F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 October 1944

PG30356

     
     
 
1.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
AK 62
U 262
-
BE 31
U 546
-
BD 18
U 925
-
AL 47
 
155
-
AE 83
267
-
BE 34
673
-
AL 45
953
-
Op(AM 50)
 
170
-
EK 73
281
-
Op(AM 36)
714
-
AN 88
963
-
AM 83
 
180
-
ES 14
309
-
Op(AM 55)
743
-
Op(AM 02)
979
-
AE 91
 
190
-
AN 35
382
-
AL 52
758
-
AE 68
985
-
Op(AM 52)
 
195
-
ER 25
398
-
AM 18
772
-
AF 47
1004
-
Op(AM 52)
 
198
-
LE 30
445
-
AN 23
802
-
BB 93
1062
-
EH 18
 
219
-
ER 27
480
-
AF 58
804
-
AN 34
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
AE 68
484
-
AL 34
853
-
AF 79
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
Op(AL 57)
516
-
AN 35
855
-
AN 35
1223
-
BB 97
 
247
-
AL 92
518
-
CB 72
857
-
AF 79
1226
-
AN 36
 
248
-
AE 68
530
-
AN 31
863
-
FG 63
1227
-
AL 45
 
256
-
AF 72
534
-
AL 31
865
-
AK 65
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AE 88
541
-
Op(BB 10)
871
-
DF 26
1230
-
AO 16
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 155 - 170 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 298 - 445 - 480 - 484 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 190 - 516 - 530 - Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) 0345 surfaced U-boat by aircraft of 18 Group in unresolved position, course west, speed 6 knots.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 9571 - 9738 - 0229 - 9960 - AM 8930 - AN 2350 - BE 2240 - BF 1960.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 985 has started on her return passage from operations area North Channel.  Boat encountered strong patrols, no traffic.
  c)  U 1062 must have supplied from U 219 (see War Log of 28.9. IVc), as there has been no report.
  d) 1) Group Command West's Most Secret 03007 AI of 1.10.44, on the subject of the supplying of the Atlantic fortresses:
      "Subject:  Atlantic fortresses.
      Although the battle for Brest ended 12 days ago, the expected enemy reinforcements for a mass attack on Lorient have not yet been observed.
       
- 649 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      The Lorient situation rather remains unchanged in the main since the first half of September.  It is possible, therefore, that the enemy intends to abandon the idea of specific attacks on the Atlantic fortresses altogether, especially as:
     
1) The ports on the west coast are less important for the supply of the main front.
2) Plainly there is no surplus of enemy forces on the main front, and he will therefore endeavor to get all possible troops and material to the front line.
3) The enemy has realized that the fortress ports would be entirely destroyed before they fell into his hands.
      It is therefore possible that the enemy intends to starve the fortresses out.  He must know that they have supplies for only 2 to 3 months.  Group Command therefore considers it necessary to make plans now to prevent these fortresses having to capitulate in the end because of starvation.  Group Command considers that they can only be supplied by U-boat and that only transport U-boats would be able to carry sufficient quantities.  They would have to be loaded with highly concentrated foodstuffs, that preparations will have to be made now, regardless of the uncertainty of enemy intentions.  Request decision accordingly.
              Naval Group Command West/Operations Staff Most Secret.  03007 A I."
       
      Examination of the question shows:
     
1) Food stocks of fortresses on 1.10:
 
 
Number of persons
 
Daily rations
Lorient
27,000
 
60
St. Nazaire
28,000
 
45
La Rochelle
14,000
 
70
N. Gironde
5,700
 
45
S. Gironde
4,300
 
50
  About 1 kg. of food is reckoned per person per day, i.e. 1 ton provides food for 1,000 persons for 1 day.
2) At present there are no supply boats (type XIV or XB) available.
3) As there are no fuel stocks left in the fortresses, type VIIC boats would have to be filled up with fuel to capacity.  One
 
 
 
- 650 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
  VIIC boat could load 25 - 30 tons provisions for a passage from Norway, if she carries only 2 torpedoes and no gun ammunition, i.e. she could transport 1 day's rations for Lorient or St. Nazaire.  In order to carry even a few supplies to the fortresses, a large number of VIIC boats would have to be used, which means that the Atlantic warfare would have to be abandoned altogether for the next few weeks.  This cannot be justified, as the number of boats in operations areas at present is already the lowest for about 3 years.
4) Type IXC boats can carry about 70 tons provisions.  As only about 5 or 6 such boats are likely to be available during the next 4 weeks, they also could not transport effective quantity of food.  If they were used it would also mean abandoning action on the American coast.
5) The request for supply U-boats has therefore been refused, for the reasons given, as follows in Most Secret 00229 F I:
 
"a) Suitable supply boats for supply of western bases not available at present.
b) Other boats not suitable for transport of provisions, as they can only carry 20 - 25 tons.  The total effect would be too small.  Use of these boats in any number would have too serious an effect on the Atlantic warfare.
c) For these reasons proposal cannot be carried out, with the exception of the supply of St. Nazaire by 2 boats, which is already in hand.
                                                         B.d.U. Op."
  d) 2) In radio message Secret 28 of 25.9.44. Sea Defence Commandant Loire requested supplies of war material, especially petrol, for the fortress.  The petrol cannot be carried by VIIC boats, which are fitted for this purpose, as they would have to be filled up with fuel for the passage to St. Nazaire and back and could not therefore carry petrol in their inner fuel tanks.  Sea Defence Commandant Loire has therefore been ordered to state his requirements, bearing in mind that they can only be met by general fortress supply and not by Special Naval Supply.
      The Sea Defence Commandant's list of requirements was received and consists mainly of anti-tank weapons, special ammunition, medical supplies, etc.  The gear will be assembled by Group West in collaboration with Naval Chief Command Baltic and will be loaded into 2 boats, U 722 and 772 in Kiel with the 5th U-Flotilla.  Boats will sail as soon as they are loaded and at war readiness.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
    
 
 
 
- 651 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
2.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
AK 03
U 262
-
BE 32
U 714
-
AE 85
U 963
-
AE 67
 
155
-
AE 67
267
-
BE 26
743
-
Op(AM 02)
979
-
AE 67
 
170
-
AK 45
281
-
Op(AM 36)
758
-
AE 69
985
-
AL 03
 
180
-
EH 14
309
-
Op(AM 55)
772
-
AF 71
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
195
-
ER 53
382
-
AL 27
802
-
BC 74
1062
-
DS 77
 
198
-
LE 30
398
-
AM 25
804
-
AN 35
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
219
-
ER 56
480
-
AF 59
853
-
AN 23
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
244
-
AE 69
484
-
AM 32
855
-
AN 36
1223
-
BB 83
 
245
-
Op(AL 19)
518
-
CB 69
857
-
AE 23
1226
-
AN 36
 
247
-
AL 67
534
-
AE 87
863
-
FT 45
1227
-
AL 8445
 
248
-
AE 68
541
-
Op(BB 10)
865
-
AK 83
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
256
-
AF 76
546
-
BE 12
871
-
DF 53
1230
-
AO 16
 
260
-
AE 85
673
-
Al 42
953
-
Op(AM 50)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 155 - 170 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 445 - 480 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  At 0833 an aircraft of No. 18 Group reported:  Am investigating suspicious oil patch, position unresolved.  At 1452 an aircraft of No. 15 Group reported a suspicious oil patch in an unresolved position (possibly the same patch as 0833).
     Enemy units were located in:  AB 9670 - 9370 - AF 7870 - AM 9270 - 5750 - AN 2260 - BC 3524 - BF 8159.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 245 (weather boat) is returning, as her stocks are used up.  Weather reports will continue until 7.10. and will be made in the first instance by U 546 and U 518, on return passage.
    2) U 541 has started on her return passage from the St. Lawrence River estuary, also U 518 from the Cape Hatteras area.  No situation report yet.
    3) U 863 has been instructed to steer for the Gulf of Aden via the Mozambique Straits.
       
- 652 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    4) Convoy routes in the North Channel were radioed again to boats in that operations area (U 1001 - 309 - 953 - 743), and also a note to the effect that there is no traffic outside the routes given, but strong anti-submarine activity aimed at driving off approaching boats.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 445 and U 925 must now be regarded as lost.  U 445 (non-schnorchel boat) left Lorient on 22.8.  U 650 (also non-schnorchel boat), which sailed on the same day, entered Brest 11 days ago.  U 445 did not make a passage report in BE, as ordered, and did not reply to several orders to give her position, and she was probably sunk in the inner Bay of Biscay by anti-submarine forces, of which there were large numbers there at the time.
      U 925 left Kristiansand on 24.8. for the North Atlantic via the Iceland Passage.  She made no passage report and there is no clue to the cause of her loss.
    2) Situation in the North Atlantic:
      There are at present, in the North Atlantic:
     
In operations areas: 8 boats (4 off North Channel
    1 off North Minch
    2 off Halifax
    1 in St. Lawrence River).
On return passage: 28 boats  
On outward passage:   4 boats  
      When the boats at present in operations areas leave, the number of boats in the Atlantic will have reached the lowest figure for about 3 years.  It is to be expected that the enemy will soon realize this, will curtail his anti-submarine activity accordingly and will use the naval and air forces so released for offensive operations against the coasts and against our own shipping.
      Every effort must be made to increase the number of boats quickly, and this can only be achieved by sailing Group "Mitte" boats.  If 6 schnorchel boats are withdrawn for the Atlantic, it may not be possible to replace them in a hurry in the event of an attack on Norway or Jutland.  This risk will have to be taken however, in the interests of Atlantic warfare, as a large-scale landing operation is unlikely so late in the year.
      The 6 schnorchel boats, U 978 - 1003 - 1006 - 1200 - 246 - 483 have been ordered to fit out immediately for an 11 weeks' Atlantic operation and to sail as soon as possible.  These boats are to operate in the North and Bristol Channels
 
 
 
- 653 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      and also in the Channel invasion area, if they can make it.  They are to report from BE, N. half, whether or not they consider operation off Cherbourg or in the Seine Bay possible.  They will be disposed when this report is received.
    3) In radio message 1433/1/W 47 (on operations wave West) Fortress Commandant Dunkirk requested that his fortress be supplied by U-boat with ammunition urgently required.
      At the best U-boats under escort can proceed along the compulsory routes as far as square AN 8290 and then because of danger from the air, have to move off seaward in shallow water and proceed south at depths over 20 meters, submerged, using schnorchel.  They then proceed to about AN 8740, and reach their entrance port via the shortest swept route.  A U-boat cannot carry out this operation for the following reasons:
     
1) For navigational reasons, experience and detailed knowledge of these waters are necessary.  Commanding Officers and quartermaster ratings of the available boats have no experience whatsoever of inshore waters and currents.
2) Terrestrial navigation can only be used during passage with escort.  It will no longer be possible to take fixes after the boat has started passage submerged, in view of the anti-submarine situation (location by aircraft).  Determining position therefore entirely uncertain.
3) The speed of 4 knots which can be reached with schnorchel is not adequate for the sea areas in question with their strong currents.
4) For reasons 1) -3) it can be taken for fairly certain that the boats would never reach the port, but would either be stranded in shallow water or would fall victims to mines or enemy anti-submarine activity.  The Fortress Commandant's request must therefore be refused.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 654 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix to War Log of 2.10.44
       
Mediterranean situation:
       
           The two boats damaged in harbor by air attack, U 565 and 596, have been sunk off Salamis.  U 407, the last boat, must also be presumed lost.  This boat has not replied to 2 orders to report her position during the last few days, and, according to her stocks of fuel and provisions, she should have entered port by now.  Nothing known of cause of loss.  All that is known from Radio Intelligence is that reinforced destroyer patrols have been carried out latterly in her operations area (N. of Crete).
       
           There are thus no U-boats in the Mediterranean.  It is remarkable what a decisive effect air attacks on the bases have had.  Since 6.6., 7 boats have been put out of action in harbor by air attack, while during the same period only 1 boat was lost at sea.
       
           Salamis and Pola bases are being wound up, crews and base personnel will return to Germany.  The appointment office of U-boat Staff Officer with Admiral Agean will lapse.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 655 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
3.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
AL 17
U 267
-
AL 90
U 743
-
Op(AM 02)
U 963
-
AE 68
 
155
-
AE 68
281
-
Op(AM 36)
758
-
AF 47
979
-
AE 68
 
170
-
EK 42
309
-
Op(AM 55)
772
-
AF 48
985
-
AL 36
 
195
-
ER 67
382
-
AL 26
802
-
BC 75
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
198
-
LE 30
398
-
AN 23
804
-
AN 35
1062
-
DS 71
 
219
-
ER 91
480
-
AF 57
853
-
AN 28
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
AF 44
484
-
AN 99
855
-
AN 36
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AL 41
518
-
BD 20
857
-
AN 23
1223
-
BB 59
 
247
-
AL 64
534
-
AE 87
863
-
FT 82
1226
-
AN 31
 
248
-
AE 69
541
-
BB 50
865
-
AK 85
1227
-
BE 13
 
256
-
AF 76
546
-
AL 84
871
-
DF 59
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AE 86
673
-
AL 18
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1230
-
AO 16
 
262
-
AL 96
714
-
AE 86            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 155 - 170 - 198 - 244 - 245 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 480 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Colombo repeated a U-boat sighting report from an English ship at 0035/3/10 in MR 53.  (Not one of our boats).
     Enemy units were located in:  AL 5178 - 6660 - AM 8960 - BD 3680 - BF 1620.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 262 reported her position in AL 54.  Boat encountered no traffic in her operations area N. of Lands End, strong anti-submarine activity.  Knocking buoys, boat suspects bluff or markers.  According to information here there should be at least one coastal convoy daily in this area (supply to invasion front).  For the present the absence of traffic cannot be explained here.  It is assumed that the boat did not approach close enough to the convoy routes.
    2) U 170 has started on her return passage from operations area off Freetown.  Only 3 neutral ships encountered in the coastal area between
       
- 656 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      EU 32 and ET 37 during 17 days.  Hardly any anti-submarine activity.  Strong night air activity 300 miles off the coast, slight activity at sea.
  d) 1) U 180 must be presumed lost.  This boat (a type IXD converted for transport) left Bordeaux for Penang with U 195 on 20.8.  So far she has made no passage report, despite several orders to do so and to give her position.  She was probably sunk while still in the inner Bay of Biscay.
    2) Although otherwise in order, U 255 cannot be made ready to sail by U-boat base St. Nazaire, as schnorchel cams were sent to Germany shortly before the invasion for adaptation.  As the enemy apparently does not intend to attack the fortress in the immediate future, the U-boat base requests that cams be sent over by aircraft.  As U 255's cams cannot be found at present, other cams have been prepared and will be flown to St. Nazaire as soon as possible by HE 115.  U 255 is expected to be ready by about the middle of November.
    3) In reply to Supreme Command of the Armed Forces WFST/Op/M Most Secret 0011916/44 on the subject of supplying the fortresses, the same decision was given as in the War Log of 1.10. paragraph IV d).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
4.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
AL 16
U 267
-
AL 95
U 743
-
Op(AM 02)
U 963
-
AE 69
 
155
-
AE 69
281
-
Op(AM 36)
458
-
AF 72
979
-
AE 69
 
170
-
ET 11
309
-
Op(AM 55)
772
-
AF 57
985
-
AL 34
 
195
-
ER 95
382
-
AL 33
802
-
BC 76
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
198
-
LE 30
398
-
AM 24
804
-
AN 35
1062
-
DS 44
 
219
-
ER 98
480
-
AF 59
853
-
AN 31
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
AF 71
484
-
AF 74
855
-
AN 36
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AL 19
518
-
AK 97
857
-
AN 29
1223
-
Op(BB 58)
 
247
-
AL 52
534
-
AE 84
863
-
FT 67
1226
-
AN 31
 
248
-
AF 47
541
-
BB 92
865
-
AK 87
1227
-
BE 16
 
256
-
AF 87
546
-
AL 82
871
-
DF 86
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AE 91
673
-
AL 18
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1230
-
AO 16
 
262
-
AL 54
714
-
AE 83            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 155 - 170 - 198 - 244 - 245 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 480 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 480 - Trondheim;  U 190 - 516 - 530 - 547 - 858 - 989 - Flensburg.
  Sailed:  U 300 - Trondheim.
       
- 657 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  1324 U 1227 sighted a convoy in BE 1585 (no other boats in the vicinity).
  b) None.
  c)  At 0805 an aircraft of No. 18 Group reported a presumed U-boat location in an unresolved position.
     English unit reported a surfaced U-boat, bearing 1700, 8 miles off.  The position of the unit was not decyphered (possibly U 1227).
     Enemy units were located in:  AM 7830 - BD 393 - BE 3640
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
  d) 1) 0930/4/10 150-200 Liberators attacked Bergen dockyard.  U 228 and U 993 sank.  B shelter received 7 direct hits, no damage.  When power has been reestablished the dockyard's capacity is expected to be only 4 boats for large repairs, one for small repairs, as crane installations have been put out of action.  Details of damage to dockyard cannot be assessed.
    2) A further request from Fortress Commandant Dunkirk to be supplied with ammunition by U-boats has had to be refused for reasons given in War Log of 2.10. paragraph IV d) 2).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
AL 29
U 267
-
AL 55
U 743
-
Op(AM 02)
U 963
-
AF 47
 
155
-
AE 69
281
-
Op(AM 36)
758
-
AF 72
979
-
AF 47
 
170
-
EK 74
300
-
AF 58
772
-
AF 58
985
-
AL 32
 
195
-
ER 99
309
-
Op(AM 55)
802
-
BC 82
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
198
-
LE 30
382
-
AL 24
804
-
AN 35
1062
-
DS 17
 
219
-
FC 36
398
-
AM 31
853
-
AN 31
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
AF 49
484
-
AF 78
855
-
AN 36
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AL 15
518
-
AK 92
857
-
AN 31
1223
-
Op(BB 55)
 
247
-
AL 28
534
-
AE 83
863
-
GF 16
1226
-
AF 76
 
248
-
AF 48
541
-
BB 96
865
-
BD 11
1227
-
BE 15
 
256
-
AN 23
546
-
AL 58
871
-
DR 31
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AE 68
673
-
AL 25
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1230
-
AO 16
 
262
-
AL 51
714
-
AE 67            
 
       
- 658 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 155 - 170 - 198 - 244 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 991 - 1231 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in:  AL 9561 - AM 5390 - 7178 - 7950 - AM 8930 - 6270 - AN 8440 - 7390 - BB 8400 - BE 3280 - BF 1950 - 5120 - 1830 - 3320.
    2) For some time Defence Unit "348" has appeared off the North Channel.  Aircraft of this unit have been D/F'd in the area AE 53-57.  This is probably anti-submarine Control Station, which works together with No. 18 Group in AF 77.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 518's situation report from Cape Hatteras area:  Medium shipping traffic in DO 1240 - 1750, course 300.  Convoy sighted in DO 1580.  Medium anti-submarine activity and patrol concentrating in DO 1220.  The report was made in short signals and so far it is not known whether the boat attacked or, if not, why not.
    2) U 546 reported from AL 54 that she still had 20 cbm fuel left for operation.  This report is very opportune, as at present there is no weather boat.  U 546 will therefore remain where she is and report weather twice daily until her stocks are used up.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 659 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
6.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AF 47
U 281
-
Op(AM 36)
U 758
-
AF 76
U 985
-
AE 88
 
170
-
EK 47
300
-
AF 58
772
-
AF 91
991
-
AO 72
 
195
-
FD 14
309
-
Op(AM 55)
802
-
BC 59
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
198
-
LE 30
382
-
AL 31
804
-
AN 35
1062
-
DR 33
 
219
-
FD 41
398
-
AM 32
853
-
AN 34
1199
-
Op(AM 17)
 
244
-
AF 73
483
-
AF 75
855
-
AN 36
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AL 13
484
-
AF 79
857
-
AN 31
1223
-
Op(BB 51)
 
247
-
AL 26
518
-
AK 69
863
-
GF 52
1226
-
AN 24
 
248
-
AF 49
534
-
AE 64
865
-
BD 11
1227
-
BE 43
 
256
-
AN 23
541
-
BC 77
871
-
DR 37
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AE 68
546
-
AL 45
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1230
-
AO 16
 
262
-
AL 02
673
-
AL 24
963
-
AF 72
1231
-
AO 72
 
267
-
AL 29
714
-
AE 68
979
-
AF 48      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 198 - 244 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 772 - Trondheim.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) 1120 aircraft of No. 15 Group reported a suspicious oil patch in an unresolved position.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 1370 - 8860 - AM 8920.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
  d) 1) U 743 must be presumed lost.  This boat left Trondheim on 28.8. and went into the North Atlantic via the Iceland Passage.  She did not make any passage report on entering the North Atlantic and was given an operations area off the North Channel.  According to her supplies she should by now be on return passage, but has not reported despite several orders.  She may have been lost in the Iceland Passage on her way out or otherwise by anti-submarine hunt in the North Channel.
    2) U 154 has been lost off the North American coast.  She left Lorient on 20.6. and her operations area was Cape Hatteras.  If it was impossible to remain
       
- 660 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      submerged in this area for long periods at a time owing to too high water temperatures, she was free to move N.E.  She must have reached the operations area, as several U-boat sightings were received.  Last report:  SSS from an American steamer at 2324/22/8 from BA 9615; Have been torpedoed.  Presumably this was a success of U 154.  She has not answered several orders to make a situation report, so that she was probably sunk by patrol vessels off the coast.
    3) The following Radio Message was radioed to all boats:
      Experimental Radio Message No. 165:
      During the last few days 4 boats in the North or Bristol Channels have reported no traffic.  It is known for certain however that several convoys passed through the areas while these boats were operating.  Failure to find the traffic can only be explained by the fact that boats were not on the convoy routes or in positions where shipping is concentrated, but remained further out to sea.
     
1) The sole aim of every Commanding Officer must be to attack.  This means:  going to it with courage and dash, holding out with determination, but with intelligence, in areas which promise success even if there is strong anti-submarine activity.
2) Boats operating off the entrances to the English coast should come as close as possible to the narrowest places where traffic has to pass.  Boats' reports show that the enemy has created an anti-submarine zone up to 150 miles off the coast to intercept boats.  Activity is equally strong outside as well as further in, possibly not quite so effective further inshore.  Inshore traffic is certain to be found, whereas in the remoter area chances are much worse and anti-submarine activity is the same.
3) Shallow water below 200 meters is in most cases most favorable for operation.  (See Experimental Radio Message No. 160).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
 
 
 
- 661 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix to War Log of 6.10.44.
       
Gulf of Finland:
       
           Naval Liaison Officer with Army H.Q. 20 reports by T/P that forces of Army Corps 20 in Tornio are engaged in bitter fighting with ships of up to 3,000 GRT.  Our own dive bombers had to break off operations against these ships owing to the appearance of Finnish FW 190 fighters.  U-boat operation requested.
  a)  It would be possible to break through the Aaland barrage and approach unnoticed.
  b)  Very shallow water in operations area, therefore only above-water attack.  Even if it is assumed that the Finns have no anti-submarine forces to speak of, it would nevertheless be possible to close the Aaland barrage, especially as the boats would take from 3-4 days to reach it from their operations area.
           Nevertheless 2 boats, U 290 and U 1001, were detached for this operation.
           On 6.10., however, the Liaison Officer reported that Army Corps 20 expected to be able to mop up Tornio bridgehead within 2-3 days and the 2 boats were no longer required.  The boats were therefore recalled.
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 622 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
7.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AF 72
U 300
-
AF 57
U 758
-
AF 87
U 985
-
AO 41
 
170
-
EJ 66
309
-
Op(AM 55)
802
-
BC 64
991
-
AO 41
 
195
-
FD 42
382
-
AE 87
804
-
AN 35
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
219
-
FD 48
398
-
AM 32
853
-
AN 35
1062
-
BF 94
 
244
-
AF 76
483
-
AF 75
855
-
AN 36
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
AL 13
484
-
AF 79
857
-
AN 34
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
247
-
AL 31
518
-
AL 41
863
-
CF 64
1223
-
Op(BB 43)
 
248
-
AF 57
534
-
AE 67
865
-
BD 11
1226
-
AF 87
 
256
-
AF 76
541
-
BC 79
871
-
DR 65
1227
-
BE 57
 
260
-
AE 69
546
-
AL 48
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
262
-
AL 24
673
-
AL 31
963
-
AF 72
1230
-
AO 16
 
267
-
AL 28
714
-
AE 68
979
-
AF 49
1231
-
AO 41
 
281
-
Op(AM 36)                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 244 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 963 - Bergen;  U 804 - Farsund;  U 857 - Kristiansand;  U 1231 - Horten.
  Sailed:  U 722 - 773 - Kiel;  U 246 - 1200 - Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Enemy units were located in:  AL 5782 - AM 9130 - BD 5282 - BE 1693.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 1227 reported a fast convoy on 4.10. in BD 3932, course 2700, 14 knots, consisting of about 12 ships.  She did not get near.  She remained unnoticed by day, in the evening 2 Catalinas without radar.  After the evening alteration of course, roaring continuous location transmission from destroyer, then a large quantity of star shell fired.  She remained on the surface, but was firmly driven off.  Curve shot at Jervis class destroyer, angle on the bow 00.  After firing, accurate star shell, dived, torpedo exploded, loud sinking noises heard in multi-unit hydrophones and with the naked ear.  Then a dull explosion.  Escort kept boat submerged, no depth charges, contact lost.  Boat continued on her way to her operations area (Gibraltar).
       
- 663 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 198 (Far East boat) must be regarded as lost.  She left La Pallice for Penang on 20.4.44.  She sank 3 ships totaling about 15,000 GRT in the Capetown area and the southern approach to the Mozambique Straits.  Boat made her last report on 8.8. from LT.  She should have entered port by now at latest.  Cause and date of loss unknown.
    2) U 168:
      According to a report from Tokyo, U 168 was lost near Tajoe E. of Semarang (Java), while transferring from Djakarta to Soerabaja.  So far 22 survivors, commanding officer dead.  Details not yet received.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 1227                1 destroyer.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AF 76
U 281
-
Op(AM 36)
U 722
-
AO 74
U 1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
170
-
EJ 39
300
-
AF 49
758
-
AF 87
1062
-
DF 67
 
195
-
FD 49
309
-
Op(AM 50)
773
-
AO 74
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
219
-
FD 76
382
-
AE 84
802
-
BC 62
1200
-
AN 31
 
244
-
AF 87
398
-
AF 77
853
-
AN 35
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AL 12
483
-
AF 75
855
-
AN 35
1223
-
Op(BB 18)
 
246
-
AN 31
484
-
AF 79
863
-
GG 71
1226
-
AF 76
 
247
-
AN 87
518
-
AL 19
865
-
BD 16
1227
-
BE 47
 
248
-
AF 58
534
-
AE 68
871
-
DR 92
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
256
-
AF 87
541
-
BC 87
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1230
-
AO 16
 
260
-
AF 47
546
-
AL 57
979
-
AF 49
1231
-
AO 16
 
262
-
AL 31
673
-
AL 35
985
-
AE 86      
 
267
-
AL 35
714
-
AE 69
991
-
AO 16      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 244 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 802 - 853 - 855 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 763 - 218 - 548 - Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  U 1230 - Horten;  U 763 - 857 - Kristiansand to Flensburg.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  2330 U 546 sighted an aircraft with lights (presumably courier aircraft) in AL 4785, course west.
       
- 664 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) None.
  c)  Enemy units were located in:  AF 7370 - AM 3340 - 7220 - 9220 - AL 2425 - BF 3380.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 541 has started on her return passage from her operations area in the St. Lawrence River.  
      Sunk:  3.9. 7,000 GRT tanker in BB 5957.  8.9. BB 1869 destroyer, with curve shot.  Then traffic stopped.  Searching groups of destroyers and MLY-boats not dangerous, little air activity.  For the next 3 weeks nothing seen along the steamer route to BA 38, good chances outside the Gulf, lights as in peacetime, no air activity.  BB 59 good square (Halifax traffic).  In this area curve shot miss at night on 27.9. in BB 5599 at patrol vessel, quadruple fan miss by day at 12,000 tonner.
    2) Because of this report, the two boats off Halifax, U 1229 and U 1221, have been given freedom to remove their operations area in the direction of Cape Race.
      No news is yet forthcoming of these boats, whilst U 1229, who has already been in her operational area for four weeks (on a special operation in the Gulf of Maine), will again be requested to make her situation report.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 541 1 ship
7,000 GRT
 
  1 destroyer.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AF 76
U 281
-
Op(AM 36)
U 722
-
AO 41
U 1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
170
-
EJ 32
300
-
AF 48
758
-
AF 87
1062
-
DF 61
 
195
-
FD 81
309
-
Op(AM 55)
773
-
AO 41
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
219
-
FD 87
382
-
AE 85
802
-
BC 39
1200
-
AE 28
 
244
-
AF 87
398
-
AF 77
853
-
AN 35
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AL 21
483
-
AF 77
855
-
AM 35
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
246
-
AN 28
484
-
AF 77
863
-
GG 79
1226
-
AF 73
 
247
-
AE 87
518
-
AL 18
871
-
DR 99
1227
-
BE 72
 
248
-
AF 58
534
-
AE 69
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
256
-
AF 87
541
-
BC 82
979
-
AF 58
1230
-
AO 33
 
260
-
AF 71
546
-
AL 54
985
-
AE 83
1231
-
AO 16
 
262
-
AL 32
673
-
AL 34
991
-
AO 16      
 
267
-
AL 33
714
-
AF 47            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 244 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 802 - 853 - 855 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
       
- 665 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Entered Port:  U 309 - Bergen;  U 722 - 773 - Horten.
  Sailed:  U 978 - 1006 - Bergen;  U 218 - 548 - 804 - Kristiansand to Flensburg.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in:  AL 9970 - 4259 - 9560 - AK 5336 - AM 9136 - 4911 - BF 4350 - 4550.
    2) Active reconnaissance in the area of No. 15 Group, 28 aircraft.  Again 7 identified from Defence Unit "348" and 2 from Defence Unit "730".
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 309 entered Bergen on 9.10. unannounced.  The boat was believed to be still in her operations area in the North Channel, but actually did not remain there longer than 5 days owing to damage to her after hydroplane.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 865 has been lost on her way out to the North Atlantic.  She finally left Trondheim on 8.9., after her operation had been delayed 4 times, mainly because of Schnorchel defects.  She was to steer for BC 70.  She was ordered 6 times to report her position and no reply was received.  Possibly loss occurred in Iceland Passage (Schnorchel breakdown?).
    2) There is grave cause for concern for U 802.  She last reported her position on 13.8. from CD 19 on her way to her operations area (St. Lawrence River).  According to her fuel supplies, she should already be on her way back to Norway, but she has not made any signal in reply to repeated orders to report the situation.  As it is possible that her radio is defective, the plot of her return course to Norway will be kept in the ordinary way.  If by then no report is received from her, she will be declared missing.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 666 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
10.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AF 87
U 281
-
Op(AM 36)
U 758
-
AF 87
U 1004
-
Op(AM 02)
 
170
-
DT 91
300
-
AE 47
773
-
AO 16
1006
-
AF 87
 
195
-
FD 88
382
-
AE 83
802
-
BD 12
1062
-
DF 26
 
219
-
AL 16
398
-
AF 75
853
-
AN 35
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
AF 87
483
-
AF 77
855
-
AN 35
1200
-
AN 23
 
245
-
AL 22
484
-
AF 69
863
-
GQ 14
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
246
-
AN 23
518
-
AL 24
871
-
EG 36
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
247
-
AE 85
534
-
AE 69
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1226
-
AF 78
 
248
-
AF 58
541
-
BC 83
978
-
AF 87
1227
-
BE 76
 
256
-
AF 87
546
-
AL 47
979
-
AF 91
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AF 72
673
-
AL 32
985
-
AE 67
1230
-
AN 31
 
262
-
AE 87
714
-
AF 72
991
-
AO 16
1231
-
AO 16
 
267
-
AL 32
722
-
AO 16            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 244 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 802 - 853 0 855 - 979 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 979 - Trondheim;  U 244 - 758 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Enemy units were located in:  AM 1240 - BE 2473.
    0614 escort aircraft P 8, belonging to unit "873", in the area of No. 18 Group.
     1853 escort aircraft W 5, belonging to Defence Unit "JR", in the area of No. 15 Group.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 281 is returning from operations area North Minch, as multi-unit hydrophones damaged.  According to dead reckoning the boat was in the operations area for over a week and did not report any contact with the enemy.
  c)  None.
  d)  The following additional details of the loss of U 168 (see War Log of 8.10) have been received:  
    0800.6.10 Tokyo time torpedoed by Dutch submarine "Zwaartvisch" at close range, 10 miles E. of
       
- 667 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     Mandelika.  Hit at the level of the Chief and Petty Officer's mess.  Sank in a short time.  Boat is lying at a depth of 45 meters.  All survivors were at first taken on board by the enemy submarine.  After that 10 Chiefs and Petty Officers and 12 other ratings landed in a fishing boat.  Prisoners of war:  Commanding Officer, 1st Watch Officer, Medical Officer, Chief Engineer and one leading seaman, who was seriously wounded.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AN 23
U 300
-
AE 69
U 773
-
AO 16
U 1062
-
CD 97
 
170
-
DT 99
382
-
AE 91
802
-
BD 12
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
195
-
FL 16
398
-
AF 76
853
-
AN 35
1200
-
AF 79
 
219
-
FL 51
483
-
AN 11
855
-
AN 35
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AE 87
484
-
AF 47
863
-
GQ 42
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
246
-
AF 79
518
-
AE 88
871
-
EG 63
1226
-
AF 47
 
247
-
AE 85
534
-
AF 47
953
-
Op(AM 50)
1227
-
BE 87
 
248
-
AF 55
541
-
BC 67
978
-
AF 79
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
AF 76
546
-
AK 66
985
-
AE 68
1230
-
AN 28
 
262
-
AF 85
673
-
AE 88
991
-
AO 16
1231
-
AO 16
 
267
-
AE 87
714
-
AF 72
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
1006
-
AF 79
 
281
-
AM 21
722
-
AO 16            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 281 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 802 - 853 - 855 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 853 - Kristiansand;  U 953 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 1231 - 991 - Horten;  U 1003 - Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) 0713 U-boat sighted diving by aircraft of No. 18 Group, position unresolved.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AM 8980 - 7230 - BE 3670.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 953 entered Bergen unannounced.  The boat was believed still to be in her operations area off the North Channel.  It is assumed that the one boat remaining in this area, U 1004, is on her way back, as she arrived there even sooner.
       
- 668 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  None.
  d) 1) It must now be presumed that U 256 was lost while transferring to Norway.  She left Brest on 3.9. and did not make her passage report despite several orders to do so.  She should have arrived about 10 days ago at latest.  Loss probably occurred in Biscay from mines or submarine hunt.
    2) In future, Flag Officer U-boats West will again give the sailing orders for new boats coming from home ports to Horten (Sub-station of Front-line Training Group).  In the same way he will give these boats orders for the passage routes (Shetlands-Faroes or Iceland Passage) and change of radio service from coastal to "Ireland" or "Diana".
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AN 28
U 300
-
AE 68
U 722
-
AO 16
U 1006
-
AF 78
 
170
-
DT 52
382
-
AE 67
773
-
AO 16
1062
-
CD 91
 
195
-
FL 51
398
-
AF 71
802
-
AK 91
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
AE 87
483
-
AM 32
855
-
AN 35
1200
-
AF 78
 
246
-
AF 78
484
-
AF 72
863
-
GQ 57
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
247
-
AE 83
518
-
AE 85
871
-
EH 47
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
248
-
AF 58
534
-
AF 72
978
-
AF 75
1226
-
AE 69
 
260
-
AF 79
541
-
BC 65
985
-
AE 69
1227
-
CF 23
 
262
-
AE 83
546
-
AL 19
991
-
AO 16
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
267
-
AE 88
673
-
AE 65
1003
-
AN 31
1230
-
AN 23
 
281
-
AE 89
714
-
AF 76
1004
-
Op(AM 02)
1231
-
AO 16
 
219
-
FL 55                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 281 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 802 - 855 - 985 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 1231 - 991 - Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  U 1228 - Bergen;  U 109 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  
     
No. 15 Group: 0555 ASV location, presumably U-boat, position unresolved.
No. 18 Group: 0016 ASV location, presumably U-boat, in AN 2866.
       
- 669 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AM 5730 - BF 1128.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 953's short report states that she encountered a searching group in BE 2925 on 13.9. and heard a convoy in her hydrophones.  This is the third convoy report recently from this area.
    U 953 proceeded to her operations area along the Irish coast and observed lights as in peacetime; fishing vessels and no anti-submarine activity.  The boat remained in the North Channel for 8 days, no traffic sighted, slight anti-submarine activity.  She then started on her return passage, as her schnorchel mast could no longer be hauled down and she was therefore unable to make an underwater attack.
  c) Quartermaster General of the Army has asked to be informed via his Naval Liaison Officer whether supply U-boats can be made available to carry fuel and ammunition to Army Group North.  The proposal was turned down, because:
    1) At present there are no transport U-boats available;
    2) Supply by U-boat for such large units is quite inadequate;
    3) There are surface vessels available.
  d)  The following was radioed to all boats:
    Experimental Radio Message No. 167:
    According to boats' reports, some stationary patrol vessels have been observed in the Iceland Passage which listen for boats using schnorchel and attempt to surprise them.  Boats should therefore be careful to keep a good periscope watch and listen all round frequently, so that approaching vessels will be observed in time.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AN 31
U 300
-
AE 67
U 773
-
AO 16
U 1062
-
CD 67
 
170
-
DT 24
382
-
AE 68
802
-
AK 68
1199
-
Op(AN 17
 
195
-
FL 95
398
-
AF 72
855
-
AN 35
1200
-
AF 75
 
219
-
FL 83
483
-
AM 33
863
-
GQ 83
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AE 87
484
-
AF 75
871
-
EH 75
1223
-
Op(BB 70)
 
       
- 670 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
246
-
AF 75
518
-
AE 83
978
-
AF 78
1226
-
AE 68
 
247
-
AE 67
534
-
AF 75
985
-
AF 47
1227
-
CF 34
 
248
-
AF 83
541
-
BC 63
991
-
AN 36
1228
-
AF 87
 
260
-
AF 87
546
-
AL 17
1003
-
AN 31
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
262
-
AE 83
673
-
AE 66
1004
-
AM 28
1230
-
AN 31
 
267
-
AE 85
714
-
AF 79
1006
-
AF 76
1231
-
AN 36
 
281
-
AE 86
722
-
AO 16
1009
-
AO 48      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 281 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 802 - 855 - 985 - 1004 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 244 - 758 - Bergen to Stavanger.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
No. 18 Group: 0719 U-boat in 590 58' N., longitude not resolved (Presumably AN 2933), course 2200, speed 6 knots.  Flak defence.
  2055 U-boat in 590 31' N., longitude not resolved, later cancelled.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AM 7165 - 4750 - BE 1533 - BF 2460.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 1004 has started on her return passage.  Boat was first off the Herbrides from 18-23.9., then 17 days in the southern sector of the operations area until 10.10.  Anti-submarine activity:  Slight air activity and submarine hunt.  No traffic encountered.  Curve shot miss at patrol vessel in AM 2869.
    Nevertheless it is intended to send U 483, the first of the 6 Group "Mitte" boats to go to the Atlantic, off the North Channel.  The remaining 5 boats will go off the Bristol Channel or into the Channel.
  c)  None.
       
- 671 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  The following instructions have been given to U-boat base Penang, after the torpedoing of U 168 off the coast of Java.
    To Penang and all Far East boats:
     Everything possible is being done to reduce the danger to U-boats on passage to and between the bases.  This means:
    1) Before every sailing, find out from the Japanese exact details of enemy submarine positions, procedure and methods of attack, as far as known.  Inform approaching boats by radio, especially new boats.
    2) Avoid coastal routes and much frequented areas, haul out to sea, enter port by the shortest route.  No fixed escort rendezvous.
    3) Areas particularly dangerous to U-boats should be passed submerged.  Arrange this with Japanese.
    4) If boats have to proceed surfaced, high speed, zig-zags, vary speed degrees frequently.  Radar interception gear switched on, in bad visibility also radar.
    5) Investigate whether passage with Japanese escort is not more dangerous than passage without escort.  Take action accordingly.
    6) Insist on measures which appear necessary being carried out by the Japanese.
                                                                                                  B.d.U.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AN 34
U 300
-
AE 83
U 773
-
AN 33
U 1062
-
CD 61
 
170
-
DG 97
382
-
AE 69
802
-
AK 66
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
195
-
FL 95
398
-
AN 24
863
-
GQ 97
1200
-
AF 76
 
219
-
FL 97
483
-
AM 33
871
-
ER 13
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AE 85
484
-
AF 76
978
-
AF 77
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
246
-
AF 76
518
-
AE 67
985
-
AF 72
1226
-
AM 86
 
247
-
AE 67
534
-
AF 76
991
-
AN 31
1227
-
CF 37
 
248
-
AF 83
541
-
BD 17
1003
-
AN 23
1228
-
AF 76
 
260
-
AN 13
546
-
AL 17
1004
-
AM 26
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
262
-
AE 67
673
-
AF 47
1006
-
AF 77
1230
-
AN 23
 
267
-
AE 83
714
-
AF 87
1009
-
AO 41
1231
-
AN 31
 
281
-
AE 83
722
-
AN 33            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 245 - 247 - 248 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 281 - 382 - 398 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 802 - 985 - 1004 - 1062.
       
- 672 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Entered Port:  U 248 Trondheim;  U 398 Bergen;  U 1009 - Horten;  U 853 - Flensburg.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
      Gibraltar aircraft reported towards 1500, without giving position:  "Have regained contact with surfaced U-boat".  (Possibly U 1227).
    2) Aircraft of No. 18 Group made reports of U-boats at 2124, 2202, 0030, 0320 and 0642, all positions unresolved.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AL 9440 - AN 4620 - BE 3660.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
  d)  U 855 has been lost on her first patrol.  She left Kristiansand on 3.7. and was in AK northern half from 28.7. until the beginning of September as weather boat.  On 6.9. she fired a T 5 at a 5,000 GRT freighter in AK 2545, heard the explosion after 13 minutes.  After supplying U 516, returning from the Caribbean, on 9.9. in AK 2793, she started on her return passage as her supplies were exhausted.  She should have reported herself on her way into Kristiansand by now at latest.  On 9.9. she reported that she had provisions for 3 weeks, which confirms the assumption that she is lost.  Cause of loss:  possible submarine hunt in the Iceland Passage.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15.October 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 155
-
AN 31
U 300
-
AE 83
U 773
-
AN 36
U 1062
-
CD 37
 
170
-
DH 48
382
-
AF 47
802
-
AL 41
1199
-
Op(AN 17)
 
195
-
FS 33
483
-
AM 26
863
-
GZ 25
1200
-
AF 77
 
219
-
FS 36
484
-
AF 87
871
-
ER 27
1221
-
Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
AE 83
518
-
AE 67
978
-
AN 11
1223
-
Op(BB 10)
 
       
- 673 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
246
-
AF 77
534
-
AF 79
985
-
AF 72
1226
-
AE 67
 
247
-
AE 68
541
-
BD 12
991
-
AN 31
1227
-
CF 62
 
260
-
AF 87
546
-
AL 47
1003
-
AE 79
1228
-
AF 73
 
262
-
AE 68
673
-
AF 48
1004
-
AM 33
1229
-
Op(BB 70)
 
267
-
AE 67
714
-
AF 87
1006
-
AN 11
1230
-
AF 87
 
281
-
AE 67
722
-
AN 36
1009
-
AO 16
1231
-
AN 31
 
  On Return Passage:  U 155 - 170 - 245 - 247 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 281 - 382 - 484 - 518 - 534 - 541 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 802 - 985 - 1004 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 1231 - 991 - 773 - Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Enemy unit located in AM 8760.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 1200 has started on her return passage as her telemotor pumps are out of action.  She was intended to operate in the North Channel.
    2) U 300 is occupying an attack area off Reykjavik.
  c)  None.
  d)  In spite of U 482's good start, the last 9 boats to operate in the North Channel have not had any successes.  6 boats have entered port meanwhile, 1 is presumed lost on her way out, 2 others are plotted on their return passage, but have not reported so far.  With the exception of U 482, none of the boats which have entered port observed any traffic and only experienced slight anti-submarine activity.
    Short reports show that the boats did not press far enough forward, i.e. never reached the areas of densest traffic, which would certainly have been possible with the weak defences reported.  Experiences gained have been radioed to the new boats approaching, U 246, 1006, 978 and 1200.  It remains to be seen whether these boats can penetrate far enough into the North Channel to pick up the convoys there.
       
V. Reports of Successes:  None.
       
       
                                                                 (Signed):  GODT.
                                                         Chief of Operations Department
                                                                         for B.d.U.
       
- 674 -
 
 
     

 


 

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