F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 June 1943

PG30326

     
     
 
16.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 17)
U 195
-
FU 87
U 415
-
BE 97
U 571
-
CE 95
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
196
-
Op(JB 11)
417
-
AL 21
572
-
DG 77
 
68
-
BF 52
197
-
Op(JA 63)
420
-
AN 23
590
-
CE 91
 
84
-
CF 57
198
-
Op(KR 77)
435
-
Op(DF 75)
592
-
AK 95
 
92
-
Op(CE 69)
199
-
FC 54
449
-
AK 91
600
-
BE 95
 
119
-
CE 17
200
-
AN 23
450
-
BE 41
603
-
Op(DE 34)
 
126
-
ES 38
211
-
Op(DE 38)
455
-
DH 45
608
-
Op(DE 31)
 
134
-
CF 27
214
-
DG 22
460
-
DG 22
615
-
BE 95
 
135
-
CE 72
221
-
Op(DE 35)
487
-
BF 91
618
-
CE 95
 
154
-
Op(DQ 70)
228
-
Op(DE 34)
488
-
CD 94
634
-
BE 97
 
155
-
BF 52
232
-
DE 67
508
-
DH 47
641
-
Op(DE 31)
 
159
-
BE 97
257
-
BE 95
510
-
DG 73
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
170
-
BD 24
271
-
Op(AK 54)
511
-
GR 87
645
-
BE 41
 
172
-
DG 77
306
-
CF 57
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
650
-
AK 57
 
177
-
Op(JA 47)
308
-
AL 20
515
-
DT 53
653
-
CF 27
 
178
-
Op(JB 11)
333
-
DT 41
521
-
Op(DC 10)
666
-
Op(DE 37)
 
180
-
DS 54
334
-
Op(AK 67)
527
-
Op(DL 24)
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
181
-
Op(KR 71)
336
-
Op(DE 91)
530
-
DG 77
669
-
AK 89
 
185
-
BE 98
338
-
BF 91
535
-
AK 68
732
-
CF 54
 
190
-
Op(CA 83)
341
-
Op(AK 61)
536
-
AK 86
758
-
DG 27
 
193
-
Op(DE 92)
358
-
CF 27
558
-
Op(DE 61)
759
-
DG 52
 
194
-
AN 23
388
-
AE 68
569
-
CE 35
951
-
Op(DE 61)
                   
953
-
Op(DE 64)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 68 - 92 - 119 - 126 - 155 - 180 - 185 - 195 - 214 - 460 - 515 - 569 - 645 - 650.
  Entered Port:  U 68 - 155 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 460 reported having managed to meet U 758, 460 with U 214 at 0100 in CE 9792.  Return passage together.
    2) U 415 reported concerted outward passage through Biscay area.  No further incidents after U 68's return on account of the Commander.  Aircraft contact shaken off by submerging in BF 7815.  Badly placed depth charges.  Halifax beaten off on 15.6. in BF 9938, subsequent submerging by group.  R/T traffic confirmed on 2.65 meters V/HF.
    3) U 92 reported surfacing for 3 minutes while passing through the current of the mole head "Porte Delgada", steamer "Rubens" in harbor.  No traffic.  Return passage.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  In DN 19, AK 54, BE 9840, apart from these, there was a sighting report of 3 U-boats in the Biscay area upon which judging from a decoded wireless message sent to 13 aircraft, a large number of aircraft were detailed for action.
  d)  None.
       
- 494 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 417 receives operations area AJ 6585, depth 70 seamiles for the dummy operation at present taking place in the North Atlantic.
    2) After the dissolution of the concerted Biscay passage the boats receive the following positions:U 415, 634, 615, 257, 600 = DF 50.  U 185 = EB 60.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None
       
VI. General:
  Standing Order No. 14
  A. Purpose:
    Possibility of mutual aid in the event of bomb damage sustained in aircraft attacks.  Intensified anti-aircraft defence in surprise attacks.
  B. Execution and general directions:
    1) 2-3 boats working together W. of 180 W., under Command of senior Commander.
    2) Distance apart 3 to 500 meters in surface passage.  Broad quarterline formation.  Passage through Biscay area according to Standing Order No. 13, in other words, principally submerged.  Surface only during the day to recharge batteries.  If strong enemy air activity makes this impossible, recharge batteries at night.
    3) When on recharging passage, submerge as directed by senior Commander; on prompt sighting of aircraft , on radar location, also in action at a favorable moment, likewise on continuous air contact.
    4) Remain on the surface during surprise attacks, offensive action with all armament available.  Boat to first sight aircraft is to fire short burst in the direction of the attacking aircraft.
    5) On each surface passage, the senior Commander decides mean course, time and place of surfacing, for possible submerged passage.  Submerged mean course, low speed, position comparison important.
    6) Submerged passage of S.O.'s boat at 40 meters, accompanying boat at 60 meters.  Contact possible with good hydrophone gear.
 
 
 
- 495 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    7) Communications on surface by semaphore, submerged sonic telegraphy, executive command for submerging, also crash diving to be given by signaling with red flag.
    8) Sonic telegraphy signals:  
      SS = submerge to periscope depth
      AA = surface
      1 NN = surface in one hour
      GG = am proceeding on mean course, mean speed at ordered depth
      HH = strange hydrophone bearing, no more sonic traffic
      2 DD = surface in 2 hours
      LL = am proceeding at high speed for 2 minutes for hydrophone bearing
      3 EB = surface in 3 hours
      PP = proceed at high speed for hydrophone bearing.
      Only AA is to be repeated, in this case the order is to be executed on the second long dash from the S.O.'s boat.
    9) The S.O. is to set out the necessary orders for the entire passage before the boats assemble and to give them to the various boats.
    With reference to VI paragraph 2) see below.
___________________________________________________________________
       
Survey of measures to be adopted
of measures to be adopted for the improvement of U-boat anti-aircraft armament.
(As of 15.6.43)
       
  A. The necessity for the improvement of U-boat anti-aircraft armament arose from the growing danger to U-boats of aircraft in the summer of 1942.  Boats must be in a position to defend themselves on the surface with an adequate number of anti-aircraft weapons of sufficient caliber against surprise air attacks which are increasingly favorable by the use of Radar apparatus.  In addition personnel exposed on the bridge must have adequate protection against enemy small-arms fire to avoid crippling losses. Both these needs lead to the adoption of the following measures within approximately the last 12 months.
    1) Increase in number of anti-aircraft weapons.
    2) Disposition on additional, raised anti-aircraft platforms.
    3) Development of 2 cm quadruple mounted guns for U-boats.
    4) Development of line-carrying rocket H.E. projectile, for use on U-boats.
    5) Improvement in armament performance.
    6) Introduction of armored doors and side plating for the bridge.
    7) In connection with 1) to 6) abandoning of 8.8 cm guns and of 3.7 cm quick loading gun.
    8) Equipment of U-boats with especially strong anti-aircraft armour, for use as anti-aircraft U-boats.
 
 
 
- 496 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  B. Development was as follows:
    1) Anti-aircraft weapons and platforms:
       A conference between OKM AWA and B.d.U. on 16.6.42 in Paris marked the starting point.  Subsequently B.d.U. proposed the strengthening of anti-aircraft armament (turret 0) formerly consisting of one MG C/30 to 2 double MG 151, as an immediate measure.
      A further demand was for the supplying of a 3.7 cm double mounting (later 3 cm) for U-boats, also a tri axial deck armament.
      As a temporary measure OKM ordered 2 double MG 151 on the former bridge platform and one 2 cm twin mounted gun on a new second platform to be placed at half the height of the bridge (turret I).  In place of the 2 cm twin mounted gun which will have to be developed - a 2 cm single mounted gun will be placed for the time being.  Only one boat was thus equipped, U 553, however, as a result of unfavorable performance and the insufficient caliber, also owing to good results achieved with the 2 cm C/38 - it was given up.  In B.d.U.'s report to the Fuehrer on 28.9.42 he already denied the adequate penetration, especially of MG 151, and considered an increase of caliber to at least 3.7 cm. necessary.
      In place of MG C/30 (useless on account of its liability to break down) it was proposed to equip the boats with the considerably superior 2 cm MG C/38.  The continuous change over to this weapon began on 1.12.42.
      In the search for more, especially suitable multiple firing machine guns, two 2cm quadruple mounted C/38s were procured from the Army and adapted for use by U-boats.
      The following was laid down in a discussion with B.d.U. on 14.11.42, as the anti-aircraft armament desirable.
        Upper platform:  two 2 cm twin mounted guns.
        Lower platform:  One 2 cm quadruple mounted or a 3.7 cm automatic.
      As long as the 2 cm twin mounted guns were not available, the upper platform was to be equipped with 2 cm single mounted guns.
      As, for the time being, the quadruple mounted gun and the 3.7 cm automatic could also not be expected to be ready for operations, and the installation of MG 151 proposed at this time was delayed owing to difficulty in delivery, a 2 cm/38 was ordered in place of the MG 151 on the upper platform, as a temporary measure.  This measure led to conning tower design II with 2 2 cm/38, one each on the upper and lower platform, after the abandonment of MG 151, likewise conning tower design III with two 2 cm guns on an enlarged upper platform, whereby constructively the application of a lower anti-aircraft position was planned for the quadruple mounted gun.
   
 
 
- 497 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      The adoption of the conning tower II began in a big way in December 1942 and was only temporarily discontinued from the end of December 1942 to the beginning of January 1943 as a result of unfavorable performance experienced by the first operational boats.
      After the overcoming of several childish ailments the 2 cm quadruple mounted gun had so far progressed in March 1943 that it was installed in 2 trial boats type VIIc in April May 1943.  Originally one of these two boats was to receive the quadruple mounting, the other the 3.7 cm automatic on the lower platform.  The latter weapon was not, however, at this time suitable for U-boat installation.  At the same time, two quadruple mounted guns were installed on the first anti-aircraft U-boat (see paragraph 6).  The provision of quadruple mounted guns for operational armament was so arranged in April 1943, that (depending on the experiences of the trail boats) 24 quadruple mounted guns were to be delivered up to the 15.7 and 24 more up to the 15.9.
      The ever increasing danger from air activity and the growing losses caused by enemy aircraft made it necessary in the middle of May 1943, however, to push forward the completion of quadruple mounted guns and appropriate turrets and their installation on operational U-boats on a large scale without waiting for the reports of performance in action.  This program provided for the following delivery figures of quadruple mounted gun turrets (design IV):
        June  50
        July  150
        August 150.
       The completion of 2 cm quadruple mounted guns kept pace with these figures, so that turret reconstruction could be started as early as the beginning of June 1943 in the order operational, outstanding and newly constructed boats.
      On 4.6 the first trial boat reported (at sea) favorable performance of quadruple mounted guns (U 758, S.O. Manseck) not only of the gun, but also of the turret with regard to submerging times, deep diving characteristics and spray formation, so that the ordered large-scale measures were fully justified.
       The situation necessitated the order on 8.6, that no boat was to put out from Home waters or from Norway without anti-aircraft reinforcements (at least two 2 cm guns).  The same order was given to the West boats on 14.6.  Here, in the case of some boats, anti-aircraft reinforcement consisted of the installation of a helpful second anti-aircraft platform.
      The adaptation to turret design IV for all boats was the temporary aim, with the exception of the boats type VIId which stuck to turret design III, otherwise it would have been reduced to having 2 mineshafts.
   
 
 
- 498 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Progress in reconstruction of operational boats on 15.6.43:
     
Turret II and III completed :
72 boats
under construction
:
57 boats
Turret IV :
2 boats
under construction
:
16 boats
Total no. of operational boats :
214 boats
    2) Line carrying and H.E. rockets:
      The request was also made to OKM on 16.6 for line-carrying rockets as a defence measure for submerging and therefore defenceless U-boats.  In this case for the 8.6 cm rocket line-carrying shell, started from primitive firing firing stand, and the H.E. rocket of the same caliber.  Installation took place for the first time in the first anti-aircraft U-boat (see paragraph 6), but, however, it has not yet been used.  According to the most recent information, the line-carrying rocket is of little use without an explosive charge at the lower end, in its present form it has no deterring effect.  In comparison, the H.E. rocket is more effective and achieves almost the same object when putting up a barrage against attacking aircraft as the 8.8 cm H.E. and it is proposed to equip all boats with the 8.6 cm. H.E. rocket.
    3) Increased performance of armament:
      The unsafe 2 cm ammunition (incendiary H.E. tracer shell self destroyer) was superceded by the incendiary H.E. without tracer and on 1.7.43 by the A.P.H.E. shell tracer self destroyer.
      Advantages of the first:  Explosive charge three times as late.  (Hexogen), very effective against unprotected surfaces (mine projectile)
      Disadvantages of the first :  No tracer, or effect on armor plating.
      Advantage of second:  Good armor piercing performance, tracer.
      Disadvantages of second:  Small explosive charge, no effect on unprotected surfaces.
      For the time being both kinds are to be fired in the ratio of 1:1.
    4) Armor plating of U-boat bridge:
      On 30.10.42 the B.d.U. proposed the installation of armored doors on all boats to protect bridge exposed aft against small arms fire.  Construction took place experimentally on 2 boats and was then ordered for all boats on the 16th of February 1943.  This measure was not put into effect until May 1943 owing to shortage of material.
 
 
 
- 499 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      In addition to this U-boat, bridges were also ordered to be provided with side plates on 11.5.43.In the event of material not being available, extensive improvisations are to be made.  Owing to suggestions from the front, the forward part of the bridge was surrounded by bullet proof armour plating.  For the rest, the quadruple mounted gun shield serves as adequate protection for its crew.
      The increasing number of occasions on which U-boats have suffered crippling losses among personnel on the bridge, as a result of enemy small arms fire, made the armor plating of the bridge a necessity of the greatest importance.
    5) Special measures:
     
a) In order to bring the U-boat guns (8.8 or 10.5cm) into line with aircraft defence, barrage fire for U-boats was developed in November 1942.  2 barrages of 15 and 30 hectometers was proposed.  Equipment of the boats with the necessary time fuses took place in the middle of January 1943.
b) Already on 14.11.42, B.d.U. had abandoned the 8.8 cm gun in favor of the 2 cm quadruple mounted gun for type VII boats.  Further, on 27.4.43 all boats were ordered to give up the 8.8 cm guns, as there was no need for them and they could be used to greater advantage elsewhere.  This measure was put into force without first ascertaining whether quadruple mounted guns were already available.  On requests, this gun was only left to the North Sea and Mediterranean boats.
c) For the same reason, on 13.3.43, and order was given to surrender 3.7 cm quick firing guns on all boats of type IX, XB and XIV.
d) In February the gradual equipment of boats with MG 81 Z (8 m/m twin MG) in place of the MG 34 and MG 15, both of which were no longer produced, took place.  Results of the performance of this weapon are still awaited.
    6) Anti-aircraft U-boats:
      The putting in of a U-boat (U 256) at the beginning of September 1942, so badly damaged that further use as an operational boat seemed out of the question, lead to B.d.U.'s decision to adapt this boat as an anti-aircraft U-boat (Flak trap).  The boat was to be provided with every radar detection device and radar apparatus, and to carry the heaviest possible Flak machine armament.  Also, structural reinforcement was to increase resistance to bombs.  Anti-aircraft guns were to be put in the converted conning tower.
      The limits of conversion throughout were only to be caused by the necessity for maintaining a certain degree of similarity to other boats.
      The following duties for such a boat were laid down:
 
 
 
- 500 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
a) Action against enemy aircraft in the Biscay area.
b) Escort and anti-aircraft protection for damaged boats unable to submerge in the Biscay area.
      After much consideration the armament for this boat was decided upon as follows:
     
On Flak position before the bridge : one 2 cm quadruple mounted gun
On Flak position on the bridge: :         "        "        "
On Flak position aft the bridge : one 3.7 cm automatic
2 MG 81 Z, armour plated bridge,    
Equipment with line-carrying rockets    
Equipment with one round of torpedoes(5)    
      As the completion of U 256 was decisively delayed, the speedy conversion of U 441 into a Flak boat was ordered on 16.4.43.  On the 16.5.43 the production of a third, on 20.5 seven further Flak boats were ordered.  It was decided on 8.6 that the third boat to be converted was to be U 621.
      On 22.5, U 441 put out on her first operation shot down a Sunderland on 24.5 in the Biscay area and had to put in subsequently owing to bomb damage.  The 3.7 cm, the quadruple mounted gun and ammunition all proved their worth.
      Certain shortcomings apparent in the quadruple mounted gun must be put down to growing pains, whose elimination presents no very serious difficulties.
       
  C. Further development of Flak armament:
     It is apparent from the U-boats reports of anti-aircraft defence, that as was expected the enemy remains outside the range of the 2 cm gun (approximately 2,000 m) and carries out his attack at a high altitude with good bomb aiming devices or sometimes too with remote controlled bombs.  It appears advisable then not only for reasons of effectiveness on the target, but also for reasons of range to keep the original intention and increase the caliber of at least a section of the Flak armament.  The 3.7 cm automatic is suited to this purpose and its further development to a twin mounted gun must, by all means, be promoted.  Of the remainder, the setting up of 3 cm twin mounted gun comes into the question.  The position for this still has to be considered.  Placing on a Flak position before the bridge appears possible, according to the first experiences of U 441 regarding deep diving characteristics and crash diving times.  In such an operation the difficulty lies in the formation of spray the elimination of which is always questionable.
 
 
 
- 501 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
17.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 197
-
JB 19
U 420
-
AF 87
U 590
-
CE 85
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
KR 79
435
-
Op(DE 65)
592
-
AK 91
 
84
-
CF 75
199
-
FC 84
449
-
AK 91
600
-
BE 89
 
92
-
Op(CE 69)
200
-
AF 87
450
-
BE 46
603
-
Op(DE 34)
 
119
-
CE 24
211
-
Op(DE 38)
455
-
DH 16
608
-
Op(DE 31)
 
126
-
ES 23
214
-
CE 95
460
-
CE 98
615
-
BE 89
 
134
-
CF 45
221
-
Op(DE 35)
487
-
BF 92
618
-
CE 88
 
135
-
CE 77
228
-
Op(DE 34)
488
-
CD 99
634
-
CF 31
 
154
-
Op(DQ 70)
232
-
Op(DE 67)
508
-
DH 77
641
-
Op(DE 31)
 
159
-
CF 31
257
-
BE 89
510
-
DG 77
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
170
-
BD 54
271
-
Op(AK 54)
511
-
JJ 12
645
-
BE 46
 
172
-
DG 77
306
-
CF 75
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
650
-
AK 56
 
177
-
Op(JA 55)
308
-
AL 20
515
-
DT 31
653
-
CF 45
 
178
-
JB 13
333
-
DT 71
521
-
Op(CA 10)
666
-
Op(DR 37)
 
180
-
DS 27
334
-
Op(AK 67)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
667
-
Op(BD 31)
 
181
-
KR 76
336
-
Op(DE 91)
530
-
DG 77
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
185
-
BE 97
338
-
BF 82
535
-
AK 95
732
-
CF 75
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
Op(AK 61)
536
-
BD 24
758
-
CE 95
 
193
-
Op(DE 92)
358
-
CF 45
558
-
Op(DE 61
759
-
DG 49
 
194
-
AF 87
388
-
AE 59
569
-
CF 12
951
-
Op(DE 61)
 
195
-
FN 48
415
-
CF 31
571
-
CE 86
953
-
Op(DE 64)
 
196
-
JB 21
417
-
AL 12
572
-
DG 77      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 180 - 185 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 450 - 460 - 515 - 535 - 569 - 645 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 634 sighted a steamer on a northerly course, zig-zagging at high speed, in BE 8883.  THe boat submerged on account of aircraft with search lights and lost contact.
    2) U 333 reported a freighter on a general course of 200, speed 16 knots in DT 7125.
    3) U 758 encountered Swedish tanker "Kalmia" showing lights, course southwest, in CF 75.  On asking whether the ship might be sunk, the boat was not granted permission as the "Kalmia" is registered (as neutral vessel) and is sailing at present under Portuguese charter.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In BE 9936, DA 96.  Attack on U-boat in CB 12 and EO 66.
    2) The Spanish steamer "Cabo de Buena Esperanza" took survivors on board in FJ 3121.  (Possibly success of U 513 or 199).
  d)  None.
       
- 502 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) After carrying out replenishment of supplies U 590 is to proceed to EP 40, U 618 and 571 to ET 60.
    2) To occupy new operations areas in Northern Atlantic:  U 271 = AJ 9383, U 341 = AK 7753, U 334 = BD 1456.  Depth 70 sea miles.
  c) U 154 began return passage and proposes meeting with U 126 for the purpose of a concerted passage.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  The following is ordered as an addition to Standing Order No. 11:
  Para. 3)
  IF it is not possible to take ship's officers prisoner, take other white members of crew on board, in as far as accommodation and further duties allow.  Reason:  Interrogation of prisoners for military purposes.
  Para. 4)
  When an isolated destroyer, corvette or escort vessel has been sunk, try to take prisoners, if this is possible without endangering the boat.  Questioning of prisoners by P/W/ transit camp can reveal the most valuable information on enemy U-boat defence procedure, apparatus and armament.  The same applies to shot down aircraft crews.  Be careful of aircraft wreckage, however.  (See Standing Order No. 12).
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
18.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 197
-
JB 10
U 435
-
Op(DE 65)
U 590
-
CE 78
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
KR 70
449
-
AK 91
592
-
BD 23
 
84
-
CE 97
199
-
FK 15
450
-
BE 92
600
-
DF 34
 
92
-
CF 46
200
-
AF 76
455
-
DH 22
603
-
Op(DE 34)
 
119
-
CE 2195
211
-
Op(DE 38)
460
-
CF 73
608
-
Op(DE 31)
 
126
-
EJ 84
214
-
CF 73
487
-
BF 73
615
-
CF 34
 
134
-
CE 96
221
-
Op(DE 35)
488
-
CE 78
618
-
CE 78
 
135
-
DF 34
228
-
Op(DE 34)
508
-
DT 29
634
-
CF 29
 
154
-
Op(DQ 1845)
232
-
Op(DE 67)
510
-
DR 36
641
-
Op(DE 31)
 
159
-
CF 37
257
-
CF 34
511
-
JJ 52
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
170
-
BD 84
271
-
Op(AK 43)
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
645
-
BE 92
 
172
-
DG 77
306
-
CE 96
515
-
DH 75
650
-
AK 94
 
177
-
JA 60
333
-
DT 77
521
-
Op(CA 20)
653
-
CE 96
 
178
-
JB 10
334
-
Op(AK 85)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
666
-
Op(DE 37)
 
180
-
DS 13
226
-
Op(DE 91)
530
-
DG 77
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
181
-
KR 70
338
-
BF 81
535
-
AK 9182
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
       
- 503 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
185
-
CF 35
341
-
Op(AK 83)
536
-
BD 51
732
-
CE 97
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
CE 96
558
-
Op(DE 61)
758
-
CF 73
 
193
-
Op(DE 92)
388
-
AE 82
569
-
CF 12
759
-
DG 75
 
194
-
AF 76
415
-
CF 29
571
-
CE 78
951
-
Op(DE 61)
 
195
-
FU 17
417
-
AL 11
572
-
DG 77
953
-
Op(DE 64)
 
196
-
JB 20
420
-
AF 76            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 180 - 185 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 450 - 460 - 515 - 569 - 645 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 338 was bombed by a Halifax at 1930 on 17.6 in BF 7561.  The boat attempted at first to repair the damage sustained but later began the return passage.
    2) U 645 reported attack by aircraft at high altitude.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  In DM 19, CA 5629 and another on 610 25' N, no longitude given.  Aircraft of 19 Group reported group of 3 U-boats in BE 9518 (U 450 - 645).
     An attempt is being made to jam aircraft contact messages by jammer Brest in order to prevent reinforcements being called up.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 135 is proceeding to DE 93 and is joining Group "Trutz".
    2) U 653, 358 and 134 are waiting in CE 76 and 79 and are later to be supplied from U 488.
  c) The following are to assemble at 0600 on 21.6 in BE 8155 for the purpose of returning together:  U 650, 119, 449.
  d) 1) U 511 reported the 13th July as probable day of rendezvous.
    2) U 318 has not reported since putting out of Kiel.  Repeated requests for a position report remained unanswered.  It is possible that the boat was intercepted and destroyed by the regular air reconnaissance in the Iceland Passage.  There are no further details.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 504 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
19.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 197
-
JB 28
U 435
-
Op(DE 65)
U 590
-
CE 78
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
KR 88
449
-
BD 36
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
84
-
CE 88
199
-
Op(FK 44)
450
-
BF 71
600
-
CF 28
 
92
-
CF 55
200
-
AF 72
455
-
CF 96
603
-
Op(DE 34)
 
119
-
CE 31
211
-
Op(DE 38)
460
-
CF 55
608
-
Op(DE 31)
 
126
-
EJ 48
214
-
CF 55
487
-
BE 96
615
-
CF 28
 
134
-
CE 97
221
-
Op(DE 35)
488
-
CE 78
618
-
CE 78
 
135
-
DQ 22
228
-
Op(DE 34)
508
-
DT 75
634
-
CF 51
 
154
-
CF 51
232
-
Op(DE 67)
510
-
DR 53
641
-
Op(DE 31)
 
159
-
AK 69
257
-
CF 28
511
-
Op(JK 21)
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
170
-
AL 69
271
-
Op(AJ 93)
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
645
-
BF 71
 
172
-
DG 77
306
-
CE 88
515
-
DH 46
650
-
AK 31
 
177
-
KR 85
333
-
EJ 12
521
-
Op(CA 20)
653
-
CE 97
 
178
-
CF 53
334
-
Op(BD 12)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
666
-
Op(DE 37)
 
180
-
DG 77
336
-
Op(DE 91)
530
-
DG 77
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
181
-
KR 85
338
-
BF 76
535
-
BD 22
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
185
-
CF 53
341
-
AK 84
536
-
BD 81
732
-
CE 88
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
CE 87
558
-
Op(DE 61)
758
-
CF 55
 
193
-
Op(DE 92)
388
-
AL 13
569
-
BE 79
759
-
DG 77
 
194
-
AF 72
415
-
CF 51
571
-
CE 78
951
-
Op(DE 61)
 
195
-
FT 32
417
-
AL 10
572
-
DG 77
953
-
Op(DE 64)
 
196
-
JB 22
420
-
AF 72            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 338 - 449 - 450 - 460 - 515 - 569 - 645 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 382 - St. Nazaire;  U 462 - Bordeaux.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Close support for U-boats putting in.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 455 reported bombing and small arms attack by Liberator in CF 9484.  No damage, hit observed by defence.
    2) U 600 reported on group passage.  Bombed by Sunderland at 16.6 in BE 9585.  No damage, one man killed.  Contact shaken off by mass submerging.  Boat suggests armor plated bridge.
    3) U 177 reported heavy westerly storm S. of 340 S. since 10.6.  No armament or "Bachsteltze" activity.
  b) No events of interest.
  c) U-boat sightings:  In FB 49, CA 84, EH 1413.  U-boat attack in CF 97 (U 415).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  The expected America-Gibraltar convoy has not yet been intercepted.
       
- 505 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) U 388 is occupying AJ 6585 as operations area.  Depth 70 sea miles.
    2) After carrying out present fuel replenishments:  U 306 = DN 70, U 732 and U 84 = EC 10.
  c) 1) U 530 has surrendered the remainder of its fuel to U 172, 572, 759 and U 180.  It has started on the return passage with U 180.
    2) U 618, 590 and 571 have replenished supplies from U 488 on 18.6 and are proceeding to the ordered position.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 197
-
JB 31
U 420
-
AF 47
U 572
-
DG 77
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
KR 97
435
-
Op(DE 65)
590
-
CE 78
 
84
-
CE 78
199
-
Op(FJ 90)
449
-
BE 42
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
92
-
CF 29
200
-
AF 47
450
-
BF 73
600
-
CF 24
 
119
-
BE 77
211
-
Op(DE 38)
455
-
CF 95
603
-
Op(DE 34)
 
126
-
EJ 18
214
-
CF 29
460
-
CF 53
608
-
Op(DE 31)
 
134
-
CE 88
221
-
Op(DE 35)
462
-
BF 91
615
-
CF 46
 
135
-
DF 46
228
-
Op(DE 34)
487
-
BE 98
618
-
CE 78
 
154
-
DE 96
232
-
Op(DE 67)
488
-
CE 78
634
-
CF 48
 
159
-
CF 73
257
-
CF 46
508
-
EJ 14
641
-
Op(DE 31)
 
170
-
AK 98
271
-
Op(AJ 93)
510
-
DR 57
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
172
-
DG 77
306
-
CE 78
511
-
JK 33
645
-
BF 73
 
177
-
JB 14
333
-
EJ 42
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
650
-
BE 42
 
178
-
KR 89
334
-
Op(BD 14)
515
-
DH 16
653
-
CE 88
 
180
-
DG 77
336
-
Op(DE 91)
521
-
Op(DC 20)
666
-
Op(DE 37)
 
181
-
KR 95
338
-
BE 82
527
-
Op(DL 20)
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
185
-
CF 58
341
-
Op(AK 77)
530
-
DG 77
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
CE 88
535
-
BD 28
732
-
CE 78
 
193
-
Op(DE 92)
382
-
BF 91
536
-
BD 87
758
-
CF 53
 
194
-
AF 47
388
-
AK 36
558
-
Op(DE 61)
759
-
DG 77
 
195
-
FM 83
415
-
CF 48
569
-
BE
951
-
Op(DE 61)
 
196
-
JB 32
417
-
AL 10
571
-
CE 78
953
-
Op(DE 64)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 338 - 449 - 450 - 460 - 515 - 569 - 645 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Escort for outgoing and incoming U-boats.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 488 was sighted by the Swedish steamer "Kalmia" during the refueling of U 306.  The supply position was therefore transferred.
       
- 506 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) Nothing of interest.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In DC 67, AE 5846, CA 96.  Also 3 sightings in an undecoded position one of which was on 570 35' N (U 388 ?).
    2) English reconnaissance aircraft reported bombing and depth charge attack on U-boat on course of 2500, speed 18 knots.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 667 is to occupy operations area around AK 9893, depth 350 sea miles in order to feign in and outgoing U-boat traffic.  Here, the boat is to transmit wireless messages and short signals on various bands.
    2) U 511 has orders to maintain wireless silence and within 300 sea miles circumference of supply area KS 74, also isolated traffic is not to be attacked with the exception of large troop transport ships and warships from cruisers upwards.  The Commander may replenish fuel supplies from "Schliemann".
  c) U 306 has replenished fuel supplies from U 488.
  d) U 417 has not reported since putting out of Kiel.  The loss of this boat (probably due to Iceland aircraft) must be presumed.  There are no further details.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  The following has been added to Standing Order No. 13.  Life jackets are to be available to the entire crew in the air endangered areas according to para. 1).
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 507 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
21.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 197
-
KR 99
U 435
-
Op(DE 65)
U 590
-
DF 67
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
KR 98
449
-
BE 81
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
84
-
CE 78
199
-
Op(FQ 30)
450
-
BF 81
600
-
CF 43
 
92
-
CF 35
200
-
AE 68
455
-
DG 71
603
-
Op(DE 34)
 
119
-
BE 81
211
-
Op(DE 38)
460
-
CF 35
608
-
DE 31
 
126
-
DT 77
214
-
CF 35
462
-
BF 81
615
-
CF 43
 
134
-
CE 79
221
-
Op(DE 35)
487
-
BE 97
618
-
DG 57
 
135
-
DF 47
228
-
Op(DE 34)
488
-
CE 78
634
-
CE 95
 
154
-
DF 72
232
-
Op(DE 67)
508
-
EJ 45
641
-
Op(DE 31)
 
159
-
CE 96
257
-
CF 43
510
-
DR 78
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
170
-
BD 26
271
-
Op(AJ 93)
511
-
KZ 98
645
-
BF 81
 
172
-
DS 45
306
-
DF 35
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
650
-
BE 81
 
177
-
JB 21
333
-
EJ 49
515
-
CG 16
653
-
CE 76
 
178
-
KR 96
334
-
Op(BD 14)
521
-
Op(DC 20)
666
-
Op(DE 37)
 
180
-
DG 45
336
-
Op(BE 91)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
181
-
KR 96
338
-
BF 64
530
-
DG 45
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
185
-
CF 76
341
-
Op(AK 77)
535
-
BD 55
732
-
CE 78
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
CE 79
536
-
CE 18
758
-
CF 35
 
193
-
Op(DE 92)
382
-
BF 81
558
-
Op(DE 61)
759
-
DS 35
 
194
-
AE 68
388
-
AK 02
569
-
BE 90
951
-
Op(DE 61)
 
195
-
FM 54
415
-
CE 95
571
-
DG 57
953
-
Op(DE 64)
 
196
-
KR 99
420
-
AE 68
572
-
DR 34      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 338 - 449 - 450 - 460 - 515 - 530 - 569 - 645 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 338 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  None.
  b)  Nothing of interest.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In BE 3666, AE 9759, AE 8113, DM 27, AE 8121 also 2 boats in BE 9491.
      Apart from this, 5 other sightings in the Biscay area in undecoded positions were reported.
    2) 3 more aircraft were lead to the U-boat sighted in BF 7546, by the undecoded positions were reported.
    3) An unidentified unit was located in BF 1810 and CG 2110.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) The America-Gibraltar convoy expected by Group "Trutz" has not yet been intercepted.  According to reckoning it must have already passed through the "channel" area.  Group "Trutz" is ordered
       
- 508 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    therefore to proceed at 0000 on course 800, daily reckoning 160 sea miles on 22.6.  It is intended to dispose the boats S. of the Azores for operations on the Gibraltar-America convoy expected on 29.6.
  c)  U 488's supply position has been transferred to CE 4967.  U 536, 171 and 535 are to surrender their entire fuel supply here.  The following are to replenish supplies from U 488 to full capacity:  U 653, 358, 134, 415, 634, 600, 257.
  d)  U 462 was attacked and damaged by 5 aircraft in BF 8153.  One aircraft was possibly shot down.  U 462 had one man killed and several seriously wounded and has begun the return passage.
       
V. Reports of Success:  
    U 462 - 1 aircraft.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
22.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 197
-
KS 74
U 449
-
BE 83
U 590
-
DF 86
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
KS 74
450
-
BF 52
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
84
-
CE 73
199
-
Op(FQ 61)
455
-
Op(CG 46)
600
-
CF 48
 
92
-
CG 11
200
-
AE 67
460
-
CG 11
603
-
Op(DE 35)
 
119
-
BE 83
211
-
Op(DE 38)
462
-
BF 82
608
-
Op(DE 31)
 
126
-
DT 47
214
-
CG 11
487
-
BE 89
615
-
CF 48
 
134
-
CE 73
221
-
Op(DE 32)
488
-
CE 73
618
-
DG 88
 
135
-
Op(DE 93)
228
-
Op(DE 34)
508
-
EJ 76
634
-
CE 89
 
154
-
DF 57
232
-
Op(DE 68)
510
-
EF 36
641
-
Op(DE 32)
 
159
-
DG 28
257
-
CF 48
511
-
JA 77
642
-
Op(DE 67)
 
170
-
BD 55
271
-
Op(AJ 93)
513
-
Op(FQ 70)
645
-
BF 52
 
172
-
DS 74
306
-
DF 29
515
-
CG 12
650
-
BE 83
 
177
-
KR 89
333
-
EJ 86
521
-
Op(DC 20)
653
-
CE 73
 
178
-
KS 74
334
-
Op(BD 14)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
666
-
Op(DE 38)
 
180
-
DG 27
336
-
Op(DE 92)
530
-
DG 19
667
-
Op(BD 35)
 
181
-
KS 74
341
-
Op(AK 77)
535
-
BD 84
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
185
-
DG 36
358
-
CE 73
536
-
CE 45
732
-
CE 73
 
190
-
Op(CA 83)
382
-
BF 72
558
-
Op(DE 61)
758
-
CG 11
 
193
-
Op(DE 93)
388
-
AK 51
569
-
BE 90
759
-
DR 28
 
194
-
AE 67
415
-
CE 89
571
-
DG 88
951
-
Op(DE 62)
 
195
-
FM 19
420
-
AE 67
572
-
DR 27
953
-
Op(DE 65)
 
196
-
KS 74
435
-
Op(DE 65)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 450 - 460 - 515 - 530 - 569 - 645 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 450 - 645 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 387 - 277 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Escort of U-boats putting in.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 271 was intercepted by large escort vessel after Fu-MG location in a thick fog in AJ 9354 and was pursued with depth charges.
       
- 509 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 221 reported 2 westward bound steamers in DE 3376.  According to reckoning probably Swedish vessels.
    3) U 572 sighted a strongly escorted convoy at 2046 on a course of 110, speed 10 knots in DR 4133.  THe boat reported strong group and single aircraft activity.  The boat scored 2 hits with loud explosions on a steamer of 10,000 GRT.  Probably sunk.  Proceeded after hydrophone and depth charge activity lasting several hours.  (For further information see paragraph IVa.)
  b) Nothing of special interest.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DN 84, EC 74, AE 9785, AE 9456.
    2) Unidentified aircraft reported being torpedoed.  (According to later Radio Intelligence report U 593's successful attack in the Mediterranean).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operation:
  a) The convoy reported by U 572 is probably that awaited by the Group "Trutz", which accordingly must have put out several days late and made a far greater detour than was expected.  Group "Trutz" has been sailing to the E. since 000 on the 22nd.  Operations on the convoy are not ordered as the first boats could not be at the scene of action for about 2 to 4 days, and would then find themselves in an area under constant shore based aircraft patrol, which would make an attack scarcely possible.
  b) 1) Owing to the fog report sent by U 271, boats in the vicinity are to be disposed 100 sea miles to the E and will occupy the following positions with depth of 70 sea miles.   U 388 = AK 4484, U 271 = AK 7284, U 341 = AK 7952, U 334 = BD 1646.
    2) U 135 joins Group "Trutz" and extends the center reconnaissance channel one position to the south.
    3) Boats belonging to the supply group "Schliemann", are to withdraw in a northwesterly direction after refueling.  Orders with regard to operational areas follow later.
  c) Fuel management is not anticipated for boats in the North Atlantic.  After exhaustion of supplies they are to begin the return passage.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  
    U 572 - 1 ship  10,000 GRT.
       
VI. General:
    After an evaluation of the latest experiences on the Biscay passage, the boats receive the following directions in Standing Order No. 13, issued in June 1943.
 
 
 
       
- 510 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  A. The procedure of U-boats in approach and operational areas depends to a great extent on the appearance, behavior and numerical deployment of the enemy U-boat chaser planes equipped with radar apparatus.  Attacking tactics, time and place of the enemy operational concentration constantly changes and this, as soon as known, necessitates an alteration in the tactics of the U-boats and a continuous unavoidable amendment of the orders accordingly.
    As far as possible, a certain report of enemy air force dispositions in the North Atlantic will be transmitted regularly.
  B. The greatest danger to the U-boat lies in the surprise attack of aircraft locating by radar.  Danger of surprise consists:
    By day:  In medium to heavy cloud, low-lying cloud, medium to poor visibility.
    By night:  In clear peaceful weather, bright moon light, phosphorescence on the sea.
    Unfavorable for an attacking aircraft is: clear cloudless weather with good visibility or thick fog by day; further: changeable, stormy nights, in which the rough confirmation of the boat is possible with the radar apparatus, but the location of its exact position, speed and course and a therefore precise placing of the bombs, is greatly complicated.
  C. The following principles are laid down:
    Proceed with greatest caution on passage and in the waiting position in the operations area.  Avoid losses.
    If operations on a decided target are being carried out, then act with dash and determination, in spite of threatening aircraft activity, remain on the surface and beat off aircraft if necessary.
    See also Standing Order No. 181, Section C and Appendix 1.
    It is ordered in this connection:
    1)
a) On the out and return passage in the Biscay area as far as 18 W and outward passage Home Waters to North Atlantic as far as upper third of Naval Grid AL, boats must proceed principally submerged.  Surface only to recharge batteries and ventilation of the boat generally only by day.
  If daylight passage appears inadvisable owing to especially strong air activity, unfavorable visibility and defence conditions, proceed at night (See Section B).
  If the visibility is sufficiently good to make surprise impossible, surface passage by day is permissible.  Then, however, proceed at high speed, to gain distance.
 
 
 
- 511 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
b) On putting in routes, boats are to proceed on the surface.  Submerge only in the event of acute danger from the air.  Boats put out in the morning and put in the evening, so that the approach routes are passed during the daytime.
  See Standing Order No. 483, Section D, para. 1).
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
23.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 196
-
KS 74
U 388
-
AK 44
U 571
-
DS 38
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
KS 74
415
-
CE 81
572
-
DR 41
 
84
-
CE 49
198
-
KS 74
420
-
AE 82
590
-
DR 25
 
92
-
BF 47
199
-
Op(FO 50)
435
-
Op(DF 45)
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
119
-
BE 92
200
-
AE 82
449
-
BE 92
600
-
CE 92
 
126
-
DT 17
211
-
Op(DF 18)
455
-
Op(CG 55)
603
-
Op(DF 12)
 
134
-
CE 49
214
-
BF 47
460
-
BF 75
608
-
CD 78
 
135
-
Op(DF 72)
221
-
Op(DF 13)
462
-
BF 93
615
-
CE 92
 
154
-
DF 56
228
-
Op(DF 14)
487
-
CF 30
618
-
DS 39
 
159
-
DG 27
232
-
Op(DF 45)
488
-
CE 49
634
-
CE 57
 
170
-
BD 82
257
-
CE 92
508
-
ES 22
641
-
Op(CD 79)
 
172
-
EH 14
271
-
Op(AJ 93)
510
-
EF 62
642
-
Op(DF 47)
 
177
-
KS 74
277
-
AO
511
-
JA 84
650
-
BE 92
 
178
-
KS 74
306
-
DF 43
513
-
Op(FQ 70)
653
-
CE 49
 
180
-
DG 23
333
-
ES 35
515
-
BF 74
666
-
Op(DF 15)
 
181
-
KS 74
334
-
Op(BD 14)
521
-
Op(DC 20)
667
-
Op(BD 35)
 
185
-
DG 62
336
-
Op(DF 48)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
669
-
Op(CA 89)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
Op(AK 77)
530
-
DG 23
732
-
CE 49
 
193
-
Op(DF 48)
358
-
CE 49
535
-
CE 16
758
-
BF 75
 
194
-
AE 82
382
-
BF 74
536
-
CE 49
759
-
DR 45
 
195
-
FE 87
387
-
AO
558
-
Op(DF 41)
951
-
Op(DF 18)
             
569
-
BF 70
953
-
Op(DF 42)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 460 - 462 - 515 - 530 - 569 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 462 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Against convoy traffic Gibraltar-Lisbon.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 67 chased a C type steamer, course 3200, on 8.6 in DP 1733 without success.  It fired a double miss on a vessel of the same type on a course of 1300, speed 16 knots on 24.6 in DP 1657.  The boat submerged under gunfire and subsequently continued the pursuit.
    2) U 126 sighted aircraft flying at high altitude in ES 65 and 13 on 15.6.  Probably transfer flight.  The boat has welded two cracks in the pressure hull and is again able to submerge to A plus 40 meters.
    3) U 650 was attacked with depth charges by an aircraft, at a depth of 80 meters in BE 9245.  Although the damage sustained was considerable, the boat is still able to submerge to a depth of 100 meters.
       
- 512 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) Our own aircraft sank two medium sized steamers in a small convoy in CG 83.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In DP 16, FC 76, GH 4450, BF 7159.  An attacking aircraft received orders to send D/F/ signals for two other aircraft.
    2) Another reconnaissance aircraft reported 3 U-boats in approximately BE 86 (Group U 119).  An aircraft located at 1330 in BE 9360 was also requested to send D/F signals for other aircraft.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) New position for U 487 is DG 80.
    2) After carrying out fuel replenishment, these boats are to make for the following positions:  U 134 : DN 10, U 415 = ED 90, U 358 : EK 46, U 653 : EO 50, U 634 : DP 70.
    3) To occupy as attack areas:  U 333 : Freetown Sector 45 - 1350, U 510 : 250 sea mile wide channel between 50 and 550 W (Brazilian coast).
      U 508 receives freedom of movement in the Gulf of Guinea between EU 80 and EW 80.
    4) As a result of the last traffic report the Cape Town boats at present refueling from the tanker "Schliemann" are ordered to take up position in the following operational areas:  U 178 : western half, U 196 : eastern half of KE.  Center point : narrows of Mozambique channel.  U 198 : northern half, U 197 southern half of area off Durban, depth 800 sea miles.  U 177 : area round KQ 92, depth 400 sea miles. (S. of Madagascar), U 181 : area round KG 83, depth 400 sea miles (Mauritius Islands).  All boats will be informed of the presumed traffic situation in their areas.
  c) The handing over of "Metox" apparatus by U 572 to U 67 is ordered for 29.6 in DP 8725.
  d) U 569 was operating in the Group "Mosel" on Convoy No. 42 and reported for the last time from BD 1325 on 22.5 of having contact according to hydrophone bearing.  Subsequently, the boat was probably not in contact with the enemy.  On 26.5, U 569 joined Group "Trutz" and was assigned the task of intercepting the American-Gibraltar convoy in the southern section of the patrol channel from CD 4657 to DF 4221.  The boat was probably destroyed by carrier-borne aircraft on 4.6.  No further details have been received.  Numerous requests for a position report remained unanswered.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 513 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
24.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 20)
U 196
-
KS 74
U 388
-
Op(AK 44)
U 572
-
DQ 56
 
67
-
Op(DP 16)
197
-
KS 74
415
-
CE 49
590
-
DR 43
 
84
-
CE 49
198
-
KS 74
420
-
AE 84
592
-
Op(BD 36)
 
92
-
BF 49
199
-
Op(FQ 50)
435
-
Op(DF 52)
600
-
CE 83
 
119
-
BE 93
200
-
AE 84
449
-
BF 71
603
-
Op(DG 21)
 
126
-
DG 86
211
-
Op(DF 25)
455
-
Op(CG 50)
608
-
Op(CD 85)
 
134
-
CE 49
214
-
BF 49
460
-
BF 91
615
-
CE 82
 
135
-
Op(DF 57)
221
-
Op(CD 89)
487
-
CF 37
618
-
DT 45
 
154
-
DF 38
228
-
Op(DF 21)
488
-
CE 49
634
-
CE 49
 
159
-
DG 42
232
-
Op(DF 51)
508
-
ES 38
641
-
Op(CD 88)
 
170
-
CE 21
257
-
CE 83
510
-
EF 83
642
-
Op(DF 54)
 
172
-
EH 44
271
-
Op(AK 72)
511
-
JA 91
650
-
BF 71
 
177
-
KS 74
277
-
AN 36
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
653
-
CE 49
 
178
-
KS 74
306
-
DF 47
515
-
BF 52
666
-
Op(DF 24)
 
180
-
CE 96
333
-
ET 17
521
-
Op(DC 20)
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
181
-
KS 74
334
-
Op(BD 16)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
185
-
DG 91
336
-
Op(DF 57)
530
-
CE 96
732
-
CE 49
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
Op(AK 79)
535
-
CE 43
758
-
BF 91
 
193
-
Op(DF 58)
358
-
CE 49
536
-
CE 49
759
-
DQ 68
 
194
-
AE 84
382
-
BE 98
558
-
Op(DF 27)
951
-
Op(DF 25)
 
195
-
FE 48
387
-
AN 36
571
-
DS 66
953
-
Op(DF 27)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 460 - 515 - 530 - 569 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 515 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 518 - Lorient;  U 604 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For escort of homeward bound U-boats in the Biscay area and against convoys in CG.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 271 was attacked by "Martin" flying boat in AK 7253 and shot it down after a bombing attack.  No damage to U-boat.
  b)  Aircraft sighted convoy on course of 100 at 2200 in CG 1732.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In BE 9627.
    2) English aircraft frequency reported depth charge attacks in BF 4256, BF 4245, AD 8880 and in 580 15' N unknown longitude.  Messages from our own units have not been received.
    3) U 445 was also sighted by aircraft in CG 50.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Operations on the convoy reported by aircraft are not anticipated.  Boats have received instructions to exploit all available opportunities.
  b) U 510, 572, 590 and 759 are to be aquatinted of the latest
       
- 514 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    experiences and general situation in the coastal area between Trinidad and Cape S. Roqe.
  c) There is no news of the supply groups Bartke and Schliemann.  Fuel replenishment must therefore be going according to plan.
  d) 1) U 650 was forced to surface in BE 9386, owing to empty batteries.  The boat has rudder and gyro trouble and is proceeding temporarily on main motors.
      Aircraft escort is to be provided as soon as possible.
    2) U 388 reported for the last time on weather conditions on 19.6 from AK 36.  The boat was then assigned AJ 6585 as operational area, depth 70 sea miles.  A U-boat was reported by an aircraft on 20.6.  Position 570 35' N and unknown longitude.  Also, according to another Radio Intelligence report, a U-boat on a course of 2500, speed 18 knots was attacked with bombs and depth charges.  U 388 must be the U-boat referred to in the first sighting report, probably identical with report of attack, according to accurate estimation.  In spite of requests the boat has not reported since that day, and its loss, therefore, must be presumed.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 271 - 1 aircraft.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
25.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(CA 90)
U 196
-
KS 74
U 415
-
CE 49
U 590
-
DR 77
 
67
-
Op(DP 10)
197
-
KS 74
420
-
AE 79
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
84
-
CE 49
198
-
KS 74
435
-
Op(DF 62)
600
-
CE 49
 
92
-
BF 55
199
-
Op(FO 80)
449
-
BF 43
603
-
Op(DF 31)
 
119
-
BF 73
200
-
AE 79
455
-
Op(CG 50)
604
-
BF 54
 
126
-
DG 56
211
-
Op(DF 35)
460
-
BF 68
608
-
Op(CD 94)
 
134
-
CE 49
214
-
BF 55
487
-
CF 55
615
-
CE 49
 
135
-
Op(DF 67)
221
-
Op(CD 99)
488
-
CE 49
618
-
DT 77
 
154
-
DG 14
228
-
Op(DF 31)
508
-
ET 45
634
-
CE 49
 
159
-
DF 66
232
-
Op(DF 61)
510
-
EF 87
641
-
Op(CD 98)
 
170
-
CE 27
257
-
CE 49
511
-
JA 63
642
-
Op(DF 56)
 
172
-
EH 74
271
-
Op(AK 72)
513
-
Op(FQ 70)
650
-
BF 73
 
177
-
KS 74
277
-
AN 36
518
-
BF 57
653
-
CE 49
 
178
-
KS 74
306
-
DE 92
521
-
Op(CD 20)
666
-
Op(DF 34)
 
180
-
CF 57
333
-
Op(ET 50)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
667
-
Op(AK 90)
 
181
-
KS 74
334
-
Op(BD 16)
530
-
CF 57
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
185
-
DS 33
336
-
Op(DF 64)
535
-
CE 49
732
-
CE 49
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
Op(AK 79)
536
-
CE 49
758
-
BF 64
 
193
-
Op(DF 65)
358
-
CE 49
558
-
Op(DF 29)
759
-
DO 82
 
194
-
AE 79
382
-
BE 97
571
-
DS 96
951
-
Op(DF 34)
 
195
-
FE 41
387
-
AN 36
572
-
DQ 81
953
-
Op(DF 37)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 460 - 530 - 569 - 650 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 758 - St. Nazaire;  U 460 - Bordeaux.
    Sailed:  - . -
       
- 515 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For homeward bound U-boats in the Biscay area.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 67 fired quadruple miss on the freighter reported yesterday, one Pi 2 torpedo exploded 100 meters from the boat.  The ship was lost in rain squalls at the beginning of defence activity.
    2) U 513 situation report:  The outward routes from Rio de Janeiro run on the line 100 likewise 1700.  2 ships sighted putting in, 2 putting out on 24.6.  One freighter sunk, one freighter torpedoed.  Air activity no surface patrol.
  b) Nothing to report.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In CA 84 and another in an unknown position.
    2) Brazilian aircraft reported the bombing of a U-boat near Cape Frio (U 193).
    3) English units located in BF 8110 and CG 5776.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Continuing dummy wireless traffic, the following boats are occupying these new operational areas in the North Atlantic at a depth of 8 sea miles:  U 271 = AK 1799, U 341 = AK 5289, U 669 = AK 8128, U 592 = BC 3354, U 667 = AK 6957, U 420 = AJ 9452.
    2) After carrying out present refueling operations the following positions are allocated:  U 257 = ET 50, U 615 = EE 40, U 600 = ET 50.  New position for outward bound boat U 382 = CE 4967.  The boat is to replenish fuel supplies from U 488.
    3) U 190 and 66 are to have complete freedom of movement along the entire American coastal area.  The same applies for U 67 after taking on "Metox" from U 572.  This boat is not to receive further fuel supplies.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 513 - 1 ship  5,000 GRT torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 516 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
26.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DP 18)
U 195
-
FD 35
U 382
-
BE 89
U 572
-
DP 96
 
67
-
Op(DP 10)
196
-
KS 74
387
-
AN 36
590
-
DQ 99
 
84
-
CE 49
197
-
KS 74
415
-
CE 49
592
-
Op(BD 29)
 
92
-
BF 52
198
-
KS 74
420
-
AL 21
600
-
CE 49
 
119
-
BF 82
199
-
Op(GB 21)
435
-
Op(DG 17)
603
-
Op(CE 78)
 
126
-
DG 26
200
-
AL 21
449
-
BF 82
604
-
BF 49
 
134
-
CE 49
211
-
Op(DG 11)
455
-
Op(CG 50)
608
-
Op(CE 71)
 
135
-
Op(DG 44)
214
-
BF 52
487
-
CF 51
615
-
CE 49
 
154
-
CE 88
221
-
Op(CE 75)
488
-
CE 49
618
-
EJ 17
 
159
-
DF 91
228
-
Op(CE 77)
508
-
ET 82
634
-
CE 49
 
170
-
CE 49
232
-
Op(DG 17)
510
-
Op(EP 10)
641
-
Op(CE 75)
 
172
-
ER 14
257
-
CE 49
511
-
JB 42
642
-
Op(DF 63)
 
177
-
KS 74
271
-
Op(AK 72)
513
-
Op(GB 19)
650
-
BF 82
 
178
-
KS 74
277
-
AN 36
518
-
BF 48
653
-
CE 49
 
180
-
CF 53
306
-
DE 85
521
-
Op(DC 20)
666
-
Op(DG 11)
 
181
-
KS 74
333
-
Op(ET 50)
527
-
Op(DL 20)
667
-
Op(AK 98)
 
185
-
DS 38
334
-
Op(BD 16)
530
-
CF 35
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
190
-
Op(DG 44)
336
-
Op(DG 41)
535
-
CE 49
732
-
CE 49
 
193
-
Op(DG 44)
341
-
Op(AK 79)
536
-
CE 49
759
-
DO 75
 
194
-
AL 21
358
-
CE 49
558
-
Op(DF 36)
951
-
Op(DG 14)
             
571
-
EJ 14
953
-
Op(DG 17)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 449 - 530 - 650.
  Entered Port:  U 92 - 214 - Brest
  Sailed:  U 662 - 406 - 598 - 270 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In BE 6358, DM 28 and another on 490 10 N, unknown longitude.
    2) Attack and SSS message from American steamer in CA 65.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) The following new disposition must be taken up at 0800 on 27.6 by Group "Trutz", for the interception of the Gibraltar-America convoy expected on 28.6.:  U 608, 228, 558 and 642 in patrol channels from CE 7624 to DG 4281.  U 641, 603, 666, 951, 953, 232, 336 and 135 patrol channels from CE 7669 to DG 4839.  U 211, 435 and 193 in patrol channels from CE 8722 to DG 4682.
      Depth of position 20 sea miles.
       
- 517 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      As the possibility of the enemy either passing the Azores close to the S. or N. must not be overlooked, the boats supplied by U 488 have received orders to extend the center channel at a distance of 25 sea miles from one another, to the N.  This time, the convoy is not expected to make a southerly evasive movement, as several U-boats have transmitted S. of the channel, and also the last convoy was attacked by a U-boat.  All the same, this is pure speculation.  It must again be stressed that the interception of convoys in these enormous areas without our own aerial reconnaissance and also without decyphered intelligence is extremely tricky and more or less a matter of luck.
    2) Boats proceeding to the Caribbean and Brazilian coast receive the following operations areas:  U 759 the area between DM 91, EB 37, DN 83 and EC 29.  Center point Windward Passage.  U 572 the area between ED 71, 87 and EE 43 to the S. as far as the coast, center point round Trinidad.
      U 590 a 250 sea mile wide channel off the Brazilian coast between the longitudes from EP 15 and 26.  In the event of excessive defence activity, the aforementioned boats may withdraw from their operational areas.
    3) Owing to an incorrect decypher, U 306 is in a position in EH 65.  Contrary to the previous intention of assigning this boat to the Caribbean area, it has now been directed to the area around Dakar.
    4) U 66, 521, 190 and 257 are to proceed nearer to the coast in the new moon period.
    5) 1 Naval War Staff proposes the extension of the operations area S. of Rio de Janeiro.  U 513 and 199 therefore have freedom of movement in the grids GA 60 and GB 40 - 60.  A 30 sea mile wide coastal strip S. of GA 29, must not be exceeded on the land side.
    6) As a result of operations by Japanese U-boats U 511 has been directed to proceed via the following points:  KJ 27, LP 58, LP 61 and LE 6630.
  c) 1) Contrary to previous order, U 194 is to lay the first weather buoy in AK 5151.
    2) If numerically possible U 180 is to be escorted by Ju 88 from 8 W.  Destroyer escort is also anticipated.  The boat is carrying Japanese Officers also valuable apparatus and gold.
  d) 1) Boats are again warned to exercise the greatest caution with regard to enemy aircraft and U-boat chaser groups in the North Atlantic.  The latter are especially suspected in AK 20 and 30.
      Further, boats are to proceed with the utmost speed to another area, after transmission of wireless message.
 
 
 
- 518 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Owing to the strained supply situation southward bound boats are duty bound to proceed at economical cruising speed in order to have more freedom of movement in the event of enemy contact.
    3) U 334 reported its position in AK 3681 after passing the Iceland Passage.  A request for a weather report on 18.6, likewise other requests made on following days were not answered.  The boat must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(CA 90)
U 197
-
KS 74
U 420
-
AL 14
U 592
-
Op(BD 27)
 
67
-
Op(DP 40)
198
-
KS 74
435
-
Op(DG 19)
598
-
BF 83
 
84
-
CE 49
199
-
Op(GB 20)
449
-
BF 80
600
-
CE 49
 
119
-
BF 80
200
-
AL 14
455
-
Op(CG 50)
603
-
Op(CE 79)
 
126
-
CE 99
211
-
Op(DG 13)
487
-
CF 49
604
-
BF 71
 
134
-
CE 49
221
-
Op(CE 87)
488
-
CE 49
608
-
Op(CE 76)
 
135
-
Op(DG 48)
228
-
Op(CE 79)
508
-
ET 91
615
-
CE 49
 
154
-
CE 95
232
-
Op(DG 42)
510
-
Op(EP 40)
618
-
EJ 46
 
159
-
DF 84
257
-
CE 49
511
-
JB 26
634
-
CE 49
 
170
-
CE 49
270
-
BF 58
513
-
Op(GB 10)
641
-
Op(CE 76)
 
172
-
ER 44
271
-
Op(AK 46)
518
-
BF 71
642
-
Op(DG 42)
 
177
-
KS 74
277
-
AN 36
521
-
Op(DC 20)
650
-
BF 80
 
178
-
KS 74
306
-
EH 44
527
-
Op(DL 20)
653
-
CE 49
 
180
-
CF 34
333
-
Op(ET 60)
530
-
CF 34
666
-
Op(DG 12)
 
181
-
KS 74
336
-
Op(DG 45)
535
-
CE 49
662
-
BF 58
 
185
-
DS 67
341
-
Op(AK 54)
536
-
CE 49
667
-
Op(AK 93)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
CE 49
558
-
Op(DG 15)
669
-
Op(AK 81)
 
193
-
Op(DG 46)
382
-
CF 23
571
-
EJ 48
732
-
CE 49
 
194
-
AL 14
387
-
AN 36
572
-
DP 94
759
-
DP 98
 
195
-
ES 86
406
-
BF 58
590
-
EF 37
951
-
Op(DG 15)
 
196
-
KS 74
415
-
CE 49
591
-
Op(BD 24)
953
-
Op(DG 18)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 449 - 530 - 650.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 518 was heavily bombed by a "Sunderland" at 1240 in CG 1213 and began the return passage with limited submerging capacity.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  2 boats in BF 4221 and 2 more in the Biscay area without exact position.
    2) Aircraft attack on U-boat in BE 9837 (U 518).
    3) An English aircraft in an unknown position (probably Biscay area, however,) reported dummy attack - torpedoes fired.
       
- 519 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      As more specific details of this attack are lacking, it remains to be seen whether this refers to a new method of U-boat warfare introduced as counter measure to the intensified U-boat Flak defence.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) In order to increase the possibilities of evasion for the boats sending dummy wireless transmissions in the North Atlantic, the operational area for U 669, 667, 420 and 592 are to be increased to a depth of 150 sea miles.
    2) U 508 will be informed of the traffic situation in the Guinea Bay.
  c) Still no reports from supply group U 488 and "Schliemann".
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
28.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(CA 80)
U 197
-
KS 74
U 420
-
AK 2725
U 592
-
Op(BD 1172)
 
67
-
Op(DP 70)
198
-
KS 74
435
-
Op(DG 19)
598
-
BF 81
 
84
-
CE 49
199
-
Op(GB 20)
449
-
BF 80
600
-
CE 49
 
119
-
BF 80
200
-
AL 15
455
-
Op(CG 50)
603
-
Op(CE 79)
 
126
-
CE 72
211
-
Op(DG 13)
487
-
CF 72
604
-
BE 96
 
134
-
CE 49
221
-
Op(CE 87)
488
-
CE 49
608
-
Op(CE 76)
 
135
-
Op(DG 49)
228
-
Op(CE 79)
508
-
Op(EU 74)
615
-
CE 49
 
154
-
CF 72
232
-
Op(DG 42)
510
-
Op(EO 30)
618
-
EJ 84
 
159
-
DF 78
257
-
CE 49
511
-
JB 32
634
-
CE 49
 
170
-
CE 49
270
-
BF 81
513
-
Op(GB 20)
641
-
CE 76
 
172
-
ER 74
271
-
Op(AK 1962)
518
-
BE 9951
642
-
Op(DG 42)
 
177
-
KS 74
277
-
AN 31
521
-
Op(DG 20)
650
-
BF 6776
 
178
-
KS 74
306
-
EJ 46
527
-
Op(DL 20)
653
-
CE 49
 
180
-
BE 97
333
-
Op(ET 60)
530
-
BE 97
662
-
BF 81
 
181
-
KS 74
336
-
Op(DG 45)
535
-
CE 49
666
-
Op(DG 12)
 
185
-
DS 89
341
-
Op(AK 55)
536
-
CE 49
667
-
Op(AK 69)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
CE 49
558
-
Op(DG 15)
669
-
Op(AK 8152)
 
193
-
Op(DG 46)
382
-
CF 24
571
-
EJ 76
732
-
CE 49
 
194
-
AK 34
387
-
AN 31
572
-
DP 88
759
-
DP 45
 
195
-
ES 54
406
-
BF 81
590
-
EF 59
951
-
Op(DG 15)
 
196
-
KS 74
415
-
CE 49
591
-
BF 81
953
-
Op(DG 18)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 119 - 126 - 154 - 180 - 195 - 449 - 530 - 650.
  Entered Port:  U 650 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 160 - 462 - Bordeaux.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Escort for outward-bound boats.
       
- 520 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 172 sank British ship "Cornish City" of 4952 GRT, southerly course, carrying coal to Bahia in FD 7458.
  b)  Nothing of interest.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In AJ 9755 and another in an unknown position.
    2) U-boat attack in EV 7520 (U 508 ?).  Report of torpedo attack from unidentified merchant ship in GB 1587.
    3) According to an agent's report, several steamers sailing in ballast may be expected to leave Freetown for Pernambuco, between 29 and 30.6.  The boats have been instructed accordingly.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  The expected Gibraltar-America convoy was to have reached the channels occupied by Group "Trutz" early on the 28.6.  Presumed convoy speed 8.3 knots.  As up to 2400 no contact had been reported, the Group received orders to proceed in reconnaissance lines on a course of 2700, speed 8 knots at 0000 on 29.6, and to take up a patrol line in the position reached at 0900.
     Four of the boats supplied by U 488 have extended the center line to the N. by 25 sea miles each.  The group is to remain stationary until after sunset and if the convoy is not then found it is to proceed to the E. and take up a stationary disposition W. of Portugal.
  b) 1) U 604 is to occupy the grid CG 14,15, 17 and 18 as temporary operations area.  U 270, 662, 598, 591 and 406 are making for CG 17.  A stationary disposition against north/south bound convoy traffic is intended somewhere in this area.  Boats are to remain unobserved if possible.
    2) U 618 receives the same operational area as U 333 - the Freetown sector, 45 to 1350.
    3) U 571 occupies the area between EU 49, 92, FF 14 and 37.
    4) U 185 operates in the area between the Brazilian coast and a line from FB 57 via FB 24, FC 42, 88, FK 45, FJ 99 to 79.  All these boats will be instructed on the current traffic situation.
  c)  U 535, 170 and 536 have surrendered their fuel via U 488 to the following boats:  U 84, 653, 358, 732, 134, 615, 415 and 600.  U 257 and 634 are still with the tanker - their supply should take place on 29.6.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 172 - 1 ship  4,952 GRT.
       
- 521 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
29.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(CA 80)
U 196
-
KS 74
U 415
-
CE 48
U 590
-
EF 85
 
67
-
Op(DP 87)
197
-
KS 74
420
-
AK 01
591
-
BF 75
 
84
-
DF 16
198
-
KS 74
435
-
Op(DG 18)
592
-
Op(BD 11)
 
119
-
BF 80
199
-
Op(GB 20)
449
-
BF 80
598
-
BF 75
 
126
-
CF 72
200
-
AK 38
455
-
Op(CG 50)
600
-
CE 72
 
134
-
CE 75
211
-
Op(DG 12)
462
-
BF 91
603
-
Op(CE 79)
 
135
-
Op(DG 47)
221
-
Op(CE 79)
487
-
CF 72
604
-
Op(CG 14)
 
154
-
CF 72
228
-
Op(CE 78)
488
-
CE 49
608
-
Op(CE 75)
 
159
-
DQ 31
232
-
Op(DG 41)
508
-
Op(EU 80)
615
-
CE 72
 
160
-
BF 91
257
-
CE 49
510
-
Op(EO 30)
618
-
ES 31
 
170
-
CE 49
270
-
BF 75
511
-
KS 78
634
-
CE 49
 
172
-
FD 78
271
-
Op(AK 17)
513
-
Op(GB 20)
641
-
Op(CE 75)
 
177
-
KS 74
277
-
AN 24
518
-
BF 75
642
-
Op(DG 41)
 
178
-
KS 74
306
-
EJ 58
521
-
Op(DG 20)
653
-
DF 58
 
180
-
BE 96
333
-
Op(ET 60)
527
-
Op(DL 37)
662
-
BF 75
 
181
-
KS 74
336
-
Op(DG 44)
530
-
BE 96
666
-
Op(DG 11)
 
185
-
EH 25
341
-
Op(AK 55)
535
-
CE 49
667
-
Op(AK 69)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
DG 67
536
-
CE 49
669
-
Op(AK 81)
 
193
-
Op(DG 45)
382
-
CF 18
558
-
Op(DG 14)
732
-
CE 49
 
194
-
AK 37
387
-
AN 24
571
-
ES 22
759
-
DO 68
 
195
-
ES 16
406
-
BF 75
572
-
DP 87
951
-
Op(DG 14)
                   
953
-
Op(DG 17)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 119 - 154 - 170 - 180 - 195 - 126 - 449 - 518 - 530 - 535 - 536.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 386 - 359 - St. Nazaire;  U 307 - 713 - Kiel;  U 466 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For outward bound U-boat groups.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 159 sighted heavy warship unit without escort, course 2700, speed 20 knots in DQ 1222.  The boat's attack came to nothing owing to gunfire.
    2) U 154 fired a double miss on ship of type "Mariposa" course 2950, speed 20 knots, in CF 4391.  Boat started return passage with U 126.
    3) U 180 reported:  Aircraft attacked at high altitude.
  b)  Nothing of interest.
  c) U-boat sightings:  4 different reports from undecyphered positions, probably Biscay area however, including a report of an attack.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) The expected westbound convoy was not intercepted by Group "Trutz".  Taking the known date of sailing and a speed of 8.3 knots into account, the convoy must have already passed or by-passed the channel.
       
- 522 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) Group "Trutz" patrol channel was disbanded after sunset.
      U 221 and 558 are to operate in the area between Lisbon and Gibraltar and are proceeding to CG 58 for this purpose.
      U 193 and 135 are proceeding to DH 89 in order to attack the north/south bound traffic in this area.
      Apart from U 666 which is forced to return owing to fuel shortage, the "Trutz" boats are proceeding at economical cruising speed to the E.  It is intended to subdivide them into groups to comb the area W. of Gibraltar and the Portuguese coast.  Later if fuel supplies are adequate a stationary disposition will be formed in approximately the northern third of CG.
      Freshly supplied boats, temporarily allocated to Group "Trutz" are released and proceed to their ordered positions.  The last course order for U 604, 598, 406, 662, 591, 382 and 487 is cancelled.  Boats are to proceed to DF 60 for fuel replenishment.  Later operations in the Caribbean, likewise off Freetown is intended.
  c) 1) U 178, 198, 181, 196, 197 and 177 have increased their supplies to about 420 - 440 cubic meters from the tanker "Schliemann", and taken the appropriate provisions on board.  The boats are to occupy the operational areas ordered on 23.6.
    2) U 536, 190 and 535 have assembled in CF 3546 for a concerted return passage.
    3) U 180 and 530 were picked up at 0600 on 1.7. in BF 4643 by destroyers and escorted to Bordeaux.
  d) U 119 and 449 were returning together via the Biscay area.  The last certain position was BE 9256, dated 23.6.  Since that date there have been no messages.  On 25.6. there was particularly heavy English air activity, and an English unit was located in BF 8110.  It is impossible to say whether this ties up with the destruction of the boats.  It may have referred to an English U-boat which scored 2 lucky hits with a quadruple spread.  The boats have not reported again.  U 119 and 449 must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 523 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
30.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(CA 80)
U 198
-
KS 74
U 415
-
CE 71
U 591
-
BE 96
 
67
-
Op(DP 80)
199
-
Op(GB 20)
420
-
AK 42
592
-
Op(BC 33)
 
84
-
DE 63
200
-
AK 65
435
-
Op(DG 19)
598
-
CG 14
 
126
-
CF 49
211
-
Op(DG 13)
455
-
Op(CG 50)
600
-
CE 76
 
134
-
CE 74
221
-
Op(CE 84)
462
-
BF 82
603
-
Op(CE 79)
 
135
-
Op(DG 48)
228
-
Op(CE 79)
466
-
BF 91
604
-
Op(CG 10)
 
154
-
CF 25
232
-
Op(DG 42)
487
-
CE 96
608
-
Op(CE 76)
 
159
-
DP 36
257
-
CE 49
488
-
CE 49
615
-
CE 75
 
160
-
BF 82
270
-
BF 74
508
-
Op(EU 80)
618
-
ET 14
 
170
-
CE 36
271
-
Op(AK 17)
510
-
Op(EO 30)
634
-
CE 49
 
172
-
FK 29
277
-
AN 24
511
-
KS 58
641
-
Op(CE 76)
 
177
-
KS 74
306
-
Op(EJ 60)
513
-
Op(GB 20)
642
-
Op(DG 42)
 
178
-
KS 74
307
-
AO 47
518
-
BF 76
653
-
DF 84
 
180
-
BF 75
333
-
Op(ET 60)
521
-
Op(DG 20)
662
-
CG 14
 
181
-
KS 74
336
-
Op(DG 45)
527
-
Op(DL 60)
666
-
Op(DG 12)
 
185
-
EH 57
341
-
Op(AK 52)
530
-
BF 75
667
-
Op(AK 69)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
DG 98
535
-
CE 36
669
-
Op(AK 81)
 
193
-
Op(DG 49)
359
-
BF 91
536
-
CE 36
713
-
AO 47
 
194
-
AK 29
382
-
CE 61
558
-
Op(DG 15)
732
-
DF 18
 
195
-
EJ 77
386
-
BF 91
571
-
ES 38
759
-
DO 82
 
196
-
KS 73
387
-
AN 24
572
-
EE 13
951
-
Op(DG 15)
 
197
-
KS 74
406
-
CG 15
590
-
Op(EP 20)
953
-
Op(DG 18)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 119 - 126 - 154 - 170 - 180 - 195 - 270 - 449 - 518 - 530 - 535 - 536.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 188 - 155 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For in and outward bound boats.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 180 was attacked by carrier borne aircraft in BF 7564.  The boat reported strong air escort.  It is to be picked up by our destroyers in BF 7643 and escorted to Bordeaux.
  b)  Nothing to report.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  In BF 7386 and another in an undecyphered position.
    2) Aircraft of 19 Group reported two different depth charge attacks on U-boats.  Hits possible.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Former "Trutz" boats, now proceeding to the E. have received the following orders:
     
1) U 608, 603, 641, 228 form Group "Geier I"
  U 211, 951, 953, 435 form Group "Geier II"
  U 232, 642, 336 form Group "Geier III".
       
- 524 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
2) Groups are to form reconnaissance channels in the order given beginning from the N. distance apart 40 sea miles, diagonal to the direction of advance.  The centerline of the channel is via the following grids:
  "Geier I" CE 9571, CF 7553, 8278, 9126, 6813, CG 4514.
  "Geier II" DG 3424, 3396, CF 8887, 9716, 9611, CG 4789, 4527.
  "Geier III" same way as "Geier II"
3) The groups pass the first position of their ordered routes as follows:
  "Geier I" CE 9571 on 2.7 at 0800
  "Geier II" DG 3424 on 3.7 at 0800
  "Geier III" DG 3424 on 4.7. at 0800
  The next positions always one day later.
  After reaching the last position the boats disperse fanwise and occupy the following grids as operational areas:
  U 608 = CF 33, 641 = CG 11, 603 = CG 12, 228 = CG 13, with depth of 50 sea miles
  U 211 = CF 3566, 951 = CG 1444, 953 = CG 1544, 435 = CG 1644, 232 = CG 17, 642 = CG 18, 636 = CG 19.
4) Punctual and exact maintenance of position is not strictly necessary.  Merely reinforcements.
5) The reason for the concerted passage in groups and the later disposition is warfare against convoy traffic encountered if necessary, fluid convoy operations are not however, intended.
    2) U 511 received freedom of action.  Attacks are forbidden, however, S. of the communicating line from KS 33 to LQ 58, owing to Eastbound tanker "Schliemann".
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 521 reported its position for the last time from BE 67 on 13.5.  It had received orders to operate off the American coast and was requested to send a situation and position report for the first time on 5.6.  As, when operating off the coast the boats often do not report for a long time, and in this case the Commander is experienced, U 521 was not again requested to send a report until 21.6.  The boat has not yet replied, and its loss must be presumed.  It is not known whether this was the result of aircraft activity.
    2) U 194 and 200 were proceeding with U 420 through the Iceland Passage.  The group dispersed in AE 8783 on 21.6 after warning of destroyers.
 
 
 
- 525 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      While U 420 sent its passage report on 1.7. this was lacking from the other boats, and in spite of numerous requests there was no reply.  It is possible that the boats were destroyed by escort forces called up.  In this case though, U 420 should have heard depth charge explosions.  There is no information on the loss which must be presumed.
      Coastal forces of the Brandenburg Division were on board U 200.
    3) U 188 is the first Monsoon boat to put out.  See Monsoon Appendix.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    Because of the loss of U 194 and 200 and previous experiences, C-in-C has ordered, to have immediate effect, that no boat is to put out without quadruple mounted guns.  A temporary postponement of operational orders for 3 to 4 weeks and a hold up in German shipyards must be taken into account.
  The intention of sending several boats through the Channel, i.e. under strong escort at night and lying on the bottom during the day, is postponed for the time being as:
  1) The prevailing moon quarter is unsuitable for such an undertaking.
  2)  The necessary forces are not available for the escort groups at such short notice.  Further, the first attempt should not be made with a IXd2 (U 847).  The first breakthrough will probably take place during the next new moon period.
  3) C-in-C has also ordered that the 4 boats, U 387, 277, 307 and 713 at present outward bound in the North Sea are to be temporarily placed at the disposal of S.O. U-boats Norway.  S.O. U-boats Norway is planning the execution of several minelaying operations in the Kara Sea.
       
       
                                                                                 (Signed):  GODT
                                                                    Chief of Operations Department
                                                                                       for B.d.U.
       
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 526 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
C-in-C German Navy
2. Sk1./B.d.U. Op.
Nr.      Ckdos.  3495      A1
10.June 1943.
 
Operational Order "Monsoon"
for
       
  U 188, U 532, U 168, U 509, U 183, U 514, U 506, U 533, U 516 and for U 200 and U 847.  
     
  (Only the general regulations apply for the latter boats)  
       
I. Duties:
  1) Blitz attack on enemy merchant shipping and enemy surface forces in the Arabian Sea area.
    Time:  Termination of South West Monsoon.
  2) On the outward and return passage roughly according to the general directions in Operational Order Atlantic No. 54.
  3) Procedure according to Commander's Hand Book, Standing War Orders, Standing Orders and General instructions Operational Order No. 54.
       
II. Intelligence of the Enemy:
  4) See appendix 1.
       
III. Intelligence of our own surface forces:
  5) Warships.
    The appearance of our own warships (also auxiliary cruisers) is not to be expected in the entire outward passage and operational area.  Japanese surface forces and U-boats may be encountered.  Appropriate statements on this matter, however, will be made by wireless when necessary.
  6) Store and supply ship's blockade runners.
    See Instructions Operational Order No. 54 paragraph 12 and Appendix 1.  Supply is planned from German supply ships putting out from Japan.  Announcement by W/T.
       
IV. Execution:
  A) General Scheme.
  7) The boat must be equipped with special care with regard to the heavy long term strain to be imposed upon it.  Spare parts, machine equipment are to be carried in adequate supply, a cabin on the upper deck is to be set aside as store room.
    Maximum supply of provisions must be provided.
  8) The boats are to sail in the period from 25th June to 4th July.  They are to make for FD 20 at economical cruising speed.  The first fuel replenishment will take place here.  Supply boat U 462.  Enemy air reconnaissance must be expected in this area within a 300 sea mile circumference of Ascension Island.
 
 
 
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  9)  Progress is to be made on the shortest routes but with adequate distance )about 300 to 400 sea miles from the South African coast outside the enemy short range aircraft area, to KS 50.  Here, the second replenishment of supplies is to take place from German merchant ships sailing from Japan.  For details of supply and procedure at the supply point see paragraph 16 and 20.
  10) After replenishment of supplies, boats will proceed to the operational areas allocated to them.  Central points MP 60, MF 30, MH 70 and LC 30.
    Boats must expect to be in their respective operations areas for about one month.  Course for operations, change of operations area will be sent by W/T.
  11)  After exhaustion of supplies etc., and on instructions to return, via new supply point in KS or KT.  Replenishment from German ship, then return passage to Lorient.
  12) Measures to be adopted in the event of nonappearance by German Supply Ships.
    On nonappearance of ship for second replenishment (according to paragraph 9) according to situation:
    a) Occupation of Cape area as operations area, subsequent return passage with further supply by U-boat tanker or
    b) Passage to Penang, refuel and short rest, operations in Arabian Sea, refuel on the return passage.
      (Directions for approach to Penang, see Appendix 3)
  13) On the nonappearance of the supply ship for 3rd replenishment (see paragraph 11) passage to Penang.  Mutual assistance with fuel.  There refuel for return passage.  Small number of torpedoes available.
  Further Plans.
  14)  Some boats will be allowed to undergo short overhaul and supply (also with torpedoes) according to the need of boat and personnel.  Further operations in India area subsequent return passage.
  B) Permission to attack and general procedure.
  15)  On the outward passage up to 200 sea miles off the supply point in KS 50:  Wireless discipline according to Signals Directive Operations Order No. 54.  Permissions to attack according to general directive of Operations Order Atlantic No. 54 and Standing War Orders No. 101 and 105.  Exploit every chance to the utmost also convoys.  In the case of north bound convoys in the Atlantic orders for the breaking off of operations will be given by the Command.
  16) Within a 200 sea miles circumference of the supply area in KS and KT.  Wireless and attack ban.  Remember that surface craft are considerably more vulnerable than U-boat tankers.  Boats are free to attack if the supply ship is in danger or if the latter has been sighted by an enemy merchant ship.
 
 
 
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  17)  The 100% success of this undertaking can only be assured if the boats attacks are carried out swiftly and unexpectedly at the focal points, in a time limit determined by keyword order.
    In addition, on passage to Operations area in Arabian Sea:
    (After replenishment of supplies in KS 50)
    a) Until arrival in operations area definitely remain unseen and unlocated.
    b) Strict wireless silence.
      Only transmit if it is confirmed with certainty that the boat is observed and recognized as German by the enemy.  Even in this case, the Commander must question whether according to circumstance (the course on which the sighting took place, the certainty of recognition etc) the enemy's reaction can be anticipated in which case the breaking of wireless silence is justified and correct.
    c) General ban on attacks on merchant ships and war-ships until keyword is given.  Attack is only allowed on:
      Battleships
      A/c carriers
      Troop transport ships of more than 15,000 GRT.
      if a hit is certain
  18) a) In operations area:  Permission to attack on the key-word order "Hinein" with appropriate number which gives the date of the attack when divided by 7.  Start of attack 1800 German Summer Time.  Example:  Hinein 196 means:  Permission to attack at 1800 German Summer Time on 28th.
    b) As long as the traffic and defence situation is clarified and the boat has been observed by the enemy, send situation report.  Clear reports, so that, if necessary, the Command can redistribute the operational areas.
    c) Sensible use of torpedoes.  Economical considered use of torpedoes in busy traffic.  If there is not much traffic do not economize, fire fans.  Fully exploit the effectiveness of magnetic firing torpedoes especially for finishing shots.  Do not over rate the enemy defence.  It has never been used against U-boats and is therefore inexperienced and inferior.
  C) Supply.
  19)  First supply in FD 20 from U 462.  Replenishment with fuel, taking on of provisions for 3 to 4 weeks.
  20)  Second and third supply from German tanker "Brake".  Special recognition signal for merchant ships to be met in ES, will be ordered by W/T.
 
 
 
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     Full replenishment of fuel supplies from "Brake".  Suitable U-boat provisions are apparently not available in adequate supply there, so that if necessary provisioning will have to take place from U-boat tankers on the return passage.
       
V. Communications Instructions:
    See appendix 2.  (T.N. page 541)
       
VI. Miscellaneous:
    There will be a doctor on every boat.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
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C-in-C German Navy
bt.Sk1./FL B.Nr. 2078/43gKds
Berlin 4.June 1943.
 
Enemy Situation in the Indian Ocean
1.6. 1943.
       
I. Distribution of Naval Forces.
II. Naval and Air Bases.
III. Surface and Air Patrol.
IV. Merchant shipping Traffic and shipping routes with chart (Appendix 5).
V Harbor approaches with charts (Appendix 1 - 4)
       
Appendices:  5 charts
Special distribution list.
       
I. Distribution of Naval Forces:
  On the grounds of wireless search intelligence since 1942, Japanese reports and unconfirmed agents reports, the following are in the Indian Ocean including the Cape area:
  a) English Naval Forces.
   
6 battleships: Warspite, Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge, Royal Sovereign, Valiant (one or two of which are presumed to be undergoing repairs (USA?))
1 aircraft carrier: Illustrious
9 light cruisers (Indian Ocean): Birmingham, Caradoc, Colombo, Danae, Dauntless, Frobisher, Cambia, Hawkins, Martitius.
5 light cruisers (Cape Area): Cape Town, Ceres, Durban, Emerald, Newcastle
2nd and 7th Destroyer Flotilla: about 25 - 30 destroyers
U-boats: No information
Auxiliary vessels: 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers
  about 10 auxiliary cruisers
  1 aircraft transport ship
  1 aircraft and U-boat depot ship (each)
  at least 24 corvettes, mine sweepers and small units.
  b) American Naval Forces:
   
1 heavy cruiser: Portland
2 light cruisers: Cincinnati, Detroit
Destroyers: At least 7.
  c) Indian Navy:
    9 gun boats
    16 corvettes and minesweepers.
    There is no reliable information of the present distribution and activity of the Naval forces.
    It is presumed that the heavy units are for the most part based in Ceylon (Trincomali) and that their field of action lies mainly in the areas E. and S. of Ceylon.  In the past,
 
 
 
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     battleships have appeared in the western Indian Ocean among the long range escort of WS convoys.  This is still possible today with important transport ships, especially in the transfer of troops, also in India - Red Sea traffic.
     Cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels are presumably distributed in the various main bases and operate in patrols and convoy service.
     With regard to the proportion of orders issued, it is evident from wireless traffic that the English are in command of the Indian Ocean and that this is not shared by the Americans.  Three Command stations are known:
    a) Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet (Vice Admiral Sir J.F. Someryille), under him the S.O. Destroyers Eastern Fleet.
    b) Royal Indian Navy (Vice Admiral J.H. Godfrey)
    c) F.O.I.C. Ceylon (Vice Admiral Sir G. Layton)
       
II. Naval and Air bases:
  a) Naval bases 1st Class.
      Durban
      Diego Suarez
      Trincomali
    Naval bases 2nd Class.
      Mombassa
      Aden
      Karachi
      Bombay
  b) Air bases:
     No information of air bases outside the area of naval bases which are also air bases.
       
III. Surface and air patrol:
  a) Surface patrol.
     Apart from the presumed activity of naval forces mentioned in paragraph I medium escort activity is to be expected off the main harbors.  In the case of harbors with especially swept approach channels (see paragraph V) it must be assumed that there is daily routine minesweeping activity to the extreme end of the entrance channels.
  b) Air patrol.
    Routine air patrol must be expected up to about 100 sea miles from the coast, in the entire coastal approached to Aden, Persian Gulf to Ceylon.
 
 
 
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    Formation and strength of air escort in Indian Ocean are not known in detail.
    The great USA-India Air Transport line runs from Khartoum via Aden to Salata (Arabia) then to Karachi.
       
IV. Merchant shipping traffic and shipping routes:
  A) General Traffic situation.
    1) Apparent in shipping traffic in the Indian Ocean:
     
a) Troop transport vessels and freighter tonnage engaged in ocean going service - in passage between England and U.S.A. - at present still Cape area and Indian area.  (Stopping in Indian area only in the case of through traffic):
          Troop transport vessel tonnage - no information possible.
          Freighter tonnage about 700,000 GRT monthly.
b) Freighter and tanker tonnage in Empire service sailing between East African, Near and Middle Eastern ports, likewise India (operating permanently in India area).
          Freighter tonnage about 750,000 GRT monthly.
          Tanker tonnage about 470,000 GRT monthly.
  Troop transport ships appear mainly in convoys from and to the Pacific and Atlantic.  They also probably take over troop transport duties within the Indian area and are encountered on the routes Karachi - Bombay - Colombo to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.  It is not possible to obtain a clear picture of the freighter and tanker tonnage set up except in the case of ocean-going service and tanker tonnage in Empire service.
  Except for the general statement that the greater part of the freighter tonnage engaged in Empire service operates as Indian coastal traffic, and would, therefore, be most likely encountered off the ports of Karachi, Bombay and Calcutta - lack of confirmation prevents a more detailed survey.
    2) Monthly traffic strength in the main passage areas.
      (estimate)
      To be met with in both directions per month.
      (from a favorite point on the former routes)
 
 
 
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Routes
Freighters
Tankers
Remarks
1) Cape - Red Sea
|
Approx. 50
|
-
|
 
2) Cape - Persian Gulf
|
    "      30
|
Approx. 5
|
Tankers not W. of
3) Cape - Indian (Karachi, Bombay,
|
"      15
|
-
|
Port Elizabeth
  Colombo, Calcutta)
|
 
|
 
|
 
4) Cape - Australia
|
"      10
|
-
|
 
5) Persian Gulf - Red Sea
)
|
Approx. 25
|
At present via Durban
6) Persian Gulf - India/Australia
)
|
"      55
|
 
7) Persian Gulf - Karachi, Bombay,
)
about 150
|
-
|
 
  Ceylon inclusive
)
ships on
|
|
 
8) Bombay - Red Sea
)
Empire
|
-
|
 
9) Colombo - Red Sea
)
service
|
-
|
 
10) Bombay - East Africa
)
 
|
-
|
 
11) Colombo - East Africa
)
|
-
|
 
       
    3 Estimated monthly traffic on the main junctions.
      The following amount of traffic at the main junctions per month is conjectured according to the traffic strength on individual routes (both ways).
       
   
 
Area
Freighters
Tankers
Total
Remarks
1) Area Cape Guardafui |
Approx. 80
|
Approx. 25
|
Approx 105
) Plus smaller
  Socotra-S. Coast of Arabia |
|
|
) part of Empire
2) Gulf of Aden |
"      50
|
"      25
|
"      75
) service.
3) Gulf of Oman |
"      30
|
"      80
|
"    110
)  
4) Karachi )
|
"      10
|
   
5) Bombay )
larger part of
|
"      10
|
   
6) Colombo )
Empire service
|
"      20
|
   
7) Calcutta )
|
"      15
|
   
       
      With the introduction of direct England/USA-Indian area traffic these facts alter in favor of the Red Sea and to the detriment of the Cape traffic.  The proportion of the alteration depends on the extent of shipping traffic withdrawn from the Cape route and directed through the Mediterranean.  (Maximum about half the amount of Cape traffic).
      Direct traffic through the Mediterranean not yet started but must be expected shortly.  The process of deflecting traffic into the Mediterranean route will take about 2 to 3 months to complete.
  B) Convoy Traffic:
     The main part of shipping traffic including that in the Atlantic and Pacific, consists of isolated vessels.  Generally speaking only particularly valuable troop and war material convoys sail with convoy protection.
     Between Cape Town and Durban (presumably as far as Lourenco Marques) escorted coastal traffic has recently appeared.
 
 
 
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