F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 January 1945

PG30362

     
     
 
1.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 14
U 485
- Op(BF 35)
U 863
- Op(MQ 40)
U 1053
- AL 26
 
248
- Op(BD 37)
486
- Op(BF 35)
869
- AK 38
1055
- AM 89
 
278
- Op(AN 16)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 85
1058
- AO 44
 
285
- AM 42
650
- Op(BF 26)
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1172
- AM 32
 
297
- Op(AN 36)
680
- BF 15
905
- BF 12
1200
- AN 29
 
312
- Op(AN 15)
764
- AM 32
907
- AN 32
1202
- AN 24
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- BF 25
979
- AE 73
1208
- AO 44
 
315
- AF 77
773
- AN 73
1009
- AK 61
1230
- AK 85
 
322
- BF 16
806
- Op(BB 75)
1014
- AO 44
1231
- Op(BB 75)
 
325
- BF 11
825
- AN 28
1017
- AN 28
1232
- Op(BB 76)
 
400
- BF 16
843
- KS 87
1020
- Op(AN 17)
1233
- AE 67
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1051
- AN 28
1235
- AN 32
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1200 - 1230.
  Entered Port :  U 1202 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 864 - Farsund;  U 1199 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
                15th Group: 0943 suspicious object, position unidentified.
  1010 suspicious patch of oil, position unidentified.
  1105 suspicious object, position unidentified.
  1219 suspicious object, position unidentified.
  0039 suspected submarine location, preparing to attack, position unidentified.
  0207 suspected submarine location, preparing to attack, position unidentified.
    All sightings were made by patrol aircraft of unit 899.
             Basra reported the 0719 message from the American steamer (KE 20 U):  Torpedo fired on the starboard side, missed in LC 2110 (U 863?).  See also War Log 31.12. paragraph III c).
     Enemy units were located in:  AL 6130 - 6860 - AM 4870 - BE 2970.
  d) According to a radio intercept, a convoy passed the loop barrage (Firth of Forth) at 1520 ( 1020 informed).
       
- 811 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) As situation reports from all operational areas are urgently required, all boats returning to base were requested to make same.
  c)  None.
  d)  According to a report from U 1227 there would be very good opportunities for surprise attacks by submarines in the sea area off Gibraltar, against the heavy convoy and single ship traffic.  U 1227 fired a four fan torpedo shot at a battleship accompanied by a small cruiser, but missed as the ship zig-zagged heavily.  Submarine reported that enemy air patrols were rendered ineffective by the use of Schnorchel.  Density-layering (only in Straits and off the coast) was another safeguard.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 15
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 31
U 1053
- AL 36
 
248
- Op(BD 61)
537
- Op(JH 10)
869
- AK 39
1055
- AM 94
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(EF 35)
870
- Op(CG 85)
1058
- AO 47
 
285
- AM 45
680
- BE 33
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1199
- AF 87
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- AM 33
905
- BF 16
1172
- AL 33
 
312
- Op(AN 15)
772
- BF 16
907
- AN 29
1200
- AN 31
 
315
- AN 12
773
- AN 23
979
- AN 81
1208
- AO 41
 
322
- BF 15
806
- Op(BB 75)
1009
- Op(AK 67)
1230
- AK 85
 
325
- BF 15
825
- AN 25
1014
- AO 41
1231
- Op(BE 75)
 
400
- BE 15
843
- JC 12
1017
- AN 12
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1020
- Op(AN 17)
1233
- AE 83
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- LC 25
1051
- AN 22
1235
- AN 43
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1200 - 1230.
  Entered Port:  U 1208, 1058, 1014 Horten (907 Bergen);  U 1235 Stavanger.
  Sailed:  U 1004 Bergen.  (U 991, U 1227, U 1228 Kristiansand to Flensburg).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 812 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) Submarine sightings:
     Colombo repeated the submarine sighting from the American steamer (WE 2 KJ):  "At 1230 submarine attacked to starboard in LD 1841 bottom right, and at 1240 the submarine surfaced.  Send aircraft immediately".  (Possibly Japanese, as yesterday's submarine sighting report was 360 miles to the west).
  d) 1) The channel Isles reported several loud detonations at 1053, some way off to the north, at 1245, ENE and at 1415 WNW.   Active enemy sea patrols in the Alderney-Guernsey area.
    2) The large numbers of escort aircraft from Group "Pistol" which have appeared recently are nothing to do with the anti-submarine group of the same name, but are escorting convoys in conjunction with "Eastcheap".  (Command station or anti-submarine craft).  According to wireless telegraphy traffic, anti-submarine craft are operating in the area from North Scotland, along the English east coast, to Yarmouth.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 181 reported that she was putting in to Djakarta on 5.1., and had completed the refuelling operation with U 843.  On 27.8. she had come across active carrier-borne aircraft in LZ 96.  The boat was again warned of the danger of submarines on the incoming route.
    2) U 1235 put in to Stavanger as her port Diesel was out of order.
  c)  None.
  d) Experiences of U 1202 in the Irish Sea:
             A good area for operations, full of possibilities.  Heavy convoy traffic, continuous single-ship traffic around points of concentration of convoy routes in AM 9470 - 9570 - 9250.  Consequently these are the most favorable submarine stations.
     Defence:  Mediocre sea defences, aircraft over day and night; all the same, we managed to proceed off-shore, by Schnorchelling, and were never contacted.  Good conditions for navigation.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 813 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
3.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 10
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 31
U 1051
- AF 79
 
248
- Op(BD 64)
650
- Op(BF 35)
869
- AK 39
1053
- AM 15
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 86)
1055
- Op(AM 98)
 
285
- AM 48
680
- AM 79
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AO 47
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- AM 26
905
- BF 24
1172
- AM 26
 
312
- OP(AN 15)
772
- BF 15
907
- AN 29
1199
- AF 79
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
773
- AN 23
979
- AE 82
1208
- AO 41
 
315
- Op(AN 16)
806
- Op(BB 75)
1004
- AF 87
1230
- AK 59
 
322
- BF 15
825
- AF 79
1009
- Op(AK 37)
1231
- Op(BB 75)
 
325
- BF 16
843
- JB 26
1014
- AO 41
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
400
- BF 11
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AN 31
1233
- AE 86
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
863
- Op(LC 20)
1020
- Op(AN 17)
1235
- AN 31
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1230.
  Entered Port:  U 312 - Trondheim, U 1235 Stavanger.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Submarine sightings:  At 2346, an American steamer (KW 2 RA) was pursued in LC 3671 by a submarine.  At 0130, the steamer opened fire on the submarine (possibly Japanese or even U 863).
     Enemy units were located in:  AL 3883 - AM 3250 - 7510 - CG 9514.
  d)  During the morning of 3.1., 3 escort aircraft from unit 899 were located in the St. George Channel by means of radio intercepts.
             At 1056, a convoy passed the Loop Barrage in the Firth of Forth.
             In reply to a query from B.d.U. as to what they considered the detonations had been, Sea Defense Commandant of the Channel Isles reported that during the night of 20/21.12.  several depth-charge patterns had been heard.  Detonations on the 26.12. were so heavy that houses on Alderney were shaken.  Reports on more distant detonations were not clearly explained.Each detonation report was checked by an experienced officer.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 814 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  U 1230 transmitted this position report:  Spies landed according to plan.  Operations only in BA 95/96.  Very little single ship traffic, much fishing activity.  Ship sunk:  On 3.12. in BA 95/96, one 5,500 GRT single ship proceeding on course 500 at 10 knots.  Apparently very little patrol activity.  Most of the escort off the Gulf, lights showing according to peacetime regulations.  The submarine is thoroughly clear for submerging again (battery mounting hatch was welded inside to the twin dual mounting, with armor plating).  The submarine still has 8 T IIIa, 5 T V, provisions for 5 weeks and 100 cubic meters.  She requested further instructions.
    2) U 1172 was ordered to alter course to AM 87 (along the coast).  U 764 was allocated to the operations area in the Channel.
    3) U 312 put into Trondheim without previously reporting.  Broke off the operation.
  c)  According to enemy press reports, both the spies landed at Boston on 30.11. by U 1230, were arrested soon afterwards.  (American report on 24.12).  As we have also had no news from the spy landed by U 1229, it appears that the use of submarines for this type of task is not justified, and will not be continued.
  d) 1) U 1200 must be presumed lost.  She put out from Bergen on 19.10. with the Channel as her operational area.  On 3.11. she reported "clear for Channel operation in AM 70".  Since then we have received no more signals from the boat.  According to our calculations she should have entered port by now.  A spy report on 5.11. stated that a patch of oil had been observed in mid Channel, which presumably came from a sunk submarine.  U 1200 should have been just off Cherbourg at this time.We presume that she was sunk by anti-submarine craft in the Channel while entering the operational area.
    2) With submarine losses as low as they are, it is striking how many seem to be type IXC submarines while still outward bound in the Iceland Passage (U 1226, 877.  There is considerable anxiety about U 869).  Losses were most probably caused by Schnorchel breakdowns.  As however it is likely that patrols will be increased, U 1233 was warned and ordered not to take any risks during her passage.
    3) As U 1202 had met with such success in the Irish Sea, U 1055 was given a detailed situation report and U 285 was allowed freedom to maneuver in the Irish Sea/St. Georges Channel.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 1230  1 ship 5,500 GRT.
 
 
- 815 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
4.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 12
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 31
U 1051
- AF 78
 
248
- Op(BD 64)
537
- Op(JH 10)
869
- AK 39
1053
- AM 14
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
870
- Op(CG 94)
1055
- Op(AM 98)
 
285
- AN 73
680
- AM 76
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AO 16
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- AM 29
905
- Op(BF 25)
1172
- AM 26
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- BF 14
907
- AN 24
1199
- AF 78
 
315
- Op(AN 16)
773
- AN 23
979
- AE 83
1208
- AO 16
 
322
- BF 11
806
- Op(BB 75)
1004
- AF 79
1230
- AK 62
 
325
- BF 24
825
- AF 78
1009
- Op(AK 56)
1231
- Op(BB 75)
 
400
- AM 79
843
- JB 37
1014
- AO 16
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AF 78
1233
- AE 85
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- Op(LC 38)
1020
- Op(AN 17)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1230.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 1203 Kiel (U 907 Bergen).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
0845 Submarine location with preparations for attack, position unidentified.
1005 Periscope sighted by Gibraltar based aircraft (U 870).
0145 American steamer reported:  "Am being pursued by submarine, in DH 2226" (None of our boats in the vicinity).
0357 Escort aircraft (184 W 14) reported submarine location with preparations for attack, position unidentified, to Liverpool.
0600 Aircraft (OJPM) reported to Colombo:  "Am over enemy submarine"  (possibly connected with the message from the American steamer.  See KTB. 3.11., paragraph III c).
     Enemy units located in:  AF 7780 - AL 9198 - 3480 - AM 2540 - 9710 - BE 3690 - 4642.
  d) Sea Defence Commandant of the Channel Isles reported that a lifeboat from the steamer "Dumfries Newcastle" (5,149 GRT) had been brought in by the harbor defence vessel Peter Port.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 816 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) As U 1230 still has sufficient supplies to continue transmitting weather reports in AK 6156 for at least 14 days, she is to occupy this grid square to a depth of 200 miles, as a base for making weather reports.  Reports are to be made 3 times a day.  The former meteorological submarine, U 1009, was transferred to the North Channel, as an attacking area, with instructions to proceed into the Irish Sea whenever possible.  Also to attack off Anglesey whenever possible, as the Liverpool-St. George and Bristol Channel traffic was calculated to pass through this area.  Submarine to remain at least 14 days within the operational area.
    2) U 312 put into Trondheim.  While trying to press into Hoxa Sound (Scapa), she was forced on to the rocks by the current, and her main rudder put out of action.  The boat returned to base, steering with her engines.  No traffic was located.  2 patrol lines in Pentland Firth.
      U 315 returned to base at Trondheim because of damaged engines.  She should have been off Scapa Flow to make attacks on carriers, but according to dead reckoning, did not even reach the operational area.
      Submarines have been off Scapa now since 7.12. for the purpose of attacking carriers.  As the enemy must have noticed the existence of submarines during this time, and have taken every precaution not to lay themselves open to attack, we do not intend to detail any more boats to this area.  The 3 boats which are already in the area are to remain in the operational area until provisions are exhausted.  Air reconnaissance is required, to find out what traffic is in the Bay, and the type and lay-out of the barrages.
    3) U 680 reported movements in the Channel, from AM 19.  We have located N.W. convoy traffic in EF 3529 and S.W. convoy traffic in BF 3539.  Most of the traffic is on the Cherbourg route.  Patrol vessels and search groups active all the time, schnorchelling possible.  Wireless telegraphy message was not received complete, but apparently the submarine made no successful attacks.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 817 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
5.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 21
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 24
U 1051
- AM 11
 
248
- Op(BD 86)
537
- Op(JH 10)
869
- AK 39
1053
- AM 23
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 95)
 
285
- AM 76
680
- AM 19
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AO 16
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- AM 51
905
- Op(BF 26)
1172
- AM 28
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- BF 11
907
- AF 87
1199
- AF 77
 
315
- AF 58
773
- AN 23
979
- AE 83
1203
- AO 72
 
322
- AM 79
806
- Op(BD 75)
1004
- AF 78
1208
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 25)
825
- AN 11
1009
- AK 59
1230
- Op(AL 42)
 
400
- AM 75
843
- JB 54
1014
- AO 16
1231
- Op(BB 75)
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AN 11
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- Op(LD 41)
1020
- Op(AN 17)
1233
- AE 87
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 315 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053.
  Entered Port:  U 864 Bergen;  U 181 Djakarta (U 682 Kiel).
  Sailed:  U 868 Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:  At 1252, an English unit transmitted this message to Commander-in-Chief Gibraltar:  "Am attacking a submarine".  Unidentified position.  At 1442, Gibraltar broadcast important wireless telegraphy messages to 4 other units.  (possibly U 870).
     Enemy units were located:  AL 3643 - 0280 - AM 9480 - 4070 - BE 3670 - 3472 - 1460 - BF 1340 - 5420.
  d) 1) According to a priority radio intercept on 4.1., a ship from the T.B.C. convoy (26) (Thames-Bristol Channel) capsized and sunk on 3.1. off Cape Cornwall (in the vicinity of Land's End).  Steps were taken to rescue the crew.
    2) A priority radio intercept:  Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches (Admiral Liverpool) at 2331 on 4.1. announced that the convoy rendezvous was at 1300 on 5.1 in AE 8896, course 3060.  Possibly this refers to a convoy proceeding to Reykjavik.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 818 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) U 1231 is returning to base from the operational area St. Lawrence River/Halifax.  Position BC 8242.  No nearer positions have been reported as yet.
    2) The priority radio intercept message about the convoy rendezvous in AE 8896 (see paragraph III d) was passed on to the boats in the vicinity (U 1233 en route for the Atlantic, U 979 returning to base from Reykjavik).  Boats were instructed to make full use of all opportunities.
  c) U 868 (supply boat for St. Nazaire) put out from Kiel (subsequently to Horten for training in Schnorchelling).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 92)
U 537
- Op(JH 10)
U 869
- AK 39
U 1053
- AM 23
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 95)
 
285
- BF 11
680
- AM 17
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AO 16
 
297
- Op(AM 36)
764
- AM 54
905
- Op(BF 35)
1172
- AM 51
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- AM 75
907
- AF 79
1199
- AN 11
 
315
- AF 82
775
- AN 23
979
- AE 83
1203
- AO 72
 
322
- AM 72
806
- Op(BB 75)
1004
- AF 77
1208
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 26)
825
- AM 32
1009
- AK 68
1230
- Op(AK 68)
 
400
- AM 48
843
- JB 40
1014
- AC 16
1231
- BC 82
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 32
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- Op(LD 40)
1020
- Op(AN 17)
1233
- AE 79
 
486
- Op(BF 35)
868
- AO 74
1051
- AM 32
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 315 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 315 Trondheim.
  Sailed:  U 480 Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
19th Group: At 1100 investigated a suspicious object, a patch of oil, in an unidentified position.
  At 1254, submarine location made, with preparations for attack, position unidentified.  Cancelled at 1306.
       
- 819 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Enemy units were located in:  AM 0281 - AM 1660 - 4150 - BF 1940 - 2580.
  d) All Allied merchant ships in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean were ordered to cease zig-zagging as from 5.10., except within a 500 miles from the African coast, and within a 500 mile radius of Freetown.  Limits in the Atlantic were 210  N - 400 W., in the Indian Ocean 100 S. - 800 E.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 869 reported from AK 63, in answer to a request for position.  There was some concern about the submarine as she should have been considerably further south-west, if she had proceeded along the normal route through the Iceland Passage.  According to our calculations (taking an average day's run of 55 miles) the boat must have gone through the Straits of Denmark.  The boat is to report her fuel reserves tonight, so that a decision can be taken as to allocation of operational area.
    2) U 486 is returning to base from the Channel operational area, as she has expended all her torpedoes.  Position AM 46.  Ships sunk:  1 motor vessel, 6,000 GRT, in BF 2516; 3 escort destroyers; 1 corvette probably in BF 3516/28/29 torpedoed on 24.12.  A passenger vessel of 11,000 GRT in BF 3553, not actually observed to sink, but presumed definitely sunk, as lifeboats and floats from the troop transport "Leopoldville" (11,509 GRT) washed up on the Channel Isles.  The submarine Schnorchelled day and night to the north of Barfleur.  Traffic off Cherbourg at night, fast convoys during the day.  Concentrations of ship traffic; N.W.-S.E. traffic in BF 3259, and S.W.-S. traffic in 3553/61.  Traffic during the day off Lizard Head.  Remained 9 days in the operational area.
    3) U 1231 reported her position, on request, as the Gulf of St. Lawrence/Nova Scotian coast.  In BB 59, little traffic, only at night.  In BB 14 - BA 38, also very little traffic (boat has been there since 8.12).  BB 81 - 75 (until 25.12.), little traffic, convoys sighted on 26. and 27.12. respectively on the Cape Sable - Cape Canso route, and vice versa, not on the Halifax route.  Traffic around the latter in the evenings.  Day's run to the north to cover BB 7613 - 7534.  Southgoing traffic during the day from BB 7527.  Very little patrol activity or air defence.  Lights burning according to peacetime regulations.
 
 
- 820 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      As a result of these experiences off Halifax, the boats in that area (U 806 - 1232) received instructions, if present operations unsuccessful, to approach as near as possible to New York - fuel and provisions permitting.
    4) U 1172, in AM 51 according to dead reckoning, was given freedom to maneuver in the Irish Sea, on basis of situation report from U 1202, to proceed to this area through the North Channel.
  c)  None.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 486  3 ships 17,509 GRT
                 3 escort destroyers
                 1 corvette probably sunk.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 83)
U 537
- Op(JH 10)
U 869
- AK 63
U 1053
- AM 31
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 92)
 
285
- BF 88
680
- AM 17
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AO 16
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- AM 57
905
- Op(BF 35)
1172
- AM 52
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- AM 71
907
- AF 78
1199
- AM 32
 
322
- AM 47
773
- AN 23
979
- AE 91
1203
- AO 44
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(BB 75)
1004
- AN 11
1208
- AO 16
 
400
- AM 44
825
- AM 33
1009
- AK 66
1230
- Op(AK 91
 
480
- AF 87
843
- JA 93
1014
- AO 16
1231
- BC 64
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 33
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- Op(LD 40)
1020
- Op(AN 17)
1233
- AE 84
 
486
- AM 46
868
- AO 72
1051
- AM 33
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1203 Horten;  U 244 Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Submarine sightings:
     
0243 Submarine sighting, preparing to attack, reported by Iceland-based aircraft to Sangerdi (Iceland), unidentified position (possibly U 1223).
       
- 821 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   
1310 Submarine sighted, preparing to attack, reported by Gibraltar-based aircraft to Lyauthey.  Position unidentified (U 870).
    Enemy units located in:  AM 7310 - AN 1620 - BE 5860 - BF 2247(?) - 2770 - CF 2276.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) When U 486 had given her situation report, U 764 received orders to proceed along the English south coast to the operational area off Cherbourg, as there are good opportunities for attack in this area.
    2) U 1230 reported, on request, that she intended to return to base on the 26.1.
  c)  None.
  d) From a short report from U 315, we gathered that she had been forced to break off the operation and return to base on the 6th as her starboard engine was out of order.  It was impossible to repair the damage on board.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 83)
U 537
- Op(JH 10)
U 869
- AK 66
U 1053
- AM 32
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 92)
 
285
- Op(AM 89)
680
- AM 16
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AO 16
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- AM 81
905
- Op(BF 35)
1172
- Op(AM 53)
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- AK 47
907
- AF 77
1199
- AN 33
 
322
- AM 47
773
- AN 23
979
- AE 92
1203
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(BB 75)
1004
- AM 32
1208
- AO 16
 
400
- AM 19
825
- AM 33
1009
- AL 45
1230
- Op(AK 28)
 
480
- AF 79
843
- JA 86
1014
- AO 16
1231
- BC 62
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 24
1232
- Op(BB 75)
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- Op(LD 40)
1020
- Op(AN 18)
1233
- AE 76
 
486
- AM 51
868
- AO 44
1051
- AM 24
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 1014 - 1058 Horten.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 822 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
15th Group:
1350
probable submarine conning tower on (570  57' N., longitude West unidentified, course 2000, speed 4 knots.
18th Group:
At 1444
hours attack on 1 landing craft, 1 convoy vessel, and 1 stationary ship in 580  05' N., longitude Ease unidentified (shuttle boat).
 
At 1630
an Iceland-based aircraft made a location on a suspected submarine, prepared to attack, in an unidentified position (U 1233?).
 
At 1632
a Gibraltar-based aircraft located a submarine, prepared to attack.  The submarine submerged and the attack did not materialize.
    From 2024 - 2139, very urgent wireless telegraphy messages were transmitted by a unit in the same area, (probably U 870 contacted from the air and attacked by naval forces).
    Enemy units located in:  AL 3560 - 9190 - AM 5770.
  d)  According to a priority radio intercept at 1300 on 8.1., the Norwegian steamer "Bestik" (2,684 GRT) was damaged in the Scapa Flow area.  The steamer "Ashbury" (3,901 GRT) was lost.
     The damaged "Bestik" anchored, and was under escort by units "St. Theresa", "Bandit", and "Narvik".  (Possibly a successful attack by a submarine).
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) As, according to our calculations, U 297 must shortly return to base, the limits to the operational area were removed, and the boat given freedom to maneuver along the Scottish coast as far as Aberdeen.  U 1020 was allowed freedom of operation further to the south.
 
 
- 823 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      The operational area consists of the entire English coast to about Flamborough Head.
    2) Further information concerning the situation in the operational area was urgently needed.  As several boats (U 322 - 400 - 772) were returning to base from the operational area and the Bristol Channel, they were reminded to transmit position reports while returning in AM.
    3) No report was received from U 869 as to the state of her fuel, in spite of continuous inquiries.  The boat was allocated an operational area off Gibraltar.  Sea area to the west of CG 9592, but not within the Straits of Gibraltar.  To proceed schnorchelling when entering CG.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 83)
U 650
- Op(BF 35)
U 871
- Op(MQ 40)
U 1058
- AN 33
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
680
- AM 23
905
- Op(BF 35)
1172
- Op(AM 64)
 
285
- Op(AM 94)
764
- AM 87
907
- AM 32
1199
- AM 27
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
772
- AM 19
979
- AF 71
1203
- AO 16
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
773
- AN 23
1004
- AM 33
1208
- AO 16
 
322
- AM 17
806
- Op(BB 77)
1009
- AL 54
1230
- Op(AK)
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
825
- AM 26
1014
- AN 33
1231
- BD 14
 
400
- AM 16
843
- JL 22
1017
- AM 26
1232
- Op(BB 77)
 
480
- AF 78
862
- Op(JH 50)
1020
- Op(AN 18)
1233
- AE 79
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
863
- Op(LD 82)
1051
- AM 25
   
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
868
- AO 16
1053
- AF 77
   
 
486
- AM 26
869
- AK 69
1055
- Op(AM 92)
   
 
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 95)
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1014, 1058 Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  U 244 Bergen;  U 1014, 1058 Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
2043 submarine located by aircraft "348 W 8", in AM 3948 prepared to attack.
       
- 824 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
2359 submarine located by aircraft "348 W 8", in AM 0284 prepared to attack.
     Enemy units were located in AM 1890 - BE 7860 - 2110.
  d) 1) According to a priority radio intercept at 1647 of urgent wireless telegraphy traffic from the tanker "Sitala" (6,218 GRT) with the Casablanca/Gibraltar convoy, she was either damaged by the sea or in contact with the enemy.  (U 870 is in this area).  Possibly an attack by a submarine.
    2) War Log of 8.1., paragraph IIId):  The tug "Bandit" reported to Scapa at 1558 on 8.1:  "Consider it inadvisable to take the Norwegian steamer "Bestik" in tow this evening, am waiting until daybreak".
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 739 (North Sea Schnorchel boat) is ready to put out from Trondheim today.  She was originally intended to operate against carriers off Scapa, but as this did not prove fruitful, the boat was put under F.d.U. the Northern Waters.  No decision was reached about detailing U 313 and U 315 which would both shortly be ready for action.
    2) As no message was received from U 248, U 1231, en route for home, received instructions to transmit short weather reports during the next three days.
    3) As we are expecting situation reports from the Channel and the Bristol Channel during the next few days, U 1017, 1051, 1004, 825 and U 1199 have been instructed to scatter to positions off the S.W. coast of Ireland.
  c)  None.
  d) Wireless telegraphy message No. 211 was transmitted to all boats.     (See Appendix).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 825 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix to War Diary 9.1.45.
Information gathered:  W/T message No. 211
       
           The enemy's interest in new devices, the "M" cypher and cypher material is such that he tries in every way to get alongside submarines unable to submerge or unmaneuverable and even submarines which are sinking.
       
           Returned prisoners of war report that as soon as the submarine has surfaced, the enemy ;lowers a boat and tries to come alongside, usually under cover of light arms fire.  In several cases the enemy was known to have come alongside a slowly sinking submarine which had already been abandoned by the crew.
       
           Therefore:  If a submarine which is not battle-worthy and is unmaneuverable is forced to surface in the vicinity of enemy sea forces, in order to disembark the crew, measures are to be taken to ensure that she is then sunk at once under all circumstances.  The Captain and the Engineering Officer and the most experienced members of the crew are to remain on board until the very last moment before sinking.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 826 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
10.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 87
U 486
- AM 25
U 868
- AO 16
U 1051
- AM 27
 
248
- Op(BD 83)
537
- Op(JH 10)
869
- AK 96
1053
- AF 78
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 92)
 
285
- Op(AM 95)
680
- AM 32
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1058
- AN 34
 
297
- Op(AN 38)
764
- AM 88
905
- Op(BF 35)
1172
- Op(AM 65)
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- AM 73
907
- AM 31
1199
- AN 28
 
322
- AM 43
773
- AN 24
979
- AF 72
1203
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(CB 15)
1004
- AM 26
1208
- AO 16
 
400
- AM 45
825
- AM 02
1009
- AL 64
1230
- Op(AK 24)
 
480
- AF 77
843
- JL 16
1014
- AN 34
1231
- BD 12
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 27
1232
- Op(CB 15)
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
863
- Op(LD 40)
1020
- Op(AN 18)
1233
- AL 22
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 684 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1058 Stavanger;  U 773 Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
18th Group:
1050
submarine located, aircraft preparing to attack, unidentified position.
 
1110
hours - surfaced submarine, course south, speed 2 knots, position unidentified.
 
1235
hours - submarine located, aircraft preparing to attack, position unidentified (thought to be in Shetland-Faroes area).
19th Group:
1500
hours - submarine located, aircraft preparing to attack, unidentified position.
    Enemy units located in:  AF 8480 - AL 3490 - 3370 - AM 8720 - 3650 - BF 4298 - 4843.
  d) according to a radio intercept, Rosyth gave 2 units orders to operate against a submarine in 40  N 38' W., latitude unidentified (AN 1318?) (possibly connected with the submarine location made by 18 group).
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 1004 reported that she was putting in to Bergen.  On 2.1 she had put out from Bergen,
       
- 827 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      and according to our calculations was forced to break off operations just before entering the Shetland Straits, as her Schnorchel was out of order.
    2) During the last 2 days, U 248 has not transmitted any weather reports, as she was contacted on the 7. and 8.1 by Search Groups.  She fired a hook shot at a corvette and detonation was heard after 12 minutes 14 seconds, but nothing was observed.  The submarine was given permission to make a detour 200 miles to the north if the present anti-submarine measures in the operational area continue.
    3) U 244 formerly had instructions to proceed to position off Reykjavik.  As we have still not received any situation reports from U 979 which is proceeding back to base, and as this area is not sufficiently fruitful owing to the continual darkness, U 244 was detailed to proceed to the sea area west of Ireland (AM 72).  Route between the Shetlands and the Faroes.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    1 corvette torpedoed by U 248.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 79
U 486
- AM 24
U 869
- AK 99
U 1051
- AM 43
 
248
- Op(BD 53)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1053
- AF 79
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
650
- Op(BF 35)
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1055
- Op(AM 92)
 
285
- Op(AM 95)
680
- AM 31
905
- Op(BF 35)
1172
- Op(AM 68)
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
764
- BF 16
907
- AM 33
1199
- AM 02
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
772
- AM 46
979
- AF 75
1203
- AO 16
 
322
- AM 29
806
- Op(CB 17)
1004
- AF 87
1208
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
825
- AM 51
1009
- AL 65
1230
- Op(AK 67)
 
400
- AM 46
843
- JL 17
1014
- AN 31
1231
- AK 84
 
480
- AN 11
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 51
1232
- Op(CB 17)
 
482
- Op(AM 64)
863
- Op(LD 40)
1020
- Op(AN 18)
1233
- AL 23
 
485
- Op(BF 35)
868
- AO 16
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1004 Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 880 - 927 Kiel;  U 510 Djakarta.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 828 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) Submarine sightings:
   
18th Group:
1045
suspicious object, probably a Schnorchel, in AN 4455.
 
0024
submarine located, preparations to attack, in unidentified position.
 
0040
suspicious object, wake or eddy, in unidentified position.
19th Group:
1345
suspicious object, probably Schnorchel 57 44' N., 080 09' W., sighted by aircraft "348 W 34" (patrol).
 
2056
submarine located, preparations to attack, in AN 0323.
 
2119
submarine, course 1200, speed 5 knots, thought to be in M 0323.  At 2100 a bearing contact buoy, in position.  (this can only be U 764 who has entered the Channel, therefore the position given is unlikely).
    At 1927, American steamer (WZ 2 BJ) reported:  Am being attacked in MQ 4190 (possibly U 871).  Active anti-submarine activity by enemy patrols in the North Channel area.
    Enemy units were located in:  AM 8950 - AN 7321 - 0130 - 4480 - 4720.  The unit located in AN 4410 has apparently made contact.
  b) 1) A steamer was torpedoed in the Irish Sea in AM 9252, probably at 1520, and subsequently sunk.  The following messages were received:  At 1530 and 1620, British steamer CY 5 UR:  Sinking ship in distress, AM 9252.  From these messages, we gathered there were 2 steamers.
    2) A drifting wreck was reported on 10.1. in the Milford area.
    3) Canadian passenger ship took two Allied ships in tow in BB 7990, on 21.12.
    4) On 21.12:  English steamer reported "no survivors".  According to a subsequent wireless telegraphy message, this probably referred to the loss of a French ship.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 427 (acting as shuttle-escort to the convoys off the S.W. coast of Norway), fired a 3 fan
 
 
- 829 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      torpedo on a destroyer formation which was attacking the convoy, at 2338, in AM 3277.
      At 0012 and 0045 she fired hook shots on hydrophone bearings.  Detonations and sinking sounds occurred both times.  The submarine was thought to have sunk 2 destroyers, a short report is awaited.
    2) U 907 was ordered to proceed to AK 97.  She is to relieve U 248 as meteorological submarine, as the later intends to return to base on 19.1.
    3) Until further notice, no boat is to pass through the North Channel to the Irish Sea.  The 4 boats in the North Channel en route for that area, are to proceed South instead.  U 1009 has insufficient provisions to make the detour through the St. George Channel, and is therefore permitted to continue through the North Channel and operate there.
  c)  None.
  d) U 773 reported, after putting in, that she had cruised up and down AM 88 until her supplies were exhausted.  This boat also confirmed convoy traffic off the south coast of Ireland (AM 8881), proceeding towards the gap in the minefield in the Irish Sea.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 78
U 486
- AM 31
U 868
- AO 16
U 1020
- Op(AN 01)
 
248
- Op(BD 61)
510
- LR 78
869
- BD 36
1051
- AM 46
 
278
- Op(AM 15)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1053
- AN 23
 
285
- Op(AM 95)
650
- Op(BF 35)
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1055
- Op(AM 92)
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
680
- AM 32
880
- AO 74
1172
- Op(AM 92)
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
764
- BF 16
905
- Op(BF 35)
1199
- AM 54
 
322
- AM 27
772
- AM 46
907
- AM 26
1203
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(CA 63)
927
- AO 74
1208
- AO 16
 
400
- AM 43
825
- AM 54
979
- AF 76
1230
- Op(AK 64)
 
480
- AM 32
843
- JK 62
1009
- AM 44
1231
- AK 03
 
482
- OP(AM 61)
862
- Op(JH 50)
1014
- AN 28
1232
- Op(CA 63)
 
485
- Op(BF 26)
863
- Op(LD 40)
1017
- AM 46
1233
- AL 16
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 482 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 68 Horten.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 830 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine Sightings:
     
15th Group:
0920
submarine located, preparations for attack.
 
0932
"am continuing patrol", position unidentified (probably Herbrides area).
 
1730
Schnorchel sighted, course 1750, unidentified position in the North Channel.
 
1816
submarine located, preparations to attack, in AM 9284.
 
1830
enemy submarine sighted in AM 9257, submarine submerged when sighted.
 
2254
submarine located, preparations to attack, in AM 5377, finally cancelled.
 
0330
submarine located, preparations to attack, in unidentified position (Irish Sea?).
     American steamer sighted periscope in MR 9980 at 1435.
    Unidentified American craft received orders from Annapolis at 1230, to proceed to BA 8994 at full speed ahead, as an enemy submarine had been reported in that area.  Estimated time of arrival, course and speed to be reported.
     At 2120, Scapa broadcast:  "Patrol "E" reported a suspicious object 100 yards from "Baffle" (probably craft).  Patrol "E" to go in as support.
     Enemy units were located:  AL 8262 - AM 0270 - 7540 - 4120 - BE 6686 - BF 2150.
  d)  As a result of the submarine successes (see War Log of 11.1. paragraph III d) the enemy moved her route on 11.1. to the middle of the Irish Sea (presumably only for single ships).
    South Route:
     AM 68128, AM 68774 (rendezvous for ships southgoing from Liverpool), AM 94336, AM 95961.
    North Route:
     Parallel to the former, but 8 miles to the east.  Rendezvous for northgoing convoys, 8 miles east,
       
- 831 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Rendezvous for northgoing convoys, 8 miles east of the south-traffic rendezvous.
    All single ships are to use these routes.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 1233 was ordered to proceed towards Cape Hatteras, on the surface as much as possible.
    2) According to a position report from U 1202 - U 825 - U 1051 are proceeding into the Irish Sea.  The new traffic route in the Irish Sea was transmitted on wireless telegraphy to the three boats in the area at the time (U 1172 - 285 - 1055).  The boats received instructions to operate on the routes mentioned, if the traffic situation seems unfavorable from the positions they are occupying at the moment.  The best positions seem to be the rendezvous and both the southernmost extremities.
    3) U 1199 and U 1017 were given freedom to maneuver in the Channel, according to operational orders and situation reports.  They were instructed again, that the main target for attack is the Cherbourg traffic, and if defence measures are too strong there, they can attack the convoy off the English coast. (or further to the west).
    4) U 1231 reported, on request, that she had fired shots at one destroyer in BB 1486 on 30.11. and at another in BA 3832 on 3.12.  Each time, detonations were heard, and "echoes" like sounds of sinking.  A decision can only be reached when the boat has returned to base.
    5) U 1014 is putting in to Bergen, as her periscope is damaged.
  c) None.
  d) 1) Escort-submarines off southern Norway:  A short report from U 427 showed that of the 2 destroyers presumed to have been sunk yesterday, 1 destroyer was sunk for certain as a direct hit was observed and sinking noises heard, and another destroyer had anyway been torpedoed.  The ship which was sunk might possibly have been a cruiser.  A statement to this effect will be made in the OKW-report (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces).
    2) Air attack on Bergen at 1300 on 12.1., by about 40 4-engined aircraft, submarine pens attacked, presumably 5 ton bombs.
 
 
- 832 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      2 hits were scored on the 3.5 m. roof, which was pierced twice.  One of these bombs did not damage the 1.5 m. roof, 4 m. below the other.  The second bomb pierced the upper roof.  The thin walls dividing the workshops were torn out but machines and apparatus were scarcely damaged.  Very little damage was inflicted on the dockyard, and the submarines were not hit.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 427  1 destroyer
          1 warship (destroyer or cruiser) torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 77
U 486
- AM 32
U 868
- AO 16
U 1020
- Op(AN 01)
 
248
- Op(BD 65)
510
- KA 33
869
- BE 45
1051
- AE 49
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1053
- AN 29
 
285
- Op(AM 95)
650
- Op(BF 35)
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1055
- Op(AM 95)
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
680
- AF 77
880
- AO 48
1172
- Op(AM 95)
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
764
- Op(BF 24)
905
- Op(BF 35)
1199
- AM 57
 
322
- AM 26
772
- AM 43
907
- AM 27
1203
- AO 16
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(CA 61)
927
- AO 48
1208
- AO 16
 
400
- AM 29
825
- AM 81
979
- AF 79
1230
- Op(AK 66)
 
480
- AE 99
843
- JK 28
1009
- AM 45
1231
- AK 69
 
482
- AM 53
862
- Op(JH 50)
1014
- AM 22
1232
- Op(CA 61)
 
485
- BF 26
863
- Op(LD 40)
1017
- AM 49
1233
- AL 17
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 482 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1014 Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 1208 Horten;  U 275 Bergen;  U 532 Djakarta.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
15th Group:
0906
location thought to be submarine preparations to attack.
 
0920
"suspicious object sighted thought to be a Schnorchel".
 
0922
submarine located, preparations for attack.
     All positions unidentified.
     
18th Group:
1620
possible Schnorchel sighted
       
- 833 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
 
in AN 1554, and attacked with depth-charges.
 
1630
probable submarine located in AN 1554, preparations for attack.
 
2010
probable submarine located in AN 1631, preparations to attack.
    Patrol aircraft "W 18" reported probable submarine location, preparations to attack, in unidentified position, on 14.11.
     Enemy units located in:  AK 6555, AN 1313.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
  d)  U 245 (in Kiel at the moment) is to operate against the Thames-Scheldt convoy route.  She was issued with the following operational order "Brutus":  See Appendix.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 834 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     
Appendix to War Log 13.1.45.
   2 Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Op.
   Ref. No. 625.
       
Operational Orders "Brutus"
Operation against Thames-Scheldt convoy traffic by U 245
       
I. Task:
  1)  Attack supply traffic proceeding from the Thames to Antwerp.
             Supplies on this route are of the greatest importance to the battle on the Western Front.  Every ship sunk has an effect on this battle.  The lives of many German soldiers will be saved by the destruction of such important war material.  The captain should think of this while operating, and should carry out his task ruthlessly.
  2)  The submarine is to follow Operational Orders "Brutus", the verbal instructions from B.d.U., and otherwise to act according to the situation. The success of the operation depends on the captain's ingenuity, his "sense of swell" and his daring.  When opportunities for attack are unfavorable because of sand banks and minefields in the area, the captain himself is left to decide whether the chances of success, by advancing to the west or the east on to the convoy route, through the mined area, justify the risks incurred.
       
II. Reports on the Enemy.        State on 13.1.1945.
  3) a) Sea forces:
             See appendix 1 paragraph 3).  Enemy forces are not likely to appear in the area in which the boat is advancing.  Contact with the enemy forces is only likely to occur in the English declared mined areas (from AB 8170).  With regard to the defence measures of these naval forces, they have not had to reckon with submarines in this area since 1939 and they appear to be inexperienced and unobservant.  A submarine fitted with Schnorchel and TV is far superior.
    b) Air forces:
             As soon as submarines put out from Kiel, they are in danger of air attacks.  The most dangerous time is when the submarine has put out from the Elbe and before she has begun Schnorchelling.  In the opinion of the Naval Chief Command North, there is less danger from air attacks within the Heligoland Bight out to point "Xant", than, for instance, in the Bay of Biscay and off the Norwegian coast.  Otherwise the submarine is to act, on the surface in accordance with the current orders of B.d.U.
 
 
- 835 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
    c) Supply Traffic to be attacked:
            On the Thames-Scheldt convoy route, see Appendix 1 and appendices to charts, a-e.  Appendix 1a will be of some assistance.  For the convoy route along the English east coast, from AN 8170 to AN 7960, see Appendix 2.
    d) Mine situation:
            See Appendix 3 and tracing 3a.
       
III. News of our own Sea Forces:
  4) a) Outward bound:
            Our own patrol forces as far as Heligoland, our own escort vessels as far as point "Sophie", but from there on none of our own craft to be expected.
    b) In the Operational Area:
            S-boats and midget craft may be encountered, but the submarine will be warned whenever possible (see cover-name list).  It is unlikely that our own air forces will operate, and they would anyway not affect the boat.
       
IV. Execution:
  5) a) To put out from Kiel when ready for action.  All preparations and tactical repairs should be made very carefully, as, if the submarine were forced to return to base owing to damage, the intended operation might be discovered.  The crew are not to be informed before putting out, but only when the boat has reached the open North Sea, and it is obvious that she will not be forced to return to base because of technical damage.
  6) All secret documents which are, in the commander's estimation, absolutely necessary, to be thrown overboard.  Measures to be taken for destruction of secret cypher material (especially operational orders with appendices) in case of need.
  7) The boat is to pt out on receipt of verbal instructions from Senior Officer Flotilla, after orders issued by Naval Chief of Command North.  Give out the following to camouflage the real reason for the intended departure through the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal:  The installation of important apparatus in Bremen.  Ice-protection will be required, instructions concerning use and distribution will be issued by the Flotilla Senior Officer.
  8) Approach:
    a) Minefield escorts will be carried out by Sperrbrecher from Brunsbüttel to Cuxhaven minefield.  From there onwards, minefield escort by two M-boats 35 (minesweepers) and by one boat as an escort as far as point "Sofie".  While under escort,
 
 
- 836 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      the boat is under orders from the escort leader, with full Flak readiness.  Route as far as point "Sofie" to be covered at night.
    b) From there on, proceed alone on route "Blue (Blau)" as far as possible by night and on the surface (because of danger of moored mines), to 6 miles north of point "Xant".
      Naval Chief Command intends laying a light buoy at point "Xant".   This will be confirmed when definite.  (These general instructions on putting out are liable to altercation by NAval Chief Command North if the situation demands it, by direct consultation with the Senior Officer Flotilla and the Captain).
      Submerge 6 miles to the north of point "Xant", proceed on course 2700 to AN 6556, then to Grid Square 6756, and from there to the operational area on course 1920.
      Our own declared area:  Pass this at 25 m., there is no danger from our own mines at this depth.
      English declared area:  Proceed as close to the bottom as possible.  The effectiveness of the minefield is considered to be negligible.
      Contact with the enemy from Grid Square 8170 onwards is possible at any time, also see Appendix 2.
    c) Navigation:  Absolutely accurate navigation is necessary to the success of the operation, especially before entering the operational area, as the attacking area is very small.
      Therefore the submarine is to take direction finder bearings and soundings and the exact position by "Elektra" sun sights, in AN 8710 at the latest.  If this is not possible, the boat is to surface to make a fix.  (This ought to be possible under present conditions),
  9) Behavior in the Operational Area:
            No binding rules.  The commander's"instinct" is essential to the conduct of the operation.
             The submarine will only be successful on the convoy route itself, therefore calculate the exact position of the convoy route and remain close up to it.  Buoys are the best means of navigation.
    a) All information gathered fro radio intercepts, and observations made by Fortress Commander Dunkirk, will be transmitted to the submarines using the list of cover names enclosed in Appendix (a).
    b) As the submarine is fitted with Schnorchel, she is naturally to try and attack by day.  If this is impossible, and the convoy has gone by in the dark,
 
 
- 837 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      the Captain must see whether an attack by night without visual sighting (if the moonlight is not bright enough) is likely to succeed taking into consideration the enemy's speed and course, or whether it would be better to surface before firing.  As the boat can get into position right on the convoy route and thus face the convoy, it is not necessary for her to haul ahead.  Also LUT torpedoes make it possible to fire at the convoy from ahead or astern, with reasonable prospects of hitting.
    c) The boat will receive instructions on W/T with regard to returning to base.
       
V. Communications:
  10) Wave-length "Coast" to be used when putting out:  Transfer to "Diana" at orders from B.d.U.  Important news for the boat concerning convoy traffic, will be marked with an "X" after the T.O.O. and repeated again at the beginning of routine transmissions.  It will be repeated as "Emergency" as long as it is of importance to the submarine.
       
   
Distribution Copies
   
U 245 1
1 Naval War Staff 2    for B.d.U.
Naval Chief Command North 3)  Chief of Op. Div.
2 Naval War Staff 4)
War Logs 5-8
Reserve 9-12
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
                                                                    (signed): GODT.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 838 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix 1 to Operational Orders "Brutus"
Enemy situation Thames-Scheldt. on 10.1.1954.
       
1) Traffic:
    3 convoys putting out from the Thames every day.
  TAM  (Merchant ships, Thames-Antwerp), convoys, speed 8 knots, consisting mainly of Liberty ships.
  TAC  (Coasters, Thames-Antwerp) convoys, speed 6 knots, small coasters.
  TAL  (Landing craft, Thames-Antwerp) convoys, speed 9 knots, consisting of landing craft.
            The convoys proceeding at 6 and 9 knots are bound for Ostend and other small discharging positions along the coast as far as the Scheldt.
            The 3 convoys which proceed back to the Thames every day are as follows:
  ATM  (returning Liberty ships, speed 8 knots).
  ATC  (returning coasters, speed 6 knots).
  ATL  (returning landing craft convoys, speed 9 knots).
            Ships with higher grades of speed, proceed as single ships.
       
2) Times:
  a) The TAM convoys proceeding to Antwerp at 8 knots, run to a definite time-table.  The assembly point for these convoys is the Outer Thames off East Spile.  They are as follows:
    From 6.12. - 17.12.44:
     
Thames off East Spile 2330-0000.
off Dumpton 0315.
    Alteration of this time-table on 17.12.44, and still in force:
     
Thames off East Spile about 2230.
off Dumpton, about 0200.
             There was a delay off Dumpton of 1/2 to 3/4 hour, as a result of waiting for ships to connect, and changing pilots.
  b) Reciprocal convoys from the Scheldt to the Thames - ATM, speed 8 knots:
    From 8.12.44. to 17.12.44:
    To the north of Flushing at 1800.
 
 
- 839 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     Off Dumpton buoy, at about 0310.
     In the Outer Thames off East Spile, 0630-0730
    Alteration of this time-table on 17.12.44 and still in force:
     
To the north of Flushing, at 1300.
off Dumpton buoy 2300.
In the Outer Thames, off East Spile, 0230.
     Middlegate roads - anchoring position for these convoys.
  c) The TAC convoy, speed 6 knots, and the TAL convoy, speed 9 knots, do not put out at any specific time, as putting in to Ostend and the other discharging positions depends on the tide.  Up till now, the TAC convoys, speed 6 knots, were off Dumpton buoy between 0600 and 1900, 14 hours after high tide, in Ostend.  The faster TAL convoys, speed 9 knots, followed about 3 hours later.  The Commander can therefore calculate the times of passage of these convoys by means of tide tables.
             The returning ATC convoys leave their ports at high water when the tide is turning, often in two parts.  The ATL convoys, up till now, passed the Dumpton buoy any time up till several hours after the ATC convoys.
             Apart from these, odd and irregular troop convoys were spotted, proceeding from Newhaven to Ostend and consisting of landing craft infantry.  These convoys passed Folkestone at about 0245 and put in to Ostend at about 1300, judging from what we have hitherto observed.
             Returning convoys left Ostend at about 2035, depending on the tide.
       
3) Defence:
  a) Close escort:
             According to our information, escorts are as follows:
    TAM - at least 1 destroyer or 1 frigate.
    TAC  - several trawlers, occasionally escorted by Hunt class destroyers.
    TAL  - without escort.
  b) Escorts in fixed positions:
             These consist of mixed bands of destroyers and MGBs which patrol 2-4 miles to the north of the convoy route, with a distance of 10 miles between them.  The NF route, as a rule, is escorted by 6 destroyers in this way.  Permanent groups of about
 
 
- 840 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
    8 MGBs were located at night to the east of 0240 east.  All craft are equipped with depth-charges.  They are considered as comparatively ineffectual against submarines, as they have no standard operating procedure or apparatus of any kind.
  c) Patrol Areas:
            The Thames-Scheldt sea area is divided into patrolled areas with patrol strong points.  Patrol strong point"X", with mixed bands of destroyers and MGBs "FH", lies in the vicinity of 5127N. 0300 E. and is 4 miles to the north of the convoy route.  Other strong points have not yet been discovered, but lie about 4 miles to the west of the convoy route with 10 miles between them.
       
4) Routes:
  Thames (East Spile) - Dumpton - South Falls - NF route via Dijk - Kwintebank - Wielingen Channel.
          Convoys proceeding to Ostend branch off onto the OD-route, off NF 8 (= Dijk).
  The NF route passes:
     NF 1 - 51180 12 minutes N., 0153 minutes 300 E.
     NF 8 - Dijk - light buoy.
    NF 2 and NF 7 are about 3.6 miles apart, with even numbers to the North and odd numbers to the South of the route.
     After NF 8, the distances apart are about 4.5 miles, to buoy NF 15, which lies off "Sluissche Hompels".
     All buoys are illuminated.  So far we know:
     NF 1 or NF 2 flashes white every 5 seconds, NF 8 flashes white every 15 seconds.
     We have no further information so far.  We have come across buoys on the convoy route and have the following information of them:
     Flashing every:  5 seconds/ - 10 seconds/ - 15 seconds/ - 20 seconds/ - 25 seconds/ - 30 seconds/ - and etc. starting again from 5 second intervals.
     Any differences from these, illustrate specific navigational positions, e.g. indicating buoys on sand banks, which have shorter intervals between flashes.  Red and green flashing buoys as a rule show such dangers as wrecks, sand banks, etc.
 
 
- 841 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
5) Traffic Strength:
            Since traffic began putting in to the Scheldt at the end of November, ships have daily increased in numbers.  During the last days of December, on an average of 13 ships totaling about 60-70,000 GRT passed daily.  On 21.12., 18 ships totaling about 120,000 GRT were reported putting in to the Scheldt.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 842 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix 1a) to Operational Orders "Brutus"
       
A) General:
  The following supplements are attached:
  1) A sea chart of the operational area with the Thames-Scheldt convoy route traced on.
  2) A plan of the route followed by the TAM convoys, speed 8 knots, attached to chart 1).  The actual time this convoy puts out from the East Spile buoy, in the Outer Thames, is 2330.  The returning ATM convoys leave the Scheldt, off Flushing, at 1300.  Both times are chalked in on the plan.
  3)  A plan of the convoy route followed by the TAC convoys, speed 6 knots.  These convoys pass Dumpton Buoy 14 hours before high water at Ostend (between 0600 and 1900).  The returning convoys put out when the current changes.
  4) A plan of the convoy route followed by the TAL convoys, speed 9 knots, which pass Dumpton buoy 11 hours before high water at Ostend. The returning convoys put out after the convoys which proceed at 6 knots.
  5)  In addition, a chart is enclosed of the ships sighted by Commander Fortifications, Dunkirk.  A reckoning of these sightings shows that all these ships passed longitude 0230 E. in daylight.
       
B) Times of passing certain points:
  Times of passing Dumpton, and high water at Ostend, for the period 20.1. - 5.2., are as follows:
       
Date
TAC
Due off Dumpton
High water at Ostend
20.1.
 
0359
1759
21.1.
 
0500
1900
22.1.
 
1722
0722
23.1.
 
1843
0843
24.1.
 
2002
1002
25.1.
 
2113
1113
26.1.
 
2210
1210
27.1.
 
2257
1257
28.1.
 
2338
1338
29.1.
 
0019
1419
30.1.
 
0056
1456
31.1.
 
0131
1531
1.2.
 
0206
1606
2.2.
 
0240
1640
3.2.
 
0316
1716
4.2.
 
0353
1753
5.2.
 
0444
1844
       
    Any alterations to 2), 3) and 4) will be transmitted immediately.
 
 
- 843 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
C) Cover-name list for transmissions of radio messages:
  The following to be used as cover-names:
       
    
East Spile = Lampe
Dumpton = Licht
Ostend = Kerze
Flushing = Leucheter
TAM (convoy, speed 8 knots) = Igel
TAC (convoy, speed 6 knots) = Maus
TAL (convoy, speed 9 knots) = Dachs
ATM (returning convoy, 8 knots) = Ratte
ATC (returning convoy, 6 knots) = Hamster
ATL (returning convoy, 9 knots) = Wiesel
Single ships = Schaf
Sighting reports made by Commander Fortifications Dunkirk (all dead reckoning in relation to latitude of Ostend and transmitted on W/T) = Auge
Our own S-boats = Achwefel
Our own midget craft = Feuer.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 844 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     
Appendix 2 to Operational Orders "Brutus"
Traffic off the East Coast of England
       
On the North-South route, one convoy proceeds from the Firth of Forth to the Thames, and one convoy proceeds from the Thames to the North.
       
The route leading to the Thames has illuminated buoys in:
       
5320 N .   0101 E.
5304 N.   0126 E .
5254 N.   0208 E.
5244 N.   0212 E.
5231 N.   0157 E.
      and further along the route, about 8 miles from the coast.
       
   The southgoing convoys pass the following points according to a time-table:
      Buoy 5320 N.  0101 E., in at 1900, and
      Buoy 5231 N.  0157 E., out again at 0400.
       
The northgoing convoys use the same route as far as Buoy 5231 N.  0157 E. and then the Inner Route past 5246 N.  0157 E. to 5320 N.  0101 E.
       
   The northgoing convoys pass buoy 5231 N.  0157 E. at 1800, and are off buoy 5320 N.  0101 E. at 0230.
       
   Convoy strength is about 20 steamers, and convoys are escorted by a few escort craft, and some escorts while passing to the east of the outer route.  Speed 8 knots.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 845 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     
Appendix 3 to Operational Orders "Brutus"
Minefield situation in relation to operation "Brutus"
(see tracing attached)
       
A) General:
            As a general rule, it is not necessary to reckon with our own and English mines while proceeding through German and English declared mined areas. All the same, it is advisable to proceed submerged (at least 25 m.) through this area. It is better not to Schnorchel in the declared areas.
            We have not replaced any mines since 1939 at the points through which the convoys pass the mined areas.  The English also did not replace their own minefields, as they have not had to contend with submarine operations and surface craft attacks since 1940.
       
B) Declared areas:
            For the German declared area, see daily orders 431 B 1.  For the English mined area, see daily orders 451 B 1.  According to captured information, the deepest English minefield is about 16 m.
       
C) Known minefields:
  German:  The last mines were laid in June 1939 on the route through Westwall, in the eastern area.  There was a minefield consisting of 180 dummy mines in the western area, with some watching mines (laid September 1939).  These mines are in a safe condition or no longer extant.
            Area 7 was fouled with mines by our own S-boats at the end of December 1944.  Types 147 LMB, 59 UMB.  Firing:  DM 1, MA 2.  Mines still live.
            Barrage 8 was laid in November 1942.  Types of mine:  96 UMA laid as watching mines (mines are considered as no longer existing).
            Barrage 9 was laid in November 1942.  Types of mine:  72 UMA laid as watching mines (mines considered as no longer existing).
            Barrage 10 was laid in November 1942.  Types of mine:  180 UMA laid as watching mines (mines considered as no longer existing).
  English:  Barrage 1,2,3,4,5 and 11 (see daily orders 451, section C, paragraphs 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17).  Consider them to have been laid in 1940, probably not live or no longer extant.
 
 
- 846 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
            Area 6 was declared an English mined area before 1942.  Mines in this area are probably not live or no longer extant.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AM 11
U 486
- AF 77
U 863
- Op(LC)
U 1020
- Op(AN 01)
 
248
- Op(BD 65)
510
- KA 37
868
- AO 16
1051
- AM 73
 
275
- AF 87
532
- LR 79
869
- BE 48
1053
- AN 28
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 95)
 
285
- Op(AM 95)
650
- Op(BF 35)
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1172
- Op(AM 95)
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
680
- AF 78
880
- AO 16
1199
- AN 81
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
764
- Op(BF 25)
905
- Op(BF 35)
1203
- AO 16
 
322
- AM 24
772
- AM 29
907
- AM 18
1208
- AN 33
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(CA 55)
927
- AO 16
1230
- Op(AK 68)
 
400
- AM 27
825
- AM 84
979
- AN 23
1231
- AL 16
 
480
- AM 32
843
- JJ 52
1009
- AM 46
1232
- Op(CA 55)
 
482
- AM 02
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 73
1233
- AK 63
 
485
- BF 25
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 482 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1208 Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  U 861 Djkarta.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
18th Group:
suspicious object, probably Schnorchel, in AF 7881.
 
1105
probable submarine located in AF 7891, preparations to attack.
 
0115
probable submarine located, preparations to attack, in unidentified position.
             Subsequently it was reported:  "At 1435 on 26.12., an English steamer made contact with a submarine in ER 2250.At 0730, contact was lost in ER 2259, no submarine was in the vicinity.
     Enemy units were located in:  BF 3160 - 6170 - 1812 - BF 2730 - 4370 - BE 3870 - AM 9480.
             At 0937, an English unit sent out urgent W/T message to Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth.  Probably contact with the enemy.
       
- 847 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  Subsequently it was reported:  Devonport broadcast as follows, on 13.1. at 1636:  "Abandoned craft - Jonas Lie (undecipherable).  Thought to be at . . . . . . hours in approximate position BF 2456 . . . . . . (types) (search) in the vicinity.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 278, after 14 days in the Pentland Firth, reported little success in this area, owing to the current, and heavy anti-submarine measures with 60 percent battery capacity and loud under-water noises.  The submarine requested AN 1620 (exit to Stromsay-Firth), as a new operational area.  As operations against carriers putting out from Scapa Flow does not promise sufficient success, judging from present experiences (patrolled by submarines since 7.12.), U 278 and U 313 were allowed freedom to maneuver along the Scottish east coast as far south as the Firth of Fourth.
    2) According to a spy-report, new minefields were laid against submarines off the North Channel. Traffic is alleged to proceed between "Inishtrahull" and/or "Rathlin" and "Festland", just off the coast.  Although this seems unlikely, as there are very swift currents here and channels which are very hard to navigate, U 1009 was instructed not to proceed into the Irish Sea via the North Channel, but to proceed S.W. from her present position to off "Inishtrahull".  The submarine is to proceed over these longitudes and not to the east.
      The three submarines in the Irish Sea (U 1172 - 1055 - 285) were ordered to return to base instead of proceeding to the southernmost point of Ireland as had originally been ordered, on the basis of the same spy-report.
  c) None.
  d)  According to an enemy report 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers took part in the English attack on a German convoy off Egersund on 11.1.  As air reconnaissance established at the first light that only 1 large and 3 small units were in the area, it is quite possible that one cruiser was sunk.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 848 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
15.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AM 32
U 486
- AF 78
U 863
- Op(LC)
U 1020
- Op(AN 01)
 
248
- Op(BD 92)
510
- KA 52
868
- AO 16
1051
- AM 75
 
275
- AF 79
532
- KA 33
869
- BE 76
1053
- AK 28
 
278
- Op(AN 15)
537
- Op(JH 10)
870
- Op(CG 95)
1055
- Op(AM 95)
 
285
- Op(AM 95)
650
- Op(BD 35)
871
- Op(MQ 40)
1172
- Op(AM 95)
 
297
- Op(AM 38)
680
- AN 22
880
- AO 16
1199
- AM 84
 
313
- Op(AN 15)
764
- Op(BF 26)
905
- Op(BF 35)
1203
- AO 16
 
322
- AM 31
772
- AM 27
907
- AM 19
1208
- AN 36
 
325
- Op(BF 35)
806
- Op(CA 52)
927
- AO 16
1230
- Op(AK 65)
 
400
- AM 26
825
- AM 79
979
- AN 28
1231
- AL 24
 
480
- AM 33
843
- JJ 12
1009
- Op(AM 54)
1232
- Op(CA 52)
 
482
- AM 28
862
- Op(JH 50)
1017
- AM 76
1233
- AK 66
 
485
- BF 27
861
- LR 79
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 482 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 880 - 927 Horten.
  Sailed:  U 963 Bergen;  U 1203 Horten;  U 1058 Stavanger.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
18th Group:
1615
probable submarine located in AM 9215, preparations to attack, wake or eddy sighted.
             English steamer reports:  At 0900, suspicious submarine in MR 8570.  American steamer is firing on what appears to be a periscope in LC 3120.
     Enemy units located in:  AN 8747, AL 9390, AL 2650, BE 1240, BF 7720, AM 5610, 5360.
  d) 1) At 1300, the tanker "Spinager" (7,429 GRT) reported that she had been torpedoed abreast the Clyde Lightship, and urgently required immediate towing assistance, and that she was still afloat.  (Armed lightship at the mouth of the Firth of Clyde).
    2) Unidentified English steamer transmitted submarine warning messages, and finally:  "Struck a mine in AM 9212, at 1315".  This position lies on the new shipping route in the Irish Sea, which was reported on W/T to submarines. This probably refers to a success achieved by one of our boats.  It
       
- 849 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      was followed by an unusual increase in W/T traffic in the sea area round Scapa - North Minch (probably anti-submarine units making contact with the enemy).
    4) At 1300, the tug "Saucy" reported from the Channel:  2 ships, not seriously damaged.  The ships are proceeding towards the Downs".
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 979 reported that she was proceeding to Stavanger to put in there.  The submarine has been operating off Reykjavik, but so far we know no details of the operation.  Length of operation is 10 weeks.
    2) As a result of yesterday's spy report, U 1009 received orders to keep a watch on the traffic route to Inishtrahull.  She was given complete freedom to attack, taking territorial waters into consideration.  If the traffic actually proceeds between the island and the coast, the spy report seems authentic.  The submarine is then to press on into the Irish Sea, close offshore.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
       
       
                                                                      (signed):  GODT.
                                                                          for B.d.U.
                                                              Chief of Operations Division.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 850 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
The German Naval High Command  
2 Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Op.
"Koralle".
Ref. No. Chief of Staff 611.
5.1.1945.
       
Disposition of submarines 1.1.1945.
       
1)
Serviceable on 1.12.1944.  
 
411
On active service, type
VIIC
2
 
  XVII
1
 
  XXI
19
 
  XXIII
7
*
29
   
 
440
    *) U 2339 was commissioned in November but counted in for December
    
Paid off =
frontline boat,
U 547
 
training boats
U 3, 6, 29
   
   
   
Lost in action:
 
U 196, 365, 387, 479, 737, 877, 1200, 1209
at home:
U 416, 735, 2342
 
11
Serviceable on 1.1.1945.  
 
425
       
2) Losses in December 1944:
    
Atlantic:
type VIIC
  U 1200, 1209
2
 
IXC
  U 877
1
 
IXD2
  U 196
1
 
   
Northern Waters:
type VIIC
  U 737 (rammed), 365, 387
3
 
   
Gulf of Finland:
type VIIC
  U 479
1
 
   
Home:
type VIIC
  U 416 (training boat) rammed, U 735, sunk during aircraft attack on Horten
2
 
type XXIII
  U 2342 (trial boat) struck mine.
1
       
11
       
3) Distribution of the boats:
       
   
 
II
VII
VIIC
VIID
VIIF
IXB
IXC
IXD1
IXD2
XB
Frontline
-
-
101
1
1
-
33
1
6
1
Trials
-
-
  78
-
-
-
  9
-
4
1
Training
26
1
  65
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
 
26
1
244
1
1
2
42
1
10
2
 
 
- 851 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
   
 
XVII
XXI
XXIII
Total
Foreign
 
Frontline
-
-
-
144
2
 
Trials
5
58
27
182
-
 
Training
-
  4
  1
  99
3
 
 
5
62
28
425
5
       
     
During December 1944
   
 
   
the following went to the front line
+
14
(+ 11)  
added to the total
+
14
(+ 13)  
added to boats at the front
+
4
(+   5)  
added to trial boats
+
12
(+   9)=*  
subtracted from training boats
-
2
(-    1)  
       
  *) = a boat type XXI and a boat type XXIII (U 2501 and 2339) taken from trials for a Warship Construction Acquaintance Detachment.
       
4) Distribution of boats at the front on 31.12.44:
       
    
Atlantic
105
 
Northern Waters
20
 
Torpedo Supply Boats
1
 
Convoy escorts on Norwegian coast
3
 
Gulf of Finland
115
 
 
144
 
       
5) Boats in the Atlantic in December 1944:
       
    
Average number of boats at sea during the day 51  
of this number, in the operations area 17  
Outward bound 34  
of this number, returning to base 10  
       
       
       
       
                                                                      (signed):  GODT.
                                                                          for B.d.U.
                                                              Chief of Operations Division.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 852 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
   
The German Naval High Command  
2 Naval War Staff/B.d.U./Op.
"Koralle".
Ref. No. 626.
13.1.1945.
       
Submarine Efficiency
(Type VIIC in the Atlantic).
       
           A comparison of the efficiency of submarines in August 1942, when submarine warfare was at it height, with their efficiency in December 1944, shows the following:
       
    They sank:
     August 1942, average of 33 boats in the operations area         300,000 GRT.
     December 1944, average of 11 boats in the operations area    100,000 GRT
       
           The efficiency of submarines actually in the operational area was quite as great in December 1944 as in August 1942.  If single boats succeeded in remaining the same length of time in the operational area now as they did in 1942, maintaining the same proportion of time spent at sea to that spent on the route when outward bound, in port for repairs and on refits, they would be as efficient now as they were in 1942.
       
           In 1942, however, a submarine was in the operations area as soon as she had passed the Iceland-Shetland line when putting out from home, or the outer Bay of Biscay when putting out from France.  Submarines on the surface were able to cover large areas at high speed and thus, when convoy warfare was at its height, one boat was able to cover hundreds of miles after receiving a message from another boat. Apart from boats in the North Sea and in the Bay of Biscay, only those boats returning to base after using up all their battle supplies, were proceeding "on a dead march".
       
           Nowadays, on the other hand, only boats which are in enemy territorial waters where concentrations of enemy traffic are to be found, are in the "operations area".  Boats in the open sea only have chance successes, as they are forced to proceed under water with a very small radius of visibility and can only attack targets actually sighted by themselves.  Consequently the length of a cruise has increased considerably from what it was before, as boats proceed almost entirely under water.  It also means that when referring to the successes achieved by these boats, we no longer mean those achieved only in the "operations area", but those achieved during the entire cruise.
       
    On an average, each boat sank the following each day:
     
August 1942
approximately 200 GRT.
December 1944
        "              80 GRT.
 
 
- 853 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
           It is impossible to alter this situation at the moment.  It will increase considerably when new boats are commissioned, as the boats in use now only cover about 60 miles in a day, whereas the new types should cover 100-110 sea miles, as a larger battery capacity enables them to proceed at a higher speed on their electric motors when submerged.
       
           With their high speed, these new boats should be able to use many opportunities for attack, when submerged, which boats in use now are unable to use.  The new types will therefore reach the operational area more quickly than types now in existence, and will therefore be more economical.
       
           The proportion of time spent at sea and in port by single boats has a considerable effect on efficiency.In 1942 the average ratio of time spent at sea and in port was calculated as 60 to 40, now, the ratio is reversed, in December it was 37 to 63.
       
    Single boats spent 100 days as follows:
     
At sea
In the operations area
August 1942
60
40
December 1944
37
  9
    The reasons for this are as follows:
       
        In the West, 5 of the most productive submarine dockyards for submarine warfare in the Atlantic were lost.  7,400 highly qualified workmen and employees of the submarine dockyards have not returned to the Reich from France. The greater part of them was used as trench troops to defend the bases in the Bay of Biscay.
       
           It is therefore impossible to deal with the large amount of submarine repairs in Germany and Norway with the necessary speed.  Boats returning from the front are forced to wait some time before they can be taken in for repairs.
       
           Although it is impossible to make any alterations in the cruising speed and the time spent on operations, it is possible to improve the efficiency of boats while they are in port.
       
           Therefore I shall do all I can to curtail the periods which the boats spend in port.  The workmen necessary to put this plan into operation are guaranteed as far as possible by the regulation of all skilled dockyard personnel and their number will be increased by certain measures to be taken shortly.  A decrease in the number of workmen would result in a very real decrease in submarine efficiency, and would delay to a vast extent the operational readiness of new type submarines already in use.
 
 
- 854 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
           Besides, this would occur at a time when the submarines calculate they can operate successfully against the main bulk of the enemy shipping, and when losses have decreased considerably.  (The 3 boats lost in the Atlantic in December constituted 8% of all the boats at sea, whereas during the worst period up to 44% were lost there, and 25.5% in the summer of this year).
       
           According to official reports and press commentaries, the enemy is aware of this state of affairs and has begun to trade on it.  Consequently submarines in port are in an increasingly dangerous position, even more so than when at sea.  Everything must be done to exploit the possibilities of success and meet this danger.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 855 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     
Appendix 3 to War Diary 1.1.1945
       
General submarine situation in the Atlantic,
November - December
       
           There are two outstanding factors concerning submarines during these two months:
  a)  Increased number of successes and openings for attack against the enemy in their transport areas.
  b)  Small number of our own boats lost.
       
           During November and December 1944 there was an average of 14 boats a day in the operational area, which sank 14 ships totaling 91,000 GRT and 4 destroyers or escort vessels.  Moreover, not all the submarines reported their successes, and according to radio intercepts, a further 5-6 ships were sunk, mainly in the Channel.
       
           In comparison, during May and June there was an average of 10 ships in the operational area which sank 7 ships totaling 42,000 GRT and 7 destroyers or escort vessels.
       
           This increase in successes is not caused by the improved weapons for attack (LUT torpedoes instead of FAT torpedoes) so much as by the use of Schnorchel.  It allowed submarines which formerly had proceeded and attacked mainly on the surface, to proceed as "under water boats" and thus enter particularly heavily patrolled areas in which there were heavy concentrations of traffic.
       
           It was necessary to make these searches for concentrations of traffic if submarine warfare, with these old types of boats, was not to become inefficient.  Only with the use of Schnorchel was it possible for these boats, which were formerly almost stationary with a very small radius of visibility, to have a sea area to patrol with any likelihood of contacting the enemy.
       
           By these means, it was possible to occupy again operational areas which we had been forced to partly evacuate since 1940 by the strong enemy defences, and which had become unnavigable.
       
    
With VIIC boats: Area off Reykjavik
  North Minch
  North Channel
  Bristol Channel
  Area off Cherbourg.
   
With IXC boats: Gulf of St. Lawrence
  Halifax
  Gibraltar.
 
 
- 856 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
           The following disposition shows at a glance the numbers of boats in these operational areas which achieved successes and suffered losses:
       
      In the op. area
       
   
 
II
VII
VIIC
VIID
VIIF
IXB
IXC
IXD1
IXD2
XB
Frontline
-
-
101
1
1
-
33
1
6
1
Trials
-
-
  78
-
-
-
  9
-
4
1
Training
26
1
  65
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
 
26
1
244
1
1
2
42
1
10
2
 
       
   
Operations area
Total U-boats
Average
Successes
Losses
Reykjavik
300,979
1
2/5,500
0
Orkneys, as
1020*
-
from
  297*
-
December
  278*
2
-
 
  312*
-
North Minch
  296
-
 
  775
1
1 Destroyer
0
North Channel
  483
2/10,000 1 torp.
 
1003
1
-
0
 
    482*
-
Bristol Channel
1006
-
 
1202
4/26,000
          1006
 
   400*
1
-
1
 
1055*
-
Channel
  978
3/22,000
          1200
(Cherbourg)
1209
-
          1209
 
1200
-
2
 
  991
1/7,000  1/12,000
 
650-322*
4
torp.
 
680-485*
-
 
772-486*
Gulf of St. Lawrence
1223
2/9,500
 
1228
1
1 destroyer
0
 
  1231*
1 destroyer
Halifax
1229
1/5,000
          1229
 
1221
2
-
1
 
1230
-
 
806-1232*
-
Gibraltar
1227
1
1 destroyer
0
 
     870*
* Boats which have not reported as yet.
 
 
- 857 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
           Brief summary of traffic and defences situation in the operational areas:
       
Reykjavik:
           Moderate traffic, especially supply convoys from England to Iceland, consisting of medium-sized ships, 1-3000 GRT.  Very weak defences and little air escort.  The boats are restricted in operating owing to the large numbers of fishing craft.  The boats operated until just before the ships put into port.  Operations not very successful.
       
North Minch:
           Little traffic and moderate defences.  Operations not very successful, as although the boats obtained hydrophone bearings, they never contacted concentrations of traffic.  The boats were twice unable to use opportunities of firing on a battleship (aircraft carrier, as both times hydrophone contact with the enemy was obtained too late, and position and distance were unfavorable for attack).  This area is unsuitable for attack during the long nights in winter months, as the enemy is able to cover the entire route from the North Channel to Pentland Firth in one night.  This point was stressed by the boats which obtained the majority of their hydrophone bearings on steamers during the night.
       
The North Channel:
           Moderate traffic, with moderate defences, becoming strong after the boats had achieved successes.  Especially difficult to contact traffic, the majority of which, according to reports from the boats, put in along the North Irish coast and put out in the northern part of the Channel.
       
Bristol Channel:
           In spite of reports that part of the American convoys put in and out of the Bristol Channel, the boats only reported very little traffic in the outer Channel.  They only came across very heavy traffic with moderate to heavy defences, after penetrating into the sea area off Milford in the Irish Sea.  This is further evidence of the fact that submarines can only contact traffic at points where it is most concentrated.
           Even narrow areas such as North Minch, the North Channel and the Bristol Channel, through which traffic putting in and out is sure to pass, are "wide" from the point of view of stationary submarines.
           This fact is stressed by events in the Channel.  Boats in this area, as far as we know, contacted and operated against traffic while it was off Cherbourg.  During recent months this has been the most fruitful area, with very heavy traffic strongly defended.
 
 
- 858 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
As, however, in all coastal areas, these strong defences were not nearly as powerful as they seemed when it came to the point, as submarines are particularly difficult to contact by hydrophone gear and under water location, owing to currents and density layers.  Only rarely did depth-charge hunts "on the old scale" take place in coastal areas, during which three or more destroyers would hunt a submarine for hours at a stretch.  Mines are only considered to be dangerous on the outward routes and are not taken much into consideration in the attacking areas or in the areas through which enemy traffic proceeds on a large scale.
       
St. Lawrence River and Halifax:
           Medium to heavy traffic, only slight opposition.  The Gulf is a favorable area because of the shallow waters as already mentioned, but cannot now be occupied until about next June as it will shortly be frozen over.
       
Gibraltar:
           Moderate to heavy traffic, but no operations took place, as the only submarine in the area was attacked and forced to return to base owing to damage from depth-charges.
 
   1)    It is impossible to occupy only areas which offer the greatest opportunities for attack, e.g. the Channel, possibly also the North Channel and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as the enemy would discover this very quickly and would concentrate his defences on them.  He is now forced to defend himself from attacks on all sides, to divide up his forces to cover different areas and thus weaken them.  Besides, it serves little purpose to send more boats into a limited operational area than the traffic justifies, as the enemy will respond to more successes with increased defence measures.  Thus not only one, but several submarines would be put out of action at the same time.  Another advantage in occupying several operational areas at the same time, is the information obtained of new measures and methods of enemy defence, and a better idea of the development of enemy dispositions.
 
   2)    We expected to lose greater numbers of submarines as more Schnorchel boats were sent to the more difficult operational areas.  That this did not occur, on the contrary, there was a decrease compared to the losses incurred in 1941 and 1942, illustrates the immense value of the Schnorchel.
 
   3)    In comparison, the numbers of boats lost in relation to those at sea, are taken during the months of November - December 1944 and April - May 1944 (when the Schnorchel was being introduced and afterwards):
   
November/December: Lost 7, average No. at sea, 49.
April/May: Lost 23        "        "       "     42.
           Those examples are not peak months, but the months before and during the introduction of Schnorchel.
       
4)      This sudden change at the end of 1944 not only gave the Captains and crews in action at the time new faith in
 
 
- 859 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
   this weapon.  It also showed that the basic idea of this new type of boat, namely the "under water boat" with its higher submerged speed and greater staying power, was justified, and opened up great possibilities for success.  This change also made it clear to the enemy that the danger from submarines was by no means over.  Subsequently collected press reports, spy reports and decyphered W/T messages show that submarines may again become a great problem for the enemy, and he must begin gradually to prepare the public for this fact.
           These sources predict that there will soon be a renewal of submarine warfare.  The German submarine fleet is to be increased by new constructions, and is to be especially equipped against English anti-submarine weapons.  According to earlier reports, submarines which have recently come into operation have a submerged speed of 15 knots.  Consequently they would be able to attack and shadow allied convoys during the day as well.
           These reports also show a good knowledge of the details of the new boats and show that it is almost impossible to keep secret the characteristics of a weapon whose adaptation takes so long to complete.
       
5)      As well as the outward adjustment of the submarine weapon to submarine warfare, an inner adjustment had also to be achieved by commanders, crews, operations and training headquarters.  This adjustment is now practically complete.  It means that the commanders have become accustomed to stationary positions in comparison to the former mobile operations, the crews have learnt to endure worse conditions, and the operations and training headquarters have pooled experiences and exploited them.
       
   6)    As well as all this, the following operations were carried out during the last two months:
  a) 1-2 boats have been detailed continually in the North Atlantic during the past year, to make weather reports every day.  These weather reports were and are included in the formation of the general weather conditions in Europe, and also in a review of the conditions at the front, of the defences of the Reich and all such operations in which a report on the enemy air forces is of such great importance.  The weather boats were increased to 3 at the beginning of December, to ensure that enough reports were received daily as were necessary for us to start the West Offensive.
    Although the boats, whose positions were well known to the enemy owing to their extensive use of wireless telegraphy, were attacked now and then at the beginning of the year, this has no longer been the case during the last three months:  It shows that the enemy's Atlantic air patrols have decreased over the open sea to enable them to cover the coastal waters to a width of about 400 miles, that is to say, their own outward and supply routes to Norway.
 
 
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  b)  2 VIIC type boats put in with supplies to St. Nazaire which had been cut off.  They did not come up against any enemy defences.  We cannot comply with a request that such support be carried out continuously, as the small supplies (maximum 25 tons per boat) would have no effective influence on conditions in the fortress, and the removal of boats from operations would have a very bad effect on the fighting strength.
             Supreme Command of the Navy has received the right to make decisions on supplies, so they can concentrate on transporting those things which are most needed.  At the beginning of January, therefore, a third submarine (type IXC) put out, to take fuel to U 255, the last boat which had been made clear to put out from western France and also to take weapons and other things which were needed at St. Nazaire.
       
7)   In January 1945 the first two boats of type XXIII will be ready, and we can take it for granted that these new boats will fight outstandingly well in calm waters.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
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Appendix 4 to War Diary 1.1.1945
Submarine patrols and anti-submarine measures employed
by British naval air reconnaissance
       
           British submarine patrol and anti-submarine measures have changed since the middle of 1944, and since then it has fallen into the following distinct groups:
  a) Sea reconnaissance, which as usual, has been covered by aircraft from various Groups, and which only occasionally co-operates with surface patrol craft, and
  b) Close-range reconnaissance in the inshore waters, with aircraft co-operating with patrol craft, and the W/T guardship organizing this co-operation.  Each of these Groups operates strictly within an allotted area.  Diagrams are attached, illustrating these areas under reconnaissance.  We have discovered the limits of these areas by position reports, submarine or ship's messages transmitted by English aircraft or patrol craft and by means of bearings taken by German naval of G.A.F. direction finder stations on previous W/T traffic.  They are divided up as follows.
    1) Areas in which sea reconnaissance concentrates,
    2) Areas covered by close-range reconnaissance.
       
1) Areas under concentrated sea patrol:
       
    
July/August 1944 - Reconnaissance lines from North Scotland across the Channel between the Shetlands and the Orkneys and the Iceland Straits,
  Reconnaissance penetrating Northern Waters and the Arctic, with very little air activity off the west coast of Norway.
August/September - Increased air activity over straits through which submarines pass.  Reconnaissance was also strengthened off southern Norway and extended to the points and bases of operations.
September/November - Air activity increased, particularly over the Mediterranean routes.
November/December - Similar to previous months.  Anti-submarine patrols, flying between the Shetlands and Orkneys, were increased.  Reconnaissance off the coast of Norway remained in the same latitude.
            The new focal points are clearly defined as follows:
            The passages between England and Iceland, as the inward and outward routes for submarines.
 
 
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            The area off central Norway, likewise the submarine cruising areas.
            Coastal routes off Norway used by German shipping, and the ports and bases used by submarines above traffic.
       
2) Areas covered by close-range reconnaissance:
       
            From the diagrams, the allocation of areas off the coast to patrol groups co-operating with aircraft can be seen.  A 3-figure cypher group is used as the wireless telegraphy call-sign for the W/T guardship.  Groups at sea are relieved in such a way that these reliefs overlap by days.  The focal points are:  The Minch, the North Channel, the Bristol Channel and coastal areas in which English traffic is heavily concentrated and where Schnorchel submarines operate.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 863 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
AREAS UNDER RECONNAISSANCE BY PATROL GROUPS CO-OPERATING WITH AIRCRAFT
       
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
       
     
 
Reported
873 26/11 - -
Units
   
624   6/12 - -
"
   
730 13/11 - 12/12 73
"
  2 subs sighted by location gear.
348 13/11 - 12/12 214
"
  9    "        "      "        "        "         .
133 13/11 - 12/12 107
"
  2    "        "      "        "        "         .
       
       
       
 
 
- 863 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
SUBMARINE PATROLS
       
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
       
   
     
 
Reported
SUBMARINE PATROLS: See original - - - 30
Units
  1 sub location.
    13
"
   
    15
"
   
    12
"
  1 sub exhaust.
    122
"
  1 patch oil.
    151
"
  4 sub locations.
    28
"
   
    43
"
   
Probably exercises
  9
"
   
    2
"
   
    1
"
   
    3
"
   
    1
"
   
    1
"
   
    1
"
   
    2
"
   
    2
"
   
       
 
 
- 864 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
AREAS UNDER ENGLISH CLOSE-RANGE RECCE.  15.9. - 15.10.1944
       
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
       
348 daily, except 7.10 608 units
730 etc. see original   26     "
479         "        "     9     "
873         "        "   14     "
WSU       5     "
       
 
 
- 865 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
AREAS UNDER ENGLISH SEA PATROL  15.7. - 15.8.1944
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
       
       
       
 
 
- 866 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
AREAS UNDER ENGLISH SEA PATROL  15.8. - 15.9.1944
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
       
       
       
 
 
- 867 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
AREAS UNDER ENGLISH SEA PATROL  15.9. - 15.11.1944
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
  
       
       
       
 
 
- 868 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
AREAS UNDER ENGLISH SEA PATROL  15.11. - 15.12.1944
(Supplement to B.d.U. War Diary 1.1 - 15.1.1945)
   
       
       
       
 
 
- 869 -
     
     

 


 

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