F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 August 1944

PG30352

     
     
 
1.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 87)
U 490
-
GG 86
U 546
-
EK 17
U 858
-
Op(AK 87)
 
181
-
Op(MQ)
516
-
DE 31
547
-
CF 37
859
-
Op(LA)
 
196
-
Op(LC/LN)
518
-
BD 88
549
-
ED 56
860
-
JB 14
 
198
-
Op(KZ)
530
-
ED 45
719
-
BF 49
861
-
GN 27
 
233
-
Op(BB 87)
534
-
BE 69
802
-
BD 92
862
-
GP 33
 
244
-
AN 24
537
-
Op(LD)
804
-
Op(BD 45)
863
-
AF 12
 
248
-
AO 16
539
-
CC 68
855
-
Op(AK 27)
1062
-
KH 89
 
296
-
AO 16
543
-
BF 82
857
-
BE 82
1229
-
AF 12
 
300
-
AE 37                  
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 2553
U 309
-
Op(BF 32)
U 667
-
BF 1985
U 672
-
Op(BF 32)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
333
-
Op(BF 24)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
984
-
Op(BF 25)
 
275
-
Op(BF 33)
621
-
Op(BF 36)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 719 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 275 - Boulogne.
  Sailed:  U 865 - Trondheim;  U 170 Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  Air attack on U 475 (boat of Narva patrol) in AO 3740/3660 at 0158.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:
    1)
19 Group:
0055
U-boat in unspecified position.
 
0106
cancelled.
    2) Colombo repeated an American steamer's report of having sighted a periscope in MT 5160, the same thing at 0430 in LO 1140.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AL 9537 - AM 5390 - 5350.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) U 309 reported 12 hours off Brest.  Owing to uncertain land operations, however, the boat received instructions to proceed to La Pallice, if it were not absolutely essential to put into Brest.
       
- 500 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 275 (unable to submerge) has put into Boulogne, no further details.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command East:
    In attacking areas:
    U 348 in operations area "Bengalen", U 370 southern exit to Koivisto, U 475 and U 481 Narva patrol.
    According to Russian radio message U 250 is sunk.  6 officers and crew were taken prisoner.  Boat was at the northern exit of Koivisto Sound.  According to Finnish observations there was an explosion at 1142 on 30.7. followed by a 100 meter high column of smoke.  Subsequently one escort vessel on fire.  2 boats dropped depth-charges.  U 250 probably lost as a result of depth-charges after attack.  Mine not out of the question.
    U 475 (Narva patrol) attack by aircraft at 0158.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) Japanese U-boat "Föhre" has today still not appeared at the meeting place.  Convoy was at assembly point at 2315 on 2.8. according to previous information.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Owing to the advance in the enemy offensive from the landing area, all U-boats in far away operational areas are reminded to start the homeward journey in good time so that no further supplies are required until a Norwegian port is reached.
    2) The loss of U 860 (Monsoon boat) must be presumed.  The boat sailed from Kiel on 11.4. bound for the Indian Ocean.  The last message was picked up on 10.6. from FU 42.  Short message from U 860 relayed by U 198 on 4.7., with time of arrival 1925 - report on air attack - no position given.  According to dead reckoning boat is in the Capetown area.  The boat was probably lost in this action.
      According to the propaganda transmitter "Calais" the commander and 19 men were taken prisoner, 42 men were killed.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
 
 
 
- 501 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
2.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 87)
U 490
-
GG 86
U 546
-
EK 45
U 858
-
Op(AK 87)
 
170
-
BF 55
516
-
CC 99
547
-
CF 35
859
-
Op(LA)
 
181
-
Op(MQ)
518
-
CE 16
549
-
DO 89
861
-
GN 53
 
196
-
Op(LC/LN)
530
-
DO 76
719
-
BF 49
862
-
GQ 15
 
198
-
Op(KZ)
532
-
LE 91
802
-
BD 91
863
-
AE 33
 
233
-
Op(BB 87)
534
-
BE 69
804
-
Op(BD 51)
865
-
AF 56
 
248
-
AO 16
537
-
Op(LD)
855
-
Op(AK 01)
1062
-
KH 84
 
296
-
AO 16
539
-
CC 69
857
-
BE 83
1229
-
AE 36
 
300
-
AE 59
543
-
BF 82            
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 2469
U 333
-
Op(BF 24)
U 667
-
BF 1836
U 672
-
Op(BF 32)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
621
-
Op(BF 36)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
984
-
Op(BF 26)
 
309
-
BF 3273                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 516 - 530 - 532 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 719 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 309 - Brest;  U 537 - Djakarta.
  Sailed:  U 413 - 618 - 766 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) Aircraft attack in AN 3196 at 1337 (U 1163)
    Aircraft attack in AN 3193 at 1354 (U 771 unsuccessful).
         (Boats of Group "Mitte").
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
18 Group:
U-boat on surface at 1345 in 02.45 East, longitude unspecified, course 1350, speed 10 knots (see III a))
    2) ASV locations:  0340 in unspecified position (Apulian aircraft).
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AM 2830 - BE 8916.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) Shortly before putting in U 309 reported:  "Have sunk 14,000 GRT and 6,100 GRT vessels".  The boat put into Brest.
       
- 502 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 618 and U 766 put out of Brest to occupy BF 5213 and BF 5216 as Group "Wiesel".  Duties wireless telegraphy transmission, etc. as for previous groups.
    3) U 214 received orders to return to port immediately on completing minelaying operations.
      All remaining Channel boats are to return with enough fuel to reach Bordeaux if orders to proceed there should be given.
      These measures are to be taken so that in the event of an unfavorable military development the boats will not be in the Biscay area without sufficient fuel to reach port.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:
     U 475 (Narva patrol) was attacked unsuccessfully by aircraft.  U 481 reported seven fast motor minesweepers in AO 3744 at 0930, and a group at 2245 in the same position.
    Atlantic:
  b) 1) U 300 (still in Iceland Passage) received orders to make for Western France.
      After a short period for overhaul operations in the Channel are intended.
    2) The Japanese U-boat "Föhre" again did not appear at the escort meeting point tonight.  Japanese Attache group suggests that the boat probably gave 96 hours (instead of 36 hours) off the escort assembly point in her message.  The escort is therefore taking up the position again tonight although the grounds for this assumption are unlikely.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Systems American I a and b with their relevant short wave daily call-ups and very long wave are to be discontinued on 3.8. at 1200.  Reason:  As owing to the present emergency all U-boat wireless telegraphy stations may have to be transferred to N.S.O. Bernau, the simultaneous transmission of all programs would be impossible on account of insufficient radio equipment.  The least important system is therefore being closed down.
    2) As a result of further knowledge of response sensitivity of TZ 3 (translator's note:  torpedo firing gear) MZ (magnetic fuse) is
 
 
 
- 503 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      no longer to be used.  "TZ" is therefore only to be fired with "AZ" (translator's note:  impact fuse).
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 309
2 ships
14,000 GRT
 
 
1 ship   
6,100 GRT
torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 87)
U 490
-
GG 86
U 546
-
EK 48
U 858
-
Op(AK 84)
 
170
-
BF 57
516
-
CD 74
547
-
CG 15
859
-
Op(LA)
 
181
-
Op(MQ)
518
-
CE 11
549
-
DO 94
861
-
GN 65
 
196
-
Op(LC/LN)
530
-
DO 81
719
-
BF 57
862
-
GQ 43
 
198
-
Op(KZ)
534
-
BF 47
802
-
BD 83
863
-
AE 32
 
233
-
Op(BB 87)
539
-
CD 45
804
-
Op(BD 20)
865
-
AF 53
 
248
-
AO 16
543
-
BF 82
855
-
Op(AK 18)
1062
-
KS 21
 
296
-
AO 16      
857
-
BE 91
1229
-
AE 38
 
300
-
AE 82                  
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 2481
U 413
-
BF 5211
U 667
-
BF 1555
U 766
-
Op(BF 32)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
618
-
Op(BF 52)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
984
-
Op(BF 32)
 
333
-
Op(BF 24)
621
-
Op(BF 36)
672
-
Op(BF 32)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 719 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 865 - Trondheim;  U 170 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  (U 248 - Horten);  U 480 - 764 - Brest;  U 772 - Kiel;  U 741 - Le Harve.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1)
19 Group:
0115
Periscope in unspecified position.
 
0324
U-boat in unspecified position, course 1000, speed 8 knots.
Colombo: 0400 SSS report from American steamer, submerged U-boat in LD 1868.
    2) ASV locations:  None.
    3) Allied units were located in:  AM 3660 - 3620 - 3390 - 4519 - 8110 - BE 1210.
       
- 504 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
     Short reports from U 275 and U 309 see Appendix.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Baltic boats:
     U 745 and 958 also U 1001 sailed from Kiel for operations in the eastern area.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) 1) U 865 put into Trondheim owing to "Schnorchel" breakdown, U 170 put into Lorient again after deep diving trial.
    2) U 248 sailed from Horten for the Atlantic, "Schnorchel" training ended.
  c)  None.
  d)  There is great anxiety concerning the Japanese U-boat "Föhre", from whom no messages have been received.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 505 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Excerpts from short reports (All positions BF)
       
   
U 309  
   
14.7. Put out of Brest.  Operations area reached in 5 days (very quickly).  Approached each day by destroyer patrol group consisting of 3 to 4 vessels using Asdic, explosive sounding location and circular saw (radar).
  Continuous hydrophone bearings in operations area.  Schnorchelled until these reached signal strength 2 - 3.
19.7. Small craft passed over.
20.7. Convoy in 3533 at 1400.  Southerly course, using Asdic and explosive soundings.  "LUT" triple spread on type "C3" ship.  Hit heard after 9 minutes 30 seconds.  Certain hit.  Destroyer in vicinity stopped.  Fired stern T5 at 1530 at escort vessel.  Miss, as escort stopped.  Depth-charges, then pattern of depth-charges.  No damage.  Pushed on eastwards - no traffic found.  Therefore returned to 3532 on 23.7.  Convoy listening group at 1430.  At 1530, Asdic from groups of 3 and 4 motor gunboats.  Short inaccurate depth-charge attack.
25.7. Return passage owing to exhaustion.  No defensive activity experienced.
3.8. Put into Brest.
       
Result:  1/6,100 GRT torpedoed, 2/14,000 GRT sunk.
       
Experiential:  Strong patrols in operations area.  Convoy routes continuously searched.  On an average 2 1/2 hours per day schnorchelling.  No day or night air activity confirmed.
       
   
U 275  
   
16.7. Put out of Brest.  Normal passage until
20.7. Daily reckoning 50 sea miles.  Fast craft with ground trawl apparatus avoided.
21.7. Proceeded to center of operations area Plymouth Bay.
 
 
 
- 506 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   
22.7. At 1335 position check with Eddystone Lighthouse observed by aircraft, immediate appearance of strong search groups.  Intensive search lasting seven hours.  As observed proceeded Seine area.
25.7. Destroyer suddenly sailed at speed over the boat in 3511 at 1600.  Well-placed depth-charges - action until 0015.  Damage:  periscope, electrical engines, rudder, 2 battery cells torn.  "Schnorchel" stretched.
27.7. Ten well-placed depth-charges at a depth of 50 meters at 2110.
28.7. :Schnorchelling" impossible owing to strong and continuous hydrophone bearings, battery practically empty.  Boat drifted eastwards with the current.
30.7. Depth suddenly 19 meters.  Presume position 3381.  Depth-charge attack during an attempt to "schnorchel" to the S.W. at 2333.  2 hours later search group with Asdic and explosive soundings.  No success.  Drifted N.E.
1.8. 5 strong hydrophone bearings at 0307.  As the battery was quite exhausted and only 180 potassium chlorate cartridges left surfaced and attempted to reach Boulogne.  Submerged later as remaining battery current and drifting should bring the boat off Boulogne.
2.8. Tied up in Boulogne at 0045.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
- 507 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
4.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 87)
U 490
-
GG 86
U 546
-
EK 73
U 857
-
BE 92
 
181
-
Op(MQ)
516
-
CD 48
547
-
CG 12
858
-
Op(AK 81)
 
196
-
Op(LC/LN)
518
-
CD 33
549
-
DO 92
859
-
Op(MQ)
 
198
-
Op(KZ)
530
-
DO 57
719
-
BF 57
861
-
GO 47
 
233
-
Op(BB 79)
534
-
BF 48
772
-
AO 47
862
-
GQ 58
 
248
-
AN 36
539
-
CD 43
802
-
BD 81
863
-
AE 31
 
296
-
AO 16
543
-
BF 82
804
-
Op(BD 20)
1062
-
KS 18
 
300
-
AE 85      
855
-
Op(AK 17)
1229
-
AE 61
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 1695
U 480
-
BF 2799
U 667
-
BF 1555
U 741
-
Op(BF 36)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
618
-
Op(BF 52)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
766
-
Op(BF 52)
 
333
-
Op(BF 24)
621
-
Op(BF 36)
672
-
Op(BF 32)
984
-
Op(BF 31)
 
413
-
BF 2788                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 719 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 618 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 170 - Lorient;  (U 296 - Horten).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
19 Group:
0013
U-boat on surface in unspecified position, course 2700, speed 8.5 knots.
Iceland: 2134 submerging U-boat in unspecified position, course 240.
18 Group: 0945 U-boat in unspecified position.
    2) ASV locations:  None.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AN 2130, AM 4675, 4879, 5260.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) U 618 put into Brest yesterday.  The second boat of Group "Wiesel" should have put in at the same time (U 766).  Apparently the boat did not reach the escort.  It could not be picked up in the night of 4th to 5th owing
       
- 508 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      to mine laying and heavy fog off Brest.  Another attempt will be made on the night of the 6th.
    2) U 984 received operations area north of Seine Bay south of 500 10' N.
    3) U 621, 672 and 214, who may well be on the return passage, have received instructions to put into La Pallice.
    Group Command "Mitte":  
    A Mosquito was shot down by U 1163 during an air attack on 3.8.  (see KTB of 3.8.).
    Baltic boats:  Nothing to report.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) 1) Penang relayed the following message:
     
a) U 537 scored "FAT" hit on tanker of 7,000 in LD 4656 on 8.7. and a T5 hit on a destroyer.
b) U 181 began return passage owing to bomb damage from MS 97 on 19.7.  Sunk up to now:  25,000 GRT.
c) Report of return passage on 29.7. from LD, probably U 537.
d) U 196 reported return passage from LE 75 on 2.8.  Escort for U 196 was in position at 0300 on 5.8 off Penang.  U 196 has presumably reported.  Wireless telegraphy message not heard here.
    2) U 300 received operations area north exit North Minch contrary to previous orders.  Position and procedure will be sent by wireless telegraphy.
    3) U 296 put out of Horten for operations.
      "Schnorchel" training ended.
  c) None.
  d) The loss of Japanese U-boat "Föhre" must now be presumed.
    The boat received German Liaison Officer on board from U 530 in EG 55 on 23.6. for the Biscay passage.
     The short message "Am 36 hours off escort meeting place" was picked up once on 30.7. and twice on 31.7.  There was no signature.  The short message is taken from cypher instructions "Flieder" and must therefore originate from "Föhre"*.
       
   * Pencil note in margin:  "Good visibility".
 
 
 
- 509 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     However, the boat has not arrived at the meeting place.  As neither a further report or a Radio Intelligence report on this boat is available it is uncertain whether the "Föhre" even got as far as the mined Biscay area.  No information as to cause of loss and dates is available.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 1163
  1 aircraft
 
537
  1 ship
7,000 GRT
  torpedoed
1 destroyer
  torpedoed
181
? ships
19,000 GRT
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 300
-
AE 87
U 546
-
EK 79
U 857
-
BE 92
 
170
-
BF 57
490
-
GG 80
547
-
BE 99
858
-
Op(AK 57)
 
181
-
LF 44
516
-
CD 46
549
-
DO 66
859
-
Op(MP/MQ)
 
196
-
LF 53
518
-
CD 34
719
-
BF 57
861
-
GO 81
 
198
-
Op(KZ)
530
-
DO 53
772
-
AO 16
862
-
GQ 94
 
233
-
Op(BB 70)
534
-
BF 49
802
-
BD 73
863
-
AE 21
 
248
-
AN 29
539
-
CD 27
804
-
Op(BD 81)
1062
-
KS 41
 
296
-
AN 33
543
-
BF 82
855
-
Op(AK 18)
1229
-
AE 64
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 1966
U 413
-
BF 2738
U 667
-
BF 1392
U 741
-
Op(BF 36)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
480
-
BF 2757
671
-
Op(BF 32)
766
-
Op(BF 52)
 
333
-
Op(BF 24)
667
-
BF 1392
672
-
Op(BF 36)
984
-
Op(BF 32)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 196 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 537 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 719 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 772 - Horten.
  Sailed:  U 736 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
19 Group:
2309
in 480 25' N, longitude not resolved.
  0102 in unspecified position and
  0850 in 030 02' W, latitude not resolved.
  0118 "SSS" report from Aden to Bombay steamer from position not intercepted.
       
- 510 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) ASV locations:  None.
    3) English units located in:  AN 1670 - 2796 and BF 8123.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    U 766 put into Brest.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Baltic boats:
    U 479 (Narva patrol) was shot up by enemy group.  T5 miss on fast motor minesweeper which had broken through old position AO 3644.  Forced to submerge by heavy enemy air activity.  Depth-charge attack after torpedo miss.
    Atlantic boats:
    U 296 put out of Horten on operations.  "Schnorchel" training ended.
  b) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 300
-
AE 88
U 546
-
Op(ET 21)
U 858
-
Op(AK 54)
 
170
-
BF 57
490
-
GG 80
547
-
BF 77
859
-
Op(MP/MQ)
 
181
-
LF 43
516
-
CD 51
549
-
DP 17
861
-
GO 83
 
196
-
LE 59
518
-
CD 29
772
-
AO 16
862
-
GQ 96
 
198
-
Op(KZ)
530
-
DO 37
802
-
BD 72
863
-
AE 12
 
233
-
Op(BB 70)
534
-
BF 57
804
-
Op(BD 91)
1062
-
KR 68
 
248
-
AN 24
539
-
CD 26
855
-
Op(AK 27)
1229
-
AE 59
 
296
-
AN 36
543
-
BF 82
857
-
BE 93      
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 5111
U 480
-
BF 2496
U 671
-
Op(BF 32)
U 741
-
Op(BF 32)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
621
-
Op(BF 32)
672
-
Op(BF 36)
766
-
BF 5221
 
333
-
Op(BF 24)
667
-
BF 1392
736
-
BF 5538
984
-
Op(BF 36)
 
413
-
BF 2579                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 196 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 766 - Brest;  U 296 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 541 - Lorient;  U 245 - 482 - 680 - 979 - 1223 - Kiel;  U 764 - Brest;  U 396 - Trondheim.
       
- 511 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 679 fought 3 smoke-laying craft in AO 3744 at 1421, with 8.8 cm. guns.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sighting report at 1510 from Colombo to Admiral Mombassa, in LT 5825 (U 198).
    2) 3 ASV locations by aircraft of 19 Group in unspecified position.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AE 8751 - 8490 - 8960 - AL 5793 - 6629 - 8541 - AM 1138 - BE 3160 - BD 7944 - BF 5450.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) Captain U-boats West will leave Angers in the evening and move to La Rochelle (3rd U-boat Flotilla).  Until arrival C-in-C U-boats will be in command and will allocate bases.  Captain U-boats will be again in command on the evening of 7.8.
      Until this time Captain U-boats has handed over the control of all U-boat systems controlled by him to C-in-C U-boats.
    2) To simplify wireless telegraphy traffic, flotillas are to switch on to coastal waves only, also boats putting out.
    3) U 764 put out of Brest for operations area Seine.
    4) U 621 (put out of Brest 15.7.) and U 672 (put out on 6.7.) have received orders to return.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:
    U 679 reported heavy MTB and escort vessel activity in operations area (Narva patrol).  Permanently heavy air activity.  The same boat reported minesweeping group in AO 3744 and fired at smoke-laying vessel with 8.8 cm. gun.  U 479 also reports heavy air and depth-charge activity by escort vessels, from this area.
       
- 512 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Atlantic boats:
  b) 1) U 198 gave situation report:
      2 Hudson aircraft beaten off in KP 98 in the forenoon of 6.7.  Sunk on 15.7. in KP 3568 ship "Director" (5,107 GRT) sailing in ballast parallel to the coast between Durban and Beira.  At dusk on 19.7. large freighter in KP 3288, 3 corvettes, speed 13 knots in KP 3332.  Only explosion heard 130 seconds after electrical torpedo running time, as corvette was in a ramming position.  Depth-charges.  On 5.8. in KE, a T5 miss on a liberty ship, general course 50.  Circling torpedo of 13 knots, premature explosion near the boat.  Slight damage.  On 6.8. in KE 5839 sank "Empire City", general course 50, speed 11 knots.  Carrying coal from Lourence to Aden.
    2) U 804 fired 3 T5s on 2 of a group of 3 destroyers with westerly course, in BD 5514 on 2.8.  2 explosions after 3 and 4.5 minutes.  Isolated depth-charges, no pursuit.  Note:  presumed sunk.
      Boat intends to return on 15.8.  As, however, there is still sufficient fuel and provisions, U 804 received orders to remain in the operations area until they are exhausted - as relief is impossible at the moment.
    3) U 181 reports putting in to Penang for 8.8., ships with tonnage of 24,096 GRT sunk.  U 196 will put into Penang on 11.8.
  c)  None.
  d)  The loss of U 719 must be presumed.  The boat put out from Stavanger on 22.5. on her first trip.  The boat fired T5 miss on escort vessel in operations area (North Channel) and sent long W/T message on 26.6.  It is possible that the boat was lost as a result of the intensified patrol activity following the sending of the wireless telegraphy message and detection by the enemy.  This theory is supported by the fact that numerous Radio Intelligence messages were received on the following day in this area.  According to the fuel estimate the boat should have reported putting in.  Repeated requests for a position report were unanswered.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 198 2 ships 12,107 GRT  
  1 ship torpedoed  
U 804 2 destroyers.    
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 513 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
7.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 396
-
AF 56
U 546
-
Op(ET 26)
U 858
-
Op(AK 57)
 
170
-
BF 81
482
-
AO 47
547
-
BF 84
859
-
Op(MP/MQ)
 
181
-
LF 55
516
-
CE 13
549
-
DP 15
861
-
GO 69
 
196
-
LE 67
518
-
CD 51
680
-
AO 47
862
-
GR 79
 
198
-
LT 29
530
-
DO 33
772
-
AO 16
863
-
AE 14
 
233
-
Op(BB 70)
534
-
BF 47
802
-
BC 93
979
-
AO 47
 
245
-
AO 47
539
-
CD 31
804
-
Op(BD 95)
1062
-
KR 82
 
248
-
AN 24
541
-
BF 55
855
-
Op(AK 25)
1223
-
AO 47
 
300
-
AM 11
543
-
BF 81
857
-
BF 71
1229
-
AE 58
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 5123
U 413
-
BF 2565
U 667
-
BF 2151
U 741
-
Op(BF 32)
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
480
-
BF 2558
671
-
Op(BF 32)
736
-
BF 5585
 
333
-
Op(BF 24)
621
-
Op(BF 32)
672
-
Op(BF 36)
984
-
Op(BF 36)
                   
764
-
BF 28
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 196 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 772 - Horten;  U 309 - Brest;  U 260 - 608 - 981 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 482 reported 2 torpedo tracks to starboard in AO 1683 at 0347.
  b)  Aircraft sighted convoy consisting of 20 auxiliary vessels with escort and one aircraft carrier, in AM 7428 at 1030, course South.  No U-boats in the vicinity.
  c) 1) U-boat sighting by aircraft of 19 Group at 1805 in BF 2815, course W., speed 4 knots.
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AE 8970 - 8840 - 8770 - AM 5480 - 6410 - 6110 - 0230 - AN 5192.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) U 309 put out of Brest and U 260, U 608 and U 981 put out of Lorient for transfer passage to La Pallice.  The installation of "Schnorchel" is to be carried out there as far as equipment for this is available.
       
- 514 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) The further American advance in Brittany necessitates the following measures, C-in-C orders:
     
a) The aim of all measures is to prepare all boats for action as "Schnorchel" boats.
b) Boats unable to obtain "Schnorchel" in Brest, Lorient or St. Nazaire, are to transfer to La Pallice or Bordeaux as soon as possible.  According to information here, these are:  U 766, 618, 270, 437, 281.  Transfer is also to be used for transferring valuable U-boat nucleus crew and shipyard workers.
c) Schnorchel parts, not needed in northern bases are to be transferred to the south by U-boat or other craft.
d) Boats which cannot be adapted owing to lack of Schnorchel in La Pallice or Bordeaux are to be paid off.  On release the crews of these boats are to be sent home immediately.
e) Boats not at full complement may retain personnel of released boats if necessary.
f) Trained U-boat personnel are to be sent home if not absolutely necessary.
g) Boat are to fill up with fuel when transferring to the south.  The aim of these measures is to prepare boats for action as soon as possible and to return crews not taking part in these operations to Germany for the manning of new boats, in the quickest possible time.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:  Nothing to report.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) U 772 put out of Horten on operations.
     "Schnorchel" training ended.
  c)  U 154, 546 and 518 received orders to return in good time so that if necessary Bergen can be reached without further supplies.
    U 518 is to report if the operations in position area (Caribbean) appear unpromising.
  d)  U 490 must be presumed lost (supply boat).  The boat put out of Kiel on 4.5. for Penang and was to supply homeward-bound IXc boats in the Indian Ocean en route, subsequently to return with cargo of military importance.  The last message was a
 
 
 
- 515 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     short weather report from CD 23 on 11.6.  Since then no reply to repeated request for position report.  No details of date of loss or reason.
     The last XIV type boat is therefore lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 482
-
AO 16
U 547
-
BF 94
U 859
-
Op(MP/MQ)
 
170
-
BF 73
516
-
BD 88
549
-
DP 13
861
-
GP 72
 
181
-
LF 56
518
-
CD 49
680
-
AO 16
862
-
JJ 11
 
196
-
LE 65
530
-
DD 97
772
-
AN 36
863
-
AD 53
 
198
-
LJ 97
534
-
BF 82
802
-
BC 91
979
-
AO 16
 
233
-
Op(BB 70)
539
-
CE 12
804
-
Op(BD 95)
1062
-
KR 87
 
245
-
AO 16
541
-
BF 57
855
-
Op(AK 20)
1223
-
AO 16
 
300
-
AM 14
543
-
BF 85
857
-
BF 72
1229
-
AE 82
 
396
-
AF 52
546
-
Op(EU 44)
858
-
Op(AK 29)      
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 212
-
BF 4358
U 413
-
Op(BF 26)
U 667
-
Op(BF 21)
U 741
-
Op(BF 32)
 
260
-
BF 6442
480
-
Op(BF 26)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
764
-
BF 2753
 
214
-
Op(BF 25)
608
-
BF 6442
672
-
BF 3189
981
-
BF 6443
 
309
-
BF 5248
621
-
BF 3186
736
-
BF 5571
984
-
Op(BF 36)
 
333
-
Op(BF 24)                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 196 - 516 - 630 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 181 - Penang.
  Sailed:  U 398 - 484 - 1221 - Kiel;  U 766 - Brest;  U 286 - Kristiansand to Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:
    1)
19 Group:
1848
submerging U-boat in BF 2556, speed 7 knots (probably U 621 or U 672).
  2358 U-boat in BF 2758.
  0005 submerging U-boat in BF 2756, course 3100, speed 4 knots (U 764?).
  0528 ASV location in 500 12' N., longitude unspecified.
       
- 516 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Aden repeated report from English steamer U-boat sighted on the surface in MP 6290 at 1242 (U 859?)
    3) Azores aircraft reported ASV location (probably U-boat at 0410 in 430 22' N., longitude unspecified.
    4) Enemy units were located in:  AM 3380 - 3610 - AN 1510 - 4470 - AL 9575 - BF 2210.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    The 3 boats at present on transfer passage from Lorient to La Pallice are to operate on their couth-bound voyage against enemy units as Group "Füchse".  There units have been appearing during the night and also by day between Ile de Croix and Ile d'Yeu.  For this purpose boats are to proceed 3 sea miles to the seaward of the coastal route at a distance of 4 sea miles from one another, at night when not charging batteries at periscope depth, and also during the day as frequently as possible.  Location reports by W/T, otherwise, however, operations are to be for the most part on own hydrophone bearings.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:  Nothing to report.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) U 198 reported return passage in short message from LT.  Boat considers traffic situation in this area definitely auspicious.  U 861 and U 862 therefore received orders not to remain in Capetown area, but to proceed to the Gulf of Aden.  Operations in about KE, according to traffic situation.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 482
-
AO 16
U 546
-
Op(EU 48)
U 858
-
Op(AK 55)
 
170
-
BF 75
484
-
AO 47
547
-
BF 92
859
-
Op(MP/MQ)
 
196
-
LF 51
516
-
BD 97
549
-
DD 96
861
-
GP 84
 
198
-
LT 30
518
-
CD 72
680
-
AO 16
862
-
JJ 13
 
233
-
Op(BB 70)
530
-
DD 95
772
-
AN 31
863
-
AD 55
 
245
-
AO 16
534
-
BF 86
802
-
BC 83
979
-
AO 16
 
300
-
AM 23
539
-
BD 88
804
-
Op(BD 20)
1062
-
KR 12
 
396
-
AF 28
541
-
BF 49
855
-
Op(AK 26)
1221
-
AO 47
 
398
-
AO 47
543
-
BF 82
857
-
BF 73
1223
-
AO 16
                   
1229
-
AK 38
 
       
- 517 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
Western Boats:
  En route to their new bases:
 
U 260
-
BF 6730
U 212
-
BF 4630
U 621
-
BF 3170
U 736
-
BF 5450
 
309
-
BF 5520
214
-
Op(BF 25)
667
-
Op(BF 21)
741
-
Op(BF 32)
 
608
-
BF 6730
333
-
Op(BF 25)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
764
-
Op(BF 25)
 
766
-
BF 5270
413
-
Op(BF 23)
672
-
BF 3170
984
-
Op(BF 36)
 
981
-
BF 6730
480
-
Op(BF 23)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 196 - 198 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 543 - 539 - 547 - 549 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 989 - 763 - Brest;  U 244 - Bergen;  U 281 - 385 - 4437 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)
2000 west of Belle Ile 4 enemy destroyers on varying courses sighted.
2300 in BF 6467 several fast ship targets, course 800
2330 in BF 6496 enemy target located.
0000 in BF 6421     "        "        "
0520 in BF 6596 several enemy targets located.
0650 in BF 6571 one cruiser, 5 destroyers located.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Heavy 19 Group operations in Biscay area.  88 aircraft confirmed.
    2) U-boat sightings:
     
19 Group:
0815
U-boat in BF 5219.
 
0830
submerging U-boat in BF 5241, course 3300.
 
1430
periscope in BF 6458, course 600, speed 2 knots.
 
1434
U-boat in BF 6428.
 
0300
U-boat in BF 6482, course 400, speed 2 knots.
    3) Signal station "Sword Area" (in landing area) sent following message to "coastal force":  Task Force "GL 2" has opened fire on a U-boat on the surface.
    4) ASV location in BF 6473 at 0145 and in BF 2825 at 0252.
    5) Enemy units were located in:  AK 7373 - AL 3818 - 5594 - AM 4174 - BE 2792 - CD 1261.
  d)  None.
       
- 518 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) Put out tonight for transfer to south ports:
      from Brest:  U 763 to La Pallice, U 766 to Bordeaux.
      from Nazaire:  U 281 to La Pallice, U 437 to Bordeaux.
    2) U 385 has put out from St. Nazaire on operations in the Channel.
    3) Transfer voyages have caused heavy enemy activity in about BF 64, 6 locations of enemy units and 5 U-boat sightings tonight (see also paragraph III a)).
    Group Command "Mitte":
    3 further boats are intended for operations in the Baltic:  U 290, 100, 1165.
    Group Command Baltic:
    U 479 (Narva patrol) reported 9 craft in AO 3744, course N.W.  U 679 (Narva patrol) also reports 3 craft in AO 3471, course N.  The boat also reports run-in with flares.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) Nothing to report.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 482
-
AO 16
U 547
-
BF 92
U 859
-
Op(MP 60)
 
170
-
BF 77
484
-
AO 16
549
-
DE 48
861
-
GP 97
 
196
-
LF 56
516
-
BB 98
680
-
AO 16
862
-
KY 94
 
198
-
LK 77
518
-
CD 74
772
-
AN 24
863
-
AD 82
 
233
-
Op(BB 70)
530
-
DE 47
802
-
BC 81
979
-
AO 16
 
245
-
AO 16
534
-
BF 86
804
-
Op(BD 82)
1062
-
JA 35
 
244
-
AF 87
539
-
BD 89
855
-
Op(AK 21)
1221
-
AO 16
 
300
-
AM 26
541
-
BF 73
857
-
BF 83
1223
-
AO 16
 
396
-
AF 16
543
-
BF 82
858
-
Op(AK 58)
1229
-
AK 28
 
398
-
AO 16
546
-
Op(EU 80)            
                         
 
Western Boats:
  En route to their new bases:
 
U 260
-
BF 6812
U 766
-
BF 5532
U 413
-
Op(BF 31)
736
-
BF 4638
 
281
-
BF 6812
981
-
BF 6736
480
-
Op(BF 31)
741
-
Op(BF 32)
 
309
-
BF 6441
212
-
BF 5443
621
-
BF 2622
764
-
Op(BF 25)
 
437
-
BF 6470
214
-
Op(BF 25)
667
-
Op(BF 21)
984
-
Op(BF 36)
 
608
-
BF 6814
333
-
Op(BF 25)
671
-
Op(BF 32)
989
-
BF 5210
 
763
-
BF 5240
385
-
BF 6730
672
-
BF 2625      
 
       
- 519 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 196 - 198 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 549 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  I 196 - Penang.
  Sailed:  U 953 - 218 - Brest;  U 270 - Lorient;  U 865 - Trondheim.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1)
0830 in BF 5224, 3 large surface units, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers sighted.
1732 south of Ile d'Yeu, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers sighted.
2005 in BF 6815 enemy units with N.W. course sighted.
    2) U 772 was attacked by aircraft in AF 8523 at 1400.  Attack unsuccessful.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Very heavy air activity by 19 Group in Biscay area.  75 aircraft confirmed in operation.
    2)
19 Group:
1210
in BF 5522
 
2050
in BF 3246
U-boat sightings:
0228
in BF 6752 course 2300, 8 knots
 
0238
in BF 6737
 
0402
ASV location in BF 5134.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AM 6540 - BE 1735 - 2320.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) Group West requests U-boats for urgent supply of fortresses in Brittany from the area of 1st Army H.Q., southern Biscay ports, as enemy surface patrol has been intensified.  The supplies will be assembled by 1st Army H.Q. according to need and loaded in Bordeaux and La Pallice.  This will above all consist of anti-tank weapons and provisions.  The following are or will be ready for this task:  The IX d 1 boats U 180, U 195 in Bordeaux and the boats still to put in that have been transferred from Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire to the southern ports.
       
- 520 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Continuing strong Biscay patrols by cruisers and destroyers (see paragraph III a) 1)).  Apart from this destroyers with air escort have been seen patrolling off Lorient at 1030 but sheared off after gunfire.  Further destroyer sightings off Belle Ile.
    3) Put out:  U 218 put out of Brest for mining operations south of Start Point.  U 953 with relief commander to Bordeaux.  U 270 put out of Lorient to transfer to La Pallice.
    4) According to Radio Intelligence reports a unit of a Bristol Channel/Seine area convoy was sunk.  According to decyphered position data this may refer to either a mine success of U 214 or a torpedo success of U 667.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:
     U 479 (Narva patrol) reported 2 patrol boats in AO 3744.  Isolated enemy aircraft activity.
    Atlantic boats:
  b)  U 541 received position Nova Scotia, U 170 Guinea Bay.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Boats proceeding to Atlantic from Norway do not need to haul off to the north to the same extent any more, as there is complete darkness for 4 - 5 hours at 630 N. at the moment - enough time therefore to charge batteries with the "Schnorchel".
      In future disposition of the boats after putting out from Horten on operations will be given at the appropriate time by B.d.U. on U-boat coastal wave, so that escort may be promptly provided.
    2) Standing Order No. 49 was transmitted to all boats (appendix).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 521 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Standing Order No. 49
issued August 1944
Density layering and hydrophone conditions.
       
        The examination of salt content and temperature layering in open sea areas has shown that balls of water of varying temperature and salt content are continually drifting and pushing against one another.
       
           As hydrophone range is greatly influenced by horizontal and vertical temperature and salt layerings, it varies continuously.
       
   
Procedure: 1) Keep continual check on weight of sea water.
  2) In apparently poor hydrophone reception alter depth and attempt to obtain better signal strength.  Hydrophone conditions may also be better at greater depth.
  3) As known underwater location apparatus works by means of sound measuring, when pursued proceed to layers unfavorable to sound, which can be assessed by weight measurement and observation of the hydrophone signal strength.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
- 552 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
11.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 484
-
U 680
U 680
-
AO 16
U 862
-
Op(KY 69)
 
170
-
BE 99
516
-
BD 99
772
-
AF 91
863
-
AD 85
 
198
-
LK 84
518
-
DE 31
802
-
BC 76
865
-
AF 56
 
244
-
AF 91
534
-
BF 86
804
-
Op(BD 73)
979
-
AO 16
 
245
-
AO 16
539
-
BD 97
855
-
Op(AK 20)
1062
-
JA 29
 
300
-
Op(AM 35)
541
-
BF 71
857
-
BF 92
1221
-
AO 16
 
396
-
AF 15
543
-
BF 82
858
-
Op(AK 82)
1223
-
AO 16
 
398
-
AO 16
546
-
Op(EU 80)
859
-
Op(MP 65)
1229
-
AK 29
 
482
-
AO 16
547
-
BF 93
861
-
GP 99      
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 260
-
BF 6812
U 766
-
BF 6480
U 385
-
BF 9120
U 672
-
BF 2560
 
270
-
BF 5530
953
-
BF 5280
413
-
Op(BF 32)
736
-
BF 4350
 
281
-
BF 6850
981
-
BF 6736
480
-
Op(BF 31)
741
-
Op(BF 32)
 
309
-
BF 6480
212
-
BF 5490
621
-
BF 52
764
-
Op(BF 26)
 
437
-
BF 6870
214
-
Op(BF 25)
667
-
Op(BF 22)
984
-
Op(BF 36)
 
608
-
BF 6814
218
-
BF 2780
671
-
Op(BF 32)
989
-
BF 2780
 
763
-
BF 5530
333
-
Op(BF 26)      
-
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 198 - 516 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 547 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 772 - Trondheim;  U 621 - Brest;  U 547 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  U 548 - Lorient;  U 618 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 534 was attacked by aircraft in BF 9310 at 0142.
    2) U 309 reported at 0503:  U 981 out of action owing to mine.  Cannot submerge.  U 309 was attacked by aircraft at 0624 near the convoy assembly point "Garten"
    3) 3 heavy units sighted in BF 6468 at 0930.  Enemy units sighted in BF 6842 at 1837 course south.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
0154 English unit reported submerged U-boat in BF 6857.  First appearance of U-boat chaser groups off the western ports.
0553 U-boat in BF 9321.
0616 from aircraft of 19 Group:  "Am over 2 u-boats, 010 28' W., latitude unspecified".
       
- 523 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Enemy units were located in:  AL 6944 - BE 66511 - BF 2790 - BD 8470.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) U 621 (Stuckmann) put into Brest without warning yesterday, owing to W/T breakdown.  Sank 4 ships of 22,000 GRT, and torpedoed one ship of 7,000 GRT in Seine area.  Defence intensified, especially heavy off Brest and western exit of Channel.  Otherwise nothing to report.  Boat put out on 13.8. for transfer to La Pallice.
    2) U 309 reported at 0503:  U 981 has hit a mine.  Complete breakdown, unable to submerge.  Boats in position at assembly point.  U 309 attacked by aircraft at 0620.  Pick up by escort should have taken place at 0800.  No report on this yet received.
    3) U 480 and U 413 received operations area between 000 30' W. and 020 15' W., north of of 500 N.  Boundaries not fixed, U 764 south of this area.  According to dead reckoning there are 5 boats in the landing area today.
    4) U 218 (minelaying boat) and U 953 did not put out until tonight on their voyage to Bordeaux owing to the presence of M.T.B.s off Brest.  U 548 is on the transfer passage from Lorient to Bordeaux.
    5) Situation report on bases:
     
Brest: Major air attack yesterday afternoon.  Central point base and surrounding batteries.  Extensive damage to buildings.  No report of U-boat pens being hit.
Bordeaux: Air attack on U-boat pens at 1008 and 1108.  9 to 12 hits on pen roofs.  6.2 meters + 3.5 meters of bomb catching mesh on main roofs.  No serious damage.
    6) U 650 and U 445 were each loaded in St. Nazaire with about 70 - 80 tons of assorted ammunition and anti-tank weapons, according to 1st Army H.Q., and are ready to put out this evening.
      Approach at the best only possible as far as Brest, under no circumstances St. Malo, as requested by 1st Army H.Q.
 
 
 
- 524 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:
    U 370 reported 2 escort vessels in AO 3398 on 10.8. and 12 fast motor mine sweepers presumably on escort route eastwards on 11.8.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) U 518 has transferred her operations area to Cape Hatteras.  Operations were originally planned in the Caribbean area.  As return passage must take place in good time, so that further supplies are unnecessary, the boat has complete freedom of movement.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 233 (minelaying boat) must now be presumed lost.  She put out of Kiel on her first voyage consisting of mining operations off Halifax on 27.5., without "Schnorchel" apparatus.  Since her passage report there has been no further news in spite of repeated requests.  No information of cause of loss or date.
    2) In addition, the loss of U 549 must now be presumed.  The boat put out of Lorient on 14.5. and sent passage report from CG 17 on 22.5; according to instructions she would have proceeded to FB 90 and operated there making use of the coastal current to the N.W.  On 23.6. the day on which according to dead reckoning the boat would have reached the ordered position, a Radio Intelligence report of underwater hydrophone contact by an American unit in FC 7181 was received.  The boat must have started the return passage in the meantime, in order to reach Bergen, as ordered, without fresh supplies.  No message, in spite of repeated requests.  It is possible that the appearance of U-boat chaser groups in the operations area (see Radio Intelligence report) may have something to do with it.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 621 4 ships
22,000 GRT
  1 ship
7,000 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 484
-
AO 16
U 680
-
AO 16
U 862
-
Op(KZ 44)
 
170
-
CG 11
516
-
BE 77
802
-
BC 75
863
-
AK 23
 
198
-
LK 83
518
-
DE 25
804
-
Op(BC 50)
865
-
AF 55
 
244
-
AF 91
534
-
BF 93
855
-
Op(AK)
979
-
AO 16
 
245
-
AO 16
539
-
BD 98
857
-
BF 93
1062
-
JA 51
 
       
- 525 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
300
-
AF 18
541
-
BE 93
858
-
Op(AK)
1221
-
AO 16
 
396
-
AF 45
543
-
BF 82
859
-
Op(MP 60)
1223
-
AO 16
 
398
-
AO 16
546
-
Op(EU 80)
861
-
GY 31
1229
-
AK 43
 
482
-
AO 16
548
-
BF 6480            
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 260
-
BF 6850
U 618
-
BF 5220
U 218
-
BF 2790
U 671
-
Op(BF 32)
 
270
-
BF 6480
763
-
BF 6480
333
-
Op(BF 23)
672
-
BF 2540
 
281
-
BF 6850
766
-
BF 9330
385
-
BF 5890
736
-
BF 1980
 
309
-
BF 8850
353
-
BF 5280
413
-
Op(BF 32)
741
-
Op(BF 36)
 
437
-
BF 9330
212
-
BF 5830
480
-
Op(BF 32)
764
-
Op(BF 23)
 
608
-
BF 6850
214
-
Op(BF 25)
667
-
Op(BF 22)
984
-
Op(BF 36)
                   
989
-
BF 2770
 
  On Return Passage:  U 198 - 300 - 516 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 309 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 228 - St. Nazaire;  U 445 - 650 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 300 reported in addition that it was attacked with a stick of bombs by an aircraft on 4.8. and submerging is restricted.
      U 228 0206 aircraft attack in BF 6468.
      U 534 0650        "        "         " BF 6898.
    2)
1320 3 enemy destroyers sighted in BF 6468
2225 Enemy target confirmed in BF 6882
2250         "        "        "        " BF 6897
2300         "        "        "        " BF 6855
  b)  None
  c) 1) 74 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed in the Biscay area.
    2) U-boat sightings:
     
19 Group:
0830
periscope in BF 2526
 
1400
U-boat in BF 6819
 
1430
U-boat in BF 5526
 
1435
U-boat in BF 5539
 
1626
submerged U-boat in 2700, course east, speed 8 knots, 6 miles from Juno Lightship (in landing area)
 
0015
U-boat in BF 6738, course 1100
 
0053
U-boats in BF 6737
 
0642
U-boat in BF 9317.
       
- 526 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Colombo repeated report of periscope sighting by English steamer from MT 5320, at 1520.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AL 6479 - CG 2570.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) Short report - U 621:
      Put out of Brest on 15.7.  Passage to and fro in northern part of Channel with daily average of 40 - 50 sea miles, with on an average 2 hours schnorchelling daily.  Continuous propeller sounds and U-boat chaser groups from BF 2336.  On the return passage heavy patrols from BF 2555 to BF 2495, especially from the 100 meter line off Brest.  Nearly starved.  In operations area Seine and north of Cotentin from 23.7. to 3.8.  Return passage 6.8.
      Put into Brest on 11.8.
      "LUT" double spread on north convoy at 25.7. in BF 3533.  1 miss, 1 firing failure.  Schnorchel breakdown on 26.7. resulting in 400 to 500 millibar (?) pressure drop in boat.  Fainting casualties, water inflow through schnorchel cable.  Attack on southbound convoy in BF 3533 on 29.7.  Fired T5 at two-funneller of 7,000 GRT.  Torpedo returned.  After the first hit numerous circular saw noises were heard in the line of fire.  Single "LUT" fired at 4,000 GRT (vessel) with destroyer 2 hours later.  Hit after 53 seconds, steamer sunk.
      Attacked large 4 sea mile long southbound convoy in BF 3274 on 3.7.  Double spread "LUT" fired at 9,000 GRT passenger freighter in 10th column.  Double explosion with immediate sinking noises after 1 minute 50 seconds.
      Attack on southbound convoy in BF 3613 at 2.8.  Double spread "LUT" fired on 6 and 7,000 GRT vessels, both scored hits after 8 minutes, 48 seconds and 9 minutes, 13 seconds.  Sinking noises.  T5 miss on destroyer.  Stopped.
      Numerous depth-charge attacks - no serious damage, much bombing and searchlight activity while schnorchelling.  Many listening groups (convoys) in the sea area north of Cotentin.  Traffic confirmed on known routes.
 
 
 
- 527 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Defence on the whole heavier than previously, otherwise no change in situation.
    2) U 309 the first of the transfer boats to put in to La Pallice.  Boat had crew of U 981 on board.  U 981 sunk at about 0600 on 12.8. by mine and subsequent bombs, as reported.  One subordinate officer, 5 petty officers and 7 men remained with the boat.
    3) Further, very heavy enemy air and surface patrols off Biscay coast and especially off the ports.  Two boats reported air attacks (U 228 when putting out of La Pallice and U 534 when putting into Bordeaux).  Numerous sightings and radar locations by enemy units, 8 U-boat sightings according to Radio Intelligence reports.
    4) Bombing attacks:  
      On U-boat pens in Brest:
      1 penetration with a diameter of 10 meters through 5.6 meter thick roof, 1 hit on roof over partition - broken away top and bottom, 1 platform broken away over roof on the outside of the first shelter berth.  No damage to U-boats.
      On U-boat pens in Bordeaux:  
      14 hits on roof of shelter berths (6.2 meter + 3.5 meter thick bomb mesh).  Slight damage.
    5) U 275 probably put out of Boulogne after repairs.
    6) Put out of La Pallice as armament transport:  U 650 to Lorient, U 455 to Brest.  Will not arrive before the 17th and 18th/8.  Neither boat equipped with schnorchel.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing of interest.
    Group Command Baltic:
     Mines in outward routes.  Minesweeping U-boats are not operating east of sea hog (hedge) barrier until the routes are completely free.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) U 300 reported position from AF 18.  The boat was attacked by aircraft on 4.8.  Return to Norway as only able to submerge partially.  U-boat hunts by 13th U-boat Flotilla will be suspended.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 528 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
13.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 482
-
AO 16
U 548
-
BF 6840
U 862
-
Op(KZ 19)
 
170
-
CF 36
484
-
AO 16
680
-
AO 16
863
-
AK 31
 
198
-
LK 65
516
-
BE 78
802
-
CD 19
865
-
AF 59
 
228
-
BF 67
518
-
CC 74
804
-
Op(BD 83)
979
-
AO 16
 
244
-
AF 55
534
-
BF 93
855
-
Op(AK 26)
1062
-
JA 45
 
245
-
AO 16
539
-
BD 99
857
-
BF 93
1221
-
AO 16
 
300
-
AF 43
541
-
BE 92
858
-
Op(AK 89)
1223
-
AO 16
 
396
-
AF 39
543
-
BF 82
859
-
Op(MP 60)
1229
-
AK 49
 
398
-
AO 16
546
-
Op(EU 90)
861
-
GY 36      
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 260
-
BF 68
U 763
-
BF 6480
U 385
-
BF 5840
U 671
-
Op(BF 35)
 
270
-
BF 6480
766
-
BF 9330
413
-
Op(BF 31)
736
-
BF 1962
 
281
-
BF 68
953
-
BF 6440
445
-
BF
741
-
Op(BF 35)
 
437
-
BF 9330
214
-
Op(BF 25)
480
-
Op(BF 31)
764
-
Op(BF 35)
 
608
-
BF 68
218
-
BF 2750
650
-
BF
984
-
Op(BF 35)
 
618
-
BF 5280
333
-
Op(BF 31)
667
-
Op(BF 22)
989
-
BF 3530
 
  On Return Passage:  U 198 - 300 - 516 - 534 - 539 - 543 - 857 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 260 - La Pallice;  U 437 - 857 - 534 - Bordeaux;  U 865 - Trondheim;  U 290 - 1000 - 1165 - Kiel.
  Sailed:  U 275 - Boulogne;  U 621 - 963 - Brest;  U 772 - Trondheim.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 445 attacked by aircraft in BF 6761 at 2226.
     U 396        "        "        "        "  AF 5523 at 0218.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) 48 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed in the Biscay area.
    2) U-boat sightings:
     
19 Group:
0655
3 U-boats in convoy in BF 6898, course 1100, speed 6 knots (U 857, 534, 437).
 
1545
periscope in BF 2786, course 2200, speed 2 knots.
 
0541
U-boat in BF 6746, course 3600, speed 10 knots (U 650?).
18 Group:
0220
U-boat in 050 08' E., latitude unspecified.  This refers to U 396.
       
- 529 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Colombo repeated at 2110, the U-boat sighting report sent by the steamer "Hilde Moller" in MT 26, reporting torpedo track (not one of ours).
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AL 6381 - AM 1527 - 4192 - BD 3432 - BE 2962 - BF 9126.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) U 981 reports re sinking:  Put out of Brest on 7.8.  Reached escort assembly point off La Pallice without difficulty on 12.8. at 0300.  Escort did not arrive.  Proceeded to U 309 and turned back to position.  Hit mine at 0415.  Unable to submerge.  Halifax approached.  3 flares, then 6 bombs dropped near the boat, serious damage and fires.  Again hit mine, received direct bomb hit on W/T office by 2-engined aircraft.  The boat then sank quickly.
    2) Put in from transfer passage:  U 260 in La Pallice from Lorient and U 437 in Bordeaux from St. Nazaire.  Neither schnorchel boats.  Put out of Brest for transfer:  U 963 (with relief commander) and U 621, both with schnorchel.
    3) U 275 put out of Boulogne after repairs.  Operations area Seine.
    4) U 180 will put out of Bordeaux in the evening of 14.8. carrying armament supplies for St. Malo (continuous gunfire and bombs, as well as no lights showing at night), it is intended that the boats shall unload in either St. Aubin Roads or in St. Peter Port.
    5) U 212 and U 672 must be presumed lost.  U 212 put out of Brest on 5.7. and U 672 on 6.7. for the Seine area.  There has been no further information since then.  U 212 and U 672 received instructions to return on 27.7. and 7.8. and should in the meantime have put in.
    Group Command "Mitte":
    3 boats have put out of Kiel for operations in the Baltic.
    Group Command Baltic:  Nothing of interest.
    Atlantic boats:
  b) U 396 has started return passage owing to schnorchel breakdown.  Aircraft attack at 0218 (see III a)).
 
 
 
- 530 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  Report of situation off Colombo given by U 537 after putting in:
     No traffic off the harbor, in LD 18 or off the south coast, continuous land radar on 150 cm. day air activity to a distance of 35 sea miles.  At 0102 on 8.7. triple miss on stopped tanker of 7,000 GRT, followed by "FAT" explosion after 8 minutes, 2 seconds.  Freighters (sighted) at 1200.  Both on easterly course.  Fired T5 at 1333 on "Jervis" destroyer in receding search group.  Explosion after 6 minutes, 45 seconds.  All in LD 4656.  Obstinate air and sea activity shaken off after two days.  On 13.7. in LC 6925 after repeated transmission of radio message two destroyers appeared as sequel to aircraft radar location.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 482
-
AO 16
U 548
-
BF 9310
U 861
-
GZ 19
 
170
-
CF 36
484
-
AO 16
680
-
AO 16
862
-
Op(KZ 21)
 
198
-
LL 41
516
-
BE 79
772
-
AF 59
863
-
AK 33
 
228
-
BF 6440
518
-
CB 95
802
-
CB 17
979
-
AO 16
 
244
-
AF 54
539
-
BE 75
804
-
Op(BD 50)
1062
-
KZ 69
 
300
-
AF 51
541
-
BE 91
855
-
Op(AK 35)
1221
-
AO 16
 
396
-
AF 55
543
-
BF 82
858
-
Op(AK 89)
1223
-
AO 16
 
398
-
AO 16
546
-
Op(EU 90)
859
-
Op(MP 60)
1229
-
AK 72
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 270
-
BF 6480
U 953
-
BF 6480
U 385
-
BF 5488
U 671
-
Op(BF 35)
 
281
-
BF 6850
963
-
BF 5570
413
-
Op(BF 31)
736
-
Op(BF 24)
 
608
-
BF 6850
214
-
Op(BF 25)
445
-
BF 6762
741
-
Op(BF 35)
 
618
-
BF 5530
218
-
Op(BF 24)
480
-
Op(BF 31)
764
-
Op(BF 35)
 
621
-
BF 5280
275
-
Op(BF 33)
650
-
BF 6480
984
-
Op(BF 35)
 
763
-
BF 6820
333
-
Op(BF 31)
667
-
Op(BF 22)
989
-
Op(BF 24)
 
766
-
BF 9310                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 198 - 300 - 396 - 516 - 539 - 543 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 281 - 763 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 484 - 1221 - 1223 - 245 - 482 - 979 - 680 - Horten.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 531 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) 1) 55 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed in the Biscay area.
    2) U-boat sightings:
     
1835 English unit to Milfordhaven:   submerged U-boat in BF 2222.
0005 Aircraft of 19 Group sighted U-boat on surface in BF 5523, course 1600, speed 12 knots.
0153 ASV location in BF 2817.
      According to Japanese report received on 14.8., an American steamer sighted a periscope in LD 59.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AK 9195 - AM 0260 - 9230 - BD 7236.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) U 260 gives the following short report on transfer passage:
      Put out of Lorient on 7.8.  Proceeded from point "Leben" to 100 meter line and along this as far as convoy assembly point "Pumpe".  Hydrophone bearing on 8.8. in the morning in BF 6412, subsequently craft resembling "Brummer" (anti-aircraft auxiliary cruiser?) sighted.  No opportunity to fire.  Ship withdrew but returned after 2 hours with 3 destroyers.  Passed at a distance of 7,000 meters.  From 1500 to 2000 on 9.8. in BF 6455, a stopped search group was directly above the boat lying on the bottom, but in spite of search gear and sounding locations it was not detected.  Submerging owing to silhouettes on 11.8. in BF 6488 in bright moonlight, and afterward passed over by 2 destroyers.  Made fast in La Pallice at 0610 on 13.8.
      Experiences:  "Hohentwiel" (radar) was very effective during (battery) charging under way at night.  Average radar range for aircraft, 10,000 meters, many intercepted at 20,000 meters.  Aircraft continually pursued which meant that it was possible to submerge only when there was a direct run-up between 8,000 and 6,000 meters.  Immediate "Naxos" location on surfacing, it was then often half an hour before the aircraft was intercepted by "Hohentwiel".
 
 
 
- 532 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) There is a torpedoing report from a steamer in the landing area, and in connection with this a U-boat report (contact) and a report of an oil patch in the torpedoing area.
    Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing to report.
    Group Command Baltic:
     U 348 (Narva patrol) reported enemy U-boat in AO 3666 according to hydrophone bearing.  Mining operations presumed.  Hydrophone bearing confirmed by U 481.
    Atlantic boats:
  b)  A corrupt short message has come in.  Apparent contents position report of U 530 from DQ 79.  As, according to estimates of the fuel and provision supplies, the boat could still be in this area, previous reports of its loss no longer apply.
  c) Owing to the defense situation off Bordeaux both U 516 and U 539 (on their way back from the Caribbean) have received orders to proceed to Trondheim not Western France.  If, however, supplies are absolutely necessary it should be possible to receive slight additions from other IXc boats in the northern half of AK.  In this case, the amount necessary and a position report is to be sent here.  U 539 reported 15 cubic meters of heavy Diesel oil needed.
  d) 1) All IXc boats on the return passage are to proceed to Norway instead of Western France when their fighting strength is exhausted unless instructed otherwise.  All boats in the East Asiatic area are also to anticipate putting into Norway instead of Western France.  As fresh supplies can only be obtained from outward bound operational boats, boats are advised to exercise the strictest economy.
    2) U 181 sends the following report on putting into Penang:
     
1) Situation report:  
  No traffic or defense activity in the western section of KR or S.W. and W. of KG.  No traffic in KG.  Aerial activity day and night by flying boats with radar equipment.  North to south traffic runs east of KG, presumably spread out.  Light LC 24 is burning.  During the full moon period the channels north and south of it have no traffic.  During the new moon period a steamer was observed making for the northern channel.  No air activity.
 
 
 
- 533 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
  No traffic observed in MS.  Apparently medium isolated traffic 30 sea miles off the coast at night in MS 55, protected by aircraft with radar.  Coastal light extinguished.  Frequent aircraft, at night, inexperienced, by day approximately 120 sea miles off the coast.  Otherwise no new observations.
2) Aircraft locations:  
  At dusk on 15.7. in MS 5647 and MS 5591; on 16.7. in MS 5846; on 29.7. in LO 4829.  Picked up on "Wanze" on 173 centimeters, on 15.6. in KG 2895.  On "Borkum" on 16.7. in MS 5847.
3) Aircraft sightings:
  Dusk on 14.6.  Flying boat in KG 4928.  During the day on 16.7. in MS 5825 aircraft, probably Beaufighter.  At dawn on 4.8. heavy aircraft in LE 5948.
4) Sinkings:
  At 0411 on 1.5. in FS 5931, freighter in ballast, course 1750.  Name understood to be "Birmingham", more likely "Benavon" according to silhouette.  At 1935 on 19.6. in LW 7346, freighter "Caroot" carrying sugar and coal to Durban, course 1900.  At 1703 on 19.7. in MS 7944, freighter "King Frederic", course 1050, carrying salt from Port Said to Calcutta.  At 2213 on 15.7. in MS 5569 scored a hit with one magnetic and one impact fuze, amidships a heavily laden 6,000 GRT freighter on a course of 3400.  Heavy damage resulting from magnetic fuze.  Did not await certain sinking, submerged owing to aircraft with loud radar.  Otherwise no steamers sighted.
4) Torpedoes used:
  8 electric torpedoes, 7 of which scored hits, one unexplained failure.
6) Anti-aircraft armament:
  3.7 cm. gun in action (full automatic) until the end, after numerous repairs.  2 cm. gun showed signs of wear and tear eventually, and was therefore unreliable.
7) Damage sustained:
  On 16.7. in MS 5824 while in pursuit hydrophone bearing of aircraft.  Attack by 2-engined aircraft from great eight.  4 well-placed depth-charges at depth A-40 meters.  usual damage.  Tube 6 bent.  One T5 out of action.  The other only to be fired with
 
 
 
       
- 534 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
  "SS" setting.  Otherwise engine damage which became apparent on entering the operational area remained however within (reasonable) limits.
8) "Bachstelze":
  Torn away and lost during first attempt owing to faulty repair.  Pilot saved.
9) W/T:
  Every W/T transmission from the operational area was a tragedy.  No W/T messages were heard on the first sending, if ever.  Short signal book 41 need overhaul.  The immediate reaction of the enemy (also on the transmission of short signals) was often observed.  All Fu. MBs (radar) were in action until the end.  "Wanze" was only switched on in especially dangerous areas as there was an inadequate supply of spare parts.
10) Weather condition:
  In general unfavorable during S.W. monsoon owing to numerous rain showers, squalls of hurricane strength and variable visibility.
11) Boat type proved its practicability.  In areas with heavy air patrols, the small compressed air supply, which only allows for 4 crash dives - was a dangerous weakness.  Ventilation and air cooling apparatus inadequate for the tropics.
12) Crew:
  Again proved efficient.  Owing to long submerged passage and extensive operations in equatorial areas this operation tested the limits of endurance.
    3) U 865 broke off operations for the third time on 13.8. owing to schnorchel breakdown.  Flotilla reported in this connection that there the impression prevails that the crew is not familiar with the equipment.  After construction of a new schnorchel head, therefore, the boat is to be transferred to Horten for overhauling and training the crew.  The case of U 865, strengthens the belief that the high number of losses (in about July) of boats proceeding through the Iceland Passage to the Atlantic can also be attributed to schnorchel breakdown owing to inexperience of the crew.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 535 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
15.August 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
Op(CA 80)
U 482
-
AO 16
U 548
-
BF 92
U 861
-
GZ 28
 
170
-
CF 38
484
-
AO 16
680
-
AO 16
862
-
Op(KP 89)
 
198
-
LL 27
516
-
BE 76
772
-
AF 54
863
-
AK 25
 
228
-
BF 64
518
-
CB 97
802
-
CC 39
979
-
AO 16
 
244
-
AF 46
530
-
DQ 79
804
-
Op(BD 50)
1062
-
KZ 91
 
245
-
AO 16
539
-
BE 79
855
-
Op(AK 37)
1221
-
AO 16
 
300
-
AF 55
541
-
BE 83
858
-
Op(AK 86)
1223
-
AO 16
 
396
-
AF 59
543
-
BF 82
859
-
Op(MP 60)
1229
-
AK 75
 
398
-
AO 16
546
-
Op(EU 90)            
                         
 
Western Boats:
 
U 270
-
BF 6850
U 963
-
BF 5530
U 413
-
Op(BF 31)
U 736
-
Op(BF 24)
 
608
-
BF 6850
214
-
Op(BF 25)
445
-
BF 6450
741
-
Op(BF 35)
 
618
-
BF 6470
218
-
Op(BF 24)
480
-
Op(BF 31)
764
-
Op(BF 35)
 
621
-
BF 5530
275
-
Op(BF 32)
650
-
BF 5530
984
-
Op(BF 35)
 
766
-
BF 9310
333
-
Op(BF 31)
667
-
Op(BF 22)
989
-
Op(BF 25)
 
953
-
BF 6850
385
-
BF 5440
671
-
Op(BF 31)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 198 - 300 - 396 - 516 - 530 - 539 - 543 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 285 - 925 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) 45 aircraft of 19 Group were confirmed in the Biscay area.
    2) U-boat sightings:
     
18 Group:
0819
U-boat in AF 8463.
 
0826
submerging U-boat in AF 8465 (U 427?).
19 Group:
0220
U-boat in BF 2492.
 
0400
ASV location in BF 6714 (U-boat?).
    3) Enemy units were located in:  AM 5720 - 7126 - 5540 - BF 5550 - CD 3673.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Western boats:
    1) Channel boats received orders to proceed to Norway on completion of operations.  The
       
- 536 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      following boats are not in a position (to do this) as fuel supply is inadequate = U 214, 667, 333, 984 and 671.
      Up to now, no more boats on transfer passage have put in.  Anxiety exists for U 608, 766 and 270 (carrying relief commander).  All without Schnorchel.
    2) Transport situation:
      As there have been no further requests for armament from Brest and also as no armour-piercing shells, etc. have been delivered, it is intended to operate the boats U 262 and 714 (in La Pallice ready for action) in the Channel, then on return to home waters.  Instructions for this have been given.
      From 17.8., U 195 will also be available as a transport boat.
      Cargo for U 180 has not yet been altered.  The boat has not yet put out.
     Group Command "Mitte":  Nothing of interest.
    Group Command Baltic:  Nothing of interest.
    Atlantic boats:  
  b)  Nothing of interest.
  c)  As no fuel report has been received from U 516 it is presumed that the boat has reached Norway without additional supplies.  U 539 received orders to proceed to AK 10 in order to take on board the necessary 15 cubic meters of fuel from U 855.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 537 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Position of U-boats on 1st August 1944
       
I.   
In service on 1st July 1944:
434
Recently commissioned type VIIC 8
    XXI 3
    XXIII 3
14
       
448
Out of action "U 123"    
1
Losses: Operations    
23
  At home    
4
In service in 1st August 1944    
420
In addition foreign boats: Operations
2
    At home
4
       
II. Losses in July 1944:
 
Atlantic and Indian Ocean
Type VII: U 243, 269, 390, 441, 478, 678, 767, 971, 988, 1191 - at sea
  and U 415 in Brest harbor
=
11
Type IXC: U 505, 1222, 1225
=
3
Type IXD2: U 860
=
1
North Sea: U 361, 742
=
2
Group "Mitte": U 317, 319
=
2
Mediterranean: U 586, 642, 952 destroyed in Toulon harbor in air attack (continued)
=
3
Gulf of Finland: U 250
=
1
Home waters:      
Type VIIC: U 239, 1164 sunk during air attack in Kiel harbor by time bomb.
=
3
Type XXIII: U 2323 sunk in Kiel harbor by time bomb
=
1
Type IXD2: U 872 sunk in air attack at A.G. Weser-Bremen on 29.7.
=
1
   
27
       
III. Distribution of boats:
    
 
II
VII
VIIC
VIID
VIIF
IXC
IXD1
IXD2
In operations area
  6
-
108
2
3
32
2
8
Trials
-
-
126
-
-
22
-
6
Training
31
2
  53
-
-
  4
-
-
 
37
2
287
2
3
58
2
14
 
 
 
- 538 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    
 
XB
XIV
XVII
XXI
XXIII
total
foreign
In operations area
2
1
-
-
-
164
2
Trials
1
-
4
4
3
166
-
School
-
-
 -
-
-
90
4
 
3
1
4
4
3
420
       
 
During July 1944:    
To operations area :   +
7
(+ 25)
Decrease of total:   -
14
(- 9)
Decrease of number of boats in operations area:   -
24
(+ 7)
Number of trial boats increased with 4 losses    
        (U 239, 872, 1164, 2323):   +
4
(- 13)
Increase in training boats:   +
6
(- 3)
(+ 6 boats from operations area to training area)    
(+ 1 boat        "        "        "            for firing instruction).    
       
IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1st August 1944:
    
Atlantic (including Landwirt boats)
92
Mediterranean  
8
Northern Waters: Northern Waters operation
29
  Group Command "Mitte"
15
  Torpedo supply
2
Black Sea  
6
Gulf of Finland  
12
   
164
       
V. In Atlantic in July:
    
Daily average at sea:
34
if which in operations area:
13
on passage:
21
of these, on return passage
7
       
VI. Put out in July:
    
Home waters to the Atlantic
7
  to Northern Waters
0
  to Group Command "Mitte"
0
 From France to the Atlantic
22
 From Group "Mitte" to Gulf of Finland
8
 
 
 
- 539 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix 2 to Naval War Staff (2nd Division)/
B.d.U. Op. Most Secret 356 ING. of 6.8.44.
       
   
U 243 1st trip.  Last message on 27.6. from Western Channel.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 269 Veteran boat.  Last report on 18.6.  Put out of Peter Port.  Loss due to aircraft.
U 390 2nd trip.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 441 Old veteran boat.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 478 1st trip.  Last report on 30.6. east of Iceland.  Loss probably caused by aircraft.
U 678 1st trip.  Last report on 22.6. south of Iceland.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 767 1st trip.  Last report 6.6. south of Iceland.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 971 1st trip.  Last report 24.6. western Channel.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 988 1st trip.  Last report on 18.6. from western Channel.  Loss probably due to aircraft.
U 1191 1st trip.  Last report on 12.6. west of Ireland.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 415 Loss due to mine in Brest.
U 505 Veteran boat, new commander.  Last report on 14.5. in Gulf of Guinea.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 1222 1st trip.  Last report 11.-. Biscay area, cause of loss unknown.
U 1225 1st trip.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 860 1st trip.  Last report by U 198 in Indian Ocean on 4.7.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 361 2nd trip.  Last report on 17.7. in Northern Waters.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 742 2nd trip.  Last report on 18.7. from Northern Waters.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 317 1st trip.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 319 1st trip.  Last report on 15.7. North Sea.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 586 On 5.7. lost in Toulon in aircraft attack.
 
 
 
- 540 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   
U 642 On 5.7. lost in Toulon in aircraft attack.
U 952 On 5.7. lost in Toulon in aircraft attack.
U 250 1st trip.  No report.  Loss in Gulf of Finland.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
- 541 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
The deployment of U-boats in the invasion and
Invasion endangered area
       
5.VI. 
           Continuing the building up of the Group "Landwirt" laid down in the U-boat disposition of 1.6., the following figures were reached up to the beginning of the invasion:
   
8
VIIC boats with schnorchel
   
28
VIIC boats without schnorchel.
           The boats were distributed among the four Biscay ports Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire and La Pallice.  A transfer of U-boats to the doubtless most endangered Channel area could not be carried out, as there were no U-boat shelter berths in the Channel ports.  The absence of these boats owing to continuous pre-invasion air attacks must therefore be reckoned with.
           As anticipated, Senior Officer U-boats West assumed command of Group "Landwirt" - later renamed Group West - at the beginning of the invasion.  This measure proved dislocated just at the time when all the countermeasures were put into operation.  The boats themselves were informed of the decisive importance of their operations, of the predictable operational opportunities and of defense conditions, also of the lessons learnt from the Group "Dragoner's" Channel operations.
       
6.VI.
        When the first report of large groups of paratroops and gliders west of Trouville and in western Normandy was received at 0305 on 6.6., it was at once realized that this was the beginning of the invasion.
           The following deliberations on the use of U-boats are relevant.  They are based on the idea of the decisive nature of the invasion and the necessity, therefore, of putting into operation all the stratagems of warfare.
  1)  The attacking of the invasion fleet in the Seine area.  This are can only be reached by schnorchel boats and even for these penetration exceedingly difficult.  It can be presumed that the enemy will resort to all measures available to prevent a U-boat penetration.  If and when the U-boats break through to the Seine area, they have great chances of success, being in the center of heavy supply traffic, apart from which they would be difficult to locate and counter attack.
  2) Commander-in-Chief has decided to operate non-schnorchellers (i.e. those lying in Brest) in the Plymouth Bay area against the invasion supply lines.
 
 
 
- 542 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  3)  As further landing operations are anticipated at other points, the following measures are to be put into force:
              The non-schnorchellers in the Western are are to be disposed in the area most threatened (the Biscay coast), as a reconnaissance screen.
              The outboard-bound schnorchel boats having reached the North Atlantic are ordered to proceed at maximum cruising speed to Western France, in order to be nearer the invasion area.
              Seven schnorchelless boats east of Iceland are to remain there for the present until it is clear whether landings in the Norway/Denmark area are to be expected or not.
              A six hour readiness appears sufficient at present for the boats of Group "Mitte" (South Norway area).
           On the night of the invasion all the measures given in these deliberations were carried out.  35 of the 36 West boats put out up to 0015 on 7.6.  The 8 schnorchel boats proceeded to BF 3184, the 7 non-schnorchellers proceeded to the area south of Plymouth, one boat to the area between the Lizard and the Scillys.  19 non-schnorchellers occupied the area off Biscay along the 200 meter line (approximately) as reconnaissance screen.
           In order to bring the boats into operation at the earliest possible moment they are to proceed full speed ahead at night on the surface.  This order signifies a considerable risk for the boats and is only given in view of the extreme necessity.  It is at the beginning of the invasion that everything is to be thrown into the fight regardless of heavy losses.
           The anticipated heavy enemy aircraft operations (daily figures of 19 Group: 90 to 100 aircraft) was an immediate consequence of the boats emergence.  6 boats reported 9 aircraft attacks on putting out, and apart from this, 18 Radio Intelligence reports of U-boat sightings and attacks were received.  Which shows the large scale operations called forth by the mass sailing alone.
           Subsequently it was possible to ascertain that at least two boats were lost during the night.  3 boats were forced to put in again as a result of damage received in aircraft attacks.  Further, during the following night, 2 boats were sunk in the persistently heavy aircraft operations.  The greater part of the crew was rescued, however.  Two more boats were damaged and forced to put in.  These heavy losses forced the command to permit submerged passage at night also.
 
 
 
- 543 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
                   The following table shows the difficult and hazardous nature of the operations:
   
Air attacks from 6th to 11th June
Boats Reported attacks Total Loss Put in owing to damage
   
8 schnorchellers
5
   
28 non-schnorchellers
24
   
 
 
Total
29
   
   
       
           Only the reported attacks are taken into consideration.  It was evident from the commanders reports on putting in, the boats experienced far more attacks (than those given).
           The appearance of destroyer groups off Brest indicated the possibility of an invasion in the Biscay area.  As a counter-measure, the reconnaissance screen was brought closer to the coast - to about the 100 meter line, so that they should be closer at hand in the event of a landing.
       
9.VI.
           The following is a picture of events up to 9.6.
           No information of schnorchel boats.  An evaluation of the operation of these boats can only be made when a report has been received, and this can scarcely be expected before they berth.  Deployment of non-schnorchel boats is not practicable in the Western Channel.  Of seven boats, five were forced to put in again owing to damages.  The remaining two were ordered to put in, but as they have not done so, they must be presumed to have been sunk on putting out.
           The non-schnorchellers in the Biscay area cannot for the moment be recalled for the following reasons:
           In the event of an invasion in the Biscay area, they would be bottled up in the ports by air attacks as well as the anticipated heavy mining operations.  Boats are to remain at sea until the enemy's intentions can be seen more clearly.  In order to avoid heavy losses and damage by strong enemy air defence and to shorten the time necessary for battery charging, the boats are to lie on the bottom as much as possible.  Boats in port without schnorchel are not to put out again.
       
   12.VI.
           By 12.6., the situation showed that imminent danger of a Biscay landing no longer existed, and there was therefore no reason for keeping the non-schnorchellers at sea.  Boats received orders to put
 
 
 
- 544 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
in, as persistent enemy air operations were resulting in heavy losses, wear and tear, without corresponding chances of success on our side.  They are remaining in port to be ready for action within six hours, is necessary.
           The question again rises in this connection whether it is better to hold a large number of boats ready for action in ports in Western France, or to send them out on operations in the Atlantic.
           To be taken into consideration is the fact that although the danger of invasion in the Biscay area is slight, it cannot be entirely ruled out.  As well as this, the possibility of an enemy attack on Brittany, where the French Resistance Movement is increasingly active and shipping movements are continually confirmed, is apparent.
           As a result of U-boat operations in the Atlantic the following could be expected:
           Withdrawal of enemy air and surface craft from the invasion area for protection of Atlantic convoys whose escorts were probably weakened as a result of the invasion.  It is questionable, however, whether in fact such a diversion of forces would result.  The enemy has at his disposal sufficient forces to be in both areas at full strength.  Also, nowhere has it been shown that he has actually postponed any operations in favor of the invasion.
           And even if the Atlantic operations had the desired effect, it is still questionable whether the deployment and chances of success would justify such an action.
           These operations would most certainly result in heavy losses.  In the case of non-schnorchellers, on the long outward passage, as well as in the waiting period of uncertain length probably necessary, owing to ignorance of enemy movements, before the finding of a worthwhile target.
           Experience of the past year has shown the high losses and small chances of success incurred, for example, in an attack on a convoy, by a far larger number of boats.
           In spite of this, such or similar operations would have to be undertaken if the boats were not required to repel further landing attempts.  These, however, must still be reckoned with.
           Naturally, heavy losses must also be expected in these operations.  The possibility, though, of finding and attacking targets in this area is obviously greater than in the Atlantic, and above all the targets are more important.
           Although two years ago "Norway's first line of defence lay in American waters", in other words where the bulk of the shipping was, today this maxim no longer holds good.  It is more important
 
 
 
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to sink an L.S.T. in the invasion area for example, than a Liberty ship in the Atlantic.
           Finally, to sum up:
           Operations in the Atlantic with West boats would mean heavy losses and small direct successes - the diversionary effect would be doubtful.
           At the moment it is more important to hold the boats in readiness for possible landings in the West, where the losses would not be less, but the chances of success greater and isolated successes of significance.  The boats are therefore to remain in port ready for action.
           At the same time, delivery of schnorchels from home is to be speeded up, and these boats are to be equipped with them, so that by the middle of August about 10 boats can put out with schnorchel.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
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Evaluation of Non-Schnorchel Boats
       
Put out for Plymouth Bay
8
boats
Lost
3
"
Put in owing to damage
5
"
Put out for Biscay area
19
"
Lost
2
"
Put in owing to damage
8
"
       
That means:
  Plymouth Bay:  losses 37.5%, put in owing to damage 62.5%.
  Biscay:                losses 10.5%, put in owing to damage 42%.
       
Success:
  2 mining operations carried out on English S. coast.
  7 aircraft shot down.
       
Further development of Channel operations
       
Subsequent survey of boats sailing from Western France - first to Seine area.
Put out for Seine area
8
boats
Lost on passage
1
"
Turned back owing to damage         before reaching         operations area
4
"
Reached operations area
3
"
Lost
1
"
Put in
2
"
       
That means:
  25% losses.
  25% operations area reached and return passage.
  50% did not reach operations area.
       
11.VI.
           These facts, however, were not at first known.  The command estimated that the appearance of the first boats in the Seine area would take place on about the 11.6., as for the first time a Radio Intelligence report was received during the night of a U-boat (hydrophone effect).  In order to increase the effect of U-boats against the invasion fleet, 5 boats proceeding to the Atlantic from home waters, are ordered to the Channel area so that now altogether 9 boats will be able to operate in this area, not including the West boats which have put out in the meantime.
       
18.VI.
           Up to 18.6. there has been absolutely no news - apart from U-boat sighting reports in the Seine area.  It is wondered whether the boats have even reached the operations area, or whether they have been sunk on the outward passage by heavy air and chaser patrol groups, also whether in this confined shallow water (depths 40 - 60 meters) it is not all too easy to sink a boat once it has been detected.  This uncertainty over the
 
 
 
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situation and operational possibilities in the landing area makes it doubtful whether the order to proceed direct to the Channel from home waters can be carried out.  On the other hand the order must stand because of the decision to throw all resources into the invasion warfare.
           The first two boats to put into Guernsey, confirm the view that penetration into the operations area is extremely difficult owing to the very heavy patrol activity especially along the line Land's End - Brest, Plymouth - Channel Islands.  Nevertheless the boats navigated the southern section of the Channel.  It is to be presumed that it is in these sections that the enemy patrols are heaviest.  Boats following are ordered to keep to the north.  Their for the most part unobserved passage, as it was revealed later, confirms this conjecture.  The reports of these two boats of bombing attacks on schnorchel even when inaccurate, are disturbing.
           As these raids also took place at night there can be no doubt that the enemy is locating the schnorchel by radar.  The passage out is therefore more difficult; in the operations area the great number of targets will make location scarcely possible.  It is evident that a passage through the western Channel to the operational area is only possible through determined relentless endurance and absence of U-boat chaser attacks.
           As the situation at Cherbourg necessitates the supplying of armament by sea, and no other means are available, 4 schnorchel boats were to be detailed for this.  This operation is contrary to all U-boat practice, which, with its complicated equipment, is a highly developed instrument of war, and not a means of transport.  The decision to use the boats for this, however, is explained by the total ignorance of operational possibilities of U-boats in the landing area.  The situation has developed so quickly that the boats are no longer able to reach Cherbourg and have put in again.
           As up to 20.6., neither the boats' reports nor news from other sources had clarified the situation, the boats longest in the operations area were requested to report; this, however, they were unable to do.
       
23.VI.
           At last two boats put in on 23.6.  The reports are very positive.  They sank one destroyer, one destroyer possibly, and one L.S.T. of 3,000 GRT.  Unfortunately one boat had several unexplained misses.  Chances of success in the Seine area are good; there is practically no defence owing to unfavorable hydrophone and radar conditions.
           The approach is, however, as already mentioned and previously conjectured - tricky.
           Boats have to miss good opportunities for firing either because the submerged speed is too slow or because traffic passes overhead in this busy area and nothing can be done about it.  These facts are encouraging for boats
 
 
 
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   of type XXI and XXIII:
  a) in the case of submerged passage with schnorchel and their good approach to sighted, as well as hydrophone located, targets owing to their high submerged speed.
  b)  the possible exploitation of all chances of firing with deep firing of "LUT".
       
30.VI.
           These reports then, are the only ones received up to the beginning of July, which again sets problems for the command.  Apart from this, the previously received U-boat sighting and Radio Intelligence reports are almost completely lacking.  A new summing up of the situation is, however, significant in the event of a decision to send a continuous stream of boats into the Channel; there is nothing to show that the defence situation previously experienced is still the same and that the two returned boats did not strike particularly favorable circumstances.  The following survey shows the uncertainty of the situation:
   
Reckoned to be in the operations area 9 boats
Subsequently confirmed, however, only 4 reached the area
                                             the remaining 5 lost
           Owing to the obscure situation in the Seine area, 3 more boats from home and 2 from Western France are not to proceed to the Channel.  They have received orders to return - as have the 5 boats in the Channel area (according to reckoning).  A new picture of the U-boat situation in the invasion area can be obtained only after these boats have put in.  Wireless reports cannot be expected.
       
4.VII.
           The first of these boats put in on 4.7. and brought enlightenment.  The previous experiences were confirmed to the fullest extent.  The boat turned back without encountering serious opposition having sunk 2 ships of 15,000 GRT and torpedoed one ship of 9,000 GRT.
           This finally proves that U-boats can operate throughout the Seine area and that the boat is enabled through the use of the Schnorchel to operate in heavily air patrolled areas, though it must not be overlooked that schnorchelling is full of surprises.  Until now, bombing attacks on schnorchel have been very inaccurate.  The slight defence operations following attacks in the operations area may be attributed to the fact that the enemy is unaware of U-boats in this area - only suspecting mines or perhaps small forces.  The experiences will be confirmed by other returning boats.
       
Summary:
  1)  Deployment was right and considering the circumstances, successful.  Defences slighter than anticipated and only considerable in the western section of the Channel.
 
 
 
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    Successes and losses were in proportion - bearable, if one does not take the boats lost proceeding to the Biscay area into consideration.
  2)  Deployment of boats from home without ports of call in Western France was too difficult.  Of a total of 8 boats ordered to the Channel, 2 were presumably lost in the Biscay area and 4 more in the Western Channel.  Of the two latter, one put in in Western France before reaching the Channel area, the other put in to Boulogne after being heavily damaged in the Seine area.  That means a loss, then of 75%.  Reasons for these heavy losses are obscure.  Probably due to the inexperience of the commanders and crew for whom this task was too difficult.  For the purposes of comparison the same proportions for the Western boats are given.  Of the 18 boats which put out only 2 were lost in the same area.  That means 11% losses.
  3)  The losses of boats at home were considerable, even before reaching the North Atlantic - due to heavy air attacks shortly after putting out.  A renewed examination of the question of whether to send these boats through the North Sea and the Straits of Dover must lead to a negative conclusion, in consideration of the lack of experience of the crews and in view of the navigational difficulties.
  4)  The results up to the end of July are satisfactory throughout, but not decisive.  The effectiveness of these boats, however, is far greater than that of the U-boats in the Atlantic in the last three months, quite apart from the fact that a ship sunk in the landing area is of more value than one sunk in the Atlantic.  All the commanders of Channel boats expect great things of future operations.  When one considers that it was considered impossible to navigate this area several weeks ago, these successes say much for the schnorchel, without which operations against the landing fleet would have been impossible.
       
           Summarized survey of successes and losses of Schnorchel boats on operations in the Channel up to 31.VI.
       
       
                                                                      (Signed):  GODT
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
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