F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 July 1943

PG30327

     
     
 
1.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(CA 80)
U 196
-
 KQ 56
U 420
-
 AJ 69
U 592
-
 Op(BC 33)
 
67
-
 Op(DP 50)
197
-
 JA 23
435
-
 Op(DG 27)
598
-
 CF 38
 
84
-
 DE 64
198
-
 KQ 68
455
-
 CG 55
600
-
 DG 13
 
126
-
 CF 31
199
-
 Op(GB 20)
462
-
 BF 76
603
-
 Op(CE 89)
 
134
-
 CD 97
211
-
 Op(DG 21)
466
-
 BF 82
604
-
 CF 63
 
135
-
 DG 81
221
-
 Op(CE 86)
487
-
 DG 28
608
-
 Op(CE 86)
 
154
-
 CF 31
228
-
 Op(CE 89)
488
-
 CE 49
615
-
 DF 32
 
155
-
 BF 54
232
-
 Op(DG 19)
508
-
 Op(EU 90)
618
-
 ET 43
 
159
-
 DP 37
257
-
 CE 49
510
-
 Op(EO 30)
634
-
 CE 49
 
160
-
 BF 76
270
-
 BF 67
511
-
 KS 29
641
-
 Op(CE 86)
 
170
-
 CF 13
271
-
 Op(AK 17)
513
-
 Op(GB 20)
642
-
 Op(DG 19)
 
172
-
 FK 54
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
518
-
 BF 76
653
-
 DR 11
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
527
-
 Op(DL 60)
662
-
 CF 39
 
178
-
 KQ 52
336
-
 Op(DG 43)
530
-
 BF 76
666
-
 CE 85
 
180
-
 BF 76
341
-
 Op(AK 52)
535
-
 CF 13
667
-
 Op(AK 69)
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
358
-
 DT 25
536
-
 CF 13
669
-
 Op(AK 81)
 
185
-
 EH 87
359
-
 BF 82
558
-
 Op(DG 24)
732
-
 DE 65
 
188
-
 BF 54
382
-
 CE 59
571
-
 ET 44
759
-
 DO 72
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
386
-
 BF 82
572
-
 EE 18
951
-
 Op(DG 24)
 
193
-
 DG 82
406
-
 CF 39
590
-
 Op(EP 50)
953
-
 Op(DG 24)
 
195
-
 EJ 71
415
-
 CD 99
591
-
 BE 98      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 126 - 154 - 170 - 180 - 195 - 270 - 518 - 530 - 535 - 536 - 666.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 628 - 648 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance: 
  For groups of inward bound U-boats in Biscay.
  Against a N.-bound convoy off Lisbon.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 511 sank "Sabastiano-Cermino-Linert", 7,000 GRT, course 800, 10.5 knots, on 27.6 in KR 4869.  Proceeding in ballast from Suez.   Orders not known.
  b)  Convoy not found.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BE 3926 and one other in 360 N. and latitude unknown (U 455?).
    2) U 180's group escorted by 2 destroyers, were also sighted in BF 7620.
    3) Torpedo report from unidentified ship from DB 62 (U 66?).
  d)  None.
       
- 1 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  Caribbean boats have been instructed as follows:  According to experience so far of enemy air activity in the operations area, especially at focal points of traffic and in through passage routes, stationary operation only will be possible.  During waiting periods in the operations area all safety regulations are to be closely observed; collect experiences and remain unseen.  Commanding officers have full freedom of action; they can therefore of their own accord move into less patrolled areas according to the anti-submarine situation, either into the inner Caribbean or towards the Atlantic, for instance during the full moon period.  If the enemy is sighted, try to force a success by a well-considered, but keen attack.  According to boats which have returned from the Caribbean, enemy surface escort vessels with convoys there are untrained and not to be compared with Atlantic escorts. 
     A convoy gives you your big chance, which must be fully exploited; it can mean the success of the whole patrol.
  c)  U 488 has refueled U 634 and 257.  Boat is sold out and returning.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 511 1 ship 7,000 GRT.  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(CA 80)
U 197
-
 JA 13
U 455
-
 Op(CG 50)
U 600
-
 DG 27
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
198
-
 KQ 58
462
-
 BF 74
603
-
 Op(CE 94)
 
84
-
 DE 58
199
-
 Op(GB 20)
466
-
 BF 76
604
-
 CF 61
 
126
-
 BE 97
211
-
 Op(DG 22)
487
-
 DG 43
608
-
 Op(CE 94)
 
134
-
 CD 88
221
-
 Op(CE 96)
488
-
 CE 49
615
-
 DF 29
 
135
-
 DG 86
228
-
 Op(CE 97)
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
154
-
 BE 97
232
-
 Op(DG 24)
510
-
 Op(EO 30)
628
-
 BF 54
 
155
-
 BF 49
257
-
 CE 49
511
-
 KH 64
634
-
 CE 49
 
159
-
 DP 55
270
-
 BF 58
513
-
 Op(GB 20)
641
-
 Op(CE 94)
 
160
-
 BF 77
271
-
 Op(AK 19)
518
-
 BF 90
642
-
 Op(DG 24)
 
170
-
 BE 87
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
527
-
 Op(DL 60)
648
-
 BF 54
 
       
- 2 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
172
-
 FK 76
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
530
-
 BF 90
653
-
 DQ 35
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
336
-
 Op(DG 28)
535
-
 BE 87
662
-
 CF 61
 
178
-
 KQ 24
341
-
 AK 91
536
-
 BE 87
666
-
 CE 55
 
180
-
 BF 90
358
-
 DT 56
558
-
 Op(DG 31)
667
-
 Op(AK 69)
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
359
-
 BF 76
571
-
 ET 81
669
-
 Op(AK 81)
 
185
-
 ER 19
382
-
 CE 84
572
-
 Op(EE 40)
732
-
 DE 56
 
188
-
 BF 49
386
-
 BF 76
590
-
 Op(EP 50)
759
-
 Op(DN 90)
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
406
-
 CF 64
591
-
 CF 33
951
-
 Op(DG 25)
 
193
-
 DG 95
415
-
 DF 26
592
-
 Op(BC 33)
953
-
 Op(DG 25)
 
195
-
 EH 65
420
-
 Op(AJ 90)
598
-
 CF 56      
 
196
-
 KQ 28
435
-
 Op(DG 29)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 126 - 134 - 154 - 170 - 195 - 530 - 535 - 536 - 666.
  Entered Port:  U 270 - St. Nazaire;  U 180 - 518 - 530 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance: 
  For inward-bound U-boat groups.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 527 Situation of Florida and in the Gulf:  Best approach via DM 36, 31, 23.  Strong activity by night by aircraft with position lights.  Also airships.  No sea patrol.  Lights as in peace-time.  Proceed submerged by day.  Operation in the Gulf favorable from DL 31 to 63. W. of this neutrals only.  Untrained night air activity with Radar in DM 40; Radar partly not detected in METOX.  In DL 10 S.W. sector infrequent air activity by day.  Return passage via DF 60.
    2) U 558 reports Radar interceptions in the open sea area:  Northern area 15, Southern area 2, generally in the evening hours off the probable convoy routes.  No sightings, though visibility was mainly very good and boat only dived by night.  High-flying carrier-borne aircraft with Radar are suspected, which generally do not attack.
    3) U 462: Bomb hit in the forecastle.  No. 9 diving tank damaged, No. 3, 7 and 8 blown.   Return passage off the Spanish coast (U 462 is escorted by U 160).
    4) U 154 reports:  0244 unsuccessful bombing attack on U 126, contact lost.   Independent passage from BF 4775.
  b)  Our own aircraft sighted at 1100 one heavy and one light cruiser in BF 4847, course 3200 (To be taken with a pinch of salt.  Probably only destroyers).
  c) U-boat sightings:  BE 99, BF 75, BF 71 (U 462 and 160).
  d)  None.
       
- 3 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) The following attack areas have been allocated:  U 193 - DH 80, 90, lower third and DU 10, 20 concentrating on DU 33.  U 135 - DH 50, 60, 80 , 90 concentrating in 94 and 95.
      Operation against convoys along the coast or between the islands.  Constant air reconnaissance to be expected also strong formations of land-based a/c once a boat has been discovered.  Aim at scoring the first success as far as possible without being noticed.
    2) U 759 is now to concentrate in DN 75 and 78.
    3) U 172 has been given freedom of action in the area W. of 300 W. and N. of 270 S.
    4) The following attack areas have been allocated:  U 221 - CG 80 N. half concentrating in 8340.  U 558 - CG 50 S. half.
      Operation against Lisbon convoy traffic.  Information on traffic will be radioed from time to time.  Air reconnaissance generally only to be expected after a boat has been discovered.
  c) 1) From 6th July U 382 will refuel to capacity from U 487 in CF 6882.
    2) U 592 and 341 have been ordered to proceed in company through Biscay.  U 592 will suggest a rendezvous.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(CA 80)
U 196
-
 Op(KE 80)
U 420
-
 Op(AJ 90)
U 598
-
 CF 57
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
435
-
 Op(DG 34)
600
-
 DG 59
 
84
-
 DE 72
198
-
 KQ 49
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
603
-
 Op(CE 75)
 
126
-
 BE 96
199
-
 Op(GB 20)
462
-
 BE 95
604
-
 CF 59
 
134
-
 DF 11
211
-
 Op(DG 31)
466
-
 CG 14
608
-
 Op(CF 72)
 
135
-
 DG 96
221
-
 Op(CF 73)
487
-
 DG 44
615
-
 DF 54
 
154
-
 BE 96
228
-
 Op(CF 78)
488
-
 CF 15
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
155
-
 BF 71
232
-
 Op(DG 23)
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
628
-
 BF 72
 
159
-
 DP 48
257
-
 DG 55
51
-
 Op(EO 30)
634
-
 DF 23
 
160
-
 BF 78
271
-
 Op(AK 19)
511
-
 KH 52
641
-
 Op(CF 45)
 
170
-
 BE 86
306
-
 Op(BK 40)
513
-
 Op(GB 20)
642
-
 Op(DG 20)
 
172
-
 FR 11
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
527
-
 Op(DC 87)
648
-
 BF 48
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
336
-
 Op(DG 26)
535
-
 BE 86
653
-
 DQ 56
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
341
-
 AK 98
536
-
 BE 86
662
-
 CF 58
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
358
-
 DT 95
558
-
 Op(CF 78)
666
-
 CE 38
 
185
-
 ER 48
359
-
 BF 74
571
-
 ET 89
667
-
 Op(AK 69)
 
188
-
 BF 71
382
-
 DG 11
572
-
 Op(EE 40)
669
-
 Op(AK 81)
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
386
-
 BF 74
590
-
 Op(EP 50)
732
-
 DE 49
 
193
-
 DH 74
406
-
 CF 58
591
-
 CF 57
759
-
 Op(DN 80)
 
       
- 4 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
195
-
 EH 34
415
-
 DF 51
592
-
 BD 16
951
-
 Op(DG 34)
                   
953
-
 Op(DG 34)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 126 - 154 - 170 - 195 - 535 - 536 - 666 - 341 - 592.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 514 - 183 - 168 - 505 - 509 - 532 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 641 sighted a destroyer, course W. high speed, in CF 7297.
    2) U 66 sank a tanker, course 200, speed 15 knots in DB 62.  Air activity as hitherto, little sea patrol.
    3) U 406: Nothing of note to report on passage through Biscay.
    4) U 199 bombed in GB 1815.  Strong activity by day by sea planes and land-based a/c.  Night attack repelled, a/c shot down.  2716.  "Liberty-Schjal" hit twice, heavy gunfire. No traffic observed S. and E. of CA 37.
    5) U 527 situation:  Convoys and independently-routed ships, steering a course for DA 68 observed between DL 63 and 31.  No air escort with convoys, but good surface escort.  Independent ships without escort, do not zig-zag at night.  When boat has been discovered air activity by day and S/m chasers.
  b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BF 79, EO 19, BF 76, BE 93, AJ 98 (3 hits, U 407?), DE 41.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 466, 359 are to make for DF 60, U 358 for EU 70.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success: 
    
U 66 1 ship 7,000 GRT  
U 199 1 ship 7,000 GRT  
U 199 1 aircraft.    
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
- 5 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
4.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(CA 80)
U 196
-
 Op(KE 80)
U 455
-
 Op(CG 50)
U 598
-
 CF 75
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
462
-
 BF 86
600
-
 DG 89
 
84
-
 DE 74
198
-
 Op(KP 60)
466
-
 CF 39
603
-
 Op(CF 82)
 
126
-
 BF 49
199
-
 Op(GB 20)
487
-
 DF 68
604
-
 CF 75
 
134
-
 DE 35
211
-
 Op(DH 11)
488
-
 CF 25
608
-
 Op(CF 82)
 
135
-
 DH 75
221
-
 Op(CF 83)
505
-
 BF 55
615
-
 DF 73
 
154
-
 BF 49
228
-
 Op(CF 85)
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
155
-
 BE 96
232
-
 Op(DG 31)
509
-
 BF 55
628
-
 BF 79
 
157
-
 DO 93
257
-
 DG 86
510
-
 Op(EO 30)
634
-
 DF 27
 
160
-
 BF 76
271
-
 Op(AK 17)
511
-
 KH 38
641
-
 Op(CF 84)
 
168
-
 BF 55
306
-
 Op(BK 40)
513
-
 Op(GB 20)
642
-
 Op(DG 42)
 
170
-
 BE 94
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
514
-
 BF 55
648
-
 BF 79
 
172
-
 Op(FJ-GB)
336
-
 Op(DG 34)
527
-
 DC 97
653
-
 DQ 82
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
341
-
 BD 36
535
-
 BE 95
662
-
 CF 75
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
358
-
 EJ 36
532
-
 BF 55
666
-
 CF 24
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
359
-
 CF 39
536
-
 BE 95
667
-
 Op(AK 69)
 
183
-
 BF 55
382
-
 DF 39
558
-
 Op(CF 84)
669
-
 AK 86
 
185
-
 ER 78
386
-
 BF 74
571
-
 ET 99
732
-
 DE 74
 
188
-
 BE 96
406
-
 CF 76
572
-
 Op(EE 40)
759
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
415
-
 DF 48
590
-
 Op(EP 50)
951
-
 Op(DH 11)
 
193
-
 DH 79
420
-
 Op(AJ 90)
591
-
 CF 75
953
-
 Op(DH 11)
 
195
-
 DS 88
435
-
 Op(DH 14)
592
-
 BD 29      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 126 - 154 - 170 - 195 - 341 - 527 - 535 - 536 - 592 - 666 - 669.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 267 - 706 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 608 sighted a W.-bound destroyer in CF 5941.
    2) U 420 was heavily bombed in AJ 9571 by a Halifax.  Boat can dive to A + 20 meters and is starting on her return passage with considerable damage.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BF 7818 - FA 20 - DN 58 - EO 19 - BE 41 - BE 77 and 5 others in uncyphered positions.
    2) U-boat attack in GA 36.
    3) An unidentified English unit was located in BF 4847.
  d)  None.
       
- 6 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  Attack areas for radio boats in the N. Atlantic have been extended as follows:  U 667 will occupy AK 60, 90 and AL 40, 70.  U 271 AK 40, 50 and S. half of AK 10, 20.
  c)  None.
  d) U 462 is to have close escort by JU 88 and will later be picked up by torpedo boats.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC-DA)
U 196
-
 Op(KE 80)
U 435
-
 Op(CF 88)
U 592
-
 BD 61
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
598
-
 CE 99
 
84
-
 DP 13
198
-
 Op(KP 30)
462
-
 BF 84
600
-
 DT 15
 
126
-
 BF 40
199
-
 Op(GB 20)
466
-
 CF 64
603
-
 Op(CF 91)
 
134
-
 DE 53
211
-
 Op(CF 88)
487
-
 DF 68
604
-
 CE 99
 
135
-
 Op(DH 80)
221
-
 Op(CF 93)
488
-
 CF 32
608
-
 Op(CF 91)
 
154
-
 BF 40
228
-
 Op(CF 91)
505
-
 BF 49
615
-
 DF 77
 
155
-
 CG 12
232
-
 Op(DG 33)
508
-
 Op(EK 70)
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
159
-
 DO 97
257
-
 DT 12
509
-
 BF 49
628
-
 DF 45
 
160
-
 BF 84
267
-
 BF 91
510
-
 Op(EO 30)
634
-
 Op(CF 91)
 
168
-
 BF 49
271
-
 Op(AK 01)
511
-
 KJ 15
641
-
 Op(CF 91)
 
170
-
 BF 96
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
513
-
 Op(GB 20)
642
-
 Op(CG 33)
 
172
-
 Op(EJ-GB)
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
514
-
 BF 49
648
-
 CG 13
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
336
-
 Op(DG 33)
527
-
 DC 96
653
-
 DQ 79
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
341
-
 BE 59
532
-
 BF 49
662
-
 CE 99
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
358
-
 EJ 63
535
-
 BE 96
666
-
 CF 32
 
183
-
 BF 49
359
-
 CF 64
536
-
 BE 96
667
-
 Op(AK 69)
 
185
-
 Op(FC 42)
382
-
 DF 60
558
-
 Op(CF 94)
669
-
 BD 26
 
188
-
 CG 12
386
-
 BF 84
571
-
 Op(EU 79)
732
-
 DD 99
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
406
-
 CE 99
572
-
 Op(EE 40)
759
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
193
-
 Op(DU 10)
415
-
 DF 74
590
-
 Op(EP 50)
951
-
 Op(CF 88)
 
195
-
 DS 57
420
-
 Op(AJ 86)
591
-
 CE 99
953
-
 Op(CF 88)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 126 - 154 - 170 - 195 - 341 - 420 - 527 - 535 - 536 - 592 - 666 - 669.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 230 - 566 - 706 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance: 
  For inward and outward-bound groups.
       
- 7 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 608 dived away from an attacking aircraft in CF 6468.
    2) U 232 reported the Swedish ships "Bandaland" and "Camelia" W.-bound in CF 7279.  U 603 sighted the Portuguese ships "Amarante" in CF 9161, course 2600, and "Gorgulav" in CF 6891, course 2800.
    3) U 669 sighted a battleship and 4 destroyers in BD 6319, course 550, high speed, no attack.
    4) U 527 was several times approached by English aircraft in DD 7839 and in one instance surprised by a land-based aircraft diving out of the clouds from the direction of the sun.  No casualties.
    5) U 66 was rammed while making a day attack on a ship type "Lassin".   Ship was steering 1500.  Boat will remain in her operations area until 16.7. and then return via the supply boat.
    6) Sinkings:
      U 590 on 4.7. in FA 5322 independently-routed freighter, 4,000 GRT, course 2700, speed 10 knots.
      U 199 cargo sailing vessel by gunfire. Boat is continuing to operate in the Rio de Janeiro area.
      U 178 on 4.7. in KE 7471 S.S. "Breifiken", 2,669 GRT, course 300, and in KD 9985 S.S. "Michael Livanos", 4,774 GRT, 2150.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  CF 6166, DD 79, CC 45, MF 3440, AE 8314 (?).  3 U-boats in company were reported in BF 7830 and numerous aircraft started against them.
    2) U-boat attacks probably in EC 12 and GA 36.
    3) A convoy of 7 freighters and 12 tankers may leave Dakar on 5 or 6.7., bound for Curacao.  Boats have been informed.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 271 has been ordered to return, with 34 cbm fuel, and will rendezvous with the damaged U 420.  U 667 will then be the only boat remaining in the N. Atlantic.
  c) U 669 and 592 will rendezvous at 1400/7/7 in BE 4815 for return passage in company, U 420 and 271 at 0800/7/7 in AK 9975.  As enemy air reconnaissance is at present in BF 70, boats are to proceed E. approximately along 46-470 N.
       
- 8 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  U 230 and U 566 sailed for mining operations Chesapeake and Norfolk respectively.  (See Special Order).
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 590 1 ship
4,000 GRT
 
U 199 1 sailing ship
 
U 178 2 ships
7,443 GRT.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 57)
U 197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
U 455
-
 Op(CG 50)
U 598
-
 DG 23
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
198
-
 Op(KP 90)
462
-
 BF 94
600
-
 DT 46
 
84
-
 DO 36
199
-
 Op(GB 10)
466
-
 CF 58
603
-
 Op(CF 66)
 
126
-
 BF 55
211
-
 Op(CF 86)
487
-
 DF 68
604
-
 DG
 
134
-
 DE 54
221
-
 CG 72
488
-
 BE 98
608
-
 CF 65
 
135
-
 Op(DH 80)
228
-
 Op(CF 69)
505
-
 BF 73
615
-
 DQ 26
 
154
-
 BF 55
230
-
 BF 47
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
155
-
 CG 11
232
-
 Op(CF 88)
509
-
 BF 72
628
-
 CG 11
 
159
-
 ED 24
257
-
 DT 52
510
-
 Op(EO 30)
634
-
 DE 69
 
160
-
 BF 75
267
-
 BF 81
511
-
 KJ 23
641
-
 Op(CF 69)
 
168
-
 BF 73
271
-
 Op(AK 01)
513
-
 Op(CB)
642
-
 Op(CF 80)
 
170
-
 BF 72
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
514
-
 BF 48
548
-
 CG 11
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 60)
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
527
-
 DD 72
653
-
 EF 17
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
336
-
 Op(DH 13)
532
-
 BF 72
662
-
 DG 23
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
341
-
 BE 67
535
-
 BF 72
666
-
 BE 98
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
358
-
 EK 74
536
-
 BF 72
669
-
 BD 63
 
183
-
 BF 48
359
-
 CF 58
558
-
 CF 93
706
-
 BF 81
 
185
-
 Op(FC 40)
382
-
 DF 68
566
-
 BF 47
709
-
 BF 47
 
188
-
 CG 11
386
-
 BF 94
571
-
 Op(EU 70)
732
-
 DP 11
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
406
-
 DG 23
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
759
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
193
-
 Op(DU 10)
415
-
 DQ 23
590
-
 Op(EP 50)
951
-
 Op(CF 97)
 
195
-
 DS 19
420
-
 AK 78
591
-
 DG 23
667
-
 Op(AK 69)
 
196
-
 Op(KE 80)
435
-
 Op(CF 97)
592
-
 BD 93
953
-
 Op(CF 97)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 126 - 154 - 170 - 195 - 271 - 341 - 386 - 420 - 488 - 527 - 535 - 536 - 592 - 666 - 669.
  Entered Port:  U 154 - Lorient;  U 462 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  U 506 - 533 - Lorient;  U 340 - Bordeaux; U 847 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance: 
    For inward and outward-bound U-boat groups.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Enemy sighting by U 667.  See paragraph IVa).
    2) U 177 sank the Canadian "Jasper Park", course 245, in JA 2577.   Cargo of tea and tobacco from India to Durban.  The ship had topped-up anti-torpedo nets.
       
- 9 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) U 193 situation:  5.7. double miss at escort vessel.  6.7. twice beat off attack by Catalina in DU 2366.  Damage to after jumping wire by bomb.   Boat moved off to the west.  Lively coastal small vessel traffic in DU 20, medium sea patrol and air activity with Radar.
    4) U 634 sighted the Spanish ship "Ciburnum", 650, 8.5 knots, in DE 9536.
    5) U 608 reported a steamer on an E. course in CG 4145.
    6) U 641 was attacked by a Martin bomber in CF 6638 and was depth charged 4 minutes after the alarm was given.
    7) The homeward-bound group U 535, 170 and 536 was attacked in BE 7832 by a Consolidated. After the group surfaced again U 535 was searched for in vain.  U 536 and 170 continued on their passage.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  4 reports from undecyphered position.
    2) Aircraft attack on a U-boat in CG 4179 and DH 9880.
    3) Torpedo reports from EC 11 and JA 2810.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) At 2327 U 667 sighted an E.-bound convoy, escorted by land-based aircraft.  According to reckoning, this is SC 135.  Boat was given freedom to attack.  She is free to haul off if anti-submarine and air activity prove too strong.
  b) 1) U 667, the only boat in the N. Atlantic, has been given freedom of action at her own discretion.
    2) Until they proceed to the Caribbean, boats will occupy the following attack areas:
      U 134 between DL 31, 67, DM 69, DB 93.
      U 732 and 759 between DM 61, EB 37, EC 29, DN 53.
      U 159 between EB 63, 41, 77 and EL 39, concentrating off Colon.
      U 615 between EC 61, 97, ED 79, 43, concentrating off Curacao.
      U 415 from ED 51 and EE 43 S. to the coast, concentrating off Trinidad.
      U 653 from EE 71, and 99 to the coast.
      U 84 has freedom of action in the areas of U 732 or 134.  Boats have been informed of the air and traffic situation.  If necessary boats are free to move away outside the limits of the operations area ordered, should anti-submarine activity be too strong.
 
 
 
- 10 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) U 358 is to occupy FF upper third and EU lower third as attack area as far as the coast.  U 571 is in the same area and possibly U 333 and 618.
    4) U 181 is to have freedom of action S. of 160 S. and W. of 700 E.
    5) U 155 is to make for FC 70, U 648 and 628 for DF 60, U 382 for EU 80.
    6) Groups "Geier 1-3" have been ordered to cruise at a lower speed at their own discretion if the speed of advance ordered cannot be maintained because of the air situation.
  c) 1) The following will supply from U 487, from 1000/9/7 in DF 6882: U 195 for return passage at most economical speed., U 598, 406, 604, 662 and 591 35 cbm each and provisions for 7 days.
    2) At 0800/8/7 U 558 will hand over to U 455 in CG 5715 cipher memoranda Triton-M, Officers and General, for July and August.
  d)  All boats proceeding S. have again been reminded of the order for most economical fuel consumption outside the areas particularly endangered by aircraft.  There is so little traffic in all the operational areas that the desired success can only be achieved after a long period in the operations area.  Only few boats can supply on return passage owing to the shortage of tankers.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 177 1 ship 5,000 GRT.  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 50)
U 199
-
 Op(GB 60)
U 487
-
 DF 68
U 600
-
 DT 76
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
211
-
 CF 92
488
-
 BF 74
603
-
 Op(CG 44)
 
84
-
 DO 29
221
-
 Op(CG 81)
505
-
 BF 71
604
-
 DG 19
 
126
-
 BF 50
228
-
 CG 45
506
-
 BF 54
608
-
 Op(CG 44)
 
134
-
 DE 44
230
-
 BF 48
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
615
-
 DQ 19
 
135
-
 Op(DH 80)
232
-
 CF 86
509
-
 BE 93
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
155
-
 CF 33
257
-
 DT 72
510
-
 Op(EO 30)
628
-
 CF 33
 
159
-
 ED 17
267
-
 BF 75
511
-
 LY 74
634
-
 DE 94
 
160
-
 BF 77
271
-
 AK 99
513
-
 Op(GB 20)
641
-
 CG 45
 
168
-
 BF 71
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
514
-
 BF 71
642
-
 CF 97
 
170
-
 BF 49
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
527
-
 DD 86
648
-
 CF 39
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 60)
336
-
 CF 97
532
-
 BE 93
653
-
 EE 68
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 87)
340
-
 BF 91
533
-
 BF 54
662
-
 DG 19
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
341
-
 BE 69
535
-
 BF 49
666
-
 BF 74
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
358
-
 ET 12
536
-
 BF 49
667
-
 Op(AL 42)
 
183
-
 BF 71
359
-
 CF 76
558
-
 CG 92
669
-
 BE 48
 
185
-
 Op(FC 40)
382
-
 DF 68
566
-
 BF 48
706
-
 BF 75
 
188
-
 CF 33
386
-
 BF 60
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
709
-
 BF 48
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
406
-
 DG 19
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
732
-
 DO 37
 
193
-
 Op(DU 13)
415
-
 DQ 27
590
-
 Op(EP 80)
759
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
       
- 11 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
195
-
 DS 12
420
-
 AK 99
591
-
 DG 19
847
-
 AO 71
 
196
-
 Op(KE 80)
435
-
 CF 96
592
-
 BE 48
951
-
 CF 92
 
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
455
-
 Op(CG 55)
598
-
 DG 19
953
-
 CF 96
 
198
-
 Op(KP 90)
466
-
 CF 76            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 195 - 271 - 341 - 386 - 420 - 488 - 527 - 535 - 536 - 592 - 666 - 669 - 706.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 757 - St. Nazaire;  U 468 - 373 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
    For outward-bound U-boat group.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 185 attacked a convoy, course 290, 10 knots in FC 7179.  During the first attack one tanker and one freighter, each 8,000 GRT, were left burning and sinking, and a Pi 2 hit was scored on 7,000 tonner.  In the second attack in FB 9396 one freighter and one ammunition ship each of 6,000 GRT were sunk.  The boat dived after gunfire.  Air escort with the convoy by day, untrained escort vessels only by night, so far no Radar.
    2) U 198 sank the Greek "Hydraios" 4,476 GRT on 6.7. in KP 3810 and the British "Leana" 4,742 GRT by gunfire on 7.7.  Captain captured.  Both ships were steering a course of 2400.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BF 4434, BF 77, BC 12, FQ 52.
    2) A/c attack on U-boat in CF 6559, CG 4758.
    3) Attack report from FC 74.
    4) SSS report from FD 84 and KP 3851.
    5) A rubber dinghy with 2 English airmen was reported in BF 7741.  Boats were instructed to take them prisoner if sighted.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  U 667 was several times forced to dive by an a/s group and a/c and bombed.  She is moving away to the W.  Convoy's last position was AL 4117.
  b) 1) U 196 has freedom of action to the W. as far as the coast in U 178's area (Mozambique Channel).
    2) U 267, 160 and 505 are to make for DF 60.
       
- 12 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) A S.-bound convoy is expected today in CG 10 and 40.  Boats have been reminded of increased enemy air activity.
  c)  None.
  d) U 373 sailed for mining operation Port Lyautey (See Special Order).
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 185 5 ships
35,000 GRT
 
U 198 2 ships
9,218 GRT.
 
   
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 50)
U 211
-
 Op(CG 47)
U 487
-
 DF 98
U 604
-
 DG 45
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
221
-
 Op(CG 82)
488
-
 BF 76
608
-
 Op(CF 39)
 
84
-
 DO 43
228
-
 Op(CG 19)
505
-
 BE 96
615
-
 DP 63
 
126
-
 BF 50
230
-
 BF 71
506
-
 BF 49
618
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
134
-
 DD 68
232
-
 Op(CF 92)
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
628
-
 CF 30
 
135
-
 Op(DH 50)
257
-
 EJ 12
509
-
 BE 95
634
-
 DQ 12
 
155
-
 CF 61
267
-
 BE 99
510
-
 Op(EO 60)
641
-
 Op(CG 17)
 
159
-
 EC 61
271
-
 BD 32
511
-
 LY 49
642
-
 Op(CF 96)
 
160
-
 BE 98
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
513
-
 Op(GA 60)
648
-
 CF 64
 
168
-
 BE 96
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
514
-
 BE 96
653
-
 Op(EE 80)
 
170
-
 BF 57
336
-
 Op(CF 96)
527
-
 DD 92
662
-
 DG 42
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 70)
340
-
 BF 82
532
-
 BE 95
666
-
 BF 76
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
341
-
 BF 82
533
-
 BF 49
667
-
 Op(AK 68)
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
358
-
 ET 43
535
-
 BF 57
669
-
 BE 49
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
359
-
 CE 99
536
-
 BF 57
706
-
 BF 65
 
183
-
 BE 96
373
-
 BF 91
558
-
 Op(CG 57)
709
-
 BF 47
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
382
-
 DF 68
566
-
 BF 47
732
-
 DO 51
 
188
-
 CF 30
386
-
 BF 65
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
757
-
 BF 91
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
406
-
 DG 45
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
759
-
 Op(DN 80)
 
193
-
 Op(DU 10)
415
-
 DQ 44
590
-
 Op(EP 40)
847
-
 AN 36
 
195
-
 DF 92
420
-
 BD 32
591
-
 DG 42
951
-
 Op(CG 47)
 
196
-
 Op(KE 80)
435
-
 Op(CG 72)
592
-
 BE 49
953
-
 Op(CG 71)
 
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
455
-
 Op(CG 55)
598
-
 DG 45      
 
198
-
 Op(KP 98)
466
-
 CE 99
600
-
 EJ 15      
 
199
-
 Op(GA 60)
468
-
 BF 91
603
-
 Op(CG 15)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 195 - 271 - 341 - 386 - 420 - 488 - 527 - 535 - 536 - 592 - 666 - 669 - 706.
  Entered Port:  U 386 - 706 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 86 - 441 - Brest.
       
- 13 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  For inward and outward-bound U-boat groups in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 333 reported no traffic in ET 30.  Boat is continuing to search in a S.E. direction.
    2) U 455 fired a double miss on 3.7. in CG 5835.
    3) U 435 sighted the W.-bound Swedish S/S "Calanda" in CG 4836.  CG 4886 air attack from a great height D/c's.  Slight damage.
    4) U 603 was bombed by a Sunderland in CG 1285.  Boat dived.  All jumping wires damaged.
    5) U 466 beat off an attack by a Martin bomber, together with U 359, in CF 3921 on 3.7.  A/c was hit.  U 359 sighted a parachute while diving.  A/c believed shot down.
    6) U 134 reported a low-level attack by a Lerwick from DD 9475.  6-8 bombs and gunfire.  No damage.  Flying boat was hit.
  b) None.
  c) 1) English units were located in BF 7180, AF 7957 and AF 75.
    2) Particularly strong air reconnaissance in the areas CG 10 and CF 30 today.  A/c attacks on the U-boats were reported in CG 1845, CF 1698, DD 89, CG 7225, CG 1754.  4 boats were sighted in undecyphered positions and one each in BF 7914, BF 7618, DN 76.
    3) U-boat attack in EP 49.
    4) SSS report from an unidentified U.S.A.-steamer from KZ 76.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Groups "Geier 1-3" have been ordered to return if air reconnaissance in their area is too strong.  Commanding Officers are to decide for themselves.
    2) U 197 has freedom of action to the N. in U 198's area.
    3) U 634's attack area is between E. 661 and ED 43.  S. as far as the coast, concentrating off Aruba and Curacao.  U 615 is in the same area.  U 634 is to arrange to be off San Juan during the next favorable moon period.  There is believed to be a convoy assembly point here.
       
- 14 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    4) U 306 is to leave her present attack area off Dakar, for EU 80 if conditions in the former seem unfavorable, and no traffic is encountered.
    5) U 172's attention has been called to convoy and single ship traffic to and from Bahia.  The harbor is also an assembly point for convoys from and to Trinidad.
    6) U 135 and 193 cannot be refueled.  They will start on their return passage when they have used their fuel.
  c) U 455 took over cipher memorandum, Triton from U 558 as ordered.
  d) 1) Our own air reconnaissance sighted cruisers and destroyers during the night 7-8 July, also probably one battleship, in the Shetlands area and N. of Iceland.  At 1600 today 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers were sighted on an E. course in AF 7957.
      At 1600 the radio guard ship of a convoy reported 1000, 18 knots.
      English units were located in AF 75 between 1500 and 1700.
      As an operation against Norway seems possible Group Command North has requested additional support by Atlantic boats.  This cannot be provided, as the Kiel boats are all under conversion and there is no boat in the N. Atlantic at present.
      F.O. U/B Norway has at present 21 boats at his disposal and 6 of these were ordered to operate against the forces sighted.  There are 5 boats in the area between Norway and Spitzbergen, 2 are on return passage, the rest in harbor.
    2) U 154 and 126 were on return passage in company through Biscay.  U 154 reported on 2.7.: lost contact with U 126 after she had been bombed.  U 154 has meanwhile entered port without sighting U 126 again.  She must be presumed lost.
    3) U 267 reported at 1853 from CG 2212:
      Unable to dive, am proceeding inshore.
      This boat may have been picked up by escort forces of a N.-bound Gibraltar convoy and bombed.  She has been ordered to put into El Ferrol if she cannot restore her diving efficiency.  If she returns directly air escort and destroyers will be provided.  There are no U-boats in the vicinity to give immediate assistance.  U 247 (T.n. sic) had not reported again by morning.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 466                1 aircraft.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 15 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
9.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 50)
U 199
-
 Op(GA 60)
U 466
-
 DG 25
U 592
-
 BE 58
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
211
-
 Op(CG 44)
468
-
 BF 82
598
-
 DF 68
 
84
-
 DN 66
221
-
 Op(CG 82)
487
-
 DF 68
600
-
 EJ 45
 
86
-
 BF 54
228
-
 Op(CG 13)
488
-
 BF 93
603
-
 Op(CG 12)
 
134
-
 DD 86
230
-
 BE 96
505
-
 BE 98
604
-
 DF 68
 
135
-
 Op(DH 50)
232
-
 Op(CG 47)
506
-
 BF 72
608
-
 Op(CF 33)
 
155
-
 CF 58
257
-
 EJ 42
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
615
-
 DP 56
 
159
-
 EC 54
267
-
 BE 98
509
-
 CF 33
618
-
 Op(ET 60)
 
160
-
 CG 11
271
-
 BE 14
510
-
 Op(EO 60)
628
-
 CF 30
 
168
-
 BE 98
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
511
-
 LY 53
634
-
 DP 35
 
170
-
 BF 52
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
513
-
 Op(GB 10)
641
-
 Op(CG 11)
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 70)
336
-
 Op(CG 71)
514
-
 BE 98
642
-
 Op(CG 44)
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
340
-
 BF 73
516
-
 BF 54
648
-
 CF 58
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
341
-
 BF 91
527
-
 DE 71
653
-
 Op(EE 80)
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
358
-
 ET 58
532
-
 CF 33
662
-
 DF 68
 
183
-
 BE 98
359
-
 DG 25
533
-
 BF 72
666
-
 BF 64
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
373
-
 BF 82
535
-
 BF 54
667
-
 Op(AK 60)
 
188
-
 CF 59
382
-
 DF 68
536
-
 BF 52
669
-
 BE 58
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
406
-
 DF 68
558
-
 Op(CG 57)
709
-
 BE 96
 
193
-
 Op(DU 10)
415
-
 DP 92
566
-
 BE 96
732
-
 DO 44
 
195
-
 DF 68
420
-
 BE 14
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
757
-
 BF 82
 
196
-
 Op(KE 60)
435
-
 Op(CG 46)
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
759
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
441
-
 BF 54
590
-
 Op(EP 70)
847
-
 AN 31
 
198
-
 Op(KP 80)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
591
-
 DF 68
951
-
 Op(CG 45)
                   
953
-
 Op(CG 45)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 170 - 195 - 267 - 271 - 341 - 420 - 488 - 527 - 535 - 536 - 592 - 641 - 642 - 666 - 669.
  Entered Port:  U 170 - 536 - Lorient;  U 66 - St. Nazaire; U 488 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  For U-boat groups and against Gibraltar convoy traffic.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 228 and 953 were attacked by aircraft in CG 4233 and CG 4169 respectively.  No damage.
    2) Situation reports:
      U 508:  Nothing sighted for 7 days in EV 71-73.  Medium air activity by day.  8th July in EV 7399 3 ships, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette, course 700, speed 11 knots. Air escort by day.  No attack, as boat was seen too soon.  9th July in EV 6729 two-funneled passenger freighter of 2,000 GRT and freighter of 2,000 GRT and freighter of 6,000 GRT sunk.  Heavy rain at present strongly phosphorescent sea.
      U 618 sank a 7,000 tonner proceeding from Alexandria to Freetown with a cargo of cotton, in ET 5498.  So far no night air activity in her area.   Submerged by day.
       
- 16 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      U 513:  Coastal traffic along the 20-meter line, overseas traffic between the 40-meter and 100-meter line. Many small ships off Rio and Santos seldom large ones.  3.7. bunch of 7 large freighters, course 900, speed 11 knots.  2 freighters sunk.  Boat suspects that Africa traffic starts from further south.
      U 510:  10,000 GRT tanker and 6,000 GRT freighter sunk on 8.7. from a convoy in EP 4925, course 130, speed 9 knots.  Another steamer was hit twice (sinking assumed). Untrained escort vessel with the convoy.   Remote, high-flying air escort by day.
  b) Aircraft sighted a convoy in BE 6754.  None of our own boats in the vicinity.
  c) U-boat sightings:  DH 2153, AE 8587?, DJ 13, CG 43, CG 1917, CG 4215, DM 1870, EP 85, EE 98.
    U-boats were attacked in DH 69, CG 4819, EP 87, CF 8189.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) After supplying U 662 is to make for ED 90, U 406 for EP 50, U 598, U 604 and 591 for FB 90.
    2) Constant patrol by anti-submarine groups and submarines is to be expected in the sea area within a range of approximately 100 miles off BF 7985.
  c) 1) U 382 has supplied from U 487.  She tested the shadower's signal buoy at wind 5 and sea 4.  Container was stable, discharge faultless. Angle of ascent 80 - 90 degrees.
    2) As U 267 did not at first reply to an order to give her position arrangements were made via the Spanish Military Attache for a Spanish Navy vessel to be sent out to search and give assistance. At 2200 however U 267 reported her position as DF 7892. She had succeeded in shaking off a shadowing Sunderland and is restoring her diving efficiency.  She required no further help and is proceeding to St. Nazaire.  On 8.7. 3 enemy destroyers were observed off Cape Finisterre and on the 9th an enemy unit immediately off El Ferrol.   The English thus appear to have expected U 267 to put into El Ferrol.  The boat's last position reported was BF 7928 at 0250.
 
 
 
- 17 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) U 535 was on return passage through Biscay in company with U 536 and U 170.   This group was attacked on 7.7. in BF 7832 by aircraft.  According to U 536, U 535 did not surface again after this attack and was not found after a long search had been made.  She must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 508 2 ships
18,000 GRT
 
U 618 1 ship
7,000 GRT
 
U 513 2 ships
10,000 GRT
  
U 510 3 ships
21,000 GRT.
 
       
VI. General:
  Our own aircraft repeatedly report that boats are still diving when surprised, so that when the aircraft is overhead the boat's stern is still visible.  Boats have again been reminded that at the moment their greatest danger lies in diving too late.   Boats must only dive if they have definitely not been sighted and if they are still sure of reaching a depth of at least 100 meters.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 50)
U 199
-
 Op(GA 60)
U 455
-
 Op(CG 50)
U 598
-
 DF 68
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
211
-
 CF 11
466
-
 DG 43
600
-
 EJ 81
 
84
-
 BF 48
221
-
 Op(CG 80)
468
-
 BF 73
603
-
 CG 12
 
86
-
 DN 83
228
-
 CG 16
487
-
 DF 68
604
-
 DF 68
 
134
-
 DD 76
230
-
 BE 97
505
-
 CF 32
608
-
 CF 33
 
135
-
 Op(DH 50)
232
-
 CG 45
506
-
 BE 93
615
-
 DP 73
 
155
-
 CF 76
257
-
 EJ 73
508
-
 Op(EV 70)
618
-
 Op(EU 48)
 
159
-
 Op(EC 47)
267
-
 BF 70
509
-
 CG 17
628
-
 CF 30
 
160
-
 CF 35
271
-
 BE 19
510
-
 Op(EO 60)
634
-
 DP 28
 
168
-
 CF 32
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
511
-
 LY 36
641
-
 BF 96
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 50)
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
513
-
 Op(GA 39)
642
-
 CG 18
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
336
-
 CG 45
514
-
 CF 32
648
-
 CF 73
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
340
-
 BF 71
516
-
 BF 48
653
-
 Op(EE 80)
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
341
-
 BF 68
527
-
 DE 81
662
-
 DF 68
 
183
-
 CF 61
358
-
 ET 95
532
-
 CF 34
667
-
 Op(AK 39)
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
359
-
 DG 43
533
-
 BE 93
669
-
 BE 67
 
188
-
 CF 84
373
-
 BF 73
558
-
 Op(CG 57)
709
-
 BE 97
 
190
-
 Op(CA 80)
382
-
 DF 68
566
-
 BE 98
732
-
 DN 67
 
193
-
 Op(DU 10)
406
-
 DF 68
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
757
-
 BF 73
 
195
-
 DF 68
415
-
 DP 88
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
759
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
196
-
 Op(KE 60)
420
-
 BE 19
590
-
 Op(EP 70)
847
-
 AF 87
 
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
435
-
 CG 16
591
-
 DF 68
951
-
 CG 11
 
198
-
 Op(KP 60)
441
-
 BF 48
592
-
 BE 67
953
-
 CG 18
 
       
- 18 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 195 - 221 - 267 - 271 - 341 - 420 - 527 - 592 - 603 - 641 - 642 - 669 - 953.
  Entered Port:  U 341 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 613 - La Pallice; U 445 - 607 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
    Against enemy searching groups in outer Biscay and against Gibraltar convoy traffic.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 603 sighted a sailing vessel when surfacing in CG 1316 and dived again in CG 1312 in sight of 2 trawlers. They may have been patrol vessels.
    2) U 373 and 566 beat off one English aircraft each in Biscay.
    3) U 505 was was depth charged in BF 8564 and is starting on her return passage as her ability to dive is impaired.
    4) U 336 was bombed by a Sunderland in CG 4377, first surfaced then submerged.  Slight damage.
    5) U 183 was attacked by a Consolidated in CG 2446 and bombed while crash-diving.
      8.7. bombed again surfaced and submerged in CG 1842.  No. 3 tube temporarily unserviceable.  Other damage repaired.  Boat reports a number of duds among A.P.H.E. shells.
    6) U 759 sank a cargo sailing vessel on 30.6. in EC 3932 by gunfire and on 5.7. in EC 1253 and independent ship (6,000 GRT) escorted by a coastguard cruiser, course 1100, speed 12 knots.  On 7.7. she sank a loaded freighter of 7,000 GRT from a N.-bound convoy, in a day attack in EC 1183.  Since then strong night air activity with and without Radar.  8.7. bombed at periscope depth by an aircraft in EC 7658, then hunted for 7 hours by an anti-submarine group.  No casualties.
    7) U 600 chased a Portuguese ship, course 2500 on 30.6. in CE 76 and the Spanish "Montenegro", course 2100 on 10.7.
    8) U 198 sighted a darkened armed cruiser at anchor in KP 5351.  Attack was forbidden because of territorial waters.
  b) 1) Aircraft sighted a cruiser or destroyer in BF 89, course 2000.
    2) Air reconnaissance by Condors is planned for 11.7. in the area between CF 3220, CG 1230 and 1830.
       
- 19 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) 1) According to Radio Intelligence, English units have been detected in BF 7550, BF 72 and 74. Presumably anti-submarine groups.  Another unit was located in BF 9893.
    2) U-boat sightings:  DJ 2152, CG 4612, CG 8921.
    3) Aircraft attack on a U-boat in CG 4523.
    4) Unidentified steamer reported torpedo attack.  Position 370 N longitude.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 487 reported that U 604, 591, 598, 662, 406 and 195 had been supplied.   The tanker is proceeding to DF 9595 and will there deliver 35 cbm and 1 week's provisions each to U 359 and 466.  Subsequently supply is planned for U 648 and all Far Eastern boats in CG 77.   The latter will receive course instructions accordingly.
  c) Contrary to present orders, U 662 is to make for EP 50 and U 406 for ED 90.
  d) U 607 and 613 sailed to carry out mining operations Kingston and Jacksonville respectively (See Special Order).
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 759 1 sailing vessel
 
U 759 2 ships
13,000 GRT.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 50)
U 211
-
 BE 98
U 466
-
 DG 47
U 600
-
 ES 23
 
67
-
 Op(DP 40)
221
-
 Op(CG 82)
468
-
 BF 71
603
-
 BE 99
 
84
-
 Op(DN 70)
228
-
 CG 13
487
-
 DF 68
604
-
 DF 68
 
86
-
 BF 70
230
-
 BE 89
505
-
 BF 83
607
-
 BF 91
 
134
-
 DD 77
232
-
 CG 17
506
-
 BE 95
608
-
 CF 33
 
135
-
 Op(DH 50)
257
-
 ES 22
508
-
 Op(EV 60)
613
-
 BF 91
 
155
-
 DG 35
267
-
 BF 82
509
-
 CF 66
615
-
 DO 96
 
159
-
 Op(EB 90)
271
-
 BE 27
510
-
 Op(EO 60)
618
-
 Op(EU 40)
 
160
-
 CF 67
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
511
-
 LP 75
628
-
 CF 30
 
168
-
 CF 65
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
513
-
 Op(GA 30)
634
-
 DP 46
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 20)
336
-
 CG 18
514
-
 CF 59
641
-
 BF 72
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
340
-
 BE 96
516
-
 BF 47
642
-
 CG 12
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
358
-
 Op(EU 70)
527
-
 DE 83
648
-
 CE 99
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
359
-
 DG 47
532
-
 CF 37
653
-
 Op(EE 80)
 
183
-
 CF 54
373
-
 BF 71
533
-
 BE 95
662
-
 DF 68
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
382
-
 DS 88
558
-
 Op(CG 57)
667
-
 Op(AK 39)
 
188
-
 DG 35
406
-
 DF 68
566
-
 BE 58
669
-
 BE 69
 
       
- 20 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
193
-
 Op(DU 10)
415
-
 EE 16
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
709
-
 BE 89
 
195
-
 DF 68
420
-
 BE 27
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
732
-
 Op(DN 80)
 
196
-
 Op(KE 60)
435
-
 CG 16
590
-
 Op(EP 80)
757
-
 BF 71
 
197
-
 Op(KZ 30)
441
-
 BF 47
591
-
 DF 68
759
-
 Op(BC 15)
 
198
-
 Op(KP 60)
445
-
 BF 91
592
-
 BE 69
847
-
 AF 73
 
199
-
 Op(GA 60)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
598
-
 DF 68
951
-
 CG 14
                   
953
-
 CG 12
 
  On Return Passage:  U 195 - 211 - 267 - 271 - 336 - 420 - 505 - 527 - 592 - 603 - 641 - 642 - 669 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
    Against Gibraltar convoys and suspected stationary patrol vessels in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 533 was hunted by two destroyer at 2300/9/7 in BF 7738.   So far little air activity.
    2) U 228 sighted an escort vessel in CG 1314, U 441 a smoke cloud in BF 4887.
    3) U 155 reported as follows on her passage in company:  passage in company good.  It is easier to see and above all easier to hear.   Five aircraft sightings by day as far as CF 52 and 11 short location transmissions during two short night passages.
    4) U 306 regards the enemy situation off Dakar as favorable, and is remaining in her present operations area.
    5) U 510 sank the Swedish "Skandinavia", 2,475 GRT in EP 2984 after the crew had left the ship.  Course 1300.  Ship was proceeding from Curacao to Montevideo.
    6) U 198 was unsuccessfully bombed in KP 3783.
    7) U 211 sighted an Irish ship in BE 9618, N. course, 14 knots.
  b)  Our own aircraft reported 3 merchant ships and 3 escort vessels, course 1900, medium speed at 2120 in CF 3651.   Hits were scored on a 20,000 tonner and another steamer.   Both ships were on fire.  Boats in the vicinity were ordered to operate against the damaged ships, U 608 sighted a weak light in CF 3698 towards 0500 which disappeared in a direction 1550 at a speed of over 15 knots.  Boat suspected this was a steamer on fire.  She is returning as her fuel is exhausted after a 5-hour hunt at full speed.
  c) 1) According to Radio Intelligence there was an English unit in CG 5150 at 1736.
       
- 21 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U-boat sightings:  CG 1633 and another in an unidentified position.
    3) A/c attacks on U-boats:  CG 1447 (U 951?), CG 1471, CF 3397, EP 8790.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) Operation in the sea area off Freetown is intended for U 709, 340, 86, 757, 468 and 455.  They will proceed there at most economical speed, making use of the trade winds.  Boats cannot be supplied until they have spent some time in the operations area.
    2) U 566, 230, 607, 613 and 373 have been given course instructions for carrying out their mine laying operations.  Except for U 373, it is intended to refuel these boats as far as possible on their return passage or after they have carried out their operations.
    3) The remaining "Geier" boats have been informed of the N.-bound Gibraltar convoy which is expected in about 400 N. P.M. on 11.7.  Increased enemy air activity is probable in the area by day.
  c) None.
  d) U 628 has not reported since she left Brest on 1.7.  She must be presumed lost.  Nothing is known of the cause of her loss, but it was probably due to a/c or A/S groups in Biscay.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 510 1 ship 2,475 GRT.  
       
VI. General:
U-boat Situation.
     
  A. North Atlantic:
    1) When on May 24th convoy operation "Donau" failed and all the boats still well off for fuel (U 569, 641, 228, 603, 636, 666, 211, 608, 221, 951, 232, 435, 642, 217 and 92) were ordered to proceed to the central Atlantic, it was intended that the remaining boats in the N. Atlantic should occupy varying attack areas and deceive the enemy as to the number of boats actually in the area by heavy dummy radio traffic.  Altogether 13 boats remained in the Northern operations area and during the first few weeks is was actually possible to keep the enemy in the dark as to the number of boats there, as English U-boat situation reports have shown.  He continued to believe that there were 2 or 3 large groups of U-boats.
 
 
 
- 22 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) It was intended to keep the number of U-boats remaining in the operations AK and AJ, at approximately the same level by relieving them by boats sailing from home ports. Within a short time however, several boats had to return owing to fuel consumption and damage and 2, U 202 and 304, were lost.  The number of boats coming from home ports was not sufficient, especially as 4 Atlantic boats in Bergen were made available to F.O. U/B Norway, for operations in Northern Waters.
      Of the 16 boats which left home ports or Norway up to 12.5. (i.e. U 467, 667, 450, 535, 341, 170, 669, 271, 308, 449, 536, 417, 388, 194, 200 and 420);
     
a) 5 were lost in the Iceland Passage:  (U 467, 308, 417, 200, 194).
b) 2 were lost after 2 days in the operations area:  (U 334, 338).
c) 2 were damaged in the Iceland Passage and returned to W. France:  (U 450, 449).
d) 3 boats, type IXc were ordered to CE 70 to deliver their fuel, owing to the strained tanker situation (U 535, 536, 170).
    3) After it became known that U 194 and U 200 had been lost the sailing of all boats without quadruple Flak from home ports was cancelled.  This meant a postponement of approximately 4 weeks for all sailing dates.  4 boats on their way to the Atlantic:  (U 387, 277, 713 and 307) were diverted and made available to F.O. U/B Norway for his mining operation.
    4) These facts have led to the N. Atlantic being at present practically devoid of U-boats.  There is one boat U 667 still in the Northern operations area.  It is presumed that the enemy is no longer deceived to the actual state of affairs (there is no information on this, as no English U-boat situation reports have been received because of change in Radio procedure ("Frankfurt").  As far as can be gathered from the press, the enemy believes that, by using more auxiliary carriers, he has succeeded in chasing the U-boats off the North Atlantic convoy routes.   At present chances of attacking are so slight owing to the strength of the escort forces and chances of finding the convoys so remote with so few U-boats, that there is little purpose in sending boats from Western France to fill this gap in the Northern operations area. In practice boats would have to operate in the North Atlantic with very small prospects of success.
    5) The plan to resume convoy operations in the North Atlantic, at the end of July with stronger forces, has been abandoned as by that time neither the Zaunkönig nor the improved Radar interception gear necessary to prevent surprise attacks by aircraft will be available. If it is possible to equip boats leaving W. France by the middle of August with Zaunkönig and the Radar interception gear, action
 
 
 
- 23 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      against convoys on the England - America route will be resumed during the new moon period at the end of August.
       
  B. Central Atlantic:
    Convoy operations planned with the U-boats sent to the Central Atlantic have failed.  Boats forming Group "Trutz" were operated against 2 E.-bound and one W.-bound convoy.  Except for the sightings and attacks by carrier-borne aircraft reported by "Trutz" boats on 4.6., these boats did not have any further contact with the enemy between 1.6. and 29.6.   It is believed that the first convoy expected during the period 4-6.6. evaded the "Trutz" line to the south.  The second, E.-bound convoy, which was the same as that attacked by U 572 on 22 June in DH 4133, also passed Group "Trutz's" patrol line far to the south.  Nothing is known of the route followed by the third, W.-bound convoy.
    It is believed that in each case the patrol line was located by high-flying carrier-borne aircraft and then skirted. (See War Diary of 2.7.)  This is confirmed by Lieut(s.g.) Krech, the experienced Commanding Officer of U 558.  The sea area in which the U.S.A. - Gibraltar convoy route lies permits the convoys to make extensive evading movements without greatly prolonging their passage and there therefore seems no purpose in sending another group to the Central Atlantic to intercept U.S.A. - Gibraltar convoys while boats cannot detect enemy Radar transmissions from aircraft. Apart from the uncertainty of finding the convoys, constant high pressure weather conditions and the presence of enemy aircraft carriers with the convoy make conditions of operations so difficult for the U-boats that they are not likely to meet with success.
    The diversion of Group "Trutz" into Groups "Geier 1-3" on return passage did not lead to any success.
     Of the 16 "Geier" boats there are at present 3 in the operations area W. of Spain.  The remaining boats are returning to W. France owing to strong air activity and damage received on the England - Gibraltar convoy route.
    In retrospect, it can be said that, when the North Atlantic U-boats still well off for fuel were sent to the sea area W. of the Azores, an attempt was made to achieve some success with these boats in some sea area outside the America - England convoy routes.  From the start there were no illusions as to the difficulties of finding convoys in this area without reconnaissance by our own aircraft.
       
  C. Southern Operations Area:
    The operation of all available type VIIC and IXC boats, which could be supplied by U-tanker, in remote operations area in the Caribbean,
 
 
 
- 24 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    and off the Brazilian and W. African coast, has begun to take effect during the last few days.   On the way to their operations areas these boats did not sink a single ship, a clear proof of the fact that there are actually no independently-routed ships in the N. and Central Atlantic.
     After a short period in their operations areas, the boats have so far scored the following successes:
     
In the Caribbean: 2 steamers from convoys
  1 cargo sailing vessel by U 759 in EC
Off the N. coast of Brazil: 1 steamer by U 590
  3 steamers from a convoy and one independent ship by U 510 in EP
  5 steamers from a convoy by U 185 in FC
Off the E. coast of Brazil: 1 steamer by U 172 in FD 70
Off Rio: 4 steamers by U 513
Off Freetown: 1 ship by U 618 in ET 50
Off Lagos: 2 steamers by U 508 in EV 60.
     It can be seen that in the main, traffic is by convoy even in these areas and according to present experience the escort is very poorly trained.  The constant air activity is unpleasant, although is it by no means as strong or as dangerously effective.   It remains to be seen how long the U-boat crews will be able to stand being submerged all day with few opportunities to surface in these operations areas, in the Equatorial zone where the weather is particularly hot and damp at this time of year.  Although the risks are much fewer than in the N. Atlantic, operation in those waters requires extreme endurance on the part of the crews.  The length of time spent in the operations area will ordinarily be governed by the state of health of the technical personnel who usually have to work in temperatures of 40 - 50 degrees.   On the whole, however, all Commanding Officers and crews like to go to these areas, in spite of the trials involved, because chances of success are so much greater than in the convoy operations on the England - American routes.
 
 
 
- 25 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     The first wave of boats which have arrived in these operations areas will be relieved by a second and a third wave.   Unfortunately much depends on the tanker situation, which is at present bad (U 462 has returned to port, she was forced to turn back on her way out through Biscay owing to bombing attacks).  Only small supplies of fuel and provisions can be provided fairly far N. in the Central Atlantic.
       
  D. Situation in Biscay:
     So far 4 losses have occurred this month in Biscay, U 126 and 535 on return passage and U 528 and 514 on outward passage.  It is fairly certain that the first two were the victims of an enemy air attack, but there is no clue as to the cause of loss of the other 2.  It is strongly suspected that the enemy has laid a form of blockade around Biscay with part of the defence forces withdrawn from the N. Atlantic, convoys concentrating in BF 70, BE 90, BF 10 and BE 30.   The following facts speak for this:
    1) Increased sightings of A/S vessels of all kinds (destroyers, corvettes, trawlers) by U-boats.
    2) Increased sightings of destroyers and cruisers by aircraft.
    3) U 650's report of a long methodical D/C hunt heard in her hydrophones in BE 90.  U 450 and U 119 were probably sunk at this time.
    4) The unexplained disappearance of inward and outward-bound boats in Biscay.
    5) A report from Naval Attache Madrid of the sighting of 3 destroyers and one other patrol vessel in the Cape Finisterre area and off El Ferrol.
    6) Enemy press reports of the blockading of Biscay by naval forces.
    This organized blockade may develop into a really serious danger for U-boats.  The activity of English A/S a/c already makes great demands on the battery capacity of the boats which are submerged all the time, so that sometimes the boats are forced to proceed on the surface to charge their batteries in spite of danger from enemy a/c and keep off the planes with their Flak armament.  The presence of English naval forces, which, according to experience, can be brought up to the U-boats in a very short time by the a/c will mean a considerable increase in losses which are already numerous due to English a/c alone.  Every effort must therefore be made
 
 
 
- 26 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    1) To obtain an exact idea of the disposition of these light naval forces and their method of operation, so that the boats can be given routes which will evade the blockade or enable them to break through it at the most favorable points.  This will have to be done by organized air reconnaissance and systematic evaluation of all Radio Intelligence reports and reports from U-boats themselves.
    2) To attack and destroy anti-submarine forces reported with our own few naval forces (destroyers).
    3) To combat these light anti-submarine vessels, which usually operate in twos or threes with the FW 200s available, suitably armed.
    If we cannot succeed in driving the English forces off from Biscay further losses will be inevitable.   The danger is particularly serious for damaged U-boats returning.  The situation with regard to combating the enemy anti-submarine aircraft by G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces' heavy bomber formations has not in the main changed.  It must however be noted that enemy air activity has abated considerably W. of 80 W., so that at least in this sector of Biscay the U-boats are safer against surprise attacks.  It is to be hoped that the new ME 410s will reduce the superiority of the English Mosquitoes and Beaufighters to such an extent that the Ju 88s operating further south will be able to carry out their sweeps with less than 8 aircraft at a time. If fewer aircraft can operate in one formation more sorties can be flown and greater success achieved.   It is probable however that the enemy will counter the new aircraft by increasing the numbers of Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 27 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
12.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 43)
U 211
-
 BE 96
U 466
-
 DF 97
U 600
-
 ES 39
 
67
-
 Op(DP 10)
221
-
 Op(CG 80)
468
-
 BE 92
603
-
 BF 71
 
84
-
 Op(DN 70)
228
-
 Op(BE 96)
487
-
 DF 95
604
-
 DR 64
 
86
-
 BE 92
230
-
 BE 58
505
-
 BF 50
607
-
 BF 82
 
134
-
 DC 98
232
-
 Op(CG 17)
506
-
 BE 86
608
-
 Op(CF 36)
 
135
-
 Op(DH 81)
257
-
 ES 37
508
-
 Op(EV 60)
613
-
 BF 82
 
155
-
 CE 99
267
-
 BF 80
509
-
 CF 67
615
-
 ED 23
 
159
-
 Op(EB 91)
271
-
 BE 61
510
-
 Op(EF 87)
618
-
 Op(EU 40)
 
160
-
 CF 82
306
-
 Op(EK 45)
511
-
 LP 57
634
-
 DO 68
 
168
-
 CF 83
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
513
-
 Op(GA 60)
641
-
 BF 81
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 20)
336
-
 CG 12
514
-
 CF 60
642
-
 BE 96
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
340
-
 BE 95
516
-
 BE 92
648
-
 DG 26
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
358
-
 Op(EU 80)
527
-
 DE 92
653
-
 Op(EE 80)
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
359
-
 DF 95
532
-
 CF 56
662
-
 DR 23
 
183
-
 Op(CF 73)
373
-
 BE 92
533
-
 CF 35
667
-
 Op(AK 67)
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
382
-
 EH 37
558
-
 Op(CG 50)
669
-
 BF 48
 
188
-
 DG 38
406
-
 DF 85
566
-
 BE 73
709
-
 BE 84
 
193
-
 Op(DU 11)
415
-
 EE 44
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
732
-
 Op(DN 82)
 
195
-
 DG 18
420
-
 BE 61
572
-
 Op(ED 64)
757
-
 BE 92
 
196
-
 Op(KE 50)
435
-
 CG 16
590
-
 Op(EP 80)
759
-
 Op(DN 15)
 
197
-
 Op(KP 90)
441
-
 BF 72
591
-
 DR 61
847
-
 AF 44
 
198
-
 Op(KP 37)
445
-
 BF 82
592
-
 BF 48
951
-
 Op(CG 14)
 
199
-
 Op(CA 60)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
598
-
 DR 37
953
-
 BE 96
 
  On Return Passage:  U 195 - 211 - 228 - 267 - 271 - 336 - 420 - 505 - 527 - 592 - 603 - 608 - 641 - 642 - 669 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  Against Gibraltar convoys and patrol groups in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 67 has encountered no traffic in DP 10-80 and is starting on return passage.
    2) U 193 reported from DH 1773 that she had again been attacked with bombs in DU 12; her transmitter had been temporarily out of order. She requested an early rendezvous with a boat on return passage as her Metox was out of order.
    3) It now appears that an English submarine fired a sextuple fan at a German U-boat on 30.5.
  b)  Aircraft reported at 0710 4 destroyers in BF 7887, course 3200, 0750 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 3 ships in BF 7855, course N. high speed.   At 1925 our own aircraft attacked a merchant ship and a destroyer in CG 4727, course S.
  c) 1) At 1200 an English unit was located in BF 7730. At 1540 another unit reported 8 aircraft in BF 7187. At this time there was a destroyer and a patrol vessel in BF 7519, course N.
       
- 28 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U-boat sightings:  DN 81, DO 51, GB 55, FC 79, EC 12, BF 3760, and a group of 3 boats in unspecified position. (Biscay),
    3) Attack on a U-boat in CF 3562.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 600 will occupy the sector ET 38 90-200 as operations area.  It is believed that traffic bound for Freetown no longer approaches this port mainly from the S. but more from the W.
    2) U 257 is to make for FF 20, U 466 for EP 40, and U 359 for EC 50.
  c) 1) U 359 and 466 have supplied from U 487.  The tanker is proceeding to DG 77 to refuel U 648, 527 and all Far Eastern boats.
    2) It is intended to supply boats in the Freetown area, the Caribbean and S. of this later, but time and place cannot yet be determined.  Boats are therefore to report when they reach 40 cbm.
  d) 1) U 441 (Flak boat) was attacked with machine guns in BF 4894 by 3 Beaufighters.   No bombs. 10 men dead and 13 wounded, including the C.O.  She is returning.   Air escort and surface escort will be arranged.
    2) U 709 reported from BD 8452 that there had been a heavy explosion in the forward battery.  She had 3 men seriously wounded and requested immediate medical assistance.  U 566 was ordered to give assistance.
    3) U 514 has not reported since she left Lorient on 3.7.  She must therefore be presumed lost.  There is no further information;  loss is presumed to be due to a/c or A/S groups in Biscay.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 29 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
13.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
 Op(DC 40)
U 211
-
 BF 72
U 466
-
 DF 97
U 603
-
 BF 73
 
67
-
 Op(DP 10)
221
-
 Op(CG 80)
468
-
 BE 94
604
-
 DR 91
 
84
-
 Op(DM 90)
228
-
 BF 71
487
-
 DF 95
607
-
 BF 73
 
86
-
 BE 97
230
-
 BE 49
505
-
 BF 52
608
-
 BE 97
 
134
-
 DN 23
232
-
 Op(CG 17)
506
-
 BE 89
613
-
 BF 73
 
135
-
 Op(DH 80)
257
-
 ET 41
508
-
 Op(EV 60)
615
-
 ED 27
 
155
-
 DG 25
267
-
 BF 64
509
-
 CF 85
618
-
 Op(EU 40)
 
159
-
 Op(EB 80)
271
-
 BF 65
510
-
 Op(EP 20)
634
-
 DO 91
 
160
-
 CF 79
300
-
 Op(EK 40)
511
-
 LP 37
641
-
 BF 57
 
168
-
 CF 87
333
-
 Op(ET 60)
513
-
 Op(GA 60)
642
-
 BF 72
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 20)
336
-
 BE 96
516
-
 BE 94
648
-
 DG 52
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
340
-
 BE 89
527
-
 DF 75
653
-
 Op(EO 20)
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
358
-
 Op(EU 80)
532
-
 CF 81
662
-
 DR 51
 
181
-
 Op(KG 80)
359
-
 DF 95
533
-
 CF 37
667
-
 AK 68
 
183
-
 CF 78
373
-
 BE 94
558
-
 Op(CG 50)
669
-
 BF 49
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
382
-
 EH 66
566
-
 BE 76
709
-
 BE 76
 
188
-
 DG 24
406
-
 DR 13
571
-
 Op(EU 80)
732
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
193
-
 DH 14
415
-
 Op(EE 40)
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
757
-
 BE 89
 
195
-
 DG 21
420
-
 BE 65
590
-
 Op(EP 80)
759
-
 Op(EC 10)
 
196
-
 Op(KE 50)
435
-
 Op(CG 16)
591
-
 DR 67
847
-
 AE 63
 
197
-
 Op(KP 90)
441
-
 BF 54
592
-
 BF 49
951
-
 Op(CG 14)
 
198
-
 Op(KP 30)
445
-
 BF 73
598
-
 DR 64
953
-
 BF 72
 
199
-
 Op(GA 60)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
600
-
 ET 43      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 195 - 211 - 67 - 193 - 195 - 211 - 228 - 267 - 271 - 336 - 420 - 441 - 505 - 527 - 592 - 603 - 608 - 641 - 669 - 953 - 642.
  Entered Port:  U 441 - Brest;   U 505 - Lorient;   U 267 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 403 - Brest;  U 43 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:
    Reconnaissance flights in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 613 was attacked by 2 or more a/c in Biscay on her outward passage.
    2) U 592 was attacked by an English S/M with a sextuple fan at 0845 in BF 5872.  All misses.
    3) U 571 dived on 12.7. in EU 8656 on detecting a location transmission and afterwards received 4 bombs at 20 meters.  Slight damage.   Boat hauled off for repairs.  So far no traffic in the attack areas.
    4) U 333 scored a hit on a Hudson in about EU 71.
    5) U 199 situation:  Several neutral ships daily from GA 91 to GB 22 and back.  Enemy traffic only picked up close inshore or in GK 93.  Boat requested permission to attack in this square and an exchange of experiences with U 513.
       
- 30 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    6) U 172 sank "African Star", 8,200 GRT, on 12.7. in GB 5466, course 1050, speed 15 knots, ore and mixed cargo to New York.  The steamer had instructions to steer S. from Rio 1050 and to change course N when far out to sea.
  b) Our own a/c reported 5 units (probably a patrol group) at 2025 in BF 7523 course S. medium speed.
  c) 1) An unidentified English unit was located in BE 96 at 0012.
    2) U-boat sightings:  BF 7625, BF 4643, BF 4138, BE 4617, BE 9310, MF 2530 and 3 others in undecyphered position (Biscay).  An a/c also reported boats in company in BF 7340 first with course 2060, later 1400.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) The last 3 Group "Geier" boats, U 435, 951 and 232 have been ordered to return.  Because of enemy A/S groups they are ordered to proceed outside a semicircle radius 150 miles around BF 7955.
    2) U 177 and 181 will again operate off Capetown during the next new moon period.  Until then they have freedom of action.
    3) After supplying on approximately 15.7. U 648 will steer for EO 20.
  c) None.
  d) 1) U 709 is starting on her return passage with one battery having completed repairs.
    2) U 43 sailed today for mining operation Lagos (see Special Order).
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 172 1 ship 8,200 GRT.  
       
VI. General:
    U 462 which was to have been the tanker for the Far Eastern boats, and was to have refueled them in about FD 20, is again out of action.  The Far Eastern boats will therefore have to be supplied further N. than intended, (DG 7754).  As the tanker U 487's stocks will not be sufficient an outward-bound operational boat (U 160) will have to be used as reserve tanker.  It will then be possible to let all Far Eastern boats, as well as U 648, have 40 cbm and the corresponding provisions and also to supply U 527 for her return passage.
 
 
 
- 31 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    With this quantity of fuel the Far Eastern boats can reach Penang without difficulty if for some reason the second supply cannot take place.
  The IXC and VIIC boats at present on outward passage will have to occupy their attack areas without first refueling.  For this reason the VIIC boats which have so far been replenished by the tanker are to operate in the Caribbean or off the Brazilian coast, so that the VIIC boats proceeding south without refueling can occupy the less remote sea area off Freetown.  The boats should be able to arrive there with about 80 cbm.  If the 3 next U-tankers to sail get through Biscay unscathed one of them will go to ER, so that the boats off Freetown can remain as long as possible in their operations area.  They must start their return passage with about 20 cbm, and would thus have 60 cbm to use until then in their operational area.
  The second U-tanker is to proceed as far west as possible to supply the Caribbean and American boats.  Nothing has been decided yet for the last tanker to leave.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
 BF 54
U 199
-
 Op(GA 60)
U 466
-
 DR 37
U 603
-
 BF 57
 
66
-
 Op(DC 40)
211
-
 BF 49
468
-
 BE 86
604
-
 EG 31
 
67
-
 DQ 24
221
-
 Op(CG 80)
487
-
 DG 77
607
-
 BF 71
 
84
-
 Op(DM 80)
228
-
 BF 72
506
-
 CF 31
608
-
 BE 92
 
86
-
 CF 32
230
-
 BE 71
508
-
 Op(EV 60)
613
-
 BF 71
 
134
-
 DN 15
232
-
 CG 14
509
-
 CF 79
615
-
 Op(ED 40)
 
135
-
 Op(DF 80)
257
-
 ET 84
510
-
 Op(EP 10)
618
-
 Op(EU 70)
 
155
-
 DG 52
271
-
 BF 44
511
-
 LE 98
634
-
 DO 84
 
159
-
 Op(EL 20)
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
513
-
 Op(GA 60)
641
-
 BF 50
 
160
-
 DG 35
333
-
 Op(EU 71)
516
-
 CF 32
642
-
 BF 49
 
168
-
 DG 32
336
-
 BF 71
527
-
 DF 87
648
-
 DG 49
 
172
-
 Op(FQ 20)
340
-
 CF 26
532
-
 CF 78
653
-
 Op(EO 20)
 
177
-
 Op(KQ 90)
358
-
 Op(EU 90)
533
-
 CF 55
662
-
 DR 48
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
359
-
 DR 25
558
-
 Op(CG 50)
667
-
 Op(AK 68)
 
187
-
 Op(KG 80)
373
-
 BE 86
566
-
 BE 75
669
-
 BF 69
 
183
-
 Op(DG 34)
382
-
 EJ 72
571
-
 Op(EU 90)
709
-
 BE 85
 
185
-
 Op(FC 70)
403
-
 BF 54
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
732
-
 Op(DN 70)
 
188
-
 DG 43
406
-
 DQ 36
590
-
 Op(EP 80)
757
-
 CF 34
 
193
-
 CF 87
415
-
 Op(EE 40)
591
-
 DR 97
759
-
 Op(EC 10)
 
195
-
 CE 97
420
-
 BF 44
592
-
 BF 64
847
-
 AE 37
 
196
-
 Op(KE 50)
435
-
 CG 12
598
-
 DR 94
951
-
 CG 11
 
197
-
 Op(KP 90)
445
-
 BF 71
600
-
 Op(ET 40)
953
-
 BF 49
 
198
-
 Op(KP 30)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)            
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 32 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 193 - 195 - 211 - 221 - 228 - 232 - 271 - 336 - 420 - 435 - 527 - 558 - 592 - 603 - 608 - 641 - 642 - 669 - 709 - 951 - 953.
  Entered Port:  U 592 - 669 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 757 beat off an attack by a Liberator in CF 6163.  The aircraft was hit and her starboard engine was on fire.  Slight damage to boat.
    2) U 445, proceeding in company with U 613 and 607, lost them both on 13.7. in BF 73 after an air attack.  In the Commanding Officer's opinion U 607 dived too soon and was bombed, but she could afterwards be heard in the hydrophones.  So far only U 613 has given her position.  Strong air activity in BF 73.
    3) U 953 fired a quadruple miss at a destroyer on a S. course in BE 9259 and was afterwards depth-charged.
    4) U 608 sighted an unidentified submarine, course 2300, while surfacing in BF 7155.  According to hydrophone bearing there was another vessel nearby.
    5) U 185 situation:  Air activity day and night after boat had been discovered.  Aircraft attack beaten off on 13.7. in FC 7956.  No radar observed.  Boat hauled off to repack cylinder liners.
    6) U 513 requests freedom to attack in the coastal strip in GA 50.
    7) U 181 situation: On 1.7. 3 medium-sized ships in Port Louis (Mauritius).  1 3-funnelled cruiser and 2 ships left on 2.7.  Of these, S.S. "Hoihow" 2,798 GRT, sunk in KG 5937. Aircraft and destroyer off Port Louis on 3.7. Radar at night, believed to be from destroyers.  Signal strength 5 at 25 miles, continuous note, no attack. Outward-bound cruiser, course 3100, sighted at midday.  Fired under a 1,000-tonner in KF 36 in heavy seas.  Flying boats in KF 3752.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) One British unit was located in BF 7565 at 0835 and another at 1025 in BF 8155.
    2) U-boat sightings:  CF 6126, BE 9183, CG 1162, EC 19, EC 27.
       
- 33 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) A capsized skoot was seen drifting in CD 9251.
 

d)

  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U 513 and 199 will rendezvous on 22.7. in GA 6699 to exchange experiences.
    2) It will probably be possible for U 172 and 513 to supply in ES after the middle of August.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 181 1 ship 2,798 GRT.  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15.July 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
 BF 46
U 198
-
 Op(KP 30)
U 445
-
 BE 92
U 600
-
 Op(ET 50)
 
66
-
 Op(DC 40)
199
-
 Op(GA 60)
455
-
 Op(CG 50)
603
-
 BF 57
 
67
-
 DQ 23
211
-
 BF 54
466
-
 DR 58
604
-
 EG 64
 
84
-
 Op(DM 80)
221
-
 CG 46
468
-
 CF 31
607
-
 BF 92
 
86
-
 CF 37
228
-
 BF 49
487
-
 DF 77
608
-
 BF 47
 
134
-
 Op(DN 30)
230
-
 BD 95
506
-
 CF 30
613
-
 BE 92
 
135
-
 Op(DH 80)
232
-
 BE 98
508
-
 Op(EV 60)
615
-
 Op(ED 40)
 
155
-
 DG 81
257
-
 ET 84
509
-
 DG 35
618
-
 Op(ET 90)
 
159
-
 Op(EL 20)
271
-
 BF 54
510
-
 Op(EP 20)
634
-
 Op(DO 70)
 
160
-
 DG 61
306
-
 Op(EK 40)
511
-
 LE 66
641
-
 BF 57
 
168
-
 DG 29
333
-
 Op(EU 77)
513
-
 Op(GA 60)
642
-
 BF 57
 
172
-
 Op(GB 50)
336
-
 BF 73
516
-
 CF 37
648
-
 DG 75
 
177
-
 Op(JA 23)
340
-
 CF 52
527
-
 DF 97
653
-
 Op(EO 20)
 
178
-
 Op(KE 70)
358
-
 Op(EU 90)
532
-
 DG 34
662
-
 DR 77
 
181
-
 Op(KR 31)
359
-
 DR 18
533
-
 CF 73
667
-
 Op(AK 86)
 
183
-
 DG 73
373
-
 CF 35
558
-
 CG 19
709
-
 BE 83
 
185
-
 Op(FC 74)
382
-
 ES 21
566
-
 BD 96
732
-
 Op(EC 10)
 
188
-
 DG 48
403
-
 BF 46
571
-
 Op(EU 90)
757
-
 CF 53
 
193
-
 CF 73
406
-
 DQ 53
572
-
 Op(ED 60)
759
-
 Op(EC 10)
 
195
-
 CF 73
415
-
 Op(EE 40)
590
-
 Op(EP 80)
847
-
 AE 25
 
196
-
 Op(KE 50)
420
-
 BF 54
591
-
 EG 37
951
-
 BE 95
 
197
-
 Op(KP 90)
435
-
 BE 96
598
-
 EG 34
953
-
 BE 92
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 193 - 195 - 221 - 211 - 228 - 232 - 271 - 336 - 420 - 435 - 527 - 558 - 603 - 608 - 641 - 642 - 709 - 951 - 953.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
       
- 34 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  a) 1) U 588 was attacked at low level by a twin-engined aircraft in CG 5191.  Boat scored a hit and suffered no damage.
    2) U 454 situation:  2.7. in CG 5835 convoy on a N. course.  Otherwise neutrals only.  The markings of these ships can often only be identified at 500 meters.  Boat suspects this is camouflaged enemy traffic.
    3) U 662 sighted a large 2-funneled ship.  Course 1200 in EF 6363.  She lost contact owing to enemy's speed being too high.
    4) U 181 sank "Empire Lake" 2,852 GRT in KF 9169 on passage from Durban to Aden.
    5) Report from U 532 and 168 see paragraph IVa).
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DN 47, FC 72.
    2) Attack on U-boat in EC 27 and CG 5185 (U 455).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) U 168 sighted 2 aircraft twice in DG 3482 and DG 2938 on 14.7.  In the evening she successfully beat off an attack by a carrier-borne aircraft in CG 2962.  On 15.7.  U 532 dived twice in DG 5354 because of 1 - 2 aircraft.  She suffered slight damage from machine gun fire.  All these aircraft are probably part of the air reconnaissance for UGF 10A, which should be in this area and must thus be proceeding to America by the shortest route.  This again confirms that the America - Gibraltar convoys have carrier-borne aircraft escort, which searches the area ahead of the convoy with radar for U-boats and makes it possible for the convoy to evade a disposition in time.
  b) U 667 is returning because of fuel.  There is thus no boat in the N. Atlantic at present.
  c) 1) U 193 and 195 have rendezvous for return passage in company.
    2) U 183, 168, 509, 532, 533 and 516 will take over 40 cbm each and provisions for 10 days from U 487.  They will reach the tanker in the order named by 23.7.
  d)  U 506 has not reported since she left Lorient on 6.7.  She must be presumed lost.  There is no information as to whether her loss was caused by aircraft or naval forces.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 181 1 ship 2,852 GRT.  
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  GODT
                                                                    Chief of Operations Department
                                                                                       for B.d.U.
 
 
 
- 35 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
       
Naval War Staff (2nd Division) B.d.U. Operation
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 261 A 2
     
28 June 1943.
       
Operations Order Norfolk for U 230
       
I. Operation:
  The approach routes to Norfolk and Chesapeake Bay are to be fouled with mines inside the 25-meter line.
       
II. Enemy Situation and Anti-submarine Activity:
    Heavy coastal and overseas traffic from and to the main ports, Norfolk and Baltimore.  Numerous independently routed coastal ships on the 20 meter or 100 meter line.  Overseas traffic consists of fast independent ships to and from the S. Atlantic.  In the summer of 1942 there were about 10 inward and outward-bound part convoys per month, between Norfolk and the St. Lawrence River.  Part convoys every 4 days in the direction of the Florida Straits, strength unknown.
    U 129 reported in April 1943:  strong activity by land-based aircraft by day close inshore, no air activity by night.  Traffic by day only, ships appear to leave Norfolk early in the morning.  Good chances at new moon.
       
III. Material:
    8 TMC, time setting 80 days, delay clockwork 1 day for 2 mines, 4 days for 3 mines, 6 days for 3 mines, response value 20 millioersteds, 2 mines to fire at first activation, 2 at third activation and 4 at sixth activation (4 blue, 2 red, 2 green).  Maximum depth of water at which mines may be laid 25 meters, minimum 12 meters, distance between mines 1000 meters.
       
IV. Geographical boundaries:
  The mines are to be laid between 370 04' N. and 370 10' N., 750 41' W. and 750 30' W.  The latitude of 370 04' N. is not to be crosses to the south, as U 566 will be carrying out a similar operation S. of 370 N. at the same time.
       
V. Execution:
  Torpedoes are to be carried in the tubes on the way to the operations area.  The tubes are to be reloaded one day off the laying area.   One bow tube is to remain loaded with a torpedo.
  Enemy traffic is to be observed before laying the mines.  The Commanding Officer is to make every effort to lay the mines as far inshore as possible.  The position of the mines given in the minefield diagram is to serve only as a guide.
 
 
 
- 36 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The Commanding Officer is free to deviate from this according to the traffic situation observed by him or transmitted to him.
    The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer.  Use is to be made of the new moon period as far as possible.
       
VI. Reporting:
  A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after laying the minefield, but from a distance of at least 100 miles away.  The Group "AFKP" will mean"have laid mines off Norfolk".
       
VII.   After mines have been laid an operations area will be allocated by radio.
       
VIII.   If the anti-submarine situation makes it impossible to carry out the operation, move away and report by radio so that a new laying area can be allocated.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  Hessler
                                                                                 for Chief of Ops. Dept.
                                                                                 for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 37 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 262 A 2
     
28 June 1943.
       
Operations Order Norfolk for U 566
       
I. Operation:
  The approach routes to Norfolk and Chesapeake Bay are to be fouled with mines inside the 25-meter line.
       
II. Enemy Situation and Anti-submarine Activity:
    Heavy coastal and overseas traffic from and to the main ports, Norfolk and Baltimore.  Numerous independently routed coastal ships on the 20 meter or 100 meter line.  Overseas traffic consists of fast independent ships to and from the S. Atlantic.  In the summer of 1942 there were about 10 inward and outward-bound part convoys per month, between Norfolk and the St. Lawrence River.  Part convoys every 4 days in the direction of the Florida Straits, strength unknown.
    U 129 reported in April 1943:  strong activity by land-based aircraft by day close inshore, no air activity by night.  Traffic by day only, ships appear to leave Norfolk early in the morning.  Good chances at new moon.
       
III. Material:
  12 TMB, time setting 80 days, delay clockwork 1 day for 2 mines, 3 days for 3 mines, 5 days for 4 mines, response value 20 millioersteds, 2 mines to fire at first activation, 2 at second activation 3 mines at fourth activation and 5 mines at sixth activation (5 blue, 4 red, 3 green).  Maximum depth of water at which mines may be laid 20 meters, minimum 12 meters, distance apart of mines 1000 meters.
       
IV. Geographical boundaries:
  The mines are to be laid between 370 N. and 360 53' N., 750 48' W. and 750 31' W.  The latitude of 370 04' N. is not to be crosses to the north, as U 230 will be carrying out a similar operation N. of 370  04' N. at the same time.
       
V. Execution:
  Torpedoes are to be carried in the tubes on the way to the operations area.  The tubes are to be reloaded one day off the laying area.  One bow tube is to remain loaded with a torpedo.
  Enemy traffic is to be observed before laying the mines.  The Commanding Officer is to make every effort to lay the mines as far inshore as possible. 
  The position of the mines given in the minefield diagram is to serve only as a guide.  The Commanding Officer is free to deviate from this according to the traffic situation observed by him or transmitted to him.
 
 
 
- 38 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer.  Use is to be made of the new moon period as far as possible.
       
VI. Reporting:
  A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after laying the minefield, but from a distance of at least 100 miles away.  The Group "AFKP" will mean"have laid mines off Norfolk".
       
VII.   After mines have been laid an operations area will be allocated by radio.
       
VIII.   If the anti-submarine situation makes it impossible to carry out the operation, move away and report by radio so that a new laying area can be allocated.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  Hessler
                                                                                 for Chief of Ops. Dept.
                                                                                 for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 39 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 263 A 2
     
28 June 1943.
       
Operations Order Port Lyautey for U 373
       
I. Operation:
  The entrance to Port Lyautey is to be fouled with mines.
       
II. Enemy Situation:
  Information for May and June 1943 is incomplete.  According to this 11 freighters coming from America alone entered the port between 9.5 and 12.5. and 17 between 1.6. and 5.6.  This heavy traffic is believed to be connected with Americans' plans to develop the sea port and airfield.  According to an agent's report, it is also intended to erect factories to assemble aircraft and tanks.  Coastal traffic is to be expected between Gibraltar and Port Lyautey and Casablanca.
       
III. Anti-submarine activity:
    Slight air activity by day, occasional air activity by night and slight surface patrol are to be expected.  Strong air activity as soon as boat is detected.  Otherwise no information on lights or approach points.  (Boat's own observations important.)  Land-based Radar must be reckoned with, but, according to experience in the Mediterranean, is little effective.
       
IV. Material:
  12 TMB, time setting 80 days, delay clockwork 1 day for 2 mines, 3 days for 2 mines, 5 days for 4 mines and 6 days for 4 mines, response value 10 millioersteds, 2 mines to fire at first activation, 2 at second activation 3 mines at fourth activation and 5 mines at sixth activation (5 blue, 4 red, 3 green).  Maximum depth of water at which mines may be laid 20 meters, minimum 12 meters, distance apart of mines 400 meters.
       
V. Geographical boundaries:
  None. The mines are to be laid as close off the entrance as possible.
       
VI. Execution:
  Torpedoes are to be carried in the tubes on the way to the operations area.  The tubes are to be reloaded one day off the laying area.  One bow tube is to remain loaded with a torpedo.
  Enemy traffic is to be observed before laying the mines.  The Commanding Officer is to make every effort to lay the mines as close as possible to the entrance. 
  The minefield position indicated in the diagram is to serve as a guide only.  The Commanding Officer is free to deviate from this according to the traffic situation observed by him or transmitted to him.
 
 
 
- 40 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer.  Use is to be made of the new moon period as far as possible.
       
VII. Reporting:
  A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after laying the minefield, but from a distance of at least 100 miles away.  The Group "AFKP" will mean"have laid mines off Port Lyautey".
       
VIII.   After mines have been laid an operations area will be allocated by radio.
       
IX.   If the anti-submarine situation makes it impossible to carry out the operation, move away and report by radio so that a new laying area can be allocated.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  Hessler
                                                                                 for Chief of Ops. Dept.
                                                                                 for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 41 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 270 A 2
     
1 July 1943.
       
Operations Order Kingston (Jamaica) for U 607
       
I. Operation:
  The entrance to Kingston is to be fouled with mines.
       
II. Enemy Situation:
  According to information in the Summer of 1942, convoys put into Kingston.  Regular medium single ship traffic is reported.
       
III. Anti-submarine activity:
  Air activity and surface patrol are to be expected.  A boat operating there in the Summer of 1942 reported a particularly strong searchlight which covered the entrance every 10 minutes, otherwise no patrol observed.  No information on Radar.
       
IV. Material:
  8 TMC, time setting 80 days, delay clockwork 1 day for 2 mines, 4 days for 3 mines and 6 days for 3 mines, response value 20 millioersteds, 2 mines to fire at first activation, 2 at third activation 4 mines at sixth activation (4 blue, 2 red, 2 green).  The mines may be laid only at depths of 10 - 25 meters. Distance apart of mines 300 meters only.
       
V. Geographical boundaries:
  None. The mines are to be laid as close as possible off the entrance, taking the main inward course into account.
       
VI. Execution:
  Torpedoes are to be carried in the tubes on the way to the operations area.  The tubes are to be reloaded one day off the laying area.  One bow tube is to remain loaded with a torpedo.
  Enemy traffic is to be observed before laying the mines.  The Commanding Officer is to make every effort to lay the mines as close as possible to the entrance. 
  The minefield position indicated in the diagram is to serve as a guide only.  The Commanding Officer is free to deviate from this according to the traffic situation observed by him or transmitted to him.
  The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer.  Use is to be made of the new moon period as far as possible.
 
 
 
- 42 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
VII. Reporting:
  A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after laying the minefield, but from a distance of at least 100 miles away.  The Group "AFKP" will mean"have laid mines off Kingston".
       
VIII.   After mines have been laid an operations area will be allocated by radio.
       
IX.   If the anti-submarine situation makes it impossible to carry out the operation, move away and report by radio so that a new laying area can be allocated.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  Hessler
                                                                                 for Chief of Ops. Dept.
                                                                                 for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 43 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 268 A 2
     
29 June 1943.
       
Operations Order Jacksonville for U 613
       
I. Operation:
  The entrance to Jacksonville is to be fouled with mines inside the 25-meter line.
       
II. Enemy Situation:
  Regular single-ship traffic is to be expected from Jacksonville to other ports on the E. coast of America and in the Caribbean, also arrival and departure of coastal convoys.  From time to time trans-Atlantic transports leave Jacksonville.
       
III. Anti-submarine activity:
  Medium to strong air activity is to be expected, especially by day.  There may be surface patrol before a convoy is due.  No information on Radar, lights or approach points.  (Boat's own observations important.)
       
IV. Material:
  8 TMC, time setting 80 days, delay clockwork 1 day for 2 mines, 4 days for 3 mines and 6 days for 3 mines, response value 20 millioersteds, 2 mines to fire at first activation, 2 at third activation 4 mines at sixth activation (4 blue, 2 red, 2 green).  Maximum depth at which mines may be laid 25 meters, minimum 10 meters.   Distance apart of mines 300 meters.
       
V. Geographical boundaries:
  None. The mines are to be laid as close as possible off the entrance, taking the main inward course into account.
       
VI. Execution:
  Torpedoes are to be carried in the tubes on the way to the operations area.  The tubes are to be reloaded one day off the laying area.  One bow tube is to remain loaded with a torpedo.
  Enemy traffic is to be observed before laying the mines.  The Commanding Officer is to make every effort to lay the mines as close as possible to the entrance. 
  The minefield position indicated in the diagram is to serve as a guide only.  The Commanding Officer is free to deviate from this according to the traffic situation observed by him or transmitted to him.
  The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer.  Use is to be made of the new moon period as far as possible.
 
 
 
- 44 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
VII. Reporting:
  A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after laying the minefield, but from a distance of at least 100 miles away.  The Group "AFKP" will mean"have laid mines off Jacksonville".
       
VIII.   After mines have been laid an operations area will be allocated by radio.
       
IX.   If the anti-submarine situation makes it impossible to carry out the operation, move away and report by radio so that a new laying area can be allocated.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  Hessler
                                                                                 for Chief of Ops. Dept.
                                                                                 for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 45 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 265 A 2
     
29 June 1943.
       
Operations Order Lagos for U 43
       
I. Operation:
  The entrance to Lagos is to be fouled with mines.
       
II. Enemy Situation:
  Regular single-ship traffic has been observed to and from Lagos, a total of 30 to 40 ships per month has been calculated.  Ships bound for Freetown sail partly in convoys of 5 or 6.  Supply traffic leaves the smaller ports on the Guinea coast for Lagos, where it is incorporated in the convoy system.
       
III. Anti-submarine activity:
  There is no information on air activity or sea patrol.  Slight air activity must be expected by day, increasing if the boat is detected. There may be land-based Radar near the harbor.
       
IV. Material:
  12 TMB, time setting 80 days, delay clockwork 1 day for 2 mines, 3 days for 2 mines, 5 days for 4 mines and 6 days for 4 mines.   Response value 10 millioersteds, 2 mines to fire at first activation, 2 at second activation, 3 at fourth activation and 5 at sixth activation (5 blue, 4 red, 3 green).  Maximum depth at which mines may be laid 20 meters, minimum 8 meters.   Distance apart of mines 300 meters.
       
V. Geographical boundaries:
  None. The mines are to be laid as close as possible off the entrance, taking the main inward course into account.
       
VI. Execution:
  Torpedoes are to be carried in the tubes on the way to the operations area.  The tubes are to be reloaded one day off the laying area.  One bow tube is to remain loaded with a torpedo.
  Enemy traffic is to be observed before laying the mines.  The Commanding Officer is to make every effort to lay the mines as close as possible to the entrance. 
  The minefield position indicated in the diagram is to serve as a guide only.  The Commanding Officer is free to deviate from this according to the traffic situation observed by him or transmitted to him.
  The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer.  Use is to be made of the new moon period as far as possible.
 
 
 
- 46 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
VII. Reporting:
  A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after laying the minefield, but from a distance of at least 100 miles away.  The Group "AFKP" will mean"have laid mines off Lagos".
       
VIII.   After mines have been laid an operations area will be allocated by radio.
       
IX.   If the anti-submarine situation makes it impossible to carry out the operation, move away and report by radio so that a new laying area can be allocated.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  Hessler
                                                                                 for Chief of Ops. Dept.
                                                                                 for B.d.U.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 47 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U. Op.
Ref. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 293 ING.
     
7.July 1943.
       
U-boats as of 1 July 1943.
       
I   
In Commission on 1.6.1943 :  
407
 boats
Commissioned during June:  
25
 boats
   
432
 boats
Losses in June: on operations:  
17
 boats
                            at home:  
-
  
Paid off  
-
  
   
415
 boats
        plus foreign boats  
8
 boats
        Handed over to Italians  
1
 boat
       
II   
Losses in June:      
In the Atlantic:
Type VII:
U 202 - 594 - 564 - 308 - 417 - 569 - 388 - 334 - 449
9
 
Type VIID:
U 217
1
 
Type IX:
U 105 - 194 - 521
3
 
Type IXD 2
U 200
1
 
Type XIV:
 
0
 
Type XB:
U 188 - 119
2
In the Mediterranean:
Type VII:
U 97
1
In Northern Waters
 
0
 
Total:
  
17
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
   
 
- 48 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Details of losses:
    
U 202 - Experienced boat.  Last report 1.6. S. of Greenland.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 594 - Experienced boat.  Last report 28.5. W. of Biscay.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 564 - Experienced boat.  Sunk by aircraft on 14.6. in Biscay.
     
U 308 - First patrol.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 417 - First patrol.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 569 - Experienced boat.  Last report  22.5. E. of Newfoundland.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 388 - First patrol.  Last report 19.6. S.W. of Iceland.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 334 - Experienced boat.  New C.O.  Last report 14.6. E. of Greenland.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 449 - First patrol.  Last report 23.6. W. of Biscay.  Probably sunk by surface forces on 24.6.
     
U 105 - Experienced boat.  Last news supply on 19.5. W. of Sierra Leone.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 194 - First patrol.  No report.   Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 521 - Experienced boat.  Last report 13.5. Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 200 - New boat.  Experienced Commanding Officer.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
     
U 118 - Experienced boat.  Last report 9.6. S.W. of the Azores.  Loss presumed due to aircraft.
     
U 119 - Experienced boat.  Last report 22.6.  Presumed lost 24.6. by surface craft.
     
U 97 - Experienced boat.  No report.  Loss probably due to aircraft on 16.6.
     
U 217 - Experienced boat.  Last report 23.5. E. of Newfoundland.  Loss presumably due to carrier-borne aircraft.
     
     
 
 
 
- 49 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Distribution of boats:
   
 
II
VIIa
VIIb/c
VIId
VIIf
IXb/c
IXD1
IXD2
XIV
XB
  
Operational:
6
-
140
2
-
43
2
7
6
1
207
Trials:
-
-
    95  
-
3
21
-
6
2
2
129
Training:
33
4
     *38     
-
-
**4  
-
-
-
-
79
 
  39  
4
273
2
3
68
2
13
8
3
415
* 20 boats temporarily detached for training.      
** 1 boat temporarily detached for training.
     
       
  In June:
    
Became operational :   +
11
 boats
Total number increased by:   +
8
 boats
Number of operational boats decreased by:   -
6
 boats
Number of boats on trials increased by:   +
5
 boats
Number of training boats increased by:   +
9
 boats
       
IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1.7.1943:
    
Atlantic
168
boats
  
Mediterranean
17
    
Northern Waters
16
    
Black Sea
6
    
207
       
V. During June in the Atlantic:
    
Daily average at sea:
86
 boats.
Of these, in operations area:
27
 boats
On passage:
59
 boats
Of the latter, on return passage:
13
 boats
       
VI. Sailed for the Atlantic during June:
    
From home ports
7
 boats.
From W. France and Bergen
44
 boats
       
       
 
 
 
- 50 -