F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 March 1944

PG30342

     
     
 
1.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GF 87
U 262
-
Op(BE 41)
U 541
-
BF 57
U 764
-
Op(BE 47)
 
JT 24
-
JA 87
267
-
BF 49
546
-
Op(AK 94)
801
-
BF 48
 
66
-
Op(EV)
281
-
BE 65
549
-
Op(BD 41)
802
-
AJ 93
 
91
-
Op(BE 47)
333
-
Op(BD 39)
550
-
Op(AK 24)
843
-
CF 67
 
123
-
Op(ET 50)
358
-
Op(BE 41)
552
-
Op(BE 41)
845
-
Op(BB 63)
 
154
-
DO 41
392
-
BF 55
575
-
BF 57
846
-
BE 66
 
168
-
KH 67
413
-
Op(AM 40)
603
-
Op(BE 44)
851
-
AN 23
 
170
-
CE 11
421
-
CF 62
608
-
Op(BD 63)
852
-
EH 43
 
178
-
JA 36
437
-
Op(BD 66)
618
-
CG 16
856
-
AF 72
 
183
-
Op(LC)
441
-
Op(BD 39)
621
-
BE 22
962
-
Op(BD 69)
 
188
-
KS 90
448
-
Op(BE 17)
625
-
BF 55
963
-
Op(BE 42)
 
212
-
Op(BE 45)
488
-
BE 98
650
-
BF 57
985
-
BE 46
 
214
-
CF 31
510
-
Op(MP)
672
-
BF 74
986
-
AL 17
 
218
-
DG 25
518
-
ED 14
709
-
Op(BE 41)
989
-
BF 44
 
255
-
AE 69
532
-
KS 90
741
-
BF 55
1059
-
AK 85
 
256
-
Op(BE 72)
537
-
BF 54
744
-
BE 37
1062
-
FL 16
 
257
-
BF 48
539
-
Op(BB 66)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 188 - 257 - 281 - 650 - 846 - 985 - 989.
  Entered Port:  U 537 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 421 (going to Mediterranean) was attacked at 0310 by a plane in CG 5586.
    2) U 441 reported in addition to her radio message of the previous day:  "Star shells were from search group.  Bow tube T 5 missed, stern tube T 5 hit after 2 minutes 25 seconds, noise of ship sinking.  Pursued by another destroyer until 2200, few series of depth charge patterns, returning because of condition of submarine.   Position 6362.
    3) On 26.2. in EV 7154 U 66 sank a steamer (5,000 GRT) belonging to an eastbound convoy and heard another hit followed by noises of sinking.   Boat was heavily depth charged.  Slight damage.  On 1.3. a single ship (7,000 GRT) with escort was sighted in EV 5877, course E., speed 8 knots; steamer was sunk.  Boat also passed a report of fuel reserves (90 cbm) for U 123 dated 26.2.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) At 0320 Gibraltar based plane was over a surfaced submarine in CG 5558, course 1800, speed 10 knots.  The same plane sent out an SOS at 0338 from CG 5835, course 1650, speed 100 knots.  (See paragraph III a) 1).
       
- 139 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) 2 ASV locations in unspecified positions.
    3) Enemy units were located in:  BE 3747 - 4680 - AL 6397 - MQ 75, AM 7340.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Group "Preussen" is en route to the attack area ordered.  U 986 has newly joined the group and as seventeenth boat has been allocated the most northerly attack area (AK 9322).
  b) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
 
U 66 3 ships 17,000 GRT
U 441 1 destroyer  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
Enclosure for War Diary 1.3.44
Submarine situation report
Situation during January/February
       
1) Course of battle:
  a) North Atlantic:
     After the patrol strip of Group "Ruegen 1-6" had been disbanded on 7.1.44 the boats were stationed singly between 61 and 500 N. and 18 - 240 W.  During January the boats were shifted several times and brought closer to the North Channel.  At first things went well.  The enemy's air and naval anti-submarine defence measures were tolerable, our boats were able to slowly edge in the direction of the North Channel as far as the W. edge of square AM.
     The first enemy sightings showed that the enemy was scattered thickly all over the whole area without any special focal point.  But shortly after, the small number of sightings and Radio Intercept Intelligence led to the conclusion that the enemy was partly by-passing even the widely spaced submarine positions in the N. and S.  Hence the submarines on the N. and S. wing were moved in a little to the E., forming more or less a semicircle of boats round the North Channel covering the inward and outward courses which we assumed were followed by the enemy.
    Despite this watch on the convoy routes, contacts with the enemy remained comparatively rare.  The causes were as follows:
      the usual bad weather conditions, particularly in the northern part of the position.
      also - the most important factor - the need for boats to remain submerged during the day and surfaced at night.
 
 
 
- 140 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     It must be assumed that many convoys and single ships passed through the boats' patrol area without being picked up by them because of their short reconnaissance range.  (Hydrophone range by day; at night the bad weather and heavy rolling of the extremely top heavy boats greatly reduce the visibility range).
    Operations against a "KMS" convoy
     On 27.1. a "KMS" convoy was observed by air reconnaissance in the North Channel.  The southern half of the "Ruegen" boats stalked it.  This operation (Group "Hinein") - see War Diary 28.1.44 - was unsuccessful because of insufficient reconnaissance reports.  Having completed their operation, the boats returned to their former semi-circle.
     Several boats pursued a convoy steering S.W. which was sighted by U 764 on 3.2. in AL 99.  An attempt was also made to pick up a northbound convoy, sighted by aircraft in BE 50, by gathering together the southern boats in the patrol area.   Neither achieved any sinking of merchant shipping.
    Towards the end of January stronger anti-submarine measures, especially in the southern area of the patrol, were already making themselves felt.  The first reports of locating the air attacks were received, radar location of enemy anti-submarine units confirmed that patrols had been increased.   After U 985 had sunk a steamer in AM 10 on 8.2., enemy air attacks increased in the northern area of the patrol, thus compelling Operational Control to move the boats farther W. again.  This fitted in well with the plan to co-operate with G.A.F. Commander for Atlantic Area (Fliegerfuher Atlantic) and carry out an attack off the North Channel on an "ONS" convoy in the period from 14 to 18.2. with all available submarines and planes.  The boats would in any case have had to be moved to the W. for this operation.
    Operation against "ONS" convoy from 14 - 19.2.44
     The operation carried out by Group "Hai" was unsuccessful - see War Diary 19.2.44.  After it had been closed the boats moved away at first to N.W., then they were stationed in loose formation in the area between AK 60 and BE 40.
    On 27.2. the boats were concentrated in the area BD 60, BE 40 in order to intercept an "ON" convoy which was due to arrive, according to an intercepted radio message.  However, the enemy was not contacted.
    Successes in the North Atlantic:
     January:  3 ships totaling 23,000 GRT, 7 destroyers;
    February: 3 ships totaling 17,000 GRT, 12 destroyers.
  b) Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean
    Only 2 boats (U 123, U 66) were in the Mid-Atlantic operational area, 3 boats (U 530 - 129 - 516) were returning, 5 boats (U 154 - 518 - 218 - 177 - 170) were en route to operational area.
 
 
 
- 141 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Successes in the Mid-Atlantic:
     January:  2 ships totaling 22,000 GRT;
     February:  1 ship of 9,000 GRT.
    6 boats operated in the Indian Ocean, 5 of them "Monsun" boats (U 178 - 188 - 532 - 168 - 183 based at Penang) and U 510.  Of these boats, U 188 achieved very good successes in the area off the Gulf of Aden.  There were other sinkings by U 178, U 532, U 168.  The high proportion of torpedo failures (due to being stored too long in tropics; torpedoes were obtained from German blockade runners and were in store at Penang for over a year) prevented the great successes that were expected.
    Successes in the Indian Ocean:
     January:  1 ship of 7,500 GRT;
     February:  9 ships totaling 58,500 GRT.
       
2) Single submarines:
  a) Behavior on approach route:
     The strength of the enemy anti-submarine air force dictates behavior in the Bay of Biscay.  Boats proceed submerged as far as 180 W. and are only allowed to surface at night to re-charge.  At the beginning of January some boats armed with 3.7 cm. guns tried charging during the day, but they had to give up the idea after a few days.  In three daylight attacks reported by the boats one boat was lost, one was badly and one slightly damaged.  This again proved that bombing attacks are more dangerous by day than by night.
     The numerical strength of enemy anti-submarine air forces (according to Radio Intercept Intelligence) amounts to an average of 30 machines a day.  This number varies according to the weather in the south of England, it is particularly high when "KMS" and "MKS" convoys are passing.
    The increased attacks by 19th Group noted at the beginning of January (see also enclosure to War Diary of 6.1.) have not been repeated.  The number of Radio Intercept reports of sighted submarines, or of ASV locations have remained about the same; even after "Thetis" buoys (decoys) had been laid they did not increase.
    The necessity for remaining submerged in approach areas (Biscay, Iceland and Shetland Passage), considerably lengthens the approach period, hence reduces the period spent in the real operational area.  Whereas right up to the Spring of 1942 the boats reached 180 W. in about 3 - 5 days, they now need about 10 - 12 days with an average daily run of 60 miles, i.e. time required to get to the area and back together represent the length of an entire operation in 1941.
 
 
 
- 142 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     Time spent in the approach area represents a considerable physical and mental strain for the crews.  The run through Biscay represents:
    20 - 22 hours a day submerged, constantly lurking danger of sudden attack by enemy air and anti-submarine forces, stinting use of battery and compressed air, fights with enemy air forces when batteries are being charged, nervous wear and tear from never ceasing noise from exploding depth-charges and bombs, and from watching the radar observation gear.  The strain is especially high for boats that have been damaged in the operational area and return with limited diving capacity.
    It has been proved that a purely defensive attitude while approaching had a bad effect on the readiness to attack of some commanders and crewsThis influence must be energetically combated in the case of operational boats by constant instruction by the S.O. Flotilla, by F.d.U. and B.d.U., in the case of boats based at home by the training authorities.
  b) Behavior in Operational Area:
     Boats are stationed singly in attack areas 20 - 40 miles in depth widely scattered between 48 and 610 N.  During the day they submerge to favorable depths for listening or to periscope depth (very long wave radio routine schedule), and surface at dusk.  At night they set course according to wind and sea.  Type VII C boats have become so top heavy through the installation of heavy anti-armament and bridge armour that angles of roll up to 60 are not unusual and in rough weather a continuous roll of 300 to each side are reached.  The physical effort required in bad weather is very great, especially on bridge watch, visibility range is greatly reduced in these unfavorable conditions.
    When the enemy is observed during the day by listening or periscope the submarine immediately attacks or surfaces and after reporting the enemy hauls ahead.  However, contrary to earlier procedure, the boat breaks off pursuit and dives if many enemy planes appear or if own defences are weak (bad servicing of weapons through sea way, fear of sudden attack when clouds are low).  If the submarine is not able to catch up with the enemy the following night, she must follow up and search at full speed during the day even if contact has been lost.
    If the sighting takes place at night the attack is not to be broken off even if boat knows she is being located or if planes appear.
     All boats that are in favorable position when another boat reports the enemy are to stalk him day and night, using the same methods as those given for single boats.  This co-operation of several boats has so far taken place once in the case of the convoy sighted by U 764 on 3.2.
 
 
 
- 143 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    When attacks on convoys are carried out in co-operation with G.A.F. Commander for Atlantic Area, submarines approach the area submerged to cover own movements.  The convoy is attacked from a patrol area for one night only, during which the boats must close in on the convoy with great determination, taking no notice of enemy locating activity.  As the 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns at present on the boats are not sufficient protection against attacking planes, the attack is to be broken off on the following day if strong enemy air forces or carrier-borne planes are observed.
  c) Influence of enemy location:
     Boats must always be prepared for surprise attacks by enemy planes in the operational area as well.  Thus their behavior is largely influenced by their radar intercept gear, with which unfortunately only the actual location can be observed, not the type, distance, and direction of the locating enemy.
     When location is observed at night the boat should dive immediately, on the assumption that it is being located by a plane.  Very often the hydrophones will show that the boat is being located by a destroyer or corvette, which is approaching the area where the boat dived.  It is then too late to surface, the boat is forced on the defensive; usually she has to lie low while depth charges are dropped.
    If, after this experience, the boat remains on the surface when next she intercepts location, she will probably have to put up with a bomb attack.  So in this case her behavior is also wrong.
    As the present radar interception gear cannot pick up all the location-frequencies used by the enemy, or (because of technical inadequacy and damage to the antennae caused by sea impact) locations that are capable of being intercepted are not intercepted, sudden attacks by naval or air forces often occur without previous warning from radar intercept gear.  It is therefore not surprising that with the constant danger of being attacked and the unreliability of radar interception many boats - especially those with young, inexperienced commanders - are purely defensive in their outlook.  On many occasions chances of attacking convoys or scattered single ships have not been pressed home with sufficient force by some commanders - because of constant apprehension that the enemy had already detected the boat - thus the chances of achieving successes have been spoilt.
    This "Defensive" attitude will presumably disappear when the radar intercept gear or an actual radar location set makes it possible to establish the direction, type and distance of the enemy.
       
3) Losses:
  The loss of 9 boats in the North Atlantic during January was still tolerable.  However, during February surprisingly high losses occurred, which are as yet inexplicable.
 
 
 
- 144 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  In detail:
 
January
In Biscay
Cruising
In operations area
Attacking convoy
426 F
645 X
364 F
757 X
263 T
641 X
305 X
972 F
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
February
377 X
177 F
545 F
264 G
592 X
761 Z
283 F
238 G
762 X
544 F
386 F
734 X
666 G
571 X
271 X
424 X
406 X
231 X
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(Key:) Established or supposed reasons for loss:
 
F -
attack by plane  
 
Z -
attack by destroyer  
 
T -
breakdown in diving dear  
 
G -
convoy units (sea or air)  
 
X -
no clue.  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  Whereas there was no clue to the loss of 4 boats in January, in February the number had risen to 9.  When the positions given in the last reports were registered, it was established that the majority were probably lost somewhere about square BE 10.  The danger of this area has been shown by reports from submarines and confirmed by direction finder bearings on numerous anti-submarine units and patrolling planes.  Certainly, in most cases loss may be assumed to be due to sudden air attack.
  Losses in February were very high.  They show the merciless hardness of present day submarine warfare.  In future, even more caution must be used, as, if such high losses continue, the number of submarines in the Atlantic will fall below a tolerable level.
  Despite the bitterness of the struggle, the bearing of commanders and crews is, as always, above all praise.  Although aware of our heavy losses, although constantly pursued and fatigued, the "submariner" remains undaunted.  Never sparing himself, relentless against fate, filled with hatred for the enemy, trusting his arms and confident of victory, he keeps on with the unequal struggle.
       
4) Number of submarines:
    The number of boats on 1.1.1944 was 130, by 1.3.1944 it had fallen to 109.  This was due (apart from the constant departure of
 
 
 
- 145 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  boats for the Mediterranean) to the high losses, whereas only a thin trickle of boats has been coming from home waters.  The small number of boats coming from home into the Atlantic is explained as follows:
  a) Because of the importance of attacking the "PQ" convoys in Northern Waters, which have been running again since December 1943, orders were given to increase the 18 submarines in Northern Waters to 24 on 29.12.43 to 30 on 10.1.1944, with an additional 3 boats with experimental conning tower.  Of a total of 11 boats which left Kiel in January, 6 went to Northern Waters, and of the 16 which left in February another 8 went there.
  b) So as to have submarines ready for immediate action in the case of an enemy landing in Norway or Jutland, the order was given on 16.2.1944 that 10 of the VIIC boats leaving Kiel should be kept ready for action in south Norwegian harbors.
     These boats were distributed as follows:
     
Bergen
-
4 boats )
Christiansand
-
4     " )  Group "Mitte"
Stavanger
-
2     " )
     This number of 10 boats will be reached by about 10.3.  From this time on, each time a boat leaves Kiel one boat from Group "Mitte" will go into the Atlantic, i.e. the normal replacements of operational submarines from home waters will recommence.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GP 24
U 262
-
Op(BD 39)
U 541
-
BF 57
U 764
-
Op(BE 72)
 
JT 24
-
JL 22
267
-
BF 72
546
-
Op(AK 91)
801
-
BF 71
 
66
-
Op(EV 83)
281
-
BE 69
549
-
Op(BD 18)
802
-
AJ 95
 
91
-
Op(BE 72)
333
-
Op(BE 11)
550
-
Op(AK 22)
843
-
CF 83
 
123
-
Op(ET 50)
358
-
Op(BE 14)
552
-
Op(AL 72)
845
-
Op(BB 63)
 
154
-
DN 66
392
-
BF 57
575
-
BF 91
846
-
BF 55
 
168
-
KH 97
413
-
Op(AM 40)
603
-
Op(BE 17)
851
-
AF 76
 
170
-
CD 35
421
-
CG 59
608
-
Op(BD 36)
852
-
EH 57
 
178
-
JA 38
437
-
Op(BE 17)
618
-
CG 19
856
-
AF 47
 
183
-
Op(LC 24)
441
-
Op(BE 44)
621
-
AL 95
962
-
Op(BD 63)
 
188
-
KS 90
448
-
Op(BE 14)
625
-
BF 46
963
-
Op(BE 42)
 
212
-
Op(BE 45)
488
-
CF 33
650
-
BF 64
985
-
BE 55
 
214
-
CF 37
510
-
Op(MP)
672
-
BE 92
986
-
AK 38
 
218
-
DG 19
518
-
EC 38
709
-
Op(BE 41)
989
-
BE 45
 
255
-
AE 68
532
-
KS 90
741
-
BF 46
1059
-
AK 88
 
256
-
Op(BE 75)
539
-
Op(BB 60)
744
-
BE 26
1062
-
FL 19
 
257
-
BF 49                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 188 - 183 - 257 - 281 - 650 - 846 - 985 - 989.
  Entered Port:  U 650 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 415 - 653 - Brest;  U 667 - St. Nazaire.
       
- 146 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 744 sank 3 small tankers totaling 3,000 GRT in BE 5221 (confusion with landing craft appears probable).
    2) On 29.2. U 183 sank large modern tanker (12,000 GRT) in LD 4379, course 1300, 16 knots, with 4 hits after one pistol and one Ga (torpedo) failure.  The boat also fired the following torpedoes, all misses:
      21.2. in LD 4253 2 electric torpedoes at a Liberty freighter with torpedo nets, course 1900, 10 knots (judging by hydrophone bearing one torpedo was definitely a Ga failure).
      In LD 4532 2 air-driven torpedoes fired at vessel of C 1 class, course 1700, 12 knots, and in LD 4665 2 air-driven torpedoes fired at the same freighter, course 1000, 10 knots.  Boat is returning via LC 10 with one air-driven torpedo.  (Failures are due to the torpedoes being stored for a long time in Penang).
      Situation in Colombo area:
     
1) Single ships at intervals along the coast 20 - 35 miles out.  4290 is a favorable waiting position as outward steamers can be picked up early in the evening and inward ones early enough for them to be chased in darkness.
2) Defences:
  Sea:  constant patrolling by single patrol vessels and destroyers with planes.  Almost all vessels have constant air escort during the day.
  Only three sightings beyond 200 miles.
  Night air patrols:  In 4558 plane approached, no bombs.  Other than that, only many lighted planes were seen landing behind the main harbor.
3) Location:
  Apart from the night air patrols and repeated exact illumination by searchlights at very long range from the main harbor and patrol, nothing is known.
4) Hydrophone conditions variable, pronounced density layering.  All in naval square LD.
    3) U 741 was attacked by a plane at 0522 in BF 4645.
  b)  None.
  c) 1)
a) U-boat sightings:  Plane of 19th Group sent a radio message to Plymouth at 2200 reporting submarine in unspecified position and at 2210 reporting a submarine in BF 1897, course 1800, 11 knots.
       
- 147 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
b) Another plane belonging to 19th Group was over a submarine at 1330 and at 1333 over a submerging submarine, course 1800, 12 knots.  Both positions unspecified.
c) At 2010 plane was over a diving submarine, course 1200, 10 knots.  No position stated.
    2) ASV location in BF 1892.
    3) Enemy units were located in LB 12, AE 9920, AM 5719, BE 2380 and 6450, BF 4460, CG 8120.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 802 manned operational area BB 70 with focal point off Halifax.  She proceeded there via CC 30 and CB 24.
  c) U 123 was ordered to move out of the operational area in such a way that she would reach ER 60 with at least 30 cbm. of fuel.  She is to refuel there from U 488.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 744 3 ships
3,000 GRT
U 183 1 tanker
12,000 GRT
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GP 29
U 262
-
Op(BD 33)
U 541
-
BF 73
U 764
-
Op(BE 72)
 
JT 24
-
JL 21
267
-
BF 71
546
-
Op(AK 68)
801
-
BE 92
 
66
-
Op(EV)
281
-
BE 47
549
-
Op(BD 45)
802
-
BC 26
 
91
-
Op(EE 72)
333
-
Op(BE 11)
550
-
Op(AK 24)
843
-
CF 85
 
123
-
Op(ET 50)
358
-
Op(BD 33)
552
-
Op(AL 75)
845
-
Op(BB 63)
 
154
-
DN 68
392
-
BF 73
575
-
BF 82
846
-
BF 61
 
168
-
KS 38
413
-
Op(AK 40)
603
-
Op(BE 17)
851
-
AF 72
 
170
-
CD 37
415
-
BF 55
608
-
Op(BB 36)
852
-
EH 86)
 
178
-
JA 55
421
-
CG 57
618
-
CG 17
856
-
AE 69
 
183
-
LC 24
437
-
Op(BE 14)
621
-
AL 92
962
-
Op(BD 36)
 
188
-
KS 90
441
-
BE 42
625
-
BF 49
963
-
Op(BE 42)
 
212
-
Op(BE 45)
448
-
Op(AL 77)
653
-
BF 55
985
-
BE 56
 
214
-
CF 53
488
-
CF 36
667
-
BF 67
986
-
AK 63
 
218
-
DG 17
510
-
Op(MP)
672
-
BE 95
989
-
BF 55
 
256
-
Op(BE 75)
518
-
EC 61
709
-
Op(BE 41)
1059
-
BD 24
 
257
-
BF 57
532
-
KS 90
741
-
BF 45
1062
-
FL 52
 
255
-
AE 91
539
-
Op(BB 60)
744
-
BE 52      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 257 - 281 - 846 - 985 - 989.
  Entered Port:  U 846 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 148 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 845 turned back from operational area off Newfoundland because of lack of fuel.  Boat observed single ships proceeding via BC 88, course 2200.  Day and night air patrolling.
    2) At 2153 U 741 was again attacked by a plane in BF 4466.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  Surfaced boat in BF 5462, course 3100, speed 8 knots.  At 1950 surfaced submarine, no position, course or speed given.
      American steamer sighted submarine in BB 8690 (probably U 539).  Later an American patrol vessel also reported the boat.
    2) English steamer reported torpedo attack in LC 9919 (U 183?).
    3) Enemy units were located in BE 3381 - 3340 - 3380 - AM 7790 - 5610 - BF 1460 - BC 2369 - BD 2944.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Group "Preussen" is in the attack area ordered.
  b) New operational areas are being manned as follows:  U 744 the sea area off AE 4840 (Reykjavik).  U 154 in square EB and S. of it, with focal point off Colon.
    U 170 coast of Florida.  U 621 North Minch.
     Experience gained and shipping reports were radioed to these vessels.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
4.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GP 62
U 257
-
BF 58
U 532
-
KS 90
U 741
-
BF 44
 
JT 24
-
JL 10
262
-
Op(AK 99)
539
-
Op(BB 60)
744
-
BE 21
 
66
-
Op(EV)
267
-
BE 92
541
-
BF 75
764
-
Op(BE 72)
 
91
-
Op(BE 72)
281
-
BF 57
546
-
Op(AK 95)
801
-
BE 95
 
123
-
Op(ET 50)
333
-
Op(BE 11)
549
-
Op(BD 48)
802
-
BC 29
 
154
-
DN 83
358
-
Op(AL 77)
550
-
Op(AK 23)
843
-
DH 19
 
       
- 149 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
168
-
KS 65
392
-
BF 92
552
-
Op(AL 75)
845
-
BC 68
 
170
-
CD 52
413
-
Op(AM 40)
575
-
BF 84
851
-
AF 47
 
178
-
JA 58
415
-
BF 49
603
-
Op(BE 17)
852
-
EH 89
 
183
-
LB 39
421
-
CG 48
608
-
Op(BE 36)
856
-
AE 68
 
188
-
KS 90
437
-
Op(BE 14)
618
-
CF 63
962
-
Op(AK 33)
 
212
-
Op(BE 45
441
-
BE 54
621
-
AL 65
963
-
Op(BE 42)
 
214
-
CF 65
448
-
Op(AL 71)
625
-
BF 48
985
-
BE 65
 
218
-
DF 63
488
-
CF 86
653
-
BF 54
986
-
Op(AK 93)
 
255
-
AE 83
510
-
Op(MP)
667
-
BF 83
989
-
BF 28
 
256
-
Op(BE 75)
518
-
EC 52
672
-
BE 91
1059
-
BD 19
             
709
-
Op(BE 41)
1062
-
FL 49
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 281 - 441 - 845 - 985 - 989.
  Entered Port:  U 989 - Brest;  U 667 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 629 - Brest;  U 466 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None
  c) 1) 2 ASV locations in unspecified position (Biscay).
    2) Convoy guardship 120 was located in the area BE 14, BD 36.
    3) Enemy units were located:  AK 8730 - AL 9472 - AM 7739 - BF 1186.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) U 741 - 625 - 575 - 653 - 415 have been given AL 70 as new approach point, and later are to join Group "Preussen".
    2) Group "Preussen" is manning the attack areas allocated.  Its transfer to the N. is planned.
  b) The Japanese submarine "Kiefer" will report 4 days before being met by escort.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 150 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
5.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GQ 47
U 257
-
BF 57
U 518
-
EC 48
U 709
-
Op(BE 41)
 
JT 24
-
JL 18
262
-
Op(AK 99)
532
-
KS 90
741
-
BE 65
 
66
-
Op(EV)
267
-
BE 91
539
-
Op(BB 90)
744
-
AL 94
 
91
-
Op(BE 72)
281
-
BF 64
541
-
BF 77
764
-
Op(BE 72)
 
123
-
Op(ET 50)
333
-
Op(BE 11)
546
-
Op(AK 95)
801
-
BE 97
 
154
-
DN 82
358
-
Op(AL 77)
549
-
Op(BD 49)
802
-
BC 55
 
168
-
KS 90
392
-
BF 77
550
-
Op(AK 24)
843
-
DH 44
 
170
-
CD 46
413
-
Op(AM 50)
552
-
AK 66
845
-
BD 47
 
178
-
JA 76
415
-
BF 48
575
-
BF 76
851
-
AE 69
 
183
-
LB 69
421
-
CG 44
603
-
Op(BE 17)
852
-
ER 35
 
188
-
KS 90
437
-
Op(BE 14)
608
-
Op(BE 36)
856
-
AE 91
 
212
-
BE 55
441
-
BE 56
618
-
CF 69
962
-
Op(AK 33)
 
214
-
CF 92
448
-
AL 44
621
-
AL 03
963
-
Op(BE 42)
 
218
-
DF 64
466
-
BF 67
625
-
BE 44
985
-
BF 44
 
255
-
AE 85
488
-
CF 88
629
-
BF 55
986
-
Op(AK 93)
 
256
-
Op(BE 75)
510
-
Op(MP)
653
-
BF 45
1059
-
BD 46
             
672
-
BE 16
1062
-
FL 86
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 281 - 441 - 532 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  U 281 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 92 - Brest;  U 155 - 537 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 539 is returning from operational area off Newfoundland because of lack of fuel.  (Boat refueled U 516 while on her outward trip, thus was able to spend only a short period in the operational area).
      Situation:  4.3.  At 1730 in BC 3820 a 3-funnelled vessel, course N.E.; at 2030 a 2-funnelled vessel with a destroyer, course S.W., both moderate speed.  1.3.  In BC 4632 part of a convoy, course S., speed 10 knots.  According to torpedo reserves, boat fired several torpedo misses.
    2) U 510 reported situation in Gulf of Aden:
     
a) 22.2.  Convoy, 13 tankers, 6 freighters (C 1 class), 2 destroyers, course 2500, 10 knots.  Powerful air patrolling by day, no night air patrolling.  At night surface location.  Successful use of "Aphrodite" (radar decoys).
b) Boat stalked and sank in MP 5511:  tankers, 8,000 GRT and 10,000 GRT, freighter, 7,000 GRT, another freighter (7,000 GRT) on fire and sinking after a hit.  In MP 5435 hit amidships on another steamer of 7,000 GRT.  (One electric torpedo depth setting 7 meters with magnetic pistol).
c) During the following night constant location, and a swarm of destroyers came out at first light.  Judging
       
- 151 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
  by the destroyer courses and hydrophone bearings, a S.E. convoy course was suspected.  Because of batteries, boat was not able to follow up for 6 hours.  Nothing more found.
d) Experience gained:  No regular air reconnaissance, only escorts for convoys and patrolling of routes.  No sign of location.  No air patrols at night.  Brisk surface radar from convoys, inexperienced.  Boat still has 10 torpedoes and is going to begin a protracted return on 11.3. via MS and will operate in the area MS, LC.
    3) U 672 sighted 3 destroyers in BE 1662 at 1420, course 800, very slow speed. 
    4) U 537 was attacked by a plane at 0505 in BF 5548 (outward route).
    5) U 629 reported plane attack at 0023 in BF 4642, and three hours later that she was returning home because the main port switchboard was out of action.
  b) None.
  c) 1) 3 U-boat sightings in unspecified positions.
    2) 1 ASV location, unspecified position.
    3) Plane reported attack on submarine in ED 7268 after "Horchfuehlung" (Trans: The original was given in brackets in the German text "Attack sound contact").
    4) British Admiralty broadcast submarine warning for MQ 82 (Eick).
    5) Radio guardships were located:
     
a) ship 120 in AL 97/98 and AL 88.
b) guardship of convoy group "BSC" in AL 42/51 and AL 55.
c) ship 377 in AM 5461 and AM 55.
    6) English units were located:  BD 2990 - DJ 1660 - CF 5680 - BC 2760 - AL 8732 - AL 7590 - AL 7540 - AL 6990 - AM 5460 - AM 5290.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Group "Preussen" - 12 boats - is manning the earlier attack areas.
  b) 1) New approach areas and operational areas planned:
      U 856 - CF 20 (Newfoundland).
      U 801 - ET 50 (Coast of West Africa, S. of Freetown).
      U 541 - DD 60 (Caribbean).
 
 
 
- 152 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 392 and 466 (boats intended for the Mediterranean) have been ordered not to cross the longitude from DJ 2455 to the E. before the 15th or 17th, as U 421 and U 618 have not yet begun their direct trip, and direct approach by all 4 boats at short intervals must be avoided.
  c) Rendezvous with "Brake" for U 532, U 168 and U 188 to refuel is fixed for 11.3. in JD 1631.
    In order to reconnoiter the refueling area in advance, U 532 is to take up station at once at the rendezvous.  U 188 is to man a square 200 miles N. and U 168 a square 200 miles W. of the rendezvous.
  d)  The Japanese submarine "Kiefer" should enter Lorient on 11.3.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 510                5 ships totaling 39,000 GRT including 2 tankers.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GQ 76
U 256
-
Op(BE 75)
U 532
-
KS 90
U 709
-
Op(BE 41)
 
JT 24
-
JL 19
257
-
BF 57
537
-
BF 54
741
-
BE 61
 
66
-
Op(EV)
262
-
Op(AK 99)
539
-
BD 18
744
-
AL 58
 
91
-
Op(BE 72)
267
-
BE 82
541
-
CG 12
764
-
BE 81
 
123
-
Op(ET 50)
333
-
Op(BE 11)
546
-
Op(AK 92)
801
-
CF 36
 
154
-
DN 84
358
-
Op(AL 77)
549
-
Op(BD 41)
802
-
BC 82
 
155
-
BF 55
392
-
CG 13
550
-
Op(AK 24)
843
-
DH 71
 
168
-
KS 90
413
-
Op(AM 50)
552
-
AK 03
845
-
BD 49
 
170
-
CD 47
415
-
BF 44
575
-
BF 74
851
-
AE 68
 
178
-
KZ 81
421
-
CF 92
603
-
Op(BE 17)
856
-
AE 83
 
183
-
LB 99
437
-
Op(BE 14)
608
-
Op(BE 36)
852
-
ER 66
 
188
-
KS 90
441
-
BE 64
618
-
CF 67
962
-
Op(AK 33)
 
212
-
BE 64
448
-
AL 19
621
-
AM 17
963
-
Op(BE 42)
 
214
-
CF 96
466
-
BF 86
625
-
BE 66
985
-
BF 45
 
218
-
DF 59
488
-
DH 12
629
-
BF 46
986
-
Op(AK 93)
 
255
-
AE 87
510
-
Op(MQ 89)
653
-
BF 44
1059
-
BD 73
 
92
-
BF 55
518
-
EC 48
672
-
BE 12
1062
-
FS 32
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  U 155 - 537 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 228 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sighted at 1800 by plane based on Iceland, position unspecified, course 1900, 14 knots.
       
- 153 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) ASV location made by plane of 15th Group, position unspecified.
    3) Unidentified steamer in unidentified position sighted a periscope on the port beam at 0835 and at 0852 reported "Have been torpedoed".  May have been in the Mediterranean.
    4) Guardship 123 was located in AM 45.
    5) English units were located:  AL 5425 - AM 4740 - 5730 - 5290 - AK 6430 - 6670 - BE 5931 - CF 3439 - CG 2720 - 1710.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Group "Preussen" is proceeding N. at economical cruising speed.
    In reply to query who would be returning by 12.3., U 256 reported return date as 12.3.
     It has been planned that the Group shall be stationed singly in such a way that the Great Circle course taken by outward convoys will be covered.  Radio Intercept Intelligence gives reason to suppose that 2 convoys have followed the Great Circle instead of steering very southerly courses as before.
  b) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GQ 86
U 256
-
Op(BE 48)
U 532
-
JD 12
U 741
-
BE 29
 
JT 24
-
JL 19
257
-
BF 57
539
-
BD 51
744
-
AL 55
 
66
-
Op(EV)
262
-
Op(AK 69)
541
-
BE 94
764
-
BE 83
 
91
-
Op(BE 45)
267
-
BE 57
546
-
Op(AK 68)
801
-
CF 38
 
92
-
BF 54
333
-
AL 86
549
-
Op(BD 19)
802
-
BC 87
 
123
-
Op(ET)
358
-
AL 71
550
-
Op(AK 25)
843
-
DG 95
 
154
-
DN 78
392
-
CG 12
552
-
AK 37
845
-
BD 58
 
168
-
JC 36
413
-
Op(AM 40)
575
-
BE 93
851
-
AE 67
 
170
-
CC 93
415
-
BE 66
603
-
Op(BE 11)
852
-
ES 71
 
178
-
KJ 71
421
-
CF 96
618
-
CF 95
856
-
AE 85
 
183
-
LM 39
437
-
Op(AL 78)
621
-
AM 16
962
-
Op(AL 74)
 
188
-
KT 73
448
-
AL 15
625
-
BE 65
963
-
Op(BE 15)
 
212
-
BE 68
466
-
BF 81
629
-
BF 52
985
-
BF 49
 
214
-
CF 99
488
-
DH 17
653
-
BE 66
986
-
Op(AK 66)
 
218
-
DF 81
510
-
Op(MQ 80)
672
-
AL 73
1059
-
BD 78
 
228
-
BF 58
518
-
Op(EB 60)
709
-
Op(BE 14)
1062
-
FS 35
 
255
-
AL 31
441
-
BE 65
608
-
Op(AL 77)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
       
- 154 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Entered Port:  U 629 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 190 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Plane based on the Azores reported between 1300 and 1400 "Am over a submarine", position unspecified.
    2) At 1951 English plane reported ASV location, position unspecified.  Probably connected with this was a message from another plane at 2025: "Have attacked enemy with impact fuze.  Hit not observed".
    3) ASV location made by plane of 19th Group in BF 4325.
    4) Enemy units were located in AM 4853 - 6410 - 4550 - 7250 - 5440 - 4644 - 5454 - AN 5949 - BF 2410.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) New stations for Group "Preussen" - 15 boats:
   
U 985
-
AL 1738  
U 603
-
AL 4569
262
-
AL 1867  
741
-
AL 4726
358
-
AL 1956  
267
-
AL 4865
962
-
AL 0186  
709
-
AL 7215
672
-
AL 4129  
625
-
AL 8125
437
-
AL 5148  
963
-
AL 7542
608
-
AL 4515  
91
-
AL 8435
   
256
-
AL 8726
  b) U 625 reported when she made her passage report that her port Diesel, "Naxos" and "Wanze" (radar interception gear) has broken down.   Boat has been instructed how to make repairs.  The big end bearing requested will be handed over to Group "Preussen" by U 963.
  c) Rendezvous for U 178 and U JT 22 to transfer "Naxos", "Borkum" and radio equipment on 11.3. in JJ 4185 at 1200 mean local time.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GZ 13
U 255
-
AL 22
U 510
-
Op(MQ 40)
U 709
-
Op(BE 11)
 
JT 24
-
JL 19
256
-
Op(BE 42)
518
-
Op(EB 60)
741
-
BE 25
 
66
-
Op(EV)
257
-
BF 57
532
-
JD 16
744
-
AL 29
 
91
-
Op(BE 18)
262
-
Op(AL 44)
539
-
BD 56
764
-
BE 95
 
92
-
BF 42
267
-
BE 51
541
-
BE 66
801
-
CF 65
 
123
-
Op(ET)
311
-
BF 55
546
-
Op(AK 95)
802
-
CC 32
 
       
- 155 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
I.
U 154
-
DN 77
U 333
-
AL 91
U 549
-
Op(BD 43)
U 843
-
DT 12
 
168
-
JC 36
358
-
Op(AL 44)
550
-
Op(AK 25)
845
-
BD 67
 
170
-
CC 94
392
-
CF 36
552
-
Op(AK 26)
851
-
AE 83
 
178
-
KY 99
413
-
Op(AM 40)
575
-
BE 92
852
-
ES 72
 
183
-
LM 66
415
-
BE 62
603
-
Op(AL 78)
856
-
AE 87
 
188
-
KT 72
421
-
CG 74
608
-
Op(AL 74)
962
-
Op(AL 47)
 
190
-
BF 55
437
-
Op(AL 75)
618
-
CF 96
963
-
Op(AL 78)
 
212
-
BE 69
441
-
BF 44
621
-
AM 10
985
-
BF 49
 
214
-
DH 32
448
-
AL 11
625
-
BE 21
986
-
Op(AL 19)
 
218
-
DF 72
466
-
BF 76
653
-
BE 62
1059
-
CD 35
 
228
-
BF 83
488
-
DG 63
672
-
Op(AL 48)
1062
-
FS 38
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  U 311 - Brest;  U 190 - Lorient; U 228 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 667 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 741 was attacked by a plane in BF 4657 on 2.3.  2 low-level attacks, 2 flares. Run-in observed at 3,000 meters in radar location gear, boat turned away.  Apparently not noticed.  Another low-level run-in with blue light (Bengal light), boat turned away after gunfire, 3 planes were picked up at 6,000 - 12,000 meters in radar location gear, dived.  3 more radar locations at distances of 6 - 14,000 meters without run-in. On the whole radar location gear proved its worth, boat made accurate anti-aircraft fire based on radar location measurements shortly before sighting.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Submarine sighted in BF 4519, surfaced boat, course 1800, 6 knots.  Unspecified position.  3 further sightings in unspecified positions.
    2) 5 ASV-locations in unspecified positions.
    3) U-boat sighting (probably underwater location) in unspecified position.
    4) Guardship "BLX" located in area BE 7110 - 60.
    5) Enemy units were located:  AM 5140 - BE 2490 - BE 4620.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  U JT 24 reported position in JC 4120.  Boat is still in the refueling area, as she has not received two radio messages.  Boat has been ordered to move away to the E. at economical cruising speed to refuel from "Brake".
       
- 156 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GZ 22
U 256
-
Op(BE 15)
U 518
-
Op(EB 50)
U 709
-
Op(AL 75)
 
JT 24
-
JC 43
257
-
BF 57
532
-
JD 16
741
-
BE 16
 
66
-
Op(EV)
262
-
Op(AL 01)
539
-
BD 65
7444
-
AL 27
 
91
-
Op(BE 12)
267
-
BE 19
541
-
BE 85
764
-
BE 93
 
92
-
BF 41
333
-
AL 92
546
-
Op(AK 95)
801
-
DH 52
 
123
-
Op(ET 20)
358
-
Op(AL 41)
549
-
Op(BD 45)
802
-
CC 23
 
154
-
Op(EC 15)
392
-
CF 39
550
-
Op(AK 25)
843
-
DT 17
 
168
-
JC 36
413
-
Op(AM 14)
552
-
AK 38
845
-
BD 69
 
170
-
CC 88
415
-
BE 61
575
-
BE 67
851
-
AE 85
 
178
-
JJ 25
421
-
CG 76
603
-
Op(AL 72)
852
-
ES 71
 
183
-
LM 93
437
-
Op(AL 57)
608
-
Op(AL 48)
962
-
Op(AL 45)
 
188
-
KT 73
441
-
BF 45
618
-
CG 78
963
-
Op(AL 75)
 
212
-
BF 47
448
-
AL 11
621
-
Op(AM 10)
985
-
BF 45
 
214
-
DJ 11
466
-
BF 55
625
-
BE 88
986
-
Op(AL 17)
 
218
-
DE 96
488
-
DG 68
653
-
BE 61
1059
-
CD 38
 
255
-
AL 17
510
-
Op(MQ 40)
667
-
BF 58
1062
-
FS 38
             
672
-
Op(AL 44)
856
-
AL 31
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 629 - 311 - Brest;  U 766 - 993 - Kiel to Northern Waters.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 575 reported when she made her passage report that she had sighted 2 steamers and 2 destroyers at 2300 in BE 8284, course 100, 12 knots.  At 0154 on 9.3. boat fired a T 5 at a destroyer, detonation after 12 1/2 minutes, then "Naxos" location and starshell fired by second destroyer.  Bow T 5 miss was fired at approaching destroyer at a range of 800 meters.  Submarine was pursued for 18 hours by hydrophone and depth charges (destroyer was possibly sunk, clarification impossible until submarine returns).
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Periscope sighted in CG 9555, 1 ASV location in unspecified position.
    2) Radio guardships were located as follows:  "BLX" in BD 4748; "142" in BE 51, BE 34, BE 19.
    3) Enemy units were located in: AL 6780 - AM 6190 - AM 6175 - BE 6110 - 3870 - BF 2294.
       
- 157 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) U 255 has joined Group "Preussen" and is manning AK 3869, to a depth of 40 miles.
  b)  None.
  c)  U JT 24 is to wait for "Brake" to arrive in JC 5451, and refuel for return journey.   U 183 has been given the same square for refueling and according to dead reckoning should arrive there about 19.3.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
GZ 38
U 257
-
BF 57
U 532
-
JD 16
U 741
-
Op(AL 87)
 
JT 24
-
JC 54
262
-
Op(AL 18)
539
-
BE 44
744
-
AL 23
 
66
-
Op(EV)
267
-
BE 12
541
-
BE 76
764
-
BF 71
 
91
-
Op(AL 84)
311
-
BF 55
546
-
Op(AK 91)
801
-
DH 49
 
92
-
BE 63
333
-
Op(AM 40)
549
-
Op(BD 67)
802
-
CC 21
 
123
-
Op(ET 20)
358
-
Op(AL 19)
550
-
Op(AK 25)
843
-
DS 66
 
154
-
Op(EB)
392
-
CF 62
552
-
Op(AK 27)
845
-
BE 48
 
168
-
JD 14
413
-
Op(AM 40)
575
-
BE 57
851
-
AE 84
 
170
-
DE 12
415
-
BE 29
603
-
Op(AL 45)
852
-
ES 78
 
178
-
JJ 19
421
-
CG 84
608
-
Op(AL 45)
856
-
AL 22
 
183
-
LW 36
437
-
Op(AL 54)
618
-
CG 78
962
-
Op(AL 01)
 
188
-
KT 79
441
-
BF 46
621
-
Op(AM 10)
963
-
Op(AL 75)
 
212
-
BF 48
448
-
AD 85
625
-
Op(AL 81)
985
-
BF 49
 
214
-
DJ 15
466
-
BF 77
629
-
BF 55
986
-
Op(AL 17)
 
218
-
DE 98
488
-
DG 91
653
-
BE 24
1059
-
CD 64
 
255
-
Op(AL 38)
510
-
Op(MQ 40)
667
-
BF 57
1062
-
FL 83
 
256
-
Op(AL 87)
518
-
Op(EB)
672
-
Op(AL 41)      
             
709
-
Op(AL 72)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 183 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None (see paragraph IV d).
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) On 9.3. at 2200 U 255 suddenly came upon convoy in AL 1771.   T 5 was fired at approaching destroyer.  Detonation and noise of sinking after 27 seconds.  Subsequently followed by hydrophone for 3 hours.
       
- 158 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) At 1423 U 845 sighted a convoy in BE 1960, course 200, 8 - 10 knots.  Boat was to attack if position favorable, otherwise to move away and not make any further reports, as no other submarine was near.
    3) U 575 sighted a destroyer at 2217 in BE 4956, course NE.
    4) On 9.3. U 183 sank a tanker (5,000 GRT) at anchor.  She fired her last torpedo through the S.W. entrance of Addu Atoll (group of islands in LN 2726) and the vessel sank on fire.  Patrol boats with location gear were shaken off by means of "Aphrodite" (radar decoys). Day air patrolling only near the islands.  Islands fortified, especially the entrances.  High radio towers, barracks.
    5) U 653 stalked the convoy reported by U 845 and at 0030 sighted formation of destroyers in BE 2451, course 200, high speed; at range of 4,000 meters submarine fired T 5 from stern tube.  11 minutes 35 seconds later explosion from the destroyer, definite noises of sinking.
    6) See paragraph IV d).
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  0425 in AL 9485, 0042 in unspecified position with same time of origin as report of attack by U 256 in AL 8574.
      6 other sightings, some with details of course, in unspecified positions.
    2) ASV locations in AL 8780 - BF 4864 - BF 4258 - BF 1888.  3 other ASV locations in unspecified positions.
    3) Guardship 142 ("MKS" convoy) was located several times in BE 28/29.
    4) According to radio reconnaissance, escort for approaching Japanese submarine was observed at 1205, with course 600, speed 12 knots.
    5) Enemy units were located in:  AM 7970 - 8870 - BE 6150 - 7372 - 3150.
    6) At 1620 American steamer sent SOS from CG 4575, torpedoed, crew leaving the ship.  At 1640: "Ship abandoned".  Position not definite, probably Mediterranean.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) The Japanese submarine "Kiefer" was met at 1100 by the escort (2 destroyers, later also 2 torpedo-boats).  Still on return journey.
 
 
 
- 159 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  Rendezvous in EH 5895 from 20.3. for U 843 and U 801 to refuel from U 488.  U 123 has been ordered to be at this point on 22.3., or on 27.3. in EH 7585 to refuel for return journey.
  d)  At 1630 and 1655 U 625 sent distress report from AL 8521, boat was badly damaged, sinking.
     Boats within a radius of 100 miles were ordered to go to U 625 and report this by short signal.  U 741 reported position in AL 8726 (75 miles away) and U 256 in AL 8574 (95 miles away).  At 0452 U 256 was attacked by a plane while en route.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 255 1 destroyer  
U 183 1 ship 5,000 GRT.
U 653 1 destroyer  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
JJ 41
U 257
-
BF 57
U 532
-
JD 16
U 709
-
Op(AL 72)
 
JT 24
-
JC 54
262
-
Op(AL 18)
539
-
BE 46
741
-
Op(AL 85)
 
66
-
Op(EV)
267
-
BE 12
541
-
BE 75
744
-
AL 21
 
91
-
Op(AL 84)
311
-
BF 46
546
-
Op(AK 91)
764
-
BF 48
 
92
-
BE 38
333
-
Op(AM 44)
549
-
Op(BD 44)
801
-
DH 75
 
123
-
Op(ET 20)
358
-
Op(AL 19)
550
-
AK 18
802
-
CC 12
 
154
-
Op(EB 60)
392
-
CF 65
552
-
Op(AK 20)
843
-
DS 67
 
168
-
JD 16
413
-
Op(AM 44)
575
-
BE 48
845
-
BE 51
 
170
-
DD 36
415
-
BE 24
603
-
Op(AL 45)
851
-
AE 79
 
178
-
JJ 41
421
-
CG 85
608
-
Op(AL 45)
852
-
FD 16
 
183
-
LN 67
437
-
Op(AL 51)
618
-
CG 87
856
-
AL 14
 
188
-
JD 16
441
-
BF 46
621
-
Op(AM 10)
962
-
Op(AL 01)
 
212
-
BF 83
448
-
AD 82
625
-
Op(AL 85)
963
-
Op(AL 78)
 
214
-
DJ 16
466
-
BE 99
629
-
BF 46
985
-
BF 55
 
218
-
DQ 24
488
-
DG 89
653
-
BE 52
986
-
Op(AL 17)
 
255
-
Op(AL 38)
510
-
Op(MQ)
667
-
BF 49
1059
-
CD 91
 
256
-
Op(AL 85)
518
-
Op(EB)
672
-
Op(AL 41)
1062
-
FL 97
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  "Kiefer" - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 155 - 190 - Lorient;  U 196 - 228 - 302 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) At 0607 U 629 was attacked by a plane in BF 4811 and at 0320 U 741 in AL 8524.
    2) At 1730 U 255 reported that she had not reestablished contact and was returning to the attack area.  At night 3 low-level attacks in naval square AL 2860 while boat.
       
- 160 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      was proceeding at half speed both engines in moonlight.  Run-in with searchlight, stick of bombs dropped; no damage.  One man badly and one slightly wounded by gunfire from aircraft.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boats were sighted in BF 4253, course 2900, speed 12 knots, and one boat by plane based on Gibraltar, position unspecified.  Besides that wake was seen in EC 5939, course 2600.
    2) Plane in Cape Town area reported diving submarine in unspecified position, and shortly after, that the boat was damaged and had surfaced again.  All planes in the area were immediately ordered to continue the attack with "DBS" (German note - "type of bomb") and machine guns until surface craft arrived to take over the operation.
      An urgent radio message was sent to 4 patrol boats, probably in connection with this attack.
    3) 3 ASV locations in unspecified positions.  Further locations in BF 7355 - 5283 - 5555 - BF 6886 and AL 9495.
    4) English units were located in AM 4724 and AM 5455.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b)  U 741 and U 256 were instructed not to give up the search for U 625 until special orders were given.  U 741 was attacked by a plane while searching.  See paragraph III a) 1).
  c)  None.
  d) 1) The Japanese submarine "Kiefer" entered Lorient according to plan.
    2) U 575 reported her experience with Schnorchel:  In areas with strong patrols of search groups it is not possible to run on the Schnorchel as it is impossible to listen.  It is also inadvisable because smoke is made.  Periscope observation is perfectly feasible.  When running on the Schnorchel "Wanze" location (radar) has been observed.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 22
-
JC 54
U 255
-
Op(AL 27)
U 510
-
Op(MQ)
U 709
-
Op(AL 72)
 
JT 24
-
Op(EV)
256
-
AL 8559
518
-
Op(EB)
741
-
AL 85
 
91
-
Op(AL 87)
257
-
BF 57
532
-
JD 16
744
-
AE 77
 
66
-
BE 29
262
-
Op(AL 18)
539
-
BE 54
764
-
BF 49
 
123
-
Op(ET 20)
267
-
BE 54
541
-
BE 74
801
-
DH 77
 
       
- 161 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
154
-
Op(EB)
302
-
BF 55
546
-
Op(AK 92)
802
-
CC 11
 
155
-
BF 55
311
-
BF 45
549
-
Op(BD 19)
843
-
DS 86
 
168
-
JD 16
333
-
Op(AM 44)
550
-
AK 51
845
-
BE 57
 
170
-
DD 34
358
-
Op(AL 19)
552
-
Op(AK 20)
851
-
AL 22
 
178
-
GZ 38
392
-
CF 65
575
-
BE 47
852
-
FD 51
 
183
-
LN 94
413
-
Op(AM 44)
603
-
Op(AL 45)
856
-
AL 15
 
188
-
JD 16
415
-
BE 21
608
-
Op(AL 45)
962
-
Op(AL 01)
 
190
-
BF 55
421
-
CG 86
618
-
CG 88
963
-
Op(AL 78)
 
196
-
BF 91
437
-
Op(AL 51)
621
-
Op(AM 10)
985
-
BF 64
 
212
-
BF 68
441
-
BF 46
629
-
BF 47
986
-
Op(AL 17)
 
214
-
DJ 24
448
-
AD 57
653
-
BE 24
1059
-
CD 89
 
218
-
DQ 43
466
-
CG 11
667
-
BF 48
1062
-
GZ 38
 
228
-
BF 91
488
-
DS 36
672
-
Op(AL 41)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 212 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 764 - 845 - 985.
  Entered Port:  U 190 - Lorient;  U 212 - St. Nazaire;  U 985 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 981 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Attacks by planes:
      U 262 on 13.3. at 2245 in square AL 18;
      U 764 at 0458 in BF 4687.
    2) When U 741 surfaced after being attacked from the air, she sighted 4 carrier-borne planes and 3 destroyers.  She was bombed and shelled and then pursued with depth charges. Slight damage.  Position square AL 4879.
    3) U 256 made a late report that she had been attacked by a plane on 11.3. at 2150 in square AL 8438.  Low-level attack with diagonal run-in, searchlight used and "Naxos" location.  Plane crashed when 1500 meters off before own fire opened up.
    4) At 2210 U 311 reported:  At 0110 radar location measurement 80 hm. square BF 4585.  Constant measurement in 2700, speed 12 knots.  Slight phosphorescence.  At 40 hm. 2 flares, then low-level attack from astern without searchlight.  A second run-in was made in the same way and 4 bombs were dropped 40 meters off the submarine, also machine gun fire.  0120 a Boeing B 17 (German note = Fortress II") was shot down.  No damage to submarine.  3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns proved their worth.
  b)  Meteorological aircraft sighted a convoy of 2 ships, 4 escorts on a course of 2900 at 0950 in AM 2274.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BE 6339, DU 81, BF 5174, course 900, speed 8 knots.
       
- 162 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      In 470 05' N., longitude W. not specified, same plane sighted a submarine 2 hours later in an unspecified position, course 1100, speed 5 knots.
      ASV location in 470 20' N., longitude W. not specified, another location in unspecified position.
    2) Radio guardships were located as follows:
      "BDT" in BE 55; "142" ("MKS" convoy) in AM 81, later in AM 5444.  Ship gave own course as 440, speed 7 knots.  Escort planes for this convoy were given several operational radio messages.
    3) Sunderland made emergency landing in AM 7243.
    4) English units were located in AM 5760, 7130, BD 3520.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 608 and U 255 were to make for AL 0176 so that badly wounded men on U 255 could be seen by a doctor.  U 255 reported that rendezvous had not been made.  Both boats have been ordered to try and meet during the night of 13-14 March, then to make for the attack area.  If unable to make rendezvous, no further attempt to be made.
    2) U 178 did not meet U JT 22 and reported a large patch of oil at the rendezvous.  On the previous day, due to constant patrolling by fast land-based planes, submarine had to remain submerged for the most part, constant air reconnaissance during the day (compare Radio Intercept report on 11.3. No. III 2)
      Further Radio Intercept reports on the subject:
      At 1307 "Simstone" sent message to 2 patrols:  "Investigate oil patch reported by plane".  At 1330:  "Submarine dived 0900".
      The loss of U JT 22 must be presumed.  Boat did not reply to request for position.
    3) According to report from U 532 "Brake" was sunk on the second day set for refueling, after U 188 had completely refueled, U 532 all but lubricating oil, and U 168 had been partially supplied.  At 1620 U 188 sighted 2 carrier-borne planes in JD 1620, U 532 sighted carrier planes and smoke plume; crew of "Brake" aboard U 168.   No observation at previous waiting positions.
      As there is no further chance of refueling, boats have been given the following instructions:
      U 183 - 168 - 532 - JT 24 to return to Penang.  Crew of "Brake" (about 125 men) is to be divided between U 168 and U 532.  U 188 is to return to home waters.
 
 
 
- 163 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    4) U 741 and U 256 have given up the search for U 625.  U 625 must be considered a total loss.  Both boats are returning to attack areas (see also III 2, 3).
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 256                1 plane
  U 311                1 plane.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
Enclosure:  Second Division Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Operations, Ref. No. 1587, dated 12.3.1944.
       
Operation of Group "Ruegen/Hinein" against "KMS" convoy
(England - Gibraltar convoy) on 25 - 27.1.44.
       
Situation at outset:
Submarines forming Group "Ruegen" had been manning the following attack areas since 21.1.44:  AM 1727 - 1958 - 4116 - 7426 - 4477 - 4761 - 7129 - 4777 - AL 3899 - 0354 - 7382 - 6649.  Other boats had a free hand in the whole assembly area.
On 24.1. an outward bound convoy was reported in the Irish Sea by the Radio Intercept Service, more exact position could not be given.  It was intended to operate against the outward bound convoy after it had been picked up by air reconnaissance.
       
Air Situation:
25.1. Reconnaissance carried out in and W. of the North Channel with a Ju 88 and 2 Ju 290.
    Ju 88:  Started from Rennes:  1241, landed at Rennes 2021.
    Flying route:  Rennes - Pt. du Raz - BF 1697 - AM 8475 - AM 5429 - AM 5283 - AM 5736 - beyond Irish territorial waters - BF 1697 - Rennes.
    2 Ju 290:  Started from M/M 0758, landed at M/M 0115 and 0125 on 26.1.
     Flying route:  A - AM 7327 - AM 0136 - AM 1876 - AM 7291.
                       B - AM 7275 - AM 1752 - AL 3862 - AM 7177.
    Radar (Fu.M.G.) on plane A broke down in AM 1876.
    Rest of reconnaissance by visual observation.
    Convoy not found!
 26.1.  Reconnaissance with a Ju 88 and 2 Ju 290s.
    Ju 88:  Started from Rennes 0813, landed at Rennes 1613.
     Flying route:  Rennes - AM 5426 - AM 5282 - AM 5345 - Rennes.
    1230 convoy in AM 5191
     18 medium sized merchant vessels, 1 tanker, course 1800, poor visibility.  Convoy might have been larger.
 
 
 
- 164 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2 Ju 290:  Started from M/M 0550 and 0606, landed at M/M 1302 and 2036.
    Flying route:  A - AM 4953 - AM 4393 - AM 0268 - AM 0216 - AM 4318 - AM 4867.
                       B - AM 7168 - AM 0174 - AM 2778 - AM 1856 - AM 1951 - AL 9632.
    Flight of plane B broken off because of technical hitch.
    1240 convoy in Am 5181 picked up with radar gear.  Visual observation not possible because of weather conditions.
       
Naval situation:
The convoy observed on 26.1. by reconnaissance planes was probably the "KMS" convoy which was established by Radio Intercept Intelligence on 24.1. in the Irish Sea - North Channel area.
The convoy was too far from the submarines on the night of 26-27 January for them to attack it.  It was therefore intended to do so during the night of 27-28 January.  8 boats belonging to Group "Ruegen" were ordered to take the cover name Group "Hinein" and to man a patrol strip from AM 7132 to AM 7628 by 1830 on 27.1.   They were to submerge by day while approaching, and to surface at 1830.  2 other boats were approaching the patrol strip from the S.  By dead reckoning the convoy should pass the waiting position about 1830.
After further air reconnaissance reports had been received it was decided to shift the patrol strip during the night of 26 - 27.1. to correspond with the reported advance course of the convoy.
       
Air Situation:
27.1. Constant renewing of contact with the convoy reported on 26.1.
    Ju 290:  Started 2138 on 26.1. from M/M, landed 1522 at M/M.
    Flying route:  M/M - S.W. corner of Ireland - AM 5778 - AM 0167 - AM 1993 - AM 4978 - M/M.
    Patrol carried out despite breakdown of radio equipment.  Results not reported until after the plane had landed.
    0455 convoy in AM 4938:  Course 2300, visual reconnaissance established:  20 merchant ships, 1 destroyer and 3 escorts.
    0955 convoy again picked up in AM 4955:  Course 2300.  1113 convoy in AM 9728, course 30 - 500.  Visual reconnaissance established:  32 merchant ships, 5 destroyers in the offing.
    Ju 290: Started 0709 in M/M.  Landed 2309 in M/M.
    Flying route:  M/M - AM 7338 - AM 4527 - 1993 - 1916 - 4458 - 7625 - M/M.
    1529 convoy in AM 4872.
    1712 convoy in AM 7212:  Course 2700.  Visual reconnaissance established about 55 merchant ships, 9
 
 
 
- 165 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    destroyers (incomplete).   Beacon signals for submarines sent from 1553 till 1730.
    1750 convoy in AM 7346, course 50.
    Special remarks:  At a range of 50 Km. radar was constantly jammed by the convoy, after a change of frequency, it was again jammed within 4 - 10 minutes.
    BV 222:  This plane was to maintain contact and send beacon signals during twilight and night.
    Flying route: AM 7388 - 4495 - 1954 - 0178 - 4564 - 4998.
    Cancelled because of engine trouble!
    Ju 290:  Started 1801 M/M.  Landed 0918 in M/M on 28.1.
    Flying route:  M/M - BE 6377 - AM 7212 - AM 4975 - AM 7387 - AM 7422 - BE 3794 - M/M.
    0023 several targets picked up in AM 7129 by radar, probably convoy.
    0046 the same in AM 4917.
     
Remarks:
   Convoy was picked up at long range.  Indications on the radar gear were insufficient, no exact details of the convoy.  When planes made their run-in and obtained more precise orientation on the targets it was established that the radar gear did not indicate at short range.  When the plane moved away to N.E. in order to approach the targets from longer range, a second convoy was observed.  When it was realized that the second convoy in AM 4917 was a northbound one that had been picked up by a Ju 290 at 1115 in AM 7928, a fresh run-in was made on the first convoy.  It was then noted that the radar equipment was not working properly and gave no further indications.  Visual observation was not possible because of weather conditions.  The pilot decided, although the targets were not definitely established, to send a radio report of the position located as "convoy report reconnaissance blue" and then broke off his task.
       
Naval Situation:
   The first report made by the G.A.F. was a late report from the Ju 290 which landed at 1522 with radio out of action.  It ran:
      At 0455 convoy in AM 4938, course 2300.
      At 0955 convoy in AM 4955, course 2300.
   Shortly afterwards another report was received:
      "Convoy at 1529 in AM 4872, am sending beacon signals for submarines".
   This report showed that the convoy was on a more westerly mean course and would skirt the W. wing of the submarine patrol strip.
 
 
 
- 166 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
At 1630 boats were therefore ordered on very long wave to surface immediately and operate against the reported convoy position.  No reports of beacon signals were received, so that it was assumed that, owing to the fact that the boats could not cruise at periscope level in heavy seas, they had not heard the radio message.  The group did not surface until 1830.
Group "Hinein", as shown by last report on 27.1., was operating independently:
      Convoy AM 7212, course 2700.
   B.d.U. expected the convoy to be on the line AM 7110 - 7190 at 2400 with courses between 210 - 2500.  Later the boats were ordered to operate during the night on the strength of this supposition.
   The message sent late by the Ju 290 on night patrol:  "Convoy at 0023 in AM 7129", was not received by Group "Hinein" until about 0300.  During the night no shadower reports were received, as the convoy was not found in bad visibility.
       
Summing up:
   Despite the favorable position of the boats, the operation misfired:
1) because on account of radio breakdown the Ju 290 that took off at 2138 on 26.1. did not pass the convoy sighting report at 0455 on 27.1., thus, the patrol strip was not shifted to the W. to get ahead of the convoy course,
2)   because the air reconnaissance that was so vital in order to guide the boats in by beacon signals, was cancelled because the BV 222 developed engine trouble.
3) because the radar gear of the last Ju 290 broke down, and so no beacon signals were sent on the night of the operation, and the boats had no clue to the convoy's position in bad visibility.
   An increase in the number of planes operating at the same time is the basic remedy for these weak spots.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 24
-
JC 54
U 256
-
Op(AL 88)
U 510
-
Op(MQ)
U 672
-
Op(AL 41)
 
66
-
Op(EV)
257
-
BF 57
518
-
Op(EB)
709
-
Op(AL 72)
 
91
-
Op(AL 84)
262
-
Op(AL 18)
532
-
JD 16
741
-
Op(AL 81)
 
92
-
BE 28
267
-
BE 19
539
-
BE 56
744
-
AE 71
 
123
-
Op(ET 15)
302
-
BF 83
541
-
BE 74
764
-
BF 49
 
154
-
Op(EV)
311
-
BF 45
546
-
Op(AK 95)
801
-
DT 24
 
155
-
BF 57
333
-
Op(AM 42)
549
-
Op(BD 49)
802
-
CB 35
 
168
-
JD 16
358
-
Op(AL 19)
550
-
AK 46
843
-
EH 23
 
170
-
DD 29
392
-
CF 68
552
-
Op(AK 28)
845
-
BE 61
 
178
-
GZ 29
413
-
Op(AM 42)
575
-
BD 68
851
-
AL 23
 
183
-
LX 29
415
-
AL 88
603
-
Op(AL 45)
852
-
FD 54
 
188
-
JD 16
421
-
CG 94
608
-
Op(AL 45)
856
-
AK 38
 
196
-
BF 83
437
-
Op(AL 51)
618
-
CG 89
962
-
Op(AL 01)
 
214
-
Op(DJ 22)
441
-
BF 55
621
-
Op(AM 14)
963
-
Op(AL 78)
 
218
-
DQ 48
448
-
AD 52
629
-
BE 29
981
-
BF 67
 
228
-
BF 58
466
-
CF 33
653
-
BE 13
986
-
Op(AL 17)
 
255
-
Op(AL 01)
488
-
DS 62
667
-
BF 47
1059
-
DF 22
                   
1062
-
FS 38
 
       
- 167 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 256 - 257 - 441 - 532 - 539 - 549 - 764 - 845.
  Entered Port:  U 196 - 228 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 575 was attacked by a plane in BD 6824 at 0855.
    2) See paragraph IV c) 1).
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BF 6874 - 5564 - EC 1397, 1 sighting in unspecified position.
    2) ASV locations in BF 8215 - 4644 - 8512.  7 locations in unspecified positions.
    3) Guardships were located:  "BVF" in BE 46, "BDT" in BE 5283, "BBV" in BE 46.
    4) Enemy units were located in: AM 4950 - 8437 - 4270 - 5520 - AN 8411, AL 8218, BE 2395 - 4510, BF 2180 - 2370.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  New attack areas for Group "Preussen" depth 50 miles:
     
U 255
-
AK 2432
U 415
-
AK 5988
986
-
AK 3388
267
-
AK 9274
262
-
AK 3667
653
-
AK 9713
358
-
AK 3814
603
-
AK 9839
962
-
AK 3935
741
-
AL 1781
437
-
AK 6321
709
-
BD 3297
672
-
AK 6146
963
-
BD 3841
608
-
AK 6549
91
-
BD 3986
  b) According to a report from U 168 "Blake" was picked up in the afternoon of 12.3. by "Albacore" type carrier-borne planes, and attacked by a cruiser and a destroyer.  "Brake" then scuttled herself.  Submarine took on entire crew and was still able to dive.  She is proceeding to Batavia without assistance from the other boat.  At night she was attacked with rocket-bombs by carrier-borne planes.  No damage.
     U 532 was requested to report whether she was making for home waters or Penang.
  c)  U 629 is returning from the Bay of Biscay because of damage from bombing (No. 5 tube and ballast tank No. 1 open).
  d)  None.
       
- 168 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 24
-
JC 53
U 262
-
Op(AL 15)
U 532
-
JD 16
U 711
-
Op(AL 44)
 
66
-
Op(EV)
267
-
BE 15
539
-
BE 64
744
-
Op(AE 47)
 
91
-
Op(AL 78)
302
-
BF 57
541
-
DH 13
764
-
BF 55
 
92
-
BE 24
311
-
BE 66
546
-
Op(AK 95)
801
-
DT 18
 
123
-
ES 36
333
-
AM 43
549
-
Op(BD 49)
802
-
CB 26
 
154
-
Op(EB)
358
-
Op(AK 38)
550
-
AK 72
843
-
EH 29
 
155
-
BF 81
392
-
CF 95
552
-
Op(AK 26)
845
-
BE 65
 
168
-
KT 83
413
-
AM 43
575
-
BD 59
851
-
AK 63
 
170
-
DD 51
415
-
AL 78
603
-
Op(AL 47)
852
-
FD 82
 
178
-
GZ 37
421
-
CG 94
608
-
Op(AK 63)
856
-
AK 39
 
183
-
LX 33
437
-
Op(AL 41)
618
-
CG 97
962
-
Op(AL 19)
 
188
-
JC 31
441
-
BF 28
621
-
Op(AM 23)
963
-
Op(AL 77)
 
214
-
Op(DJ 25)
448
-
AD 29
629
-
BE 65
981
-
BF 67
 
218
-
DQ 74
466
-
CF 35
653
-
BE 11
986
-
Op(AK 36)
 
255
-
Op(AL 17)
488
-
DS 67
667
-
BE 66
1059
-
DF 28
 
256
-
BE 24
510
-
Op(MQ)
672
-
Op(AK 62)
1062
-
JJ 41
 
257
-
BF 57
518
-
Op(EB)
709
-
Op(AL 74)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 256 - 257 - 441 - 510 - 532 - 539 - 549 - 764 - 845.
  Entered Port:  U 981 - St. Nazaire;  U 441 - 764 - Brest.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boats sighted in:  CG 9172, ED 9624, course 2100, (218?), boat diving in 480 56' N., longitude not specified, course 1600.  (U 413, U 333?).
    2) 1 ASV location in BF 7947 and 5 locations in unspecified positions.
    3) Guardship "BDO" probably attached to the fast convoy part of an "ONS" convoy, was located several times in approximately AC 94, AL 98, 99, AK 77 and later BE 22.
    4) American plane sighted a burning ship in FG 2287, also survivors of a land plane.  Probably one of U 66's successes.
    5) Enemy units located in AM 6430 - 5315 - 6874 - 7320 - 6850 - AL 6740, BE 5150.
  d)  None.
       
- 169 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 608 and U 255 missed each other for the second time, both boats are entering the attack area.
    2) U 532 and U 188 reported that they are returning home.  Both boats need cipher material, "Borkum" and "Naxos" gear.  It is planned that part shall be handed over by U 1062 and rest in the South Atlantic later.
    3) New arrangements for refueling (code name "Maske"):
        i)  U 488, 843 on 19.3. in EH 1489.
       ii)  U 488, 801 on 22.3. in EC 6558.
      iii)  U 123 will wait in ER 20 providing her fuel stores are sufficient to rule out immediate refueling at either of the two rendezvous.  Boat is to report her intentions.
  c)  None.
  d) U 257 must be considered lost.  Boat started return journey on 22.2. and sent her last report on that day (weather report).  No further message since.  In the meantime the boat should have entered port as her fuel must be exhausted.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15.March 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U JT 24
-
JC 32
U 262
-
Op(AK 36)
U 532
-
JC 39
U 709
-
Op(BD 32)
 
66
-
Op(EV)
267
-
BD 33
539
-
BE 66
741
-
Op(AL 19)
 
91
-
Op(BE 14)
302
-
BF 48
541
-
DH 11
744
-
Op(AE 47)
 
92
-
BE 24
311
-
BE 65
546
-
Op(AK 92)
801
-
DS 66
 
123
-
ES 34
333
-
AM 43
549
-
BD 59
802
-
CB 24
 
154
-
Op(EB)
358
-
Op(AK 38)
550
-
AK 77
843
-
EH 27
 
155
-
BF 72
392
-
CF 96
552
-
Op(AK 20)
845
-
BE 66
 
168
-
KT 65
413
-
AM 43
575
-
BD 58
851
-
AK 67
 
170
-
DD 42
415
-
AL 74
603
-
Op(AK 96)
852
-
FD 89
 
178
-
GZ 25
421
-
CG 94
608
-
Op(AK 65)
856
-
AL 19
 
183
-
LO 78
437
-
Op(AK 63)
618
-
CG 95
962
-
Op(AK 39)
 
188
-
JC 27
448
-
AE 17
621
-
Op(AM 23)
963
-
Op(BD 65)
 
214
-
Op(DJ 25)
466
-
CF 61
629
-
BF 52
989
-
Op(AK 33)
 
218
-
EE 32
488
-
DS 83
653
-
AL 77
1059
-
DF 55
 
255
-
Op(AK 35)
510
-
MR 69
667
-
BE 65
1062
-
JJ 43
 
256
-
BE 28
518
-
Op(EB)
672
-
Op(AK 69)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 168 - 178 - 183 - 188 - 256 - 510 - 532 - 539 - 549 - 845.
  Entered Port:  U 629 - Brest.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 170 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 852 reported position as square FF, had sunk 5,000 GRT so far.
    2) U 856 was attacked by a plane at 0418 (position by dead reckoning, AK 62).  No location observed before or during the attack.  No damage.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sighting:  Surfaced boat in unspecified position, course 3180.  Anti-aircraft fire.
    2) ASV locations:  BF 8378, later the same plane made a 3 group message that could not be decoded in BF 7252.
    3) Plane belonging to Group 19 sighted 5 M.T.B.s in BF 5492.
    4) Enemy units were located in:  AM 5370 - 4280 - 2970 - 4850 - AL 7440 - BE 4170 - CG 5590.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  U JT 24 reported position as JC 2782, 20 Cbm. fuel.  High rate of consumption is inexplicable.  The plans made by Operational Control are no rendered impossible, so new orders were issued for refueling:
    1) On 17.3. in KS 8965 U 532 will hand over about 80 Cbm. of fuel and take lubricating oil.  Both boats will return to Penang.
    2) U 188 will take over cipher material from U 1062 on 22.3. in JA 8845.
      U 188 will return to home waters, U 1062 to Penang.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 852               1 ship                5,000 GRT.
       
       
                                                                      for B.d.U.
                                                      Chief of Operations Division.
                                                             (Signed):  GODT.
       
       
       
- 171 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of Navy  
Second Division Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Operations.
Staff H.Q. "Koralle"
Ref. No. 107.
8.3.1944.
       
U-boat Situation on 1 March 1944
       
I.
In service on 1 February 1944:  
446
 
Losses in February:  On operations  
20
 
                                     At home  
3
 
   
423
 
   
 
Newly commissioned in February  
18
 
Re-commissioned (U 733)  
1
 
In commission on 1 March 1944  
442
 
       
In addition, foreign boats:  On operations  
4
*
                                               At home  
6
 
Given to Japan up to date  
1
 
       
*  U JT 23 lost in February.      
       
II.
Losses in February:    
Atlantic:
Type VII:
U 231, 238, 271, 283, 377, 386, 424, 571, 592, 666, 734, 761, 762, 264, 406
15
  Type IX: U 545
1
  Type IXD2 U 177
1
       
Northern Waters:
Type VII:
U 314, 601, 713
3
Mediterranean: None.  
0
Black Sea: None                                   
0
     
Home Waters: Type II U 7
1
  Type VII U 738, 854
2
     
23
       
III. Distribution of boats:
   
 
II
VIIa
VIIb/c
VIId
VIIf
IXb/c
IXD1
IXD2
Xb
XIV
XVII
Total
Foreign
Operational:
6
-
113
2
3
34
-
6
1
1
1
166
4
Trials:
-
-
  149  
-
1
27
-
8
1
1
1
189
-
Training:
32
3
     48   
-
-
4
-
-
-
-
-
  87
6
 
  38  
3
310
2
4
65
-
14
2
2
2
442
10
See enclosure for details of losses.        
 
 
 
- 172 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  During February 1944:
 
New operational boats  
+
16
 
Reduction in total number  
-
4
 
Reduction in number of operational boats  
-
5
  *
Increase in number of boats on trials  
+
1
 
Reduction in number of training boats  
+/-
0
  *
  *  U 103 has been transferred from operations to training.
       
IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1 March 1944:
       
 
Atlantic
107
Mediterranean
18
Northern Waters:  Operation in
                                  Northern Waters
30
                                  Group "Mitte"
3
                                  Torpedo supply boats
2
Black Sea
6
 
166
       
V. During February the following were in the Atlantic:
       
 
Daily average at sea 68 boats
Of these, in operational area 31     "
Cruising 37     "
Of these, on return journey 13     "
       
VI. During February the following entered the Atlantic:
       
 
from home waters
5     boats
from France and Norway
31       "
       
VII. During February the following entered Northern Waters:
       
 
from home waters
13  boats
       
       
                                                                                                 For B.d.U.
                                                                                    Chief of Operations Division,
                                                                                              (Signed):  Godt.
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
- 173 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  Enclosure for Second Division Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Operations.
  Ref. 20 107 of 8.3.44.
   
 
Additional notes for paragraph III
 
  Details of losses:
   
 
U 231 Experienced boat.  Last message on 12.1. W. of Bay of Biscay.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 238 Experienced boat.  Last message on 8.2. W. of Southern Ireland reporting aircraft carrier.  Probably lost while attacking convoy.
   
U 271 Experienced boat.  Last message on 28.1. S.W. of Iceland reporting locations.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 283 First operational trip.  Last message 10.2. S.E. of Iceland reporting attack by plane.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 377 Experienced boat.  Last message on 15.1. W. of Bay of Biscay reporting search group.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 386 Experienced boat.  Last message on 19.2. S.W. of Ireland reporting attack by plane.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 424 Experienced boat.  Last message on 7.2.  Position W. of Bay of Biscay.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 571 Experienced boat.  Last message on 18.1. W. of Herbrides reporting small convoy.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 592 Experienced boat.  Last message on 31.1. W. of Herbrides reporting damage.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 666 Experienced boat.  New commander.  Last message on 10.2. W. of Ireland reporting destroyer.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 734 Second operational trip.  Last message on 8.2. W. of Bay of Biscay giving position.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 761 Second operational trip.  Last report giving position W. of North Spain.  Probably lost through Gibraltar patrol.
   
U 762 Second operational trip.  Last message on 8.2. W. of Bay of Biscay reporting attack by plane.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 264 Experienced boat.  Last message on 19.2. W. of Bay of Biscay reporting destroyer.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 406 Experienced boat.  Last message on 26.1. W. of Ireland dealing with 3.7 cm. gun.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 545 First operational trip.  On 11.2. was holed S.E. of Iceland by bombs, then scuttled by crew.
   
U 177 Experienced boat.  Last message on 14.1. reporting position W. of Portugal.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
 
 
- 174 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
 
U 314 Second trip.  Last message on 30.1. from Northern Waters dealing with hydrophone bearing.  Probably lost while attacking convoy.
   
U 601 Experienced boat.  Last message on 24.2. from Northern Waters dealing with depth charges.  Probably lost while attacking convoy.
   
U 713 Experienced boat.  Last message on 24.2. from Northern Waters dealing with bearings.  Probably lost while attacking convoy.
   
U JT 23 New crew.  Torpedoed on 15.2. S. of Penang.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
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