Alstertor" and claimed that this was the sole reason for the meeting, but it appears certain that "Alstertor" transferred stores to "36" and possibly an aircraft to replace one which had been damaged in August, or September, 1940.
	On 22nd September, 1941, Breslau broadcast the announcement that Fregattenkapitän (Commander) Kurt Weyher had received the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross and that he had sunk 13 enemy merchant ships totalling over 80,000 gross registered tons, as the commander of a German auxiliary vessel, now operating in overseas waters.
	(N.I.D. Note. This is interesting, as "36's" sinkings up to December, 1940, only amounted to 13 ships. It would, therefore, appear that during the eight months of 1941, she had no further success.)

	XXIV. RAIDER "36" - TECHNICAL DETAILS

	(a) Identity
	"36" was stated by the prisoner to be the former "Kurmark." Her tonnage is known to be 7,800 tons, while"Kurmark's" tonnage is 7,020. It is possible that "36's" is the "Neumark" of 7,850 tons, a vessel of very similar appearance to "Kurmark."

	(b) Name
	The prisoner denied all knowledge of the raider's name, but British prisoners who had been accommodated in this ship and who had subsequently escaped and returned to Great Britian, agree that the raider's name was "Orion."

	(c) Appearance
	Identical with that of "Neumark" except: All Samson posts have been cut down or removed entirely. The midship superstructure continues to the mainmast. The funnel is sometimes camouflaged to give it a rake. Plated bulwarks have replaced the rails in the fore and after well decks. Those in the fore well deck are collapsible to allow the guns to fire. In the after well deck this is not necessary as the bulwarks are low.

	(d) Disguises
	None reported, except for the alterations mentioned above and the fact that the 5.9-in. gun on the poop is not concealed; this is intended to give the appearance of a D.E.M.S.

	(e) Engines
	Almost certainly turbines geared to a single shaft, Oil fuel. Maximum speed unlikely to exceed 17 knots.

	(f) Armament and Equipment (see Plate II).
	Six 15-cm. (5.91-in.) short barelled guns with maximum range of 18,000 yards; two of these, disguised as deck cargo by dummy cases (four in all) are mounted on each side on the fore well deck; of the remaining two guns, one is mounted in No. 6 hatch in a dummy deckhouse, the barrel of the gun being disguised as a derrick, while the other is on the poop deck and is not concealed.
	Twin 7.5-cm. (2.95-in.) guns are also mounted on the poop beneath the after 15-cm. gun. Ammunition hoists to all guns are electric.
	There are six 2-cm. (0.79-in.) H.A. guns; two on the fo'c'sle in canvas covers, one each side of the bridge and one each side of the after end of the midship superstructure.
	Main magazines are in No. 5 and probably in No. 2 holds, with a torpedo magazine in No. 4 hold. Abaft the torpedo magazine is a torpedo repair shop. Twin torpedo tubes are mounted on the main deck, each side, at the after end of the midship superstructure.



	45

	Four small A.A. rangefinders are mounted on the bridge, two on each side, while the main rangefinder is situated at the after end of the midship superstructure.
	There is a small hand-operated searchlight on the bridge, while the main searchlight, 1.5 metres in diameter, is mounted on rails abaft the funnel, so that it can be moved to either side of the ship by a hand winch.
	Mines were apparently stowed on rails in No. 6 hold aft. The prisoner thought that about 90 mines were carried.

	(g) Aircraft
	An Arado seaplane is housed in a cradle in No. 2 hold. It is apparently hoisted up by hand and then swung out by means of the foremast derricks and winches.

	(h) Accommodation
	The crew's accommodation is in No. 1 hold, the f''oc'sle being occupied by a carpenter's and repair ship. The officers' accommodation is in the bridge superstructure.
	In No. 3 hold was a recreation and cinema room and the prisoners' quarters were in No. 4 hold.

	(i) Recognition
	Points that might be noticed from the air would be the companion-way in No. 1 hatch, No. 4 hatch decked over with companion-way down to prisoners' quarters, and the dummy deckhouse on No. 6 hatch with the barrel of the 15-cm. gun showing.

	XXV. LIFE ON BOARD RAIDER "36"

	The prisoner stated that the ship's company was not told that they were to go on a long cruise, when they left Germany, and they were constantly being encouraged by promises that they would be home "soon."
	Food appears to have been quite good, although the prisoner said that the stock of potatoes had been exhausted many months ago. Vitamin pills were issued daily to make up for the lack of fresh vegetables.
	About 50 hens and five pigs were shipped in Germany, but these had long since been slaughtered. A number of live sheep were taken off one captured ship, the prisoner believed it was the "Holmwood." and these too, had been killed and eaten.
	There was a beer issue of one glass per man per day. The prisoner remembered that some sailors had been locked up for some days for getting drunk on stolen beer.
	The ship's company numbered approximately 300. Many of them were young recruits whose seamanship was not particularly good, but they were strengthened by a number of Baltic fishermen who made excellent seamen.
	There were cinema performances twice each week, the ship possessing 50 full length films and many short films. There were also concerts and training courses during the evenings.
	A number of Iron crosses, 1st and 2nd Class had been awarded to members of the ship's company but, as there were no Crosses on board, the men fashioned their own medals which they were wearing, until they could replace them in Germany.
	Wireless programmes were constantly broadcast throughout the ship, and the prisoner stated that they had frequently heard concerts from Australia.
	The prisoner alleged that the standard of health was fairly high, but a number had fallen ill with the fever which had afflicted him. He added that his own illness had resulted in his losing a number of teeth. He was fitted with false teeth on board.
	The prisoner did not care to remember the names of many of the ship's officers. He stated that the Captain was Fregattenkapitän (Commander) Kurt Weyher, and the First Officer was Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Blancke. Three surgeons were carried, the name of one being Dr. Martell.
	The ship's company was detailed off to four Divisions, the first two being seamen, the third technical and the fourth engine room. A Lieutenant was in charge of the second Division and a Lieutenant-Commander (E) in charge of the fourth.



	46

	XXVI. OTHER RAIDERS

	(a) General Remarks
	Considerable difficulty has been experienced in collating the details of other raiders which prisoners have given. The system of employing sister ships, and of changing names and numbers frequently, has obviously confused and muddled prisoners; in addition, these men were extremely obstinate in refusing information about ships which they knew to be still operating. Prisoners from Raider "33" were particularly vague as to the identity of the raider they met at Kerguelen Island in March, 1941. The number of this raider was given as "41" and also "45." The bulk of evidence would now seem to prove that this raider was, in fact, "45" and observations made when she was in company with "33" are included as a description of that ship. The possibility that she may yet turn out to be "41" must not, however, be overlooked.

	(b) Raider "41"
	Prisoners stated that Raider "41" was a brand new ship called "Steiermark," completed since the outbreak of war. She was originally destined for the Hapag Line and is of approximately 10,000 tons. Her speed was given as 20 knots. Her armament was stated to be modern in all respects, including long-barrelled 15-cm. (5.91-in.) guns with a greater range than those of "16" and "33." She was alleged to have had 200 mines on board and new mine-sowing apparatus.
	"41" is believed to have left Germany or Occupied France in January, 1941, and may have been responsible for the sinking of "British Union" on 18th January, 1941, west of the Canaries, and perhaps for those sinkings in the South Atlantic not effected by "16." It is possible that "41," after meeting "16," proceeded back to the North Atlantic or, alternatively, remained in the Indian Ocean.

	(c) Raider "45"
	Prisoners stated that this raider is smaller and faster than "36." She appears to have been fitted out in Bremen. "45" apparently left Germany in July, 1940, and made her way to the Pacific. Prisoners have stated that this raider had been given a particularly difficult area and had not had much success.
	One engineer prisoner from "33" stated that when his ship and the raider he believed to have been "45," were together at Kerguelen Island in Marck, 1941, he was called aboard "45" to repair the latter's E-Boat. When he arrived aboard, he was met by the Captain, who asked him what he wanted. When he said that he was supposed to repair the E-Boat, the Captain replied: "Don't worry; I have already ordered the E-Boat to be taken to pieces and stowed away in packing cases." The prisoner stated that he was very much disappointed, as he had hoped to remain in "45," which had the reputation of being a very safe ship. the Captain taking matters easily and avoiding trouble.
	The prisoner learnt that "45" was the first ship to carry an E-Boat. This boat had four engines which gave a maximum speed of 45 knots. The boat was fitted for mine-laying and could carry up to eight mines. The prisoner stated that "45" was also fitted with a catapult across the fo'c'sle, for launching aircraft.
	The prisoner alleged that he was told on board "45" that she had reached the Pacific by going north round Russia. He was told that at one period the raider had run fast in the ice and had had to be freed by Russian ice-breakers. The Russians had warned the Captain to put back, as the British were waiting for him in the Pacific. This story, which seems highly improbable, was repeated by other prisoners from Raider "33" who can, however, only have heard of it from the same source.
	(N.I.D. Note. This story is emphatically denied by Russian naval authorities.)
	The total tonnage sunk by Raider "45" when she reached Kerguelen Island, was stated by prisoners from "33" to be not more than 18,000 tons. It is probable that they would under-estimate the success of a rival raider.
	The Captain of "45" was alleged by prisoners to have been made a Rear-Admiral during this cruise.
	No details could be given as to possible movements of "45," but according to one prisoner, the ship was heading back for the Pacific Ocean.



	47

	Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Bahr, Captain of the supply ship "Egerland," captured on 5th June, 1941, professed to have heard that one raider was making a "world tour" and would leave the Indian Ocean for the Pacific to attack merchant shipping in the Panama area. She would then head south and reach the South Atlantic by way of Cape Horn to meet "Egerland." Bahr was much upset that he would not be able to keep the rendezvous. It has not been established which raider Bahr referred to, but it appears likely that it would be either "45" or "41."
	(N.I.D. Note. The presence of a raider in the Panama area in August/September, 1941, has been established.)

	(d) Raider "21"
	A prisoner stated that the Captain of Raider "21" was Fregattenkapitän (Commander) Hellmuth von Ruckteschell. The prisoner agreed that "21" had operated in the North Atlantic in 1940 and returned to Germany or France before Christmas, 1940. Von Ruckteschell is believed to be a particularly ruthless officer. He was born on 23rd March, 1890, and in 1918 was in command of "U 54." Previously he had been watch-keeping officer of "UB 34."
	On 10th November, 1940, the German High Command announced that the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross had been conferred on von Ruckteschell.

	(e) Unknown Raider
	Prisoners stated that one raider, which had left Germany after "33," had been torpedoed by a British submarine almost at the start of her cruise. She was damaged and put back for repairs, but is now believed to be operating.

	XXVII. "ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE"

	An officer who had served in the pocket battleship "Admiral Graf Spee," from the start of her cruise to her sinking in the Rio Plate, was captured when the supply ship "Alstertor" was intercepted by H.M. forces on 23rd June, 1941. This officer had escaped from internment Montevideo and had made his way to Santos, where he had shipped aboard the Hamburg Süd cargo vessel "Babitongs," hoping to return to Germany. He was transferred to "Alstertor" on 15th June, 1941. This officer stated that he was ordered aboard "Admiral Graf Spee" in the summer of 1939, it being intended that he should serve as Prize Ship Officer. He was given the naval rank of Leutnant zur See der Reserve. "Admiral Graf Spee" was then fitting out for a long raiding cruise. The prisoner alleged that Kapitan zur See (Captain) Langsdorff was displeased with the complement drafted to him, and he protested that the average age was far too old. Requests were at once made to German shipping firms for young experienced seamen with knowledge of conditions in the North Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Australian waters. These were conscripted much to the indignation of the shipping firms, as there was already a dearth of the required type of seaman.
	"Admiral Graf Spee" left Germany before the outbreak of war to take up her station.
	The officer prisoner remembered only a few details of "Admiral Graf Spee's" raiding activities. He recalled that the pocket battleship stopped a Dutch ship at night in the Indian Ocean and signalled "Illuminate bridge." The Dutch captain pretended he had not understood, and turned his searchlight on "Admiral Graf Spee" bridge instead of lighting up his own. This caused general amusement and the Dutchman was allowed to proceed. The incident apparently occurred off the African coast.
	About the same time "Admiral Graf Spee" stopped a large neutral tanker which was forbidden to make wireless signals and told to carry on. The prisoner also remembered the stoppage of a small British ship, off the African coast, which attempted to escape into the three-mile zone. An 11.9-in. shell was fired across the ship's bows and she then hove to. The Captain was ordered on board "Admiral Graf Spee" and the remainder of the crew allowed to escape to land.
	(N.I.D. Note. This incident refers to the capture of "Africa Shell" (Captain Dove) off Portuguese East Africa on 15th November, 1939.)



	48

	The prisoner stated that "Admiral Graf Spee's" fuel began to run low and, in December, 1939, the Captain decided to run for home. He recounted how, when they were running up the South American coast one morning, they were intercepted by three British cruisers.
	"Admiral Graf Spee" took heavy punishment, as she could only train her guns on two targets simultaneously.
	After one and a half hours the Captain summoned his officers and explained that the damage was so severe that no harbour in the vicinity could effect repairs in time for them to escape detention. To remain out would be to court certain destruction as, while he might hold off the cruisers, it was to be anticipated that they would maintain contact until further assistance arrived. He had, therefore, decided to run for Buenos Aires and allow the ship to be interned. He then turned to the prisoner and stated "You know the Rio Plate, take over the navigation of the ship."
	The same evening, while they were running for Buenos Aires, the cruisers engaged again and more damage was sustained. The Captain then came to the prisoner and said: "The cruisers are trying to cut us off, we had better steer the straightest course for Montevideo." The prisoner alleged that the "Admiral Graf Spee" escaped into Montevideo harbour by a few minutes.
	The next day there was another conference at which the Captain, who was under the impression that the cruisers had been reinforced by two battleships and an aircraft carrier said: "I intend to put out again, fire off my entire ammunition, and then return. They will have to grant us more time." He reported his intention to the German Operations Directorate in Berlin. The reply was: "You are to reconsider your decision most carefully. The Führer is particularly anxious that there shall be no unnecessary sacrifice - are you convinced your intended course of action is worth while?" The Captain then told his officers that he could not allow the ship to be interned in Uruguay, as there was danger that that country might declare war on Germany, with the sole object of acquiring "Admiral Graf Spee" for their own use. This had to be prevented at all costs. It was then decided to take the pocket battleship out and scuttle her, employing s.s. "Tacoma" of the Hapag Line, then in the harbour, to bring back the skeleton crew. The prisoner stated that Captain Langsdorff wished to remain in his ship, but his officers went to him and said: "If you stay here, we shall all stay, let us leave together." To this the Captain, who later shot himself, agreed. The prisoner stated that he, a number of officers and the majority of the ship's company had already been put ashore in Montevideo.

	XXVIII. GENERAL REMARKS

	Merchant Ships
	An officer prisoner stated that the Germans intended to complete a large French ship named "Pasteur" and two fast 18,000-ton German ships, which would be ready this year.

	Invasion Preparations
	Prisoners stated that a large number of passenger ships had been collected in Hamburg and had had part of their bows cut away, in order to facilitate the landing of troops. It could not be ascertained whether these ships were for use against England or Russia.

	German Ships in Japan
	Prisoners stated that about 80 German ships were now in Japanese harbours. It was popularly supposed that some, including the merchant vessel "Scharnhorst," would be fitted out as raiders.



	49

	"Graf Zeppelin"
	The presence of a partially completed German aircraft carrier in Gotenhafen was confirmed.

	Leuna Works
	According to an Austrian prisoner, the main Leuna petrol producing plant had been moved from its location near Leipzig to Linz, on the Danube. This prisoner had been offered employment at the new works, but had had to refuse as he was called up by the German navy.

	Iron Ore Deposits
	A Chief Petty Officer prisoner, formerly an industrial engineer, stated that new iron ore deposits had been found near Magdeburg. The ore was of poor quality and needed to be treated by special expensive processes, otherwise it would be too brittle for use.

	Treatment of Poles
	One prisoner described the German treatment of the Poles in occupied areas as bestial. He stated that a friend of his had returned from Poland with chronic-melancolia and had been given two year's sick leave.

	Air-Raid Damage
	One prisoner who lived at Wilhelmshaven stated that a huge crane, known familiarly as "Long Henry," had been wrecked during an R.A.F. raid. The prisoner believed this crane to be the largest of its kind in the world.




	______________________

APPENDIX I

List of Prisoners ex Raider "33"

Name.	Rank.	English Equivalent.	Age.
Roll, Dr. Ulrich	Marinemeteorologe	Naval Meteorologist	31
Roll, Dr. Ulrich	Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant-Commander	31
Bottcher, Oskar	Leutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant	33
Hasselmann, Werner	Marineassisstenzarzt	Surgeon	31
Neumeister, Ernst	Obersteuermann	Chief Q.M., 1st Class	28
Rausch, Kurt	Bootsmannsmaat	Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class	27
Werner, Hans	Bootsmannsmaat	Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class	23
Schilcher, Andreas	Bootsmannsmaat	Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class	28
Splittgerber, Rudolf	Funkmaat	P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class	24
Besser, Alfred	Zimmermannsmaat	Shipwright's Mate, 2nd Class	25
Müller, Friedrich	Schreibermaat	P.O. Writer, 2nd Class	23
Bründel, Ernst	Matrosenhauptgefreiter	Leading Seaman	25
Miketta, Siegfried	Matrosenhauptgefreiter	Leading Seaman	26
Simon, Walter	Matrosenhauptgefreiter	Leading Seaman	24
Becker, Paul	Signalhauptgefreiter	Leading Signalman	27
Tobianus, Willy	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	26
Lindner, Hermann	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	22
Schöche, Hans	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	24
Boldt, Franz	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	21
Röhl, Kurt	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	22
Barmester, Walter	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	19
Strasser, walter	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	26
Kracht, Albert	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	23
Krackhofer, Johan	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman	21
Grönwald, Rudolf	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class	22
Jasmann, Herbert	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class	25
Angrick, Karl-Heinz	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class	23
Kerl, Heinz	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class	22
Radden, Heinz	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class	26
Braum, Kurt	Maschinenobergefreiter	Stoker, 1st Class	21
Wiedemann, Heinz	Signalobergefreiter	Signalman	21
Prösdorf, Heinz	Funkobergefreiter	Telegraphist	20
Wurmscher, Heinrich	Funkobergefreiter	Telegraphist	23
Vick, Walter	Funkobergefreiter	Telegraphist	21
Klisch, Heinz	Funkobergefreiter	Telegraphist	25
Göhler, Herbert	Mechanikerobergefreiter	Artificer, 1st Class	22
Maasz, Herbert	Mechanikerobergefreiter	Artificer, 1st Class	21
Poeten, Robert	Sanitätsobergefreiter	Sick Bay Attendant, 1st Class	23
Schilhabel, Hellmut	Sanitätsobergefreiter	Sick Bay Attendant, 1st Class	23
Kommick, Gerhard	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	31
Poon, Max	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	29
Markucik, Richard	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	21
Harder, Ulrich	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	20
Richter, Otto	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	30
Pirwitz, Hans	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	35
Heinrich, Josef	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	35
Weissenberg, Wilhelm	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	26
Gamerschlag, Hans	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	21
Herzog, Josef	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	20
Kirchwehm, Werner	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	25
Tappendorf, August	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	35
Schonert, Richard	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	32
Bachmann, Willi	Maschinengefreiter	Stoker, 2nd Class	27
Langhofer, Hugo	Signalgefreiter	Ordinary Signalman, 1st Class	20
Geissler, Kurt	Funkgefreiter	Ordinary Telegraphist, 1st Class	30
Niemann, Helmut	Matrose	Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class	22
Muller, Willy	Matrose	Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class	18

APPENDIX II

List of Officers and Ratings known to have lost their lives in Raider "33"

Name.	Rank.	English Equivalent.
Krueder, Ernst-Felix	Kapitän zur See	Captain.
Schwinne, Max	Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant-Commander
Kramer,	Kapitänleutnant (Ing.)	Engineer Lieutenant-Commander
Levit,	Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Rieche.	Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Gabe,	Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Brunke,	Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Muller,	Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant.
Michaelsen,	Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve	Lieutenant, Naval Reserve.
Grau,	Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve	Lieutenant, Naval Reserve.
Warning,	Leutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant.
Voslow,	Leutnant (Ing.)	Engineer Sub-Lieutenant.
Wenzel,	Dr.	Surgeon.

The following officer are known to have served in Raider "33" but it it thought possible that they had been transhipped to prize ships before her sinking:

Name.	Rank.	English Equivalent.
Kuster,	Oberleutnant sur See	Lieutenant.
Stenner,	Oberleutnant sur See	Lieutenant.
Scherer,	Oberleutnant sur See der Reserve	Lieutenant, Naval Reserve.
Neumeier	Leutnant zur See der Reserve	Sub-Lieutenant, Naval Reserve.
Hahnefeld,	Leutnant zur See der Reserve	Sub-Lieutenant, Naval Reserve.

The following ratings are known to have lost their lives in Raider "33":

Zimmermann,	Feldwebel	Chief Petty Officer.
Huettenemister,	Feldwebel	Chief Petty Officer.
Krasemann, Helmut	Unteroffizier	Petty Officer.
Weissfleck, Max	Unteroffizier	Petty Officer.
Krebitsch, Franz	Unteroffizier	Petty Officer.
Doppelfeld, Anton	Unteroffizier	Petty Officer.

APPENDIX III

List of Prisoners from other Raiders

Raider Prisoners ex Supply Ship "Alstertor"

Name.	Rank or Rating.	English Equivalent.	Raider served in.
Ulpts, Gerhard	Leutnant zur See der Reserve	Sub-Lieutenant, Naval Reserve	"Admiral Graf Spee."
Visser, Friedrich	Oberzimmermannsmaat und Taucher	Shipwright's Mate, 1st Class, and Diver	Raider "16."
Hell, Eduard	Matrosenobergefr.	Able Seaman	Raider "16."
Bontemps, Hans	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	Raider "16."
Gruhn, August	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	Raider "16."
Stellberger, Robert	Signalgefreiter	Ordinary Signalman, 1st Class	Raider "36."

Raider Prisoner ex Supply Ship "Lothringen"

Brauer, Heinz	Matrosengefreiter	Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class	Raider "10."

(C42749) 325

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