F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 November 1944

PG30358

     
     
 
1.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 78
U 546
-
AF 76
U 978
-
BF 16
U 1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
181
-
KJ 75
680
-
AM 32
991
-
AM 43
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
195
-
GZ 31
722
-
AM 18
1003
-
Op(AM 53)
1226
-
AK 58
 
219
-
GZ 34
773
-
AM 01
1006
-
BF 16
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AL 62
775
-
AO 72
1053
-
AO 16
1228
-
AK 55
 
262
-
AN 35
802
-
AE 67
1062
-
AE 79
1229
-
AL 22
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
806
-
AN 28
1199
-
AN 24
1230
-
AL 25
 
396
-
AE 83
863
-
Op(KE 23)
1200
-
AM 29
1231
-
AE 67
 
483
-
Op(AM 53)
870
-
AO 72
1202
-
AN 28
1232
-
AO 16
 
541
-
AF 87
871
-
FN 59            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 262 - 541 - 546 - 802 - 1062 - 1199 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 262 Farsund.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in AM 6420, BB 3233.
    2) Air escort consisting of 6 planes observed with a convoy off North Minch.  Probably an especially important convoy.
    3) 19th Group carried out brisk activity with 37 planes.  The enemy had probably picked up an approaching boat.  (U 978, 1006), as on the previous day there was far less activity.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 246 was damaged by depth-charges in BB 33.  She is returning and has been instructed, providing the damage is not major and permits her to remain somewhere about the western half of AL, to step in immediately as meteorological boat until her supplies are exhausted.  The reason for this order lies in the urgent need for weather reports and the fact that U 1226 has still not made any report.
    2) U 1228, 1226, 170 have again been reminded of the urgent need for weather reports.  Despite this, no reports have been received.
       
- 703 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  None.
  d)  St. Nazaire submarine base informed B.d.U. of the rendezvous and procedure to be followed by transport submarines (U 722, 773) when they enter port.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 71
U 680
-
Op(AM 34)
U 978
-
BF 14
U 1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
181
-
KH 98
722
-
AM 01
991
-
AM 46
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
195
-
GZ 34
773
-
AM 19
1003
-
Op(AM 53)
1226
-
AK 58
 
219
-
GZ 39
775
-
AO 44
1006
-
BF 16
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AL 02
802
-
AE 68
1053
-
AO 16
1228
-
AK 57
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
806
-
AE 23
1062
-
AE 87
1229
-
AL 22
 
396
-
AE 83
863
-
Op(KE 23)
1199
-
AN 24
1230
-
AL 18
 
483
-
Op(AM 53)
870
-
AO 44
1200
-
AM 43
1231
-
AL 31
 
541
-
AN 23
871
-
FN 24
1202
-
AN 23
1232
-
AO 16
 
546
-
AN 23                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 541 - 546 - 802 - 1062 - 1199 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 322 - Kiel;  (U 262 - 281 - Kristiansand).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  
1500 probable submarine location by 19th Group, position unintelligible.
1507 diving submarine spotted by same plane, position unintelligible, course east.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) At 1606, a longish radio message was heard on coastal radio service.  Impossible to intercept because of weak signal strength and enemy jammer.  Radio message was sent by U 1199 (operational Moray Firth), about whom B.d.U. was getting worried, as she had been at sea for 8 weeks.
       
- 704 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) According to Radio Intercept Intelligence (see paragraph III c) an enemy plane spotted a surfaced submarine en route to the Channel (U 1006 or U 978).  Boats were informed that they must never surface in this area.  Sudden increase in the number of planes belonging to 19th Group now operating is probably due to the submarine sighting report.
  c)  None.
  d)  U 262 has arrived in Norway.  She is the last boat earmarked for transfer from France.  On looking back, the following facts stand out:
    Out of the 17 transfer boats that were in part merely patched up for service, only one boat (U 445) was lost.  Of 17 other boats that carried out the interim operation, 3 boats have not so far returned (U 413, 736 operational area Channel, U 247 operational area Lands End).  These losses must be considered slight.
    The losses in October have decreased again satisfactorily.  In all, 6 boats were lost through enemy action.  This reduction in loss is entirely due to the introduction of the Schnorchel.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 47
U 546
-
AN 28
U 978
-
BF 25
U 1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
181
-
KS 26
680
-
Op(AM 36)
991
-
AM 48
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
195
-
JJ 18
722
-
AM 19
1003
-
Op(AM 53)
1226
-
AK 58
 
219
-
JJ 42
773
-
AM 41
1006
-
BF 24
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AL 28
775
-
AO 16
1053
-
AO 16
1228
-
AK 76
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
802
-
AE 69
1062
-
AE 85
1229
-
AE 79
 
322
-
AN 77
806
-
AF 87
1199
-
AN 24
1230
-
AL 19
 
396
-
AE 85
863
-
Op(KE 23)
1200
-
AM 46
1231
-
AL 24
 
483
-
Op(AM 53)
870
-
AO 16
1202
-
AF 87
1232
-
AO 16
 
541
-
AN 28
871
-
FN 98            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 541 - 546 - 802 - 1062 - 1199 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  (U 775 - 870 - Horten).
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 705 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) U-boat sightings:
   
18th Group: 1052 probably a submarine location, position unknown.
  1115 surfaced submarine, plane later lost contact.
  1730 probable submarine location, position unintelligible.
  1800 message was cancelled.
19th Group: 0909 probable submarine location) U 1006
  0943         "         "         "        "         )       978!
                                                                      Channel area!
    On 2nd November, Portsmouth made message to an unknown unit at 1704 - submarine reported by plane, position not intelligible.
    Gibraltar repeated report from patrol (2 MDM):  0730 submerged submarine, position not intelligible.
    Same patrol made a radio message to Gibraltar at 0820 and 0840.  (U 1227?).
    Enemy units were located in:  AD 6950, AN 8749, 2630, 7920, BF 1410.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 1200 made a report from AM 70 as ordered on the state of the boat and crew:  Boat ready for operations in the Channel, boat has been allotted the same operational area as U 978 (sea area between longitude BF 2610, 3610).  If the shipping situation warrants it, the boat has sanction to cross the eastern boundary.
    2) As weather reports from U 1226 have ceased, 4 boats stationed in AK - AL have been urgently requested to report the weather.  Reports are vital for the defence of the Reich (assessment of the chances of own and enemy air force operating and of the possibility of landings).
  c) None.
  d) 1) B.d.U. is worried about U 1062 (transport submarine with valuable cargo returning from Penang), as boat has not replied to several urgent requests for weather reports from North Atlantic.
    2) Following remarks must be made on the sighting of a submarine by a plane belonging to 18th Group at 1115 (see paragraph III c):
      Reports was made to Murmansk and repeated by that station.  A repeat is unusual and leads one to
 
 
 
- 706 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      suppose that a "QP" convoy is expected in this area.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
4.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 41
U 546
-
AN 31
U 978
-
Op(BF 26)
U 1221
-
Op(BB 82)
 
181
-
KS 51
680
-
Op(AM 36)
991
-
AM 29
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JJ 27
722
-
AM 41
1003
-
Op(AM 53)
1226
-
AK 58
 
219
-
JJ 51
773
-
AL 66
1006
-
Op(BF 25)
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AL 24
775
-
AO 16
1053
-
AO 16
1228
-
BC 33
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
802
-
AF 71
1062
-
AE 82
1229
-
AE 84
 
322
-
AO 77
806
-
AF 76
1199
-
AN 24
1230
-
AK 62
 
396
-
AE 87
863
-
Op(KE 31)
1200
-
AM 75
1231
-
AL 25
 
483
-
Op(AM 53)
871
-
FU 36
1202
-
AF 76
1232
-
AO 16
 
541
-
AN 31                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 541 - 546 - 802 - 1062 - 1199 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 296 - Trondheim.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  
      Colombo broadcast a submarine sighting report made by an unidentified steamer in KU 1630:  "1154 crew taken to life boat, need help".  Probably a success scored by U 181 who is homeward bound.  She is a transport boat.  Torpedo armament 2 electric torpedoes.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AK 977, AL 9650, AM 7491, BF 1420.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 170 (type IXC boat on her way back from Freetown) reported from AL 58 that she had moved away to repair damage from depth-charges.  It is assumed that she was hunted with depth-charges by a search group somewhere about AL 80, as boat has again cruised N.N.E. since her last weather report from BE 12.
       
- 707 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 1221 has begun her return journey from the Halifax area.  A corrupt radio message shows that she had no success, although she picked up convoys both from the south and northeast to Halifax.
      23rd October boat fired a triple FAT miss at a passenger freighter in BB 35.  No further reports of contacts with the enemy;  Report on operation will show why the boat has scored no successes:
      Anti-submarine defences:  After firing the miss boat ran into mine sweepers, then patrols (PC boats).  Usual well-trained day air patrolling, when a convoy was passing day and night air patrols were strengthened.  Possible to run on Schnorchel without being disturbed.
    3) As weather reports from U 1226 have ceased, U 396 (type VIIC) has been stationed approximately in the southern half of AK as meteorological boat.  Boat is not to interrupt reports unless special anti-submarine measures are observed.  In any case, metrological boats have been unmolested for a long time.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 58
U 541
-
AN 35
U 978
-
Op(BF 26)
U 1221
-
BC 32
 
181
-
KS 77
546
-
AN 35
991
-
AM 75
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JJ 29
680
-
Op(AM 36)
1003
-
Op(AM 53)
1226
-
AK 58
 
219
-
JJ 53
722
-
AL 66
1006
-
Op(BF 26)
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AL 31
773
-
AL 69
1053
-
AN 36
1228
-
BC 35
 
296
-
AF 82
775
-
AO 16
1062
-
AE 63
1229
-
AE 82
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
802
-
AF 72
1199
-
AN 24
1230
-
AK 61
 
322
-
AO 44
806
-
AF 72
1200
-
BE 33
1231
-
AL 18
 
396
-
AE 87
863
-
Op(KE 31)
1202
-
AF 73
1232
-
AN 36
 
483
-
Op(AM 53)
871
-
FV 42            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 541 - 546 - 802 - 1062 - 1199 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 1199 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 400 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 708 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) U-boat sightings:
     
1630 probable submarine sighting by plane based on Iceland.  Position unreadable.
1645 Iceland-based plane investigated suspicious object, probably a periscope, course 1600, 5 knots.
     Colombo repeated the submarine sighting report of an American steamer in KU 4998:  "1244 in urgent need of help.  Crew taking to boats"  (probably a success by U 181).
     Army station in "MIM 2" reported to Nore:  "1530 submarine in AN 8769, 1630 in AN 8844.  Both boats on westerly course".  These were probably small battle units.
     Enemy units were located in:  AL 5519, AM 9480, AN 4430, 4990.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  b) 1) U 1199 has returned from her first operation off Bergen.  Her short report shows that the operation lasted 50 days, of which 31 were spent in the operational area off Peterhead and Aberdeen (AN 1895, 0131) close under the coast.  Boat ran submerged the whole time, crew most enthusiastic about Schnorchel.
      Successes:  21.10. Freighter (8,000 GRT) sunk in AN 0131.
      Shipping:  Boat observed strikingly little convoy traffic.  2 convoys of about 10-15 medium-sized ships were sighted in 31 days.  According to information to hand, there must be much more traffic (a convoy about every two days).  However, as boat found listening conditions very bad and ran into a great deal of fog, she probably did not pick up the other convoys.  Boat found a constant stream of small vessels, some of them minesweepers and patrol vessels; drifters, etc. were particularly numerous on the 20 meter line.
      Anti-submarine measures:  Constant air patrolling.  Anti-submarine group always watching convoy route, not well-trained, submarine was never picked up.  Shallow water best protection.  Dangerous search groups of drifters in line abreast with nets or kites, camouflaged as harmless fishing vessels, at same distance usually submarine chasers with Asdic.
      Boat passed through declared mined area off AN 0132 four times.
 
 
 
- 709 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Operation again shows that it is possible to work immediately off the enemy coast with old boats, and provides valuable information for the use of the new types of submarine.
    2) Following repeated submarine sighting report in KU, U 181 has been asked to give details if she has scored any successes.
  c)  None.
  d)  The original plan to pick up two naval constructors from La Rochelle by submarine has been given up.  The men have much experience of submarine construction and can ill be spared, but the danger of the transport submarine that was earmarked for the task striking a mine while moving from St. Nazaire to La Pallice is too great.  There is no objection to the men returning home by transport boat from St. Nazaire.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 1199 1 ship 8,000 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 54
U 483
-
Op(AM 61)
U 870
-
AO 16
U 1221
-
AK 78
 
181
-
KS 77
541
-
AN 36
871
-
FV 57
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JK 25
546
-
AN 36
978
-
Op(BF 26)
1226
-
AK 58
 
219
-
JK 28
680
-
Op(AM 36)
991
-
AM 78
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AE 87
722
-
AL 69
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
BC 37
 
296
-
AF 57
773
-
AL 93
1006
-
Op(BF 26)
1229
-
AE 83
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
775
-
AO 16
1053
-
AN 36
1230
-
AK 61
 
322
-
AO 16
802
-
AF 76
1062
-
AE 67
1231
-
AL 19
 
396
-
AL 31
806
-
AF 47
1200
-
BF 11
1232
-
AN 36
 
400
-
AO 77
863
-
Op(KE 31)
1202
-
AF 48      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 541 - 546 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 541 - 546 - Farsund.
  Sailed:  U 485 - 486 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) 0650 probable submarine location by plane belonging to 19th Group, position unreadable.  Possibly on of the boats operating in the Channel (U 978, 1006) or the two approaching the area (U 991, 1200).
       
- 710 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Urgent short signal in Gibraltar area from plane to Port Lyautey
    2) Enemy units were located in BE 1120, DG 3190.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 680 (with operational area North Minch) has turned back to Bergen because of badly leaking socket of direction finder gear.  According to dead reckoning, she had not reached her operational area.  U 296 has been told to make for North Minch as substitute; she has just carried out her first operation here.
    2) U 246 reported position in AF 75.  Boat turned back from BE 33 because of heavy damage from depth-charges, but maintained high speed on the run back between the Shetlands and Faroes (average daily run over 60 miles).
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Operational Staff of the Armed Forces requested an investigation into the possibilities of using about 2 submarines a month to supply the western fortresses with highly concentrated provisions, medical supplies, etc., as even this slight provisioning would be a great relief to the fortresses.  The views held by B.d.U. Ops. were given to Operational Staff of the Armed Forces in Teleprint 00625 F I:
      As supply boats would have to carry enough provisions and fuel for their outward and homeward journeys when they left home bases, they would only have enough cargo space for about 20 tons of supplies.  Assuming that 1/2 Kg. of highly concentrated provisions is needed per man per day, a submarine can carry only enough food for about 2 days for a fortress containing about 20,000 men.  This amount can hardly tip the scales, on the other hand, if a submarine is used for such a supply task, she is lost to operations for at least 4 months.
      It is intended to send a submarine with important material to the western area if an occasion arises.  Ob.d.M. is reserving his decision until the two transport boats now en route have entered St. Nazaire.
    2) Information Radio Message No. 181 was radioed to all boats:
      Electro-sonic navigation (Elektrasonnen-navigation) is not made sufficient use of by
 
 
 
       
- 711 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      commanders.  It offers good navigational possibilities even when the boat is submerged.  It has proved its use on many occasions.  For training purposes, electro-sonic navigation is always to be used, even if there is another fix available.  This gives a chance of making comparisons.  Results are to be included in the commander's report.  He is to explain the circumstances if the gear is not used.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 51
U 483
-
Op(AM 61)
U 870
-
AO 16
U 1221
-
AK 75
 
181
-
KS 77
485
-
AO 74
871
-
FF 85
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JK 23
486
-
AO 74
978
-
Op(BF 31)
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
JK 34
680
-
AF 76
991
-
BE 33
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AF 75
722
-
AL 64
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
BC 52
 
296
-
AF 49
773
-
AL 91
1006
-
Op(BF 26)
1229
-
AE 67
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
775
-
AO 16
1053
-
AO 16
1230
-
AK 81
 
322
-
AO 16
802
-
AF 87
1062
-
AE 68
1231
-
AK 63
 
396
-
AL 24
806
-
AE 69
1200
-
BF 14
1232
-
AO 16
 
400
-
AO 74
863
-
Op(KE 31)
1202
-
AF 47      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 680 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 541 - 546 - Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  U 775 - 1053 - Horten.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 1228 has been allotted BB 59 as operational area, as U 541 found it promising.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Press reports state that 47 men are missing from a freighter that was sunk by a submarine in the St. Lawrence River.  It is assumed that U 1223 was responsible.
    2) Further press reports (Stockholm's Tidningen of 5.11.) gave one of our own confidential reports,
       
- 712 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      stating that the last German submarine in the Mediterranean had been sunk in the Straits of Gibraltar while trying to break out.  In his last radio message the commander himself is said to have reported that the boat was sinking.
      It is probable that this was U 1227 (IXC boat operating off Gibraltar), as according to Radio Intercept Intelligence the boat was picked up by a patrol boat, which then made an urgent radio message to Gibraltar.
    3) Short torpedo report made by U 1199 (see War Diary for 6.11.) shows that the boat had several chances to attack despite difficulties from fog and seaway.  All in all, operations in this area appear favorable.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 27
U 483
-
Op(AM 61)
U 870
-
AO 16
U 1221
-
AK 73
 
181
-
KS 77
485
-
AO 72
871
-
FV 97
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
KZ 79
486
-
AO 72
978
-
Op(BF 91)
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
JK 32
680
-
AF 87
991
-
BE 33
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AF 76
722
-
AL 67
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
BC 54
 
296
-
AF 72
773
-
AL 94
1006
-
Op(BF 26)
1229
-
AE 68
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
775
-
AN 33
1053
-
AN 33
1230
-
AK 76
 
322
-
AO 16
802
-
AN 23
1062
-
AE 69
1231
-
AK 64
 
396
-
AL 27
806
-
AE 68
1200
-
BF 15
1232
-
AO 16
 
400
-
AO 72
863
-
Op(KE 31)
1202
-
AE 69      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 680 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 680 - Bergen;  (U 400 - Aarhus).
  Sailed:  U 775 - 1053 - Kristiansand;  U 1199 - Bergen to Haugesund;  U 541 - 546 - 267 - Kristiansand to Flensburg).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 2250 U 541 (en route to Flensburg) was attacked by a plane in AO 3315.
  b)  None.
  c)  Enemy units were located in:  AM 9470, 8940, AF 8542, BF 5250.
  d)  None.
       
- 713 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) According to dead reckoning U 991 must have already crossed the degree of latitude on which a state of readiness report should have been made in accordance with Operational Order Channel 2 Serial No. 36.  She has, therefore, been ordered to take over U 978's operational area (Channel), if she is fully operational, otherwise to take up station off Milford or Pembroke Head.  Situation reports have already been radioed.
    2) After repeated requests U 1221 has made a weather report from AK 28.  In another radio message the boat reported that she had tried in vain to transmit radio messages on all waves for the past 3 days.  Radio communication from boat to home base very bad, home base to boat perfect.  THis partly explains the lack of weather reports.
  c)  None.
  d)  On 5.11. U 400 got caught in a net barrage in AO 7217 and could not get out by herself.  She was towed to Aarhus by net tender 26 to have her screw, hydroplane and rudder examined.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 25
U 483
-
Op(AM 53)
U 871
-
GH 16
U 1221
-
AK 28
 
181
-
JB 33
485
-
AO 41
978
-
Op(BF 31)
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
KZ 84
486
-
AO 41
991
-
BF 14
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
KZ 87
722
-
AL 94
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AF 87
773
-
AL 97
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1228
-
BC 49
 
296
-
AF 75
775
-
AN 36
1053
-
AN 36
1229
-
AE 69
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
802
-
AN 28
1062
-
AF 47
1230
-
AK 78
 
322
-
AO 16
806
-
AE 91
1200
-
BF 16
1231
-
AK 59
 
396
-
AL 29
863
-
Op(KE 30)
1202
-
AE 68
1232
-
AO 16
 
400
-
AO 72
870
-
AO 16            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 485 - 486 - Kristiansand;  (U 1199 - Haugesund).
  Sailed:  U 1276 - Kiel;  U 979 - Trondheim;  U 537 - Soerabaja.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 714 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1000 plane attacked U 541 in AO 4815.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
      1137 plane ("348 W 18") spotted submarine, position not intelligible (probably sea area north west of Ireland).
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 9823, AM 9196, 5250, BF 2127, 1732.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 773, 722 were requested to give their date of arrival at rendezvous for St. Nazaire as soon as possible, because the enemy will immediately increase his anti-submarine measures if a radio message is sent immediately outside the port of destination.  During the night both boats made their reports:  U 773 arriving on 18.11., U 722 on 19.11.
      St. Nazaire Submarine base was immediately instructed to provide an escort on 18th or 19th November, also during the next few days, if the boats had not arrived by then, as the boats will not send any further messages.
  c) None.
  d)  U 400 entered Aarhus (see War Diary for 18.11.) but immediately proceeded to Horten, ballast tank No. 5 affecting trim.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 23
U 483
-
Op(AM 53)
U 871
-
GH 53
U 1221
-
AK 35
 
181
-
JB 33
486
-
AO 16
978
-
Op(BF 31)
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
KZ 83
537
-
LS 74
979
-
AF 83
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
KZ 89
722
-
AL 97
991
-
BF 15
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
246
-
AN 29
773
-
BE 22
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
BC 72
 
296
-
AF 77
775
-
AN 29
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1229
-
AF 47
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
802
-
AN 31
1053
-
AN 28
1230
-
BC 33
 
322
-
AO 16
806
-
AE 91
1062
-
AF 72
1231
-
AK 85
 
396
-
AL 42
863
-
Op(KE 31)
1200
-
Op(BF 24)
1232
-
AO 16
 
400
-
AO 71
870
-
AN 33
1202
-
AE 91
1276
-
AO 48
 
       
- 715 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 775 - Bergen;  (U 400 - Horten).
  Sailed:  (U 870 - 1232 - Horten).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
15th Group: 1039 plane reported "348 W 18":  Am investigating patch of oil.  Position unreadable.
  1730 probably submarine location, position unreadable.
19th Group: 0055 same type of message.
    2) At 1015 escort planes of formations "348", "430", "73" were located:  "348 W 10" in AM 6160;  "430 W 6" in AM 3640;  "73 W 6" in AM 3810.
    3) Enemy units located in:  AL 9964 - AM 2172, BE 6721, 3690, BF 1150.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 802 reported that she was entering Bergen because of Schnorchel breakdown.  (She had been allocated Kristiansand as port of destination).
    2) U 979 has been given the same operational area as she had on her first trip (Reykjavik).  Approach via Iceland Passage.
    3) U 1231 has been given a free hand in BB 59.  She may also go through the Cabot Straits into the Gulf of St. Lawrence if she wishes.
    4) U 1230 has been given a free hand in the whole of BB after she has carried out her special task.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 716 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
11.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AL 31
U 483
-
Op(AM 53)
U 978
-
Op(BF 31)
U 1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
181
-
JB 37
486
-
AO 16
979
-
AF 81
1226
-
AK 91
 
195
-
KZ 92
537
-
LR 85
991
-
BF 16
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
219
-
KZ 96
722
-
BE 38
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
BC 71
 
246
-
AN 29
773
-
BE 63
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1229
-
AF 76
 
296
-
AE 99
802
-
AN 23
1053
-
AN 23
1230
-
BC 66
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
806
-
AE 86
1062
-
AF 76
1231
-
AK 79
 
322
-
AO 16
863
-
Op(LT 94)
1200
-
Op(BF 25)
1232
-
AN 33
 
396
-
AL 48
870
-
AN 33
1202
-
AE 86
1276
-
AO 41
 
400
-
AO 16
871
-
GH 68
1221
-
AK 34      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 246 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 246 - Stavanger;  (U 1232 - 870 - Kristiansand);  (U 1276 - Horten); (U 541 - 546 - 267 - Flensburg).
  Sailed:  U 877 - 297 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
      Plane based on Iceland made three reports that were probably submarine sightings, positions were unreadable:  1) at 2034;  2) at 2145;  3) at 2223.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  BE 9558, BF 1620.
  d) Following was decyphered from phone traffic on 9.11. sent by "Commander Task Force 125" (probably in Le Harve):
     "Recorded for your information:  Anti-submarine defence force has repeatedly stated that increased German submarine activity must be expected during the winter months, and all patrol vessels must be directed to carry out special patrols in areas that have been declared as anchorages".
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 396 made her first weather report from the area allocated.  Boat cruised very slowly (47 miles direct), she probably made a leg to the north.
       
- 717 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 1202 has been ordered to proceed via AL 32 along the eastern boundary of the large grid square to AM 98.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AE 79
U 483
-
Op(AM 61)
U 877
-
AO 74
U 1221
-
AL 14
 
181
-
JB 56
486
-
AO 16
978
-
Op(BF 31)
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JA 44
537
-
KB 24
979
-
AF 49
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
JA 71
722
-
BE 63
991
-
BF 24
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
296
-
AM 32
773
-
BF 41
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
BB 92
 
297
-
AO 74
802
-
AN 24
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1229
-
AF 76
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
806
-
AE 88
1053
-
AF 76
1230
-
BC 64
 
322
-
AO 16
863
-
Op(LT 94)
1062
-
AF 79
1231
-
BD 11
 
396
-
Op(AL 27)
870
-
AN 36
1200
-
Op(BF 26)
1232
-
AN 36
 
400
-
AO 16
871
-
GH 96
1202
-
AF 88
1276
-
AO 16
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 802 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  U 802 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 1232 - 870 - Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 0025 large enemy target, probably aircraft carrier, in AN 3512.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
15th Group: 1624 probably submarine location, unintelligible position.
18th Group: 2358 submarine sighting in AF 7965.
  0019 message cancelled.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 7562, 9174, BE 8250, BF 1467.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 1232, U 870 were ordered at 0208 to go to AN 3432 - 3436, as plane in AN 3412 top right had
       
- 718 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     picked up with its search gear a large enemy target, probably an aircraft carrier.  If nothing seen by 0830 boats were to proceed.  No reports have been received.
  c)  None.
  d) Short report from U 802 shows that on 16.8. while she was approaching the operational area, an aircraft carrier crossed her course in CC 3759.  By the time the submarine was at periscope depth, the range was already 8,000 meters, angle on the bow 140, no destroyers seen, listening gear very bad.  3 days later air attack in CC 2645, 2 heavy depth-charges on the bow, slight damage.  Search group with circular saw then operated for 2 days.  Hardly any anti-submarine defences in the St. Lawrence River operational area, no shipping found.  Only 3 single ships of under 1,000 GRT.  Listening gear practically unusable.  After U 541's success on 8.9. in BB 1869 (without being observed by U 802) anti-submarine measures suddenly became very strong.  On 14.9. a destroyer belonging to a search group was probably sunk by curve shot in BA 3693.  Few depth-charges were dropped, as there was pronounced density layering.  Battery at only half capacity, almost empty.  Boat only ran on Schnorchel during twilight as there was a great deal of air patrolling during the day and strong phosphorescence, lay stationary in density layering at other times.  On 20.9. all again quiet in operational area.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AE 84
U 400
-
AO 16
U 877
-
AO 44
U 1221
-
AL 23
 
181
-
JB 49
483
-
Op(AM 61)
978
-
Op(BF 31)
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JA 43
486
-
AO 16
979
-
AF 49
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
JA 49
537
-
KB 42
991
-
Op(BF 25)
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
296
-
Op(AM 34)
722
-
BF 41
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
Op(BB 91)
 
297
-
AO 44
773
-
BF 45
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1229
-
AF 76
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
806
-
AM 11
1053
-
AF 73
1230
-
BC 82
 
322
-
AO 16
863
-
Op(LT 94)
1062
-
AN 23
1231
-
BC 81
 
396
-
Op(AL 28)
870
-
AN 34
1200
-
Op(BF 35)
1232
-
AN 34
       
871
-
Op(GJ 78)
1202
-
AE 88
1276
-
AO 16
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  (U 802 - Bergen to Kristiansand).
  Sailed:  U 680 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 719 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:
   
18th Group: 0605 plane reported suspicious object, same plane then gave a submarine location, position unreadable.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) According to dead reckoning U 806 (outward bound IXC boat) must have negotiated the Iceland Passage, and has been given BB 59 as approach point.  To proceed there via BD 10, when somewhere in southern half of AK she is to make 3 weather reports on different days.
  c) None.
  d) "Commander Task Group" made the following radio message ( High Priority Radio Intercept Intelligence):
    Increased German submarine activity may be expected during the winter.  In the area referred to the instructions given in the "Alert" (Manual of Methods of Combating Submarines and Small Battle Units) are to be adhered to.  The radio message was only partly decipherable.  This and other German Intelligence Service reports show that the enemy is prepared for increased submarine activity in coastal waters.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AE 83
U 483
-
Op(AM 61)
U 877
-
AO 16
U 1221
-
AL 22
 
181
-
JA 95
486
-
AO 16
978
-
Op(BF 31)
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JA 51
537
-
KB 72
979
-
AF 48
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
JA 54
680
-
AF 87
991
-
Op(BF 26
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
296
-
Op(AM 36)
722
-
BF 41
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1228
-
Op(BB 59)
 
297
-
AO 16
773
-
BF 45
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1229
-
AN 23
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
806
-
AL 33
1053
-
AF 75
1230
-
BC 28
 
322
-
AO 16
863
-
Op(LT 94)
1062
-
AN 23
1231
-
BC 38
 
396
-
Op(AL 51)
870
-
AN 28
1200
-
Op(BF 31)
1232
-
AN 23
 
400
-
AO 16
871
-
Op(GH 24)
1202
-
AL 32
1276
-
AO 16
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  - . -
       
- 720 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Sailed:  U 120 - 1209 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Submarine sightings:
     
18th Group: 1222 probable submarine location 600 56' N., longitude unreadable.  Plane (PXAH) made her report to "Aftonshoefdi" at
  2335 and at
  0015 submarine locations, positions unreadable.
  2305 aircraft "348 W 19" reported submarine location in AM 5331 (U 483 or U 1003).
      English patrol (1 GZO) reported:  2039 "am attacking submarine 4 miles north of Skagi (AE 4761).  At 2305 same unit reported:  "Good attacks, have lost contact".
      Messages refer to U 300 who is operating in this area.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 8573, AM 0284, AN 1380, BF 1510.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 877 has been instructed not to leave Horten for the time being, as she is intended for meteorological service.
  c)  None.
  d)  At 0000 on 15.11. new submarine radio bands came into force.  "Irland" now covers up to about 300 North, so that "Wotan" which covered the Gibraltar area is now superseded.  The one boat using this band (U 1227) is to use band "Irland".  Bands "Afrika I and III" have also been returned for the area roughly from Capetown to north of Mozambique and for the eastern part of the Indian Ocean up to the west coast of Australia respectively.
       
V.   Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 721 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
15.November 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 170
-
AE 59
U 486
-
AO 16
U 979
-
AF 47
U 1221
-
AE 79
 
181
-
JL 32
537
-
KN 12
991
-
Op(BF 32)
1223
-
Op(BB 15)
 
195
-
JA 29
680
-
AF 76
1003
-
Op(AM 61)
1226
-
AK 91
 
219
-
JA 53
722
-
BF 45
1006
-
Op(BF 31)
1227
-
Op(CG 94)
 
296
-
Op(AM 36)
773
-
BF 46
1020
-
AO 72
1228
-
Op(BB 55)
 
297
-
AO 48
806
-
AL 26
1053
-
AF 46
1229
-
AN 28
 
300
-
Op(AE 47)
863
-
Op(LT 94)
1062
-
AN 28
1230
-
BC 49
 
322
-
AO 16
870
-
AN 23
1200
-
Op(BF 35)
1231
-
BC 53
 
396
-
Op(AK 52)
871
-
Op(GR 52)
1202
-
AL 36
1232
-
AN 23
 
400
-
AO 16
877
-
AO 48
1209
-
AO 72
1276
-
AO 16
 
483
-
Op(AM 61)
978
-
Op(BF 31)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 181 - 1062 - 1221 - 1229.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  (U 322 - 400 - 1276 - Horten).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
19th Group: 0215 probable submarine location, position unspecified.
  0220 same plane reported that target had been lost and that she was resuming patrol.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 8770, AM 3989, 5233, 4780, 4760, 9540, AN 2880, BC 6730, BD 4260, BE 2348, 3310, 3230, BF 4811, 1210, 1179, 1950.  Striking concentration in eastern half of BE and western half of BF.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 877 and U 297 had to break off their cruise to Horten because of bad weather.  They are expected to arrive on 17.11.
     U 322, 400, 1276 have left Horten, partly delayed by escort difficulties.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Agent reported from Cherbourg that according to an English sailor there was an oil patch
       
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      covering several square miles in mid-Channel.  It was said to be from a German submarine that had been sunk.
    2) Another agent's report shows transfers of anti-submarine forces:
      "A change is being carried out in methods of anti-submarine attack, the number of naval escort groups will probably be reduced to 14 at the most, as opposed to 19 in September and 23 in July.  Among others the 4th, 9th, 11th and 18th are being released.
      Escort ship pool will be used partly for operational purposes, partly for patrol service.  Convoys are already running with far fewer escorts since the Atlantic bases have been occupied.
      Air reconnaissance will be maintained on the European side at any rate, may even be increased.  The number of USAAF/RAF planes operating each day is, however, far less than it was 2 months ago.  But the total number of planes available for immediate use against submarines is still increasing.
      A changeover from naval to air escort service is being made.  21 squadrons of RAF Coastal Command are available for anti-submarine service.  It is not known precisely how many the USAAF can provide.  These figures do not include the Azores and North Africa.
      Apparently only a few small convoys have been zoned through, they were escorted by only 2 convoy ships for 5 freighters, but were under constant air escort according to a special relay plan.  These planes were not carrier-borne but came from land bases.  (Bases in Azores, England, Southern France)".
      Note by B.d.U.
      The naval escort groups form the American convoy protection organization.  According to reliable information this has been in process of reduction for a year past and has been strengthened by newly-commissioned vessels in the same way as the English escort service.  The agent's report given above is probably partly explained by this.
      Strengthening of submarine reconnaissance and of air squadrons used for convoy protection is also confirmed by intelligence from the G.A.F. Intercept Service.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None
       
       
                                                                 (Signed):  GODT.
                                                         Chief of Operations Department
                                                                         for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
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Supreme Command of the Navy
Staff H.Q. "Koralle"
Second Division/B.d.U. Op.
7.11.1944.
Naval War Staff Ref. No. 507  
       
Submarine situation on 1 November 1944
       
I. In commission on 1st October 1944:
401+
  Newly commissioned type XXI
12
    XXIII
4
         
16
     
417
     
  Paid off:
 
          Operational boats: U 92, 256, 437, 957, 673
5
          Boats on trials: U 2331  
1
     
 
  Losses: On Operations
10
    In home waters
3
13
  In commission on 1ist November:    
398
           
  Plus foreign boats: Operational
 
2
    Home
 
3
    ("UD 3" paid off)
 
         
II. Losses in October 1944:
 
  Atlantic, North Sea and Indian Ocean:
 
 
Type
VIIC:  
U 247, 484
2
   
IXC:  
U 168, 855, 865
3
   
IXD2:  
U 198
1
           
  Northern Waters:        
 
Type
VIIC:  
 U 362, 703, 921
3
   
VIIF:  
 U 1060 (torpedo transport)
1
         
  Gulf of Finland: None.
 
         
  Sunk in harbor by air attack:        
 
Wilhelmshaven:
  Type VIIC: U 777 (on trials)
1
 
Bergen:
  Type VIIC: U 228, 993 (operational)
2
       
13
       
       
III. Distribution of boats:
    
 
II
VII
VIIC
VIID
VIIF
IX
IXC
IXD1
IXD2
On operations
  -  
-
91
1
2
-
33
1
6
On trials
-
-
94
-
-
-
13
-
5
School boats
28
2
67
-
-
2
  -
-
-
Total
28
2
252
1
2
2
46
1
11
 
 
 
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XB
XVII
XXI
XXIII
Total
Foreign
On operations
1
-
-
-
135
2
On trials
1
4
28
16
161
-
School boats
-
-
3
-
102
3
Total
2
4
31
16
398
5
   
   
    
During October 1944:    
Following joined operational boats   +
11
(+ 7)
Total decrease of   -
3
(-2)
Reduction in number of operational boats   -
6
(- 10)
Reduction in number of boats on trials =   -
3
(+ 10)
Increase in number of school boats   +
6
(- 2)
      (=) = 3 boats on trials U 1170, 1205, 1271.
       
IV. Distribution of operational boats on 31st October 1944:
    
Atlantic
86
Northern Waters  
26
Group "Mitte"  
7
Torpedo supply  
1
Gulf of Finland  
15
   
135
       
V. During October 1944 the following were in the Atlantic:
    
Daily average at sea  
45
of which in operations area  
7
On passage  
39
of these, on return passage.  
21
       
  + on 1.10.44 401 boats were in commission, not 400.  The number of Type VIIC boats on trials was 105, not 104, thus total number of boats on trials was 164 not 163.
       
       
                                                                      (signed):  GODT.
       
       
       
 
 
 
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Appendix to Second Division/Naval War Staff B.d.U. Ops.
Most Secret S.O. only 459/44
       
   
U 413 Matschulat Second trip.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 484 Schäfer First trip.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 168 Pich Experienced boat.  6.10. torpedoed and sunk by Dutch submarine north of Java.
   
U 855 Ohlsen First trip.  Last report made on 12.9. S.W. of Iceland.   Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 865 Stellmacher First trip.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 198 Heusinger v. Waldegg First trip.  Last report on 8.8. from east coast of Africa.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 362 Franz Experienced boat.  Last report on 3.9. from the Kara sea.   Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 703 Brünner Experienced boat.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 921 Werner Second trip.  Last report on 24.9. from Northern Waters.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 1060 Brammer Experienced boat.  Sunk by plane on 27.10. off Fleina, Norway.
   
U 228 Christopherson Sunk by plane on 4.10. in Bergen.
   
U 993 Steinmetz Sunk by plane on 4.10. in Bergen.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
       
- 726 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   Supreme Command of the Navy
Second Division Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Ops.
   Ref. No. 521 FII.
     
22nd November 1944
       
Operational Order "Capetown" and Colombo" for U 234
       
I. Task:
  Widespread minelaying is to be carried out on the convoy or steamer routes off Capetown and Colombo.  This minelaying is only a secondary task for the submarines.  The main task (transport to Penang) is to be carried out whatever happens, hence, if anti-submarine defences are too strong or if there are any great difficulties in the operational area, minelaying is to be broken off or carried on in a remoter spot.
       
II. Enemy situation:
  a) Capetown:
     According to Radio Intercept Intelligence about 50 vessels a month both outward and inward bound from overseas and the Indian area.  See attached sketch for convoy routes and approach points based on Radio Intelligence and captured documents.
  b) Colombo:
     According to Radio Intercept Intelligence about 40 ships a month, outward and inward bound.  Single ships sail from Naval Grid Square MP to LD and to the south from LD via LC to LN.  Harbor approaches and convoy routes according to captured documents and observations made by U 168 are shown on the attached sketch.
    Listening conditions vary greatly, at times range is greater than visual range.  Strongly fluctuating currents along the coast of Colombo, they are not directly influenced by the prevailing wind.
       
III. Anti-submarine defences:
  a) Capetown:
    June 1943:  U 177 reported brisk convoy traffic; she noted constant horizontal searching location transmission on 141 cm., plane location on 170 cm.  South of Capetown 6 reflections permanently trained upwards, probably aerodrome with night lighting.
    February 1943:  U 506 reported land-based locations on 240 cm. at regular intervals; plane locations on 166 cm.
 
 
 
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    March 1943:  U 509 reported locations by land stations, submarine chaser of 100-150 GRT off the harbor entrance, strongly escorted traffic to the main harbor.  Searchlights on shore and irregular showing of lights.
    July 1944:  U 198 Waldegg reported deterrent bombing during the day, night planes operated twice with light, but not location gear.  "Naxos" land stations in Naval Grid Square GR 5328, 5352 and 5660.
    No other information available on anti-submarine defences.  Day and night air patrols must be expected.
  b) Colombo:
    Near Colombo main harbor are destroyer or patrol vessel and air patrol operating daily.  Otherwise there are submarine chaser formations only when important transports are sailing nearby.  Frequent single ships with naval escorts, once with 3 escorts.  To date, no use of depth-charges against German submarines has been reported.  Regular air reconnaissance has been observed only close inshore and near the main harbor.  Increased use of planes ahead of and accompanying convoys, also after submarines have been sighted or have sunk enemy vessels or have made radio messages.  Important single vessels are also escorted by planes.  Mainly day air activity, seldom at night, now using location gear.  Land-based location with searchlights observed off Colombo main harbor.  Numerous air bases on the mainland as well as on the islands in Naval Grid Square LD.
    March 1944:  U 183 Schneewind reported on defences:  Constant patrolling by single patrol vessels and destroyers with planes.  Constant air escorts during the day for almost all vessels.  Night air activity:  One run-in without bombs.  Otherwise nothing seen but a number of planes showing lights landing behind the main harbor.  No location noted.  Boat was illuminated several times at long range with searchlight from main harbor and patrol boat, no explanation known.  Listening conditions variable, strong density layering.
       
IV. Minefield material:
  1) 42 SMA mines (21 mines each for Capetown and Colombo), mooring cable = 400 meters, time setting = 80 days, safety device = 3 hours, clockwork arming switch = 36 hours.  Depth setting minus 15 meters, period delay mechanism one, 21 SMA mines with firing mechanism M 3 for southern hemisphere (Capetown) and 21 SMA mines with firing mechanism M 3 for northern hemisphere (Colombo).
 
 
 
- 728 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  2) Deepest water in which mines may be laid, 350 meters, shallowest, 50 meters.  (In the Colombo operational area laying is sanctioned to 45 meters).  Distance apart of mines not less than 400 meters.  Mines may be laid only up to seaforce 6.
       
V. Execution:
  1) Boats will sail according to war readiness and orders for main task.
  2)  Mines are to be laid at a new moon period if possible, but only if it can be done without delaying the main task.  Attached sketches are to serve as a guide.
  3) Deviations when laying mines are left to the discretion of the commander if the enemy situation observed by the boat or radioed to her warrant them.  Time for laying mines is left to the commander once the area has been reconnoitered.  See sketch for boundary of area to be mined.
  4) The commander will regulate the loading of the shafts for the Capetown operational area (firing mechanism for southern hemisphere) and Colombo (firing mechanism for northern hemisphere).
       
VI. Report:
    Report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after mines have been laid, but at a distance of at least 500 miles from the mined area.  When making report "AFKP" = have laid mines.
    The number "1" as short signal with this, means Capetown.
    The number "2" as short signal with this, means Colombo.
       
VII.   If enemy situation does not permit mine laying, boat is to move away and continue on her course.  She is to report that she has not carried out the task when a favorable opportunity arises.
       
       
                                                                 (Signed):  GODT.
                                                         Chief of Operations Department
                                                                         for B.d.U.
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
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