NORTH ATLANTIC |
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NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER |
WAR DIARY |
JANUARY 1942 |
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Chapter II. |
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The Submarines Arrive |
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| "History is repeating itself and, as in 1914-1918, so in 1939-1942, although we shall not win the war by defeating U-boats, we shall assuredly lose the war if we do not defeat them." | ||||||
| British Admiralty Report. | ||||||
| "It is submitted that should enemy submarines operate off this coast, this command has no forces available to take adequate action against them, either offensive or defensive." | ||||||
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| The understandable panic running along the deck of the sinking VENORE spread out over all the waters of the east coast in the month just past. On the last day of December the tension that built up throughout January, started with a dispatch from the First Naval District. The Coast Guard reported a periscope between Cushing and Ram Islands in Portland Channel. But the "Duty officer (Com 1) rather questioned the report", and no further action was taken. | ||||||
| One week later an Army plane "sighted 2 DDs, 2 SSs and 2 unidentified ships 50 miles SE of Cape May." A later flight revealed two trawlers and periscopes in the same position. No further word came in and it was estimated that the ships were all "probably fishermen." Next day another Army plane reported "a large black submarine, long conning tower, gun forward on surface moving slowly NE. Submerged on seeing plane. Position 40-55N; 70-48W. Cinclant notified." | ||||||
| That same day, January 7th., Cominch gave firmer foundation to the reports that had been flowing into the Headquarters, North Atlantic Naval | ||||||
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Coastal Frontier. "There are"
it was stated in a dispatch "strong indications that
16 German submarines are proceeding to the area off the
southeast coast of Newfoundland. ----- The object of this
operation is not understood." The intentions of the
enemy became more clearly defined on January 11th, when
word was received that the S. S. CYCLOPS had been torpedoed
and sunk at position 41-50N; 63-48W, about three-hundred
miles due east of Cape Cod. It was apparent that some of
the U-boats, at least, were moving down the coast. Next
day, at 2200 another dispatch on the movement of the submarines
was followed by a conference at Headquarters that lasted
until 0200. January 13th., the North Atlantic Naval Coastal
Frontier presented the First Bomber Command with a memorandum
that began "Submarines may be expected off our coast
at any time. At least four were known to be about 300 miles
east of Nantucket Light on January 12, and are probably
proceeding westward. Five or six enemy submarines are moving
westward between latitudes 30N and 50N." |
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The
log for that same day, January 13th., reads in part as follows: |
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About
one hour and a half after the ports of Boston, Portland
and Portsmouth had been closed the first ship within the
limits of the Frontier was sunk. At 0130 EWT, January 14th.
the Panamanian tanker NORNESS was hit by three torpedoes
and went down at position 40-20N; 70-50W, sixty miles southeast
of Montauk Point. Twenty four hours later Admiral Kalbfus
telephoned to Admiral Andrews the news that six officers
and twenty-four men had been rescued and landed at Newport. |
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The
sinking of the NORNESS was the signal for the opening of
an unprecedented submarine attack upon the merchant shipping
in the coastal waters. In the remaining seventeen days of
the month, thirteen vessels were lost through enemy action.
The worst day of all was the 19th. when three ships went
down off Cape Hatteras. This area, where the land reaches
out almost to the 100 fathom curve, proved to be a favorite
hunting ground for the U-Boats. The losses in these waters
during the month were six vessels, almost half the total
for the whole Frontier. |
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| A pattern for enemy attacked was clearly discerned as January ended. Ordinarily the submarines worked at night, on the surface and alone. As many torpedoes were fired as necessary to sink a vessel or to prevent successful salvage. In one case four were sent into a ship over a period of five hours. The work of torpedoes were supplemented when possible by gunfire. Three of the ships sunk had been silhouetted against the lights from the shore; a fourth had been proceeding with dimmed running lights. | ||||||||
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In the rare cases when submarines operated
together, it was noticed that they communicated with each
other by blue lights after the torpedoeing had taken place.
It was also remarked, in one or two instances that the moment
of attack was followed by a "strong odor" of phosphorous
or sulphur. |
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Knowledge
of such curious details was of little help to those intrusted
with the security of the sea lanes during the past month.
The appearance of the enemy in such force gave little opportunity
for warding off the blows that were struck so rapidly against
the shipping. An attempt to reduce the casualties was made
on January 22nd. when the sea lanes were moved sixty miles
out to sea around Cape Hatteras, but since little was accomplished
by this maneuver, the lanes were brought back as close inshore
as possible on the last day of January. The answer to the
problem of the submarine lay in a different direction, but
as the month ended there was little promise that the answer
could be made in the foreseeable future. |
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The
arrival of the submarines in the waters off the east coast
was not unexpected. For this there were several reasons.
In the first place, it was reasonable to assume that what
the German's had done with some success and with less efficient
submarines in the last war, they would try to do again in
this war. One of the assumptions upon which the Operation
Plan for the Frontier had been based was that "submarine
activity may be expected with submarines operating against
shipping with either torpedoes, mines or gunfire."
But a more compelling reason for expecting submarine operations
than the Germans' actions in the past can be found in the
present conditions of what has been called the "Battle
of the Atlantic." |
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The
security of the sea lanes along which vital supplies moved
from America to England had been greatly increased during
the final months of 1941. Added protection for convoys had
multiplied the dangers to the U-Boats and greatly reduced
the hazards to merchant shipping. The culminating of this
steady progress came on December 15-16, when the Germans
in a prolonged attack on Convoy H.G. 76, lost four submarines
while sinking only two ships out of a possible thirty-two. |
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Successes
of this sort gave increasing confidence to those intrusted
with the protection of the life lines of the United Kingdom.
But they also aroused fears that the enemy would react to
the altered conditions with his usual resiliency; that he
would, as he had in the past whenever his operations were
bringing diminishing returns, shift both the method and
location of the attack. In the great chain of communications
that hold the allied countries together, the German has
always been quick to discover the weakest link. The entry
of this country into the war, it was foreseen, would provide
an excellent opportunity for Admiral Doenitz to reveal his
gifts for improvisation. |
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In
every way the coastal waters of North America offer an extremely
attractive hunting ground for the submarine. The great length
of the sea lanes running down from our eastern shore and
into the Caribbean places imposing burdens upon any forces
assigned to protect them. At all times, too, these lanes
are crowded with merchant vessels sailing, ordinarily alone.
Such ships offer easy, frequent, and valuable targets. Most
valuable of all, of course, are the numerous tankers running
from our northern ports to the oil refineries in South America
and the Gulf. And finally, at the southern extremity, these
lanes flow into the confined waters of the Caribbean |
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where submarines may find safe and secret
harbor from which to launch attacks against the shipping
that is compressed within the narrow channels. These coastal
waters present an alluring opportunity to a resourceful
enemy who is looking for new hunting grounds. |
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For
the reasons suggested above, it was almost a certainty that
at least some submarines would begin to operate off our
coast, after war began. The steps to be taken upon their
arrival in these waters were clearly understood for the
historic principles and traditional weapons of anti-submarine
warfare have changed little since the first world war. Ship
routing, convoy and escort, patrol and search of endangered
areas, remain the accepted methods of counter-attack, while
small escort craft, airplanes, the K or Y gun and the depth
charge are still the most effective weapons in the armory
that can be used against the U-boat. |
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| But the heart of the problem of anti-submarine warfare can perhaps best be stated in terms of mathematics. Effective application of the methods and efficient use of the weapons depends directly upon the numerical strength of the forces involved. The solution of this problem, therefore, must be arrived at primarily in terms of mathematics. Changes in principle or redesign of instruments will accomplish little if it is impossible to increase the numerical strength of ships and planes to the amount required. Historically, those responsible for the security of sea lanes have had to spend far less time in hunting for theories than in searching for forces. Such was the case in the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier when the operations of the submarines this passed month revealed the weaknesses inherent in numerical deficiency with mathematical exactitude. | ||
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