F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 November 1943

PG30334

     
     
 
1.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 24)
U 256
-
BD 28
U 420
-
Op(AJ 94)
U 586
-
AK 78
 
91
-
BD 28
262
-
Op(BE 54)
424
-
AE 87
592
-
Op(BC 67)
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
267
-
Op(AJ 98)
426
-
Op(BC 93)
603
-
BF 45
 
123
-
BE 99
271
-
BF 49
437
-
Op(BC 93)
608
-
Op(BC 37)
 
129
-
CD 73
274
-
Op(CD 23)
441
-
Op(BE 50)
642
-
CG 90
 
154
-
Op(EQ 70)
280
-
AK 79
448
-
BF 82
648
-
Op(BC 99)
 
155
-
Op(FA 20)
281
-
Op(AJ 99)
455
-
BD 63
707
-
Op(BE 54)
 
168
-
LC 25
282
-
Op(BC 32)
466
-
Op(BE 54)
709
-
Op(BC 99)
 
170
-
Op(GB 30)
306
-
Op(BE 50)
488
-
CD 73
714
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
190
-
DR 29
309
-
BE 46
505
-
BE 96
731
-
BF 54
 
193
-
CD 73
333
-
Op(BE 54)
516
-
DQ 28
732
-
CG 90
 
211
-
Op(BE 50)
340
-
CG 90
518
-
DE 44
762
-
BD 28
 
212
-
Op(AJ 95)
343
-
AK 36
530
-
CD 67
764
-
AF 78
 
214
-
CD 73
373
-
Op(BC 99)
533
-
Op(MF 10)
842
-
Op(BC 96)
 
218
-
Op(EO 50)
378
-
BE 46
536
-
Op(BB 70)
843
-
Op(BC 32)
 
219
-
AL 25
391
-
AF 49
537
-
Op(BB 60)
848
-
FD 92
 
220
-
BD 28
402
-
BD 60
538
-
AE 83
849
-
CE 87
 
226
-
Op(BC 96)
405
-
BD 28
542
-
AE 59
953
-
Op(BE 50)
 
228
-
BE 86
413
-
Op(BC 32)
552
-
Op(BC 96)
963
-
Op(BC 32)
 
231
-
Op(AJ 98)
415
-
BF 58
575
-
Op(BC 96)
967
-
Op(AJ 95)
             
584
-
BD 28
969
-
Op(AJ 98)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 271 - 309 - 378 - 402 - 405 - 415 - 448 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 532 - 603 - 731 - 762.
  Entered Port:  U 731 - Brest.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  Against traffic proceeding England-Gibraltar in the area southwest of Ireland (for operation Group "Schill").
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 415 sights 4 unidentified craft proceeding on SW course on point "Lade" (possibly our own).
    2) U 714 reports an overwhelming aircraft attack in AJ 9114.  Short signal is not entirely comprehensible and was received in a mutilated form.  The actual position of the boat in the Group "Körner" line, must have been AJ 9513.
  b)  Aircraft sights a destroyer proceeding on course 2000, speed 15 knots, in BE 3241.  Convoy traffic was not sighted.
  c)  English units were located in BE 1262, AM 4320, AL 94, BE 2425, BE 3820, BE 6450, BE 2670, BE 5240, BE 2560.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Apart from the aircraft message from U 714, no enemy movement took place within Groups "Körner" and "Jahn".  HX 263 which had been very carefully awaited, must have already passed the area.  No calculations can be made as yet concerning the ON convoy which is still in the area.
       
- 262 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) In accordance with the deployment of forces scheduled for 3 - 4.11, boats belonging to Group "Schill", strengthened by U 228, proceed towards grid square BE 84.  U 306 has not reported again in spite of requests, U 441 returned to base because of damage.
      At about 2030, U 953 sights a convoy proceeding on course 400 at high speed, in BE 8183.  According to our own dead reckoning the convoy consisted of a fast troop transport convoy (Naval M/T).
      Boats belonging to Group "Shill" which, in spite of their advanced position, are able to reach the convoy this same night, should operate against it; those unable to reach it should proceed towards the position laid down in the orders.  Further orders do not apply.
  b) 1) U 358 receives instructions to adjust speed as much as possible in order to reach BE 80 during the night of 4.11.  Boat should contact the convoy from within Group "Schill".
    2) Alleged particularly strong carrier-borne aircraft, in square BD at this time.  Boats proceeding in that direction should submerge during the day in unfavorable weather.
  c) According to a signal from U 214, the rendezvous for refueling with U 488 in CD 7331, has been compromised by carrier aircraft.
    As it was not possible to tell from here if U 214 had already refueled, and if, because of the low state of fuel in the boat it was still possible to postpone the rendezvous, the following orders were laid down:
    1) If U 488 and U 214 are together, the refueling position should automatically be altered 50 sea miles to the north.
    2) If a meeting with U 488 has not yet occurred, U 214 should immediately propose a new rendezvous with U 193, in order to receive full supplies from the latter for the return journey.
    3) U 129 and U 530 to proceed to DE 8155 and on about 7.11. should receive full supplies from U 488, if the latter is still reporting.  The same orders also apply to U 193.
  d) 1) U 103 has successfully completed mining operation Takoradi.
    2) According to reports from Tangier, the Straits of Gibraltar are very heavily guarded at this time.
      Boats en route for the Mediterranean which are still to the W. of the Straits, should abandon the breakthrough ordered, and should turn aside to the west.
    3) U 306 has not answered again queries as to position.  As the boat did not make an appearance to the last convoy operation by Group "Schill", she must be presumed lost.
 
 
 
- 263 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      According to a Radio Intercept, a submarine was successfully bombed on 28.10. at 460 11' N., longitude unknown.  As all the boats in question have reported up to now, U 306 probably was the boat involved in the attack.
      A later message states that U 953 contacted U 306 in BE 87.  It must be presumed from this that U 306 was lost when with convoy KMS 31.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 262
-
BE 81
U 426
-
Op(BC 93)
U 592
-
Op(BC 67)
 
91
-
BD 23
267
-
Op(AJ 98)
437
-
Op(BC 93)
603
-
BF 55
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
271
-
BF 46
441
-
BE 80
608
-
Op(BC 37)
 
123
-
BF 78
274
-
Op(CD 23)
448
-
BF 67
642
-
CG 90
 
129
-
CD 73
280
-
Op(BC 33)
455
-
BE 43
648
-
Op(BC 99)
 
154
-
Op(EQ 70)
281
-
Op(AJ 99)
466
-
BE 73
707
-
BE 73
 
155
-
Op(FA 20)
282
-
Op(BC 32)
488
-
CD 73
709
-
Op(BC 99)
 
168
-
LC 30
309
-
BE 58
505
-
BF 75
714
-
Op(AJ 92)
 
170
-
Op(GB 30)
333
-
BE 73
516
-
DQ 42
732
-
CG 90
 
190
-
DR 58
340
-
CG 90
518
-
DE 43
762
-
BD 28
 
193
-
CD 73
343
-
AK 61
530
-
CD 58
764
-
AF 77
 
211
-
BE 73
358
-
BE 92
533
-
Op(MF 10)
842
-
Op(BC 96)
 
212
-
Op(AJ 95)
373
-
Op(BC 99)
536
-
Op(BB 70)
843
-
Op(BC 32)
 
214
-
CD 73
378
-
BE 54
537
-
Op(BB 60)
848
-
EL 23
 
218
-
Op(EO 50)
391
-
AF 48
538
-
AE 82
849
-
DG 19
 
219
-
AL 16
405
-
BD 28
542
-
AE 82
953
-
BE 80
 
226
-
Op(BC 96)
413
-
Op(BC 32)
552
-
Op(BC 96)
963
-
Op(BC 32)
 
228
-
BE 80
415
-
BF 28
575
-
Op(BC 96)
967
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
231
-
Op(AJ 98)
420
-
Op(AJ 95)
584
-
BD 38
969
-
Op(AJ 98)
 
256
-
BD 38
424
-
AE 79
586
-
BD 13      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 183 - 188 - 214 - 256 - 271 - 309 - 378 - 405 - 441 - 448 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 532 - 584 - 603 - 762.
  Entered Port:  U 415 - Brest.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Against England - Gibraltar convoy traffic, for Group "Schill".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 448 hears aircraft while proceeding into BE 6497.
  b) The expected south-going convoy was not located.  As the date on which the convoy was to leave port could only be estimated, it is possible that the convoy is still further back. On the other hand, three north-bound convoys were sighted, namely:
       
- 264 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    1430 hours in BE 4325, convoy consisting of 23 merchant ships, 6 patrol vessels and 1 cruiser proceeding on course 400.
    1702 hours in BE 2683, 17 merchant ships and 6 patrol vessels, course 700.
    1716 hours in BE 2693, 44 merchant ships and 6 patrol vessels, course 700.
    A further report was made on 3 destroyers in BE 6596 proceeding on course 1800 and 1 destroyer in BF 3541 on course 1500.
  c) 1) English escort group "Samphord", proceeding on course 370 reports air contact with the convoy.
    2) English units were located in BF 1669, BF 4763, AL 9350, BE 3740, AJ 9890.
    3) Suspicious ship sighted in CC 3267.  (U 170)
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) U 592, an advanced boat belonging to Group "Jahn" sights several craft in BC 6762 proceeding on course 1300 at high speed.
      As this cannot be anything to do with the expected convoy, the boats were told that no operation was intended.  All opportunities for attack should however be used.
      U 592 submerges at about 1900 in BC 6464 in front of a flying boat.  She suspects, among the enemy reported, a carrier under escort, which has probably proceeded away to the W.  Pressing on continues to be unsuccessful.  No contact was reported by the other boats.
    2) The operating Air Reconnaissance has not located convoy KMS 31, expected about the evening of the 3rd by Group "Schill".  It is possible that the convoy has not yet reached the area under Air Reconnaissance, and is probably much further to the west as a result of the last attack on convoy MKS 28.
      The northeast going convoys, contacted from the air, were not attacked by the "Schill" boats as the distance was too great.  Air Reconnaissance is to be resumed on 3.11 with stronger forces.
      In order to have the boats in position in good time on the supposed convoy route, Group "Schill" is strengthened by U 358, received orders to remain in patrol line U 211 - 333 - 707 - 262 - 466 - 228 - 953 and 358, from BE 7647 to BE 8557 on 3.11 at 2000 hours.  During the day, boats should remain submerged, but should secure  long wave reception.
 
 
 
- 265 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      The patrol line was intentionally spread out further, as nothing was known about the supposed convoy route, and a possible shifting of the patrol line to the east or west had to be reckoned with.
  b) As the expected HX and both the ON convoys must have already passed the dispositions of Groups "Körner" and "Jahn", both groups were liquidated, and the boats placed into 5 small patrol lines.
     
Order: U 714 - 420 - 212 - 267 from Group Tirpitz 1
  U 967 - 413 - 969 - 608 from Group Tirpitz 2
  U 280 - 281 - 575 - 586 from Group Tirpitz 3
  U 282 - 592 - 426 - 226 from Group Tirpitz 4
  U 842 - 373 - 274 - 648 from Group Tirpitz 5
     On 5.11. at 1000, the Groups mentioned were in the following Patrol lines:
     
  Tirpitz 1 from BC 2211 to BC 2264
  Tirpitz 2 from BC 2626 to BC 2699
  Tirpitz 3 from BC 6145 to BC 6442
  Tirpitz 4 from BC 6786 to BC 9183
  Tirpitz 5 from BC 9713 to BC 9779
     U 843 - 963 - 552 and U 709 proceeded in this order to Groups "Tirpitz 1 - 4" and as advance posts, occupied grid squares BC 2549, BC 5237, BC 5863, BC 8619, at a depth of 20 miles.  Positions are to be taken up unobserved as far as possible.  Boats are to remain on the surface at night and below the surface during the day, and proceed hourly to periscope depth.  On sighting the enemy, they should surface and report as quickly as possible.  As there is no opportunity for refueling, boats should, when down to about 32 cubic meters, return automatically without a signal.
     U 231 and U 437, which are already very low in fuel, have freedom to maneuver until their supplies are exhausted.
     On the whole this disposition found nothing new.  Nevertheless, all opportunities which might lead to contacting the convoy, must be developed and tried out.  It looks as if the enemy located and circumvented almost all the dispositions in time, probably by location.  The results of the numerous closely placed patrol lines should be as follows:
    1) when a patrol line is attacked, the entire disposition will not be discovered, and
    2) when contact is made with a patrol line several boats are to come in to attack as soon as possible.  The advance boats have the task of reporting either the convoy or the Air Reconnaissance attached to the convoy, as soon as possible.
 
 
 
- 266 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) 1) When U 219 has made a position report, U 586 ceased acting as tanker and was assigned to Group "Tirpitz".  U 219 proceeded at high speed to U 91, and supplied the latter for a return to base at economical cruising speed.
    2) At 0813 hours, U 214 proposed a new rendezvous (CD 7133) 100 sea miles W. of the existing one.  U 488 has however not yet been contacted.  U 214 was therefore supplied by U 193.  A confused short signal at 0908 leads one to suppose that U 488 is still in the vicinity and has not used W/T until now.  The request for a position report was undoubtedly not answered before.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:        1.11.43
    The following illustrates the period since resuming the operations in the N. Atlantic against the "Leuthen" convoy.
  1) The operations against the "Leuthen" convoy were a complete success, as described in the final report, with regard to destroyer combat and tactics against the enemy air force (Submarines remained on the surface).  This was shown by the Captain's report made after his return.  The air escort attached to this convoy was stronger than had at first been estimated.  That would emphasize still further the success resulting from the boats remaining on the surface.  It must be admitted however that the thick fog in this operation hindered the greater success against the main target, the merchant ships, and also particularly thick patches sheltered the boats from air attacks, and the fact that only two boats were lost is due to the shelter provided from the fog.  For while the successful results in combating destroyers was confirmed by the use of Zaunkönig during the period in question, the same does not apply to anti-aircraft combat.
  2)  Losses resulting from air attacks have again increased seriously since the "Leuthen" convoy.  Since 19.9., 72 air attacks were reported by the submarines as a result of which 17 submarines were most probably lost, only 2 of them with the "Leuthen" convoy itself.  Only a fraction of these attacks took place on the outward and inward routes, on which the boats only proceeded on the surface to recharge.  A good two thirds of the attacks occurred when the submarines were below the surface in patrol lines, during the  operations against convoys and in the areas for refueling.  The actual losses were in the same proportion.
 
 
 
- 267 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  3) We cannot stand these losses however, particularly with no successes to counterbalance them, and they necessitate tactical measures as long as the Flak in the boats is not improved by installing 3.7 cm guns.
    Attempts to attack convoys with every boat on the surface at once must be postponed until these improvements have been made, in spite of the good results obtained against the "Leuthen" convoy.  Until then, it will also be necessary to try and operate mainly at night, and to break off contact with a convoy during the day, if strong air forces come on the scene.
  4)  This state of affairs also necessitates the boats remaining below the surface in patrol lines during the day, and makes it necessary to take into consideration the difficulties in making locations due to the reduced reconnaissance area and the increased difficulties of intercommunication.  This precaution is also necessary because the enemy has always succeeded in discovering the submarine dispositions through their air reconnaissance, and presumably turning away from them.  It is not known as yet whether, and how far, still unknown methods of location played any part in this.
  5)  With this state of affairs, attention is drawn to the following:
    a) to avoid as far as possible, the discovery of our dispositions and consequently their evasion by the enemy,
    b) after contacting the enemy, to strike quickly and surely,
    c) to avoid too great losses, which are mainly incurred by air attacks.  This should be done as follows:
     
1) by remaining below the surface during the day, taking up disposition in short patrol lines, close formation within the patrol lines, and maintaining some distance between the separate patrol lines, and separate reconnaissance boats to be between the enemy and these patrol lines,
2) to take up position so that the enemy is contacted, if possible, in the evening, and attacks made during the early part of the night,
3) to break off the operation if stronger air forces appear.
  6) A large scale operation against a convoy can only be undertaken under particularly favorable conditions, as only a concentration of larger numbers of boats is likely to succeed against the enemy.  This can only be considered when the Flak guns are improved.
    Conditions with regard to location will only improve when our own air reconnaissance permits the boats to move quickly from one convoy to another.  With our forces as weak as they are at the moment, this can only be done in the England - Gibraltar convoy area.
 
 
 
- 268 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
3 November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BD 38
U 424
-
AL 22
U 584
-
BD 38
 
91
-
BD 23
262
-
BE 84
426
-
Op(BC 92)
586
-
BD 15
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
267
-
Op(BC 23)
437
-
Op(BC 93)
592
-
Op(BC 67)
 
123
-
BF 76
271
-
BF 52
441
-
BE 65
603
-
BF 52
 
129
-
CD 78
274
-
Op(BC 98)
448
-
BF 64
608
-
Op(BC 37)
 
154
-
Op(EB 10)
280
-
Op(BC 37)
455
-
BE 55
642
-
CG 90
 
155
-
Op(FA 20)
281
-
Op(BC 34)
466
-
BE 84
648
-
Op(BC 97)
 
168
-
LD 40
282
-
Op(BC 38)
488
-
CD 47
707
-
BE 76
 
170
-
Op(GB 30)
309
-
BE 67
505
-
BF 73
709
-
Op(BC 94
 
190
-
DR 87
333
-
BE 76
516
-
DP 68
714
-
Op(AJ 97
 
193
-
CD 47
340
-
CG 90
518
-
DE 25
732
-
CG 90
 
211
-
BE 76
343
-
AK 55
530
-
CD 76
762
-
BD 28
 
212
-
Op(AJ 97)
358
-
BE 85
533
-
Op(MF 10)
764
-
AM 32
 
214
-
CD 47
373
-
Op(BC 98)
536
-
Op(BB 70)
842
-
Op(BC 98)
 
218
-
Op(EO 50)
378
-
BE 59
537
-
Op(BB 60)
843
-
Op(BC 34)
 
219
-
AK 97
391
-
AE 89
538
-
AE 84
848
-
FL 61
 
226
-
Op(BC 95)
405
-
BD 28
542
-
AL 33
849
-
DG 45
 
228
-
BE 84
413
-
Op(BC 31)
552
-
Op(BC 91)
953
-
BE 85
 
231
-
Op(AJ 98)
420
-
Op(AJ 97)
575
-
Op(BC 92)
963
-
Op(BC 34)
             
969
-
Op(BC 31)
967
-
Op(BC 23)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 214 - 256 - 271 - 309 - 378 - 405 - 441 - 448 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 584 - 592 - 762.
  Entered Port:  U 271 - 603 - Brest;  U 448 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 510 - Lorient;  U 962 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Against England - Gibraltar traffic for Group "Schill".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 154 sights convoy at 1000 on 3.11 in FB 9241, proceeding on course 1200 at 8 knots, escorted by an airship.
     Surprise attack at 1800 by Catalina on submarine getting into position.  Aircraft beaten off.  Heavy aircraft bombs aimed at U 154 which suffered no damage.  Further operations intended in EP 40.
  b)  KMS 31 has not been located.  Destroyer sighted in BE 3642, mean course 1000, and another in BE 3541, mean course 1500.
  c) 1) Submarines were attacked in FB 9248 (U 154) and BC 2382 (Group "Tirpitz").  A further 3 attacks reported, positions uncertain, but 2 most likely occurred in BE, 1 off Gibraltar or in the Mediterranean.
    2) English units located in BC 1310, AL 6933, AM 4969, AM 4490, AL 0390, AM 4430, BF 1670, AM 4280.
       
- 269 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) 5 large steel tanks sighted, drifting in DP 9941.
  d) Positions now known of 2 stragglers in AK 0285 and AL 0289 from HX 263 against which the Group then known as "Siegfried" was operating.  Judging from this, it looks as if the convoy had also discovered these patrol lines beforehand, and had by-passed to the north.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Group "Tirpitz" should have occupied the assigned patrol lines at 1000 on 5.11.  The existence of submarines in BC 2382 was discovered after an aircraft attack in this area which was not reported by any of the boats until now.  An evasion by HX 264 must also be reckoned with.  The unidentified unit located in BC 1310 is not sufficient to occasion an operation.
    2) The convoy awaited by Group "Schill" was not contacted by air reconnaissance.  According to the estimated intervals between the convoys, this one should have been in a position at the head of the patrol line on the evening of the 3rd.  Reasons for the delay are not known, but it is presumed that the convoy is overdue and can still be expected.
      Further Air Reconnaissance is required for 4.11.  In order to allow for any deviation of the convoy to the W. and not to keep the boats too long in the same position, Group "Schill" received orders at 1000 on 4.11. to take up new patrol lines from BE 7813 to BE 8722.
  b)  None.
  c) In order to clarify the intended refueling operation, the following orders stand:
    U 214, immediately after refueling from U 193, to report if U 488 has arrived.
     If so, the next refueling operation is to take place from U 488 in DE 8155, if not, U 129 - 530 and 193 to proceed to the next approach point without refueling.
  d)  U 378, after refueling from U 488 on about 26.10. in BD 2819, was returning to base in Western France.  As the boat has not answered repeated requests for her position, she must be presumed lost.  There are no signs of her.   Probably she was destroyed by carrier aircraft towards the end of October somewhere in the area of BD 60.
       
V. Reports of Success: None.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
- 270 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
4.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BD 38
U 437
-
Op(BC 90)
U 592
-
Op(BC 91)
 
91
-
BD 23
262
-
Op(BE 79)
441
-
BF 44
608
-
Op(BC 26)
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
267
-
Op(BC 22)
455
-
BD 64
642
-
CG 90
 
123
-
BF 81
274
-
Op(BC 97)
466
-
Op(BE 79)
648
-
Op(BC 97)
 
129
-
DE 35
280
-
Op(BC 61)
488
-
CD 47
707
-
Op(BE 78)
 
154
-
Op(EB 10)
281
-
Op(BC 61)
505
-
BF 49
709
-
Op(BC 86)
 
155
-
FB 64
282
-
Op(BC 67)
510
-
BF 54
714
-
Op(BC 22)
 
168
-
LD
309
-
BE 69
516
-
DP 83
732
-
CG 90
 
170
-
Op(GB 30)
333
-
Op(BE 78)
518
-
CC 98
762
-
BD 28
 
190
-
EG 27
340
-
CG 90
530
-
DE 33
764
-
AM 33
 
193
-
CD 47
343
-
AK 49
533
-
Op(MF 10)
842
-
Op(BC 94)
 
211
-
Op(BE 78)
358
-
Op(BE 87)
536
-
Op(BB 70)
843
-
Op(BC 25)
 
212
-
Op(BC 22)
373
-
Op(BC 97)
537
-
Op(BB 60)
848
-
EL 68
 
214
-
CD 47
391
-
AE 68
538
-
AE 79
849
-
DG 75
 
218
-
Op(EO 50)
405
-
BD 28
542
-
AL 25
953
-
Op(BE 87)
 
219
-
BD 23
413
-
Op(BC 26)
552
-
Op(BC 58)
962
-
AF 87
 
226
-
Op(BC 91)
420
-
Op(BC 22)
575
-
Op(BC 64)
963
-
Op(BC 29)
 
228
-
Op(BE 79)
424
-
AK 39
584
-
BD 38
967
-
Op(BC 26)
 
231
-
Op(BC 30)
426
-
Op(BC 91)
586
-
BC 63
969
-
Op(BC 26)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 214 - 256 - 309 - 378 - 405 - 441 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 584 - 762.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 541 - Kiel;  U 269 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Against England - Gibraltar convoy traffic for Group "Schill".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 218 sinks French sailing freighter off Trinidad.  Returning to base because of fuel.
    2) U 168 bombed during the night by a Catalina, while following a convoy in LC 3133.  Boat suffers reduced diving efficiency and is proceeding to Penang.
  b) Convoy (KMS 31) expected, was not located.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings in DN 1978 as well as on 460 28' N. and about 100 44' W.  Position inaccurate.
    2) English units located in AL 4290, AL 9990 and AL 6510.
    3) English reconnaissance aircraft alleged to be over 3 enemy submarines in BF 70.  Message very improbable.
  d)  Subsequently various rendezvous with ONS 21 were decoded.  According to these the convoy should be in AM 5242 at 1300 on 24.10., and in AM 1973 at 1300 on 25.10.  On 26.10. part of the route followed by stragglers was cancelled, and set down to go through AK 2774.
    This message confirms our own dead reckoning.  The convoy must either have passed or circumvented Group "Siegfried" which was placed to contact it.
       
- 271 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) U 967 - belonging to Group "Tirpitz 2" - was contacted at 0324 on 4.11. in BC 2629 by a patrol group.  Boat submerged after having been fired on and was followed up closely with depth charges and hydrophones.  As, according to our own dead reckoning, no convoys were suspected in that area, it seems likely that this was a question  of a stationary patrol group as often the case previously.  Group "Tirpitz" took up its patrol line as ordered on 5.11.  It was calculated that this group would make contact with convoy HX 264 on the evening of 5.11.
    2) U 333 came on convoy of landing craft in the fog, proceeding on course 1600, at 0330 on 3.11.  Boat was located by Afridi destroyers with searchlights and depth charges were dropped.  A Zaunkönig torpedo fired by the submarine missed.
      It is incomprehensible why U 333 sent the W/T message with a delay of 18 hours and no grid square number.
      It was not certain that convoy KMS 31 which had been expected for the last 3 days by Group "Schill" and had been searched for in vain by our own air reconnaissance, was in the vicinity.  It must have proceeded to the south beyond the area under air reconnaissance, which also explains the fruitless search.
      As, owing to the long delay, it was out of the question for Group "Schill" to press on, this group took up position in a patrol line from BE 7797 to BE 7998 as from 1000 hours on 5.11.  Thus the patrol line covered an area lying beyond that covered by our own air reconnaissance.  No air forces will be operating on 5.11 owing to shortage.
      The next disposition for the group is on about 7.11 at the top of CF 25 against a convoy coming from Gibraltar, whose own air cover should direct us.
  b)  None.
  c)  U 762 has not met with U 405 in the grid square allotted for refueling.  A request for a position report was not answered.
     As U 762 only has about 3 cubic meters of fuel left, U 219 received orders to complete refueling U 91 as quickly as possible and then to proceed to U 762 at high speed.  U 343 was ordered to proceed there too, for safety.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 218                One sailing ship.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
       
- 272 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
5.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 262
-
Op(BE 79)
U 441
-
BF 45
U 592
-
Op(BC 91)
 
91
-
BD 23
267
-
Op(BC 22)
455
-
BE 68
608
-
Op(BC 28)
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
269
-
AF 87
466
-
Op(BE 79)
642
-
CG 90
 
123
-
BF 57
274
-
Op(BC 97)
488
-
CD 47
648
-
Op(BC 97)
 
129
-
DE 37
280
-
Op(BC 61)
505
-
BF 57
707
-
Op(BE 78)
 
154
-
Op(EB 50)
281
-
Op(BC 61)
510
-
BF 57
709
-
Op(BC 86)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
282
-
Op(BC 67)
516
-
DP 79
714
-
Op(BC 22)
 
168
-
LC 45
309
-
BF 47
518
-
CD 75
732
-
CG 90
 
170
-
FR 79
333
-
Op(BE 78)
530
-
DE 35
762
-
BD 28
 
190
-
EG 57
340
-
CG 90
533
-
Op(MF 10)
764
-
AM 23
 
193
-
Op(BE 78)
343
-
AK 72
536
-
Op(BB 70)
842
-
Op(BC 94)
 
211
-
Op(BC 22)
358
-
Op(BE 87)
537
-
Op(BB 60)
843
-
Op(BC 25)
 
212
-
CD 47
373
-
Op(BC 97)
538
-
AL 24
848
-
FL 99
 
214
-
Op(BE 78)
391
-
AE 91
541
-
AO
849
-
DS 22
 
218
-
Op(BC 22)
405
-
BD 28
542
-
AL 01
953
-
Op(BE 87)
 
219
-
CD 47
413
-
Op(BC 26)
552
-
Op(BC 58)
962
-
AF 76
 
226
-
Op(BC 91)
420
-
Op(BC 22)
575
-
Op(BC 64)
963
-
Op(BC 52)
 
228
-
Op(BE 79)
424
-
AK 53
584
-
BD 38
967
-
Op(BC 23)
 
231
-
Op(BC 30)
426
-
Op(BC 91)
586
-
Op(BC 64)
969
-
Op(BC 26)
 
256
-
BD 38
437
-
Op(BC 90)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 256 - 309 - 405 - 441 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 584 - 762.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Against Gibraltar - England traffic (MKS 29) for Group "Schill".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 848 sank a freighter of about 5,000 GRT in about FD 60 on 2.11.  Boat was heavily attacked 3 times in FL 6675 by an aircraft at 1433 on 5.11.  Submarine is damaged, but is clear for submerging for the time being, and is proceeding on course 2500, speed 7 knots.  For further information see IV d).
  b)  The convoy has not been found, possibly it is still further back.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  FC 7853 (U 155?), MF 2650 (U 533?) and another in an uncertain position.  Icelandic-aircraft reports suspicious object in AE 84, probably submarine conning tower.  Unidentified U.S.A. steamer sights periscope in BA 9715 (U 536?).
    2) English units located in AM 4350, AL 3930, AL 0310, AM 4220, AL 1598, AL 0350, AM 4290, AM 2989.
    3) According to reports from Natal one submarine was sunk by an American aircraft during the last days of October off the coast of Rio Grande do Norte.  The boat was alleged to have been sighted on the surface, attacked with dive bombs and exploded and sank after receiving several direct hits.
       
- 273 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) U 333, while refueling, reports that the convoy sighted at 0330 on 3.11 in BE 7670, consisted of about 6 200 GRT Landing Craft with lights, and 4 Afridi class destroyers.
      As convoy KMS 31 can no longer be expected, Group "Schill" received orders to take up patrol line at 1800 on 7.11. from CF 2767 to CF 2969.
      New order:  U 211 - 333 - 707 - 262 - 466 - 228 - 358.  U 953 which originally belonged to the group has only a little fuel left, and has freedom to maneuver until this is exhausted.
      Group "Schill" is to operate against the north-going convoy MKS 29 during the night of 7 - 8 or 9 - 8.11.
      No air reconnaissance on 6.11., as C. in C. G.A.F. Atlantic has insufficient forces at his disposal to supply the requirements of the next few days.
      The next mission will be on 7.11. with increased forces.
    2) U 967, from Group "Tirpitz 2" was attacked at 2241 in BC 2667, by an aircraft.
      As according to earlier reports, a patrol group was also in this area, and the convoy was by-passing an area mined by submarines, Group "Tirpitz 2" was immediately dissolved and split up to the north and south.  U 967 and U 413 lengthened the "Tirpitz 1" patrol line as far as BC 2375, U 608 and 969 lengthened the "Tirpitz 3" patrol line as far as BC 3778.
      Convoy HX 264, for which the "Tirpitz" Group have been waiting since the evening, has not been contacted as yet.  As there is no further information concerning the convoy, it may well be still further back, the boats are maintaining their positions until further notice.
  b) 1) U 516 has been allocated the lower half of grid square EU and to the south of it, as attacking area.  Focal point off Colon.  Boat will be kept informed, as far as possible of traffic movements.
    2) Further approach point for U 538 and 542 is BC 32.  Boats should only take up position in that area for the purpose of attacking convoys.
  c)  U 214 requests bearings on U 193, therefore the boats cannot have contacted each other.  Executive messages awaited from the other supply groups, have still not been received.
  d) 1) After receiving the message from U 848, U 170 which was about 900 sea miles S.W. of her, received orders to proceed towards her at full speed.  They should meet in
 
 
 
- 274 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      about 2 1/2 days.
      U 848 should report as soon as help  is no longer required or should propose a rendezvous with U 170.
    2) U 642 reports her position from CH 72 and has apparently passed the Straits of Gibraltar.  She now comes under F.d.U. Mediterranean.
    3) U 405 had orders  to supply U 762 with fuel in BC 4826.  According to a message received from U 762, the boat did not arrive there.
      On 30.10., U 405, en route for the west, attacked a small south-going convoy in BD 1647.  She was forced away, and lost contact.  No further messages were sent out by the boat.  It was presumed that U 405 was surprised, and destroyed near the rendezvous for refueling.  There are however, no details.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 848                1 ship                5,000 GRT.
       
VI. General:
  1) The submarine losses during the last weeks, the increasing number of reports by submarines of aircraft attacks without any fixed location and the subsequent obvious detours by convoys confirm the suspicion that the enemy is using new ways and hitherto unknown methods of detecting submarines.  Against these, our own location and warning devices are inadequate in their present form.
  2)  It is possible that, with regard to radio location, the enemy has entered new fields, as yet unknown to us.  It is however, also possible that the enemy is using passive location on the electric or heat radiation given out by the submarine.  Perhaps other variations of active or passive location are possible.  As the visible forms of this enemy superiority are similar to those observed in certain positions from May to July is looks suspiciously as though there were a dangerous radiation on the part of the submarines.  Successes achieved through the use of Radar decoys makes it appear that the enemy used active location, although there have been no reports of this kind during the last weeks.
  3)

The electrical apparatus which, based on theoretical calculations, appear to confirm the suspected dangerous radiation, are the short wave receiver E 437 S and the wave indicator (Wanze G 1).

    Consequently the boats were forbidden, with immediate effect, to use Wanz G 1 for W/T messages, and were restricted in the use of the short wave receiver as far as operational control permits.  The use of other wireless sets which showed any signs of dangerous radiation had already been forbidden or restricted.
       
 
 
 
       
- 275 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  4) Wave indicator Wanz G 1 is being replaced  by the improved Wanz G 2.  The first apparatus to arrive in the west today.  No other boat is to put out with Wanz G 1.  Wanz G 2 is guaranteed to be almost entirely free from radiation.  The receiver type "Borkum", which, as a detector receiver, cannot radiate, is also due for distribution.  This week there were so many :Borkum" receivers for distribution, that it was possible not only to supply the boats which were putting out, but also those at sea, by submarine transport.  Compared to Wanz G 2, the "Borkum" receiver has the advantage of being a more primitive apparatus, but it is adequate as a means of warning.
  5) The short wave receiver E 437 S is being replaced by the new short wave receiver type "Main", with which a good number of the submarines are supplied.  The possibility of supplying all outgoing boats with "Main" seems dubious, owing to the numbers delivered.
  6)  The very decisive measures mentioned were taken as a precaution, although there was no definite proof that the enemy were basing their location on the radiation of these receivers.  The inevitable disadvantages of these precautions have been taken into consideration.
  7) A careful examination is required of all possibilities of electrical or heat radiation from submarines, and its use by the enemy.
  8) The commissioning of specially equipped submarines (Field Watch), which put out on or after 25.11. was organized after a watch had been kept on hitherto unwatched frequency bands, on new types of location apparatus and location methods used by the enemy.
  9)  Intelligence Sections and prisoners of war interrogation camps were established to obtain information on the new type of location devices used by the enemy.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
- 276 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
6.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BD 38
U 437
-
BC 69
U 586
-
Op(BC 64)
 
91
-
BD 23
262
-
Op(BE 78)
441
-
BF 45
592
-
Op(BC 91)
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
267
-
Op(BC 22)
455
-
BF 47
608
-
Op(BC 26)
 
123
-
BF 57
269
-
AF 76
466
-
Op(BE 78)
648
-
Op(BC 97)
 
129
-
DE 55
274
-
Op(BC 97)
488
-
CD 47
707
-
Op(BE 78)
 
154
-
Op(EB 40)
280
-
Op(BC 61)
505
-
BF 57
709
-
Op(BC 86)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
Op(BC 61)
510
-
BF 49
714
-
Op(BC 22)
 
168
-
LD 65
282
-
Op(BC 67)
516
-
EE 14
732
-
CG 90
 
170
-
FR 49
309
-
BF 48
518
-
CD 49
762
-
BD 28
 
190
-
EG 87
333
-
Op(BE 77)
530
-
DE 53
764
-
AM 16
 
193
-
CD 47
340
-
CG 90
533
-
Op(MF 10)
842
-
Op(BC 94)
 
211
-
Op(BE 77)
343
-
BD 25
536
-
Op(BB 70)
843
-
Op(BC 95)
 
212
-
Op(BC 22)
358
-
Op(BE 79)
537
-
Op(BB 60)
848
-
FL 67
 
214
-
CD 47
373
-
Op(BC 97)
538
-
AL 25
849
-
DS 28
 
218
-
EF 47
391
-
AE 82
541
-
AN 35
953
-
Op(BE 79)
 
219
-
BD 23
413
-
Op(BC 26)
542
-
AL 41
962
-
AF 72
 
226
-
Op(BC 91)
420
-
Op(BC 22)
552
-
Op(BC 58)
963
-
Op(BC 52)
 
228
-
Op(BE 79)
424
-
AK 35
575
-
Op(EC 64)
967
-
Op(BC 26)
 
231
-
BC 36
426
-
Op(BC 91)
584
-
BD 38
969
-
Op(BC 37)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 309 - 405 - 437 - 441 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 584 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 421 - 734 - 801 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 536 situation report: A fast single ship sighted in CC 5270 proceeding on course 2700.  The convoy route goes from CB 60 along the 200 meter line between Brown and Emerald Bank to the Sambro lightship.  Sea and air reconnaissance there.  Returned to base owing to lack of fuel.
  b)  None.
  c) English units located in CF 6240, BD 8740, AE 7410 and about CF 36.  
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) At 1800 on 7.11. Group "Schill" was in the patrol lines ordered.  C. in C. G.A.F. Atlantic is covering, with extra forces, the area in which the convoy will arrive if it is proceeding at between 6 - 8 knots.
    2) Group "Tirpitz":
      U 575, in BC 6412, reports hydrophones bearing and depth charges on 2850 at 1303.  A pursuit in this direction proved fruitless.
       
- 277 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      The Group is ordered again to remain on the alert as the convoy expected is probably on the way.
      U 842 was attacked by an aircraft at 1401 in BC 9416. Why the submarine remained on the surface is incomprehensible as the Group had laid instructions to proceed below the surface in the day-time.
      As no contact was reported before the evening and convoy HX 264 expected must already have gone through, the Groups were somewhat split up for the night and proceeded as from 2200, at 5 knots on the following courses:
      Tirpitz 1 - 3300;  Tirpitz 3 - 450;  Tirpitz 5- 1500; Tirpitz 4 - remains stationary, U 963 to go to Group 1.
      All boats are to submerge at 1000 on 7.11 and proceed submerged, at economical cruising speed, towards the northeast.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U 91 has supplied U 219 for the return to base.   The tanker has orders to proceed to U 762 at full speed ahead.
    2) U 256 has not met with U 584 at the rendezvous.  Continuous queries as to position.
    3) U 488 is to supply U 214 with fuel as quickly as possible, because of the low state of her fuel.  U 488 reports however, from a position 90 sea miles to the west of the grid square ordered for refueling. (CD 7133), that she has supplied U 193 (which was also sent to the rendezvous for the sake of security), but has lost sight of U 214 without supplying her with fuel. Aircraft bombs and depth charges as well as a patrol group were heard by the tanker, which intends to proceed further to the south to provide U 129 and 530 with fuel.   At 0131 U 214 requested bearings, and was at her rendezvous.
      U 488 again received orders to hurry and supply U 214 with fuel in another grid square, CD 4753.
    4) U 129 and U 530, which were waiting for U 488 in grid square DE 8155, were ordered to take up position about 200 sea miles to the west of this grid square.
  d) 1) U 848 should either have proposed a rendezvous last night with U 170 or have reported if she no longer required help.  So far, the W/T message ordered has not been received.  As, according to the last message received from U 848, she was being shadowed by an aircraft, she is a serious source of worry.
    2) Of the 4 boats en route for the Mediterranean, U 340 and U 732 have not reported in spite of requests.
 
 
 
       
- 278 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Judging from various facts, 2 boats are thought to have been destroyed in the Straits of Gibraltar on 31.10.  and 1.11., probably by a patrol group.  (see War Log 31.10.).  It can only refer to the boats mentioned, which must be counted as lost.  This is confirmed by a message from the Naval Attache at Tangier, according to which 60 - 70 submarine personnel were landed at Gibraltar.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BD 38
U 437
-
BD 47
U 586
-
Op(BC 64)
 
91
-
BD 23
262
-
Op(CF 28)
441
-
BF 52
592
-
Op(BC 91)
 
103
-
Op(EV 70)
267
-
Op(BC 22)
455
-
BF 48
608
-
Op(BC 61)
 
123
-
BF 61
269
-
AF 72
466
-
Op(CF 29)
648
-
Op(BC 97)
 
129
-
DE 57
274
-
Op(BC 97)
488
-
CD 47
707
-
Op(CF 28)
 
154
-
Op(EB 40)
280
-
Op(BC 61)
505
-
BF 80
709
-
Op(BC 86)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
Op(BC 61)
510
-
BF 73
714
-
Op(BC 22)
 
168
-
LE 42
282
-
Op(BC 67)
516
-
ED 62
734
-
AO
 
170
-
FR 36
309
-
BF 52
518
-
CD 55
762
-
BD 28
 
190
-
EQ 27
333
-
Op(CF 28)
530
-
DE 58
764
-
AM 15
 
193
-
CD 47
343
-
BD 28
533
-
Op(MF 10)
801
-
AO
 
211
-
Op(CF 27)
358
-
Op(CF 29)
536
-
CC 42
842
-
Op(BC 91)
 
212
-
Op(BC 22)
373
-
Op(BC 97)
537
-
Op(BB 60)
843
-
Op(BC 25)
 
214
-
CD 47
391
-
AE 84
538
-
AL 17
848
-
FL 84
 
218
-
EF 51
413
-
Op(BC 23)
541
-
AN 31
849
-
DS 29
 
219
-
BD 23
420
-
Op(BC 22)
542
-
AK 65
953
-
BE 80
 
226
-
Op(BC 91)
421
-
AO
552
-
Op(BC 58)
962
-
AF 47
 
228
-
Op(CF 29)
424
-
AK 73
575
-
Op(BC 64)
963
-
Op(BC 52)
 
231
-
BD 14
426
-
Op(BC 91)
584
-
BD 38
967
-
Op(BC 23)
                   
969
-
Op(BC 37)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 309 - 405 - 437 - 441 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 584 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  U 309 - 441 - Brest;  U 123 - St. Nazaire;  U 505 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 600 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For Group "Schill" against MKS 29.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 123 reports aircraft attack at 0957 in BF 5050, and one hour later urgently requests air support in BF 5530.  The submarine has a hole in the conning tower after being fired upon by the aircraft.  She will be picked up at the rendezvous by an escort and taken into Lorient.
       
       
- 279 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  Aircraft locate the convoy at 1055 in CF 6984, course 3500, speed 7 knots.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  ED 2477, ED 1952 (U 516).
      The American steamer "Panrop" and Azores aircraft report another submarine in CE 6584 (possibly U 518).
    2) English units located in BE 6530 and BE 5770.
    3) Unit of convoy MKS 29 reports air contact.  Course of convoy is 3200, speed 7 knots.
  d)  Stragglers of convoy ON 210, received information concerning the alteration of the route which now passes over BE 1667 and a point on 440 54' N.  When this route was confirmed, air patrols based on the Azores appeared for the first time as part of the escort.
     So far one convoy has been located on this course once in December 1942, and was escorted there after discovering the position of a submarine disposition.
     Since the area through which the enemy convoys pass and which he is able to cover from the air has now increased, location has become more difficult.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 47:
      Group "Shill" can only be committed to the convoy reported by aircraft to be in CF 6984 and proceeding on course 3500, in the evening of 8.11., as boats are not advancing any more tonight. Allowing for the course of 3200 reported by Radio Intercept message, and the course of 3500 reported by aircraft, Group "Schill" received orders to take up position in patrol line in the original order, from CF 2631 to CF 3296, as from 1800 on 8.11.  Boats should surface at 1800 on 8.11. and stand for D/F. Our own reconnaissance should fly on the same day in the morning and the afternoon.  Condors to send beacon signals as soon as they have made contact.
    2) The disposition of boats in long patrol lines which has been maintained until now, has not stood the test recently. The majority of convoys waited for have circumvented the dispositions so obviously, that a systematic method of interception must be taken into consideration (for suspected reasons see War Log 5.11.).  In the future, various new types of dispositions are to be tried out, with anticipated success Group "Tirpitz" is to be liquidated.  They are to proceed as follows:
     
U 843 - 424 - 538 = AJ 36;   U 714 - 542 - 280 = AK 19;
U 212 - 967 - 575 = AK 65;   U 969 - 963 - 552 = AK 55;
U 586 - 420 - 608 = AK 82;   U 373 - 282 - 226 = AK 95
U 274 - 709 - 842 = AK 87;   U 592 - 648 - 413 = BD 22;
U 267 - 281 - 426 = BD 35.                
 
 
 
- 280 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Submarines should proceed submerged during the day, and on the surface at night. A day's run of between 85 and 100 sea miles is estimated.   Disposition orders will be issued later.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U 762 refueled from U 343 o 6.11. and started to return to base.  U 343 steered for AK 82.  U 219 was thus free and proceeded to the south through DG 70.  The Southern boats are to refuel somewhere in this area.
    2) U 193 has already supplied U 214 with fuel for her return to base.  Consequently U 488 was not used for refueling purposes.  The next date on which the three submarines U 129 - 193 - 530 are to refuel from U 488 is the evening of 12.11., in DE 5855.  The boats mentioned are to fill up with fuel.
      U 488 is subsequently to proceed to EG 30 and eventually turn over the rest of her fuel to U 219.
  d) 1) According to a message from U 256, U 584 did not arrive at the rendezvous for refueling.  Queries as to position remain unanswered.   According to a message transmitted by U 91, both U 584 and herself were attacked by an aircraft in BD 28 on 31.10., during which the boats got lost.  U 584 must be presumed lost in this attack.
    2) U 848 has not reported anymore.  She was heavily attacked three times at 1433 on 5.11. by an aircraft, in FL 6675.  As the aircraft maintained further contact, U 848 must be presumed lost in a later attack.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    With reference to picking up prisoners from enemy aircraft and surface forces, the following orders are issued to the boats:
  1) Statements made by prisoners of war are the safest and best sources of information concerning enemy tactics, armaments, location apparatus and movements.  Prisoners from aircraft and destroyers can be of great value to us. Therefore every effort should be made to pick up such prisoners, insofar as is possible without endangering the boat.
  2)  As prisoners are particularly willing to talk when still suffering from the effect of being captured, they are to be questioned at once, on board.  It is of primary interest, as to how aircraft succeeded in locating submarines, whether it was by radio-location or by passive location methods, for instance by picking up electronic or heat radiation from the boats.   Captures are to be reported as soon as possible, so that the prisoners may be passed on eventually to boats returning to base.
 
 
 
- 281 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
8.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BD 38
U 437
-
BD 26
U 600
-
BF 55
 
91
-
BE 14
262
-
CF 34
455
-
BF 49
608
-
BC 35
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
267
-
AJ 97
466
-
CF 35
648
-
BC 98
 
129
-
DE 73
269
-
AF 47
488
-
CC 95
707
-
CF 34
 
154
-
Op(EB 40)
274
-
BC 98
510
-
BF 71
709
-
BC 91
 
155
-
Op(FA)
280
-
BC 35
516
-
ED 42
714
-
AJ 86
 
168
-
LE 55
281
-
BC 39
518
-
CD 61
734
-
AN 35
 
170
-
FL 70
282
-
BC 65
530
-
DE 81
762
-
BD 28
 
190
-
EQ 57
333
-
CF 34
533
-
Op(MF 30)
764
-
AL 36
 
193
-
CC 99
343
-
BD 28
536
-
CC 51
801
-
AN 35
 
211
-
CF 26
358
-
CF 33
537
-
Op(BB 80)
842
-
BC 95
 
212
-
AJ 94
373
-
BC 98
538
-
AK 37
843
-
AJ 89
 
214
-
CD 46
391
-
AE 76
541
-
AN 23
849
-
DS 59
 
218
-
EF 26
413
-
BC 31
542
-
AK 56
953
-
BE 90
 
219
-
BD 28
420
-
AJ 97
552
-
BC 61
962
-
AE 69
 
226
-
BC 68
421
-
AN 35
575
-
BC 35
963
-
BC 26
 
228
-
CF 35
424
-
AK 72
586
-
BC 38
967
-
AJ 98
 
231
-
BD 18
426
-
BC 68
592
-
BC 68
969
-
BC 35
       
437
-
BD            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 437 - 455 - 505 - 518 - 536 - 584 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Against Gibraltar - England traffic for Group "Schill".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For message from U 648 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 714 sighted a steamer in ballast with 4 escorts in AJ 9914 at 1034, proceeding on course 2400.  At 1720, the boat was attacked by an aircraft, but succeeded in driving it away without suffering any damage.
    3) U 537, while proceeding in BC 4170, made several locations with Wanz and Naxos.   She was attacked on 31.10., while her Naxos was not clear, by an aircraft without bombs.  Submarine intends to push on to BB 5940.
    4) U 518 reports the following situation:
      Single ship and heavily escorted convoy traffic proceeding in both directions through the Straits of Florida.  Active sea patrols, night flying aircraft, especially in DM 26, with navigation lights. Weakly escorted single ship traffic along the 200 meter line of the western edge of the Straits of Yucatan.  Little night flying.
  b)  Air reconnaissance sights a cruiser proceeding on course 2700 in CF 3952.  Convoy MKS 29 has not been located.
  c) U-boat sightings: BF 7441 (U 953), AJ 8297 (U 714).
  d)  None.
       
- 282 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) U 648 sighted an aircraft carrier with escort in BC 9924.
      Boats in suitable positions are to follow this important target as soon as they receive the W/T message.
      Towards morning, U 648 reported that at 2200 in BC 9935 she had already fired 3 times at and missed the carrier reported, which was proceeding on course 2700.  Contact was subsequently lost in a smoke screen and a squall of rain.  A Zaunkönig torpedo fired at an escort vessel was a premature.
      In spite of pressing on, contact was not reestablished, even by the boats already following the convoy.  The operation must therefore be considered as ended.  Possibly the carrier group is in contact with convoy ON 209 which, according to dead reckoning, is in the vicinity.
    2) Convoy No. 47:
      The simultaneous attack by 8 boats on convoy MKS 29 did not take place.
      The air reconnaissance which set out in the morning and the afternoon did not locate the convoy either time.   Possibly the convoy was in the area to be reconnoitered.  Reconnaissance was however insufficient, as the westerly aircraft broke down in the morning and the search gear of the center aircraft broke down in the afternoon reconnaissance.
      It seemed out of the question to postpone the operation until the following day, after renewed air reconnaissance, as, if the convoy made a further detour to the west on 10.11., it would be beyond the range of our own aircraft.
      Should the convoy be in the area covered by air reconnaissance, the submarines are to proceed, as from 2000 on course 2500 at full speed ahead and as from 0100 on course 2300.
      Thus the submarines will be covering an area in which the convoy would be if proceeding between course 3450 and 3050 and at speed of 5.5 - 7.3 knots.
      At 0800 on 9.11. the submarines should be in reconnaissance lines from CF 2754 to 2929, and should proceed to the north, below the surface, at 2 knots.
      The latter orders were issued, as renewed air reconnaissance is intended on 9.11. and then the submarines will be able to proceed as far as possible to the north during the day.
      At 0500, from CF 2833, U 262 sighted star shells on a true bearing of 900.   Behind U 262, two further submarines are proceeding towards the west, and immediately reconnoiter the area from which the star shells were fired. Not all the submarines were ordered to take part, as former experiences
 
 
 
- 283 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      oppose operations against star shells.  No further message was sent before 0800.
  b) - c) None.
  d) It is still possible that the crew of U 848 is still floating in rubber dinghies, U 170 received orders to follow course 700 and then to proceed in legs towards FL 6675 and to make a search in that area.  U 170 will have to refuel.
       
V. Reports of Success:   None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BE 17
U 437
-
BD 35
U 600
-
BF 46
 
91
-
BE 19
262
-
Op(CF 28)
455
-
BF 57
608
-
BD 11
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
267
-
BC 32
466
-
Op(CF 28)
648
-
BC 99
 
129
-
DE 75
269
-
AE 69
488
-
DE 23
707
-
Op(CF 28)
 
154
-
Op(EB 40)
274
-
BC 93
510
-
BE 68
709
-
BC 65
 
155
-
Op(FA)
280
-
AK 77
516
-
EC 66
714
-
AJ 91
 
168
-
LE 65
281
-
BD 17
518
-
CC 99
734
-
AN 31
 
170
-
FL 82
282
-
BC 63
530
-
BE 76
762
-
BE 42
 
190
-
Op(EQ 84)
333
-
Op(CF 27)
533
-
Op(MF 36)
764
-
AL 28
 
193
-
DE 29
343
-
BD 21
536
-
CC 37
801
-
AN 31
 
211
-
Op(CF 27)
358
-
Op(CF 29)
537
-
BC 72
842
-
BC 93
 
212
-
AJ 92
373
-
BC 93
538
-
AK 27
843
-
AJ 91
 
214
-
CD 52
413
-
BC 32
541
-
AF 79
849
-
DS 89
 
218
-
DQ 98
420
-
AJ 95
542
-
AK 42
953
-
BE 95
 
219
-
BD 55
421
-
AN 31
552
-
BC 38
962
-
AE 78
 
226
-
BC 66
424
-
AK 45
575
-
BC 33
963
-
BC 31
 
228
-
Op(CF 29)
426
-
BD 44
586
-
BC 33
967
-
AJ 95
 
231
-
BD 25
391
-
AE 78
592
-
BC 66
969
-
BC 33
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 437 - 455 - 518 - 536 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 508 - 515 - St. Nazaire; U 543 - 544 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For Group "Schill" against MKS 29.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Hydrophone contact made by U 413 from AK 7895 at 0121, on a bearing of 1200.  She operated on it without meeting any enemy traffic, and proceeded to the waiting position.
       
- 284 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 256 was attacked by a destroyer in BD 2842 on 1.11.  She was damaged in several places by depth charges, and forced to return to base.
    3) U 510 reports aircraft attack in CG 5526.  Position is unlikely and is queried.
  b)  Air reconnaissance sighted the convoy at 1130 in CF 2591 proceeding on course 3600 and at 1910 in CF 2342 on course 60, speed 7 knots.
     At 1521, another convoy, consisting of 24 landing craft one destroyer and one merchant ship was reported in CG 1159, proceeding on course 3300, speed 6 - 8 knots.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings in CF 3320 (U 707), CG 1115, CF 2672, BF 9433, DM 8158.
    2) English units were located in AM 7780, AL 9930.
  d) According to priority Radio Intercepts, stragglers from convoy ON 209 received instructions to pass a point on the former route and proceed through AJ 7583.  Clearly this convoy has used the northerly route, the subsequent convoy however, ON 210, has, according to information at hand, turned aside to the south.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 47:
    According to a message received at 0821, U 262 sighted 4 red lights at 0700 on the 9th, in CF 2679, and suspected a search group.   At 0827, U 707 was attacked by an aircraft.   Group "Schill" again received orders to submerge in order to avoid unnecessary losses.
     The operating air reconnaissance suddenly located the convoy at 1130 in CF 2591.  According to subsequent dead reckoning this convoy must have passed on course 3150, speed 6 knots straight through the area covered by air reconnaissance during the morning.  It probably had the luck to be in the uncovered area resulting from the breakdown of the aircraft.  This explanation is the most likely, and is confirmed by messages received from U 262 which was apparently in the vicinity of the convoy at 0700/9.  The opinions passed by Operational Control on the evening of the 9th, subsequently proved correct.  The convoy passed the reconnaissance lines at about the head of the middle submarine (U 262).  The message that U 466 had attacked the convoy escort, was only received in the evening. The submarine came on a destroyer at 1602 on the 9th, and sank her with a Zaunkönig torpedo.  The depth charges hindered the transmission of the message.  The submarine was forced to return to base because of damage.  
 
 
 
- 285 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     When the aircraft had located the convoy at 1130, the question arose whether or not, in this area under careful air observation, to operate against this target, and to press on on the surface in order to make the best of any possible chances of success.  The submarines then received orders to surface and press on to the north, provided that no danger of surprise existed under the visibility and weather conditions and provided that Flak was possible.  As soon as aircraft appear, they should submerge again and proceed submerged towards the north.
    The Condors, which started out during the afternoon, sighted the convoy again on 19.10., in CF 2342, course 60, speed 7 knots. The aircraft sent out beacon signals, which were, however, not received by the submarines (possibly the distances were too great).  According to dead reckoning, the first boats should have reached the convoy between 0400 and 0600hours.  As there are no clues to the positions of the boats, those in a position to reach the convoy by 0800 on 10.11. received orders during the evening, to give position reports.  Only 333 and 358 turned out to be sufficiently far ahead.
    U 262 subsequently reports firing a Zaunkönig end of run detonator at a destroyer in position 130, at 1023 in CF 2658.
    General orders were issued, that boats which are able to maintain attack positions until daylight are to continue the operation, the remainder are to break away and proceed towards the west.  U 707 is a cause of anxiety, as she has not reported since the aircraft attack.
  b) The following revised disposition is ordered for boats proceeding west and northwest after the liquidation of the "Tirpitz" Group; as well as for boats putting out from home.
    Within Group "Eisenhart" every 3 boats are to form a smaller group, and, with 30 sea miles between each boat, are to occupy the following patrol lines, in direction 3250:
     
Group 1 = U 538 - 391 - 542 from AD 9857 to AK 1544.
Group 2 = U 843 - 714 - 424 from AJ 3849 to AK 4154.
Group 3 = U 764 - 280 - 969 from AK 1965 to AK 5151.
Group 5 = U 963 - 552 - 586 from AK 5641 to AK 5937.
Group 4 = U 212 - 967 - 575 from AK 4782 to AK 7248.
Group 6 = U 420 - 709 - 282 from AK 7665 to AK 8752.
Group 7 = U 608 - 274 - 343 from AK 8665 to AK 9752
Group 8 = U 592 - 413 - 373 from BD 2471 to BD 2759.
Group 9 = U 267 - 281 - 426 from BD 3242 to BD 3538.
Group 10 = U 226 - 648 - 842 from BD 5346 to BD 5662.
     During the day, Groups are to remain below the surface, and by night on the surface.  Certain boats, particularly those in the southern Groups, are so low in fuel, that they are certain to have to return to base soon. Refueling cannot take place
 
 
 
- 286 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    owing to the scarcity of tankers, and is no longer to take place owing to the outstanding losses incurred while replenishing in the North Atlantic during recent months.
    As mentioned earlier on, the revised disposition was arranged to produce the best patrol lines for locating convoys and those best able to make enemy locations, as well as maintaining a good chance of contacting and fighting.  This disposition can only be regarded as an emergency measure to fill the time required to install 3.7 cm guns on the boats.
    Disadvantages:
     Impossibility of a collective operation with many submarines.  Convoys are able to pass, unnoticed, through the gaps or are first sighted on the least favorable side of the Group.
    Advantages:
    Increased difficulty for the enemy locating the disposition.  If a convoy is sighted on the most favorable side, it is possible to use from two to three Groups, the following night when radio intercepts are received several small Groups can quickly be formed into a larger one.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success
    U 466                1 destroyer.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 262
-
Op(BF 87)
U 466
-
Op(CF 34)
U 592
-
Op(BD 18)
 
91
-
BE 28
267
-
BC 33
488
-
DE 27
600
-
BF 45
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
269
-
AE 68
508
-
BF 91
608
-
AK 79
 
129
-
DE 77
274
-
BD 47
510
-
CG 52
648
-
Op(BD 74)
 
154
-
Op(EB 40)
280
-
AK 75
515
-
BF 91
707
-
Op(BE 79)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
Op(BD 16)
516
-
EC 15
709
-
BC 63
 
168
-
LF 44
282
-
BD 17
518
-
CD 75
714
-
Op(AJ 65)
 
170
-
FL 65
333
-
Op(CF 87)
530
-
DE 79
734
-
AN 23
 
190
-
Op(FB 25)
343
-
Op(AK 89)
533
-
Op(MF 30)
762
-
BE 51
 
193
-
DE 55
358
-
Op(CF 87)
536
-
CC 39
764
-
AL 27
 
211
-
Op(BE 79)
373
-
BD 47
537
-
Op(BB 93)
801
-
AN 24
 
212
-
Op(AJ 93)
391
-
AL 21
538
-
AK 16
842
-
BC 66
 
214
-
CD 37
413
-
Op(BD 12)
541
-
AF 76
843
-
Op(AJ 68)
 
218
-
DR 71
420
-
Op(AK 74)
542
-
AK 01
849
-
DH 26
 
219
-
BD 82
421
-
AN 24
543
-
AO
953
-
BF 74
 
226
-
BD 45
424
-
Op(AK 41)
544
-
AO
962
-
AE 67
 
228
-
Op(BE 87)
426
-
BD 45
552
-
Op(BC 36)
963
-
Op(AK 77)
 
231
-
BD 34
437
-
BD 39
575
-
Op(AK 74)
967
-
Op(AK 71)
 
256
-
BE 17
455
-
BF 57
586
-
Op(AK 78)
969
-
AK 75
 
       
- 287 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 437 - 455 - 536 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  U 712 from Bergen to Kiel (surfaced).
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  Fighter aircraft flying into the Bay of Biscay to escort a submarine damaged, according to a Radio Intercept, by an English aircraft.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 537 attacked by Consolidated with 4 aircraft bombs at 2127 in BB 9651.  Submarine sheers off.
  b)  Submarine not met with.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings in CF 2536, CF 2611 as well as several messages from BF 76 and BF 84.
    2) English unit located in BE 7550.
    3) According to a submarine message, an unidentified English steamer was fired at in MP 6830 (Japanese submarine).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 47:
     No further messages received from the "Schill" boats.  Probably they did not reach the convoy before daylight and turned off towards the west.  U 228 reports subsequently that at 1109 on 9.11. in CF 2685 she sighted a 5,000 GRT freighter (straggler) under air escort and attacked her with a Zaunkönig torpedo.  She heard a torpedo detonation and sounds of sinking.  The ship is presumed lost.  At this point, the operation against the convoy came to an end.
    Final Remarks:
    The operation against Convoy MKS 29 convoy began on 5.11. when several FW 200 were committed.  The convoy was not contacted that day and must have been further back or to the south, as the area under reconnaissance was only very small.   No flying took place on 6.11. to make it possible for stronger forces to reconnoiter on 7.11. At 1155 on 7.11., the Air Forces contacted the convoy in CF 6984 proceeding on course 3500.  Group "Schill" with 7 boats (U 333 - 358 - 211 - 228 - 466 - 707 - 262) was sent out in the evening of the 8th, as the main action was expected during the night of 8th - 9th.  C. in C. G.A.F. Atlantic arranged for a reconnaissance to take place in the morning and afternoon of 8.11.
       
- 288 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     On sighting the convoy, aircraft were to send out beacon signals to lead the boats to it in the evening twilight.  This cooperation planned, was not put into operation as the aircraft committed did not find the convoy again.  Then a few of the submarines proceeding S.W. at full speed ahead, came upon a patrol group, which, as it turned out later, was attached to the convoy.  In the morning of 9.11., the newly committed Air Forces contacted the convoy in CF 2591 and in the afternoon in CF 2342. The boats were then behind the convoy, and did not succeed in advancing any more during either the day or the night.  The lack of information resulting from the reconnaissance on 8.11. led to the failure of the entire operation.
    Weather:  was N.E. until about 8.11., later turning to the S.W.  Average wind strength 2 - 4.
    Information gained by Air Reconnaissance:
     Both "Schill" operations showed that due to a lack of long distance aircraft (results:  first, no replacements for aircraft out of order, second, too small an area under reconnaissance) on those days which were of the greatest importance to the submarine operation.
     A successful collaboration with submarines is only possible, judging from these results, if a sufficient number of long distance aircraft is available for a more frequent reconnaissance in close formation, as well as the reserves necessary to replace broken-down aircraft and gear.
    Successes:
    During the action against the patrol group in the morning of the 9th, U 466 sank one destroyer, U 288 one 5,000 GRT straggler under escort.   U 262 fired one end of run detonating Zaunkönig at a destroyer.
    Losses:
    U 707 was attacked by an aircraft in the morning of the 9th, and afterwards did not report any more.
    U 466 must have returned to base owing to damage by depth charges.
    General:
     For the next operation against this convoy traffic, at least two patrol lines are to be formed, in quarterline formation one below the other, with a distance of a day's run in between.  Thus, one Group should be in front of the convoy while it would be possible to use the other for search purposes in the case of a lack of air reconnaissance (because of the events which took place during the night 8/9.11.).
 
 
 
       
- 289 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Owing to the recent results, G.A.F. Ops. Staff were informed that the forces of C. in C. G.A.F. Atlantic were still insufficient for a successful submarine reconnaissance.
  b)  U 426 - 373 and 592, from Group "Eisenhart", report they must return to base immediately owing to lack of fuel. U 426, which still has 36 cubic meters, can only continue occupying her position for a short time.
    In order to fill the positions which U 373 and U 592 left on their return to base, the patrol lines of Group "10" were liquidated.  U 648 and U 226 went over to Group "8" and occupied the southerly and northerly positions there.  The 3rd boat of Group "10" ( U 482) must be counted as lost.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) According to a Radio Intercept, several English aircraft were assigned to a damaged submarine which had been contacted in about BF 7630 and was proceeding towards the Spanish coast on course 1600, speed 12 knots.  As the submarine did not send out any messages, the W/T was presumed to be out of order.  Several Junkers 88 were sent out to assist, and arrived in the area towards 1800, where they shot down a Sunderland but were unable to locate the submarine.   Possibly U 510 is the damaged submarine as she reported an aircraft attack yesterday in CG 5526 (position could not agree with dead reckoning as the submarine was heading for BE 58).  U 953, according to dead reckoning is further on in are BF 70.  Further messages expected.
    2) U 707, a submarine belonging to Group "Schill", reported an aircraft attack at 0825 on 9.11. Position CF 3320, according to a Radio Intercept.  Subsequently, the submarine did not reply in spite of frequent requests for position.  She must be considered lost.
      At 0827 on 9.11., U 707, after returning to base, reported hearing a loud detonation with a very clear ring (similar to a torpedo detonation), followed by sounds of sinking.  The sounds of Diesels which had been heard previously, had disappeared.
    3) At 1401 on 6.11., U 842, according to her own message, was attacked by an aircraft in BC 9716.  The submarine was on the surface, in spite of lucid orders to proceed below the surface during the day. Subsequent requests for position reports received no reply.  She must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 228                1 freighter                5,000 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
 
 
 
       
- 290 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
11.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 262
-
Op(CF 22)
U 466
-
CF 33
U 586
-
Op(AK 76)
 
91
-
BE 53
267
-
BD 12
488
-
DE 49
592
-
BD 19
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
269
-
AE 67
508
-
BF 82
600
-
BF 44
 
129
-
DE 77
274
-
BD 45
510
-
CG 50
608
-
AK 87
 
154
-
Op(EB 30)
280
-
AK 72
515
-
BF 82
648
-
Op(BD 72)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
Op(BD 24)
516
-
EC 57
709
-
Op(BD 17)
 
168
-
LF 50
282
-
BD 12
518
-
CD 81
714
-
Op(AJ 63)
 
170
-
FL 60
333
-
Op(BE)
53
-
DE 79
734
-
AF 79
 
190
-
Op(FB 50)
343
-
Op(AK 97)
533
-
Op(MF 30)
762
-
BE 64
 
193
-
DE 57
358
-
Op(CF 23)
536
-
CD 15
764
-
AL 17
 
211
-
Op(CF 22)
373
-
BD 49
537
-
Op(BD 96)
801
-
AN 24
 
212
-
Op(AK 47)
391
-
AL 10
538
-
Op(AK 15)
843
-
Op(AJ 66)
 
214
-
CD 36
413
-
BD 16
541
-
AF 72
849
-
EH 56
 
218
-
DR 45
420
-
Op(AK 75)
542
-
Op(AK 25)
953
-
BF 84
 
219
-
BD 87
421
-
AN 24
543
-
AN 35
962
-
AE 83
 
226
-
BD 43
424
-
Op(AK 41)
544
-
AN 35
963
-
Op(AK 75)
 
228
-
Op(CF 26)
426
-
BD 51
552
-
Op(BD 12)
967
-
Op(AK 71)
 
231
-
BD 39
437
-
BE 18
575
-
Op(AK 72)
969
-
AK 73
 
256
-
BE 43
455
-
BF 61            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 168 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 373 - 413 - 426 - 437 - 455 - 466 - 518 - 536 - 592 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  U 455 - Lorient;  U 168 - Penang.
  Sailed:  U 618 - St. Nazaire;  U 86 - Brest; U 238 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter patrols in the outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 537 reports renewed attack in BB 9973 by Consolidated aircraft at 1305.
    2) U 510 reports having remained unobserved in CG 5526 during the aircraft attack on 9.11., and the position correct.  (Presumably the aircraft flew at low altitude over the submarine during the night).
    3) U 508 was attacked at 0230 by an aircraft in BF 8253.  No report as to position.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat attacks in BB 9985 (U 537) and another in an undetermined position (Biscay, U 508).
    2) English units located in:  BE 4348, BE 3890, BE 4930, BF 1470 and AK 9452.
  d) 1) According to the deciphering which has now been accomplished, stragglers and Convoy HX 264 received  the following instructions at 1630 on 4.11.:
       
- 291 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Cancel the straggler route and replace it by BC 7179 - CD 1536 - BD 8679 - AL 8719.  The next position lies on 450 59' North, longitude is missing.
    2) A rendezvous was arranged in AM 7158 on 8.11. for stragglers and Convoy ONS 22.
      For operational effects of order 1) and 2) see War Log of 12.11.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) The information gained by Group "Schill" should be used in the next operation against England - Gibraltar convoy traffic, if numbers allow.  It is intended to establish two patrol lines one behind the other.
      As Group "Schill" is too weak for this with 5 boats, the "Eisenhart" boats U 420 - 608 - 267 - 281 and U 420, which are lowest in fuel, are taken from their Group, and ordered to proceed to CF 25 at economical cruising speed.  Similar orders also apply to U 413 as far as fuel permits.
      Thus patrol lines 8, 9 and 10 are missing from Group "Eisenhart".  Of the remaining boats, U 266 is occupying the northerly position in patrol line number 6, U 648 the northerly position in patrol line number 7.
    2) After breaking off the operation against Convoy No. 47, the"Schill" boats proceeded to the upper half of BE 70, and waited there.
    3) U 515 and U 600 should adjust their speed so as to reach CF 25 on 18.11.  Both submarines will take part in the "Schill" operation.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) According to reports from the Naval Attache, a German submarine crew has landed in El Barquero (the N.W. corner of Spain).  The crew are from the submarine which was attacked yesterday several times by English aircraft in BF 7630. The name of the Captain was apparently Wolf.  We must wait for further information, as this boat had not reported since leaving Trondheim, and had been presumed lost.
    2) U 533 reports at last on 13.10., from MF 62.  She had orders to operate in the Oman Gulf.  Since 28.10., the submarine had been repeatedly and unsuccessfully requested for position reports.  As several submarine sightings were know to have taken place during this period, owing to Radio Intercepts, (the latest on 5.11. in MF 2650) it could be presumed that U 533 was in her area.
       
 
 
 
       
- 292 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      She must now be presumed lost, as renewed and urgent calls received no reply. The submarine definitely torpedoed at least one ship in the Oman Gulf.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 86
-
BF 55
U 488
-
DE 78
U 592
-
BD 52
 
91
-
BE 62
267
-
BD 16
238
-
BF 55
600
-
BE 68
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
269
-
AE 83
508
-
BF 82
618
-
BF 91
 
129
-
DE 78
274
-
BD 19
510
-
CG 72
608
-
BD 22
 
154
-
Op(EB 30)
280
-
Op(AK 46)
515
-
BF 73
648
-
Op(BD 46)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
BD 29
516
-
Op(EC 47)
709
-
Op(BD 12)
 
170
-
FL 60
282
-
Op(AK 87)
518
-
CD 59
714
-
Op(AJ 41)
 
190
-
Op(FB 50)
333
-
Op(BD 70)
530
-
DE 78
734
-
AF 76
 
193
-
DE 78
343
-
Op(AK 97)
536
-
CD 25
762
-
BE 68
 
211
-
Op(BD 70)
358
-
Op(BE 70)
537
-
CC 21
764
-
AK 39
 
212
-
Op(AK 47)
373
-
BD 58
538
-
Op(AD 99)
801
-
AF 87
 
214
-
CE 13
391
-
AL 32
541
-
AF 47
843
-
Op(DJ 28)
 
218
-
DR 27
413
-
BD 26
542
-
Op(AK 16)
849
-
EH 83
 
219
-
CE 17
420
-
AK 87
543
-
AN 29
953
-
BF 82
 
226
-
BD 16
421
-
AF 76
544
-
AN 29
962
-
AE 82
 
228
-
Op(BE 70)
424
-
Op(AK 41)
552
-
Op(AK 84)
963
-
Op(AK 73)
 
231
-
BE 42
426
-
BD 56
575
-
Op(AK 72)
967
-
Op(AK 71)
 
256
-
BE 52
437
-
BE 51
586
-
Op(AK 82)
969
-
Op(AK 46)
 
262
-
Op(CF 70)
466
-
BE 18            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 373 - 391 - 426 - 437 - 466 - 518 - 536 - 592 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  English units were located in AM 9869, BE 15, BE 3291, AM 9841, BE 3291, BE 3310.
  d)  Convoy SC 146, which, according to W/T traffic and dead reckoning, passed longitude 400 West sometime on 11.11. received orders on 10.11., about a new route for stragglers.  The W/T message was only partly deciphered.  One position lay on 460 45' North.
    In a further message dated 12.11. the position was referred to as AM 7134.  This convoy therefore also seems to chose the southerly route.
       
- 293 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) The "Eisenhart" Group disposition was moved 350 sea miles in a direction of 1450.  See Figure VI for reasons for these orders (General).
      The Groups are now in the following patrol lines:
     
Group 1 = U 538 - 391 - 542 from AK 5678 to AK 5995.
Group 2 = U 843 - 714 - 424 from AK 8714 to BD 1331.
Group 3 = U 764 - 280 - 969 from AK 9481 to AK 9793.
Group 4 = U 212 - 967 - 575 from BD 2713 to BD 2798.
Group 6 = U 226 - 709 - 282 from BD 5627 to BD 6714.
Group 5 = U 963 - 552 - 586 from BD 3259 to BD 3646.
Group 7 = U 648 - 274 - 343 from BD 6676 to BD 6693.
      Similar methods of advance were ordered, i.e. below the surface during the day, and on the surface at night.  It was calculated that the patrol lines would take until 16.11. to get into positions.  Convoys SC 146 and HX 265 were expected in the area at this time.
    2) Owing to lack of fuel U 413 was unable to carry out the intended convoy operation within Group "Schill".  She returned immediately to base.
  c) As from today we must count on beginning to refuel U 129, U 193, and U 530 from U 488.
  d) 1) U 170 ceased the fruitless search for the crew of U 848 and returned to base.
    2) The crew which was landed on the North Spanish coast is actually from U 966 which was missing immediately after putting out from Trondheim on 5.10.  The submarine was attacked at 0300 on 10.11. in BF 7423, and later on in the day by several other aircraft.
      When U 966 was blown up at about 1600, while unable to dive, and down in the water, to the gallery hatch.
      She was then southeast of Punta Estaca, about 2 miles off shore.  5 dead, 2 missing.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  1) When the "Tirpitz" Group was liquidated on 6.11. a loose disposition in several groups consisting of 3 boats was intended, in the area ranging from the southernmost point of Greenland to BD 53. As a result of this disposition, all the convoy routes were located since those on 1.9. - 6.11. which were discovered by priority radio intercepts, except Convoys HX 262
 
 
 
- 294 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     and SC 144 which passed to the south.  About 26 of the total of 28 convoys, proceeded along the northern route.
    On 7.11., a passage point in BE 1670 of convoy ON 210, on 11.11. the route followed by stragglers of convoy HX 264 (BC 7170, CD 1536, BD 8679, AL 8749) and a rendezvous of convoy ONS 22 in AM 7150 on 8.11. were all discovered through Special Radio Intercept.
     This tendency of the 3 convoys to follow the southern route is striking, and seems likely that the enemy, after building its air base on the Azores moved its convoy routes to the south within the area covered by air patrols from the Azores.  This alteration is understandable, on looking back on the stormy winter in the North Atlantic.
    After receiving the messages about the southerly routes followed by the 3 convoys mentioned, the best thing for us to do is to act on the information and move the entire disposition of the "Eisenhart" Groups in a southeasterly direction.  Only time will show whether the enemy has organized a general move to the south of all the convoys or whether it is a question of the enemy by-passing suspected submarine dispositions.
  2) The submarine operations of recent weeks and reflections on the disposition of Group "Eisenhart", have illustrated the difficulties of the present state of defence and the Air Forces, involved by the problem of locating the convoys.  The enemy holds all the trump cards: Far reaching Air Reconnaissance covering all areas permanently and using location methods against which we still have no secure method of warning, thus safeguarding the ships and their dispositions.
     Possibility of making detours and scattering the convoys over an immense area.
    On our side:
     Hitherto, no Air Reconnaissance of our own, the submarines did their own reconnaissance, very small reconnaissance area of submarines, no new methods of location, minimum mobility of submarines, as dangers of air attacks made it necessary for submarines always to proceed submerged during the day.  The enemy knew all our secrets and we knew none of theirs, and such a knowledge would be necessary for us to achieve successful attacks on convoys.
    Renewed imperative request:
     A far reaching Air Reconnaissance, speedy improvements of our own active and passive location gear.
  3) The need for avoiding too high losses caused by strong air forces by proceeding during the day and going into action at night, has resulted in such immobility among the submarines, that it has become necessary to alter former methods of attacking convoys.  The
 
 
 
- 295 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     necessity of proceeding submerged during the day means:  that the submarines take very much longer on their outward and return journeys (as far as BC 35 = 19 days advance, as far as AK 85 = 16 days, i.e. the outward and return journeys take as long as a former average Atlantic operation; that the submarines remain considerably less time in the actual operational area (the 2 cubic meters  used per day, for a days run of 90 - 100 miles is the same amount used for a days run of 140 - 150 miles formerly achieved);  considerably less numbers of submarines in the operational area: impossibility of forming boats into groups when suddenly sighting the enemy; impossibility of refueling under poor weather conditions in the Atlantic (almost impossible all through the winter).
    The necessity of abbreviating our outward routes in order to maintain the submarines for longer periods in the actual operational areas (the convoy routes) means giving up the western half of the North Atlantic as a base for attacking convoys and moving all our dispositions against America - England traffic to the east of 350 West, and further, concentrating more on attacking England - Gibraltar convoy traffic, which indeed has occurred.
  4)  There have been no attacks on England - Gibraltar traffic for some time - since June 1942.  Now, the following three factors make it worthwhile to resume this battle.
    a) The use of Zaunkönig, thus rendering it possible to maintain and base our craft in the formerly particularly dangerous area BE and CF (former haunt of anti-submarine groups).
    b) Far reaching reconnaissance by Ju 290, thus leading the boats successfully and quickly to convoys, and making possible brief submarine operations lasting only one night.
    c) The necessity of attacking in operational areas in the vicinity, so as to use the fighting strength of the boats to the full. (See figure 3), last paragraph).
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
- 296 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
13.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BE 56
U 466
-
BE 99
U 592
-
BD 61
 
86
-
BF 46
262
-
Op(BE 70)
488
-
DE 78
600
-
BE 91
 
91
-
BE 66
267
-
BD 28
508
-
BF 76
608
-
BD 26
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
269
-
AE 85
510
-
CF 96
618
-
BF 82
 
129
-
DE 78
274
-
BD 52
515
-
BF 75
648
-
Op(BD 54)
 
154
-
Op(EP 80)
280
-
Op(AK 57)
516
-
Op(EB 90)
709
-
Op(BD 16)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
BD 61
518
-
CD 62
714
-
Op(AK 48)
 
170
-
FL 42
282
-
Op(BD 21)
530
-
DE 78
734
-
AF 48
 
190
-
Op(FB 50)
333
-
Op(BE 70)
536
-
CD 31
762
-
BF 47
 
193
-
DE 78
343
-
Op(BD 31)
537
-
Op(CC 20)
764
-
AK 64
 
211
-
Op(BE 70)
358
-
Op(BE 70)
538
-
Op(AK 15)
801
-
AN 24
 
212
-
Op(AK 75)
373
-
BD 91
541
-
AE 68
843
-
Op(AK 44)
 
214
-
CE 22
391
-
AK 39
542
-
Op(AK 29)
849
-
ER 31
 
218
-
DR 23
413
-
BD 62
543
-
AN 24
953
-
BF 57
 
219
-
CE 44
420
-
BD 21
544
-
AN 24
962
-
AE 84
 
226
-
BD 27
421
-
AF 72
552
-
Op(AK 88)
963
-
Op(AK 85)
 
231
-
BE 43
424
-
Op(AK 48)
575
-
Op(AK 79)
967
-
Op(AK 75)
 
228
-
Op(BE 70)
426
-
BD 67
586
-
Op(AK 86)
969
-
Op(AK 57)
 
238
-
BF 46
437
-
BE 52            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 373 - 413 - 426 - 437 - 466 - 518 - 536 - 592 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 672 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For messages from U 592 and U 281, see Figure IV a).
    2) U 536 reports escorting destroyer on easterly course in CE 1339.  Judging from the type of message, it looks as if the destroyer is in the vicinity of a convoy.
    3) U 155 sinks the 5,393 GRT, Norwegian ship "Siranger" off the Brazilian coast.  The submarine is operating from a base in FB.
  b)  None.
  c)  English units located in: AK 6540, AL 7282, BD 5440, AM 7831, BE 2890, BF 2529.
  d) According to a spy report, convoy MKS 20 put out from Gibraltar on 13.11. according to plan.  Presumably this convoy will join convoy SL 139 coming from the south, in about CG 70.
     Group "Schill" is to operate against this convoy, in conjunction with her own Air Reconnaissance.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) At 0756, U 592 sights, in BD 6723, 4 steamers, which, according to a later report, were proceeding on course 3300 at 8 knots.  The "Eisenhart boats which were in the vicinity, immediately received orders to operate but to
       
- 297 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    break off in the case of an approach of enemy aircraft.
    U 592 attacks, and from a distance of 3,000 m., fires a two-fan and a F.a.T. torpedo, which missed.  She heard 3 detonations after 13 and 14 minutes, probably end of run detonators.
    Unfortunately, contact was then lost and not reestablished.  Only U 281, of all the boats committed, is operating against the enemy.  At 1217, she sighted several clouds of smoke in BD 6517, which vanished from sight when she pursued them.
    No further messages were received.
    It is not clear whether the 4 ships were part of a convoy.  Possibly they were stragglers, otherwise there is no explanation for the course of 3300, they were following.  According to dead reckoning, there was a convoy in the vicinity.
  b) U 238, 618 and 86, which were in the Bay of Biscay on their outward route, were informed of the intended "Schill" operation on 18.11. and 19.11. at the head of CF 21.
    These submarines are to try to reach the area on the date mentioned, by proceeding cautiously in the inner Bay and faster in the outer Bay.
  c) U 488 finished refueling U 193, 530 and 129, in DE 78.
    The tanker was attacked by depth charges on 8.11., and reports some damage.
    As it did not seem worth while to refuel U 219 as arranged and the tanker would be in too much danger, U 488, received orders to return to base.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 155                1 ship                5,393 GRT.
       
VI. General:
  Submarines at sea receive the following W/T message:
    The submarine operations of recent weeks have been ruined by the lack of convoys located.  It is assumed that enemy Air Reconnaissance locates our patrol dispositions by means of location methods we do not fully understand, and thus the enemy have circumvented us.  We must reduce the difficulties in contacting the enemy by using far reaching Air Reconnaissance with location gear.
 
 
 
- 298 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The first 4-engined long distance reconnaissance Ju 290 are ready for use today, and have a radius of 1400 sea miles.  Both their numbers and radius are to be increased.  As supplements, there are the BV 222 and FW 200, and as from today, the fighter aircraft HE 177.
  The use of Zaunkönig has considerably lightened the difficulties of attacking sea forces, we have deduced from their use of depth charges that the enemy has become weaker and less determined.
  The automatic 3.7 cm gun will also help in the battle against the main enemy, the enemy Air Forces, and will increase the mobility of submarines during the day.   It has already been installed in 7 boats, and a further 8 are in process of being fitted with it.
  All boats putting out from Western France will be fitted with this excellent weapon at the beginning of December, and all home-based boats, in the middle of that month.  As well as the 3.7 cm guns, the most modern type of mine was installed, the effect of which was far greater than that of a 2 cm gun. Any craft hitting this type of mine was almost bound to sink.
  With regard to radar location, the installation of detector receiver's "Naxos" and "Borkum" (as well as Wanz G 2) guaranteed radio interception without the disadvantage of radiation over all hitherto essential wave bands.  A watch on wider wavebands was kept by specially equipped boats.
  The most important points established are as follows:
    Recent experiences in the Atlantic ("Schill" Group) and the Mediterranean have shown that you can successfully attack from the stern as well as from ahead.  The reason for the failure of the last months attack in the Atlantic is due to the failure to locate the convoy.   You have had to combat the heaviest type of Air Forces, with very little chance of success.   Your fighting has led to a strong cooperation between the enemy air and sea forces.   These forces must not be turned against Germany.  You must defend your Fatherland even though the battle seems fruitless to you.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
- 299 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
14.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BE 65
U 466
-
BF 78
U 600
-
BE 86
 
86
-
BF 48
262
-
Op(BE 70)
488
-
DE 78
608
-
BD 62
 
91
-
BF 44
267
-
BD 61
508
-
BF 76
618
-
BF 73
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
269
-
AE 84
510
-
DH 22
648
-
Op(BD 56)
 
129
-
DE 78
274
-
Op(BD 53)
515
-
BE 96
672
-
AO
 
154
-
Op(EP 80)
280
-
Op(AK 82)
516
-
Op(EB 90)
709
-
Op(BD 28)
 
155
-
Op(FA)
281
-
BD 64
518
-
CE 17
714
-
Op(AK 73)
 
170
-
FL 12
282
-
Op(BD 25)
530
-
DE 78
734
-
AF 47
 
190
-
Op(FB 50)
333
-
Op(BE 70)
536
-
CE 21
762
-
BF 48
 
193
-
DE 78
343
-
Op(BD 35)
537
-
Op(CC 20)
764
-
Op(AK 67)
 
211
-
Op(BE 70)
358
-
Op(BE 70)
538
-
Op(AK 01)
801
-
AN 24
 
212
-
Op(AK 79)
373
-
BD 92
541
-
AE 67
843
-
Op(AK 48)
 
214
-
BD 98
391
-
Op(AK 61)
542
-
Op(AK 56)
849
-
ER 61
 
218
-
DF 86
413
-
BE 41
543
-
AF 87
953
-
BF 57
 
219
-
CE 74
420
-
BD 29
544
-
AF 87
962
-
AE 79
 
226
-
Op(BD 56)
421
-
AF 47
552
-
Op(BD 23)
963
-
Op(AK 94)
 
228
-
Op(BE 70)
424
-
Op(AK 73)
575
-
BD 13
967
-
Op(AK 87)
 
231
-
BE 52
426
-
BD 93
586
-
Op(AK 97)
969
-
Op(AK 86)
 
238
-
BF 48
437
-
BE 64
592
-
BD 66      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 170 - 214 - 218 - 231 - 256 - 373 - 413 - 426 - 437 - 466 - 518 - 536 - 592 - 762 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter aircraft over the outer Bay of Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 373 sights a single ship in BD 9387 proceeding on course 600 at 16 knots, at 2353.  She followed this ship as far as BD 9338, and then broke away because of lack of fuel.
    2) U 515, proceeding out on the coastal route in the Bay of Biscay, reports 5 Naxos locations, with the remark that the radius of the gear is too small.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sighted in ED 9571.
    2) English units located in BF 1520, AE 8890, AM 43, AL 94, BD 35.
  d)  Convoy SC 146 and stragglers received the following instructions during the morning of 10.11.:
     Cancel the former straggler route and replace it by 460 45' North and (Longitude not clear) BD 3352, AL 6615.
       
- 300 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) It appears, judging from various facts, such as U 592's message on 13.11., that the enemy was sailing her convoys still further south, so the "Eisenhart" Group was moved 125 sea miles in a direction 1400, and is now in position as follows:
     
Group 1 from AK 9186 to AK 9572,
Group 2 from BD 2144 to BD 2453,
Group 3 from BD 3182 to BD 3547,
Group 4 from BD 5287 to BD 5596,
Group 5 from BD 3934 to BE 4116,
Group 6 from BD 9126 to BD 9511,
Group 7 from BE 4782 to BE 7247.
      It was calculated that 2 convoys proceeding north and 2 proceeding southwest are somewhere in the area 150 sea miles around BD 28.  The boats have instructions to report all signs immediately.
      When the Priority Radio Intercept message about convoy SC 146 had been received, the boats proceeding southeast ("Eisenhart") were ordered to remain in the area 40 sea miles on both sides of the route BD 49 - BD 3350 and AL 6610, and search until 0800 on 16.11.  Boats to the north of this route can proceed S.E. at increased speed.  This does not apply to boats which are to join Group "Schill", and they should proceed without delay.
    2) U 849 is to be committed to the area off Mauritius (Grid square KG).  The submarine is to proceed to the E. of the line ES 9850 - FE 8910 - FM 4940 - GZ 7640 because of our own blockade runner.  It is forbidden to attack W. of that line.
    3) U 267 is unable to take part in the convoy operation by Group "Schill", owing to lack of fuel, and is returning to base.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
 
 
 
       
- 301 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
15.November 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
Op(EW 70)
U 256
-
BE 66
U 466
-
BF 76
U 600
-
BE 89
 
86
-
BF 47
262
-
Op(BE 70)
488
-
DE 57
608
-
BE 74
 
91
-
BF 48
267
-
BD 65
508
-
BF 74
618
-
BF 72
 
103
-
Op(EU 70)
269
-
AE 79
510
-
DH 24
648
-
Op(BD 68)
 
129
-
DD 96
274
-
Op(BD 65)
515
-
BE 98
672
-
AN 35