F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 June 1943

PG30325

     
     
 
1.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 197
-
GH 49
U 409
-
CG 81
U 569
-
Op(DF 15)
 
67
-
DD 93
198
-
Op(KQ 77)
413
-
BE 42
575
-
AK 88
 
91
-
BE 43
199
-
CE 46
418
-
BF 45
592
-
BF 72
 
92
-
Op(CD 46)
202
-
Op(AK 41)
435
-
Op(CD 73)
594
-
CF 63
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
211
-
Op(DF 18)
436
-
BF 40
603
-
Op(DF 12)
 
118
-
CF 55
214
-
DH 17
440
-
CF 33
607
-
BF 40
 
119
-
Op(BB 70)
217
-
Op(DF 42)
450
-
AN 23
608
-
Op(DF 18)
 
123
-
CF 82
218
-
BF 51
455
-
BF 82
621
-
BF 45
 
126
-
Op(ET 60)
221
-
Op(CD 79)
459
-
BF 73
636
-
AK 01
 
154
-
Op(FC 70)
228
-
Op(DF 12)
460
-
EH 99
641
-
Op(DF 15)
 
161
-
BE 74
229
-
BE 74
488
-
AK 92
642
-
Op(CD 79)
 
170
-
AN 23
232
-
Op(CD 76)
511
-
FL 68
645
-
Op(BD 19)
 
172
-
BF 48
264
-
BF 61
513
-
EH 38
650
-
Op(AJ 29)
 
177
-
Op(JJ 20)
271
-
AN 31
515
-
Op(EU 70)
664
-
BE 18
 
178
-
Op(KY 65)
304
-
Op(AK 46)
521
-
Op(CA-DC)
666
-
Op(CD 73)
 
180
-
GG 14
305
-
BF 52
527
-
DO 21
667
-
AE 79
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
308
-
AN 31
530
-
BF 47
669
-
AN 23
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
336
-
Op(CD 76)
535
-
AF 47
731
-
Op(AK 72)
 
193
-
AK 61
341
-
AF 47
552
-
BE 46
758
-
CF 39
 
195
-
JJ 16
377
-
BE 46
558
-
Op(CD 49)
951
-
Op(CD 49)
 
196
-
Op(KZ 20)
378
-
BF 48
564
-
BF 91
953
-
Op(CD 49)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 161 - 180 - 218 - 229 - 264 - 305 - 575 - 377 - 378 - 413 - 418 - 436 - 459 - 552 - 607 - 621 - 636 - 664.
  Entered Port:  U 305 - Brest;  U 264 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 449 - 536 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Search for crew of U 563.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 515 reported a convoy consisting of several 2-funnelled ships and one large tanker in ET 6621, course 290, speed 16 knots.Boat was heavily depth-charged.  
  b)  23 Ju 88's carried out a search without result.  Sea was force 5.  Nothing was seen of the crew.  In air battles the Ju's shot down 4 English aircraft, including 2 Wellington bombers and one large carrier aircraft (Douglas).
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DN 87, FJ 89 and 5 further sightings, 4 in the Gibraltar area and one in the Freetown area.
    2) The Norwegian tanker "Montana", 10,170 GRT, was reported on fire off Cape Fear.  The ship was to be beached there if possible (attack by U 66 ?).
  d) English aircraft reported a depth-charge attack on a U-boat in BE 6543 at 1025/30/5.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) GUS 7a passed Gibraltar on 23.5 and should therefore reach the "Trutz" patrol line on 2 June.  Although originally an operation against an E-bound convoy was intended the boats have been ordered to operate against GUS 7a if they sight it, as there is no information as to the date of sailing or position of the expected
       
- 458 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     W-bound convoy.
    Group "Trutz's" patrol line has been transferred 90 miles to the S. and is now in position from CD 7927 to DF 4581.  This covers all E-W convoy courses at present known.
  c) 1) U 197, 177, 181, 178, 198 and 106 are to supply with about 250 cbm each from 20.6.
    2) U 552 and 413 are proceeding in company to CF 23.  There U 455 will deliver fuel and machine gun parts to U 552.
  d)  U 409 was observed in CG 9472 during her passage through the Straits of Gibraltar.  She was ordered to move away to the W and attempt to break through again after about 48 hours.  The same goes for U 594.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 197
-
GH 85
U 418
-
BF 40
U 569
-
Op(DF 42)
 
67
-
DD 86
198
-
Op(JA 10)
435
-
Op(CD 76)
575
-
BD 23
 
91
-
BE 41
199
-
CE 76
436
-
BF 40
592
-
BE 96
 
92
-
Op(CD 73)
202
-
Op(AJ 63)
440
-
CF 30
594
-
CG 48
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
211
-
Op(DF 45)
449
-
AO
603
-
Op(DF 15)
 
118
-
CF 50
214
-
DH 48
450
-
AF 76
607
-
BF 64
 
119
-
Op(BB 70)
217
-
Op(DF 45)
455
-
BF 73
608
-
Op(DF 42)
 
123
-
CF 56
218
-
BF 52
459
-
BF 82
621
-
BF 54
 
126
-
Op(ET 60)
221
-
Op(DF 12)
460
-
EH 67
636
-
AK 33
 
154
-
Op(FB 60)
228
-
Op(DF 18)
488
-
BD 58
641
-
Op(DF 18)
 
161
-
BE 73
229
-
BF 73
511
-
FM 74
642
-
Op(DF 12)
 
170
-
AF 76
232
-
Op(DF 12)
513
-
EH 67
645
-
Op(BD 18)
 
172
-
BE 93
271
-
AN 23
515
-
Op(EU 70)
650
-
Op(AJ 29)
 
177
-
Op(GR 50)
304
-
Op(AK 46)
521
-
Op(CA-DC)
664
-
BE 41
 
178
-
Op(KY 60)
308
-
AN 23
527
-
DO 11
666
-
AL 23
 
180
-
FU 85
336
-
Op(CD 79)
530
-
BE 93
667
-
AL 21
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
341
-
AE 68
535
-
AE 68
669
-
AF 76
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
377
-
BE 55
536
-
AO
731
-
AK 85
 
193
-
AK 82
378
-
BF 49
552
-
BE 73
758
-
CF 65
 
195
-
GZ 33
409
-
CG 85
558
-
Op(CD 73)
951
-
Op(CD 76)
 
196
-
Op(KZ 20)
413
-
BE 73
564
-
BF 83
953
-
Op(CD 76)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 161 - 180 - 218 - 229 - 377 - 378 - 413 - 418 - 436 - 459 - 552 - 575 - 607 - 621 - 636 - 664 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 218 - Brest;  U 607 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 572 - 333 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 667 beat off an attack by a Lockheed Hudson on 26.5. in AF 4915 and scored several hits on a Catalina on 29.5. in AE 6714 during an 80 minute action.  No damage.  No radar observed in either attack.  2 small sailing vessels observed on patrol in the Iceland Passage and 2 destroyers with deterrent D/c's.
       
- 459 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 126 sank a tanker of 11,000 GRT in a convoy course 1200, 8 knots in ET 6246.  Afterwards well-placed gunfire and depth-charges.
    3) U 195 situation:  nothing sighted in KZ 7558 - 24 - 16 - 15 - 19.  Horizontal Radar location in KZ 1630, presumably aircraft.  Return passage.
    4) U 178 attacked the convoy, which she had already reported, on 1 June in KP 8779 and scored 2 hits.  Boiler explosion probable.  Effect not observed owing to heavy seas, as accurate depth keeping impossible.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DC 11, FB 51 and 2 unidentified positions.
    2) A U-boat attacked or was attacked in CA 82.  Dangerous wrecks were reported in CA 3715 and CA 7364.
    3) According to a radio broadcast the U.S.A. tanker "Florian" was beached, in order to avoid attack by a U-boat.  ( 128 ?)
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) No sighting of a convoy so far in Group "Trutz's" patrol line.
  b) 1) New approach points:  U 667 : AK 75, U 513 : FJ 80 after refueling, U 197 : KQ 10, making long legs and free to penetrate close inshore.
    2) U 154's attack area has been extended to the north as far as the latitude of EP 70.  Boat has been informed of SE-NW-bound convoy traffic with untrained escort in EP 40 S.W. half.
    3) As her METOX set is out of order, U 67 has been allocated the sea area between the lines joining DD 7795 - 8125 - DP 5645 - 7655.  Boats have several times attacked and sunk NW and SE-bound independent ships here.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 126 - 1 ship  11,000 GRT
    U 178 - 1 ship    5,000 GRT
 
 
 
- 460 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
VI. General:
  Resumption of convoy operations in the North Atlantic:
  When the main operations area was transferred from the North Atlantic it was intended to resume convoy operations there in the near future.
    The next possible period would be the new moon period about 2.7.  This means that boats sailing on and after 9.6. would have to go into the N. Atlantic and the matter therefore has to be decided now.
    Conditions have hardly changed since the center of operations was transferred.  The situation at the beginning of July will only be more favorable insofar as more boats with increased Flak armament will be available and some boats will be equipped with the radar decoy device "Aphrodite" (Tactical instructions for "Aphrodite" see Appendix).
    On the other hand the coming new moon period is the least favorable in the whole year.  There are only about 3 hours of complete darkness at 550 N and there is no darkness at all at 600 N.  Is is in the latter area that the operation would probably take place, so that in actual fact no darkness could be expected.  This means that the advantages of using "Aphrodite" are to a large extent lost, as the device is particularly effective in the dark, and also that there would never be any time during which there was no air activity and therefore never any chance for boats to get ahead unhindered.
    These circumstances are so unfavorable that it is not planned to undertake the first convoy operation in the N. Atlantic until the new moon period at the beginning of August.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 197
-
GQ 33
U 418
-
BF 40
U 569
-
Op(DF 42)
 
67
-
DO 36
198
-
Op(KQ 70)
435
-
Op(CD 79)
572
-
BF 91
 
91
-
BE 41
199
-
DG 15
436
-
BF 40
575
-
BD 35
 
92
-
Op(CD 73)
202
-
Op(AJ 63)
440
-
CF 37
592
-
BE 98
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
211
-
Op(DF 45)
449
-
AN 36
594
-
CG 84
 
118
-
CE 96
214
-
DH 76
450
-
AF 72
603
-
Op(DF 15)
 
119
-
Op(BB 70)
217
-
Op(DF 45)
455
-
BF 74
608
-
Op(DF 42)
 
123
-
CF 39
221
-
Op(DF 15)
459
-
BF 68
621
-
BF 52
 
126
-
Op(ET 64)
228
-
Op(DF 18)
460
-
EH 67
636
-
AE 78
 
154
-
Op(EQ 56)
229
-
BE 82
488
-
BD 87
641
-
Op(DF 18)
 
161
-
BE 82
232
-
Op(DF 12)
511
-
FT 13
642
-
Op(DF 12)
 
170
-
AF 72
333
-
BF 91
513
-
EH 67
645
-
Op(BD 19)
 
172
-
BE 95
271
-
AF 76
515
-
Op(EU 70)
650
-
Op(AJ 29)
 
177
-
Op(GR 50)
304
-
Op(AK 46)
521
-
Op(CA 90)
664
-
BE 43
 
178
-
Op(KP 87)
308
-
AF 76
527
-
DN 34
666
-
Op(CD 79)
 
180
-
FU 49
336
-
Op(CD 79)
530
-
BE 94
667
-
AL 15
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
341
-
AE 83
535
-
AE 83
669
-
AF 72
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
377
-
BE 64
536
-
AN 36
731
-
BD 32
 
193
-
BD 21
378
-
BF 83
552
-
CF 23
758
-
CF 59
 
195
-
KY 91
409
-
CG 80
558
-
Op(CD 73)
951
-
Op(CD 76)
 
196
-
Op(KZ 20)
413
-
BE 87
564
-
BF 68
953
-
Op(CD 76)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 123 - 161 - 180 - 195 - 229 - 377 - 378 - 575 - 413 - 418 - 436 - 459 - 552 - 621 - 636 - 664 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 621 - Brest;  U 564 - 459 - Bordeaux.
       
- 461 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Sailed:  U 510 - Lorient;  U 417 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 180 reported a steamer on an E. course in FL 37.  Boat was given permission to attack.
    2) U 515 reported additional to her convoy report of 2.6.  Approached twice by destroyer while hauling ahead to the limit of visibility, it was a very dark night.  Altered course.  Flares at long distance.  Nothing observed in Metox.  Convoy unlikely to have heard boat in listening gear, owing to its high speed.
    3) U 178 reported:  As convoys proceed close inshore, it is possible to haul ahead without maintaining close contact, if the boat remains at least 60 miles off the coast.  Boat will not then be subject to interference by a/c, even though Radar locations constantly intercepted.  The enemy is using a large number of a/c, which patrol the area ahead and to seaward of the convoy.  At times 3 a/c were sighted at one time by day as far as 50 miles off the coast.  Boat succeeded in getting away on the surface.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  DH 1911.
    A/c attack on a U-boat in DH 1599.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) It is intended that U 575 and 731 shall proceed in company through Biscay.  The following basic order has been issued.  As far as possible 2-4 boats are to make the return passage through Biscay in company.
      Commanding Officers will agree at the rendezvous on details of procedure for the return passage.
      The basis is to be:
     
1) Conduct in accordance with Standing Order No. 13.
2) Remain surfaced as long as possible in good weather in order to cover ground.
3) In case of a surprise attack, remain on the surface.  Fire from all guns.
4) Keep together at all costs.
    2) U 119 has carried out the minelaying operation off Halifax as ordered.
    3) U 513 has completed refueling from U 460.  The tanker is proceeding N and will be given another rendezvous.  Fuel remaining 129 cbm.
       
- 462 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) U 304 last made a short weather report on 24.5. from BD 23.  On the same day she was ordered to an attack area in AK 4675, depth 70 miles.  Since 1.6. the boat has several times been ordered to give her position and no answer has been received.  She must be presumed lost.  There are no clues.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 197
-
GR 42
U 418
-
BF 40
U 569
-
Op(DF 42)
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
Op(KQ 70)
435
-
Op(CD 79)
572
-
BF 82
 
91
-
BE 55
199
-
DG 55
436
-
BF 40
575
-
BE 17
 
92
-
Op(CD 73)
202
-
Op(AJ 63)
440
-
CF 30
592
-
CF 33
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
211
-
Op(DF 45)
449
-
AN 31
594
-
CG 80
 
118
-
DG 23
214
-
EK 17
450
-
AF 47
603
-
Op(DF 15)
 
119
-
BB 87
217
-
Op(DF 45)
455
-
BE 95
608
-
Op(DF 42)
 
123
-
CG 11
221
-
Op(DF 15)
460
-
EH 67
636
-
AE 84
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
228
-
Op(DF 18)
488
-
CE 42
641
-
Op(DF 18)
 
154
-
Op(EQ 40)
229
-
BE 61
510
-
BF 54
642
-
Op(DF 12)
 
161
-
BE 91
232
-
Op(DF 12)
511
-
FT 29
645
-
Op(BD 19)
 
170
-
AF 47
308
-
AF 72
513
-
EH 91
650
-
Op(AJ 29)
 
172
-
BE 89
333
-
BF 82
515
-
Op(EU 70)
664
-
BE 55
 
177
-
Op(GR 50)
336
-
Op(CD 79)
521
-
Op(CA 90)
666
-
Op(CD 79)
 
178
-
Op(KZ 52)
341
-
AE 85
527
-
Op(DN 10)
667
-
AL 15
 
180
-
FL 35
377
-
BE 69
530
-
BE 97
669
-
AF 47
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
378
-
BF 68
535
-
AE 85
731
-
BE 14
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
409
-
CG 80
536
-
AN 31
758
-
CF 84
 
193
-
BD 19
413
-
CF 23
552
-
CF 23
951
-
Op(CD 76)
 
195
-
KY 86
271
-
AF 72
558
-
Op(CD 73)
953
-
Op(CD 76)
 
196
-
Op(KZ 20)
417
-
AO            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 119 - 123 - 161 - 180 - 195 - 229 - 377 - 413 - 418 - 436 - 552 - 575 - 378 - 636 - 664 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 378 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Reports from Group "Trutz" see paragraph IVa).
    2) U 455 successfully beat off an attack by a Mosquito in BF 37.
    3) U 758 reports experience with conning tower casing; with sea 4, diving times, depth keeping and spray normal.  No disturbance in quadruple mounting.
    4) U 180 sighted aircraft on her return passage in FM 73 course 2300, in FL 62 course 1500 and in FL 37 course 1100.  She believed that there was routine air reconnaissance from Ascension for traffic from S. America to Africa.  No radar observed.  The boat sank the Greek "Boris" 5,166 GRT on 3.6 in FL 3816.  Ship was carrying wood, minerals and mixed goods from Santos to Freetown.
       
- 463 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  FB 51 and FB 67.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  U 228, in Group "Trutz's" patrol line, was attacked at 2042 in DF 1854 by 2 single-engined carrier-borne aircraft.  At 2115 U 641 sighted a Curtiss and a Hurricane and probably shot the latter down after an action lasting 35 minutes.  At 2226 U 603 was also approached by a carrier-borne aircraft.
    The appearance of the aircraft indicates that the expected America-Gibraltar convoy is approaching.  Its present position was however doubtful , as from the position of these aircraft the convoy could have been immediately off the patrol line or 200 miles W. of it.  For this reason the boats were not to proceed along the convoy's course in case they should be ahead of it.
     In order to prevent the convoy passing unobserved during the night, distances apart of boats was reduced to 20 miles.  Group "Trutz" was therefore in patrol line from DC 7666 to DC 4599 from 100/5/6.  It was decided not to transfer the line N or S as the convoy could evade it in either direction and the boats were both N and S of the aircraft sightings.
    These decisions were made without C-inC being informed and were strongly disapproved by him.  C-in-C would have decided on a passage E during darkness immediately after the first report of an aircraft was received, so as to prevent at all costs the convoy passing the patrol line.
  b) 1) U 513's attack area is to be the Brazilian coast area between 11 and 250 S, concentrating off Rio de Janeiro.  Orders are that territorial waters need not be respected, but penetration into harbors is still forbidden.
    2) U 530, 592, 172, 572, 333 and 510 are to make for DG 40.  Boats will be refueled here and afterwards sent to the S. area.  The same goes for U 455 when she has delivered fuel and material to U 552.
    3) The attack areas of boats in the N. Atlantic are being transferred, in order to prevent their being D/F'd owing to the number of radio messages made.  The following areas will be occupied, depth 80 miles:  U 650 : AJ 3955,  U 202 : AK 4634,   U 645 : BD 1259,  U 667 : AK 8238.
    4) U 488 (tanker) is to steer for CD 73.
  c) 1) U 177 has requested a rendezvous with U 195 to transship a stoker, who is suspected of having a disease of the lungs.  Rendezvous was ordered for 1200/7/6 in GR 4885.
    2) U 594 and 409 are to move away to the W., if they have not succeeded in breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar and a fresh attempt seems too difficult.
 
 
 
- 464 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) U 418 and 436 were on their way home and, according to careful reckoning, should have made their arrival reports several days ago.  The boats last reported on 23.5. from AK 9438 and 21.5. from BD 59 respectively.  There are no clues as to cause of loss, but it was probably due to the very strong air activity in Biscay.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 180 - 1 ship  5,166 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 196
-
Op(KZ 20)
U 417
-
AN 36
U 572
-
BF 73
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
GR 57
435
-
Op(CD 79)
575
-
BE 46
 
91
-
BE 64
198
-
Op(KQ 70)
440
-
CF 30
592
-
CF 32
 
92
-
Op(CD 73)
199
-
DG 75
449
-
AN 33
594
-
CG 80
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
202
-
Op(AK 46)
450
-
AE 68
603
-
Op(DF 18)
 
118
-
DG 27
211
-
Op(DF 45)
455
-
BE 97
608
-
Op(DF 42)
 
119
-
CC 11
214
-
EK 46
460
-
EH 23
636
-
AE 83
 
123
-
BE 99
217
-
Op(DF 45)
488
-
CD 65
641
-
Op(DF 18)
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
Op(DF 15)
510
-
BF 49
642
-
Op(DF 12)
 
154
-
Op(EP 66)
228
-
Op(DF 18)
511
-
FT 69
645
-
BD 15
 
161
-
BE 93
229
-
BE 93
513
-
ER 23
650
-
Op(AJ 38)
 
170
-
AE 68
232
-
Op(DF 12)
515
-
Op(EU 70)
664
-
BE 64
 
172
-
CF 32
271
-
AF 47
521
-
Op(CA 90)
666
-
Op(CD 79)
 
177
-
Op(GR 53)
308
-
AF 47
527
-
Op(DM 60)
667
-
AK 39
 
178
-
Op(KZ 50)
333
-
BF 73
530
-
CF 31
669
-
AE 68
 
180
-
FD 99
336
-
Op(CD 79)
535
-
AE 87
731
-
BE 46
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
341
-
AE 87
536
-
AN 23
758
-
CF 99
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
377
-
BF 48
552
-
CF 23
951
-
Op(CD 76)
 
193
-
BD 49
409
-
CG 80
558
-
Op(CD 73)
953
-
Op(CD 76)
 
195
-
Op(KZ 29)
413
-
CF 23
569
-
Op(DF 42)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 119 - 123 - 161 - 180 - 195 - 229 - 377 - 413 - 418 - 436 - 552 - 575 - 636 - 664 - 731.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 334 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DM 2650, CG 8230, CG 80 (U 594 - 409), FB 51, FB 67.
    2) An American surface vessel reported a U-boat sunk at 1435/2/6 in BB 5545.  (None of our own boats in the vicinity).  False report.
  d) In an American U-boat situation report of 4.6 up to 20 boats were reported within 300 miles around AJ 54.  One radio message was made from this area from AJ 2960 on 3.6.  Actually there were only two boats there.  This situation report seems to show that the enemy definitely suspects a considerable number of U-boats in the sea area between Newfoundland and Greenland.  This time information which he usually obtains from aircraft sightings and radio D/F is lacking.  It remains to be seen whether he will soon discover the present absence of U-boats in the North Atlantic.
       
- 465 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Again several boats are believed to be within 150 miles around AK 3520, S-W bound, according to accurate radio D/F.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) The expected America-Gibraltar convoy was not picked up.  It is to be assumed that, after enemy air reconnaissance had detected 3 U-boats, it evaded the patrol line to the N. or S. or passed it unnoticed.  The patrol line was dissolved after dark.  Except for U 92 and 569, which are returning home, all "Trutz" boats will be refueled for further operations from U 488.  It is intended afterwards to dispose the boats in about CC 60 and send them S. as soon as another convoy is expected.  Boats have instructions to keep radio silence as far as possible and manage without beacon signals, so as not to betray their presence.
    2) U 341 is to make for AK 50, U 535 for CD 50.  The latter will probably join Group "Trutz".
  c) 1) U 460 will deliver 40 cbm to U 758 on 9.6 in DG 7425 and will afterwards proceed to DG 4455 to deliver her remaining fuel to U 118.  She will then return home.  U 758 is later to deliver a METOX set to U 67 in DP 80.
    2) U 575 and 731 have started their joint passage through Biscay.
  d)  U 440 has not reported since she left Nazaire on 26.5.  She was probably destroyed by aircraft in Biscay.  There is no further information.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    The following information has been given to the boats, based on general experiences and reports:
  I Permanent Order No. 12:
    1) The enemy is prepared to resort to any means in the battle against U-boats.
      It is suspected that explosives are fixed to lifeboats, cases, rafts, barrels etc. which fire when a U-boat approaches.  Boats should therefore be suspicious when such objects are sighted, especially on the usual approach routes and in the usual operations areas in the N. Atlantic.  Rafts and lifeboats should only be approached to determine the name of the ship, if they are found in a position where a ship has definitely sunk, or, in remote areas if, after close scrutiny, they are clearly seen to be harmless.
    2) Boats should not approach the wreckage after an aircraft has been shot down.  There is great danger from depth-charges which may roll out of the bomb racks, as has been proved in one case.
 
 
 
- 466 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  II. To boats with Radar:
     Boat's own Radar set should be used to detect enemy aircraft in the former Biscay, if boats have to proceed on the surface.  Aircraft are picked up at a range of at least 10 kilometers at a minimum height of 500 meters.  Radar interception by enemy aircraft need not be expected for the present.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 196
-
Op(KZ 20)
U 413
-
CF 23
U 572
-
BF 71
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
CR 86
417
-
AN 31
575
-
BE 55
 
91
-
BF 47
198
-
Op(KQ 70)
435
-
Op(DF 12)
592
-
CF 26
 
92
-
Op(CD 76)
199
-
DS 24
449
-
AF 76
594
-
CG 80
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
202
-
Op(AK 46)
450
-
AE 69
603
-
Op(DF 18)
 
118
-
DG 42
211
-
Op(DF 45)
455
-
CF 23
608
-
Op(DF 45)
 
119
-
CC 21
214
-
EK 46
460
-
DS 83
636
-
AE 67
 
123
-
BF 75
217
-
Op(DF 45)
488
-
CD 59
641
-
Op(DF 42)
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
Op(DF 18)
510
-
BF 71
642
-
Op(DF 12)
 
154
-
Op(EP 64)
228
-
Op(DF 18)
511
-
FU 75
645
-
Op(BD 12)
 
161
-
BF 54
229
-
BF 49
513
-
ER 55
650
-
Op(AJ 39)
 
170
-
AE 59
232
-
Op(DF 15)
515
-
Op(EU 70)
664
-
BF 47
 
172
-
CF 26
271
-
AE 68
521
-
Op(CA 90)
666
-
Op(DF 12)
 
177
-
Op(GR 50)
308
-
AE 61
527
-
Op(DM 50)
667
-
Op(AK 61)
 
178
-
Op(KZ 50)
333
-
BF 71
530
-
CF 28
669
-
AE 59
 
180
-
FD 68
334
-
AF 87
535
-
AL 22
731
-
BE 55
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
336
-
Op(DF 12)
536
-
AF 76
758
-
DG 23
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
AL 22
552
-
CF 23
951
-
Op(CD 79)
 
193
-
BD 79
377
-
BF 49
558
-
Op(CD 76)
953
-
Op(CD 79)
 
195
-
GR 85
409
-
CG 80
569
-
Op(DF 42)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 119 - 161 - 180 - 195 - 229 - 377 - 413 - 552 - 575 - 636 - 664 - 731.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 177 situation:  Miss at inward-bound freighter on 3.6. in GR 5319, end-of-run detonation after 7 minutes.  At dusk on 5.6. convoy coming from Saldanha Bay sighted, consisting of about 12 ships with destroyers and corvettes.  Deterrent depth-charges.  Shadowed by hydrophone bearing as far as GR 2536, in fog, with visibility about 200 meters.  Then, while she was preparing for a surface attack, the fog lifted and she found herself in the center of the convoy.  Heavy gunfire from all ships.  Boat shook off pursuing vessels.  She was bombed by a flying boat.  No damage.
    2) U 198 sank the British "Durma", 2,304 GRT, in KP 5989, course 2500, speed 7 knots, and in KP 9754 the American "William King", 6,800 GRT, main course 2800, speed 10 knots.  She took the Chief Engineer of the first ship on board and the Captain of the second.
       
- 467 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  GR 2530, and 5 others from the Iceland area including 3 D/c attacks (U 450).  An English a/c also reported a surfaced U-boat in 360 30' N and unknown longitude (U 594 - 409?)  The a/c returned to its base owing to engine damage and because the navigator was wounded.  2 other a/c reported a D/c attack.
    2) 4 Gibraltar a/c were ordered at 1715 to return to their base at once, and not to attack U-boats (Probably own S/m's in the vicinity)
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 154 has had to leave her attack area off the Brazilian coast, as her Metox is permanently out of action.  She has been ordered to move away in the direction of 300 for the present.
    2) U 92 is to start on her return passage via Porte Delgada provided she can do so without first refueling.  This port is sometimes used by enemy merchant ships and escort ships.  Territorial Waters are to be respected.
    3) Radio boats in the N. Atlantic will occupy the following new attack areas, depth 70 miles:
      U 650 : AK 5113        U 645 : BD 2454.
    4) Boats at present with U 488 will temporarily occupy the following squares, when they have supplied, in the order in which they leave:  CD 4387, 2765, 5233, 5492, 5665, 1668, 2631 and 2245.  Depth 50 miles.  U 193 is in CE 3797, and is later also to join Group "Trutz".
  c) 1) U 119 is steering for CD 4855 to deliver her remaining fuel to U 488.
    2) U 214 reported minelaying operation in Dakar carried out.
  d) U 450 was attacked by an aircraft with bombs and aircraft armament at 1050 in AE 8542 and severely damaged.  Watertight stern, No. 1. and No. 3. main ballast tanks and all external fuel tanks damaged.  Strong trace of oil, 7 wounded, 4 of them seriously, including the C.O.  Boat dived after the third attack.  She reported at 0100 course 200, and requested assistance.  Boats in the vicinity were ordered to make for U 450.  She herself was to continue on her passage to W. France.  Unfortunately there is no boat with a M.O. nearby.  (For distribution of M.O.'s see paragraph VI)
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 198 - 2 ships  9,104 GRT.
       
VI. General:
 
 
 
- 468 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The orders given to boats for beating off aircraft in surprise attacks will necessarily mean that bridge personnel will be wounded more often.  C-in-C Navy therefore gave orders some time ago that by the beginning of July every second boat to leave port should, if possible, carry a M.O.  So far 29 Medical Officers were appointed to IXd2 boats and tankers according to plan and a further 17 were available for other boats.  There are at present 16 M.O.'s at sea.  The special training of new M.O.'s is now so far advanced that from now on every other boat to leave port in June will have a M.O. on board.  Boats leaving W. France will also carry M.O.'s in accordance with orders, provided the officers asked for are appointed in time.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(CD 10)
U 196
-
Op(KZ 20)
U 413
-
CF 23
U 572
-
BE 95
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
Op(GR 99)
417
-
AN 23
575
-
BE 67
 
91
-
BF 52
198
-
Op(KP 89)
435
-
CD 82
592
-
CF 51
 
92
-
CD 91
199
-
DS 54
449
-
AF 48
594
-
CG 80
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
202
-
Op(AK 46)
450
-
AE 85
603
-
CD 75
 
118
-
DG 42
211
-
DF 12
455
-
CF 23
608
-
CF 12
 
119
-
CC 28
214
-
AK 41
460
-
DS 55
636
-
AE 69
 
123
-
BF 73
217
-
DF 12
488
-
CD 82
641
-
CD 79
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
CD 75
510
-
BE 93
642
-
CD 82
 
154
-
EP 56
228
-
CD 78
511
-
GF 26
645
-
Op(BD 24)
 
161
-
BF 61
229
-
BF 93
513
-
ER 85
650
-
Op(AK 01)
 
170
-
AE 82
232
-
CD 82
515
-
Op(ET 70)
664
-
BF 52
 
172
-
CF 27
271
-
AE 59
521
-
Op(CA 90)
666
-
CD 82
 
177
-
Op(GR 43)
308
-
AE 67
527
-
Op(DM 50)
667
-
Op(AK 56)
 
178
-
Op(KZ 50)
333
-
BE 95
530
-
CF 54
669
-
AE 82
 
180
-
FD 61
334
-
AF 76
535
-
AL 12
731
-
BE 67
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
336
-
CD 82
536
-
AF 48
758
-
DG 27
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
AL 12
552
-
CF 23
951
-
CD 82
 
193
-
CD 35
277
-
BF 52
558
-
CD 82
953
-
CD 82
 
195
-
GR 48
409
-
CG 80
569
-
DF 22      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 119 - 123 - 161 - 180 - 195 - 229 - 377 - 413 - 552 - 575 - 636 - 664 - 731 - 92 - 569.
  Entered Port:  U 91 - 377 - Brest;  U 161 - Lorient;  U 229 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  U 135 - 759 - 508 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 515 reported a convoy, course 2900, speed 7-8 knots, at 2020 in EU 4473.  The boat was approached by destroyers during the night, which was dark, and depth-charged.  She has to return home owing to damage.  Success of this patrol:  11 ships, totaling 66,000 GRT, sunk 1 freighter of 6,000 tons torpedoed.
    2) U 527 situation:  SE-bound traffic observed in DN 12,13, 15 and 16.  DM 2380 and 2620 patrol by shore-based aircraft and airships, the latter also at night.  Detected by a destroyer while making a submerged attack at twilight on a N-bound large convoy on 4.6. in DM 2661.  Subsequently trained hydrophone and depth charge hunt.
       
- 469 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Pursuit group of 2 destroyers observed in DM 4330.
  b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  CA 8610, ES 12 and one in an unidentified position.
  d) British S.S. "Alva" (1,584 GRT) ran into the minefield laid off Halifax by U 119 and sank.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 645 is to occupy the sea area around BD 3255 depth 250 miles.  She is to simulate by active use of her radio U-boat traffic entering and leaving on NW and SE courses.
    2) Because of the successes reported by U 198 the following boats in the same sea area have been given freedom of action:  U 181 to the E to square KQ inclusive, U 196 to the N including U 198's attack area and U 178 in addition the same attack area as U 196.  U 177 is proceeding E and is to haul out far to the S, so that she can use Bachstelze.
  c) 1) U 455 has delivered fuel and material to U 552.
    2) U 333 reported the following:  Passage in company with U 572 went off excellently.  Surfaced by day.  Several times unexplained location transmission observed with Magic Eye.  Boat suggests outward and inward passage should be made in company as far as 180 W.
  d) 1) U 450 was in AK 3218 course 225, at 2000.  Boat was bombed by day and the C.O. reports that she cannot be controlled much longer.  So far no other boat has reported that she is proceeding to U 450's assistance, U 341, which is about 550 miles away has been detailed to do so at maximum speed.  U 592 has also been ordered there to give medical assistance.  She can reach the position at earliest in 5 days time.  Towards 0500 U 669 reported her position in AL 3214.  She must therefore be near U 450.  U 450 has again been instructed that if it is necessary to abandon ship, the crew is to stay together at all costs and if possible starshell are to be fired every hour. 
    2) U 202 last reported on 1.6. from AJ 6335.  Since 2.6. she has several times been ordered to report her position and the weather, but has not replied.  She must therefore be presumed lost.  There are no attack or sighting reports for this area and the cause of her loss is unexplained.  It is not impossible that American S/m's which were operating at this time were responsible, although our own boats had been warned of their presence.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 119 - 1 ship  1,584 GRT (Mined)
 
 
 
- 470 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
8.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 196
-
Op(KZ 20)
U 435
-
CD 82
U 572
-
BE 97
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
Op(KY 95)
449
-
AF 44
575
-
BF 47
 
92
-
CD 93
198
-
Op(KP 80)
450
-
AE 79
592
-
CF 48
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
199
-
DS 84
455
-
CF 25
594
-
CG 70
 
118
-
DG 42
211
-
CD 72
460
-
DS 24
603
-
CD 72
 
119
-
CC 61
214
-
DT 89
488
-
CD 82
608
-
CD 72
 
123
-
BF 49
217
-
CD 72
508
-
BF 54
636
-
AN 24
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
CD 72
510
-
BE 94
641
-
CD 72
 
135
-
BF 54
228
-
CD 72
511
-
GF 62
642
-
CD 82
 
154
-
Op(EP 30)
232
-
CD 82
513
-
FG 24
645
-
Op(BD 24)
 
170
-
AE 76
271
-
AE 82
515
-
ET 65
650
-
Op(AK 01)
 
172
-
CF 76
308
-
AE 82
521
-
Op(CA 90)
664
-
BF 54
 
177
-
Op(GR 40)
333
-
BE 97
527
-
Op(DM 43)
666
-
CD 82
 
178
-
Op(KZ 40)
334
-
AF 48
530
-
CF 72
667
-
Op(AK 82)
 
180
-
FD 23
336
-
CD 82
535
-
AL 10
669
-
AE 76
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
341
-
Op(AK 53)
536
-
AF 44
731
-
BF 47
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
409
-
CG 70
552
-
CF 23
758
-
DG 45
 
193
-
Op(CD 37)
413
-
CF 23
558
-
CD 82
759
-
BF 54
 
195
-
GR 44
417
-
AF 76
569
-
CD 99
951
-
CD 82
                   
953
-
CD 82
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 123 - 180 - 195 - 413 - 515 - 552 - 569 - 575 - 636 - 731.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  Reports from U 758 see paragraph IVa).
  b)  Nothing to report.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  ES 77, CC 53, EC 12 and 3 others in unidentified positions.
    2) Aircraft reported depth-charge attack in BE 7361.
  d) 1) According to Radio Intelligence (X) reports a convoy coming from Durban is expected in the Capetown area on 8.6.
    2) There were American submarines on 5.6. in AK 7263, AK 8787, and AK 6588.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  U 758 sighted a destroyer at 1640 in DG 7153 and about 3 hours later 2 steamers in DG 7137.  The boat was then attacked by carrier-borne aircraft.  This is probably the America-Gibraltar convoy awaited by Group "Trutz" on 4.6. and 5.6., which skirted the patrol line to the south.  Reckoning back, assuming a speed of 8.5. knots, the convoy must still have been 300 miles further west
       
- 471 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     when the patrol line was attacked by air P.M. 4.6. and still about 100 miles away from it when the line was dissolved P.M. 5.6.  It can now be seen that:
    aa) When the U-boats were sighted by the carrier-borne aircraft, evasive action was to be expected on the part of the convoy.  After the second aircraft sighting in the S. sector of the patrol line had been received, it would have been better to send the boats south at high speed instead of reducing the distances apart of the boats in a southerly direction.
      If the line had been transferred south there would have course have been no chance of intercepting the convoy if it evaded to the north, on the other hand there would have been very good prospects of picking it up if it evaded to the south.
    bb) The dispersal of the patrol line at 2300/5/6 was too early.  It should be noted here however that there was then no information as to the range of reconnaissance aircraft flown ahead of the convoy from carriers.  Air reconnaissance at that range (300 miles) from an advanced carrier was not expected.  This new information will have to be taken into account in future operations.
    cc) Failing further information, the following procedure seems expedient for future operations:
     
1) If carrier-borne aircraft are sighted by day:
  Approach the convoy at high speed and at the same time transfer the patrol line in the direction of the center of the enemy's reconnaissance and so rapidly reduce the distance between the convoy and the boats.  The convoy will then only be able to evade by making very considerable alterations of course.  If the convoy is not intercepted by day, halt at dark and patrol the area of the patrol line at high speed.  If boats follow the convoy's course during the night, the enemy can evade the patrol line by making only minor alterations of course.
2) If carrier-borne aircraft are sighted in the evening:
  Do not follow the convoy's course, but boats to move at high speed to positions crossing the convoy's assumed course in the direction in which the convoy is expected to evade.  Then approach the convoy by day.
    U 758 was severely damaged by the attacking carrier-borne aircraft.  It seemed probable that she would sink.  U 118 and 460, which are about 100 miles away, were sent to her assistance, and later also U 92.  Towards morning however, U 758 reported that she had beaten off 8 carrier-borne aircraft, shot one down and damaged 4 others.  She was repairing in DF 9674 and requested medical assistance.  She therefore seems able to remain afloat.  U 92 was then ordered to continue on her return passage.  U 758 is the first boat to have the new quadruple-mounted Flak which has presumably proved satisfactory for combating the carrier-borne aircraft.  
  b) 1) U 170 is to steer for CD 50, U 308 for AK 50, U 510 - EP 40.
    2) As heavy traffic is suspected off Rio, U 199, a type IXd2 boat, has been diverted to GB 20, so that there will be at least 2 boats in this area.  If the situation changes or no traffic is found there, U 199 will operate in the Indian Ocean.
 
 
 
- 472 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) As her METOX is unserviceable, U 154 will operate against single ship traffic in the following areas until her fuel stocks are exhausted:  from DP 8136 via DQ 1481 via DQ 8962 to EE 6334.
  c)  None.
  d) U 450 is able to remain afloat again and is making for AK 66 at 8 knots, U 271, 341 and 669, are staying with her to give assistance.  She will rendezvous with a boat carrying a M.O. on about 11.6.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 758 - 1 aircraft.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 198
-
Op(KP 80)
U 450
-
AL 20
U 575
-
BF 49
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
199
-
EH 24
455
-
CF 51
590
-
BF 83
 
92
-
CE 73
211
-
CD 48
460
-
DG 74
592
-
BE 44
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
214
-
DT 82
488
-
CD 82
594
-
CG 70
 
118
-
Op(DG 44)
217
-
CD 48
508
-
BE 69
603
-
CD 48
 
119
-
CD 44
221
-
CD 48
510
-
CE 32
608
-
CD 48
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
228
-
CD 48
511
-
CG 71
618
-
BF 83
 
135
-
BF 72
232
-
CD 82
513
-
FC 54
641
-
CD 48
 
154
-
BF 86
271
-
AE 84
515
-
ET 52
642
-
CD 82
 
170
-
AE 78
308
-
AE 84
521
-
Op(CA 90)
645
-
Op(BD 37)
 
172
-
CF 96
333
-
CF 43
527
-
Op(DM 40)
650
-
Op(AK 01)
 
177
-
GR 44
334
-
AE 69
530
-
CE 98
664
-
BF 52
 
178
-
Op(KZ 40)
336
-
CD 82
535
-
AL 20
666
-
CD 82
 
180
-
EH 62
341
-
AL 19
536
-
AE 68
667
-
Op(AK 82)
 
181
-
Op(KP 60)
388
-
AO
552
-
BE 95
669
-
AL 20
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
409
-
CG 70
558
-
CD 82
731
-
BF 49
 
193
-
Op(CD 37)
413
-
BE 95
569
-
CE 75
758
-
DG 74
 
195
-
GR 44
417
-
AF 72
571
-
BF 83
759
-
BF 72
 
196
-
Op(KZ 50)
435
-
CD 82
572
-
CF 51
951
-
CD 82
 
197
-
Op(KY 70)
449
-
AE 68      
953
-
CD 82
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 180 - 195 - 413 - 515 - 552 - 569 - 575 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 664 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 564 - 185 - Bordeaux.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Escort for outward-bound U-boats in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  None.
  b)  Nothing to report.
  c) U-boat sightings:  ED 88, CA 8241, ED 85
  d) In a U-boat situation report of 2.6. the enemy believes X U-boats to be N of 400 N and W of 400 W, and a further 20 boats patrolling between 570 N 430 W and 470? N 350 W.
       
- 473 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    On 5.6. a large number of boats was believed possibly to be within 150 miles around 500 N 300 W during the last few days there have not been more than 3-4 boats in the N. Atlantic and it seems possible that the enemy has been deceived by our planned radio traffic and suspects a large number of boats in the N. Atlantic, because of the many outgoing messages on radio services which cover the N. Atlantic area.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 650 has been ordered to proceed to AK 4188 via AK 1915.  AJ 3546, AJ 3750.  She is to make one radio message from each of the positions named and in the third position she is to make 5 dummy short signals within 12 hours.  U 657 has been given the same order and will proceed with BD 1562, 1932 and 2730.  It is intended to simulate supply groups.
  c) 1) U 180 is making for DH 74 to supply.
    2) U 214 refueled from U 333 to capacity on 13.6. in DG 5955.
    3) U 177, 197, 178, 196, 198 and 181 will supply from a ship from 20.6. in KS 77.  Boats are to leave their attack areas in time for this.
  d) 1) U 409 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar.
    2) U 758 is able to dive to 40 meters.  She will remain where she is for another 3 days and is then to make her return passage in company with 2 other boats.
    3) U 450 now only needs medical assistance.  U 341 will remain with her until U 592 (M.O. boat) arrives.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 197
-
Op(KZ 80)
U 449
-
AE 83
U 572
-
CF 48
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
198
-
Op(KP 80)
450
-
AL 41
575
-
BF 57
 
92
-
DF 63
199
-
EH 51
455
-
CF 48
590
-
BF 72
 
105
-
Op(ET 50)
211
-
CD 48
460
-
DF 96
592
-
BD 36
 
118
-
DF 96
214
-
DT 43
488
-
CD 82
594
-
CG 70
 
119
-
CD 48
217
-
CD 48
508
-
BE 82
603
-
CD 48
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
CD 48
510
-
CF 29
608
-
CD 48
 
135
-
BE 91
228
-
CD 48
511
-
GG 87
618
-
BF 72
 
154
-
Op(EF 50)
232
-
CD 82
513
-
FC 84
641
-
CD 48
 
170
-
AE 87
271
-
AK 66
515
-
ET 17
642
-
CD 82
 
172
-
DG 23
308
-
AL 22
521
-
Op(CA 90)
645
-
Op(BD 83)
 
177
-
GR 49
333
-
CF 48
527
-
Op(DM 40)
650
-
Op(AK 43)
 
178
-
Op(KZ 20)
334
-
AE 68
530
-
DG 25
666
-
CD 82
 
180
-
EH 31
336
-
CD 82
535
-
AL 20
667
-
Op(AK 58)
 
181
-
Op(KP 60
341
-
AK 66
536
-
AE 83
669
-
AK 66
 
       
- 474 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
185
-
BF 91
388
-
AN 36
552
-
BF 75
731
-
BF 57
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
413
-
BF 75
558
-
CD 82
758
-
DF 95
 
193
-
CD 37
417
-
AE 69
564
-
BF 91
759
-
BE 91
 
195
-
GQ 37
435
-
CD 82
569
-
CE 81
951
-
CD 82
 
196
-
Op(KZ 20)      
571
-
BF 72
953
-
CD 82
             
572
-
CF 48      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 413 - 515 - 552 - 569 - 575 - 731.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 84 - 306 - 732 - Brest;  U 358 - St. Nazaire;  U 134 - 653 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:
  1) U-boat escort.
  2) Against convoys in sea area square CG.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 181 situation:  Waited for convoys in KP 35 and 36 from 27.5. to 5.6. and found nothing.  3 Portuguese vessels and one ship without name on the 50 meter line and 40 miles to seaward a large hospital ship, course NE off Lourenco Marques since 6.6. in sight of pilot boats.  1000-tonner sunk there P.M. 7.6.  One smoke cloud sighted on 6.6. and one on 8.6., and the gunboat "Alfonso" on 9.6.  Otherwise nothing.
  b) Aircraft reported a convoy of 27 transports with strong escort in BE 9242, course south.
  c) U-boat sightings:  CA 81, CA 82.  Attack on U-boat in CA 73.
  d) 1) According to an English U-boat situation report, 4 boats are believed to be between Madeira and the Azores, 4 or 5 patrolling within 200 miles around 430 N, 410 W and 5 or 6 patrolling within 200 miles around 330 N, 430 W.
    2) S.S. :Highland Court" struck a mine, probably in the minefield laid by U 119, in BB 7583 and sank.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  No operation is intended against the convoy reported by aircraft.  Boats in the vicinity are however to make use of any chances to attack.
  b) 1) The following attack area in the N. Atlantic are to be occupied, depth 80 miles:  U 271 : AK 5484, U 669 : AK 8941.
    2) U 508 is to operate in the sea area off Lagos and Takoradi.  She is to make for EU 80.  U 759 and 135 are proceeding to DG 70 and DF 50 respectively.
    3) U 177 and 195 have rendezvoused.
    4) U 460 has delivered her remaining fuel to U 118, except for 18 cbm which she has kept back for U 92.
       
- 475 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  None.
  d)  (Trans. note:  Passage of 5 lines heavily erased)
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 181 - 1 ship  1,000 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 196
-
Op(KZ 30)
U 435
-
CD 82
U 575
-
BF 50
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
Op(KZ 60)
449
-
AE 85
590
-
BE 93
 
84
-
BF 46
198
-
Op(KQ 90)
450
-
AK 69
592
-
AK 96
 
92
-
DG 48
199
-
EH 81
455
-
CE 52
594
-
CG 70
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
211
-
CD 48
460
-
DG 48
603
-
CD 48
 
118
-
DG 44
214
-
DT 12
488
-
CD 82
608
-
CD 48
 
119
-
CD 48
217
-
CD 48
508
-
CF 23
618
-
BE 92
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
CD 48
510
-
CF 54
641
-
CD 48
 
134
-
BF 91
228
-
CD 48
511
-
GQ 14
642
-
CD 82
 
135
-
CF 23
232
-
CD 82
513
-
FK 14
645
-
BE 71
 
154
-
Op(EF 10)
271
-
AK 64
515
-
ES 32
650
-
Op(AJ 35)
 
170
-
AL 22
306
-
BF 46
521
-
Op(CA 80)
653
-
BF 91
 
172
-
DG 25
308
-
AL 20
527
-
Op(DM 40)
666
-
CD 82
 
177
-
Op(GR 88)
333
-
CE 99
530
-
DG 19
667
-
Op(AK 88)
 
178
-
Op(KZ 30)
334
-
AE 59
536
-
AE 85
669
-
AK 68
 
180
-
ES 11
336
-
CD 82
552
-
BF 84
731
-
BF 50
 
181
-
Op(KP 65)
341
-
AK 69
558
-
CD 82
732
-
BF 46
 
185
-
BF 81
358
-
BF 91
564
-
BF 81
758
-
DG 44
 
190
-
Op(CA 85)
388
-
AN 31
569
-
CE 67
759
-
CF 23
 
193
-
Op(CD 37)
413
-
BF 84
571
-
BE 93
951
-
CD 82
 
195
-
GQ 25
417
-
AE 68
572
-
CE 96
953
-
CD 82
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 413 - 515 - 552 - 569 - 731 - 575.
  Entered Port:  U 575 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) The Group led by U 618 observed 3 location transmissions on 9.6. and sighted one aircraft on 10.6. on its way through Biscay, otherwise nothing.
    2) U 515 reports situation and experience:  Convoys only along the coast, about 2 NE-bound and one SW-bound per week.  In addition fast convoys of passenger ships.  If boat stands on and off submerged on the 200 meter line by day, it is possible to shadow and bring other boats up.  Day attacks should be aimed at, owing to density layering.  Numerous untrained escort vessels with the convoy, one very well-trained destroyer from Monrovia N. with new type location gear.  The sea area W. the main harbor is a dead sector.  Entrance route is from ET 3757 on a course of 600.  Medium to strong air activity, so far no location.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  FK 25.
  d)  None.
       
- 476 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Boats of Group "Trutz" are to leave the supply position or their temporary attack areas so as to reach the following positions at economical cruising speed on 16.6:
      U 644, 217, 603, 221, 608:  DE 34.
      U 228, 211, 666, 558, 951:  DE 61.
      U 953, 435, 232, 642, 336, 193:  DE 91.
      Boats are not to pass 350 N to the south before absolutely necessary.
    2) U 536 is to make for CD 55, U 449 for AK 29, U 571 and 618 for DG 50, U 564, 590 and 455 for DG 4455, U 185 for FB 90.
    3) Boats at present supplying from U 118 will make for the following points:  U 572 : DP 80, U 172 : and 530 : GB 20, U 759: EC 30.
  c) 1) Capetown boats will not be able to supply from tanker "Schliemann" in KS 7744 before 22 June.  Boats are to keep radio silence and are forbidden to attack after passing longitude of 550 E.
    2) U 488 has so far supplied 9 boats of Group "Trutz".
  d)  Boats have again been reminded that the sinking of Irish ships is to be avoided at all costs.  Steamers often make a lot of smoke and have indistinct neutrality markings.  Bad handling of the ships often gives the impression of zigzags as with enemy ships.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 477 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
12.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 196
-
Op(JA 17)
U 435
-
CD 82
U 590
-
BE 86
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
197
-
Op(KZ 69)
449
-
AE 87
592
-
AK 99
 
84
-
BF 72
198
-
Op(KQ 74)
450
-
AK 99
594
-
CG 70
 
92
-
DG 48
199
-
ER 21
455
-
CE 46
603
-
CD 48
 
105
-
Op(ET 60)
211
-
CD 48
460
-
DG 48
608
-
CD 48
 
118
-
DG 44
214
-
DG 86
488
-
CD 82
618
-
BE 88
 
119
-
CD 48
217
-
CD 48
508
-
CF 52
641
-
CD 48
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
221
-
CD 48
510
-
CF 72
642
-
CD 82
 
134
-
BF 81
228
-
CD 48
511
-
GQ 43
645
-
BD 36
 
135
-
CF 51
232
-
CD 82
513
-
FJ 66
650
-
Op(AJ 37)
 
154
-
Op(EF 10)
271
-
Op(AK 54)
515
-
EJ 92
653
-
BF 81
 
170
-
AL 25
306
-
BF 48
521
-
Op(CA 80)
666
-
CD 82
 
172
-
DG 43
308
-
AN 20
527
-
Op(DM 40)
667
-
Op(BD 16)
 
177
-
Op(GR 98)
333
-
DG 37
530
-
DG 44
669
-
Op(AK 86)
 
178
-
Op(JA 14)
334
-
AE 82
536
-
AE 87
731
-
BF 46
 
180
-
EH 93
336
-
CD 82
552
-
BF 91
732
-
BF 48
 
181
-
Op(KQ 44)
341
-
AK 68
558
-
CD 82
758
-
DG 48
 
185
-
BF 71
358
-
BF 81
564
-
BF 71
759
-
CF 54
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
388
-
AN 23
569
-
CE 66
951
-
CD 82
 
193
-
CD 58
413
-
BF 54
571
-
BE 86
953
-
CD 82
 
195
-
GG 95
417
-
AE 67
572
-
DG 23      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 413 - 515 - 552 - 569 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 731 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 415 - 634 - Brest;  U 600 - 615 - 257 - La Pallice;  U 194 - 200 - 420 - Kiel;  U 68 - 159 - 155 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 653's group, on outward passage, reported several a/c shadowing in BF 7346.  Boats were ordered to dive together at an opportune moment at their own discretion.
    2) U 172 reports constant air activity of carrier-borne a/c over her supply rendezvous with U 118 - (DH 4455).
    3) U 135 fired a double miss at a ship type "Glenearn" 9,784 GRT course 60, speed 16 knots, in BE 7751.  No further attack was possible despite pursuit for 5 hours at full speed.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  5 in BF 73, BB 55, CA 81, DN 73, and one in unidentified position.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 478 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  Supply rendezvous for U 118 has been transferred 100 miles to the south.
  d) 1) U 645 was attacked by a Liberator for 40 minutes at her rendezvous with U 450, BD 3666.  The aircraft dropped bombs 30 meters in her wake.  The boat hit the aircraft, which flew off making smoke.  According to a Radio Intelligence Report, this aircraft called for assistance, so it was probably shot down.  An hour later U 645 was again attacked, without result.  Rendezvous for U 450, 592 and 645 was then transferred to BD 3391.
    2) U 105 refueled from U 460 on 19.5. and then returned to the operations area off Freetown.  On 7.6. she was ordered to make a situation report and did not reply.  She must be presumed lost.  Nothing is known of the cause of loss.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 645 - 1 aircraft.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 195
-
GG 82
U 415
-
BF 54
U 571
-
CF 25
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
196
-
Op(JA 27)
417
-
AE 82
572
-
DG 24
 
68
-
BF 54
197
-
Op(JA 49)
420
-
AO
590
-
CF 25
 
84
-
BE 93
198
-
Op(KQ 76)
435
-
CD 70
592
-
BD 33
 
92
-
DG 43
199
-
ER 51
449
-
AL 22
594
-
CG 70
 
118
-
DG 44
200
-
AO
450
-
BD 33
600
-
BF 91
 
119
-
CD 48
211
-
CD 48
455
-
CD 66
603
-
CD 48
 
126
-
Op(ET 50)
214
-
DG 59
460
-
DG 51
608
-
CD 48
 
134
-
BF 71
217
-
CD 48
488
-
CD 48
615
-
BF 91
 
135
-
CE 33
221
-
CD 48
508
-
CF 82
618
-
CF 28
 
154
-
Op(DO 70)
228
-
CD 48
510
-
CE 99
634
-
BF 54
 
155
-
BF 54
232
-
CD 70
511
-
CQ 58
641
-
CD 48
 
159
-
BF 54
257
-
BF 91
513
-
EJ 62
642
-
CD 70
 
170
-
AL 42
271
-
Op(AK 54)
515
-
EJ 62
645
-
BD 36
 
172
-
DG 44
306
-
BE 93
521
-
Op(CA 80)
650
-
Op(AJ 37)
 
177
-
Op(KY 94)
308
-
AL 20
527
-
Op(DM 40)
653
-
BF 71
 
178
-
Op(JA 16)
333
-
DG 59
530
-
DG 44
666
-
CD 70
 
180
-
EH 62
334
-
AE 84
535
-
AL 17
667
-
BD 27
 
181
-
Op(KQ 49)
336
-
CD 70
536
-
Op(AL 18)
669
-
Op(AK 86)
 
185
-
BE 92
341
-
AK 68
552
-
BF 64
732
-
BE 93
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
BF 71
558
-
CD 70
758
-
DG 51
 
193
-
CD 70
388
-
AF 76
564
-
BE 92
759
-
CF 49
 
194
-
AO
413
-
BF 52
569
-
CF 19
951
-
CD 70
                   
953
-
CD 70
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 413 - 515 - 552 - 569.
  Entered Port:  U 413 - Brest;  U 552 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Escort for outward-bound U-boat groups.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 126 situation:  Operation promising during full
       
- 479 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      moon in ET 70 via FE 50 to FF 80.  Air activity in FE 31 and 37.  Regular traffic from ET 38 on 15.5. to FM 27.  Fast freighter sighted in ET 7817 on 15.5., course 1850.
    2) U 527 sighted a NW-bound convoy at night on 13.6 in DL 3277 and was forced to dive by a destroyer.  Later encounter 3 submarine chasers, similar to the PC class, in DL 3374.  Land-based aircraft and seaplane activity at times by day.  Boat is moving away to the west during the full moon period.
    3) U 536 passed through the Iceland Passage via AF 49 - AE 66 - AL 14.  Slight air activity.  Corvette patrol observed and location transmission from aircraft and destroyers.  No mines.
    4) U 84 reported:  Passage in company good.  No air activity in southern Biscay.  Sunderland shadowed on 12.6., no attack.  A Sunderland on 13.6. twice failed to notice the boats.
  b) The group of JU's was attacked once by 5 and later again by 6 English aircraft and scattered.  No damage.  A FW 200 which also took off for reconnaissance did not return to its base.
  c) U-boat sightings:  DN 77 and 4 others with no position given:  of the latter, one probably in the Bight, one S. of Iceland and 2 in Biscay.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) According to our own reckoning, transports with material for Gibraltar may be expected in DE 30 and 60 on 17.6.  A W-bound convoy will be in the same area on about 20.6.  Group "Trutz" has therefore been ordered to take up the following disposition by 1200/16/6:
      U 608 - 228 - 558 - 642 in patrol line from DE 3114 to 6771, distance apart 100 miles.
      U 641 - 603 - 666 - 951 - 953 - 232 - 336 in patrol line from DE 3159 to 9126, distance apart 50 miles.
      U 221 - 211 - 435 - 193 in patrol line from DE 3512 to 9248, distances apart 100 miles.
      This disposition gives a distance of 25 miles between boats.  The depth in quarterline is intended to prevent if possible that, if one boat is detected, the neighboring ones are picked up at the same time
 
 
 
- 480 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      and the direction of the disposition thus made known to the enemy.  The large gaps have to be accepted.
    2) Having completed dummy radio traffic as ordered, U 650 has been given orders to return.  U 667 will occupy the attack area AK 9896, depth 80 miles.
    3) New approach points:  U 84 and 306:  DG 40, U 732, 653, 358 and 134:  DF 50.
  c) 1) U 488 has supplied the rest of Group "Trutz" as ordered.  She is proceeding E. to refuel further boats.
    2) In addition, the following have refueled:  U 603 from U 119, U 333 from U 214, U 92 from U 460 and U 758.
  d) 1) U 172 heard bombs and depth charges on 12.6. in DF 4455.  The supply operation intended in this square from U 118 was then transferred 100 miles to the south.  So far U 118 has not arrived there and has not replied to calls.  It must be assumed that she was lost in the attack on 12.6.
    2) U 217 did not arrive in the square ordered for supply of Group "Trutz".  She last made a weather report from BD 47 on 23.5. and was then on her way to the Group "Trutz" patrol line, DF 10 and 40.  She must be presumed lost.  She may have been sunk during the attacks made by carrier-borne aircraft, on "Trutz" boats on 4.6. (see War Log).  There is no further information.
    3) U 594 had orders to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, into the Mediterranean at the same time as U 409.  As numerous reports showed that the boats had been detected they were ordered to move away to the west and report if it was impossible to break through.  Since then there has been no news of U 594.  She must be presumed lost.
    4) U 564, in an outward bound group of 5 boats was attacked by a Sunderland in BE 9453 and subsequently unable to dive.  The aircraft was shot down.  U 185 remained with the damaged boat to give assistance and the other 3 continued on their outward passage.  When U 564 was fit to proceed at 12 knots, she started for home with U 185.  She was still unable to dive.  It is intended that both these boats shall be met by the destroyers Z 24 and Z 32, which were leaving Verden at 0600/14/6.  The destroyers will then escort U 564 home and U 185 will continue on her outward passage.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 653 - 1 aircraft.
 
 
 
       
- 481 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
VI. General:
  1) G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces' decision to allow Ju'88's to fly only in groups, owing to their small striking power has had the result that the enemy's heavy fighters also only appear in groups.  This new state of affairs is only a disadvantage for incoming and outgoing boats, as they cannot get the better of several attacking a/c even if a number of boats are firing at once.  Experience during the next few days will show whether or not it is best for boats to proceed in groups.
  2) Carrier-borne a/c have several times been sighted on the American-Gibraltar route and it seems likely that a/c carriers are permanently stationed here and patrol the convoy routes, while the a/c which are equipped with excellent location gear, carry out anti-S/m hunts.  This may have been the cause of U 118's loss.  All boats have again been reminded that a/c must always be expected even in the most remote areas.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 195
-
CG 45
U 417
-
AE 84
U 590
-
CF 43
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
196
-
Op(JA 29)
420
-
AN 36
592
-
BD 30
 
68
-
BF 72
197
-
Op(JA 55)
435
-
DF 17
600
-
BF 81
 
84
-
CG 36
198
-
Op(KQ 58)
449
-
AK 37
603
-
CD 48
 
92
-
CE 97
199
-
ER 84
450
-
BD 30
608
-
BF 81
 
119
-
CD 52
200
-
AN 36
455
-
CD 59
615
-
BF 81
 
126
-
FE 76
211
-
CD 48
460
-
DG 25
618
-
CF 46
 
134
-
BE 95
214
-
DG 58
488
-
CD 48
634
-
BF 72
 
135
-
CE 37
221
-
CD 48
508
-
DH 12
641
-
CD 48
 
154
-
Op(DQ 70)
228
-
CD 48
510
-
DG 26
642
-
DF 17
 
155
-
BF 71
232
-
DF 17
511
-
CQ 92
645
-
BD 30
 
159
-
BF 72
257
-
BF 81
513
-
Op(FQ 30)
650
-
AK 41
 
170
-
AK 69
271
-
Op(AK 54)
515
-
EJ 31
653
-
BE 95
 
172
-
DG 47
306
-
CF 36
521
-
Op(CA 80)
666
-
CD 77
 
177
-
Op(KZ 74)
308
-
AL 20
527
-
Op(DM 85)
667
-
BD 20
 
178
-
Op(JA 25)
333
-
DG 59
530
-
DG 71
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
180
-
EH 31
334
-
AE 79
535
-
AL 19
732
-
CF 36
 
181
-
Op(KQ 58)
336
-
DF 17
536
-
AK 63
758
-
DG 25
 
185
-
BE 97
341
-
Op(AK 61)
558
-
CD 78
759
-
CE 96
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
358
-
BE 95
569
-
CE 39
951
-
CD 77
 
193
-
DF 17
388
-
AF 48
571
-
CF 51
953
-
DF 17
 
194
-
AN 36
415
-
BF 72
572
-
DG 46      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 180 - 195 - 214 - 515 - 569.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  1) Fighter protection for inward and outward bound boats in Biscay.
  2) Against S-bound Gibraltar convoy.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
       
- 482 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  a)  Boat's reports of aircraft attacks see para. IVd.
  b)  Convoy was picked up by 4 FW 200 and one ship probably sunk.  On their return flight the aircraft shot down a Halifax towing a glider in about CG 20.
  c) U-boat sightings:  CA 87, DB 74, EO 15, DG 8575, DM 56, DB 95 and 2 others in unknown positions, probably Iceland area.
     Enemy air reconnaissance in Biscay was particularly strong on 14.6.  A group of 3 U-boats was reported in BF 4471, and 2 other boats E-bound in about BF 4921.  An attack on a U-boat was also reported.  One of the attacking aircraft made SOS signals during the afternoon.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  One E-bound and one W-bound fast convoy can be expected today in Group "Trutz's" patrol line, according to reckoning.  No operation is intended, but boats are to make use of any chances to attack.
  b) 1) U 513 has freedom of action as far as the Brazilian coast.  Territorial waters need not be respected.  Bombarding the coast and penetrating into harbors is still forbidden.
    2) U 333 is to operate off Freetown.  She is making for ET 50.
    3) The following attack areas in the N. Atlantic will be occupied, depth 80 miles:  U 449 : AK 5113, U 334 : AK 5999, U 592 : BD 2955.
  c)  The present unfavorable fuel situation makes it necessary to use some IXC boats as tankers.  Boats with one or two machine guns can be considered, and they are to get the new quadruple mounting turret on their return.
     U 488 is now steering for CE 78 and is there to take over fuel from U 170 and U 536.
     U 172, 572, 180 and 759 will supply from U 530 in DG 7777.  U 530 and 180 will then return home in company and the other boats will steer for positions ordered.
  d) 1) One of the two destroyers which put out to give assistance returned because of engine trouble.  The rendezvous was ordered for 2100 in BF 7566.  During the afternoon U 180 and 564 were several times attacked by aircraft.  One aircraft shadowed constantly.  After a further bombing attack in BF 7549 U 564 sank.  U 185 took the Commanding Officer and 18 other survivors on board.  She met the destroyer as planned and continued on her outward passage after she had handed over the men.  The Ju 88's sent
 
 
 
- 483 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      out as escort shot down the English aircraft which was still shadowing.
    2) A group of 5 outward bound boats was also attacked several times by aircraft.  U 257 and 615 reported a stick of bombs which had not caused any serious damage.  U 155 and U 68 started back as several men had been seriously wounded by gunfire from 4 heavy fighters.  U 449 was also attacked at low level in AK 51, but she reported only slight damage.
    3) U 592 met U 450 and 645 and medical assistance was given to the wounded.  U 450 and 645 then started on their return passage in company and U 592 proceeded to her operations area as ordered.
    4) On the basis of recent experence in Biscay, the following order has been given to the boats.  With immediate groups of U-boats will proceed through Biscay mainly submerged and will surface only to charge batteries.  Instructions for procedure when surprised by aircraft are unaffected by this order.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
15.June 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
-
Op(DC 10)
U 194
-
AN 31
U 388
-
AE 69
U 569
-
CE 29
 
67
-
Op(DO 30)
195
-
GG 14
415
-
BE 96
571
-
CF 48
 
68
-
BF 57
196
-
Op(JA 35)
417
-
AE 78
572
-
DG 72
 
84
-
CF 53
197
-
Op(JA 64)
420
-
AN 31
590
-
CF 48
 
92
-
CE 92
198
-
Op(KQ 98)
435
-
DF 41
592
-
BD 33
 
119
-
CD 61
199
-
FC 24
449
-
Op(AK 01)
600
-
BF 74
 
126
-
ET 47
200
-
AN 31
450
-
BD 33
603
-
CC 99
 
134
-
CF 26
211
-
DE 33
455
-
CD 57
608
-
CC 99
 
135
-
CE 55
214
-
DG 28
460
-
DG 22
615
-
BF 74
 
154
-
Op(DQ 70)
221
-
CD 77
488
-
CD 57
618
-
CF 72
 
155
-
BF 57
228
-
DE 35
508
-
DH 18
634
-
BE 96
 
159
-
BE 96
232
-
DE 66
510
-
DG 54
641
-
CG 99
 
170
-
AK 95
257
-
BF 74
511
-
GR 74
642
-
DE 66
 
172
-
DG 77
271
-
Op(AK 54)
513
-
Op(FQ 50)
645
-
BD 33
 
177
-
Op(KZ 83)
306
-
CF 53
515
-
DT 83
650
-
AK 45
 
178
-
Op(JA 34)
308
-
AL 20
521
-
Op(CA 80)
653
-
CF 31
 
180
-
DS 86
333
-
DT 11
527
-
Op(DL 52)
666
-
DE 36
 
181
-
Op(KQ 67)
334
-
AK 39
530
-
DG 77
667
-
BD 23
 
185
-
BE 95
336
-
DE 66
535
-
AK 63
669
-
Op(AK 89)
 
190
-
Op(CA 80)
341
-
Op(AK 61)
536
-
AK 56
732
-
CF 53
 
193
-
DE 66
358
-
CF 26
558
-
DE 39
758
-
DG 20
       
759
-
DG 23
951
-
DE 36
953
-
DE 63
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 119 - 126 - 180 - 185 - 195 - 214 - 515 - 564 - 569 - 650.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 338 - 487 - Bordeaux.
       
- 484 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 66 situation:  23.5. chased a freighter, course 1200, speed 16 knots, as far as DE 81.  9.6. misses at 2 large tankers, 10.6. new tanker sunk.  All ships course about 200, speed 15 knots.  Since then nothing sighted.  Air activity in DB 6289, constant patrol by airship flying boats and fighter bombers along 200 meter line.  Location so far only at night in DB 30.
    2) U 600 reports the results of passage through Biscay 3 Sunderlands flew over on 14.6. in BF 7258, group dived and badly placed depth-charges were dropped.  Bombed in BF 7272, slight damage.  Aircraft shot down by U 600 in the second run-in.  Attack on U 615 in BF 7421, no damage.
    3) U 533 reported:  Bombed in AE 79 on 8.6. after repairs boat was able to dive sufficiently to start on return passage.
    4) U 449 was dive-bombed and machine-gunned in AK 2857.  No damage, but medical assistance required.
    5) U 572 sighted a submarine in DG 7715.  Probably one of our own boats.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BA 98, DB 3878 and 4 sightings in Biscay, including one depth-charge attack.  One sighting by aircraft in the Iceland area, probably N. half of AL.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Contrary to previous orders, U 455 will now make for CG 50.  There she will have freedom of action against enemy traffic from and to Lisbon.  Boat has been informed of traffic and anti-submarine situation and ordered to respect territorial waters.
    2) U 536 and 170 are steering for CE 78 and are there to deliver fuel to U 488.  The same goes for U 535 provided the state of the boat permits.
  c) 1) U 590, 618 and 571 will refuel from U 488 from 18.6. in CE 7895.
    2) U 592 is proceeding N. at maximum speed to give medical assistance to U 449.
       
- 485 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  U 758 has started on her return passage in company with U 214 and 460.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 66 - 1 ship  8,000 GRT
    U 600 - 1 aircraft.
       
       
                                                    (Signed):  GODT
                                                                    Chief of Operations Department
                                                                                       for B.d.U.
       
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 486 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Radar Decoy Device APHRODITE.
   Most Secret.
       
I Purpose:
  1)  Radar decoy device APHRODITE is intended to deceive enemy units fitted with radar and so provide tactical advantages for the U-boat.
       
II Description:
  2)  The device consists of a balloon of 70-90 cm. diameter filled with nitrogen, connected to a plate anchor by a wire rope 50 meters long.  3 strips of aluminum foil 4 meters long are attached to the wire rope 8 meters apart.
       
III. Method of Operation:
  3) The radar pulses transmitted by the enemy are reflected by the aluminum foil and the clips made in the enemy radar set are almost the same as those made by pulses reflected from a U-boat.  At first the enemy Radar Operator will not be able to distinguish them unless he is within visual range, and even later, when he knows of the existence of the device and has gained a certain amount of experience from its frequent use, he will easily be misled.
  4)  The device lasts from about 2-8 hours, according to weather, and makes effective reflections during this time.
  5)  The anchor prevents the balloon rising or sinking rapidly and thereby giving away the fact that it is a decoy.
  6) According to tests made so far (in the Baltic) the device cannot be used in wind force above 5-6, sea above 4-5, as in a stronger wind the balloon is swept into the sea or the mooring rope and/or strips of foil are torn away.
       
IV. Tactical use:
  a) General:
  7) So far only the results of trials in the Baltic are available and only guiding principles can be given for operational use, based on theory.  It is left to the boats to collect practical experiences for effective operational use.  Information obtained should be reported by radio at next opportunity for the benefit of other boats.
  8) As the balloon is comparatively large and easily visible especially by surface vessels, the Radar decoy device is for the present only to be used at night or in very bad visibility (fog), so as
 
 
 
- 487 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     not to give the enemy information before necessary.  It is also not to be used near the coast if there is any danger that it will drift ashore.
  b) Use on passage.
  9) If a boat observes an enemy unit fitted with Radar, she can start the device before diving.  It is probable that the enemy will make for the decoy and will search for the boat (with searchlight?) in the immediate vicinity.  Information as to whether or not aircraft are deceived by the decoy into dropping bombs at night is of particular value.  A specific advantage for the U-boat is however hardly to be expected.  (Organized use of a large number of decoys to "foul" a particular area (e.g. Biscay) is not intended until information has been obtained on the enemy's reaction to the Radar decoy device).
  c) Use in patrol and reconnaissance lines:
  10)  The Radar decoy device is not to be used in patrol and reconnaissance lines, as the boat may not on any account betray her presence and must dive immediately when enemy radar activity is observed.
  d) Use against Radar-fitted surface forces:
  11) If the U-boat is approached by surface forces because of Radar location, she can in certain circumstances shake off the enemy by means of this device.  After starting the decoy, it will probably be best to dive and make away submerged to leeward or against the wind.  The destroyer will probably continue to locate and pursue the decoy; hydrophone listening should show whether this is so.
    When, according to visibility conditions, the boat is sufficiently far away from the decoy, she can surface and make away above water or approach the convoy.
  12) If the destroyer is approaching at long range the U-boat may be able to make away on the surface and get away from the enemy by slowly moving away from the line of sight between destroyer and decoy.  It is important here to keep the same distance between pursuing vessel and decoy and pursuing vessel and U-boat, as a difference of range is sooner recognized than a slight change of bearing.  The destroyer must be closely observed.  If she is clearly making for the decoy, the boat can sheer off at a broader angle.  If the decoy does not appear to be so successful, the boat must dive and proceed according to paragraph 11).
  e) Use in Convoy:
  13)  If aircraft are known to be with the convoy, several decoys can be started, at intervals of at least 5 minutes.  Because of the speed of the aircraft and the greater range of their Radar, it is to be expected that they will pick up these decoys after a time even if they had not located or sighted the boat before the decoys were started.  The aircraft will then presumably be taken up with the decoy for some time and will not pick up or approach the U-boat during that time.
 
 
 
- 488 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  14) As the Radar decoy device will not be easily visible by an aircraft even by day at low level, it can, in special cases, be used even by day against air escort, outside visual range of the convoy.  (Care should be taken that the decoy does not drift into the convoy by day, note direction of wind).
  15)  A boat ahead of the convoy at night can, if the wind is favorable, start one or more decoys (at adequate intervals) so that they appear to one side of the convoy at not too great a distance off as it approaches.  It is possible that the escort on this wing will then be taken up with the decoys and the boat will be able to approach and attack undisturbed.
  16)  If the decoys are started so as to drift past the convoy on both sides, a large part of the escort forces may pursue them and drop astern; at the least the escort forces will be confused.
       
V. Analysis of experiences:
  17) Boats must try out suitable methods for themselves on the basis of these guiding principles and at their own discretion.  Short reports should be made by radio and a detailed description of methods used and successes (if necessary with diagram) given on return.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 489 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U. Op.
   Ref. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 234.
     
7.June 1943.
       
U-boats as of 1st June 1943.
       
I   
In Commission on 1.5.1943 :  
425
boats
Commissioned during May:  
28
boats
   
453
boats
Losses during May: on operations  
38
    "
                                    at home.  
0
    "
Paid off  
3
    "
In commission on 1.6.1943:  
412
    "
        plus foreign boats  
8
    "
       
II   
In the Atlantic:
Type VIIc:
U 203
-
439
-
332
 
Type IX:
U 465
-
638
-
438
 
U 630
-
663
-
456
 
U 89  
-
753
-
447
 
U 659
-
646
-
640
 
U 657
-
227
-
381
 
U 954
-
273
-
752
 
U 260
-
209
-
258
 
U 563
-
467
=  26
 
Type IX:
U 125
-
531
-
192
 
U 528
-
186
-
109
 
U 176
-
128
=  8
 
Type IXd 2
U 182
=  1
 
Type XIV
U 463
=  1
In the Mediterranean:
Type VIIc:
U 303
-
755
=  2
In Northern Waters
 
= 0
 
Total:
 
38
 
 
   
 
- 491 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Details of losses:
    
U 203 - Experienced boat.  Last report 24.5. weather S of Greenland.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 439 - Second patrol, no report.  Loss probably due to air attacks.
U 332 -         - ditto -
U 465 -         - ditto -
U 638 - Second patrol.  New Commanding Officer.  Last report, 5.5.  S of Greenland, re the convoy.  Loss probably due to surface forces.
U 438 - Experienced boat.  Last report 6.5.  S of Greenland re convoy.  Loss probably due to surface forces.
U 630 - First patrol.  Last report 17.4.  Weather W of Ireland.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 663 - Experienced boat.  Last report 7.5. heavily bombed by a/c in Biscay.  Loss due to air attack.
U 456 - Experienced boat.  Last report 12.5. W of Biscay.  Unable to dive.  Lost at the convoy.
U 89 - Experienced boat.  Last report re convoy 12.5. W of Biscay.  Presumably lost at the convoy.
U 753 - Experienced boat.  Last report 11.5. W of Biscay re attack on convoy.  Presumably lost by air attack at the convoy.
U 447 - Second patrol.  Last report 5.5. W of Portugal.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 659 - Experienced boat.  Last report 4.5. W of Portugal.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 646 - First patrol.  No report.  Presumed lost by air attack.
U 640 - First patrol.  Last report 14.5. SW of Iceland.  Contact with convoy lost.  Presumed lost by air attack.
U 657 - Experienced boat.  11.5. passage report.  Loss probably due to surface forces with the convoy.
U 227 - First patrol.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
 
 
 
- 491 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    
U 381 - Experienced boat.  Last report 9.5. SE of Greenland re tests with shadower buoy.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 954 - First patrol.  Last report 19.5. SE of Greenland.  Probably lost at convoy.
U 273 - First patrol.  Last report 19.5. when passing 600 N to the S.  Loss presumably due to air attack.
U 752 - Experienced boat.  Last report 13.5. W of Biscay.  2 destroyers lost by air attack from convoy.
U 266 - Second patrol.  Last report 12.5. SE Greenland.  Presumed lost by air attack.
U 209 - Experienced boat.  Last report 6.5. re bomb damage.  Lost by air attack.
U 258 - Experienced boat.  Last report 20.5. SE of Greenland.  No contact with convoy.  Loss presumed due to air attack.
U 125 - Experienced boat.  Last report 6.5.  Rammed SE of Greenland.
U 531 - First patrol.  Last report 5.5. SE of Greenland, re destroyers.  Loss presumed due to surface forces with the convoy.
U 192 - First patrol.  Last report 3.5. SE of Greenland, re successes against convoy.  Loss presumed due to air attack.
U 528 - First patrol.  Last report W of Biscay.  Unable to dive.  Loss presumed due to air attack.
U 186 - Second patrol.  Last report 12.5. Azores re convoy.  Loss presumed due to surface forces with the convoy.
U 109 - Experienced boat.  Last report 2.5.  Loss presumed due to air attack.
U 176 - Experienced boat.  Last report 21.4. SW of the Canaries.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 182 - Experienced boat.  Last report SW of Freetown re sinking.  Loss presumed due to a/c.
U 463 - Experienced boat.  No report.  Loss presumed due to air attack.
U 303 - Second patrol.  Torpedoed off Toulon.
 
 
 
- 492 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    
U 563 - Experienced boat, new C.O.  Last report 31.5. from Biscay.  Bombed and unable to dive.
U 467 - Second patrol.  No report.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 128 - Experienced boat, new C.O.  Last report 17.5. NE of Bahia.  Cause of loss unknown.
U 755 - Experienced boat.  Sunk by a/c 28.5. in W Mediterranean.
       
III. Distribution:
   
 
II
VIIa
VIIb/c
VIId
VIIf
IXb/c
IXD1
IXD2
XIV
XB
 
On operations:
5
-
148
3
-
44
2
7
6
3
218
On trials:
-
-
    93  
-
2
19
-
6
2
2
124
Training:
33
4
     30**
-
-
3
-
-
-
-
70
 
  38*
4
271
3
2
70
2
13
8
5
412
* Plus one boat temporarily paid off for Black Sea (U 23)      
** 12 of these temporarily detached for training purposes.
     
       
  In May:
    
Became operational :   +
16
boats
Total number decreased by:   -
13
boats
Number of operational boats decreased by:   -
22
boats
Number of boats on trials increased by:   +
6
boats
Number of training boats increased by:   +
3
boats
       
IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1.6. 1943:
    
Atlantic
183
boats
  (1.5.  :  207)
Mediterranean
18
"
  (1.5.  :  18)
Northern Waters
12
"
  (1.5.  :  12)
Black Sea
5
"
  (1.5.  :  3)
218
boats.
       
V. In the Atlantic in May:
    
Daily average at sea:
118
boats.
Of these, in operations area:
42
    "
On passage:
76
    "
Of the latter, homeward bound
26
    "
       
VI. Sailed during May for the Atlantic:
    
From home
16
boats.
From W. France and Bergen
46
    "
       
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 493 -
 
 
     

 


 

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