U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30323

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 May 1943

PG30323

1.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BF 40	U 195	-	FU 44	U 403	-	Op(BC 68)	U 569	-	Op(BC 37)
	68	-	CF 36	196	-	GQ 35	404	-	BF 40	571	-	BF 68
	84	-	BE 64	197	-	DS 34	406	-	Op(BE 94)	575	-	BD 38
	89	-	Op(BE 94)	198	-	GZ 42	410	-	CG 45	584	-	Op(AJ 76)
	91	-	BF 40	202	-	BF 40	413	-	Op(AJ 30)	598	-	AK 89
	92	-	Op(AJ 88)	203	-	AJ 96	415	-	BE 65	600	-	Op(BE 94)
	103	-	BE 42	209	-	Op(AJ 30)	418	-	AE 66	607	-	Op(BE 85)
	105	-	FE 13	217	-	BF 11	436	-	Op(BE 86)	610	-	AK 89
	107	-	BE 41	218	-	AM 51	438	-	Op(AJ 75)	613	-	BE 66
	108	-	AK 74	223	-	Op(BC 26)	439	-	Op(BE 94)	614	-	Op(BD 22)
	109	-	BF 40	226	-	Op(BD 23)	447	-	Op(BE 95)	616	-	CG 90
	117	-	DG 85	227	-	AE 66	448	-	Op(BC 62)	618	-	BE 55
	119	-	BE 59	230	-	Op(BE 85)	454	-	Op(BC 65)	621	-	BD 25
	123	-	Op(ET)	231	-	Op(AJ 30)	456	-	Op(BE 85)	628	-	Op(AJ 88)
	125	-	Op(BC 23)	257	-	BE 64	459	-	AK 98	630	-	Op(AJ 75)
	126	-	Op(ES 97)	258	-	Op(AJ 30)	460	-	CF 54	631	-	AK 89
	128	-	Op(FC 53)	260	-	Op(AJ 87)	461	-	BD 36	634	-	Op(BC 26)
	129	-	Op(CA)	262	-	Op(BB 40)	465	-	BF 80	638	-	AD 22
	134	-	BF 40	264	-	Op(AJ 89)	466	-	Op(BC 62)	645	-	AE 66
	154	-	Op(FC 96)	266	-	Op(BC 26)	468	-	Op(BC 62)	648	-	Op(AJ 30)
	160	-	DG 36	267	-	AK 89	487	-	BD 87	650	-	Op(AJ 30)
	161	-	Op(CB 10)	270	-	Op(AJ 87)	504	-	BD 36	659	-	Op(BE 86)
	168	-	Op(AJ 76)	304	-	AF 87	506	-	CF 35	662	-	Op(AJ 75)
	176	-	DG 98	306	-	AK 98	509	-	DH 14	664	-	BF 40
	177	-	FU 64	332	-	Op(BE 94)	514	-	Op(AJ 76)	706	-	Op(AJ 30)
	178	-	GG 25	340	-	AN 35	515	-	Op(ET 53)	707	-	Op(AJ 88)
	180	-	KQ 90	358	-	Op(AJ 89)	516	-	BE 98	709	-	Op(BC 37)
	181	-	GZ 56	359	-	OP(BC 65)	525	-	Op(BD 38)	731	-	AN 35
	182	-	FE 71	377	-	Op(BC 34)	528	-	AK 18	732	-	Op(AJ 87)
	183	-	DG 84	378	-	Op(AJ 30)	531	-	Op(AJ 30)	752	-	BE 44
	185	-	BE 96	381	-	Op(AJ 30)	532	-	Op(AJ 30)	760	-	AN 36
	186	-	Op(BC 68)	383	-	Op(BC 37)	533	-	Op(AJ 30)	952	-	AE 67
	192	-	Op(AJ 30)	386	-	AK 24	552	-	Op(AJ 30)	954	-	Op(AJ 30)
	188	-	BF 40	402	-	BD 34

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 108 - 134 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 203 - 257 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 387 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 571 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: U 640 Kiel; U 190 - Lorient.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance of England - Gibraltar traffic north of the "Drossel" disposition.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 33 (see para. IVa).
		2)	U 515 reported: In Et 6128 a freighter (7,000 GRT) burning and sinking, 2 other freighters of 6,000 GRT probably sinking. (Presumably vessels belonging to the convoy attacked on 30.4)

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		3)	U 182 sank "Adelfotis" (5,838 GRT) in FD 6884, course 40⁰. According to radio, up to 25 planes from FF 31 to FM 27 each day, speed 300 kilometers.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: AJ 42, AJ 8990. Three sightings, position unidentified. Report of attack in AJ 32. Report of torpedoing in South Atlantis (position unknown).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 33: Final Remarks:
			The continuing bad weather also prevented contact being reestablished on 1st May. As there was little prospect of picking the convoy up again while weather remained hazy, the boats were ordered to break off the operation at dusk on 1st May.
			To sum up:
			The operations against the convoy with 16 boats in all suffered from first to last from very hazy weather and strong S.W. wind, against which the boats had to struggle during their pursuit of the enemy. Lookout, finding and shadowing of the convoy were much hampered thereby. In all, only 5 boats contacted the convoy. After 29th April contact could not be reestablished.
			The only success was scored by U 258, who probably sank 2 ships and torpedoed a third. Naval defences were not reported as very strong. No reports were received about them. There was some air activity on the first day, but only seaplanes. During the last night a boat reported continuous air patrol, probably based on Greenland. The same boat observed what was probably a new type of location gear. The Commander repeatedly noticed planes approaching at great height and carrying a light like a planet that went on and off. No location was heard at the time.
			Two boats had to give up the chase because of enemy counter-measures. They were bombed and depth-charged and badly damaged. No boats were lost while attacking the convoy.
			The whole operation was hampered by heavy atmospherics, so that Operational Control had no definite information on the course of the operation from midnight until noon the next day. It can therefore be said that this attack failed only because of the bad weather, not because of the enemy's defences.
		2)	Convoy No. 34:
			At 2100 on 1st May, U 628 reported several plumes of smoke in BC 2215. As Operational

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			Control assumed that it was the expected "SC 128", all boats belonging to Group "Specht" were detailed to attack. They numbered 18 in all: U 438, 662, 630, 584, 168, 514, 270, 260, 732, 92, 628, 707, 258, 264, 614, 226 and 125. When it became obvious later that the convoy was definitely sailing N.E., boats belonging to Group "Star" which were stationed to the north, were also detailed to attack. They were: U 648, 533, 531, 954, 192, 381, 231, 419, 552, 378, 269, 258 and 650. Thus a total of 31 boats were stalking the convoy.
			At 0109 U 628 reported the convoy in 8896 with course 0, speed 8 knots. At 0444 U 260 reported star shell in AJ 8958. Further reports on the convoy were not received.
			All reports were much delayed, as the boats could apparently not establish contact with Control because of radio interference in the convoy area. Boats were therefore again directed to use group frequency. The operation is being continued.
	b)	1)	Group "Amsel" and Group "Specht" have been ordered to steer an easterly course at 2400 with a speed of 7 knots and to man the position line reached at 0900 on 2nd May as a patrol strip. This should ensure that the convoy which is expected from 1400 on shall not pass the patrol strip during the night.
		2)	U 176 has been given a free hand in area DM, the eastern third of DL, and the western and central thirds of DN. Focal points lie around DM 52 and DN 76. Boat will be given situation summary by U 155, U 68 and U 183.
	c)	U 487 has given her remaining fuel to U 461, has taken over Engineer Officer from U 504 and is continuing her homeward voyage.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 515 - 3 ships 19,000 GRT
	U 182 - 1 ship 5,838 GRT.

VI.	General:
	The increase of the boats in Northern Waters to 22 which was ordered in March has not brought good results because there is little enemy shipping. The last "P.Q." convoy was attacked at the beginning of March, since then no contact has been made with the enemy.
	The war against total (enemy) tonnage demands that the submarines should be detailed to attack in the area that has proved the most fruitful. As chances are better at present in the North Atlantic than in Northern Waters, and as there is no information about recommencement of supplies to Arctic harbors, First Division of Naval War Staff has issued the following order:

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	Group North is to keep 12 boats, so that there are always about 4 boats in the operational area. If definite signs of a convoy or of an enemy landing are observed the group will be reinforced by boats from the Atlantic. The danger of boats arriving too late has to be accepted.
	F.d.U. Norway has reported that the following boats are available for operations in the Atlantic: U 269, 334, 355, 467, 636, 646, 657, 629, also U 304 is leaving Kiel. The boats will be operationally ready by about 20.5.
	The boats reported as being available will remain with their former flotillas and are also to carry out their dockyard period there in order to make the most of the dockyard capacity available and also to relieve the yards in Western France.
















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Supreme Command of the Navy

Second Division NAval War Staff/B.d.U. Op.

Reference No. 200.

1st May 1943.

Submarine Situation at 1st May 1943 .

In Commission on 1.4.1943 :	423	boats
Commissioned during April:	18	boats
	441
Losses during April, on operations:	14
at home:	0
Paid off (Collisions in home waters)	2
In commission on 1.5.1943:	425
plus foreign boats	9

Losses in March :

In the Atlantic:	Type VIIc:	U 635, 632, 376, 710	= 4
	Type IX:	U 169, 124, 167, 526, 175, 189, 191, 174	= 8
In the Mediterranean:	Type VIIc:	U 602	= 1
In Northern Waters	Type VIIc:	U 644	= 1
			14

Details:

In the Atlantic: Type VIIc.

U 635	-	First trip. Last message on 5.4. East of Greenland reporting convoy. Probably sunk by convoy escort
U 632	-	Second trip. Last message on 6.4. S.W. of Iceland reporting convoy. Probably sunk by convoy escort.
U 376	-	Well proved boat. No message. Lost in Biscay.
U 710	-	First trip, no message, no clues.
Type IX
U 124	-	Well proved boat. Last message reported contact with convoy on 1.4. in CF 3658 west of Portugal.
U 167	-	New boat, experienced Commander. Sunk on 6.4 off Gran Canaria by plane.
U 526	-	First trip. Sunk on 14.4. off Lorient by a mine.
U 169	-	First trip. No message. No clue.
U 191	-	First trip. Last message on 23.4 S.E. of England reporting convoy. Probably sunk by escort.
U 189	-	First trip. Last message on 23.4. reporting convoy S.E. of Greenland. Probably sunk by convoy escort.
U 174	-	Old boat, new Commander. Last message on 27.4 reporting convoy South of Newfoundland. Probably sunk by escort.

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	U 175	-	Well proved boat. Last message on 17.4. reporting contact with a convoy in Western Bay of Biscay. Probably sunk by escort.
	In the Mediterranean: Type VIIc:
	U 602	-	Well proved boat. Last message on 24.4. from Western Mediterranean. No clue.
In the North Atlantic: Type VIIc:
	U 644	-	First trip. Last message on 20.3 reporting that 67⁰ N had been passed. Probably sunk by enemy submarine.

II.

Distribution:

	II	VIIa	VIIb/c	VIId	IXb/c	IXD1	IXD2	XB	XIV	Total

On operations:	3	-	166	3	50	2	7	3	6	240
On trials:	-	-	89	-	18	-	6	2	3	118
School boats :	33	4	28**	-	2	-	-	-	-	67

	36*	4	283	3	70	2	13	5	9	425
* also 3 temporarily out of service in the Black Sea.
** 12 of these temporarily transferred for training purposes.

III.

During April :

Following have newly joined operational boats:		22
Total increased by:	+	2
Operational boats increased by:	+	5
Boats on trial decreased by:	-	6
School boats increased by:	+	3

IV.

Distribution of operational boats at 1.5.1943:

Atlantic	207	(1.4. 194)
Mediterranean	18	(1.4. 17)
Northern Waters	12	(1.4. 21)
Black Sea	3
	240

During April in the Atlantic:

Daily average at sea:	111	boats.
Of these, in operational area:	35	boats.
Cruising:	76	boats.
Of these, homeward bound	29	boats.

VI.

During April following left port:

From home ports	22	boats
From Western France	76	boats (including 2 from Norway)

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2.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 69	U 192	-	Op(AJ 60)	U 402	-	BD 12	U 569	-	Op(BC 62)
	68	-	BE 98	195	-	FU 76	403	-	Op(BC 92)	575	-	BD 13
	84	-	BF 40	196	-	GQ 63	404	-	BF 40	584	-	Op(AJ 89)
	89	-	Op(BE 94)	197	-	DS 64	406	-	Op(BE 86)	598	-	AK 89
	91	-	BE 66	198	-	GZ 57	410	-	CB 79	600	-	Op(BE 86)
	92	-	Op(AJ 89)	202	-	BE 66	413	-	Op(AJ 60)	607	-	Op(BE 85)
	103	-	BD 39	203	-	AK 79	415	-	BF 40	610	-	AK 89
	105	-	Op(ET 85)	209	-	Op(AJ 60)	418	-	AE 67	613	-	BF 40
	107	-	BD 37	217	-	BF 13	436	-	Op(BC 86)	614	-	Op(BC 26)
	108	-	AK 79	218	-	AM 52	438	-	Op(AJ 76)	616	-	CG 90
	109	-	BE 65	223	-	Op(BC 24)	439	-	Op(BE 94)	618	-	BE 64
	117	-	DG 85	226	-	Op(BC 26)	447	-	Op(BE 95)	621	-	BD 12
	119	-	BE 57	227	-	AE 67	448	-	Op(BC 65)	628	-	Op(BC 23)
	123	-	Op(ET)	230	-	Op(BE 85)	454	-	Op(BC 68)	630	-	Op(AJ 76)
	125	-	Op(BC 26)	231	-	Op(AJ 60)	456	-	Op(BE 85)	631	-	AK 89
	126	-	Op(ET 74)	257	-	BE 66	459	-	AK 98	634	-	Op(BC 34)
	128	-	Op(FC 82)	258	-	Op(AJ 60)	460	-	CF 76	638	-	AK 78
	129	-	Op(CA)	260	-	Op(AJ 88)	461	-	BD 36	640	-	AO
	134	-	BF 68	262	-	Op(BB 40)	465	-	BF 71	645	-	AE 67
	154	-	Op(FC 97)	264	-	Op(BC 23)	466	-	Op(BC 68)	648	-	Op(AJ 56)
	160	-	CF 76	266	-	Op(BC 37)	468	-	Op(BC 65)	650	-	Op(AJ 60)
	161	-	Op(CB 10)	267	-	AK 89	487	-	BE 43	659	-	Op(BE 86)
	168	-	Op(AJ 87)	270	-	Op(AJ 88)	504	-	BD 36	662	-	Op(AJ 76)
	176	-	DC 89	304	-	AF 73	506	-	BE 97	664	-	BE 69
	177	-	FU 92	306	-	AK 98	509	-	CF 82	706	-	AK 88
	178	-	GG 61	332	-	Op(BE 94)	514	-	Op(AJ 87)	707	-	Op(BC 28)
	180	-	Op(JA 29)	340	-	AN 30	515	-	Op(ET 53)	709	-	Op(BC 62)
	181	-	GZ 63	358	-	Op(BC 22)	516	-	BF 74	731	-	AN 30
	182	-	FD 63	359	-	Op(BC 68)	525	-	Op(BC 62)	732	-	Op(AJ 88)
	183	-	DG 85	377	-	Op(BC 37)	528	-	AK 52	752	-	BD 62
	185	-	BF 91	378	-	Op(AJ 60)	531	-	Op(AJ 60)	760	-	AN 30
	186	-	Op(BC 92)	383	-	Op(BC 83)	532	-	Op(AJ 60)	952	-	AE 82
	188	-	BF 40	386	-	AK 39	533	-	Op(AJ 60)	954	-	Op(AJ 60)
	190	-	BF 54	381	-	Op(AJ 60)	552	-	Op(AJ 64)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 108 - 134 - 160 - 182 - 185 - 188 - 203 - 257 - 306 - 386 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 134 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: U 405 - St. Nazaire; U 636 - Drontheim.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: No reconnaissance because of weather.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 34 (see para. IVa).
		2)	U 459 reported at 0215 that there was a destroyer in BD 3123, course 70⁰, depth charges dropped.
	b)	None.

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	c)	U-boat sightings: AJ 89, FL 28. (no boat ?) One sighting without position. (Group "Star" ?)
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 33:
			U 532 made a later report stating that she had fired a fan of 4 and of 2 at 0514 on 29.4. in AK 7856 and heard two definite detonations. She was then hunted with depth charges for 15 hours. Because of loud noises in the submarine itself, she began her homeward journey.
			U 192 fired a spread of 3 at a freighter of 5-6,000 GRT at 0230 on 1.5. in AJ 3797. Detonation was heard, but success could not be observed because of enemy defences and high seas. A double miss from stern tube fired at a 4,000 tonner was probably set too deep.
		2)	Convoy No. 34:
			During the morning of 2nd May weather was reported from the convoy area as wind south 5, visibility 6 miles. Towards evening the wind freshened to south 9, stormy, visibility up to 3 miles. One boat reported fog.
			The only news of the convoy came from U 628, who reported at 0956 from AJ 8695 a wide band, probably a convoy, on a true bearing of 300⁰.
			U 358 reported that she had searched on a northerly course without success. U 260, who had sighted a star shell during the night of 1/2 May, searched from 30 to 40⁰, also without success. According to the report from U 628 the convoy has probably steered a course of 20-25⁰ and speed of 7.7 knots by dead reckoning. This information was radioed to the boats as a clue. Boats were also informed that enemy courses of 10-50⁰ and 6.8 knots might be reckoned on for further hunting of the convoy.
			U 92 had to move away as her Diesel coupling and thrust bearing were faulty, 2 cylinder heads had cracked. The operation is being continued. with 29 boats.
	b)	1)	Following attack areas have been allocated: U 128 Freetown sector between 40 - 0⁰, U 105 between 0 - 310⁰. Move away at full moon if situation demands it.
			Approach points: U 203 to go to BC 31 after replenishing. U 202, 109, 91, 66, 664, 645 to collect in BD 33 to a depth of 80 miles, it is intended that they shall proceed from here in wide formation.

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	c)	1)	U 183 has refueled from U 117 and is returning.
		2)	As the Italian submarine did not keep her rendezvous for refueling, U 117 has turned back.
	d)	Order: In future do not report when Iceland-Faroes have been passed. Report by short signal when passing 61⁰ North to the south.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 532 - 2 hits
	U 192 - 1 hit.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 64	U 195	-	GF 31	U 403	-	Op(BC 99)	U 569	-	Op(BC 63)
	68	-	BF 60	196	-	GR 47	404	-	BF 65	575	-	BD 14
	84	-	BF 40	197	-	DS 91	405	-	BF 58	584	-	Op(AJ 90)
	89	-	Op(BE 94)	198	-	GZ 91	406	-	Op(BE 86	598	-	AK 89
	91	-	BE 65	202	-	BE 53	410	-	CG 80	600	-	Op(BE 86)
	92	-	Op(AJ 97)	203	-	AK 89	413	-	Op(AJ 84)	607	-	Op(BE 85)
	103	-	BD 34	209	-	Op(AJ 60)	415	-	BF 40	610	-	AK 98
	105	-	Op(ET 92)	217	-	BF 10	418	-	AE 83	613	-	BF 40
	107	-	BD 25	218	-	AM 50	436	-	Op(BE 86)	614	-	Op(AJ 96)
	108	-	AK 98	223	-	Op(BC 35)	438	-	OP(AJ 90)	616	-	CG 90
	109	-	BE 52	226	-	Op(AJ 90)	439	-	Op(BE 94)	618	-	BE 66
	117	-	DG 59	227	-	AE 59	447	-	Op(BE 95)	621	-	BC 32
	119	-	BE 42	230	-	Op(BE 85)	448	-	Op(BC 66)	628	-	Op(AJ 90)
	123	-	Op(ET 10)	231	-	Op(AJ 60)	454	-	Op(BC 69)	630	-	Op(AJ 60)
	125	-	Op(AJ 90)	257	-	BF 40	456	-	Op(BE 85)	631	-	AK 98
	126	-	Op(ET 73)	258	-	Op(AJ 60)	459	-	AK 99	634	-	Op(BC 35)
	128	-	Op(FK 12)	260	-	Op(AJ 90)	460	-	DG 33	636	-	AF 57
	129	-	Op(CA)	262	-	OP(BB 40)	461	-	AK 89	638	-	BC 32
	154	-	Op(FC 80)	264	-	Op(AJ 90)	465	-	BE 68	640	-	AN 30
	160	-	CF 58	266	-	Op(BC 38)	466	-	Op(BC 66)	645	-	AE 83
	161	-	Op(CB 20)	267	-	AK 89	468	-	Op(BC 66)	648	-	Op(AJ 37)
	168	-	Op(AJ 90)	270	-	Op(AJ 90)	487	-	BE 56	650	-	Op(AJ 60)
	176	-	Op(DM-DN)	304	-	AF 48	504	-	BD 14	659	-	Op(BE 86)
	177	-	FV 77	306	-	AK 98	506	-	BF 74	662	-	Op(AJ 90)
	178	-	GG 69	332	-	Op(BE 94)	509	-	CF 64	664	-	BE 64
	180	-	JA 50	340	-	AN 28	514	-	Op(AJ 60)	706	-	AK 99
	181	-	JJ 46	358	-	Op(AJ 90)	515	-	Op(ET 59)	707	-	Op(AJ 90)
	182	-	FD 34	359	-	Op(BC 69)	516	-	BF 61	709	-	Op(BC 63)
	183	-	DG 38	377	-	Op(BC 38)	525	-	Op(BC 63)	731	-	AN 28
	185	-	BF 93	378	-	Op(AJ 67)	528	-	AK 86	732	-	Op(AJ 60)
	186	-	Op(BC 99)	381	-	Op(AJ 60)	531	-	Op(AJ 60)	752	-	BD 29
	188	-	BF 55	383	-	Op(BC 39)	532	-	AK 61	760	-	AN 28
	190	-	BF 40	386	-	AK 60	533	-	Op(AJ 60)	952	-	AE 85
	192	-	Op(AJ 62)	402	-	BC 35	552	-	Op(AJ 60)	954	-	Op(AJ 60)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 108 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 203 - 257 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 706.

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	Entered Port: U 516 - 188 - Lorient; U 404 - St. Nazaire; U 185 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 221 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: In search of south-bound convoy in area west of Portugal (Group "Drossel").

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoys Nos. 34 - 35 see para. IVa.
		2)	U 177 sighted a tanker in DG 8298 on southerly course, speed 16 knots. She was forced to submerge by escort, was depth-charged and later continued her rendezvous with U 460.
		3)	U 415 was bombed 3 times by a plane in BF 74 while homeward bound. Despite much damage she was still able to dive. Boat has requested escort from outer point "KERN".
	b)	At 0844 convoy picked up in BE 9226. Made up of 24 freight barges, 3 escorts, course 60⁰. Another machine reported 10 merchant ships and 6 escorts at 0830 in BE 6977, course 180⁰, moderate speed.
	c)	Submarine sighted by tanker in DG 8340 (U 117) two other reports by planes in unidentified position.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operation:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 34:
			At midday on 3rd weather was reported from the convoy area as wind S.W. 9, sea force 7, visibility 2-6 miles. At nightfall visibility improved to 10 miles.
			No further reports came in about the convoy, so a reconnaissance line was detailed for 1800 with 29 boats from AJ 5333 via AJ 6348 to AK 4449 ahead of the supposed enemy course. The reconnaissance line proceeded at 1800 on a course of 205⁰ over ground speed 4 knots, to meet the convoy, and at 000 was to remain stationary in the position line reached.
			U 614 had to move away to make repairs because of a cracked cylinder cover.
			If the convoy is not picked up by the patrol line, it is intended to break off the attack on the convoy, as most of the boats are short of fuel, and it is pointless for them to run about after the convoy.
		2)	Convoy No. 35:
			"Drossel" air reconnaissance spotted a convoy

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		of 11 merchant vessels and 6 escorts in BE 6945 at 0830, southerly course, only 2 submarines heard the beacon signals sent by shadower. The new patrol strip from BE 9812 to 9932 which was to be manned at maximum speed did not become effective as U 89 sighted the convoy in BE 9529 at 1425. She was forced to retire temporarily during the afternoon, reestablished contact at 2145 and maintained it until the next morning. At 1840 another "Kondor" again shadowed the convoy, 6 boats heard its beacon signals and were able to get a good fix. The "Kondor" reported a second convoy of 27 transports up to 2,000 GRT and 3 escorts some 16 miles N.E. of the first convoy. This convoy was recognized as the one expected, interpretation of photos on the plane's return showed that the convoy consisted of 27 landing craft of the LCT type. (The same that had been sighted at 0844 in BE 9226 with course 60⁰)
		U 89 and U 456 contacted only the landing craft convoy during the night. U 89 fired 3 misses. U 456 reported that the sea way prevented any chance of scoring hits.
		Contact was lost after dawn on 4.5. The convoy of merchant ships was not found again, nor was it spotted by air reconnaissance during the day. It probably sailed at more than 10 knots and was therefore not sighted again by the boats. It is not intended to continue searching to the south, because of the strong enemy air patrols that must be expected from Gibraltar. The operation is thus finished.
b)	1)	Group "Amsel" has been divided into several sub-groups and ordered to proceed to the new patrol strip at economical cruising speed.
		Following dispositions have been made:
		Sub-division 1 consisting of U 638, 621, 402, 575 and 504 to man strip from AJ 7933 to AJ 8837.
		Sub-division 2 consisting of U 634, 223, 266, 377 and 383 to man strip from AJ 9761 to BC 3274.
		Sub-division 3 consisting of U 709, 569, 525, 468 and 448 to man strip from BC 3765 to BC 6541.
		Sub-division 4 consisting of U 466, 454, 359, 186 and 403 to man strip from BC 6949 to BC 9646.
		This new type of disposition should avoid the drawbacks that arise when a patrol remains in one place for a long time so that it is D/F'd, sighted, located etc. by the enemy, who thus finds out its entire extent. The outer boats have orders to create the impression of a complete patrol searching right around the Newfoundland Banks, but when the enemy uses his D/F or location gear he will find the gaps left by the

- 311 -

			sub-divisions and will probably make for them. It is also intended to combine the sub-divisions in a single line shortly before the convoys are expected to pass according to dead reckoning or high priority Radio Intercept Intelligence as it is not supposed that it will be possible to pick it up in such a short time.
		2)	After the following boats have passed the approach points ordered on 16.4., they are to man the attack areas shown: U 181 - KP 30, 50, 60 and KQ 10, 40. Focal point Lourenzo Marques. According to reliable reports there is brisk outward and inward traffic.
			U 198 and 196 - KP 80, 90 and KZ 10 to 30. U 198 is to steer N.E. and U 196 S.W. of the line running from KP 8480 to KZ 3990. Focal point off Durban.
			Italian submarine sank several ships in this area.
		3)	ES 80 is new approach point for U 460. It is intended that the boats off Freetown shall refuel here.
	c)	U 183 has refueled from U 460; U 306 from U 459; U 631, 610, 267, 706 and 108 from U 461.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 52	U 196	-	GR 78	U 402	-	Op(BC 27)	U 569	-	Op(BC 60)
	68	-	BF 70	197	-	EH 31	403	-	Op(BC 90)	575	-	Op(BC 31)
	84	-	BF 51	198	-	JJ 71	405	-	BF 40	584	-	Op(AJ 60)
	89	-	Op(CG 10)	202	-	BE 52	406	-	Op(CG 10)	598	-	AK 89
	91	-	BE 51	203	-	AK 89	410	-	CG 90	600	-	Op(CG 10)
	92	-	Op(AJ 98)	209	-	Op(AJ 60)	413	-	Op(AJ 60)	607	-	Op(CG 10)
	103	-	BD 24	217	-	AM 90	415	-	BF 46	610	-	AK 98
	105	-	Op(ET 66)	218	-	AM 50	418	-	AE 85	613	-	BF 40
	107	-	BD 13	221	-	BF 58	436	-	Op(BE 90)	614	-	Op(AJ 60)
	108	-	AK 89	223	-	Op(AJ 97)	438	-	Op(AJ 60)	616	-	CG 90
	109	-	BE 19	226	-	Op(AJ 60)	439	-	Op(BE 90)	618	-	BF 40
	117	-	DG 64	227	-	AE 84	447	-	Op(CG 10)	621	-	Op(BC 23)
	119	-	BD 39	230	-	Op(CG 10)	448	-	Op(BC 60)	628	-	Op(AJ 60)
	123	-	Op(ET 16)	231	-	Op(AJ 60)	454	-	Op(BC 68)	630	-	Op(AJ 60)
	125	-	Op(AJ 60)	257	-	BF 40	456	-	Op(CG 10)	631	-	AK 98
	126	-	Op(ET 67)	258	-	Op(AJ 60)	459	-	AK 98	634	-	Op(AJ 97)
	128	-	Op(FK 41)	260	-	Op(AJ 60)	460	-	DG 85	636	-	AF 48
	129	-	Op(CA)	262	-	Op(BB 10)	461	-	AK 89	638	-	Op(BC 23)
	154	-	Op(FK 10)	264	-	Op(AJ 60)	465	-	BE 55	640	-	AB 28
	160	-	CF 37	266	-	Op(BC 31)	466	-	Op(BC 68)	645	-	AE 85
	161	-	Op(CB 20)	267	-	AK 89	468	-	Op(BC 60)	648	-	Op(AJ 60)


- 312 -

168	-	Op(AJ 60)	270	-	Op(AJ 60)	487	-	BE 65	650	-	Op(AJ 60)
176	-	Op(DM-DN)	304	-	AE 65	504	-	Op(BC 35)	659	-	Op(CG 10)
177	-	GG 28	306	-	BE 46	506	-	BF 70	662	-	Op(AJ 60)
178	-	GH 78	332	-	Op(BE 90)	509	-	CF 39	664	-	BE 51
180	-	KZ 60	340	-	AF 79	514	-	Op(AJ 60)	706	-	BD 31
181	-	JJ 53	358	-	Op(AJ 60)	515	-	Op(ET 50)	707	-	OP(AJ 60)
182	-	ES 89	359	-	Op(BC 68)	525	-	Op(BC 60)	709	-	Op(BC 60)
183	-	DG 38	377	-	Op(BC 31)	528	-	AK 85	731	-	AF 79
186	-	Op(EC 90)	378	-	Op(AJ 60)	531	-	Op(AJ 60)	732	-	Op(AJ 60)
190	-	BE 66	381	-	Op(AJ 60)	532	-	AK 59	752	-	BD 16
192	-	Op(AJ 60)	383	-	OP(BC 31)	533	-	Op(AJ 60)	760	-	AF 79
195	-	GF 62	386	-	AK 75	552	-	Op(AJ 60)	952	-	AE 78
									954	-	Op(AJ 60)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 108 - 117 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 257 - 306 - 386 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 84 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 657 - Drontheim; U 214 - Brest; U 228 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: In search of south-bound convoy in area manned by Group "Drossel".

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoys Nos. 35 and 36, also orders to Group "Star" and "Specht" see para IVa.
		2)	U 447 contacted 4 escort boats on southerly course at 2120. She was, however, soon forced to sheer off and took up her station in the patrol strip. After checking information with own air reconnaissance reports it was obvious that the escorts belonged to the Gibraltar-bound convoy of 27 landing craft.
		3)	U 161 reported situation:Remained stationary in CB 27 and 28 to repair Diesels, nothing seen. Then encountered destroyer patrol on convoy route in CB 21. Impossible to operate there because of too much naval patrolling. Boat proceeded to CA 90.
		4)	U 195 reported freighter on course of 290⁰ in FN 89, speed 18 knots. No opportunity of firing.
	b)	Apart from the 27 landing barges with 4 escorts the air reconnaissance reported nothing.
	c)	U-boat sightings: BE 4236, AJ 3771, also 10 other reports from unidentified position (probably North Atlantic).
		U-boat attack in DC 12.
	d)	None.

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IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 35:
			As the convoy was not contacted again by the patrol strip, the operation was broken off. The boats were then so far behind the convoy that it was pointless to follow.
			Since contact with the convoy was maintained for only a short time, no report could be made on the defences.
			The operation suffered from the hazy weather, which also caused the loss of contact with the convoy. The convoy probably escaped by making a determined detour to N.W. or east. It is not believed that it passed the patrol strip despite the hazy weather, as the boats were only 8 miles apart.
		2)	Convoy No. 36:
			As the search for Convoy No. 35 was unsuccessful, Groups "Specht" and "Star" were instructed to man a patrol strip from AJ 2758 to AK 4944 by 1000 on 5.5 as a new Group "Fink".
			Order of station: U 438, 630, 662, 584, 168, 514, 270, 260, 732, 628, 707, 358, 264, 226, 125, 378, 192, 648, 533, 531, 954, 413, 381, 231, 552, 209 and 650.
			But before this new order could be carried out U 628 sighted at 2020 in AJ 6271, S.W.-bound convoy ("ON 180") that was expected by dead reckoning.
			During the afternoon several single destroyers with varying courses were reported by the boats, but they suggested rather stationary patrol.
			At 2040 U 628 reported "ON 180" in AJ 6271 with course 200 and speed 7 knots. All Group "Fink", Groups "Amsel 1" and "Amsel 2" were ordered to attack the convoy, in addition U 614 and 258 were given a free hand. In all 41 boats were stalking the convoy, but owing to lack of fuel it had to be assumed that several boats would not be able to operate for long.
			Shadower reports came in regularly and after a new fix U 628 reported the enemy's position. During the day 5 more boats contacted the convoy and another 6 during the night. At 0700 the convoy was reported in AJ 6465.
			Weather during the night wa reported as S.S.W. 3, sea force 3, visibility good.
			Operation against the convoy was continued. 4 boats had to give up the pursuit, amongst them, U 270 because of heavy damage from depth charges. This left 37 boats to hunt the convoy. During the night the following successes were scored:

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				Assumed
Boat	Time	Report		Sunk	Torpedoed

U 125		AJ 6298	Single freighter 4,000 GRT sunk.	1/4,000
U 264	0320/5	AJ 6514	1 6,000 tonner & 1 5,000 tonner twice torpedoed, 1 4,500 tonner torpedoed.	2/11,000	1/4,500
U 358	0424 - 0428/5	AJ 6517	1 8,000 tonner and 1 6,000 tonner sunk.	2/14,000
U 732	0251/5	AJ 6432	1 5-6,000 tonner hit with MZ torpedo. Presumed sunk.	1/5,000
U 264	0659/5	AJ 6465	2 hits on 5,000 GRT ship, sunk.	1/5,000
U 707	night/5	AJ following convoy	1 7,500 GRT freighter (passenger) sunk	1/7,500

			Total: 8/46,500		1/4,500
			sunk		torpedoed.

After the operation against Convoy No. 35 had been broken off, Group "Drossel" took up a new patrol strip from CF 6235 to CG 1861 at 0800 in 5.5. in previous order. Two northbound convoys were expected from the morning. Reconnaissance south of the patrol strip by 7 Kondor planes was arranged with the GAF Commander for the Atlantic Area. From 0800 the boats kept D/F receiving watch.

Sub-divisions "Amsel 2-4" cruised at economic speed in the new patrol strip. "Amsel 2" manned the strip from AJ 9535 to AK 7758, "Amsel 3" from BC 3927 to BC 6637 and "Amsel 4" from BC 9275 to BC 9872.

U 267, 107, 752 and 103 joined the corresponding groups and , in the order, lengthened the "Amsel 1" strip by one position to the east, "Amsel 2" to the S.E., "Amsel 3" to the north, and "Amsel 4" to the north. ("Amsel 1 and 2" were directed to attack convoy No. 36 towards evening.)

U 258 began her cruise to AK 8255 as supply boat. She is to report if further operation is not possible after carrying out replenishment.

c) -

None.

- 315 -

Reports of Success:

U 125	1 ship	4,000 GRT
U 264	3 ships	16,000 GRT	1 ship torpedoed
U 358	2 ships	14,000 GRT
U 732	1 ship	5,000 GRT
U 707	1 ship	7,500 GRT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 19	U 198	-	JJ 83	U 403	-	Op(BC 98)	U 584	-	Op(AJ 28)
	68	-	BF 40	202	-	BE 19	405	-	BF 44	598	-	AK 89
	89	-	Op(CG 18)	203	-	AK 89	406	-	Op(CG 17)	600	-	Op(CG 17)
	91	-	BE 16	209	-	Op(AK 48)	410	-	CG 90	607	-	Op(CF 62)
	92	-	AJ 98	214	-	BF 58	413	-	Op(AK 44)	610	-	BE 14
	103	-	BD 18	217	-	Op(BF 20)	415	-	BF 52	613	-	BF 40
	105	-	Op(ET 60)	218	-	Op(AM 50)	418	-	AL 21	614	-	Op(AJ 69)
	107	-	Op(AK 77)	221	-	BF 49	436	-	Op(CG 17)	616	-	CG 90
	108	-	BE 11	223	-	Op(AJ 96)	438	-	Op(AJ 64)	618	-	BF 40
	109	-	BE 14	226	-	Op(AJ 65)	439	-	Op(CG 18)	621	-	Op(AJ 94)
	117	-	DG 64	227	-	AE 76	447	-	Op(CG 18)	628	-	Op(AJ 56)
	119	-	BD 31	228	-	BF 58	448	-	Op(BC 66)	630	-	Op(AJ 27)
	123	-	Op(ET 10)	230	-	Op(CF 63)	454	-	Op(BC 95)	631	-	BE 18
	125	-	Op(AJ 64)	231	-	Op(AK 48)	456	-	Op(CF 63)	634	-	Op(AJ 95)
	126	-	Op(ET 64)	257	-	BF 40	459	-	AK 82	636	-	AF 44
	128	-	OP(FK 40)	258	-	AK 45	460	-	DG 64	638	-	Op(AJ 79)
	129	-	Op(CA 90)	260	-	Op(AJ 64)	461	-	AK 89	640	-	AN 23
	154	-	Op(FK 10)	262	-	Op(BB 10)	465	-	BE 27	642	-	BF 58
	160	-	CF 32	264	-	Op(AJ 64)	466	-	Op(BC 92)	645	-	AE 79
	161	-	Op(CB 24)	266	-	Op(BC 96)	468	-	Op(BC 65)	648	-	Op(AJ 27)
	168	-	Op(AJ 65)	267	-	AK 77	487	-	BF 44	650	-	Op(AK 49)
	176	-	Op(DM-DN)	270	-	Op(AJ 64)	504	-	Op(AJ 88)	657	-	AF 58
	177	-	GG 67	304	-	AE 67	506	-	BF 40	659	-	Op(CF 39)
	178	-	GQ 26	306	-	BE 56	509	-	CG 17	662	-	Op(AJ 27)
	180	-	KZ 30	332	-	Op(CG 18)	514	-	Op(AJ 64)	664	-	BE 19
	181	-	JK 26	340	-	AF 73	515	-	Op(ET 20)	706	-	BD 36
	182	-	Op(ET 40)	358	-	Op(AJ 64)	525	-	Op(BC 63)	707	-	Op(AJ 64)
	183	-	CF 79	359	-	Op(BC 95)	528	-	AK 82	709	-	Op(BC 39)
	186	-	Op(BC 98)	377	-	OP(AK 77)	531	-	Op(AK 44)	731	-	AF 73
	190	-	BE 64	378	-	Op(AJ 66)	532	-	AK 93	732	-	Op(AJ 64)
	192	-	Op(AJ 66)	381	-	Op(AK 48)	533	-	Op(AJ 66)	752	-	Op(BD 14)
	195	-	FU 23	383	-	Op(AK 77)	552	-	Op(AK 48)	760	-	AF 73
	196	-	GZ 33	386	-	BE 13	569	-	Op(BC 39)	952	-	AL 21
	197	-	EH 62	402	-	Op(AJ 94)	575	-	Op(AJ 88)	954	-	Op(AK 44)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 108 - 117 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 257 - 306 - 386 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 415 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 603 - 663 - Brest; U 521 - Lorient; U 753 - La Pallice.

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II.	Air Reconnaissance: In search of north-bound convoys in area patrolled by Group "Drossel" (West of Portugal)

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 36 see para. IVa.
		2)	U 456, belonging to Group "Drossel" sighted a cruiser of the Fiji class with 2 destroyers, course 130⁰, high speed, at 1402 in CF 3988.
			Same formation was reported 2 hours later by U 230. Neither boat scored any success.
			U 447 had an unsuccessful gunnery duel with a landing boat, during which she shot down a barrage balloon.
			U 160, who is on her homeward trip, encountered a destroyer at 1200 in CF 3858. The forces reported were probably serving as escorts for the south-bound convoy of landing craft. No attack took place, as the slight draught of these craft made torpedoes useless and shelling was impossible because of the escort.
		3)	U 129 sank a tanker (5,000 GRT) in DC 12.
	b)	Unsuccessful air reconnaissance. It is intended to make another sweep in the same area on 6.5. as the convoy is expected to be delayed.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DC 14 and 2 others in unidentified position.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 36:
		On 5th at midday the weather in the convoy area was reported as southwest 2, visibility 15 miles. About 2-3 hours before dark visibility decreased to 1-2 miles. At 0400 on 6th a boat reported thick fog.
		At 0800 on 5th the convoy was reported in AJ 6485, course 200⁰. Contact was reported all day long by several boats. Towards evening several smaller formations were reported, such as part of a convoy or once 4 destroyers, etc. It was therefore assumed that after making a leg during the night of 4th-5th May, the convoy had split up and was sailing in several groups. About 2300 U 650 reported that the convoy definitely consisted of 20 vessels. She was ordered to send beacon signals until dark.
		According to reports from 2 boats an extra formation of 4 destroyers appeared to have joined the convoy during the 5th May. Above all, the spell of hazy weather put the boats at great disadvantage

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with the convoy's naval escort, as sudden encounters kept cropping up in the fog. No air patrolling was reported on the 5th.

6 submarines reported considerable damage from depth charges, 4 of them had to break off the chase and turn back. U 125 reported that she had been rammed, was moving away to the east on a course of 90⁰ and requested assistance from other boats. 4 boats were ordered to help her - U 381, 260, 413 and 552. 25 boats are still operating against the convoy. The others have had to turn back because of lack of fuel or damage from depth charges.

The convoy was reported for the last time at 0425 in AJ 8562

Successes:

				Assumed
Boat	Time	Report		Sunk	Torpedoed

U 628	0244/5	AJ 6436	1 large freighter sunk, 1 medium sized freighter probably sunk, 1 freighter left burning, 1 hit heard	3/17,000	1 hit
			1 corvette sunk
			1 vessel that had probably ben previously damaged by U 628 was sunk "Harburg" (5,081)	1/5,081
U 584	1634/5	AJ 5965	1 7,000 tonner and 1 5,00 tonner sunk	2/12,000
U 266	2150/5	AJ 8395	1 5,000 tonner sunk, 1 5,000 tonner probably sunk, 2 other hits.	2/10,000	2 hits


			Total: 8/44,081		3 hits

The operation is being continued. It is intended to break off during 6th May, as the fog is causing more and more dangerous situations and even after the operation boats may be lost in this way.

The north-bound convoy is still expected, as its position has only been worked out on dead reckoning. Group "Drossel" has been ordered to man the patrol strip from CF 3577 to CG 1428 from 0800 on 6th May, so that the group should definitely be ahead of the convoy on the morning of 6.5. Boats are in the following sequence: U 607, 456, 230, 436, 89, 332 and 439. They are not to leave their present patrol strip until dark, if possible, to avoid the new patrol being compromised beforehand if there should be any enemy air reconnaissance. See paras c) and d) for orders issued to U 600 and 406, U 659 and 447.

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The outward bound boats from home waters, U 418, 952, 645 and 227 are manning squares AK 35, AK 34, AK 31 and AD 88 as temporary attack areas, in the sequence noted. These boats are to be combined with the boats coming from Western France that are shown under para 2 a). They will be set up as one patrol between Iceland and Greenland to stalk "ON" or "ONS" convoys.

For this reason U 109, 91, 202, 664, 66, 465 and 190 are proceeding at economical cruising speed to take up a patrol strip from BD 3238 to BE 1843. It is intended that they shall proceed from here to the north in close order. The boats are being temporarily gathered into a patrol strip because there are many fast independents in this area, also in order to have several boats in the vicinity of a convoy should one be picked up.

U 598 and 532 refueled from U 461 for their return journey. After further refueling, the tanker proceeded to K 8769 to a depth of 100 miles.

Orders were given for the first lot of fuel to be given to U 119 in AK 8871. Further transfer to be made in BD 1255.

U 460 took over remaining fuel from U 117. She will reach the proposed supply square (ES 80) about 17.5. U 117 returning home.

U 600 and 406 - belonging to Group "Drossel" collided about 1100 somewhere about CG 18 and had to turn back because of major damage.

The serious situation in the Mediterranean has forced further withdrawal of boats from other areas. As ordered by Ob.d.M., U 447 and 659 have been instructed to try to break through during the present new moon period, without considering the amount of fuel consumed. They are to go to Toulon. Boats have been given all information available on conditions in the Straits of Gibraltar.

Reports of Success:

U 447	1 barrage balloon
U 129	1 ship	5,000 GRT
U 628	4 ships	22,081 GRT	-	1 corvette
U 564	2 ships	12,000 GRT
U 266	2 ships	10,000 GRT	-	2 hits.

VI.

General:

The order issued on 6th April that all type IXb and IXc boats were to be equipped within a reasonable length of time for use in the North Atlantic has been lifted with immediate

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effect; boats of this type leaving port this month will be equipped for use in the south. The reasons for this new order are as follows:

The gaps caused by a rapid succession of convoy attacks in the North Atlantic during March had to be closed rapidly, as a large number of boats were needed to intercept the then widely scattered convoys. The IXc boats putting out in March and the steady stream of VIIc boats leaving port in April were able to make good this deficiency.

Attacks on convoys during the past two months have definitely shown that Type IX boats are very vulnerable to bombing or depth charge attacks by reason of their more complicated structure. Comparative losses in the Atlantic give the following picture:

	Losses:
	Type IX	Type VIIc
March:	5	7
	2 of these during attack on convoy	4 of these during attack on convoy
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
April:	7 and 1 boat that struck a mine	4
	5 of these during attack on convoy	2 of these during attack on convoy
	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The ratio of Type IX to Type VIIc boats is 1 - 3.

Hence the losses of Type IXc boats are much heavier, now that enemy defences in the North Atlantic have been strengthened, and operations are only justifiable if chances of success are proportionally increased.

The expectation of better opportunities in the North Atlantic which led to the order for operations there being issued on 6.4 has not been borne out by the final information reports for March and April made by boats in the Cape Town, Natal - Freetown and Caribbean area. Attacks made on convoys by U 510, 169, 515 showed that great successes are possible because of favorable anti-submarine conditions (few naval escorts with convoys and they lack experience). Thus despite less shipping in these areas chances are actually no less than in the North Atlantic.

It has therefore been decided:

Type IXc boats leaving French ports are to be detailed to remote western or southern operational areas. Boats of the same type from home ports will still make their first operational trip in the North Atlantic.

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6.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 10	U 202	-	Op(BD 33)	U 406	-	Op(CF 36)	U 603	-	BF 54
	68	-	BF 40	203	-	AK 89	410	-	CG 90	607	-	Op(CF 35)
	89	-	Op(CF 36)	209	-	Op(AJ 86)	413	-	Op(AJ 80)	610	-	BE 24
	91	-	BE 10	214	-	BF 45	418	-	AL 13	613	-	BF 68
	92	-	AK 87	217	-	Op(BF 20)	436	-	Op(CF 36)	614	-	Op(AJ 80)
	103	-	BC 66	218	-	Op(AM 50)	438	-	Op(AJ 80)	616	-	CG 90
	105	-	Op(ET 66)	221	-	BF 47	439	-	Op(CG 14)	618	-	BF 58
	107	-	Op(AJ 86)	223	-	Op(AJ 80)	447	-	Op(CG 45)	621	-	Op(AJ 80)
	108	-	BE 27	226	-	Op(AJ 80)	448	-	Op(BC 66)	628	-	Op(AJ 84)
	109	-	Op(BD 32)	227	-	AF 77	454	-	Op(BC 95)	630	-	Op(AJ 86)
	117	-	DG 64	228	-	BF 49	456	-	Op(CF 35)	631	-	BE 28
	119	-	AK 86	230	-	Op(CF 35)	460	-	DG 64	634	-	Op(AJ 97)
	123	-	Op(ET 10)	231	-	Op(AJ 86)	461	-	AK 89	636	-	AE 68
	125	-	Op(AJ 86)	257	-	BF 91	465	-	BE 10	638	-	Op(AJ 86)
	126	-	Op(ET 64)	258	-	AJ 95	466	-	Op(BC 92)	640	-	AF 76
	128	-	Op(FJ 90)	260	-	Op(AJ 80)	468	-	Op(BC 63)	642	-	BF 54
	129	-	Op(DC 21)	262	-	OP(BB 10)	487	-	BF 49	645	-	AE 77
	154	-	Op(FJ 30)	264	-	Op(AJ 80)	504	-	Op(AJ 80)	648	-	Op(AJ 80)
	160	-	BE 97	266	-	Op(AJ 80)	506	-	BF 40	650	-	Op(AJ 80)
	161	-	Op(CB 43)	267	-	Op(AJ 86)	509	-	CG 12	657	-	AF 57
	168	-	AK 47	270	-	Op(AJ 80)	514	-	Op(AJ 80)	659	-	Op(CG 45)
	176	-	Op(DM 50)	304	-	AE 82	515	-	Op(ET 69)	662	-	Op(AJ 80)
	177	-	GG 95	306	-	BE 68	521	-	BF 54	663	-	BF 54
	178	-	GQ 64	332	-	Op(CG 14)	525	-	Op(BC 63)	664	-	BE 51
	180	-	Op(KZ 30)	340	-	AF 44	528	-	AK 89	706	-	BE 18
	181	-	KZ 79	358	-	Op(AJ 80)	531	-	Op(AJ 80)	707	-	Op(AJ 80)
	182	-	ES 39	359	-	Op(BC 95)	532	-	BD 31	709	-	Op(BC 39)
	183	-	CF 81	377	-	Op(AJ 80)	533	-	Op(AJ 80)	731	-	AF 47
	186	-	Op(BC 98)	378	-	Op(AJ 80)	552	-	Op(AJ 66)	732	-	Op(AJ 80)
	190	-	BE 55	381	-	Op(AJ 80)	569	-	Op(BC 39)	752	-	Op(BC 36)
	192	-	Op(AJ 86)	383	-	OP(AJ 86)	575	-	Op(AJ 80)	753	-	BF 91
	195	-	FU 37	386	-	BE 25	584	-	Op(AJ 80)	760	-	AF 48
	196	-	JJ 15	402	-	Op(AJ 80)	598	-	BD 31	952	-	Op(AK 34)
	197	-	EH 93	403	-	Op(BC 98)	600	-	BE 98	954	-	Op(AJ 80)
	198	-	JK 52	405	-	BE 65	459	-	AK 82

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 108 - 117 - 160 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 257 - 270 - 306 - 386 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 527 - 532 - 552 - 598 - 600 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 648 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 613 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: U 666 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: For Group "Drossel" against Convoy No. 37 (West of Portugal).

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoys Nos. 36, 37 and convoy reports by U 418 see para IVa.
		2)	U 217 broke off minelaying task off Land's End because of heavy enemy opposition.

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	b)	The expected convoy was spotted by planes at 1000 in CF 6629. Planes sent beacon signals to guide submarines in the vicinity.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: BE 6575, AD 7819 and 12 other reports with unidentified positions. (North Atlantic). Three other boats were attacked with depth charges.
		2)	Submarine attack in DC 12 (U 129).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy reported by U 418:
			With sea force 7.8., wind N.W., visibility 3 miles U 418 suddenly came upon a destroyer in AL 1275 at 1009 and sighted a westbound convoy at 1509 in AL 1312, speed 5-7 knots. According to own dead reckoning it was "ONS 6". U 952 was in the vicinity and was stalking the convoy on her own account, so no special order was given to attack. All previous experience has shown that a single boat is not able to maintain contact for long in face of the strong enemy anti-submarine defences.
			U 418 was forced to submerge about 1900 by planes and destroyer and lost contact. The last convoy position was at 1630 in AL 1317, course 260⁰, speed 9 knots, about 10 ships. At 2330 the boat again encountered a destroyer and was chased by her. The convoy was not found again. No report was received from the other submarine, this was only to be expected with short-lived contact. The hunt is being continued.
		2)	Convoy No. 37:
			The air reconnaissance sent out sighted the expected convoy at 1000 in CF 6629; 48 ships and 3 escorts on northerly course. Despite former unfortunate experiences when submarines were directed to attack convoys in positions reported by the GAF, Group "Drossel" was ordered to attack on this data, as GAF reports have been considerably more accurate recently.
			The "Kondors" maintained contact until 1200. As no submarine had arrived by then, another reconnaissance sweep was made during the afternoon, but was unsuccessful.
			Group "Drossel" worked on converging points for 6-8 miles but as the convoy was not found, they later worked in sectors to cover an enemy course of 310-0⁰. The weather was very favorable; wind N.N.E. 5, visibility good.
			About 2000 the GAF corrected the position given at 1000. The convoy was at that time in CF 6625, i.e. 30 miles farther to the S.W. This

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			explains the boat's fruitless search, they passed by to the east. The search was continued from the new position. Taking a convoy course of 340⁰ as basis for calculation, a patrol strip from CF 2962 via 3458 to 3522 was ordered for 1800 on 7th May. At 0553, however, U 607 sighted the convoy in CF 3762 with course 320⁰, speed 8 miles. An hour later U 450 also made contact.As U 607 reported star-shell over the convoy, it appeared that the boat had attacked immediately. Contact was maintained.Last position at 0715 in CF 3737.
			The operation is being continued.
		3)	Convoy No. 36:
			The operation against the convoy was broken off at 0600 for the following reasons: From 0400 in AJ 8562 there was no further contact with the convoy. The thick fog made it extremely unlikely that the convoy would be found again. In places visibility was only 200 meters and the danger kept increasing of the boats being surprised by locating destroyers, in fact several boats reported this. U 125 reported that she had been rammed in the stern by a destroyer, and almost all the boats were depth charged, as the convoy escort were easily able to find the boats by location. There was no prospect of the weather improving, as the convoy was approaching the Newfoundland Bank.
			Final remarks on convoy No. 36:
			The attack on "ON 180" lasted from the evening of the fourth to the morning of the 6th over a distance of 210 miles. In all, 41 boats were detailed to a track, of these, all the boats belonging to Group "Fink" were in an especially favorable position when contact was established at 2020 on the 4th. During the first night 8 boats were able to sink 13 ships straight away, probably mainly because of the suddenness of the attack. Between picking up the convoy and darkness there were only 5 hours, these circumstances are always favorable, as the anti-submarine defences are not usually reinforced for action for about a day. During the day two more successful underwater attacks were made and 4 vessels sunk.
			Total successes: 16 ships sunk totaling 90,500 GRT, 1 corvette and 3 ships torpedoed.
			After the first attack the convoy probably dispersed to a certain extent, as small convoy formations were reported several times during the 5th. But about 2300 a boat reported the main body of 20 vessels. The convoys speed of advance was 7 knots, course 200⁰. It was obvious during the afternoon of the 5th that the escort

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		had been strengthened. 4 destroyers in company were reported twice, one boat reported 2 destroyers, all sailing in the offing of the convoy. From this time the boats had far more trouble with the escort.
		Visibility was good and sea calm, and during the day a total of 15 boats had closed in on the convoy, an exceptionally high number, and especially good sinkings were expected during the night of 5th-6th May. But about 2 hours before darkness fell, fog suddenly came up; it grew steadily thicker and spoilt all chances of a really good bag that night. Nearly all boats lost contact again, and the convoy was sighted for the last time at 0400. If the fog had held off for 6 hours many more ships would certainly have been sunk. As it was, the fog ruined everything and no further successes were scored.
		Conditions grew steadily worse and what with the fog and the numerically strong enemy escort, the boats had a bad time. Merely during this period, 15 boats were depth-charged, and 6 of these were suddenly attacked with gunfire by locating destroyers. As they had no countermeasures against location, the boats were definitely at a disadvantage and had little prospect of success. In all, 4 boats were so badly damaged that they had to give up the attack. U 125 did not report again after she had been rammed, nor was she found by the 4 boats that searched for her. Besides this boat 5 more did not report: U 638, 438, 531, 630 and 192. 3 of these boats had reported contact with the convoy.
		If none of these boats report later, this loss of 6 boats is very high and grave considering the short duration of the attack. The blame can be laid mainly on the foggy period that began at 2300 on 5th May.
b)	After the convoy attack had been broken off, the boats moved away to the east or southwest. About 15 boats remained operationally ready and they were to take up station in roughly the same area as the "Amsel" boats off Newfoundland. 10 convoy attack boats refueled from U 459 and 461 for further operations. Some of the remaining boats proceeded home after taking on a little fuel.
c)	None.
d)	1)	U 203 made her last report on 25.2. from AJ 67. On 29.4. she was ordered to refuel in AK 8945. The boat has not yet entered port, nor has she replied to numerous challenges. She must be assumed lost. No clues are available.
	2)	While operating against Convoy No. 36 U 125 was rammed by a destroyer in the fog (AJ 8652). She was unable to dive and moved away to the

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			east. Several of the other boats in the vicinity searched in that square and to the east, but found no trace of U 125. She did not reply to a request to send beacon signals. U 264 was nearby when she was rammed, and heard heavy machine-gun and gun fire at 0610 and clearly heard sinking noises after a heavy explosion. U 125 must be assumed lost.
		3)	U 616 navigated the Straits of Gibraltar and joined the forces of F.d.U. Mediterranean. There had been anxiety for this boat, but she had apparently waited for the new moon period to break through.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

VI.	General:
	a)	At present, along with enemy air activity, enemy radar location is the worst enemy of our submarines. The operation against Convoy No. 36 also had to be broken off because of enemy radar. A summary and assessment of location conditions are enclosed.
		To sum up, the situation is as follows:
		Radar location by air and naval forces not only renders the actual attack by individual boats most difficult, but also provides the enemy with a means of fixing the stations manned by the submarines and of avoiding them, and he obviously makes good use of this method. Radar location is thus robbing the submarine of her most important characteristic - ability to remain undetected.
		All responsible departments are working at high pressure on the problem of again providing the submarine with gear capable of establishing whether the enemy is using radar; they are also concentrating on a camouflage for the submarine against (radar) location, which must be considered the ultimate goal. A solution of, at any rate, the first problem may be of decisive importance for submarine warfare.
	b)	The enemy air force is already able to take over convoy escort duties in almost all the North Atlantic area, and it must be expected that the only remaining gaps will be closed within a reasonable length of time by land based planes, or at any rate by using auxiliary aircraft carriers.
		Air escort provided by a large number of planes operating over a fairly large area round the convoy, has always forced our submarines to lag hopelessly behind the convoy and prevented them achieving any successes, especially when naval and air escorts cooperated efficiently.
		In addition, enemy air forces have made themselves felt over the approaches to Biscay to a very marked degree - losses and damage in this area have again sharply increased, as during the period before the first improvised radar interception sets were introduced.

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		Anti-aircraft armament is being strengthened as a counter-measure. But the solution can be considered satisfactory only when the boats' armament permits them to remain on the surface to fight it out with the planes, or at any rate when it is essential for boats attacking a convoy to get ahead to make an attack despite enemy air escorts.
		Anti-aircraft submarines (U 441 and 256) are also to be tried out against enemy aircraft in Biscay. The first of these submarines will leave port at the beginning of May. These boats carry strong anti-aircraft armament, and have a lightly armored bridge and weapons. They are to operate on the surface in Biscay with the specialized task of attacking planes.
	c)	Attacks on submerged boats with new types of location methods and apparently more powerful depth charges than previously, have become more concentrated. The recent increase in cases of damage to upper deck containers proves that more powerful depth charges are being used. These containers must always be especially dangerous if weight is suddenly increased; thus boats operating in the North Atlantic had to be ordered to leave upper deck containers behind.
		The VIIc 42 boat has greater resistance and greater diving depths but cannot bring any easing of the situation for a long time.
	d)	Finally the increasing number of anti-submarine vessels must be mentioned as a further hindrance to submarine warfare. It is true that a start has been made in developing counter weapons - the "Pi 2", "Falke" and "Kreislauf" (circle runners) - but as yet we posses no really effective weapon.
		To sum up: the submarine's struggle is now harder than ever, but all departments are working full out to assist the boats in their task and to equip them with better weapons.

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7.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 10	U 202	-	BD 33	U 406	-	BF 64	U 600	-	BF 71
	68	-	BF 40	209	-	Op(AJ 95)	410	-	CG 90	603	-	BF 45
	89	-	Op(CF 35)	214	-	BE 66	413	-	Op(AJ 96)	607	-	Op(CF 35)
	91	-	BE 10	217	-	BF 20	418	-	AK 26	610	-	BE 29
	92	-	AK 88	218	-	AM 50	436	-	Op(CF 35)	614	-	Op(AJ 94)
	103	-	Op(BC 92)	221	-	BE 66	438	-	Op(AJ 80)	618	-	BF 64
	105	-	Op(ET 66)	223	-	Op(BC 23)	439	-	Op(CF 35)	621	-	Op(AJ 97)
	107	-	Op(BC 31)	226	-	AK 72	447	-	CG 84	628	-	AK 74
	108	-	AL 22	227	-	AE 89	448	-	Op(BC 66)	630	-	Op(AJ 80)
	109	-	BD 32	228	-	BF 47	454	-	Op(BC 95)	631	-	BE 61
	117	-	DG 33	230	-	Op(CF 35)	456	-	Op(CF 35)	634	-	Op(AJ 97)
	119	-	AK 88	231	-	Op(AJ 95)	459	-	AK 82	636	-	AE 59


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123	-	Op(ET 20)	257	-	BF 68	460	-	DG 97	638	-	Op(AJ 80)
126	-	Op(ET 64)	258	-	AK 73	461	-	AK 89	642	-	BF 46
128	-	Op(FJ 90)	260	-	Op(AJ 93)	465	-	BE 10	640	-	AF 48
129	-	Op(DC 80)	262	-	Op(BB 10)	466	-	Op(BC 92)	645	-	AK 26
154	-	Op(FJ 30)	264	-	AJ 95	468	-	Op(BC 63)	648	-	AK 82
160	-	BE 96	266	-	Op(AJ 98)	487	-	BF 82	650	-	Op(AJ 97)
161	-	Op(CB 43)	267	-	Op(AJ 97)	504	-	Op(AJ 31)	657	-	AF 48
168	-	AK 81	270	-	AK 81	506	-	BF 40	659	-	CG 84
176	-	Op(DM 50)	304	-	AE 76	509	-	BF 74	662	-	AJ 92
177	-	GQ 21	306	-	BF 47	514	-	Op(AJ 98)	663	-	BF 45
178	-	GQ 93	332	-	Op(CF 35)	515	-	Op(EU 70)	664	-	BE 14
180	-	Op(KZ 30)	340	-	AE 66	521	-	BF 49	706	-	BE 52
181	-	KZ 82	358	-	AJ 98	525	-	Op(BC 63)	666	-	BF 54
182	-	EJ 85	359	-	Op(BC 95)	528	-	AK 89	707	-	Op(AJ 95)
183	-	CF 53	377	-	Op(AJ 98)	531	-	Op(AJ 80)	709	-	Op(BC 39)
186	-	Op(BC 98)	378	-	AJ 92	532	-	BD 36	731	-	AE 66
190	-	BE 51	381	-	Op(AJ 96)	533	-	Op(AJ 95)	732	-	AK 84
192	-	Op(AJ 80)	383	-	Op(AJ 98)	552	-	AJ 96	752	-	Op(BC 36)
195	-	FU 68	386	-	BF 37	569	-	BC 39	753	-	BF 81
196	-	JJ 22	403	-	Op(BC 89)	575	-	Op(AJ 86)	760	-	AE 66
197	-	ES 11	402	-	Op(BC 31)	584	-	Op(AJ 94)	952	-	AK 26
198	-	JK 34	405	-	BE 53	598	-	BD 39	954	-	AJ 95

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 108 - 117 - 160 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 257 - 260 - 270 - 306 - 386 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 552 - 598 - 600 - 610 - 618 - 631 - 648 - 662 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 68 - Lorient; U 618 - St. Nazaire; U 257 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: In search of north-bound convoy for Group "Drossel" (West of Portugal).

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 37 and convoy report made by U 418 see para IVa.
		2)	U 105 sighted convoy with course 135 at 1915 in ET 6621. No further reports.
		3)	U 198 found no traffic on the route to Cape Town specified, nor in the St. Helena anchorages.
		4)	U 119 encountered north-bound destroyers in the vicinity of the supply square (AK 8873).
	b)	The "Kondor" planes sent out sighted the convoy sailing in 11 columns of 4 ships in each and sent beacon signals. An exact position report was not possible.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CG 8591, CG 7955, CG 8472, CF 3786, CF 3483, and a depth charge attack.
		One report from unidentified position.
	d)	According to high priority Radio Intercept intelligence the anticipated "HX 237" Convoy was in BC 7684

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		at 2330 on 6.5., speed 9.3 knots. This course was first given as 131⁰, but this was later cancelled.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy report by U 418:
			U 418 continued to pursue the convoy and at 1244 sighted a destroyer in AK 3118, shortly afterwards she sighted the convoy of about 10 ships in AK 3117, course 210⁰, speed 9 knots. The boat was forced by the destroyer to submerge and after temporarily establishing contact about 1800 was finally forces to sheer off. When U 418 requested further orders, she was instructed to give up the chase and proceed to AJ 30.
		2)	Convoy No. 37:
			After U 607 and U 456 had contacted the convoy at 0700, U 230 also sighted it at 0830 in CF 3487. U 436 and 89 made contact at 1000. U 230 kept reporting contact all day long and sent her last shadower report at 2145 from CF 3143.
			According to U 230 the convoy consisted of more than 20 ships.GAF reported 44 ships in 11 columns, a destroyer ahead and 4 escorts on the flanks. Shadowing was greatly hampered by continuous strong air patrols, that escorted the convoy day and night. U 230 was twice attacked with bombs. At night the planes worked with radar and approached the boats with searchlights. 3 boats were depth-charged, U 456 very closely, so that major damage was caused - both compasses were put out of action and so was the stern tube. But she was able to continue operating.
			Visibility round the convoy worsened at 1700. This coupled with the strong enemy defences, hindered the boats very greatly. Orders were therefore, given during the night for the boats to give up the pursuit at dawn or, if the weather was very bad, at once. There would be little point in continuing the chase as the enemy air patrols would be stronger nearer the coast of England.
			Successes: U 89 reported that she had registered a hit with an "MZ" torpedo on a large freighter at 1200 on 7th May during the course of an under-water attack. It can be assumed that this ship was sunk.
			U 607 reported registering a hit with a "FAT" torpedo at the end of 10 minutes. It was one of a fan of four fired at 0646 on 7th May.
			Final remarks:
			The operation against the convoy proceeding to England lasted from the morning of the 7th to the morning of the 8th, as enemy air forces prevented any attack excepting in a small area off Finisterre.

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		Here, too, conditions were very difficult for the boats because of constant enemy air patrolling during the day and night. These air patrols made it very difficult for the boats to shadow the convoy or haul ahead of it during the day. The increasingly strong air patrolling forced the boats to break off the operation during the second night.
		The small number of boats taking part in the operation (5) was also a drawback. They were U 607, 456, 230, 436, 89. It must be assumed that U 439 and 332 had also operated against the convoy before the main attack. Of the 5 boats 3 were individually attacked with depth charges, as the escorts had time to deal with each boat singly. When a fairly large number of boats are operating, there is always more chance of some boats escaping when several simultaneous attacks are made.
		For this reason the sinking of one ship and torpedoing of another by 2 boats must be rated a very great success. All 5 boats contacted the convoy. If the two boats had had better luck with their torpedoes, they might have done even better and made this operation worthwhile. No submarines were lost while attacking the convoy.
b)	1)	Contrary to former instructions U 418, 952, 645, 304, 109, 202, 664, 465, 91, 190, 405 66 and 227 made for AJ 30. They are to form a patrol line south of Greenland to intercept "ON" or "ONS" convoys.
	2)	According to own dead reckoning 2 east-bound convoys may be expected about 8.5 roughly in position 42⁰ W.
		A 550 mile long patrol line formed of 28 boats was set up to intercept these convoys. The boats that moved away to the east from Convoy No. 36 - U 634, 575, 584, 650, 614, 266, 533, 231, 514, 267, 621, 223, 504, 377, 107, 383 and 402 - were to be in position on this line from AJ 9421 to BC 6246 at 0800 on 8.5. They were known as Group "Elbe". Boats of the former Group "Amsel 3 and 4" were to join on the the south as a new Group "Rhein" and be in position at the same time in the line from BC 6284 to BC 9596.
		The partly damaged boats, or those that were short of fuel were primarily intended to serve only as reconnaissance and were to report fuel reserves and state of boat after they had picked up the convoy. They were instructed to keep special watch on the areas when visibility was poor by proceeding at higher speed and making short listening dives.
		After high priority Radio Intercept Intelligence was received, which stated that the convoy was in BC 7684 at 2330 on 6.5., and it was fairly definite that it was sailing on the southerly convoy route, both groups were moved some 90 miles to the south and are now stationed in the strip

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			from BC 3141 to BC 6859 or from BC 6894 to CD 2377. U 266 has broken down. With a speed of 9.3 knots the "HX" convoy is expected to arrive by 1300 on 8.5. It is intended to detail only some of the boats to attack when the convoy is picked up. The others are to be reinforced by those at present refueling from the supply boat and are to form a patrol strip in the same area, as according to former experience the "SC" convoy which comes along one or two days later, follows the same course as the "HX" convoy.
		3)	AM 8987 is a new approach point for U 217. The boat is to lay several mine barrages in this area.
	c)	U 514 has transferred her old Engineer Officer to U 552, U 258 has replenished from U 459 for further operations.
	d)	1)	The Commander of U 214 was badly wounded by an air attack in Biscay; boat is putting back.
		2)	U 663 was heavily bombed in BF 45 and requested fighter protection. Her air extracting system is failed and she has other damage so that her diving capacity is limited. GAF Commander for Atlantic area has agreed to provide reconnaissance at 0900 on 8.5.
		3)	U 410 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and has joined the command of F.d.U. Mediterranean.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 89 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
	U 607 - 1 hit

VI.	General:
	Provision of upper deck containers:
	On 30.4 the order was given to omit upper deck containers when fitting out all boats operating in the North Atlantic. This order was necessitated by the gradually increasing number of cases where, when the boats were depth-charged or bombed, especially at fairly great depths, the upper deck containers were cracked or started leaking, or were swamped and thus very gravely endangered the boat, especially the Type IX which carries 8 deck containers. It is suspected that this has been the cause of the loss of many boats.
	The following orders are now in force for the provision of upper deck containers:
	1)	Type VIIb, c, d - none.
	2)	Type IXb, c - normally none.
		Type IXc is to take 6 upper deck containers with 6 torpedoes when special orders are given, but only on operations in the south.
	3)	Type IXd - 12 upper deck containers with 12 torpedoes.
	Thus, the upper deck cargo for IXc boats operating in the

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	south has been reduced from 8 to 6 torpedoes to reduce the danger to the boat if containers should spring a leak.
	In connection with the foregoing order Ob.d.M. made the following decision regarding new construction of upper deck containers.
	i)	Containers on all boats in commission will not be replaced if they have proved faulty.
	ii)	New construction Type VIIc will be equipped with stronger iron upper deck containers as already planned, also, as before, the loading gear for use at sea.
	iii)	New construction Type IXc will be equipped with 6 upper deck containers built of light metal, but possessing greater stability; Type IXd will carry 12 containers.
	iv)	Type IXb and c boats putting to sea without upper deck containers will not have their ballast redistributed, but will carry some 5 tons less fuel.
	v)	Type Xb will be issued with 6 upper deck containers as before, but they are only to be put on board if special orders are given.

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8.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 46	U 202	-	AK 98	U 406	-	BF 73	U 600	-	BF 73
	89	-	Op(BE 87)	209	-	AK 79	413	-	AK 74	603	-	BE 66
	91	-	BD 35	214	-	BF 45	418	-	AK 21	607	-	Op(CF 34)
	92	-	BD 12	217	-	BE 30	436	-	Op(CF 31)	610	-	BE 62
	103	-	Op(BC 68)	218	-	AL 63	438	-	Op(AJ 80)	614	-	Op(AJ 97)
	105	-	Op(ET 66)	221	-	BE 64	439	-	BE 87	621	-	Op(BC 34)
	107	-	Op(BC 38)	223	-	Op(BC 34)	447	-	CG 94	628	-	BD 12
	108	-	AE 83	226	-	AK 82	448	-	Op(BC 68)	630	-	Op(AJ 80)
	109	-	AK 95	227	-	AK 31	454	-	Op(BC 92)	631	-	BE 63
	117	-	CF 55	228	-	BE 66	456	-	Op(BE 88)	634	-	Op(BC 31)
	119	-	BD 12	230	-	Op(BE 88)	459	-	AK 82	636	-	AE 81
	123	-	Op(ET 20)	231	-	Op(BC 37)	460	-	DT 18	638	-	Op(AJ 80)
	126	-	Op(ET 60)	258	-	AK 72	461	-	AK 89	642	-	BF 45
	128	-	Op(FJ 90)	260	-	AK 72	465	-	BE 10	640	-	AF 44
	129	-	Op(DC 13)	262	-	Op(BB 50)	466	-	Op(BC 92)	645	-	AK 33
	154	-	Op(FJ 30)	264	-	AK 78	468	-	Op(BC 68)	648	-	AK 48
	160	-	BF 76	266	-	Op(AJ 77)	487	-	BF 85	650	-	Op(AJ 97)
	161	-	Op(CB 46)	267	-	Op(BC 37)	504	-	Op(BC 37)	657	-	AE 66
	168	-	AK 82	270	-	AK 86	506	-	BF 61	659	-	CG 94
	176	-	Op(DM 50)	304	-	AE 74	509	-	BF 72	662	-	AJ 75
	177	-	GQ 52	306	-	BF 49	514	-	Op(BC 37)	663	-	BE 66
	178	-	GZ 22	332	-	BE 87	515	-	Op(EU 84)	664	-	BD 32
	180	-	KZ 37	340	-	AE 67	521	-	BF 47	666	-	BF 49
	181	-	KZ 55	358	-	BD 11	525	-	Op(BC 65)	706	-	BE 61
	182	-	EJ 49	359	-	Op(BC 95)	528	-	AK 89	707	-	AK 74
	183	-	GF 34	377	-	Op(BC 37)	531	-	Op(AJ 80)	709	-	Op(BC 65)
	186	-	Op(BC 95)	378	-	AK 72	532	-	BE 18	731	-	AE 67
	190	-	BE 28	381	-	AK 75	533	-	Op(BC 31)	732	-	AK 97
	192	-	Op(AJ 80)	383	-	Op(BC 62)	552	-	AK 78	752	-	Op(BC 62)
	195	-	FU 96	386	-	BE 63	569	-	Op(BC 65	753	-	BF 72

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196	-	KY 98	402	-	Op(BC 62)	575	-	Op(BC 31)	760	-	AE 67
197	-	ES 42	403	-	Op(BC 96)	584	-	Op(AJ 94)	952	-	AK 24
198	-	JK 25	405	-	BE 53	598	-	BE 18	954	-	AK 77

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 160 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 260 - 270 - 306 - 386 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 552 - 598 - 600 - 610 - 631 - 648 - 662 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 506 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 336 - 558 - Brest; U 463 - 608 - Bordeaux; U 273 - 232 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: To search for and escort U 663, who had been damaged by bombs in Biscay.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy report by U 952, see para. IVa.
		2)	U 123 sank the British vessel "Holmbury" (4,566 GRT) in EU 7251, course 45⁰, proceeding to Freetown. Ship had been instructed to go close inshore. A 6,000 tonner making zigs on a course of 280⁰ was sunk in EU 4792.
			At 2000 on 8.5 smoke was seen in EU 4845, no contact. Planes seen twice. At night, shipping apparently proceeds farther out. Planes based on Monrovia have a range to about FE 3555 and FE 3158.
		3)	U 126 reported Portuguese gunboat "Oxvelho" in ET 6278, course 130⁰, speed 8 knots.
		4)	On 8.5 U 190 was damaged by bombs in BE 50. After effecting repairs she continues her outward voyage.
	b)	U 663 was not found.
	c)	U-boat sightings: KY 5640, AK 1520 (U 952), ER 12, and a report that probably came from the Gibraltar area.
		Reports of torpedo attacks: An unidentified vessel in FJ 62 (U 154 ?) reported an attack. Another in the Gibraltar area, possibly a mine.
	d)	See para. IVb for special Radio Intercept intelligence.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	At 1415 U 952 reported smoke in AK 1627, speed 5-7 knots, course 250⁰. According to dead reckoning it was the convoy reported by U 418 on the previous day. U 418, 227, and 645 were close by proceeding to AJ 30 and they were ordered to attack. However, none of the boats made contact, U 952 appeared to have very bad fixes, as the positions reported produced no course even remotely the same. At 2054 the convoy was in AJ 3361, course 260⁰,

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	speed 10-12 knots. Weather: wind, N. 3, sea 2, snow showers. In the dusk the boat observed a zig to the north, shortly afterwards she was forced to submerge by a destroyer. Depth charges. At 0110 she sighted the convoy for a short time on a N.E. course in AK 1381. Contact was then finally lost. No further reports were received.
b)	1)	The "HX 237" convoy expected by "Rhein" and "Elbe" at 1300 had not arrived by the evening. According to a high priority Radio Intercept the convoy of 38 ships was in CD 1185 at 1600 on 7.5. on a course of 128⁰, speed 9 knots.
		A second high priority Radio Intercept contained a message radioed at 2200 on 5.5., instructing convoy "SC 129" to proceed east from BC 8184 via points CD 1566 and CD 2819.
		This very definite avoidance of the "Amsel 4" patrol strip which had been in position until 7.5. and of the "Elbe - Rhein" patrol which was ordered to take up station on this day, makes it most important to demand how the enemy was able to intercept our patrol strip. Apart from any location by planes of which we remained in ignorance, the very busy exchange of radio messages when attacking convoy No. 36 in AJ 60 may have given us away. A weather report was also made on 5.5. from the south position of the "Amsel" strip. Despite the suggestions given this almost circular detour remains critical. It may be possible that as a general rule enemy air reconnaissance picks up all our patrol positions by location, but this cannot be assumed. It is also considered unlikely that the enemy has cracked our ciphers unless he has captured one of our boats. The possibility of his having cracked our ciphers has been cancelled out by an immediate change in the cypher setting. Other possible sources of leakage are again being checked. Corresponding action is reserved.
		As soon as the message had been received Group "Rhein" and U 402 were detailed to proceed on a course of 120⁰ at maximum speed to set up a patrol strip from DB 7687 to CE 4154 at 2000 on 9.5. in order to intercept convoy "HX 237". The boats will thus be ahead of the convoy in good time.
		An operation against convoy "SC 129" is planned with Group "Elbe". No clue to the position if this convoy is to hand. As it may be assumed that the position through the course ordered on 5.5 was farther west than BC 8184, a course of 120⁰ and speed of 10 knots was ordered for Group "Elbe" after making allowances for the most unfavorable circumstances. It is planned to set up a patrol strip from about BD 81 to CE 15 during the evening of 10.5.
		Group "Drossel" which is in BE 80 is also to be detailed to attack one of the two convoys and is therefore proceeding to the west at cruising speed.

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		2)	U 266 is making for AK 8769 to replenish.
	c)	U 528 has handed over her remaining fuel to U 461 and is returning.
	d)	1)	U 218 reported that she had laid mines in the North Channel. On account of enemy defences and exhausted battery, she had to lay the barrage 12 miles farther to the N.W. - i.e. AM 5361 - 64 - 67 - and observed shipping there. AJ 30 was allocated to this boat as a new approach point after she has transferred the sick member of her crew in AK 82 (U 459).
		2)	U 465, 439, 332 have not yet reported since they left Western France. Several challenges received no reply. Their loss must be assumed during the last few days in April when air patrolling was very strong. On 28.4. U 439 and 332 were detailed to assist U 437, who had been damaged. They did not reply to this order either, although they must have been in the vicinity.
		3)	Search planes sent out did not find U 663, although considering the prevailing sea force this was not extraordinary. No reports were received from the boats detailed to assist. So far, U 663 has not replied to control. She can use only her emergency transmitter and probably cannot get through during heavy weather (antenna awash).

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 123 - 2 ships 10,566 GRT.

VI.	General: See para IVb.

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9.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BE 17	U 209	-	BD 12	U 406	-	BE 40	U 603	-	BE 40
	89	-	CF 22	214	-	BE 40	413	-	AK 79	607	-	BE 88
	91	-	AK 92	217	-	BE 30	463	-	BF 91	608	-	BF 91
	92	-	BD 12	218	-	AL 55	418	-	AD 98	610	-	BF 40
	103	-	Op(BC 98)	221	-	BE 52	436	-	BE 87	614	-	Op(BC 34)
	105	-	Op(ET 60)	223	-	Op(BC 62)	438	-	Op(AJ 90)	621	-	Op(BC 62)
	107	-	Op(BC 65)	226	-	AK 82	447	-	CG 94	628	-	BD 12
	108	-	AE 68	227	-	AK 16	448	-	Op(BC 95)	630	-	Op(AJ 90)
	109	-	AK 83	228	-	BE 56	454	-	Op(BC 98)	631	-	BF 40
	117	-	CF 38	230	-	CF 23	456	-	BE 89	634	-	Op(BC 31)
	119	-	BD 12	231	-	Op(BC 37)	459	-	AK 82	636	-	AL 12
	123	-	Op(ET 96)	332	-	AO	460	-	DT 48	638	-	Op(AJ 90)
	126	-	Op(ET 61)	258	-	BC 33	461	-	AK 87	640	-	AE 68
	128	-	Op(FJ 20)	260	-	AK 82	466	-	Op(BC 98)	642	-	BE 66
	129	-	Op(DC 13)	262	-	Op(BB 50)	468	-	Op(BC 95)	645	-	AK 16
	154	-	Op(FJ 30)	264	-	AK 87	487	-	BF 90	648	-	AK 82
	160	-	BF 85	266	-	AK 87	504	-	Op(BC 65)	650	-	Op(BC 34)
	161	-	Op(CA 93)	267	-	Op(BC 61)	509	-	BE 40	657	-	AE 67


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168	-	AK 82	270	-	AK 99	514	-	Op(BC 37)	659	-	CG 94
176	-	Op(DM 50)	273	-	AO	515	-	Op(EU 84)	662	-	AK 87
177	-	GQ 83	304	-	AK 31	521	-	BE 60	663	-	BE 60
178	-	GZ 53	306	-	BF 52	525	-	Op(BC 92)	664	-	AK 94
180	-	KZ 20	336	-	BF 54	528	-	BD 31	666	-	BF 40
181	-	KZ 34	340	-	AE 83	531	-	Op(AJ 90)	706	-	BE 66
182	-	EJ 15	358	-	BD 16	532	-	BE 52	707	-	AK 87
183	-	BE 98	359	-	Op(CB 23)	533	-	Op(BC 37)	709	-	Op(BC 92)
186	-	Op(BC 23)	377	-	Op(BC 55)	552	-	AK 87	731	-	AE 83
190	-	BE 54	378	-	AK 81	558	-	BF 54	732	-	BD 32
192	-	Op(AJ 90)	281	-	AK 82	569	-	Op(BC 92)	752	-	Op(BC 68)
195	-	GG 23	383	-	Op(BC 68)	575	-	Op(BC 31)	753	-	BE 60
196	-	KY 72	386	-	BE 40	584	-	Op(BC 34)	760	-	AE 83
197	-	ES 57	402	-	Op(BC 68)	598	-	BE 52	952	-	AD 98
198	-	KK 25	403	-	Op(BC 23)	600	-	BE 40	954	-	BD 12
202	-	AK 83	405	-	BE 27

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 160 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 260 - 270 - 386 - 487 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 552 - 598 - 600 - 610 - 631 - 648 - 662 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 306 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 641 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Search for U 663 in sea area point "Kern".

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	For Convoy No. 38 see para IVa.
		2)	Attacks by planes were reported as follows: U 636 in AL 2438, U 405 in BE 8388. During the day air patrolling on 45⁰N. as far as 15⁰W. every uneven hour.
		3)	U 666 brought down a "Sunderland" with 6 shots in BE 6888.
		4)	While proceeding westwards U 89 encountered sailing vessel with destroyer in BE 8483.
		5)	At 0900 on 8.5. U 456 was sailed over by Convoy No. 37 while she was carrying out repairs under water, in BE 8896. The submarine was listened to and depth-charged. Despite oil trace she proceeded west to stalk the expected "HX" convoy.
		6)	U 128 position report: On 7.5 during the night 3 double misses were fired at a freighter (5,000 GRT) in FQ 21 left edge, her course was 0⁰, speed 9 knots. At the beginning of the run-in sharp changes in speed down to dead stop, boat did not turn away when the torpedo was fired. Normal speed was then resumed, presumable she was listening to the submarine. In reply, U 128 was informed that her report sounded improbable, and that no blame can be laid on ships if the Commander fires wide.

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	b)	U 663 was not found.
	c)	U-boat sightings: ED 11, FK 17 and 1 boat in unidentified position (North Atlantic, probably depth charge attack).
	d)	According to high priority Radio Intercept intelligence the "SC 129" convoy changed its course during the evening of 6.5 to 150⁰ in BC 8469.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	While proceeding to the patrol strip ordered for 2000 on 9.5 one boat encountered the convoy ("HX 237") as expected at 1306 in CD 3598. Group "Rhein" was detailed to attack and U 359 was forbidden to attack until another boat had established contact. Group "Drossel" was already approaching and was detailed to proceed at higher speed. About 1340 when visibility was 5 miles U 359 was picked up by a destroyer and forced to submerge. She lost contact and from hydrophone bearing suspected that the convoy had made a zig to the north. At 1716 U 186 picked up a wide hydrophone band from 320 - 350⁰ in CD 3928. Visibility had worsened and was reduced to 300 meters. As the convoy was bound for England and would in any case have to return to a more easterly course, the boats were ordered to push on with determination and on no account to let themselves be shaken off. Convoy speed was about 9 knots. Visibility remained bad all night. Convoy was not found again. A patrol strip was therefore ordered from BD 8711 via 8783 - CE 1354 to CE 1683 to be manned at 0900 on 10.5. Intervals between submarines to be 15 miles. The chance of picking up the convoy is slim as a long leg to the north or south can be made by the convoy under cover of the constant fog. The operation is being continued.
	b)	1)	Group "Elbe" is proceeding S.W. and has been ordered to form a patrol strip from BD 8111 to CE 1849 during the evening of 10.5. to intercept the "SC 129" convoy on which we have information from high priority Radio Intercept. The convoy should arrive in this area about 10.5. U 402 is again joining Group "Elbe". Boats of this group requiring fuel will replenish from U 119 in BD 1255.
		2)	As the days are now lengthening it can be expected that the convoys will sail the north route more than formerly. As, however, successes can be scored only where shipping is found, it is intended to set up a strong group south of Greenland. U 258 and all those boats now refueling from the supply boat for further operations (about 10) have for this purpose been ordered to make for AJ 65, after completing fuel transfer. The attack on the "HX 237" and "SC 129" convoys originally intended

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			has therefore been cancelled. Both convoys were too far to the south.
	c)	U 648, 168, 381 and 226 refueled from U 459.
	d)	1)	So far, U 663 has not reported. According to dead reckoning she must enter port at the latest on 12.5.
		2)	U 531, 638, 438, 630 and 192 were detailed to attack the S.W.-bound Convoy No. 36. The first 3 boats made contact and last reported from AJ 8368, AJ 6758 and AJ 8637. U 531 and 438 were probably caught unawares and sunk in the thick fog, U 438 was probably lost after a daylight attack. U 630 and 192 did not report at all after attacking the convoy. Last message from U 630 was dated 21.4. as she left the supply boat in BD 25. U 192 last radioed on 3.5. from AJ 3757 (Convoy No. 33)
			Both these boats may therefore have been lost earlier.
			5 boats must be considered lost.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 666 - 1 plane.

VI.	General:
	In order to make it possible for the boats to guide in other boats when they themselves have sighted a convoy even when there are major differences in fixes, a shadower's signal buoy has been constructed and two boats have been equipped with one to try out. The buoy is to be fired as a star or rocket in the same way as the former signal rocket with axial staff, and will be distinguishable by very obvious characteristics from star signals and illuminant rockets, as the enemy often uses these to lead our boats astray. If these buoys are satisfactory, it is intended to use them operationally. The boats gave the following information when they had tried the buoys out:
	U 358: First shadower's signal buoy launched with sea force 2-3 and angle of ascent 15⁰, height 50 meters, second shadower's signal buoy launched 3-4, angle of ascent 35⁰, height 150 meters, angle of fall depends on chance, burned for 10-15 seconds, in both cases the illuminant charge fell to pieces. Third S.S. Buoy was a failure.
	U 381: Shadower's signal buoy tried out with sea force 7, crooked flight, low angle of ascent, height to 150 meters, point of fall visible through sparks, otherwise satisfactory.
	These results are not yet satisfactory, but are good enough to warrant use of the buoy right away. At present the 27th Submarine Flotilla is carrying out practical tests.

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10.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BD 35	U 202	-	AK 54	U 403	-	Op(CE 16)	U 600	-	BF 91
	89	-	BE 77	209	-	BD 12	405	-	BE 20	603	-	BE 64
	91	-	AK 83	214	-	BF 52	406	-	BF 40	607	-	BD 99
	92	-	BD 12	217	-	BF 12	413	-	AK 87	608	-	BF 81
	103	-	Op(CE 16)	218	-	AL 47	418	-	AJ 39	610	-	BF 49


- 337 -

105	-	Op(ET 40)	221	-	BE 53	436	-	BD 99	614	-	BD 48
107	-	CE 11	223	-	BD 76	447	-	CG 94	621	-	BD 76
108	-	AF 75	226	-	AK 95	448	-	Op(CE 16)	628	-	BD 12
109	-	AK 46	227	-	AJ 30	454	-	Op(CE 16)	631	-	BF 52
117	-	CF 33	228	-	BE 55	456	-	BE 78	634	-	BD 42
119	-	BD 12	230	-	BE 77	459	-	AK 82	636	-	AL 23
123	-	ET 94	231	-	BD 73	460	-	DF 78	640	-	AE 59
126	-	Op(ET 60)	232	-	AN 36	461	-	AK 87	641	-	BF 58
128	-	Op(FQ 30)	258	-	AJ 93	463	-	BF 82	642	-	BE 64
129	-	Op(CA 87)	260	-	AK 82	466	-	Op(CE 16)	645	-	AJ 30
154	-	Op(FK 12)	262	-	Op(BB 50)	468	-	Op(CE 13)	648	-	AK 82
160	-	BF 92	264	-	AK 87	487	-	BF 92	650	-	BD 45
161	-	Op(CA 93)	266	-	AK 87	504	-	BD 76	657	-	AE 59
168	-	BE 14	267	-	BD 76	509	-	BF 54	659	-	CG 94
176	-	Op(DM 50)	270	-	BE 11	514	-	BD 73	662	-	AK 87
177	-	GQ 98	273	-	AN 36	515	-	Op(EU 80)	663	-	BF 50
178	-	GZ 39	304	-	AK 23	521	-	BE 56	664	-	AK 57
180	-	KZ 51	336	-	BF 50	525	-	Op(CE 16)	666	-	BE 59
181	-	Op(KP 94)	340	-	AL 22	528	-	BE 15	706	-	BF 91
182	-	DT 79	358	-	BD 12	532	-	BE 64	707	-	AK 87
183	-	BE 96	359	-	Op(CD 16)	533	-	BD 48	709	-	Op(CE 16)
186	-	Op(CF 14)	377	-	CE 11	552	-	AK 87	731	-	AL 22
190	-	BE 42	378	-	AK 82	558	-	BF 45	732	-	BE 14
195	-	GG 38	381	-	AK 75	569	-	Op(CE 16)	752	-	Op(BD 79)
196	-	KZ 46	383	-	CE 11	575	-	NF 75	753	-	BE 67
197	-	FD 23	386	-	BF 64	584	-	BD 45	760	-	AL 14
198	-	JK 23	402	-	Op(CE 14)	598	-	BE 65	952	-	AJ 38
									954	-	BD 12

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 123 - 160 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 214 - 260 - 270 - 386 - 487 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 552 - 598 - 600 - 610 - 631 - 648 - 662 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 214 - 631 - Brest; U 160 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 511 - 527 - 67 - Lorient.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Searching for damaged U 663.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 129 situation report:
			On 28.4. in DC 9261 submarine cruiser of "Narwhal" class seen course 170⁰, speed 14 knots. There appeared to be spasmodic independent traffic in DC 12 - 14 to S.W. along the 100-meter line. Night relay off Hatteras. Day air patrols only over the coastal route, no naval patrols. On 6.5. night location after transmitting a radio message in DC 2280, also destroyer and strong day air patrols. In CA 8825 fired a triple miss at 5 meters and 2 single misses at 4 meters at a tanker in ballast (8,000 GRT) course 180⁰, speed 9 knots. On 9.5. miss fired at large tanker in CA 9997, course 150⁰, speed 17 knots. Returning.
		2)	U 128: Bombed by "Lancaster" during low level attack in BF 7245, on 7.5. A good deal of damage. Boat continued on its outward course via supply submarine.

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		3)	U 195 sank a modern freighter of a specialized type (5,000 GRT) on 7.5. in FU 1615 after a 24-hour chase that began in FU 3438. Vessel settled 2 meters deeper at the stern after being hit in the screw by a MZ torpedo. U 195 observed rocket signals in FU 17, 41, 49 and 84 and followed them up without success.
	b)	U 663 was not found.
	c)	1)	Escort plane belonging to "SC 128" convoy which according to own dead reckoning might be somewhere in AL 10-30, reported: Submarine sighted 4 depth charges dropped. Boat still on the surface, but damaged.
			This must have been a faulty observation, for all boats that might have been involved, reported their position when requested by control.
		2)	According to an agent's report a convoy of 18 ships should go from Durban to India on 9th or 10th May.
		3)	U-boat sightings: DN 7915, DC 21. Another attacked in unidentified position ( = 5937 N).
	d)	Further passage point for "HX 237" on 11.5 is BD 9552 at 1600.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Operation against "HX 237":
		U 454 sighted carrier borne plane in CE 1388 coming from the west. While U 403 was unsuccessfully chasing an independent with course 30⁰ she encountered an ocean going tug in CE 2456 and through this established contact with the awaited convoy at 1830 in CE 2425. However, she was immediately picked up by a destroyer and forced to move away.
		As group "Rhein" was about 90 miles behind the very fast convoy, and there was no information available on its future course, Operational Control decided to operate against convoy "SC 129" which was still expected, and detailed only Group "Drossel" (6 boats) and U 403 to attack convoy "HX 237". While following up, U 403 had a machine-gun duel with a wheeled aircraft and was then forced by a destroyer to submerge. Last hydrophone bearing was from CE 2191 in a direction of 25⁰. After the high priority Radio Intercept report had been received giving the passage point in BD 9552, the boats were instructed to operate against the convoy according to the time given, if they had not established contact earlier. It was not considered expedient to employ further boats of Groups "Rhein" or "Elbe", as the slower convoy "SC 129" was considered to offer better chances of success. "HX 237" was not picked up again by morning. Visibility remained the same as on the previous day.

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		Operation against "SC 129":
		Two new groups were formed from "Elbe" and "Rhein" to intercept this convoy:
		U 634, 575, 584, 650, 752, 614, 709, 533, 569, 231, 525, 514, 468, 267 to be known as "Elbe 1" and form a patrol strip from BD 5711 to 8747 at 1100 on 11.5, adjoining to the south U 103, 621, 448, 466, 223, 454, 504, 402, 377, 359, 107, 383, 186 will form a patrol strip known as "Elbe 2" from BD 8777 to CE 4219. Except for U 584 and 614 all the boats have sufficient fuel for this operation. The convoy is expected from 1300 onwards.
	b)	1)	Because of the position report made by U 129, stating that shipping was encountered proceeding round Hatteras, U 521, 66 and 190 have been given CA 87 as their new approach point.
		2)	The first boats to arrive in the area south of Greenland were divided into two separate strips. U 304, 227, 645, 952 and 418, known as Group "Isar", man the patrol strip from AJ 3169 to AJ 3595, U 109, 202, 664 and 91 known as Group "Lech" man the patrol strip from AJ 8972 to AK 4258. U 340 and 731 are also making for AJ 30 to reinforce these groups.
	c)	1)	U 168 was in BE 5346 to 1700 on 11.5. to hand over bridging cables ("Uberbrueckungskabeln") to U 405, who had been damaged by air attack.
			U 228 proceeded to AK 8769 to the tanker to repair damage caused by air attack.
		2)	U 92 and U 954 refueled from U 119 for further operations; U 628 for return voyage.
	d)	1)	U 262 reported that she had carried out her task, but found nothing. For further information see Operational Order "Elster" (Not included as appendix).
		2)	U 511 has left port to carry out task according to Operational Order "Marco Polo" (Appendix).
		3)	In a submarine situation report published on 7.5. by the enemy, he calculated 10-15 boats patrolling East of Cap Flamond. Southern boundary 42⁰ N. This apparently covers both the "Amsel 3 and 4" strips, they numbered 12 boats and were disposed in BC 3927-6637 or BC 9275-9872 until 7.5. Despite the weather reported by U 403 on 5.5. in BC 9872 only location by enemy aircraft can be accepted as the cause of our boats being picked up. This also accounts for the detour made by the "HX" and "SC" convoys.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 195 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT

VI.	General:
	Tests and operational use of new types of gear in torpedo warfare:

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After due acceptance of a few weak points still existing in the gear, the following were sanctioned at the beginning of November 1942 for operational use:

Pi 39 H (Pi 2)

G 7A Fat

The operational use of these new types of gear also represented a "front-line test" aimed at speeding up the further development and perfecting of these weapons.

ii)

Pi 2:

Combined impact and non-contact pistol with the following operational limitations:

a)	Can not be used with sea force over 4-5 or when there is a strong cross swell.
b)	Track angle not below 30⁰ and not above 150⁰.
c)	"MZ one" is not to be used after heavy detonations (depth charges or bombs) near the boat.

If these limitations are not observed non-detonators or prematures must be expected.

Depth setting with "MZ one". The following guiding principles are given for operational use:

a)	Minimum depth setting in a calm sea: 2 meters.
b)	Against merchant vessels when draught is estimated: draught minus 1 meter.
	Against merchant vessels when draught is definitely known: draught.
c)	Against corvettes: 3 meters.
d)	Against destroyers: 4 meters.
e)	Against cruisers: draught.
f)	Against battleships; aircraft carriers; heavy cruisers: draught plus 1 meter.

These depth settings which were actually too shallow were chosen so that poor results should be avoided at the outset of operational use. It was wittingly accepted that the majority of hits would probably lead to percussion hits that would not allow the full explosive force of the torpedo to be utilized.

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First operational use of Pi 2 took place from bases in Western France and from La Spezia in December 1942. They could be used only if special testing facilities were available in the base. In February 1943 operational use was extended to cover Kiel and the bases in Northern Waters. Each boat will be equipped with 6 "Pi 2" as soon as the torpedo situation at the base permit it.

Experience gained:

Up to 15.3 the following definite "MZ" hits had been registered:

a)	31.12.1942 - U 561 (Schomburg) sank destroyer of "Jervis" class in the Mediterranean. 2 hits were scored with "Pi 2 MZ one" depths 2 and 4 meters.
b)	28.12.1942 - U 260 (Purkhold) attacked North Atlantic convoy. She scored a hit on a 5,000 ton freighter with "Pi 2 MZ one" depth 4 meters, vessel broke up amidships, sank immediately, hit had great force, slight, low column of water sent up.
c)	8.2.1943 - In Mediterranean U 596 (Jahn) blew an escort vessel of "Bridgewater" class out of the water with "Pi 2 MZ one" depth 3 meters.
d)	12.2.1943 - U 516 (Wiebe) attacked a 6,000 tonner in South Atlantic. She broke amidships from a "Pi 2" finishing shot, depth 7.

All other hits with "Pi 2" excepting a few doubtful cases, must be classed as percussion hits.

Only very few self detonators occurred, and in every case when the operational limitations were not observed.

On the whole, these first results were considered satisfactory, even though the potentialities of the "Pi 2" were not fully utilized.

On 20.3.1943 new depth settings were ordered. These aimed at a deeper setting of the "MZ" on one hand and on the other the introduction of fixed depth settings for different types and sizes of vessel should reduce the calculations the Commander had had to make in the past.

The basic order for the new depth settings (B.d.U. Operations No. 1419/43 W) is enclosed as Appendix 1, the depth settings themselves (Standing Order No. 309) as Appendix 2.

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	5)	To date the new depth settings have brought good results. The number of "MZ" hits have increased. However, a final opinion is not yet possible.
	6)	Assembly figures for "Pi 2": At present 200 a month. Assembly will increase slowly to about 300 a month by April 1943.
	7)	"Pi 2" is to be used only with a specially adjusted Eto (electrically driven torpedo), which will be known as "T III".
iii)	G 7A FAT:
	1)	Loop running torpedo (Schleifenlaeufer-torpedo): with setting for loop to right or left, long or short, preliminary run of 5 to 5 hectometers up to 150 hectometers. Torpedo speed - 30 knots, running range 12,500 meters. As the track is visible, orders have been given to limit use of this torpedo to the night, so as to avoid giving the new weapon away to the enemy unnecessarily.
	2)	First operational use took place in December 1942 in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic. Because of the need for exact regulation of the preliminary run the operation was limited at first to 10 boats equipped with radar gear. There was delay in delivery of radar equipment for other boats, so, on 8th January 1943 the order was given to equip as many as possible Type VII boats in the North Atlantic with "G 7A FAT" torpedoes irrespective of lack of radar. This decision was taken to make the most of the torpedoes available, as they were so valuable for convoy attacks, more especially because the first use of Fat capable of evaluation (on U 406 - Dieterichs), proved the possibility of success with estimated range data. At the same time the use of "FAT" in Northern Waters was ordered, but it was again cancelled in the Mediterranean because of the difficulties inherent in operation with "G 7A FAT" (phosphorescence, visibility of the track, defences). From May 1943 use of "Fat G 7A" was again cancelled in Northern Waters as the perpetual daylight did not permit the use of the torpedo during the night as ordered.
		Thus, at present the torpedo is being used only in the North Atlantic. Each boat carries 6 "FAT" torpedoes.
	3)	Results:
		On the whole, the "FAT" can be considered a complete success. During the first 5 months of operational use the percentage of hits

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registered with this torpedo was about 75%. The possibilities of success with "FAT" are specially shown by the following examples:

a)	22.2.1943 - U 92 (Oelrich) fired 3 single "Fat" at 3 steamers belonging to a convoy sailing in two columns. Range was 7,000 meters and attack took place at night in the North Atlantic. Preliminary run 80 hectometers long to the left. Three hits after running times of 10 minutes 30 seconds, 11 minutes, 20 seconds, 11 minutes.
	First hit on 5,000 ton freighter in second column, detonation not observed, only heard. Vessel sank stern first in 4 minutes.
	Second hit on 6,000 GRT freighter not observed, but heard. Probably sank.
	Third hit probable, explosion heard.
b)	17.3.1943 - U 135 (Strelow) fired a double "FAT" at a convoy in the North Atlantic. Preliminary runs 50 and 40 hectometers long, to the left. In 13 minutes 46 seconds two hits on a steamer before beginning the third and fourth loop. Another double "FAT", preliminary runs 30 and 40 hectometers long to the left. In 8 minutes 26 seconds and 9 minutes 12 seconds hits on second steamer during the second and before beginning the third loop.
	In both cases the new gear has made it possible to score successes that would have been out of the question without it.

Assembly figures:

Monthly assembly of G 7a FAT totals about 100 torpedoes and is only slowly increasing. This is caused by the total production of Atos (air-driven torpedoes) amounting to only about 350 a month (difficulties in assembly), of these, firing practice in home waters, upper deck container loading on submarines, and Motor Torpedo Boats require a certain proportion, thus only few FAT torpedoes can be assembled. This number will be increased by reason of the order to equip no further submarines in the North Atlantic with upper deck containers.

FAT Warning:

The risk of damaging other submarines that were not firing when attacking the convoy made it necessary to radio a special "FAT" warning to

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		boats leaving port with "fAT" torpedoes. The Standing Order No. 306 that was issued is enclosed as Appendix 3.
iv)	FAT G 7E:
	1)	Loop running torpedo with setting for "long loop" and "circle run". See enclosure 4 (B.d.U. Operations 1669/43 W) for full details. In addition it can be remarked that the G 7E circling shot represents a transitional stage in the anti-destroyer torpedo to bridge the time until the "Zerstoererknacker" is ready for operational use.
	2)	First operational use is to take place in equal numbers during May 1943 in Northern Waters and the Mediterranean, as it is not possible to use "FAT" G7A in either area. Further use during June 1943 mainly in the Atlantic, each boat is to carry 2 torpedoes in stern tube as anti-destroyer torpedo.
	3)	At present 100 "Fat" G 7E are assembled per month, but after August 1943 the number will increase.
	4)	See Standing Order 306 (Appendix 3) for measures to protect submarines not taking part in the firing when G 7E FAT are being used against a convoy.
v)	Equipping boats with torpedoes:
	Permanent Order No. 40 (Appendix 5) lays down the torpedo equipment to be aimed at from the Pi 2, Fat G7A and FAT G 7e at present available.


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Appendix I

26.March 1943.

Naval High Command

Submarine Operations

Ref. No. 1419 W.

To: Admiral Commanding Submarines etc.

Re: New depth settings of Pi 2 with "MZ one"

Previous reference: Permanent Order B.d.U. No. 35.

On 15.3. after the first 3 months operational use of "Pi 2" of 75 torpedoes fired with "Pi 2 MZ one" there were 30 reports of hits.

Analysis of these hits, by which nearly all targets were reported sunk, gives the following picture:

	22	shots may be taken as deep percussion firing hits,
	4	hits might be percussion firing hits or magnetic firing,
	4	shots definitely had typical magnetic firing effect according to corroborated observation.

This result shows that according to the previously established "Guide to Choice of Depth Setting", the majority of shots even when Pi 2 with "MZ one" is used may be expected to result in percussion firing hits.

To date, the choice of depth setting for torpedoes with Pi 2 "MZ one" has been based on the calculated draught of the target, just as it has been for torpedoes with percussion firing. This calculation is always on the shallow side for safety, especially when different types of torpedo are used with percussion and non-contact firing. Thus the general rule of:"Set torpedoes 1 meter less than the calculated draught" will continue to result in a majority of percussion firing hits.

Even if these hits lie lower on the target than those scored with percussion firing (Pi G 7H), they still do not allow the non-contact pistol to function properly, for its purpose is to achieve the greatest possible damage to the target. The firing area of the "Pi 2" on the contrary, considerably increases the effect of the explosion.

II.

When making depth settings, all targets are divided into the following categories:

Merchant vessels,

War ships,

Very shallow draught vessels,

Targets with torpedo nets rigged.

Note to 1:

Merchant vessels - freighters, tankers, transports - are grouped in three classes according to their size:

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Small ships up to	3,000 GRT
Medium sized ships over	3,000 and
up to	7,000 GRT
Large ships over	7,000 GRT

Classes are divided into "loaded" and "in ballast".

This method of arrangement makes it possible to calculate a definite depth setting for each of the 3 classes. For loaded ships, 5m, 7m and 10m, for ships in ballast 4m and 5m.

These calculations are based on the standard draughts given in the table shown in Standing Order B.d.U. No. 301 "Draughts of Merchant Vessels".

The fixed depth settings calculated for medium sized targets 2,000, 5,000 and 9,000 GRT, have been chosen to give a firing depth under the keel, which in the case of the smallest targets of each class is still within the area of 100 percent sure firing, and in the case of larger ships of each class is just on the edge of percussion firing effectiveness. This depth setting gives the firing position approximately 1/2 to 1 meter under the keel in the case of ships up to 7,000 GRT, against which a safe firing depth up to 2 meters can be used; in the case of ships over 7,000 GRT, against which the safe firing boundary extends to 3 meters, the firing position moves to about 2 meters under the keel. Thus, the three standard depth settings allow a play of 1 to 1 1/2 meters firing depth before the lower firing boundary is reached. The depth keeping tolerance of the torpedo is taken into account in these calculations. All estimates are based on the magnetic field of German vessels equipped with degaussing gear.

This choice of depth settings gives the following advantages:

In the case of the torpedo depth settings given, the firing area of the pistol off-sets all tonnage calculations within the ship's class as well as the limits between the classes when over-estimation of tonnage arises. The difficulty of making an accurate estimate of tonnage in the decisive moments of attack is therefore obviated. An approximate estimation will suffice.

By correct estimation of tonnage, miscalculation of loaded condition of small and medium merchant ships is adjusted up to a difference of 2.5 meters in depth setting, and of large merchant ships up to a difference of 1.5 meters. For choice of depth therefore, the distinction between "loaded" or "in ballast" is all that is necessary.

Relationship of the "target's draught to the course of the torpedo" is, to a certain degree, independent of seaway conditions.

The difference of draught between freighters, tankers and transports of similar size can be disregarded.

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Note to 2:

Warships: Since the medium draught of all types is familiar to everyone, the depth setting of torpedoes for warships is chosen, so that in the case of ships up to the size of heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers a firing depth of 1/2 to 1 meter under the keel is reached and of battleships, with their greater magnetic field of ignition, a medium firing depth of 2 meters under the keel. This gives the following depth settings:

Corvettes	-	3 meters
Destroyers	-	4 meters
Light cruisers	-	5 meters
Heavy cruisers	-	7 meters
Aircraft carriers	-	7 meters
Battleships	-	11 meters

Even in the case of warships this allows a margin of 1 to 1 1/2 meters firing depth before reaching the lowest firing boundary, taking into account the depth keeping tolerance of the torpedo.

Note to 3:

Very shallow draught vessels: The depth setting remains 2 meters, and attacks are sanctioned only when the sea is calm.

Note to 4:

If rigged torpedo nets are observed on merchant vessels and warships of all sizes under way or at anchor the depth setting of the torpedo must be 2 meters deeper than the standard depth. This gives depth settings of 7m, 9m, and 12m for warships (light cruisers, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers, battleships). For merchant vessels in ballast 6m or 7m.

At present, the only way to deal with torpedo nets is to fire under them. Percussion firing hits on the net have practically no effect on the vessel. The possibility of achieving hits with non-contact action can be expected only if the magnetic fields of vessels begin to decrease at depths to which the nets do not reach. In this case the "MZ-action" of the pistol must be utilized to the lower boundary of their firing area.

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Appendix 2

B.d.U. Standing Order No. 309

Depth Setting of Pi 2

Depth setting for torpedoes with Pi 2 with switch setting "MZ one"

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

		Depth setting of torpedoes in meters

Type of vessel and size of target		when target is loaded	when target is in ballast	when target has torpedo nets rigged

				loaded	in ballast

Merchant ships (freighter, tanker, transport)	up to 3,000 GRT	5	4	7	6
	over 3,000 up to 7,000 GRT	7	4	9	6
	over 7,000 GRT	10	5	11	7

	Corvettes		3	-
	Destroyers		4	-
Warships	Light cruisers		5	7
	Heavy cruisers )		7	9
	Aircraft carriers )
	Battleships		11	12

Very shallow draught vessels	Auxiliary sailing vessels, dumb barges, landing craft, patrol vessels, etc.		2
			only when sea is calm

II.

Rule (for Pi with "MZ one")

Fixed depth setting for loaded merchant vessels:

5	meters for small vessels up to 3,000 GRT
7	meters for medium sizes vessels up to 7,000 GRT
10	meters for large vessels over 7,000 GRT

Fixed depth settings for merchant vessels in ballast:

4	meters for small and medium ships up to 7,000 GRT
5	meters for large ships over 7,000 GRT

Depth setting for warships 1 meter more than the draught.

Battleships 2 meters more than the draught.

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	d)	Very shallow draught targets (only in a calm sea) - depth setting 2 meters.
	e)	When targets have torpedo nets rigged torpedoes are to be set a further 2 meters deeper than the depths given above:
		Large loaded merchant vessels - 11 meters
		Battleships - 12 meters.









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			Appendix 3

B.d.U. Standing Order 306
Method of using FAT torpedoes

A.	Surface attack:
	1)	If FAT torpedoes are fired at a convoy during a surface attack, boats inside the convoy or close to it are endangered by these torpedoes. In practice this danger is limited to few cases. However, in order to do away with as much risk as possible, submarines are to adhere to the following method of attack:
	2)	The submarine equipped with FAT torpedoes is to prepare the short coded signal: "Intend attacking with FAT" and is to transmit this signal on the short wave program ordered when the boat prepares to run in to attack (i.e. 5-15 minutes before firing). (This is known as "FAT warning"). If the program covers several short waves, operational control must fix a short wave for "FAT warning" transmissions beforehand.
		The FAT warning lasts 30 minutes. If the submarine does not fire during this time, another warning must be transmitted if she intends to fire later.
	3)	If a submarine is inside the convoy when the FAT warning is received, it is to leave the convoy at maximum speed or, if this is not possible, is to dive to a depth of at least 50 meters.
		Boats attacking from outside the convoy are to carry out their attack without restriction, as the danger outside the convoy is soon past and when a boat is 1,000 meters ahead of the convoy, or 2,000 meters astern the risk is actually no greater than when a normal torpedo attack is made.

B.	Under-water attack:
	1)	The G 7A FAT I is to be used only at night. Thus, underwater attacks must be made with G 7E FAT II.
		In this case, the far smaller area covered by the G 7E FAT represents only very slight danger. It is no larger than that covered by a fan of four, especially as the submarine is stationary under water and therefore, unless by chance she is lying within the area covered by the FAT, will hardly ever come into its sphere of action.
	2)	Hence, in underwater attacks the FAT warning can be dispensed with. The same applies to circling shots either on the surface, or submerged.
	3)	In order to rule out as far as possible the danger factor, slight as it is, submarines that dive ahead of the convoy to make an attack, are as a general rule to space out their places of diving at least 2,000

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		meters apart in the direction of advance of the convoy.


			For B.d.U.
			Chief of Operational Division
			(Signed): GODT













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			Appendix 4

			28.March 1943.

The Naval High Command.
2nd Div. Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Ops.
Reference: 1669 W.

Re: Operational release of FAT G 7E

1)	G 7E FAT has been released for front-line operations.
	Contrary to G 7A FAT, it can be fires with a long loop or as a circle runner. The short loop has been discontinued.

2)	In future the following names will be used everywhere for the FAT torpedo:
	a)	Torpedo with long and short loops to be known as FAT I.
	b)	Torpedo with long loop and circle run to be known as FAT II.
		To date the following FAT torpedoes are being used operationally:
			G 7A FAT I
			G 7E FAT II.

3)	The weak spot of the G 7E FAT II is its short running range. It is therefore necessary, if at all possible to heat these torpedoes. Further research is being carried out to increase the running range.

4)	The circle run of the G 7E FAT II opens up the following possibilities:
	a)	FAT torpedoes may be fired by day when making underwater attacks.
	b)	A pursuing destroyer or corvette approaching at an angle of 0 degrees on the bow may be attacked, although on account of the approaching target and the limitation of 5 hectometers for the minimum preliminary run the shortest possible firing range is 12 hectometers.
	c)	When firing from an angle of 0 degrees on the bow at an independent or a column of a convoy, in most cases the stern tube will be used, only rarely the bow tube. There is hardly any chance of success if the torpedo is fired from any other angle on the bow, and in such a case the torpedo must be fired with a long loop.
		For the moment it has been decided to give up the idea of altering the FAT adjuster for setting the circle runner. The circling

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		run, always to the left, is effected by placing the adjuster at any desired setting of the short loop (right or left).

5)	The Inspectorate of Torpedoes will send out instructions to the front as soon as possible. They will deal with the description and servicing instructions for G 7E FAT II, and firing instructions for FAT, covering both FAT I and FAT II. No special instruction for the operational boats is intended in the case of the G 7E FAT as it was for FAT and Pi 2.

6)	The first operational use of G 7E FAT II will take place with equal numbers in the Mediterranean and Northern Waters (50 torpedoes for each, during April 1943). Further use will be ordered in due course. For several months to come the assembly figures will remain low.

7)	Pi 2 for use with G 7E FAT II has been released for operational use with the same operational limitations as for the Pi 2 when firing a straight shot. Operational boats are to keep a very sharp watch for self-detonators when they are on the borderline of suitable weather for using FAT II with "MZ one"; if any occur, they are to be reported immediately.

8)	G 7A FAT I may still be used only at night.

9)	Orders will be issued regarding the transmission of a "FAT warning" which will be essential when firing G 7E FAT.

			For B.d.U.
			Chief of Operational Division
			(Signed): GODT












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Appendix 5

Permanent Order No. 40

Equipment with Torpedoes

All former orders are cancelled. The following torpedo equipment for the different types of submarine is to be aimed at:

a)	Atlantic:
	Type VII b, c, & d	:	forward	4	FAT I
				6	T III
			aft	2	FAT II

	Type IX b & c	:	forward	4	FAT I
				6	T III
			aft	2	FAT I
				2	FAT II

	Type IX d	:	forward	6	T III
				4	Eto
			aft	4	Eto
			upper deck	12	Ato

	Type X b	:	aft	2	FAT II
				2	Eto
b)	Northern Waters and Mediterranean:
	Type VII b & c	:	forward	4	FAT II
				6	T III
			aft	2	FAT II
c)	Black Sea:
	Type II	:	forward	5	T III

Loading in accordance with Para 1) is to be carried out so far as the torpedo stocks at the base permit. If such loading is not possible the boats are to be equipped with Etos (electrically driven torpedoes) in place of other types that are not available.

Exceptions:

If Type IXc boats operating in the south are ordered to carry torpedoes on the upper deck the loading will be as follows:

forward	6 T III, 4 Etos.
aft	2 FAT II, 2 Etos.
upper deck	6 Atos, (air driven torpedoes)

Upper deck loading for Type XB will only be carried out on special orders.

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c)	As soon as it is again possible to use G 7A FAT in Northern Waters, boats there are to be equipped in the same way as the Type VII boats in the Atlantic.


		The German Naval High Command
		Second Div. Naval War Staff /
		B.d.U. Operations. Ref. 00409/Fs
















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11.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	AK 97	U 202	-	Op(AK 42)	U 405	-	BE 49	U 598	-	BF 44
	67	-	BF 54	209	-	BD 12	406	-	BF 64	600	-	BF 68
	89	-	Op(BD 97)	217	-	BF 10	413	-	AK 87	603	-	BE 55
	91	-	AK 55	218	-	AL 71	418	-	Op(AJ 35)	607	-	BD 97
	92	-	AJ 77	221	-	BE 51	436	-	Op(BD 97)	608	-	BE 73
	103	-	Op(BD 87)	223	-	Op(CE 12)	447	-	CG 90	610	-	BF 58
	105	-	Op(EU 40)	226	-	AL 77	448	-	Op(CE 12)	614	-	Op(BD 81)
	107	-	Op(CE 18)	227	-	Op(AJ 32)	454	-	Op(CE 15)	621	-	Op(CE 12)
	108	-	AN 24	228	-	BE 83	456	-	Op(BD 98)	628	-	BD 12
	109	-	Op(AJ 39)	230	-	Op(BD 97)	459	-	AK 82	634	-	Op(BD 57)
	117	-	BE 99	231	-	Op(BD 84)	460	-	EJ 18	636	-	AL 15
	119	-	BD 12	232	-	AN 81	461	-	AK 87	640	-	AE 81
	123	-	ET 85	258	-	AJ 85	463	-	BF 73	641	-	BF 49
	126	-	Op(ET 60)	260	-	AK 82	466	-	Op(CE 12)	642	-	BE 59
	128	-	Op(FQ 20)	262	-	Op(CC 13)	468	-	Op(BD 87)	645	-	Op(AJ 35)
	129	-	CB 91	264	-	AK 87	487	-	BF 93	648	-	BE 15
	154	-	Op(FK 10)	266	-	AK 87	504	-	Op(CE 15)	650	-	Op(BD 57)
	161	-	Op(CA 90)	267	-	Op(BD 87)	509	-	BF 61	657	-	AE 81
	168	-	BE 16	270	-	BE 60	511	-	BF 54	659	-	CG 90
	176	-	Op(DM 50)	273	-	AN 31	514	-	BE 27	662	-	AK 87
	177	-	GR 57	304	-	AJ 36	515	-	BE 66	663	-	BF 52
	178	-	JJ 18	336	-	BF 44	521	-	BE 55	664	-	Op(AK 42)
	180	-	Op(KZ)	340	-	AL 13	525	-	Op(BD 84)	666	-	BE 59
	181	-	Op(KP 92)	358	-	BE 17	527	-	BF 54	706	-	BF 68
	182	-	DT 57	359	-	Op(CE 18)	528	-	BE 27	707	-	AK 87
	183	-	BF 72	377	-	Op(CE 18)	532	-	BE 66	709	-	Op(BD 81)
	186	-	Op(CE 42)	378	-	AK 82	533	-	Op(BD 81)	731	-	AL 14
	190	-	BD 36	381	-	AJ 93	552	-	AK 87	732	-	BE 27
	195	-	GG 14	383	-	Op(CE 42)	558	-	BE 66	752	-	Op(BD 81)
	196	-	Op(KZ 20)	386	-	BF 64	569	-	Op(BD 84)	753	-	BE 56
	197	-	FD 37	402	-	Op(CE 15)	575	-	Op(BD 57)	760	-	AK 36
	198	-	Op(KZ 76)	403	-	Op(BD 97)	584	-	Op(BD 57)	952	-	Op(AJ 35
										954	-	BD 12

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 123 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 209 - 226 - 260 - 266 - 270 - 358 - 386 - 487 - 509 - 528 - 532 - 598 - 600 - 610 - 628 - 648 - 662 - 706.
	Entered Port: U 509 - Lorient; U 406 - 386 - St. Nazaire; U 706 - 600 - La Pallice; U 487 - 463 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 229 - St. Nazaire; U 193 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See para IVa for Convoys No. 38 and 39.
		2)	While proceeding from CA 9914 via 9997 to CB 7688 U 129 observed location by 2 searching stations. However, she was not attacked and sighted nothing.
		3)	U 190 had contact for a short time with a fast independent on a northerly course in BD 6937.

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		4)	U 753 fired 2 single FAT torpedoes in BE 5626 at a freighter proceeding north. Half an hour after firing, she heard a loud explosion. She lost contact in rain.
		5)	The air attack on a submarine in AL reported yesterday was probably directed against U 636. After making repairs this boat will proceed on her westerly course.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: AK 3349 and another in unidentified position, probably Biscay.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 38 - HX 237:
			At 1900 on 11 May, U 436 reported the HX convoy again in BD 9554, that is, in the vicinity of the position given in a priority Radio Intercept intelligence report. U 403, 436, 89, 230, 456, 607, 603 were stalking the convoy. The outward bound boats in BE were ordered to join in the chase if they were at a fairly reasonable distance.
			On 11 May the weather in the convoy area was reported as W. 7-8, visibility varying from 5-7 miles.
			U 436 was able to maintain contact until 2100. 2 boats reported planes escorting the convoy. U 89 reported that they were carrier borne, hence it was assumed that a carrier was lying in the area. Contact was interrupted all the night, and not until 0745 did U 230 again report the convoy in BD 2826, i.e. due north of the last reported enemy position. The convoy then took avoiding action to the north on a course of 0⁰, speed 9 1/2 knots.
			At 0441 U 456 reported a 10,000 GRT freighter sunk in BD 4714. At 2220 U 403 reported a hit on a 7,000 GRT vessel in BD 9474, she was heavily armed like an auxiliary cruiser. After a heavy explosion, later loud sinking noises were heard. The operation against the convoy is continuing.
		2)	Convoy No. 39 - SC 129:
			At 1835 on 11 May U 504 sighted the expected SC 129 in CE 1543. Convoy was proceeding on the same route as that taken some 2 days earlier by HX 237. Group "Elbe" was directed to attack, although several boats in it were unable to operate further because of lack of fuel. For the present the exact number of boats in this group actually operating is not known.
			At 1917 U 504 again lost contact. Then during the course of the evening U 383 and 359 picked up

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		the convoy again. All three boats gave very different enemy positions, and because of previous poor visibility the fixes given by all the boats must be taken as inexact. At 0300 U 359 reported the convoy for the last time in CE 1655.
		U 402 also established contact with the convoy for she reported: At 2000 hit on freighter (5,000 GRT) in CE 1547, she probably sank. Hit on freighter (4,000 GRT) heard. Operational Control assumed that both vessels sank, as in the convoy area wind 9, sea 8 were reported.
		U 223 was depth charged, was unable to dive and moved away from the convoy; she reported again later and was able to do without assistance. U 402 had to move away to make repairs after being heavily depth charged; her thrust bearing was burnt out and shaft knocking.
		The operation against the convoy is being continued. U 383 had to give up through lack of fuel, U 233 has been too badly damaged to be able to take further part. Thus 22 boats are still stalking the convoy: U 186, 466, 107, 621, 103, 267, 468, 514, 525, 231, 569, 377, 454, 402, 448, 504, 709, 650, 752, 575, 634 and 359.
b)	1)	As drift ice fields have been reported, Group "Isar's" patrol strip has been moved 30 miles to the S.E. Further dispositions with approaching boats will be ordered for the same sea area.
		U 258 - 381 - 954 - 92, forming Group "Inn" are to man the patrol strip from AJ 3772 to 6371.
		U 760 - 636 - 340 - 731 - 657 - 640, forming Group "Iller" are to man the patrol strip from AK 5122 to 6564. Thus, from about 15.5. there will be 4 strips totaling 19 boats, arranged in quarterline in this area, where westbound convoys may definitely be expected, and probably eastbound as well.
	2)	BD 29 is new approach point for U 221, 603, 753, 642, 666, and 405. No decision has yet been reached on their further operation.
	3)	U 177 has been allocated the area between GR 54 and KY 66, and that north of JJ 48 as her attack area. When the moon is favorable she is to operate close inshore and later move away to the south. Independent traffic is suspected inshore and in JJ 10-50. It remains to be seen whether the "Bachstelze" (trans. Observation Kite flown by submarine) being tried out by this submarine proves its worth.
c)	None.
d)	1)	At 1158 in BE 6520 U 528 requested immediate assistance from planes as she was totally unable to dive. She was ordered to move away to the west at once and report course and speed. U 558 was ordered to proceed to her assistance.Air support cannot be provided before 12.5. by a BV 128. No further messages have been received from U 528.

- 359 -

U 663 has not been picked up although an escort has been sent out several times. She must be assumed lost.

Reports of Success:

U 456	1 ship	10,000 GRT
U 403	1 ship	7,000 GRT
U 402	1 ship	5,000 GRT
	1 ship	4,000 GRT	, torpedoed.

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12.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BD 19	U 197	-	FE 47	U 383	-	Op(CE 28)	U 598	-	BF 58
	67	-	BE 49	198	-	Op(KZ 50)	402	-	Op(CE 24)	603	-	BE 44
	89	-	Op(BD 69)	202	-	Op(AK 42)	403	-	Op(BD 68)	607	-	BD 69
	91	-	Op(AK 42)	209	-	BD 12	405	-	BE 40	608	-	BE 93
	92	-	AK 69	217	-	AM 80	413	-	AK 87	610	-	BF 64
	103	-	Op(CE 24)	218	-	AK 95	418	-	Op(AJ 35)	614	-	Op(BD 81)
	105	-	Op(EU 40)	221	-	BE 42	436	-	Op(BD 68)	621	-	Op(CE 24)
	107	-	Op(CE 24)	223	-	Op(CE 16)	447	-	GG 90	628	-	BD 31
	108	-	AN 24	226	-	BE 16	448	-	Op(CE 24)	634	-	Op(BD 85)
	109	-	Op(AJ 39)	227	-	Op(AJ 32)	454	-	Op(CE 24)	636	-	AK 26
	117	-	BF 72	228	-	BE 81	456	-	Op(BD 66)	640	-	AE 78
	119	-	BD 12	229	-	BF 58	459	-	AK 82	641	-	BF 47
	123	-	ET 75	230	-	Op(BD 65)	460	-	EJ 48	642	-	BE 46
	126	-	Op(ET 60)	231	-	Op(CE 24)	461	-	AK 87	645	-	Op(AJ 35)
	128	-	Op(FQ 20)	232	-	AN 23	466	-	Op(CE 24)	648	-	BE 27
	129	-	CC 47	258	-	Op(AJ 37)	468	-	Op(CE 27)	650	-	Op(BD 88)
	154	-	Op(FK 10)	260	-	AK 82	504	-	Op(CE 16)	657	-	AL 14
	161	-	Op(CA 90)	262	-	CC 37	511	-	BF 48	659	-	CG 90
	168	-	BE 50	264	-	AK 87	514	-	Op(CE 24)	662	-	AK 67
	176	-	Op(DM 50)	266	-	AK 87	515	-	Op(EV 70)	664	-	Op(AK 62)
	177	-	Op(GR 80)	267	-	Op(CE 27)	521	-	BE 57	666	-	BE 54
	178	-	JJ 27	270	-	BE 62	525	-	Op(CE 24)	707	-	AK 87
	180	-	Op(KZ 40)	273	-	AN 24	527	-	BF 49	709	-	Op(CE 21)
	181	-	Op(KP 60)	304	-	Op(AJ 31)	528	-	BE 64	731	-	AK 36
	182	-	DT 28	336	-	BE 65	532	-	BF 45	732	-	BE 61
	183	-	BF 53	340	-	AK 33	533	-	Op(CE 21)	752	-	Op(CE 21)
	186	-	Op(CE 24)	358	-	BE 19	552	-	AK 87	753	-	AK 36
	190	-	BD 53	359	-	Op(CE 24)	558	-	BE 64	760	-	BE 61
	193	-	AO	377	-	Op(CE 27)	559	-	Op(CE 24)	952	-	Op(AJ 35)
	195	-	GG 45	378	-	AK 82	575	-	Op(CE 81)	954	-	Op(AJ 69)
	196	-	Op(KZ 20)	381	-	Op(AJ 62)	584	-	Op(BD 54)

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 123 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 209 - 226 - 260 - 266 - 262 - 270 - 358 - 528 - 532 - 598 - 610 - 628 - 648 - 662.
	Entered Port: U 608 - Bordeaux; U 610 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 305 - Brest; U 91 - St. Nazaire; U 463 - Bordeaux; U 646 - Drontheim.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Western Biscay.

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III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See para IVa for Convoys No. 38 and 39 and Convoy report by U 640.
		2)	U 642 fired a triple miss at a tanker in BE 1894, course 50⁰, speed 14 knots. Contact lost in squall of rain.
			U 603 reported independent in BE 4442, and U 662 one in BE 1675. The later was on a course of 30⁰ speed 15 knots. Boat dived after sighting a Liberator.
		3)	U 195 sank a steamer (8,000 GRT) in GG 1656. Mean course 20, speed 15 knots.
	b)	8 merchant vessels and 3 patrols with course 70⁰ seen in BF 1216 (U 218 was in the vicinity).
	c)	U-boat sightings: AD 97, BD 6264, CB 25 and 4 other sightings in unidentified position. One depth charge attack included, (probably Convoy No. 38).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy report by U 640 (No. 40):
			U 640, who is outward bound from home waters, sighted a convoy at 0106 in AL 1265, on a northerly course, speed 8 knots. As there was no other boat in the vicinity, attack was sanctioned. According to dead reckoning, it was Convoy "ONS 7". In order to attack with more boats, the Groups "Iller", "Lech", "Isar", "Inn", and "Nab", which were in the area south of Greenland, were instructed to proceed at 0600 on a course of 30⁰, speed 5 knots. At 0230 U 640 was forced to move away in AL 1213, she followed up and at 0715 again established contact in AL 1214. Convoy was then on a westerly courses. No further messages were received. Operation continues.
		2)	Convoy No. 38:
			During the evening of 12th May the weather in the convoy area was reported with greatly varying visibility. In the course of the night several boats reported heavy squalls of rain and also showers, so that it was difficult to find the convoy again during the night with so few boats. At 1300 on 12th May, U 230 reported the convoy for the last time in BD 6652. The boat was then forced to sheer off, lost contact, and the convoy was not picked up again until 0541 by U 628 in BE 4162. This boat maintained contact until 0800 and was then also forced to sheer off, all contact was thus lost.
			Both carrier borne and 4-engined land based planes were reported with the convoy. They made it very difficult for the few submarines operating

- 361 -

		to launch an attack on the convoy.
		U 221, who was proceeding to meet the convoy, sank a single tanker (8,000 GRT) in BE 1934.
		U 603 sank the independent Norwegian vessel "Brand" (4,819 GRT) in BE 4416.
		During the day 4 boats attacking the convoy were bombed, one boat was attacked with heavy depth charges, and had to move away to make repairs. U 230 brought down a carrier borne plane. U 546 reported at 1130 on 12th that she was unable to dive, was being shadowed by a plane and urgently requested assistance. Later she reported several times that she had a bad intake of water in the after compartment, presumably from bomb hit, and that the boat was still maneuverable. She transmitted beacon signals and 4 submarines were instructed to proceed to her assistance. At 1500 U 456 reported for the last time. No trace of her could be found, and her loss must be assumed.
		It is intended to break off the operation on the morning of 13th May as there is no further chance of success with the 3 boats still operating, and also the increasing enemy air activity renders a continuation of the operation very dangerous with so few boats.
	3)	Convoy No. 39:
		At midday on 12th May the weather in the convoy area was W. 5, sea 5, visibility good. Towards night it lessened to W 3, sea 3. During the night conditions were unfavorable for attack because of moon, squalls of rain and greatly varying visibility.
		At 0930 U 186 contacted the convoy in CE 1397 and kept reporting it. During the day, as visibility was good 11 more boats closed on the convoy, an exceptionally high figure.
		Strangely enough, at 0120 at dusk the convoy was reported for the last time in BD 8954. During the night none of the boats picked it up again. All boats, with the exception of 4 that have not yet reported, were forced away by escort vessels and were attacked with depth charges, some very heavy, during long under-water pursuits. 2 boats had to move away to effect repairs. 3 other boats had to break off the operation temporarily because of damage which had not been caused by enemy action. 2 boats turned back to the supply submarine, U 406 and 383. U 223 reported again and in company with U 359 commenced her return voyage.
		No air escort was reported with the convoy. The operation continues, although there has been no contact with the convoy since 0120.
b)	1)	On account of the drift ice fields reported by U 304, orders have been given for a new grouping of the patrol strips in the Greenland area, as follows:

- 362 -

	"Isar"	from AJ 3513 to 3918
	"Inn"	from AJ 6327 to 6639
	"Lech"	from AK 4264 to 4651
	"Iller"	from AK 5167 to AK 5833

U 707, 413, 552, 264, 378 and 218, forming Group "Nab" are to take up a disposition in the same area, and are proceeding at economical cruising speed to man the patrol strip from AK 7555 to BD 1222 (since 0600 Group has been proceeding to pick up convoy "ONS 7").

U 178 has been allocated KY 60, 90 and KZ 40 and 70 as attack area. Focal point off Port Elizabeth.

U 266, 662, 707, 413, 552 and 264 have refueled from U 461. Tanker is still waiting for U 218 and will then move to the south. U 260 and 374 have refueled from U 459.

It is intended that boats which are short of fuel shall replenish from U 119 in BD 8125.

U 405 and 168 did not meet. U 405 has turned back because of bad oil trace.

U 528 did not report, despite repeated challenges. U 558, who had been detailed to render assistance; heard about 40 detonations (bombs) between 1220 and 1330 on 11.5. It must be assumed that U 528 was attacked a second time by planes and destroyed. Loss is probable.

Reports of Success:

U 195	1 ship	8,000 GRT
U 221	1 ship	8,000 GRT
U 603	1 ship	4,819 GRT
U 230	1 plane

General:

An enemy submarine situation report received on 11.5. gave several of our patrols or supply groups in the North Atlantic, and it is becoming increasingly clear that the enemy has excellent radar gear capable of picking up the submarines without their knowing it. In the case of these known dispositions not enough radio messages were sent to provide the enemy with sufficient material for his deductions.

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13.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BD 41	U 197	-	FE 79	U 381	-	Op(AJ 63)	U 584	-	BD 81
	67	-	BF 47	198	-	Op(KZ 20)	383	-	BD 87	591	-	BF 58
	89	-	Op(BD 65)	202	-	Op(AK 42)	402	-	Op(BD 89)	598	-	BF 64
	91	-	Op(AK 46)	209	-	BD 12	403	-	BD 65	603	-	BD 64
	92	-	Op(AJ 66)	217	-	AM 89	405	-	BE 10	607	-	Op(BD 65)
	103	-	Op(BD 80)	218	-	AK 87	413	-	Op(AK 75)	614	-	BD 57


- 363 -

105	-	Op(EU 40)	221	-	BE 19	418	-	Op(AJ 39)	621	-	Op(BF 80)
107	-	Op(BD 80)	223	-	CE 28	436	-	Op(BD 63)	628	-	BE 18
108	-	AN 35	226	-	BE 28	447	-	CG 90	634	-	Op(BD 80)
109	-	Op(AK 42)	227	-	Op(AJ 35)	448	-	Op(BD 80)	636	-	AK 02
117	-	BF 49	228	-	BE 48	454	-	Op(BD 80)	640	-	AL 12
119	-	BD 18	229	-	BF 49	456	-	BD 65	641	-	BE 69
123	-	ES 96	230	-	Op(BD 69)	459	-	BD 21	642	-	BE 19
126	-	Op(ET 60)	231	-	Op(BD 80)	460	-	EJ 79	645	-	Op(AJ 35)
128	-	Op(FQ 20)	232	-	AF 76	461	-	AK 87	646	-	AF 58
129	-	CC 48	258	-	Op(AJ 63)	463	-	BF 92	648	-	BE 61
154	-	Op(FJ 60)	260	-	BD 26	466	-	BD 79	650	-	Op(BD 89)
161	-	Op(CA 90)	262	-	CC 33	468	-	Op(BD 89)	657	-	AK 36
168	-	BE 51	264	-	Op(AK 79)	504	-	Op(BD 89)	659	-	CG 90
176	-	Op(DM 40)	266	-	BE 42	511	-	BF 47	662	-	BE 16
177	-	Op(GR 90)	267	-	Op(BD 80)	514	-	Op(BD 80)	664	-	Op(AK 46)
178	-	Op(JK 22)	270	-	BE 66	515	-	Op(EV 70)	666	-	BE 10
180	-	Op(KY)	273	-	AN 24	521	-	BE 59	707	-	Op(AK 75)
181	-	Op(KP 60)	304	-	Op(AJ 35)	525	-	Op(BD 80)	709	-	Op(BD 80)
182	-	DH 77	305	-	BF 54	527	-	BF 47	731	-	AK 02
183	-	BF 61	336	-	BE 64	532	-	BF 73	732	-	BE 63
186	-	Op(BD 80)	340	-	AK 28	533	-	Op(BD 89)	752	-	Op(BD 80)
190	-	BD 65	358	-	BE 52	552	-	Op(AK 78)	753	-	BE 10
193	-	AN 35	359	-	CE 28	558	-	BE 56	760	-	AK 01
195	-	GG 55	377	-	Op(BD 97)	569	-	Op(BD 80)	952	-	Op(AJ 35)
196	-	Op(KZ 20)	378	-	AK 82	575	-	Op(BD 80)	954	-	Op(AJ 63

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 123 - 168 - 182 - 183 - 209 - 223 - 226 - 260 - 266 - 270 - 358 - 359 - 383 - 405 - 456 - 466 - 528 - 532 - 584 - 614 - 628 - 648 - 662.
	Entered Port: U 183 - Lorient; U 598 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 211 - Brest; U 953 - 951 - 199 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See para. IVa for Convoys No. 38, 39, 40.
		2)	While returning because she had fired all her torpedoes U 129 sighted a tanker in CC 5713, course 260⁰, speed 12 knots. As no other boat was in the vicinity, U 129 was given permission to use her guns if the weather was favorable. However, the seaway was too strong and she continued on her eastward course.
		3)	U 641 reported a small northbound steamer in BF 4765. Boat was given permission to attack if the vessel was not Irish, Spanish or Portuguese.
		4)	U 527 encountered large damaged vessel with 2 tugs in BE 6582, course 20⁰, low speed. Submarine made underwater attack but was unexpectedly attacked by a corvette and depth charged. She followed up again, but has so far not reestablished contact.

- 364 -

		5)	U 161 reported that there was no shipping in CA 90.
		6)	U 180 Situation report: From 4-7 May stalked E-W traffic off Durban but found nothing. No traffic in KP 39 either. Destroyer and corvette in KP 9123, course 220⁰. Probably shot down a Handley Page on 12.5. in KZ 4155. Coastwise traffic off Cape St. Lucia according to bearings obtained.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CH 8185 and 6 other sightings in unidentified positions, including 3 depth charge attacks. Further attacks by aircraft in BF 17 and CH 81. Submarine attack in DM 69 (U 176).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 40:
			U 640 maintained contact until towards evening. Group "Iller" had not yet taken up its patrol line and was nearest to the convoy, so its boats were directed to attack singly. So far they have not located the convoy.
			The remaining boats have been proceeding since yesterday on a course of 30⁰, speed 5 knots and are to form a longish patrol strip, as it is not expected that a single boat can maintain contact until the Group arrives. The following order was given: Groups "Isar" and "Inn" are to be in a patrol line from AD 9475 to AK 1573 by 0800 on 15.5., they will be known as a new group "Donau I". Groups "Lech" and "Nab" will form a patrol strip from AK 1587 to 5131 and be known as Group "Donau II". According to a report from U 640 the convoy's course was via AL 1125 and AD 8971. At 1936 the submarine attacked in AD 8876 and fired a double at a freighter of 6,000 GRT. Sinking noises suggested success. Convoy was formed of about 40 vessels sailing in very open formation. Speed about 8 knots. U 640 was attacked and bombed by aircraft that put in an appearance. Contact was lost. Last convoy position at 2045 in AD 8786, course 260, speed 7 knots. No further reports were received by the morning. Operation is being continued. It is expected that the convoy will enter the patrol strip some time after the morning of 15 May.
		2)	Convoy No. 39:
			On 13 May weather in convoy area was again comparatively favorable. Wind N. 5, sea 4, visibility good. Contact with convoy was not reestablished. On the evening of 13 May the submarines reported much air activity over the convoy, mainly flying boats. According to a report from U 642, who sighted the carrier on a S.W. course at high speed, it must also be

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		expected that the carrier is now intending to escort the "SC" convoy. As therefore, strong air support must be expected on 14 May, it is intended to break off the operation on that date. For summing up see the next day.
	3)	Convoy No. 38: Summing up.
		On 13 May the operation against the "HX" convoy was broken off. The convoy was attacked from the evening of 11 May to 13 May. The weather was fairly calm and good the whole time with only occasional poor visibility in showers and rain squalls.
		7 boats had been detailed to attack, also the boats coming out from port that were at a favorable distance from the convoy. Because of the small number of boats attacking, it was only possible to maintain contact for a few hours at a stretch, leaving long intervals completely without contact with the convoy.
		Right from the first day, carrier borne planes were sighted with the convoy, and later on the carrier itself was seen once. These planes and other land based escorts made the operation very difficult, and on the last day it had to be given up because this air activity was too powerful. Of the boats directed to attack 5 were bombed singly, of them U 456 was probably sunk by a bomb hit on her stern. U 89 and 753 have also not reported and must be presumed lost.
		Two boats were pursued with depth charges for an especially long time - 5 and 10 hours.
		4 independents were sunk in the convoy area, totaling 30,000 GRT.
		To sum up it may be remarked that greater success was not expected in the case of this convoy as with so few boats operating the loss of 3 boats when attacking the convoy is very high, but considering the enemy's ability to concentrate his entire defences on these few boats, is not surprising.
b)	As the moonlit period is increasing U 176 has been given a free hand to the east and west.
c)	1)	U 218 met U 461 to get medical attention for a sick man.
	2)	The "Elbe" boats breaking off the attack are to refuel from U 459 from 15.5. onwards in BD 8566.
	3)	Freetown boats are to refuel from 17.5 onwards from U 461 in ES 8889.

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		4)	U 217 reported that she had carried out minelaying task. Mines were laid in AM 8926 and 28.
	d)	Search for U 456 was unsuccessful. She must be assumed lost. In her last radio message on 12.5. from BD 66 she reported a shadower plane, but no bombs. An intake of water was under control at the time.
		Probably a destroyer then came up and finished the boat off.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 640 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT, 1 ship torpedoed
	U 180 - 1 plane

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14.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	CE 24	U 198	-	Op(KZ 30)	U 378	-	AK 49	U 584	-	BD 81
	67	-	BE 68	199	-	AO	381	-	AJ 36	591	-	BF 49
	89	-	Op(BD 92)	202	-	AK 19	383	-	BD 81	603	-	Op(BD 92)
	91	-	AK 19	209	-	BE 61	402	-	Op(BD 90)	607	-	Op(BD 92)
	92	-	AJ 36	211	-	BF 43	403	-	Op(BD 92)	614	-	BD 81
	103	-	Op(BD 92)	217	-	BE 32	405	-	BE 53	621	-	Op(BD 92)
	105	-	Op(EU 40)	218	-	AK 81	413	-	AK 46	628	-	BE 52
	107	-	Op(BD 92)	221	-	Op(BD 92)	418	-	AJ 33	634	-	Op(BD 92)
	108	-	AO	223	-	CE 34	436	-	Op(BD 92)	636	-	Op(AD 87)
	109	-	AK 17	226	-	BE 61	447	-	CG 90	640	-	Op(AD 87)
	117	-	BF 93	227	-	AD 98	448	-	Op(BD 92)	641	-	BF 47
	119	-	BD 46	228	-	BD 61	454	-	Op(BD 92)	642	-	Op(BD 92)
	123	-	ES 90	229	-	BF 48	459	-	BD 52	645	-	AJ 33
	126	-	Op(ET 60)	230	-	Op(BD 95)	460	-	AJ 79	646	-	AF 79
	128	-	Op(FQ 20)	231	-	Op(BD 92)	461	-	AK 87	648	-	BE 63
	129	-	CC 55	232	-	AF 48	463	-	BF 82	650	-	Op(BD 92)
	154	-	Op(FJ 60)	258	-	AJ 36	466	-	BD 85	657	-	Op(AD 87
	161	-	Op(CA 95)	260	-	BD 38	468	-	Op(BD 92)	659	-	CG 90
	168	-	BE 64	262	-	CD 13	504	-	Op(BD 92)	662	-	BE 29
	176	-	Op(DM 40)	264	-	AK 49	511	-	BE 68	664	-	AK 19
	177	-	Op(GR 90)	266	-	BE 28	514	-	Op(BD 92)	666	-	Op(BD 92)
	178	-	Op(KY 70)	267	-	Op(BD 92)	515	-	Op(EV 70)	707	-	AK 46
	180	-	Op(KY 66)	270	-	BF 58	521	-	BE 59	709	-	BD 83
	181	-	Op(KP 60)	273	-	AF 76	525	-	Op(BD 92)	731	-	Op(AD 87)
	182	-	DH 48	304	-	AD 97	527	-	BE 65	732	-	BF 45
	186	-	Op(BD 92)	305	-	BF 45	532	-	BF 49	752	-	Op(BD 92)
	190	-	Op(BD 42)	336	-	BE 51	533	-	Op(BD 59)	753	-	BD 60
	193	-	AN 29	340	-	Op(AD 87)	552	-	AJ 49	760	-	Op(AK 22)
	195	-	GG 91	358	-	BE 65	558	-	BE 41	951	-	AO
	196	-	Op(KZ 20)	359	-	CE 34	569	-	Op(BD 92)	952	-	AJ 33
	197	-	FM 14	377	-	Op(BD 92)	575	-	Op(BD 92)	953	-	AO
										954	-	AJ 36

	On Return Passage: U 108 - 117 - 123 - 168 - 182 - 209 - 223 - 226 - 260 - 262 - 266 - 270 - 358 - 359 - 383 - 405 - 456 - 466 - 532 - 584 - 614 - 628 - 648 - 662 - 709.

- 367 -

	Entered Port: U 117 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See para IVa for Convoys Nos. 39 and 40.
		2)	U 527 gave up the search for the steamer reported yesterday. Nothing was seen.
		3)	U 558 was bombed by a 4-engined plane in BE 4349, but was able to proceed on her outward voyage.
		4)	U 650 sighted a steamer with regulation Irish neutrality markings in BD 6373, course 40⁰, speed 10 knots.
		5)	U 190 reported illuminated steamer in BD 5847, course 70⁰, speed 9 knots. Red Cross markings not clearly made out.
		6)	U 260 fired 3 single misses at a freighter in BD 6288, course 65⁰, speed 8 knots. Escorted by plane. Vessel apparently heard the torpedoes.
		7)	U 126 - Situation report. Only strong neutral SE-NW traffic off Freetown, to within the 200-meter line. SW boundary of air patrolling appeared to be up to ET 5635. Naval patrols by 2 destroyers in ET 9931. Nothing sighted during a search for shipping via ET 61, 64, 58, 83, 88 and 87. No air or sea patrols on the above route.
		8)	U 105 - Situation report. After constant air escort appeared, lost contact with the convoy reported on 7.5. 4 single misses were fired at a SE-bound convoy in EU 4495, they were caused by miscalculation of speed. Impossible to follow up because of increased air patrolling. Convoy sailed the whole time within the 100-meter line. No shipping in Lonmovil roadsteads, light extinguished.
			On 4, 8 and 9 May about 20 transport or ferry aircraft seen in EU 48. Course N.E.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: BE 6269, AD 8161, AE 6261, and a further 10 sightings in the North Atlantic, including one attack ("Elbe" or "Nagel" convoy).
	d)	According to a special Radio Intercept intelligence report the convoy "HX 238" was in BC 4851 at 2000 on 12.5. From that position she steered a course of 48⁰ to BC 4338 and from that position was to change her course to 350⁰.

- 368 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 40:
			No further report was received after U 640 lost contact. The "Iller" boats that were directed to the convoy also searched in vain. They were instructed to take up positions in the sequence U 760 - 736 - 340 - 731 at 1000 on 15.5 in patrol strip from AD 9313 to 9393, provided they had not made contact before that time. The whole strip is now manned with 22 boats from AD 9313 to AK 5131. Distance apart 15 miles. U 640 and 657 are continuing the search on their own. With the present good visibility and sea force 2 the convoy should be picked up in the patrol strip.
		2)	Convoy No. 39:
			With continuing good visibility U 403 contacted the convoy at 1630 in BD 6516. However, she was kept under water by air patrols and lost contact. The other boats several times reported carrier borne and sea planes. U 107 sighted the carrier on a westerly course, speed 18 knots, in BD 6429. Attack was not possible. About 1630 the boat contacted the convoy in BD 6451. Attack was prevented by destroyer, and follow up by a hydrophone and depth charge chase. As all boats were then far behind the convoy and the strong air patrolling ruled out any further successes, the operation was given up in the afternoon.
			The boats are remaining in their present area to refuel for their homeward voyage. As Type IXc boats are no longer to be used against convoys in the North Atlantic, they have been ordered to return home after transferring their fuel to other boats.
			In all 16 boats are refueling for further operations.
			9 boats for return voyage.
			Final remarks:
			The operation against the "SC" convoy en route to England was spread over 3 days from 11 to 14 May. In all, 25 boats were directed against the convoy.
			During the operation the weather was not really unfavorable. Moderate sea force, during the day mainly good visibility, at night often changeable visibility and moon, so that conditions were less favorable for attacks at night than during the day. Because of the not very rough weather, conditions must have been good for the enemy's surface location, and this assumption is borne out by the frequent driving off of the submarines.

- 369 -

		Only 4 boats were attacking the convoy during the first night from 11-12 May, but during the day on 12 May 12 boats contacted the convoy. But all these boats lost contact again before dark, and after 0100 on 13 May the convoy was lost, and was only sighted again for a short time on 14 May.
		The reason for this failure is not clearly explained by the radio messages from the boats.
		During the period when the large number of boats had contact, there was still no air escort with the convoy. Planes were first reported during the evening of 14 May, after contact had been lost. As a carrier also joined the convoy later the powerful air escort ruled out further successful operations.
		The most likely reason for the failure lies in the superior numbers of the enemy escort forces combined with good conditions for location. 11 of the shadowing boats were forced away and picked up by escort vessels during daylight on 12 May.
		This represents a very high percentage, and shows that the enemy must have picked up all the boats round the convoy with astonishing accuracy. As he could not possibly have sighted them, he must have used location gear. Since such a rapid detection of the boats has not previously occurred on such a scale, it is quite likely that the enemy is working with a new type of efficient location gear. It cannot have been merely by chance that the boats were forced to sheer off, as 9 boats were depth charged after being picked up, 2 of them with very heavy charges, so that they had to turn back.
		After the boats had been forced away during the evening of the 12th, the visibility worsened and although many boats were in the vicinity the convoy was not picked up again during the night.
		U 402 scored the only success on the convoy by sinking 2 ships in the first night.
		U 186 was lost in attacking the convoy, probably while making an under-water attack during the day.
b)	1)	U 527 and 67 are to operate in the Caribbean area and are proceeding to DO 10. U 641, 229, 305, 211 and 591 are en route to AK 77 and are to be deployed somewhere in this area in company with the remaining "Elbe" boats. U 463 is to act as tanker for this group and is proceeding to BD 20.
		After taking over potash cartridges and binoculars, U 217 is to operate in the American area. Approach point CB 41.
	2)	For orders for "Elbe" boats see final remarks on Convoy No. 39.
c)	None.

- 370 -

	d)	1)	U 223 is again able to crash dive and is proceeding home at 6 knots.
		2)	U 186 was directed to attack Convoy No. 39. She last reported on 12.5. from CE 2244: "intend to attack reported enemy forces" The boat was probably destroyed during this daylight attack. She is presumed lost.
		3)	U 89 stalked Convoy No. 38 and on 12.5. sighted smoke plume and carrier borne plane in BD 6921. Since that time boat has not reported again despite challenge. She must be presumed lost - probably through air attack.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

15.May 1943.

I.	U 66	-	CE 17	U 199	-	AN 36	U 377	-	BD 92	U 558	-	BE 41
	67	-	BE 67	202	-	Op(AK 17)	378	-	Op(AK 01)	569	-	BD 91
	91	-	Op(AK 27)	209	-	BE 66	381	-	Op(AJ 33)	575	-	BD 60
	92	-	Op(AK 15)	211	-	BF 45	383	-	BD 81	584	-	BD 81
	103	-	BD 67	217	-	BE 22	402	-	BD 91	591	-	BF 48
	105	-	Op(ET 83)	218	-	Op(AK 51)	403	-	BD 65	603	-	BD 26
	107	-	BD 83	221	-	BD 26	405	-	BE 65	607	-	BD 60
	108	-	AO	223	-	BE 33	413	-	Op(AK 01)	614	-	BD 81
	109	-	Op(AK 15)	226	-	BE 66	418	-	Op(AD 98)	621	-	BD 69
	119	-	BD 81	227	-	Op(AD 98)	436	-	BD 91	628	-	BE 61
	123	-	ES 80	228	-	BD 25	447	-	CG 90	634	-	BE 44
	126	-	ET 78	229	-	BE 69	448	-	BD 60	636	-	Op(AD 93)
	128	-	Op(FQ 20)	230	-	BD 60	454	-	BD 91	640	-	Op(AK 11)
	129	-	CC 64	231	-	BD 83	459	-	BD 85	641	-	BE 68
	154	-	Op(FJ 60)	232	-	AE 66	460	-	ES 27	642	-	BD 26
	161	-	Op(CA 90)	258	-	Op(AD 98)	461	-	BD 24	645	-	Op(AD 98)
	168	-	BE 66	260	-	BE 41	463	-	BF 73	646	-	AF 47
	176	-	Op(DN 40)	262	-	BC 98	466	-	BD 85	648	-	BF 44
	177	-	Op(GR 90)	264	-	Op(AK 01)	468	-	BD 83	650	-	BE 91
	178	-	Op(KZ 70)	266	-	BE 61	504	-	BD 83	657	-	Op(AK 11)
	180	-	Op(KY)	267	-	BE 44	511	-	CF 36	659	-	CG 90
	181	-	Op(KP 50)	270	-	BF 64	514	-	BD 65	662	-	BE 65
	182	-	DH 19	273	-	AF 47	515	-	Op(EU 80)	664	-	Op(AK 17)
	190	-	BD 49	304	-	Op(AD 94)	521	-	BE 81	666	-	BD 60)
	193	-	AF 87	305	-	BF 44	525	-	BD 61	707	-	Op(AK 17)
	195	-	GG 98	336	-	BE 18	527	-	BE 59	709	-	BD 91
	196	-	Op(KZ 20)	340	-	Op(AK 11)	532	-	BF 61	731	-	Op(AK 11)
	197	-	FM 45	358	-	BF 58	533	-	BD 68	732	-	BF 52
	198	-	Op(KP 80)	359	-	CE 33	552	-	Op(AK 01)	752	-	BD 60
	753	-	BE 40	760	-	Op(AK 11)	951	-	AN 36	953	-	AN 36
							952	-	Op(AD 98)	954	-	Op(AK 15)

	On Return Passage: U 103 - 105 - 107 - 126 - 129 - 168 - 182 - 209 - 223 - 226 - 230 - 267 - 266 - 270 - 358 - 359 - 383 - 402 - 405 - 454 - 466 - 504 - 514 - 525 - 533 - 584 - 614 - 628 - 634 - 648 - 662 - 709.
	Entered Port: U 732 - Brest; U 532 - Lorient; U 270 - St. Nazaire; U 108 - Ostsee.

- 371 -

	Sailed: U 608 - Bordeaux.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See para IVa for Convoy No. 40.
		2)	U 591 was shot up by a Sunderland in BE 6325. Boat scored some hits, but had to turn back because the Commander had been wounded.
		3)	U 569 reported 2 destroyers on N.E. course in BD 6536. At the same time U 650 established contact, but identified reported enemy as an Irish vessel. At the same time U 607 was stalking an independent on a course of 60⁰ in BD 6371. She sank the vessel at 1331 in BD 6355. The name was "Irish Oak" and she was Irish. Vessel carried neutrality markings which were not illuminated at night, she was smoking in a very obvious manner and zigged at varying speeds between courses of 40 - 80⁰. Boat suspected "Q-ship".
		4)	U 336 sighted "Irish Plane" at 1900 in BD 6338, course 250⁰. Ship is included in "Standing Orders".
		5)	U 515 sank "Corneville" (4,544 GRT) on 9.5. in EV 7356, course 300⁰, speed 10 knots, proceeding from India via Takoradi to England. Nothing else sighted in area excepting a little land based air activity. Boat requested operation area from ET 60 - EU 80 after refueling.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DM 66, CH 7733, BE 6414, DH 4265, EP 22, AM 2217 and 2 other sightings in unidentified positions, are probably near Convoy No. 40. Plane attack on submarine in CB 1395 and DH 4265 (probably 2 hits, U 182?).
	d)	In the estimated (German) submarine situation issued by the enemy on 13.5. 15 boats were reported as probably patrolling within 150 miles round 57⁰ North and 40⁰ West. At the time the Groups "Isar", "Inn" and "Lech" totaling 13 boats were lying in the area named. As only one radio message was sent from this area on 11.5, it appears that only location can have been used as a basis for this report.
		At the same time about 10 boats were supposed to be in the area between 50-55⁰ North and 27-30⁰ West. However, at the time, only 2 tankers and one submarine were there. During the previous days several radio messages were sent.

- 372 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 40:
		Contact was not established. At 0100 Groups "Iller", "Donau I and II" were ordered to proceed in their patrol strip on a course of 220⁰, speed 7 knots. Boats to the north were to proceed along the ice boundary if they had any trouble with ice. As the visibility on the previous day was probably good in the area and the boats were only 15 miles apart in the strip, it can hardly be assumed that the convoy passed without being sighted. It seems far more likely that the convoy made a wide zig to the north because of the different submarine sightings, and is now proceeding slowly there or is moving south at low speed. It is therefore still expected that the convoy will arrive.
	b) -	c)	None.
	d)	1)	U 108 has been withdrawn from active service and will be used as a school boat.
		2)	U 753 made an unsuccessful attack on a steamer in BE 5626 on 11.5. Later she was directed to attack Convoy No. 38, but did not establish contact again. She was probably sunk by Biscay plane patrols, which were very strong on this day, or possibly she may have been sunk by carrier borne planes. Loss is probable.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 607 - 1 ship 3,299 GRT
	U 515 - 1 ship 4,544 GRT.


			For B.d.U.
			Chief of Operational Division.
			(Signed): GODT

- 373 -

The German Naval High Command
Second Div. Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Ops.
Ref. 184 A1.
			3.May 1943.

Operational Orders "Marco Polo" for U 511.

I.	Task:
	1)	Voyage to Japan to hand over submarine to the Japanese.
	2)	Behavior on passage as laid down in Operational Order No. 54, Commander's Manual, Standing Orders and Permanent Orders of B.d.U.

II.	Method:
	3)	Boat to be equipped with goods to be transported, printed matter etc. in accordance with orders already issued. Crew's personal equipment to be decided by the Flotilla. It is intended to repatriate the crew speedily by Italian transport submarine or by a blockade runner (in the latter case the men would be transferred to a German submarine in the Atlantic.
	4)	Vice-Admiral Nomura and 6 passengers will be taken on board.
	5)	Departure:
		a)	After boat is operationally ready the goods to be transported and the passengers will be taken on board about 10 May.
		b)	Boat will replenish with about 30 cubic meters of fuel from U 460 in Naval Grid Square DG, she will then proceed south via ES 80 and JJ 40, subsequently on the shortest route to 0⁰ 0' and 89⁰ 0' East, from this point direct course to Rendezvous at 6⁰ 10' North 94⁰ 50' East.
		c)	Boat will be picked up by a Japanese ship (type not yet known) 2 hours after dawn on X-day, this ship will escort her to Penang. 1 hour after dawn on X-day the submarine will be picked up and given anti-submarine escort by 1 carrier-borne plane (monoplane single engine). Plane will fire at least 10 red stars. The recognition signals to be used by the submarine as suggested by German authorities.
		d)	If necessary, boat may run in to Sabang before entering Penang. If it cannot be estimated previously and reported to home port by radio, the boat may send her arrival report when at the rendezvous.
		e)	If any major repairs are required, Singapore (Schonan) is to be used.
		f)	1 Japanese Liaison Officer will be embarked at Penang, he will give navigational advice and bring the necessary charts. Subsequently, the submarine will proceed to Kure. The Naval Attache, Vice Admiral Wennecker will give instructions for the handing over of the submarine in Kure.

- 374 -

		g)	B.d.U. Ops will control the arrival at harbors.

III.	Behavior en route:
	6)	Attacks permitted within the limits of the general rules laid down in Operational Order No. 54 and Standing Order No. 101 on independents only, not on convoys, or battleships and carriers.
	7)	East of Capetown the same permission to attack stands for an area bounded by the line running from
			45⁰ S to 25⁰ E
			via 28⁰ S to 70⁰ E.
			via 20⁰ S to 70⁰ E.
			via 0⁰ N 65⁰ E to the west as far as the coast.
	8)	It has not yet been decided whether the submarine is to be given freedom to attack east of 70⁰ East.
	9)	Boat must expect Japanese submarines and auxiliary cruisers east of 70⁰ East. They will be forbidden to attack submarines during the period in which U 511 is on passage.
	10)	Until the waters off Sumatra are reached, enemy units of all types must be expected, also planes. To date, one air attack has been made on Sabang. There is danger from mines off Singapore (Schonan). U.S.A. and Dutch submarines operate in the South China Sea and the waters around Japan.

IV.	Communication regulations: Recognition signals.
	11)	See Appendix - Communications Order.

V.	General:
	12)	Only the printed matter required for the voyage, or that which is to be handed over to the Japanese is to be carried. When the boat reaches her port of destination, she is to give all papers to the German Naval Attache other than those servicing instructions which must be on board when the boat is handed over. The Flotilla will make a list of the boat's papers and of the plant and gear on board. This list will show all the printed matter carried by the boat divided into:
		a)	Papers to be handed over to the Naval Attache
		b)	Papers to be left on board.
		One copy of the list will go to the Commanding Officer, one to the Flotilla and one to Second Division Naval War Staff. Second Division Naval War Staff will make any necessary alterations to the list by radio.
	13)	It has still to be decided whether the torpedoes already in Penang are to be handed over to the base.
	14)	Instructions for the stay in Japan and repatriation of the crew will be issued, by the German Naval Attache.


			For B.d.U. Chief of Operational Division
			(Signed): GODT.

- 375 -

	Appendix for Operational Order
	"Marco Polo".

Communications Order for "Marco Polo".

Radio Programs:

As Second Division Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Ops will control the boat to her port of destination, communications between boat and Operational Control will be effected via German radio stations and services as a general rule.

Until boat reaches the Indian Ocean all communications are to be made via submarine services in accordance with Communications Manual for Submarines (NB - Uboote).

While proceeding through the Indian Ocean a change to radio service "Bruno" will be ordered.

Communications on service "Bruno" will be radiated on the service Group "Bruno I" (beam transmitter) (see Appendix I) and on the service group "Bruno III (see Communication Manual for submarines) for extended short and long distance services from Norddeich (Erweiterter Nah - und Weidienst Norddeich).

Messages to and from submarines on service "Bruno" will be coded up in groups of four using "Aegir" cypher (identification groups!). These groups will be consecutively numbered in the text, so that the boat will know definitely whether she has picked up the entire message.

All communications will be radiated at least 4 times on radio services "Bruno I" and "Bruno III" , i.e. once after reception in radio room, then twice within 24 hours, and a fourth time between 24 and 48 hours after the original transmission.

All groups of the communications being radiated will be made twice if the transmitting time allows.

The boat will transmit her messages to Operational Control on any wave of radio service "Bruno III" that seems favorable.

Short signals, short weather reports etc. will be given a routine acknowledgement by Norddeich interspersing the four figures of the time of receipt in German standard time twice running during its current transmission on all frequencies. Radio messages will be repeated once by Norddeich as rapidly as possible after receipt.

When the message is garbled and requires lengthy decoding, only the preamble of the message will be repeated at first.

The Naval Attache, Tokio, has set a receiving watch on radio service "Bruno" and is equipped with deciphering material "Aegir".

If, contrary to expectations, the boat, when east of 90⁰ East, has absolutely no transmitting communication with home, she may send messages via Choshi Radio to the Naval Attache, Tokio ("Aegir" in groups of five).

- 376 -

For procedures see radio instructions "Kirsch Bluete" (Appendix 2).

The following call signs were allocated for radio instructions "Kirschbluete".

IDA	4	DORA
ULRICH	1	EMIL
DORA	1	VIKTOR
TONI	3	CAESAR

Naval Attache Tokio will pass on messages to Second Division, Naval War Staff.

Naval Attache Tokio will route messages he may send to U 511 via Berlin to be radiated on service "Bruno".

In urgent cases, however, Naval Attache Tokio can pass his messages straight to the boat via Tokio Radio. Messages will be coded by "Aegir" in groups of five and transmitted by Tokio Radio in accordance with radio instructions "Kirschbluete".

The routine times of the "one-way service" from Tokio Radio must therefore always be covered when the boat is east of 90⁰ East.

5a)

When using "Aegir" cypher for radio messages in groups of five in traffic via Tokio Radio or Choshi Radio use procedure as set out in Signaling Instructions II Para 1354 (Nachrichtenvorschrift) with the following deviation:

Also include final identification groups. Same groups to be used for the final identification groups as for the book identification groups at the beginning, but coded with the coding table (Tausch tafel) for the following day, so that the upper and lower groups look different.

The international traffic with Choshi Radio or from Tokio Radio is to be sent or taken by the "Debeg" operator (T.N. specially trained by the German Radio Telegraphy Company) who has been included in the crew specially for this purpose. In addition, Japanese state traffic with Japanese procedure signals etc. goes out over Choshi Radio and Tokio Radio. This traffic will not be understood by the boat and is of no importance.

If Admiral Nomura wishes to send messages to his own officers using his own cypher the following method can be used.

The coded Japanese message (divided up into groups of 4 or 5) is to be given to the Commander. Message will be sent home (if necessary to Naval Attache Tokio) in the form of a German radio message, i.e. German text to begin with (for example: A Japanese telegram for ......... follows....) then the coded Japanese text as book Groups at the end of the Japanese telegram, a German dummy group to act as a decipher check. Finally recode all with code M.

The message will be passed to the desired address by Second Division, Naval War Staff (B.d.U. Ops.) (or by Naval Attache Tokio).

- 377 -

B.	Recognition Signal Procedure:
	8)	The following arrangements have been made for recognition signal procedure "Marco Polo" with Japanese naval forces and land bases prior to arrival at port of destination:
		a)	The Japanese will use letter group "Hans Richard" for both callsign and reply. U 511 will call and answer with "Richard Karl". The first to sight the other will transmit call sign.
			The letters will be sent by day or night as morse characters with an appropriate projector lamp.
		b)	The Japanese naval forces that are to escort U 511 will set distant signals as distinguishing mark, i.e. truncated cone, small surface pointing down, with a ball below.

C.	Fitting out with Cypher material:
	9)	Cypher material "Triton" General and Officer's, valid until August 1943 inclusive.
	10)	Cypher material "Aegir" General and Officer's, valid until August 1943 inclusive.
	11)	Flotilla will give instructions on keyword order "Jupiter". Keyword order itself is not to be carried.
	12)	The boat must be fitted out with all cypher material and communications service manuals required for the operation, except:
		a)	Navy Signal Book MDV 150
		b)	Aircraft recognition table MDV 58
		c)	Reconnaissance and fighter table
		d)	Key sheets for Reconnaissance and fighter table
		e)	Appendix 3 to "Special Orders for G.A.F. Radio Procedure"
		f)	Communications regulations of German Naval Group Command North.
		These confidential books are to be handed in before the submarine leaves port.
	13)	When the submarine reaches her port of destination, she is to hand over to the Naval Attache Tokio all confidential books & papers dealing with cypher, radio and recognition signal procedure or with the tactical use of gear and equipment.
		The description and servicing instructions of all the communication and location gear on board are to be left in the submarine when she is handed over.

- 378 -

D.	Submission of Reports:
	14)	After the boat has entered port of destination she is to submit a report on the events of the voyage so far as the communications and location service is concerned. The report is to go to B.d.U. via the Naval Attache Tokio.
		Points of special interest:
		a)	How the foregoing communications arrangement worked. Defects?
		b)	Up to which area could the submarine program transmitters be heard? Short and very long wave. Best program or wavelength?
		c)	Difficulties in picking up messages on radio service "Bruno".
		d)	Difficulties in transmitting messages from boat to home.
		e)	Events connected with traffic with Choshi Radio or when picking up messages from Tokio Radio.
		f)	Suggestions for submarine communications service in any similar operations
			i) as far as Penang
			ii) as far as port of destination.

- 379 -

Appendix 1 for Communications

Order "Marco Polo".

Beam Transmitters:

Table of times and frequencies.

	1 October to 31 March				1 April to 30 September
Transmitting times	North Atlantic	South Atlantic	Indian Ocean	South Africa		North Atlantic	South Atlantic	Indian Ocean	South Africa

0110	DFP	DFL	DGM	DGN		DGH	DFL	DGM	DGL
0630	DFP	DFL	DFQ	DGL		DGH	DFL	DFQ	DGL
1310	DFB	DGR	DFG	DGL		DFB	DGR	DFQ	DGZ
2000	DGH	DFL	DGM	DGZ		DFB	DGR	DGM	DGZ

Frequencies.

DFB	17,520	Kc/s	17.12.	meters
DFL	10,850	"	27.65	"
DFP	7,917.5	"	37.89	"
DFQ	18,700	"	16.04	"
DGH	10,440	"	28.74	"
DGL	12,035	"	24.93	"
DGM	9,795	"	3-.63	"
DGN	7,490	"	40.05	"
DGR	17,395	"	17.25	"
DGZ	14,605	"	20.54	"

- 380 -

The German Naval High Command
Second Division Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Op
Ref. 2555 A4.
		3.May 1943.

Re: Radar Situation report by B.d.U. April 1943.

Enclosed: "Situation Report by B.d.U. on use of Radar in Submarine Warfare

	The usual monthly radar interception report by B.d.U. is thereby superceded. The individual experiences of the operational submarines during March and April are gathered together in Appendix 3.


		For B.d.U.
		Chief of Operational Division
		(Signed): GODT.

- 381 -

			B.d.U. Ref. 2555 A4.

To all Submarine Commanders:

In his efforts to rob the submarines of her most valuable characteristic (invisibility) the enemy is several lengths ahead of us by virtue of his radar location.

I am fully aware of the difficult position that this puts you in when fighting enemy escorts and anti-submarine forces.

You may rest assured that I have done, and shall continue to do everything within my powers as Commander-in-Chief to change this situation as rapidly as possible.

Work is being carried on both within the Navy and outside it to develop and improve your weapons and gear.

I expect you to continue your determined struggle with the enemy and by pitting your ingenuity, ability and toughness against his tricks and technical developments, finally to finish him off.

Commanders in the Mediterranean and Atlantic have proved that even today the enemy has weak spots everywhere and that in many cases the enemy resources are not nearly so efficient as they would appear at first sight, if the boat's Commander is determined to score a success in spite of everything.

I believe that I shall shortly be able to give you better weapons for this hard struggle of yours.


			(Signed): DÖNITZ

- 382 -

Situation Report by B.d.U. on the Use of Radar in Submarine Warfare.

The aim of the following report is to provide the submarines with a survey of the present state of development of the enemy's radar and of our own, to show how this affects submarine warfare and what limitations it lays on the boats or what possibilities it offers.

Main Points:

The most important characteristics of the submarine is her invisibility, this gives her great strategic and tactical value and her offensive power. Her low silhouette and ability to dive and avoid being observed by the enemy gives her the great advantage of surprise when stalking or attacking and greatly reduces the enemy's ability to fight back at the submarine even after she has been attacked. Any submarine that is no longer invisible is so slow and vulnerable that she is inferior to even weak enemy forces. The armament of submarines is designed almost exclusively for attack and is wholly inadequate (in its present state of development) for defence.

Knowing this, the enemy has always done all in his power to rob the submarine of her invisibility by getting as accurate a fix as possible by location gear, which enabled him either to attack successfully or at any rate to take evasive action. The more dangerous the submarine becomes for the enemy, the more he will strive to improve his means of detection.

Radar, more than any other means of location, is able to pick up the submarine while it is still at very long range (especially from planes) and by additional measurement the position can be pin-pointed. Thus, quite naturally, the enemy eagerly seized upon radar right from its earliest stages as an exceptionally valuable weapon in the fight against submarines.

The Anglo-Americans have far greater reserve of manpower and materials to throw into the task of developing and manufacturing and doubtless are using a high percentage of these reserves for radar research, i.e. for anti-submarine measures which they consider the most important part of their war effort. Hence, the enemy has the upper hand in this field and we are forced to use our resources mainly for counter-measures to render the enemy location ineffective in order to protect our own boats and the development and manufacture of radar gear for our own boats to use offensively has to take second place.

The radar interception service forms a most important warning and counter-measure against enemy location, and when radar interception gear was installed in submarines in Autumn 1942 the effects of enemy radar location on our submarine warfare were largely off-set.

However, during the last few weeks the enemy superiority has again increased thus threatening the boats and their chances of attack.

Enemy Radar location frequencies:

The supposition reported by the boats that the enemy had partly given up his original division of the different location frequencies into shore stations, destroyers, planes etc. has now been confirmed.

- 383 -

However, the original plan
			Planes about 170 cm
			Shore stations about 150 cm
			Patrol forces about 140 cm
is still recognizable, although the exceptions from this rule are increasing. So far, most of this experience has been obtained in the Mediterranean and the sea area round Spain, Gibraltar, North Africa and, in part, in Biscay, however it may be assumed as a broad rule that radar frequencies no longer provide a definite clue to the type of enemy unit using radar.

Cooperation between shore stations and planes:

The Mediterranean boats suspect that planes and shore stations worked together on the same wavebands. The plane was partially distinguishable by deviating pulse repetition rate (pitch). This suspected cooperation is possible, but is not yet definitely confirmed.

"Intermittent Transmitter":

The reports from the boats show that enemy planes in particular are working to an increasing degree as "Intermittent transmitters", i.e. they use their radar for only a short period, in order to conceal the presence and activity of the locater as far as possible from the radar interception operator on submarines. (This method is exceptionally effective when the intermittent transmitter is working on the same frequency as a permanently locating shore installation). The best example of this type of intermittent transmission is probably given in the instructions issued to our own aircraft crews, who are using radar location gear. After picking up a target, it is measured by very short time location pulse and course is set for it. Once measurement has been effected, the gear is immediately switched off. After flying 10 Km. another short measurement is taken and gear again switched off. The leeway resulting from the 10 Km. flight is adjusted with the help of conversion table, so that the target can be approached directly. All that is then needed is one further short measurement before releasing bombs (the enemy appears to carry out this final measurement with the help of searchlights or similar gear (lichtortung) so as to stand fairly directly over the target.).

If the locator knows that he has been detected by the radar interceptor, this short time location transmission is superfluous and merely makes it more difficult for the locator to get a fix on the enemy. Hitherto, it has always been established in the case of convoys which were aware of the presence of submarines, and of shore installations that the gear was kept running the whole time with no need for radar interception or for targets within range. In these cases the danger often exists of the submarines diving or turning away because of the location, even though they have not been picked up. In this way the enemy largely achieves his purpose. It is not yet known whether he does this intentionally.

Range of enemy radar gear on destroyers:

A report from a submarine in the Mediterranean provides a clue to the range of radar gear carried by convoy escorts, and to the possibility of the submarines making some use of enemy location activity. During the day the submarine in question maintained contact at visibility range (15 miles) with a convoy despite continuous radar location. During darkness she moved up to firing range and was not picked up at a range of 4,000 - 5,000 meters from the locating vessels (1 destroyer, 1 escort vessel).

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After firing her torpedo the boat was approached by the escort vessel however she was able to get away from the enemy's location by utilizing the reports of signal strength provided by the radar interception operator.

Shore Installations:

Thanks to the daring of their Commanders, some of the Mediterranean boats were able to glean useful information on the effectiveness of shore installations. Although the signal strength of the location installations was sometimes a positive bellow, the boats were not picked up (no enemy anti-submarine measures) and were able to stand on and off close inshore to charge their batteries without being disturbed despite continuous location. However daring the Commander may be such information can only be obtained if the radar interception operator is wide awake and capable and if the state of readiness of the boat (look-out, anti-aircraft guns) greatly reduce the danger to the boat.

Inaudible pulse repetition rates:

A fair amount of information is available on location with pulse repetition rates beyond or on the very verge of audibility, however, in the main, there is no confirmation from other sources of the type of the locator.

In this connection it must be mentioned that the boats often confuse the expression "pulse repetition rate" with the real "carrier frequency" of the location. The pulse repetition rate merely gives the number of pulses transmitted per second, thus determining the pitch of the location note heard in the radar interception receiver. The carrier frequency is the transmitting frequency of the location gear. Only those location frequencies (carrier frequencies) can be picked up for which the receiver has been built and to which it can be tuned, i.e. from 125 to 264 cm on the METOX receiver, rating the first harmonic 62 cm to 264 cm (it comes on correspondingly weaker, but can be definitely picked up when the transmitter is powerful). If the transmitter is very powerful it may even be possible to pick up the second harmonic and this will provide interception up to 41 cm. Locations on, say 30 cm, can no more be picked up, than a "People's Radio Receiver" is capable of picking up a short wave transmitter.

The reception of the different pulse repetition rates by audio-reception depends on the receptive capacity of the human ear (from about 30 to 15,000 cycles per second) but this can be supplemented by visual indication through the Magic Eye or a cathode ray tube (Braunschen Rohr).

The radio operators of a boat who had detected location with inaudible pulse repetition rates (only heard in the head phones as a loud rushing noise) were given a demonstration of frequencies on the verge of audibility by the 9th Submarine Flotilla on the test floor at the yard.

According to statements made by these men the frequencies round about 50 cycles corresponded more or less to the rushing noise, heard in their receiver.

In the locations reported by several boats as hearing inaudible pulse repetition rates there was one location on 170 cm, one location on 176 cm, one location on 188 cm and two locations on 169 cm.

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No locations gave the type of location gear.

One further location was detected on 166 cm and at the same time an enemy plane was seen approaching.

The most definite information on this type of location and the first of concrete use is provided in the report from the Commander of U 382:
"When in the vicinity of a convoy at the end of April the Magic Eye was seen to light up and then fade again from time to time at night. There was no audible note (nor any rushing noise). No positive results were obtained from checking by disconnecting the aerial and testing possible sources of interference in the control room and along the antenna cable. After a short time a destroyer was sighted from the bridge. Shortly afterwards the Magic Eye was fully deflected. At this time the destroyer was at an angle of 0 degrees on the bow. A regular crackling and hissing was heard in the headphones for the first time when the destroyer was about 2,000 meters off. The submarine turned away and was able to sheer off beyond range of the location.
Towards the end the location was merely wiping and finally stopped altogether. The destroyer returned to the convoy. The submarine hauled ahead of the convoy, as she drew near the inaudible location recommenced. Two destroyers approached the boat and forced her to submerge. Depth charge pursuit followed.
The gear on this submarine was functioning properly, the whole time both before and after the pursuit indicated continuous audible location."

Drawbacks of the Magic Eye:

It is very difficult to assess these locations that are shown only by the Magic Eye, because - as previously mentioned and since confirmed by reports from a number of boats - the Magic Eye also indicated any interference either in the receiver itself or outside, (also atmospherics during storms etc.).

A fairly sure distinction between interference caused by the enemy and that arising in our own boat or gear can be made only by the cathode ray tube. (Oscillograph or "B-Rohr" of the radar installation (Fu.M.G.Anlage). All boats will be equipped with oscillographs as they become available.

Attack without any location being detected:

During the last few weeks submarines have been attacked at night to an increasing extent without any location being detected beforehand. This has occurred mainly in Biscay and the Mediterranean and some boats have been badly damaged.

In every case the plane was recognized by the flashing of the searchlight or white lights. In many cases flares were dropped during the attack.

The flashing of the searchlight was frequently observed while the plane was still at a considerable distance from the boat (1,000 - 2,000 meters or more), so that the boat was not picked up and by diving was able to avoid detection (7 out of 17 boats).

Twice location on 140 cm was detected starting up after the attack, although no location had been observed beforehand.

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The information obtained yields the following possible clues:
	a)	Location does not give the enemy an exact picture of the type of object being located.
	b)	At short range location does not provide any, or at all events very inexact, data for the attack.
	c)	The enemy works for such short periods that the radar interception operator has great difficulty in detecting him, he also puts himself at an advantage by working on different wave bands (in this case 140 cm) from the normal aircraft frequencies (170 cm wave band) on which the boats mainly search.
On the other hand the data obtained by the plane from short time location is not always sufficiently accurate for the run-in.

After the first attack the ruse no longer has point and the continuous location that is then switched on is detected by the submarine. As most boats take in their aerials either after or during the first attack or when they sight the enemy, it cannot be established whether location was distinguishable after the attack in the other cases as well. (This point may be cleared up when the equipment of the boats with all-round dipoles is completed, as this will render radar reception independent of diving readiness).

In general these effects of the enemy radar location, which are again becoming threatening for our submarines, may have the following causes:
	a)	The enemy works very efficiently with short time locations (intermittent transmitter).
	b)	The enemy works on pulse repetition rates beyond or on the verge of audibility that can be recognized only by visual indication.
	c)	The enemy works on carrier frequencies beyond the range of the submarine's radar interception receiver.
	d)	The enemy is using other methods of location that are at present undetectable or unknown.

Counter-measures:

Measures for detecting the enemy's location gear and method of operating are being worked upon.

In order to obtain more information, a specially equipped submarine will run out into Biscay during the next few days and observe the aircraft using location there. A radar specialist from the Communications Experimental Command will be carried, along with special receivers.

A second specially equipped boat is expected to be ready to leave next month.

The shore radar interception stations on the Atlantic coast will be strengthened, equipped and employed for the same purpose.

Gear is being developed that will enable the submarines to observe simultaneously the widest possible waveband without taking into consideration the pulse repetition rate used.

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Receivers for location frequencies beyond the range of the present submarine radar interception receiver are likewise being evolved.

The requirements and problems to be solved in connection with interference, camouflage and deception devices have been submitted to the research departments. Some results may be expected soon, others take much longer.

Enemy instructions (Captured documents):

Instructions for anti-submarine attacks were obtained from documents taken fro an enemy plane that made an emergency landing in the Mediterranean area. They throw light in a very interesting way on the enemy's method of fighting and also his difficulties. The instructions for the aircraft observer are especially illuminating in the latter respect and many points could equally well be followed in our own radar procedure.

Instructions are included with this report as an appendix.

Conduct of the Submarines:

Independently of the measures taken by Operational Control to clarify and improve the situation the following instructions and guiding principles are laid down for the conduct of the boats when combating enemy location.
	1)	In the present situation radar interception gear no longer serves as a reliable warning or defence!
	2)	In areas that are especially dangerous by reason of aircraft and radar, submarines are to remain submerged so far as operationally and practically possible. (See orders for cruise through Biscay). When on the surface the defensive readiness of the submarine (lookout, anti-aircraft weapons) is decisive.
	3)	Radar interception service remains vital for the submarines. Every possible means must be used to instruct and train the radar interception operators. The Commander and Officers are to take a special interest in the work done by the radar observers, but they must also be strictly supervised and led.
	4)	At present is is absolutely essential that the Commander and watch keeping officers should have a thorough knowledge of all direction and data connected with the radar interception service.
	5)	The enemy is no different from ourselves! No means of location is so perfectly effective that we cannot find some sort of counter-measure if we make use of our own skill.
		The boats themselves can contribute very decisively to a clarification of the situation by sharp observation and making reports. By cautiously, but systematically feeling their way into the enemy's method of fighting they can get a fairly clear picture for themselves and benefit to a large extent.

Equipment with offensive weapons:

In this connection it must be stated that the present markedly defensive conduct of our submarines vis-a-vis enemy escort forces is caused by the present situation, but that finally the innately offensive character

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of the submarine must be made good use of.

To take evasive action because of enemy location or from an enemy vessel using radar is a wholly undesirable emergency solution.

Every effort is being made to equip the submarine with weapons that will enable her to deal a death blow to planes and escort forces.

Submarine Radar Gear:

In the present situation the use of our own radar gear for operations and attack has rather had to take second place in view of the trouble we are having and the efforts we are making in the struggle with enemy location.

The use of radar gear on submarines:
	a)	can simplify the finding of convoys or may even be the only means of making it possible to find them (at night, or in fog),
	b)	when attacking, radar gives valuable data for firing torpedoes (exact range, and after further development it will give a fix for a blind shot).

So far the number of radar installations on submarines has been too small to enable a real evaluation of their capacity. It is especially difficult to judge whether the radar gear now in use is suitable for submarine requirements, or whether limitations in its operational effectiveness are merely due to its actual construction, to its performance capacity or to its complicated operation.

In the next few days a submarine leaving for the Atlantic will carry a radar expert so that the necessary experience and information may be gained to enable an evaluation of the radar gear and its suitability for the job.

Independently of this experiment, 3 G.A.F. radar sets (Hohentwiel) are now being adapted for use in submarines in order to test their suitability. The Hohentwiel gear is distinguished by small size combined with high capacity, and is exceptionally simple to operate and repair.

Only experience will show to what extent this gear, which has been specially constructed for use on planes, will prove suitable for submarines.

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			APPENDIX 1

Extract from instructions to English airmen for attacks on submarines.

ASV = English radar gear (Aircraft to Surface Vessel)

ASV Contacts:
	1)	Every suspicious contact in the vicinity of surface forces must be reported immediately by W/T as well as R/T.
	2)	When within range of visibility of surface forces planes have to report submarines as follows:
		a)	by a series of dips in the direction of the submarine,
		b)	by circling low over the submarine,
		c)	by dropping smoke floats, flare floats or markers,
		d)	by firing yellow flares.
	3)	Planes in the vicinity of a convoy (minimum range 8 miles) are not to drop parachute flares at night to illuminate suspicious ASV contacts. They are to inform the convoy leader by R/T of the position of the contact and suggest the use of parachute flares. However, if surface craft have already used flares because of an attack the planes may use parachute flares.

Method of Attack:
	4)	Speed of attack is most important. An attack on the eddy left by a diving submarine or on an oil streak is too late. The submarine will no longer be there.
	5)	When attacking, the following tactics are to be employed:
		a)	Lose height and carry out the run in as quickly as possible.
		b)	The attack may be made from any direction.
		c)	Normal height for releasing depth-charges is 50 feet, and for anti-submarine bombs, when they are carried, 400 feet.
		d)	If a submarine is sighted on the surface and is attacked within 30 seconds of diving, 6 depth-charges (when carried) are to be dropped at a distance apart of 36 feet. If the submarine is not attacked within 30 seconds of diving, only 2 depth-charges are to be released.
		e)	When making an attack, care must be taken that the stick of bombs straddles the submarine. To accomplish this, the estimated speed of the submarine and the forward impetus of the depth-charges after they have struck the water (40 feet) must be allowed for.
		See next paragraph for execution.

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Allowance for falling time and movement of target:

It takes about 5 seconds (2 seconds in the air and 3 seconds in the water) for a depth-charge to detonate when dropped from a height of 50 feet.

When a submarine is in the process of an alarm dive, her speed is 6 knots (10 feet per second). Thus when attacking the boat, if part of her hull is still visible, the center of the stick, 5 X 10 = 50 feet, is to be aimed at the forward part of the conning tower at the time the bombs are released.

If the submarine has dived before the depth charges are released, the stick must be aimed so that is coincides with a point at a certain distance ahead of the eddy. The eddy is caused by the forward part of the conning tower. Naturally the distance lies between the spot where the depth-charges disappear and the time they detonate. If it is assumed that the speed of the submarine is 6 knots the following Table I shows the distances.

Table I
Time (nose dive until release)	5	10	15	20	25	30	seconds.
Distance (from eddy to target point)	100	150	200	250	300	350	feet.

If only the periscope is sighted the submarine's speed will probably be only 2 knots = 3.3 feet per second, hence the stick of bombs must be aimed 5 X 3.3 feet ahead of the periscope at the time of releasing bombs.

Note: In every case additional allowance must be made for the path of the depth-charge under water.

10)

If the plane arrives more than 30 seconds after the submarine has dived, a successful attack is unlikely. The pilot must rely on his own judgment whether to attack or not. Normally he will not attack, though he must do so if the submarine is approaching a convoy or other surface vessels.

11)

Attacks are to be made on oil traces only if they are specially ordered.

Procedure after the attack:

12)

Escort duties:

A marker is to be dropped by the eddy and the area is to be searched for half an hour.

When no surface forces are present:

Plane is to await developments.

When surface forces are present:

See paragraph C.

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13)

During the day:

i	When escorting convoys or cooperating with surface forces:
	Planes on convoy escort duty are to fly at between 800 and 1500 feet.
ii	Anti-submarine hunt:
	When sky is clear or when cloud ceiling is 5,000 feet, the patrol is to fly at 4 to 5,000 feet.
	If cloud is not more than 5/10 and is below 5,000, patrols are to be carried out above the clouds but below 5,000 feet. If the cloud is not more than 5/10 and is below 5,000 feet, the cloud base is to be utilized as much as possible, if this can be done without endangering navigation.

During the night:

Planes are to fly between 1,000 and 1,500 feet.

Escort of convoys and surface forces:

14)

The most important duty of escorting planes is to force submarines to dive and prevent their sighting surface forces. Even if all ammunition is exhausted, a dummy attack will have the same result.

15)

Convoys and naval forces are usually provided with an anti-submarine escort as well as a plane.

Patrols:

16)

H.M. Ships:

At high speed:

Circle with longest range 5 or 6 miles.

At low speed:

As above, but when required, fall astern.

Convoys:

17)

During the day:

All speeds. As for H.M. ships, see above, with an occasional sweep to the rear (every two hours).

During the night:

i	A five mile circle (not more), varying in direction and radius round the convoy.
	Intelligence shows that submarines take advantage of regular patrols, by surfacing after the plane has passed over.

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ii	More than 15 knots:
	The area within a 5 mile radius is to be searched. Every half hour a sweep is to be made to the rear.

Anti-submarine hunt in cooperation with surface forces:

18)

Surface forces and planes are to meet at a stipulated time in the commencing position.

Normally the plane is to patrol 7 miles ahead over a front of 20 miles, but if the speed of the convoy

Procedure during the day, when plane has sighted enemy or made a contact:

19)

The plane is to:

attack, if possible,

transmit a report on the enemy,

mark the position of the submarine by means of smoke floats and continue to do this until a surface unit arrives,

when the surface forces arrive, a patrol is to be carried out to a depth of 10 miles from the vessels to prevent the submarine getting away on the surface.

Procedure during the night when plane has sighted the enemy or has made a contact:

20)

If the contact is confirmed as a submarine, the plane is to:

attack with depth charges, using flares as necessary,

transmit a report on the enemy,

drop parachute flares until the surface forces are within 5 miles of the estimated position of the submarine.

Drop fire floats until the surface forces arrive.

when surface forces arrive, carry out a patrol to a depth of 10 miles from the vessels to prevent the submarine getting away on the surface.

21)

The relief plane will search the area between 10 and 20 miles astern of each vessel of the surface forces for half an hour before taking over the patrol.

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		APPENDIX 2

Hints for pilots and navigators.

1)	The ASV gear is not a device to do the navigator's job for him. Its main function is to pick up surface vessels. But if it is properly handles it can be of great help for navigation.

2)	Your S.E. observer (Trans. Special Equipment ?) has only had 3 or 4 weeks training before starting on the job and he still needs all the help you can give him.

3)	Don't grumble at him if he starts you on a hunt that turns out to be a false alarm. A rock looks very much like a ship on the tube, and if nothing can be found, it may well have been a submarine that dived quickly.

4)	If he reports land that you can't see for yourself, don't be sarcastic, just remember that he can't watch his gear and look out the window at the same time. In any case he is only carrying out his instructions.

5)	If you are flying by day, make sure that your observer remains by his gear and have him report all echoes - this will be good practice for him and also help you gain more confidence in the ASV gear, while you get to know the limitations of the gear.

6)	Don't object to spending five minutes searching for a suspicious patch - you may just as well do that as fly a normal patrol and still not sight anything.

7)	Operate the ASV gear yourself sometimes - you'll get a better idea of the difficulties your observer has to contend with, and one day it may be of great help to you.

8)	Ask the S.I. Station to tell you all you want to know about ASV gear.

9)	Occasional praise for a specially good effort with the ASV gear will certainly not hurt your observer.

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			Appendix 3

Further Interception Experience by Operational Submarines during March/April 1943.

A.	Results of Observation:
	Last third of March and the month of April.

	a)	120 cm band:
		12 observations, one of them vertical.
		Mid Atlantic, North Atlantic, Biscay, in the vicinity of convoys.
		Remarks: On one occasion Diesel noises were heard after diving (enemy submarine?) 120 cm. On one occasion attack by plane 125 cm.

	b)	130 cm band:
		32 observations, 11 of them vertical.
		Mid Atlantic, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Biscay, in the vicinity of convoys and enemy coastline.
		Remarks: On several occasions powerful shore stations were located 132 and 134 cm. On one occasion an M.T.B. was sighted - 134 cm. Once a destroyer was sighted - 133 cm. One aircraft attack, bombs - 132 cm.

	c)	140 cm band:
		155 observations, 8 of them vertical.
		Mid Atlantic, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Biscay, in the vicinity of convoys and enemy coasts.
		Remarks: On several occasions shore stations were located: 137, 140 (ORAN), 141 cm. Once enemy V/HF traffic in the Mediterranean - 140 cm. On 13 occasions destroyer, patrol boat or corvette identified - 136 to 143 cm. One enemy submarine sighted 140 cm. One aircraft attack - 140 cm. One presumably hospital ship - 140 cm.

	d)	150 cm band:
		109 observations, 21 of them vertical.
		Remarks: In the Mediterranean and off Northern Scotland several shore stations were picked up: (Gulf of Arabia 155, 158 cm, Appolonia, Tobruk 147 cm, Ras Aamer 147 cm, Copinsay (Northern Scotland) 150 cm, other shore installations in the Mediterranean 147 to 149 cm). One destroyer sighted - 150 cm.

	e)	160 cm band:
		71 observations, 5 of them vertical.
		Mid Atlantic, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Biscay,

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		in the vicinity of convoys and enemy coasts.
		Remarks: Several shore stations in the Mediterranean 165 - 168 cm (Cape Tenes 163 cm). One M.T.B. sighted - 164 cm. One submarine sighted - 156 cm.

	f)	170 cm band:
		421 observations, 14 of them vertical.
		Mid Atlantic, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Biscay, in the vicinity of convoys and enemy coasts.
		Remarks: Several shore stations in Mediterranean (Oran and Cape Lindles - 168 cm). Eight heavy bombing attacks, some lasting for 15 minutes after submerging! 167 - 172 cm. One destroyer sighted, followed by depth charge pursuit - 168 cm.

	g)	180 cm. band:
		33 observations, 1 of them vertical.
		Atlantic convoys, Biscay, Nord Sea off Newfoundland.
		Remarks: None.

	h)	200 cm band:
		21 observations, 4 of them vertical.
		Area around England, North Atlantic.
		Remarks: One destroyer in the vicinity - 195 cm. One suspected shore station - 210 cm.

	i)	225 cm band:
		10 observations, 4 of them vertical.
		Iceland and Newfoundland area, Mid Atlantic.
		Remarks: None.

	j)	250 cm band:
		17 observations, 10 of them vertical.
		North Atlantic and Mid Atlantic
		Remarks: One plane sighted (?) - 240 cm. On two occasions harmonics from radio transmitters supposed.

	Special Remarks: Deviations of isolated observations from the normal frequencies have been shown in the foregoing summary.
	In the meantime besides these other land installations have been detected near Cape Verde (West Coast of Africa), they were 140, 170 and 176 cm. On the coast of Brazil similar installations were detected on 110 cm. Near Cape Ivi (Mediterranean) there is an installation on 270 cm. This is so powerful that it can still be heard clearly at a range of 60 miles (according to another report 110 miles!!) and when the boat was at a distance of about 12 miles the power blocked the whole radar interception gear. However the boats themselves could not possibly be picked up at this distance.

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These enemy locations available for evaluation during the period covered by this report give the picture shown in Appendix 4.

Information from boats:

It is again pointed out that the known weak spots in the METOX receiver cause some inexactitude in the frequency readings or in the information as to whether the beaming was horizontally or vertically polarized. The latter information is especially scrappy as the horizontal cable of the improvised radar interception gear (Behelfs-Fu.M.B.) is far more liable to break down than the corresponding vertical cable, so that false observations arise easily. For further information refer to the corresponding section of the last report.

Own new developments:

Information on the positions of own radar installations on the coast of Norway and Biscay partly out of date!

As in the case of the enemy, our new developments have deviated from the fixed frequencies used to begin with, so that it is not always possible today definitely to identify German installations from a knowledge of their positions and frequencies. As developments proceed, gear with very variable frequencies must be expected in our own equipment as in the enemy's in order to evade jamming.

Recognition of German installations:

At present investigations are being made into the possibility of providing some simple means of discriminating between German and enemy gear (possibly tuning forks). This should be possible by reason of the fairly standardized pulse repetition rates (500 cycles) of German gear and would obviate unnecessary diving by our own submarines because of own radar gear operating from own bases.

Swamping of Receiver:

3 boats reported location tones over the whole scale, one of the boats was then attacked by a plane. It has not been definitely established whether this was a case of jamming, over powerful enemy gear, or some other cause.

Enemy Jammers:

One boat suspected enemy jammer on one of the ships in the convoy. For as long as we ourselves are not using radar, it is highly improbable that the enemy will use jammers. The disadvantages would be too great (it would be possible for radar interception gear to get bearings at very long range and thus assist German submarines in their search for convoys).

Technical information:

Warming up of gear:

One report has been received to date stating that the new GRANDIN receiver warms up too much. The suggestion made in the

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	last report that use might be made of the boat's ventilation to cool the gear by attaching a metal tube to the air supply draught regulator in the listening room, has not proved suitable in all areas, as in general the ventilation is rarely working when the boat is on the surface. The best solution still seems to be the compartment ventilator (well insulated). One boat suggested that this ventilator should be suspended immediately above the receiver so that the axis of the ventilator points vertically at the upper part of the METOX casing.

	Crackling noises and dead spots in the receiver:
	The "dead spots" and crackling noises caused by the wearing of the spring washer on the shaft of the variable condenser, which were mentioned in the last report, have again occurred on many occasions on the METOX. A few boats were not able to locate the fault despite instructions sent out by radio.
	These faults have not appeared on the new "GRANDIN" from No. 031 onwards or on "METOX" from No. 1446 onwards. The gear at present installed on the boats will be adapted temporarily when they return to the yards by placing a cut-out ring (Sicherungsring) and a brass plate on the variable condenser shaft.

	More locations beyond the field of the scale!

	Gap tuning!
	Once again the ominous observations "beyond the field of the scale" have occurred on numerous occasions. (For explanation see Radar Interception Report for March). In the same way, some boats have detected a "gap" in location of the receiver! This special type of "gap" is caused by construction of the receiver. If sufficient time remains the exact frequency must be read off if possible in this gap!

	Magic Eye:

	Sensitivity:
	Some boats have reported that the Magic Eye certainly registers all interference, but reacts only very slightly or not at all to real, audible locations that come in very faintly.
	This means that within the sonic scope of the human ear the Magic Eye is somewhat inferior in sensitivity. Indeed even in the case of frequencies on the fringe of audibility the Magic Eye is not more sensitive, but by reason of the fact that in this region the ability of the ear to register sound deteriorates very rapidly, the Magic Eye has a considerable advantage.
	The check suggested in the last report for locations shown on the Magic Eye by disconnecting the aerial for a moment (provided there is sufficient time for this during short time locations), merely prevents the "amplification maxima" ("Vestaerkungsmaximas") which arise in the receiver itself. Interference caused by electric motors and gear in the control room and conning tower which reaches the receiver via the aerial cable, can only be detected by carefully tracing all possible sources of interference before leaving port.
	When reporting "inaudible locations" it must always be stated whether the check carried out leaves any margin for interference of this type.
	The best check is to pull out the aerial for a short time.

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	Horizontal and vertical locations:
	The reports made by several boats of locations that showed the same signal strength horizontally as well as vertically are probably due to damage to one of their aerial cables. Yet another interpretation might be that the enemy is using some kind of diagonal dipole. It cannot be seen what advantages or disadvantages would accrue to the enemy from this. (Revolving dipoles, as used on some of our own shore installations, are also possible.

	Insulation resistances:

	Aerial cable:
	One boat reported faulty insulation resistance of 25,000 ohm in the antenna cable!! Such high frequencies as used for radar purposes are not subject to the same laws as normal power current. In general, insulation resistances of a few hundred ohm suffice to carry sufficient power to the receiver.

	Aid for boats from Flotillas:
	In all cases of obvious false observations by the boats, it is the Flotillas' job to see that they receive instruction etc. Reports from the boats themselves are to include supplementary measures taken, just as in the case of communications reports. For example, in cases where the boat only picked up locations on new frequencies (as repeatedly reported) during the entire operation, the accuracy of the frequencies on the receiver is to be checked. In cases where the boats detected only, or mainly, vertical location during the entire operation, the horizontal cable is to be checked, etc.

	(Translator's Note: Following paragraph was deleted in original)

	Crystal headphones?
	One boat stated that from experience crystal headphones, as used for sonic telegraphy and G.H.G. reception (multi-unit hydrophones), are also better than ordinary headphones for radar intercept reception. It was, however, also immediately pointed out that the crystal headphones lose some of their sensitivity after a time through moisture etc. They must be checked and changed from time to time.

	(Translator's Note: End of delete)

	Round dipoles:
	Boats are now being equipped with round dipoles. So far, two favorable reports on their performance have been received.

	Bearings by means of small rods: (Staebchenpeilerei)
	As already known a rough guide to direction is possible on the improvised radar interception installation by using two small iron rods. In order to get the greatest possible advantage from this opportunity to take bearings some boats have laid headphone leads along the aerial cable and fixed a socket on the aerial housing.

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	Use of rod aerial as radar intercept antenna:
	U 663 has suggested using rod aerial as a radar intercept antenna. As such a solution would offer very considerable advantages in view of the current damage to the radar interception improvised aerial thorough tests were carried out by the Communications Equipment Trails Command in conjunction with Admiral Commanding Submarines.
	However the tests carried out - with gear copied from English models - showed such a drop in signal strength (4.1) especially in the most important horizontal plane, that the use of the rod aerial can only be countenanced as an extreme emergency measure.
	The cooperation is acknowledged of all radar interception gear operators, who by offering suggestions and submitting careful reports have assisted in the development of the gear and improved our own defences.

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