F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 March 1943

PG30319

     
     
 
1. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DF 69
U 223
-
BE 54
U 440
-
BF 40
U 569
-
DG 43
 
66
-
DF 82
226
-
BD 81
441
-
BF 40
590
-
BD 95
 
68
-
Op(DO)
228
-
Op(AK 81)
445
-
Op(CG 97)
591
-
Op(AJ 35)
 
84
-
Op(AJ 32)
229
-
AE 91
447
-
AE 91
600
-
BD 81
 
86
-
BE 28
230
-
Op(AK 84)
448
-
Op(AJ,AK)
603
-
BD 81
 
87
-
CF 75
258
-
BD 81
554
-
BD 83
604
-
BD 68
 
89
-
Op(AJ, AK)
264
-
BF 70
459
-
CF 91
607
-
BD 56
 
91
-
BD 81
303
-
BD 81
460
-
BE 54
608
-
Op(AK 10)
 
92
-
BD 81
305
-
AN 30
461
-
DR 69
615
-
Op(BD 21)
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
306
-
AF 87
462
-
BD 81
616
-
Op(AK 88)
 
106
-
DG 41
332
-
BD 81
468
-
BD 81
618
-
BE 12
 
107
-
Op(CG 84)
338
-
AF 72
504
-
DF 82
621
-
BD 71
 
119
-
AK 83
358
-
BF 70
506
-
Op(KZ)
628
-
BD 81
 
130
-
BF 50
359
-
Op(AJ,AK)
508
-
BD 95
633
-
AE 83
 
135
-
Op(AJ,AK)
373
-
BE 60
509
-
Op(GR)
634
-
AL 19
 
155
-
DD 79
376
-
Op(AK 10)
510
-
Op(EO)
638
-
Op(AJ 60)
 
156
-
Op(EO)
377
-
Op(AK 10)
511
-
Op(CG 86)
641
-
AE 81
 
160
-
Op(KY)
382
-
CE 99
513
-
Op(DH 10)
642
-
AE 85
 
167
-
BF 80
383
-
BD 81
515
-
CE 63
653
-
BD 71
 
172
-
BD 95
403
-
BF 54
516
-
Op(KZ)
659
-
Op(AJ,AK)
 
180
-
BD 54
405
-
Op(AK 10)
518
-
Op(FJ)
664
-
Op(AJ 32)
 
182
-
Op(KP)
406
-
BD 66
521
-
DF 73
665
-
AE 83
 
183
-
DN 78
409
-
Op(AJ 32)
523
-
Op(AK 84)
666
-
AF 87
 
185
-
DD 63
410
-
Op(CG 86)
525
-
BF 91
707
-
BD 81
 
186
-
BE 49
415
-
AN 30
526
-
Op(AK 88)
709
-
AK 63
 
190
-
AE 85
432
-
Op(AJ 98)
527
-
Op(AK 81)
753
-
BD 81
 
202
-
DF 69
435
-
Op(BD 13)
529
-
Op(AJ,AK)
757
-
AL 97
 
218
-
DG 31
437
-
BF 70
530
-
AE 85
758
-
Op(AJ 98)
 
221
BF 80
439
AL 71
558
-
DF 69
D 3
-
AO
 
 
 
566
-
Op(AK 10)
759
-
Op(AK 10)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 - 264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 403 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 444 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 13 see para IVa.
    2) U 510 reports absence of traffic from area EO 66 to EP 73, and slight air activity.  Owing to the breakdown of "Metox" the intended operations in the lower section of ED are doubtful.  The oil track experienced earlier has not yet been eliminated.
    3) U 218 - on the return passage owing to rudder breakdown - sighted an eastbound convoy at 1527, speed 8-10 knots in CE 8688.  Shortly afterwards the boat was beaten off and at 1800 lost sight of the convoy during a squall.  Two steamer masts were sighted, a smoke trail and a light grey two-funnel destroyer.
      U 513 presumably had contact with the same group at 1230
       
- 124 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      on CE 8989 and also lost it.  Both boats continue their passage.  Operation was not possible as there were no other boats in the vicinity.
    4) U 511 reported convoy on a course of 3100 in CG 8433 at 2352.  Boats of the Group "Robbe" who should have been able to attack the same night were ordered to operate.  U 511 was fired at from smoke cover in CG 8433.  Contact was lost in the subsequent hydrophone activity.  No further reports were received from any of the boats.  The operation was broken off.
    5) U 406 pursued an isolated vessel on a course of 2000, speed 15 knots in BD 3938.  Contact was lost after an eight hour chase.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  ED 9319, AK 3162, LK 5440, BE 5560, BE 8452, BE 5553, FJ 85.
     SOS from unidentified American steamer in AD 8548 (U 634) reporting U-boat attack in FJ 8563.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 13:
    Isolated messages:  U 405 sank a motorship of 9,000 GRT similar to type Perthshire, at 0039 on 1.3 in AK 1385.  It subsequently sighted another steamer with destroyers in AK 1383, very low speed, and at 1355 a suspected "Q-boat" on a variable course of 00 - 2700.  Further the boat chased 2 large steamers on a course of 2500 at 1900 in AK 1442, one of which sank at 2056 suddenly without an explosion.  The pursuit of the second ship continues.
    U 759 chased large steamer on a course of approx. 600 and speed 11 knots at 1150 from AK 1133 to AD 7859.  After a single miss is broke off operations owing to Diesel damage.  U 634 operated on this ship from AK 3171 and sank it in AD 8264 after three hits. According to call sign the "Mary Weather Sayis" of 6,800 GRT.
    U 566 did not establish contact in spite of the previous hydrophone bearings and continued further operations on presumed convoy course of 900.
     At 1321, U 608 encountered a westbound convoy in AK 1328.  At the same time, U 376 chased a tanker on a westerly course in AK 1191 and sighted in the meantime another steamer group in AK 1319.  The boat presumes this to be the southerly part of U 608's convoy.  The general course is 250, speed 8 knots.The Command conjectures that these are 2 different convoy sections. "Neptun" boats have received orders to operate on the target at the most favorable range. Both boats have apparently great differences in positions.  U 608 pursued its group via AK 1347 to AD 9861 and was beaten off by destroyers at 2230 in AD 9852.  The last course was west.  
    According to a possible new fix, U 376's convoy was in AK 1324 on a southwesterly course at 2100.  This is a fast group of 10 steamers who made a strong deviation to the north as far as AK 1172 at night ad then proceeded to the southwest.  The boat was beaten off by the apparent extremely strong and constantly attacking escort. 
     At 0230 contact was finally lost and was not re-established
 
 
 
- 125 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     until morning.
  b) 1) On the supposition that the replenishing of supplies from U 461 was carried out before the evening of 2.3, U 504, 66, 43, 202, 558, 106 and U 521 are incorporated in Group "Tümmler" and disposed in patrol channels from DF 6899 to DS 1125 at 0000 on 3.3.  Interception of the convoy made known on 27.2 in a Radio Intelligence report (special).  The boat was directed to maintain strict wireless silence, also the Group "Wildfang" and "Bürggraf".
    2) U 68 received the ops. area center and eastern third of grid EC after repairs to its "Metox" apparatus have been carried out.
    3) U 439 is operating temporarily in grid AK 62 until the arrival of further boats and the disposition of a patrol channel.
  c)  None.
  d)  U D 3 is detailed as training ship for the home front.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 405 - 2 ships  18,000 GRT
    U 634 - 1 ship 6,800 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DF 92)
U 223
-
BE 64
U 440
-
BE 65
U 558
-
Op(DF 95)
 
66
-
DF 91
226
-
BD 81
441
-
BE 66
566
-
Op(AK 10)
 
68
-
Op(DO 45)
228
-
Op(AK 71)
444
-
BF 91
569
-
DG 25
 
84
-
Op(AJ 86)
229
-
AE 88
445
-
Op(CG 97)
590
-
BD 95
 
86
-
BE 13
230
-
Op(AK 74)
447
-
AE 84
591
-
Op(AJ 94)
 
87
-
CF 57
258
-
BF 80
448
-
Op(AJ)
600
-
BD 81
 
89
-
AJ 55
264
-
BF 80
454
-
BD 93
603
-
BD 81
 
91
-
BD 81
303
-
BD 93
459
-
CF 62
604
-
BE 47
 
92
-
BE 61
305
-
AN 31
460
-
BE 59
607
-
BD 65
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
306
-
AF 75
461
-
DF 91
608
-
Op(AK 10)
 
106
-
Op(DF 96)
332
-
BD 81
462
-
BD 81
615
-
Op(AK 78)
 
107
-
Op(CG 87)
338
-
AF 47
759
-
Op(AK 10)
616
-
Op(AK 74)
 
119
-
BD 31
358
-
BD 93
468
-
BD 81
618
-
AL 75
 
130
-
BF 40
359
-
Op(AK 10)
504
-
DF 91
621
-
BD 81
 
135
-
AK 29
373
-
BE 56
506
-
Op(KZ)
628
-
BD 21
 
155
-
DO 13
376
-
AK 14
508
-
BD 95
633
-
AE 85
 
156
-
Op(ED 99)
377
-
Op(AK 10)
509
-
Op(GR)
634
-
AK 35Op
 
160
-
Op(KY)
758
-
OP(AJ 82)
510
-
Op(EO)
638
-
Op(AJ 50)
 
176
-
BF 70
382
-
CF 73
511
-
Op(CG 86)
641
-
AE 87
 
172
-
BD 95
383
-
BD 81
513
-
Op(DH 10)
642
-
AE 87
 
180
-
BD 81
403
-
BF 52
515
-
CE 26
653
-
BD 81
 
182
-
Op(KP)
405
-
Op(AK 10)
516
-
Op(KZ)
659
-
Op(AK 10)
 
183
-
DM 98
406
-
BD 36
518
-
Op(FJ)
664
-
Op(AJ 83)
 
757
-
AL 84
409
-
Op(AJ 86)
521
-
Op(DF 97)
665
-
AE 87
 
185
-
DD 67
410
-
Op(CG 86)
523
-
Op(AK 74)
666
-
AF 76
 
186
-
BE 58
415
-
AN 43
525
-
BF 54
707
-
BD 93
 
190
-
AE 79
432
-
Op(AJ 82)
526
-
Op(AK 74)
709
-
AK 35
 
202
-
Op(DF 96)
435
-
Op(AK 78)
527
-
Op(AK 71)
753
-
BD 81
 
218
-
CF 75
437
-
BF 80
529
-
Op(AJ)
   
 
221
-
BF 70
439
-
AK 66
530
-
AE 79
   
 
       
- 126 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 - 264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 403 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 336 - Brest;  U 333 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 13 see para IVa.
    2) U 518 sighted a convoy on an easterly course, speed 8 knots in FJ 8719 at 1400 on 28.2.  All together 18 empty steamers, 5 escort vessels.  The boat attacked and sank a freighter of 7,000 GRT in FJ 9411.  In other attacks with 14 electrical torpedoes, under good firing conditions there were 8 failures owing to erratic depth keeping.  Set depth 2 and 3 inches, seaway 1, slight swell.
      In the course of 2.3.  U 518 was continually forced to submerge by non-stop air activity, and broke off the pursuit owing to the hopeless position.
      Situation:
      No traffic was confirmed apart from the reported convoy during a 7 day search in FJ 80.  There was a slight surface but strong systematic air patrol.  Radar activity off Bahia.  Further operations are intended in FJ 30.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BF 5537 (U 525) and ED 97.  U-boat was attacked in ED 98.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 13:
     In order to obtain a clear picture of the intentions of the boats, they were requested to send a situation report.  Subsequently they received the following orders:  U 634 and 566 were to make for AJ 69 at economical cruising speed.  Both boats are so far astern that pursuit of the convoy was pointless.  U 448, 359, and 659 continued to operate on a convoy course of 2300 and 2500 with a passage speed of 7 to 10 knots.  U 608 and 377 broke off ops owing to fuel shortage, without having established contact, and are proceeding to supply point, U 376 to Western France without replenishment.  U 405 also had no contact.  A clear report of the numbers and size of the ships sunk is requested.  Search for the convoy continues.  No new sightings up to morning.  U 709's wireless transmitter has broken down and it operates independently from now on (confirmed subsequently from report of 5.3.).
       
- 127 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) Owing to the deployment of U 448 and 359 on the convoy operation, Group "Wildfang" is distributed to new patrol channels from AJ 5713 to AJ 9112.  Order:  U 638, 89, 529, 432, 758, 664, 84, 409, and 591.
    2) U 332 and 603 have taken on supplies.  They are to join the Group "Bürggraf" and extend the patrol channel as far as AJ 9966.
    3) New position for boats supplied by U 461 for further operations is BC 33.  Reinforcing of Group "Bürggraf" is proposed.
    4) To be occupied as temporary ops. area:  U 618 = AK 65, U 757 = AK 69.  The disposition of a channel in AK 66 is proposed with the following boats also:  U 373, 190, 530, 642, 641, 665, 447, 633 and U 229.
  c) The following have taken on supplies from U 462, U 332, 603, U 628 (Fu.M.B.) on 28.2., U 383, 753, 226 and 91 on 1.3.  Amount in tanker 384 cubic meters, provisions for 102 days, 4 torpedoes.
  d) 1) U 590 is near U 508 and remains there to assist until it has decided whether the boat is able to submerge or not.  U 172 has filled up and is now proceeding to the ordered position = CA 50.
    2) U 525 was bombed by an a/c in BF 5546 and is unable to submerge.  It proceeded at a speed of 9 knots on the approach to Lorient.  3 fishing steamers and 2 Junkers 88 were sent to render assistance. The boat put in to Lorient without further incident.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 518 - 1 ship  7,000 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DF 92)
U 226
-
BD 81
U 441
-
BE 55
U 569
-
DG 31
 
66
-
DF 91
228
-
Op(AJ 91)
444
-
BF 30
590
-
BD 95
 
68
-
DO 72
229
-
AL 31
445
-
CF 10
591
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
84
-
Op(AJ 59)
230
-
Op(AJ 92)
447
-
AE 79
600
-
BD 81
 
86
-
BE 11
258
-
BF 58
448
-
AJ 30
603
-
BC 33
 
87
-
CF 53
264
-
BF 80
454
-
BE 72
604
-
BE 73
 
89
-
Op(AJ 57)
303
-
BE 49
459
-
CG 14
607
-
BE 48
 
91
-
BD 41
305
-
AF 87
460
-
BF 81
608
-
AK 17
 
92
-
BE 65
306
-
AF 76
461
-
DF 91
615
-
Op(AJ 96)
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
332
-
BC 35
462
-
BD 81
616
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
106
-
Op(DF 96)
333
-
BF 91
468
-
BD 81
618
-
AL 47
 
107
-
Op(CG 81)
336
-
BF 54
504
-
DF 91
621
-
BP 81
 
119
-
BD 36
338
-
AE 91
506
-
Op(KZ)
628
-
BD 69
 
130
-
BF 48
358
-
BE 72
508
-
BD 95
633
-
AL 31
 
135
-
AK 58
359
-
AJ 34
509
-
Op(GR)
634
-
AK 31
 
155
-
DN 36
373
-
BE 51
510
-
Op(EO)
638
-
Op(AJ 57)
 
156
-
Op(ED 90)
376
-
AK 29
511
-
Op(CG 86)
641
-
AL 22
 
160
-
Op(KY)
377
-
AK 19
513
-
CE 75
642
-
AL 24
 
167
-
BE 98
382
-
CF 55
515
-
CE 16
653
-
BD 81
 
       
- 128 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
3.March 1943. (continued)
 
 
 
I.
U 172
-
BD 79
U 383
-
BD 81
U 516
-
Op(KZ)
U 659
-
AJ 38
 
180
-
BD 81
405
-
AJ 32
518
-
Op(FJ 84)
664
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
182
-
Op(KP)
406
-
AK 99
521
-
Op(DF 97)
665
-
AL 22
 
183
-
DM 89
409
-
Op(AJ 59)
523
-
Op(AJ 92)
666
-
AF 71
 
185
-
DD 85
410
-
Op(CG 86)
525
-
BF 55
707
-
BE 72
 
186
-
BE 68
415
-
AF 79
526
-
Op(AJ 95)
709
-
AK 20
 
190
-
AL 21
432
-
Op(AJ 58)
527
-
Op(AJ 91)
753
-
BD 81
 
202
-
Op(DF 96)
435
-
Op(AJ 96)
529
-
Op(AJ 58)
757
-
AL 47
 
218
-
CF 48
437
-
BF 80
530
-
AE 87
758
-
Op(AJ 58)
 
221
-
BE 92
439
-
Op(AK 60)
558
-
Op(DF 95)
759
-
AK 28
 
223
-
BE 68
440
-
BE 50
566
-
AK 16
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 87 - 92 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 258 - 264 - 303 - 358 - 382 - 383 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 525 - 558 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 628 - 707 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 552 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 67 - 524 - Lorient;  U 109 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 13:
      As contact was not reestablished before nightfall the boats discontinued the pursuit.  See para IVb for the new operations areas.
    2) U 373 chased an isolated vessel in EB 1356 on a course of 300, speed 17 knots.
    3) U 607 attacked a large northbound isolated freighter, speed 17 knots, in BE 4564.  An acoustic torpedo triple spread was evaded.
    4) U 119 was attacked by destroyers in BD 3655, and the wire jumper was carried away.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  CC 54, CG 4512, ED 9845, BE 5460.
    2) According to reports from Cape Town an unidentified steamer broadcast a torpedoing report (U 160).
    3) "SSS" report from steamer in convoy in unknown position (U 160).
    4) Unknown unit reported a/c contact in about CG 4512 and CG 4432 near an escort group.
  d)  The convoy expected to reach Group "Wildfang" and "Bürggraf's" patrol channels on 5.3., will probably proceed via the following grids according to a special Radio Intelligence Report:  CA 5227 - 6222 - CB 1585 - 2214 - BB 9565 - AJ 9885.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 129 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) The following ops areas were occupied after breaking off convoy operations.  U 359 = AJ 53, U 448 = AJ 64, U 659 = AJ 62, U 405 = AJ 66.  The boats are therefore astern of the "Wildfang" channels as pick up groups and are to operate against the anticipated convoy.
    2) U 91 joins Group "Bürggraf" and occupies the position AK 7773 in the patrol channel.  The group therefore consists of 11 boats in the area extending from AJ 9125 to AK 7773.
    3) U 119 is proceeding to BD 29 for the proposed supplying of U 377 and U 608.
    4) As the convoy intercepted as a result of special Radio Intelligence should, at a speed of 8 knots have reached Group "Tümmler's" patrol channel today, the latter was to proceed at 1200 on a course of 900, speed 6 knots in order to reach the convoy if possible by day.  As, however, it was not intercepted by day, they turned back at 2100 on a course of 2700, speed 7 knots.  With a speed of 6 knots, the convoy should be again encountered at 1000 on 4.3.
    5) A new channel is to be disposed, composed of boats from home and Western France, to intercept other ON, HX and SC convoys.  U 447, 229, 665, 633, 641, 190, 530, 642, 439, 618, 757, 406, 86, 373, 441, 440 and 221 form Group "Neuland" and are to take up position at 1200 on 7.3. from AK 6685 to BE 1521, course 2400, speed 5 knots.  Boats able to reach their position sooner, have freedom of movement outside the position.
  c)  The following have taken on supplies for further ops. from U 462 = U 653, 621, 600 and 468.  U 182 took fuel and trunks on board for execution of special duties.
  d)  In order to obtain a survey of defence and mining conditions in the Iceland Passage, the 10 last boats from home to arrive in this area were requested to send a situation report.  From this it can be seen that aerial reconnaissance is to be expected in the entire area; although some boats have made no mention of the fact.  Mines and surface patrols were only occasionally encountered.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
4. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DF 95)
U 221
-
BE 52
U 439
-
Op(AK 60)
U 558
-
Op(DF 98)
 
66
-
Op(DF 92)
223
-
BF 40
440
-
BE 51
566
-
AK 19
 
67
-
BF 57
226
-
BD 92
441
-
BE 19
569
-
CF 75
 
68
-
DO 77
228
-
Op(AJ 91)
444
-
BF 70
590
-
BD 95
 
84
-
Op(AJ 59)
229
-
AL 25
445
-
Op(CG 91)
591
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
86
-
Op(AL 70)
230
-
Op(AJ 92)
447
-
AL 24
600
-
BD 17
 
87
-
CF 38
258
-
BF 50
448
-
Op(AJ 64)
603
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
89
-
Op(AJ 57)
264
-
BF 58
454
-
BE 81
604
-
BE 82
 
91
-
BC 36
303
-
BE 58
459
-
BE 99
607
-
BE 54
 
92
-
BF 50
305
-
AF 76
460
-
BF 91
608
-
AK 54
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
306
-
AN 24
461
-
DF 90
615
-
Op(AJ 96)
 
       
- 130 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
I.
U 106
-
Op(DF 89)
U 332
-
Op(AJ 99)
U 462
-
BD 81
U 616
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
107
-
Op(CG 81)
333
-
BF 80
468
-
BD 81
618
-
Op(AL 70)
 
109
-
BF 83
336
-
BF 40
504
-
BD 81
621
-
BD 81
 
119
-
BD 29
338
-
AE 83
506
-
Op(KZ)
628
-
BE 48
 
130
-
BE 83
358
-
BE 81
508
-
BD 95
633
-
AL 26
 
135
-
AK 94
359
-
Op(AJ 53)
509
-
Op(GR)
634
-
AK 25
 
155
-
DN 26
373
-
BE 15
510
-
Op(EO)
638
-
Op(AJ 57)
 
156
-
Op(ED 90)
376
-
AK 64
511
-
CG 54
641
-
AL 25
 
160
-
Op(KY)
377
-
AK 57
513
-
CD 95
642
-
AL 27
 
167
-
CF 33
382
-
CF 37
515
-
CD 36
653
-
BD 81
 
172
-
CD 32
383
-
BD 68
516
-
Op(KZ)
659
-
Op(AJ 62)
 
180
-
BD 81
405
-
AJ 63
518
-
Op(FJ)
664
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
182
-
Op(KP)
406
-
Op(AL 70)
521
-
Op(DS 11)
665
-
AL 24
 
183
-
Op(DM 89)
409
-
Op(AJ 59)
523
-
Op(AJ 92)
666
-
AE 68
 
185
-
DD 79
410
-
Op(CG 86)
524
-
BF 54
707
-
BE 82
 
186
-
BF 55
415
-
AN 24
526
-
Op(AJ 95)
709
-
AK 25
 
190
-
AL 16
432
-
Op(AJ 58)
527
-
Op(AJ 91)
753
-
BD 92
 
202
-
Op(DF 95)
435
-
Op(AJ 96)
529
-
Op(AJ 58)
757
-
Op(AL 70)
 
218
-
CF 54
437
-
BF 58
530
-
AL 24
758
-
AK 25
 
 
 
 
759
-
AK 25
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 87 - 92 - 135 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 264 - 303 - 306 - 358 - 376 - 377 - 382 - 383 - 415 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 462 - 511 - 521 - 558 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 306 - 415 - Bergen;  U 258 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 663 - Brest;  U 159 - Lorient;  U 463 - St. Nazaire; U 188 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Area CG for Gibraltar convoys.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Sink in about the same area while proceeding to American coast:   By U 515, the British ship "California Star" on a course of 45, speed 15 knots in CD 3245, carry butter and meat from New Zealand to England.
      By U 172 a steamer of 9,000 GRT carrying ammunition on a course of 100, speed 16 knots in CD 3239.
    2) U 160 sighted a convoy on the night of 3.3. composed of 10 steamers and three escort vessels on a southeast course.  The boat pursued it from KZ 1336 to 2442 and sank a tanker and 4 freighters of 32,000 GRT.  Two freighters were left sinking.  All the ships were fully laden.
      Situation:  There has been daylight traffic by fast isolated vessels and small escort vessels south of Durban since 1.3.  The traffic puts in with surface and air escort from the 200 meter line, and on the outward passage as far as KZ 1336, then it spreads out to sea.  There is strong aerial activity by day and land radar off the harbor.
    3) U 506 reports approx. 4 freighters with destroyer and air escort at 0800 in KY 5640, on a westerly course.  Otherwise nothing was sighted from GR 80 via 90 to KY 53.
       
- 131 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  At 1130 aircraft sighted a convoy of 50 merchant ships, one cruiser and several escort vessels in CG 1294, southerly course, slow speed; and at 1250 a second convoy in CG 1453, northerly course, slow speed, consisting of 20 merchant ships.
  c)  U-boat sightings:  DN 75, CG 9438, EP 7977, BE 6489, CG 8211, CG 57, CG 8136, CG 8669, CG 5871, CG 9575.
     Attacks on U-boats in CG 9497 and CH 8290.
  d)  An American convoy is expected to put out of Cape Town for the Persian Gulf on about 5.3.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) Group "Tümmler" - apart from U 106 and 521, continue their eastward bound passage at economical cruising speed.  As the expected convoy was not intercepted, there was no point in staying any longer in this area.  Disposition is intended in the area between the Canaries and the mainland.  According to sighting reports intensive north-south traffic should be here.  U 106 and 521 have replenished supplies from U 461 and begun their westward and return passage respectively.
    2) U 566 occupies AJ 69 as temporary ops. area to intercept the expected convoy.
    3) U 653, 621, 600 and 468 join Group "Bürggraf" and extend the patrol channels to the southeast.  The group therefore extends from AJ 9125 to BD 1187 with 15 boats.
    4) U 185 received the following grids as ops. area in the Caribbean:  DM 80 and 90, DN 70, EB 20 and 30 and EC 10:  U 68's area is extended by EC 10.  5 boats, therefore, including U 156 operating near Trinidad, are in the Caribbean area.
    5) Owing to especially strong aerial reconnaissance boats belonging to Group "Robbe" are free to withdraw to the west or southwest.
  c)  According to message from U 634, U 709 has had main transmitter breakdown since 24.2.  The boat is working with emergency transmitter.
  d) 1) The ops. area near Cape Town is to be extended immediately to the south as far as the latitude 450 S.  The eastern and western boundaries are as formerly - 50 and 400 E.  The new southerly boundaries may on no account be passed owing to the presence of our own ships.
    2) If possible without danger to ourselves, U-boats are to stop Portuguese ships, and search for members of enemy states of military age.  If these are particularly suitable they are to be taken on board.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 515 - 1 ship  8,300 GRT
        172 - 1 ship  9,000 GRT
        160 - 7 ships 48,000 GRT.
 
 
 
- 132 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
5.March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DG 74)
U 218
-
CF 37
U 444
-
BE 55
U 590
-
BD 95
 
66
-
Op(DG 71)
221
-
BE 19
445
-
Op(CG 91)
591
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
67
-
BF 48
223
-
BF 49
447
-
AL 27
600
-
Op(BD 11)
 
68
-
Op(EC)
226
-
BE 75
448
-
Op(AJ 64)
603
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
84
-
Op(AJ 59)
228
-
Op(AJ 91)
454
-
BE 94
604
-
BE 92
 
86
-
AL 77
229
-
AL 19
459
-
BF 75
607
-
BE 56
 
87
-
CG 11
230
-
Op(AJ 92)
460
-
BF 60
608
-
AK 82
 
89
-
Op(AJ 57)
264
-
BF 50
461
-
DF 95
615
-
Op(AJ 96)
 
91
-
Op(AK 77)
303
-
BE 67
462
-
BD 67
616
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
92
-
BF 50
305
-
AF 71
463
-
BF 58
618
-
AL 72
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
332
-
Op(AJ 99)
468
-
BD 18
621
-
Op(BC 33)
 
106
-
Op(DF 99)
333
-
BF 81
504
-
Op(DG 71)
628
-
BE 58
 
107
-
Op(CG 81)
336
-
BE 66
506
-
Op(KY)
633
-
AL 29
 
109
-
BF 81
338
-
AE 84
508
-
BD 95
634
-
AK 25
 
119
-
BD 29
358
-
BE 91
509
-
Op(GR 50)
638
-
Op(AJ 57)
 
130
-
BE 88
359
-
Op(AJ 53)
510
-
Op(EO)
641
-
AL 01
 
135
-
BD 32
373
-
BE 14
511
-
CG 24
642
-
AE 67
 
155
-
DN 26
376
-
AK 93
513
-
CD 83
653
-
BE 91
 
156
-
Op(ED)
377
-
AK 83
515
-
CD 31
659
-
AK 27
 
159
-
BF 58
382
-
CF 33
516
-
Op(KZ)
663
-
BF 54
 
160
-
Op(KZ)
383
-
BE 48
518
-
Op(FJ)
664
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
167
-
CF 23
405
-
Op(AJ 66)
521
-
DF 99
665
-
AL 01
 
172
-
CD 23
406
-
AL 74
523
-
Op(AJ 92)
666
-
AE 97
 
180
-
CE 16
409
-
Op(AJ 59)
524
-
BF 45
707
-
BE 91
 
182
-
Op(KP)
410
-
Op(CG 83)
526
-
Op(AJ 95)
709
-
AK 27
 
183
-
Op(DM 75)
432
-
Op(AJ 58)
527
-
Op(AJ 91)
753
-
BE 58
 
185
-
DO 16
435
-
Op(AJ 96)
529
-
Op(AJ 58)
757
-
AL 72
 
186
-
BF 50
437
-
BF 60
530
-
AL 01
758
-
Op(AJ 58)
 
188
-
AO 48
439
-
AK 93
558
-
Op(GD 77)
759
-
AK 25
 
190
-
AL 01
440
-
BE 18
566
-
Op(AK 44)
   
 
202
-
Op(DG 74)
441
-
BE 13
569
-
CF 57
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 87 - 92 - 135 - 186 - 202 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 264 - 303 - 358 - 376 - 382 - 383 - 437 - 454 - 459 - 460 - 462 - 511 - 558 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 92 - Brest;  U 186 - Lorient;  U 264 - 437 - Nazaire;  U 460 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Active against Gibraltar convoys.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 14 (see par IVa).
    2) U 333 was attacked by enemy aircraft at night without previous radar in BF 5897.  Slight damage. Aircraft was shot down in flames.
    3) U 445 sighted outward bound convoy at 1215 in CG 9577.  Contact was lost after hydrophone activity accompanied by bombs and depth charges lasting 12 hours.  Very heavy air and surface reconnaissance in the area off Gibraltar.
       
- 133 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    4) U 183 reported Swedish steamer showing lights on a course of 700 in DM 7527.  In spite of clear orders the boat requested permission to attack.  It wa accordingly corrected.The ship was later confirmed to be an Argentinean vessel.
    5) Situation Cape Town:
      U 509 confirmed westbound traffic during the day and on moonlit nights in GR 6720.  Slight possibilities for action, owing to air and land observation.  Triple and single miss on steamers of 7,000 and 2,000 GRT.  Subsequent passage to KY 4350.
      U 516:  Nothing sighted in KZ 43 and 19 or from KZ 1781 to 1591 during a stay of several days.  A modern passenger steamer, protected by corvettes, course 2400 was sunk in KZ 1791 at 27.2.  Size 10,000 GRT.  Aerial activity up to 100 sea miles from land.  Pieces of wreckage were rammed during patrol in KZ 1690 and KZ 2470.  Withdrawn at the moment owing to oil tracks.
  b) Our own aircraft sighted Gibraltar convoy at 1830 in CG 4611, course 600, speed 7.5 knots.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BC 44, DC 1234, BB 65, DE 12.  Aircraft attack in ED 98.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 14:
     The convoy confirmed by aircraft yesterday was intercepted by U 130 at 1030 in BE 9764.  16-20 ships were reported on a course of 20, speed 5-7 knots.  As maneuverable and systematic operations are difficult in the narrow land bound area, outward bound boats also those on the return passage (if they have enough fuel) are to operate on the convoy.  U 130 followed up the convoy, which consisted of 3 columns each containing 7 steamers proceeding apparently with weak escort, via BE 9498 and 9495. The boat attacked here at 1745 and scored 5 hits.  2 steamers, each of 2,500 GRT were sunk.  2 other ships of 5 and 3,000 GRT respectively were not observed sinking.  One of them was burning.  Other boats did not come up to the convoy.  U 130 was beaten off and lost contact.  The operation is therefore, broken off.  Absence of enemy air escort contributed largely to the successes.
  b) 1) As the convoy had not arrived by night fall, the Groups "Wildfang and Bürggraf" proceeded at 2300 on a course of 450, speed 6 knots.  This way an unobserved passage during the night was to be avoided.  The Groups turned back at 1000 on 6.3 and were again in the old patrol channels at 2100.
    2) U 444 joins Group "Neuland" and occupies the southernmost position in the patrol channels = BE 1552.  Channels are to be patrolled at 1200 on 7.3 course 2400, speed 5 knots.
 
 
 
- 134 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) As more boats are to operate simultaneously in the area off the American coast, U 172, 515 and 513 already in CD are to be retained and distributed in the following order to the temporary ops. area CD 20, CD 30 and CD 40.  As soon as the boats, also intended for this, arrive further movement is to take place.  U 130 and 159 are to make for CA 50 also U 106 is to replenish supplies from U 461.  6 boats, therefore, are disposed for this operation.  U 521 is also to take on supplies from U 461 and proceed to the east to reinforce the Group "Tümmler".
    4) U 709 is to occupy AK 71 as temporary ops. area and is to operate on the expected convoy later.
  c) U 461 has given U 106 180 cubic meters of fuel and U 521 102 cubic meters.  The tanker is empty and is on the return passage.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 333 - 1 aircraft
  U 516 - 1 ship  10,000 GRT
  U 130 - 3 ships  8,000 GRT  1 ship torpedoed.
       
VI. General:
1) A) 1) The systematic evaluation of the English U-boat situation for the month of January and the beginning of February is reassuring, in view of the strong suspicion that the enemy had broken down our codes or otherwise obtained exceptional knowledge of our operations. (compare the English estimates of U-boat positions, confirmation of the facts accessible to the English, wireless bearings, sightings, U -boat attacks, a/s radar, also information obtained after the return of a number of U-boats.)
      Except in the case of 2 - 3 unexplained incidents, English information from the facts accessible to him of U-boat positions, and plots of the boats, can throughout be traced to an explicable combination of facts.  The most important revelation - confirmed almost without a doubt - was, that the enemy was able, with the help of a/c radar, to intercept U-boat dispositions with great accuracy - adequate for the successful evasive action of his convoys.  As always, our countermeasures limp several weeks behind this kind of new enemy practice because:
     
a) His evasive measures are obvious, only after constant use, partly after receipt of English wireless messages (Special Radio Intelligence messages) not solved for weeks afterwards.
b) Reports of confirmed wireless location of U-boat dispositions, are rarely received by W/T, their use is not apparent until the operational survey and Commander's oral report.
c) The technical possibilities of "ASV" location (simultaneous confirmation of several targets at long range and thereby the simultaneous interception of several boats in one disposition) was still unknown.
 
 
 
- 135 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) The fact perfectly corroborated by the increasing appearance of the additional word "radio located" in English U-boat situation (reports) of confirmation of U-boat dispositions by a/c radio location, meant an uncomfortable complication of the method used up to now, of intercepting convoys by patrol channels.  As, in many cases, the inadequate number of U-boats in the patrol channels cannot be dispensed with.
     
a) The boats are ordered to submerge for about 30 minutes on confirmation of a/c radar.  (Stipulation for the effective execution of this measure is the presence of a constantly used Fu.M.B. in good working order.  The Fu.M.B. aerials at present in use in the ops. areas are however not practicable in all weather conditions.  An alteration will not be made until the beginning of March, the time of the equipping of boats with fixed Fu.M.B. cable and round dipole.)
b) Avoid all unnecessary waiting in patrol channels before the presumed convoy passage time.  (Disposition of the groups: "Neptun", "Ritter", "Burggraf", "Neuland").  These groups were to proceed on a westerly to southwesterly course on the convoy routes as far as the area of Newfoundland Bank "Harken".  The passage speed was for the most part very small in the bad weather conditions generally prevailing; the disposition could almost be considered stationary in view of the long range of the "ASV" apparatus and the high speed and radius of action of English a/c.  Up to now no better method has been tried.  All other dispositions, i.e. the indiscriminate, unsystematic spreading out of boats in a certain area, ("castor sugar") have the disadvantage of too large spaces between the individual boats.  After the non-interception of a convoy by such a disposition there is always the riddle what's to be done.  The required certainty is lacking in a clear lineal disposition in any case up to a certain point (adverse weather conditions, periods of fog excepted), that the convoy has not sailed through the disposition area, that then, an alteration of the area and method is necessary.
  B) 1) Warfare against the African supplies from North America in the area north and south of the Azores has led to failure.  Neither a U.G.S. or G.U.S. convoy has been intercepted by means of a patrol or reconnaissance channels ("Rochen, Robbe").  The enemy's possibility of taking evasive action north or south of the Great Circle are very great - owing to the great length of the entire route without any significant extension of the convoy route.
    2) The tricky situation of the forces defending the bridgehead Tunis, forces action against African supply lines.  As, for one thing, the attacking of the convoys in the area of the Gibraltar lines is unpropitious owing to strong defence, for another, as described in 1), the interception of convoys halfway is pointless in view of the size of the area, the following is the remaining possibility:
      Deployment of U-boats off the North American departure ports.  Interception here and pursuit to open sea.
 
 
 
- 136 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      It must be ascertained in this connection:
     
a) The aerial defences off the coast is apparently very strong, disposition must therefore be stationary.
b) Facts of ports of departure and times of leaving are unpredictable therefore a certain number of boats are necessary
c) Defences, taken as a whole, mean a withdrawal to outside the coastal area during the full moon period.  Consideration of these facts leads to the demand for an adequate number of boats, some of which would act as reconnaissance units stationed directly in front of the harbor, the others further out to act as "pick-up" groups able to operate on the reconnaissance groups reports.  Owing to the length of the approach route, only a small percentage of U-boats (at the moment type IXc) come into the question.  The following boats originally intended for deployment in the Cape Town area were distributed for this:  U 172, U 515, U 513, also U 167, U 130, U 106, U 159 (See KTB of 27.2 also).
2) The reports from U 333 of 5.3 and U 156 of 6.3 confirm the conjecture of several weeks that the enemy was using new methods of locating which could not be picked up by Fu.M.B. equipment.  Reports from both boats at sea and Commander's interrogations revealed occasionally at first, then more often, that they had been attacked by a/c at night (mostly in the Biscay and Trinidad areas) without previous appearance of an a/c searchlight in the vicinity, or radar activity being confirmed.  The following new methods of locating appear possible according to observations and deliberations.
  A)  The enemy is working with either very high or very low, and therefore scarcely a completely inaudible frequency impulse.  This possibility is strengthened by the observations of U 214 from the Caribbean Sea.  The P.O. Telegraphist Bruster, on confirming scarcely audible impulse frequencies, installed the magic eye of the wireless receiver Ela 10.12 in the Metox receiver in order to make visible the inaudible impulse frequencies.  In this way apparently, a location wa once confirmed.
    Magic eyes are to be installed in the receivers of all outward bound boats, after P.O. Tel. Bruster's report to the S.O. Naval Signals and Communications Equipment Command.  Apart from this, on 6.3 a number of oscillographs were sent by courier to the western area to be added to the Metox receiver in order to ascertain as soon as possible whether the enemy is in fact, working with inaudible impulse frequencies.
     Boats at sea have received instructions to send observations if necessary.
  B)  The enemy is working on carrier frequencies outside the frequency range of the present Fu.M.B. receivers. The shooting down, over Holland of an enemy a/c apparently carrying an apparatus with a frequency of 5.7 centimeters is the only indication at present of this possibility.  It is possible that the enemy is attempting to escape from the frequency range of our Fu.M.B. which indicates the knowledge of this and the introduction of countermeasures.
 
 
 
- 137 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  C) The enemy uses his search and locating apparatus for a very short space of time (2 to 3 secs).  This method is a development and perfecting of the economical use of locating already observed.  It would be very difficulty and almost only occasionally possible for an Fu.M.B. observer to confirm a location with the Fu.M.B. equipment at present in use.  Theoretically it appears desirable to counter all these three possibilities in the following way:
     Use of an aperiodic, untuned receiver with optical sight indicator, in which every location will be immediately seen, whether carrier or impulse frequency.  It remains to be seen whether this possibility is technically practicable.  Further information in this connection is to be requested directly from the appropriate departments.
3) The Naval C.-in-C. decided on 20.2.43 that after the transference of the boats U 377, 592, 403, 405, 209, 376 and 334 from the North Sea to the Atlantic - the amount of North Sea boats will be supplemented from the boats from home - U 644, 467, 639, 711, 269, 339, 304, 636, 646 - 23 boats.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DG 84)
U 221
-
BE 19
U 447
-
AL 01
U 600
-
Op(BD 11)
 
66
-
Op(GD 81)
223
-
BF 64
448
-
Op(AJ 64)
603
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
67
-
BE 90
226
-
BE 83
454
-
BF 82
604
-
BF 40
 
68
-
Op(EC)
228
-
Op(AJ 91)
459
-
BF 91
607
-
BE 60
 
84
-
Op(AJ 59)
229
-
AL 41
461
-
DF 90
608
-
BD 22
 
86
-
AL 77
230
-
Op(AJ 92)
462
-
BE 47
615
-
Op(AJ 96)
 
87
-
BE 90
303
-
BF 40
463
-
BF 40
616
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
89
-
Op(AJ 57)
305
-
AE 68
468
-
Op(BD 11)
618
-
AL 72
 
91
-
Op(AK 77
332
-
Op(AJ 99)
504
-
Op(DG 81)
621
-
Op(BC 33)
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
333
-
BF 73
506
-
Op(KZ)
628
-
BE 67
 
106
-
Op(DF 99)
336
-
BE 60
508
-
BD 95
633
-
AL 45
 
107
-
Op(CG 81)
338
-
AL 31
509
-
Op(KY 53)
634
-
AK 19
 
109
-
BF 70
358
-
BE 90
510
-
Op(EP)
638
-
Op(AJ 57)
 
119
-
BD 29
359
-
Op(AJ 53)
511
-
BF 70
641
-
AL 45
 
130
-
BE 94
373
-
BE 14
513
-
Op(CD 40)
642
-
AL 48
 
135
-
BE 14
376
-
AL 78
515
-
Op(CD 30)
653
-
Op(BC 33)
 
155
-
DM 19
377
-
AK 97
516
-
Op(KZ 29)
659
-
Op(AJ 66)
 
156
-
Op(ED)
382
-
BE 90
518
-
Op(FJ)
663
-
BF 52
 
159
-
BF 40
383
-
BE 59
521
-
DF 96
664
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
160
-
Op(KP)
405
-
Op(AJ 66)
532
-
Op(AJ 92)
665
-
AL 44
 
167
-
CF 27
406
-
AL 77
524
-
BE 90
666
-
AE 83
 
172
-
Op(CD 20)
409
-
Op(AJ 59)
526
-
Op(AJ 95)
707
-
BF 40
 
180
-
CE 43
410
-
Op(CG 83)
527
-
Op(AJ 91)
709
-
AK 46
 
182
-
Op(KP)
432
-
Op(AJ 58)
529
-
Op(AJ 58)
753
-
BE 67
 
183
-
Op(DM 75)
435
-
Op(AJ 96)
530
-
AL 48
757
-
AL 72
 
185
-
DO 17
439
-
AK 93
558
-
Op(DG 79)
758
-
Op(AJ 58)
 
188
-
AN 30
440
-
BE 18
566
-
Op(AJ 69)
759
-
AK 02
 
190
-
AL 45
441
-
BE 13
569
-
CF 19
   
 
202
-
Op(GD 79
444
-
BE 19
590
-
BD 95
   
 
218
-
CF 33
445
-
Op(CG 91)
591
-
Op(AJ 91)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 87 - 135 - 218 - 223 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 376 - 377 - 382 - 303 - 454 - 459 - 461 - 462 - 511 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 663 - Brest;  U 223 - St. Nazaire.
       
- 138 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Sailed:  U 631 - Brest;  U 598 - St. Nazaire;  U 384 - 134 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 15 see para. IVa.
    2) The convoy reported by a/c on 5.3 in CG 1288 was intercepted by U 107 at 0930 on 6.3 in CG 8134.  The boat was forced to submerge owing to aerial activity and lost contact.  U 410 encountered the convoy consisting of 25 ships and several destroyers at 15.20 in CG 8511 and torpedoed 2 freighters of 6 and 7,000 GRT.  Another hit is possible. The sinking was not observed owing to the defence, loud sinking noises were audible however.  The boat withdrew to the west owing to depth charge damage.
    3) U 172 sank a Norwegian ship "Thorstrand" in CD 1675, of 3,041 GRT carrying piece goods from Liverpool to St. Johns.  The large detour made by the ship in order to reach her port of discharge is significant.
    4) U 156 situation report:  Off the Port of Spain as far as Grenada very strong continuous air activity with a new type of location which can not be picked up by "Metox" - Precise attacks without search lights - convoy sail to and from Testigos.  Operations there impossible.  The boat presumes from a/c courses - that there is E/W traffic in EE 45 and intends to operate there.
    5) U 182 reports absence of traffic in KP 35 and 38.  Nothing sighted on passage to west coast of Madagascar.  The boat considers operations in KQ 60 and 90 propitious.  It presumes that there is traffic passing through the Mozambique Channel, but if not, along the west coast of Madagascar.
  b)  None.
  c)  U-boat sightings:  BE 9122, FA 3957, AJ 8346, AL 19.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 15:
     U 405 reported a convoy on a northwesterly course in AJ at 1056 on the 6th.  As the boat was stationed exactly in the middle of the channels "Wildfang" and Burggraf" about 90 sea miles off - it must be presumed that the expected convoy passed the patrol channels in the previous day.  According to dead reckoning this applies to the expected SC convoy.  In all 17 boats - those in the patrol channel and those north of it - were in operation on the convoy.  These boats form the Group "Westmark".  10 of the boats of the Group "Neuland" in the east were withdrawn and sent to intercept the convoy, with the intention of taking up position in a patrol channel
       
- 139 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     for the morning of the 8th on the presumed convoy route, if contact was not established.This group received the name "Ostmark".
     
Westmark: U 405, 409, 591, 230, 228, 566, 616, 448, 526, 634, 527, 659, 523, 709, 359, 332.
Ostmark: U 229, 665, 633, 641, 447, 190, 4439, 530, 618, 642  See paragraph IVb.
     Weather conditions considerably influenced the beginning of the operations.  The boats experienced continuous poor visibility - 2 sea miles at the most, wind W 7-8 with snow and hail squalls.  U 405 maintained contact with the convoy until 1800, was then forced to submerge, attacked with depth charges without sustaining any great damage.  U 566 was able to contact the convoy from 0100 to 0200 on the morning of the 7th.  U 230 reported having run into the convoy at 0200 in a snow storm in AK 4234.
     At 0530, U 228 reported from 1972 that the convoy was on a true course of 400 hydrophone bearing.  Also at night - visibility was so variable that it was impossible to maintain continuous contact.     
     Up to now there have been few reports of the convoy's defences.  2 boats were forced to submerge by destroyers, one boat reported being searched for by an escort vessel with a red searchlight and a boat sighted an a/c in AJ 6726 - type unknown.
     The convoy operation continues.
  b) 1) After sections of the Group "Wildfang", "Burggraf" and "Neuland" were detailed to operate on Convoy No. 15, the remaining boats of both Groups were newly disposed.  U 638, 89, 529, 758, 664, 84, 615, 435, 603, 91, 653, 621, 600 and 468 occupied the new patrol channels, AJ 5982 to AK 7775, at economical cruising speed.  Boats form the Group "Raubgraf".
      It is presumed that the following HX convoy - which must be in the channels in the course of 7.3, will proceed on the same route as the SC convoy at present intercepted.
      Group "Neuland", now consisting of 8 boats is to proceed at 1200 on 7.3 to a line from AL 7813 to BE 1552 in a patrol channel on a course of 2650 speed 5 knots.  U 608, 590 and 336 join the Group and enter the reconnaissance channel at cruising speed.  U 608 extends this by 20 sea miles to the northwest, U 336 and 590 each extend the channel 20 sea miles to the southwest.
    2) The 7th boat U 167 intended for deployment in CA proceeded to CA 50.
  c)  None.
  d)  U 508 bombed by a/c on 26.2.43 is again able to submerge to some extent, and is returning from BD 94 on 9.3.  U 590 proceed as ordered.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 410 - 1 ship  7,000 GRT  2 ships torpedoed
    U 172 - 1 ship  3,041 GRT
 
 
 
- 140 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
7.March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DG 86)
U 218
-
BE 95
U 445
-
Op(DG 86)
U 591
-
Op(AK 43)
 
66
-
Op(DG 83)
221
-
Op(BE 15)
447
-
Op(AK 03)
598
-
BF 91
 
67
-
BE 97
226
-
BE 92
448
-
Op(AK 42)
600
-
Op(AK 77)
 
68
-
Op(EC)
228
-
Op(AK 19)
454
-
BF 67
603
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
84
-
Op(AJ 91)
229
-
Op(AK 39)
459
-
BF 98
604
-
BF 49
 
86
-
Op(AL 78
230
-
Op(AK 43)
461
-
DG 45
607
-
BF 48
 
87
-
BF 73
303
-
BF 55
462
-
BE 81
608
-
BD 29
 
89
-
Op(AJ 59)
305
-
AE 59
463
-
BF 47
615
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
91
-
Op(AJ 96)
332
-
Op(AK 45)
468
-
Op(AK 77)
616
-
Op(AK 43)
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
333
-
BE 93
504
-
Op(CG 83)
618
-
Op(AK 65)
 
106
-
Op(DF 82)
336
-
BE 46
506
-
Op(GR)
621
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
107
-
Op(CG 58)
338
-
AL 23
508
-
BD 95
628
-
BF 69
 
109
-
BE 98
358
-
BF 65
509
-
Op(KY)
631
-
BF 54
 
119
-
BD 29
359
-
Op(AK 43)
510
-
Op(ED)
633
-
Op(AK 62)
 
130
-
BE 85
373
-
Op(BE 11)
511
-
BF 55
634
-
Op(AK 43)
 
134
-
BF 91
376
-
BE 21
513
-
Op(CD 40)
638
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
135
-
BE 27
377
-
BD 29
515
-
Op(CD 30)
641
-
Op(AK 63)
 
155
-
Op(DM 39)
382
-
BF 67
516
-
Op(KZ)
642
-
Op(AK 65)
 
156
-
Op(ED)
383
-
BE 68
518
-
Op(FJ)
653
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
159
-
BE 69
384
-
BF 91
521
-
Op(DG 76)
659
-
Op(AK 43)
 
160
-
Op(KP)
405
-
Op(AJ 39)
523
-
Op(AK 43)
664
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
167
-
CF 46
406
-
Op(AL 78)
524
-
BE 97
665
-
Op(AK 39)
 
172
-
CD 16
409
-
Op(AK 19)
526
-
Op(AK 43)
666
-
AE 84
 
180
-
CE 73
410
-
Op(CG 86)
527
-
Op(AK 43)
707
-
BF 91
 
182
-
Op(KQ 65)
432
-
Op(AK 45)
529
-
Op(AJ 59)
709
-
Op(AK 43)
 
183
-
Op(DM 75)
435
-
Op(AK 43)
530
-
Op(AK 65)
753
-
BF 47
 
185
-
DN 64
439
-
Op(AK 65)
558
-
Op(DG 89)
757
-
Op(AL 78)
 
188
-
AN 30
440
-
Op(BE 12)
566
-
Op(AK 43)
758
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
190
-
Op(AK 65)
441
-
Op(BE 12)
569
-
CF 26
759
-
AK 66
 
202
-
Op(DG 88)
444
-
Op(BE 15
590
-
BD 83
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 87 - 135 - 218 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 376 - 377 - 382 - 383 - 454 - 459 - 461 - 462 - 511 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 707 - 753 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 459 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  U 415 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 15 see para. IVa.
    2) U 376 chased fast isolated vessel on a westerly course, with high speed in BE 1337.  The boat has been assured of fuel replenishment owing to small fuel supply.In bad weather conditions and strong enemy zig-zagging contact was lost, however, at 1430 in BE 1437.
    3) U 631 fired a triple and single miss on a freighter of about 5,000 GRT in AJ 5897.  "Q Boats" are possible here.
    4) U 641 was bombed by a/c in AK 3964.  Damage was repaired at sea.
       
- 141 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  CG 753, CG 8937, AL 1919, DH 15, AK 19, AL 32, AK 18.
    2) U-boat attack in AJ 5892 and AK 4223.
    3) A British unit presumably belonging to a convoy was located in AE 7930.  Also an a/c in AL 51 and AL 17 and 19.
  d) The last observations of the rhythm of the England/America and America/England convoys, indicate a 10 day rhythm, which has been in operation since the middle of February according to available special Radio Intelligence reports.  The enemy had been sailing at intervals of 8 days up to the beginning of January; from this date a change was noticeable, which, according to our observations, lasted until about the middle of February, and then changed to the 10 day rhythm mentioned.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 15:
    Convoy operations were considerably influenced on the day of the 7th and the night of 7/8 by particularly unfavorable and difficult weather conditions, wind strength up to 10 with continuously changing visibility between 100 to 5000 meters owing to snow and hail storms.  Maintaining contact was therefore out of the question.  Altogether 6 boats sighted the convoy.  At 0930, U 230 reported the convoy in grid AK 1954, at 0942, U 409 reported it in AK 1916 and U 591 reported it at 0906 in AK 1929.  At 1507, U 409 reported an isolated vessel on an easterly course in AK 1797 but lost her at 2032 in AK 1872 in a snow squall.  The same boat reported that the convoy was presumed to be about to disband.  It is possible, considering messages received later, that the convoy was actually split up and partly spread out owing to the adverse weather conditions.  A part of the convoy appeared to have maintained the old general course of about 50.  This can be seen from U 526's report, of having run into the convoy in a snow storm at 1600 in AK 1847 and then lost contact.  3 reports from single destroyers also corvettes substantiate the general course theory.  Another section of the convoy was reported by U 634.  After the boat had heard the convoy at 1226 on a true course of 280 from AK 1935, it reported smoke trails at 1625 in AK 0143.  Also, U 228 confirmed from a convoy message at 2025 in AK 0161, that s section of the convoy deviated sharply to the east.  Further reports of convoy contact reports were not received.  
    The Group "Ostmark", consisting of 10 boats, is to be disposed in a patrol channel for the morning of the 8th in front of the convoy, 50-90 are estimated to be the boundaries of the convoy's course.3 boats have reported not being able to reach the ordered position in time owing to weather conditions.  U 448 and 659 have broken off operations owing to temporary Diesel breakdown and proceed to the supply position.
    Result:
     U 230 reported a 5,000 ton freighter from convoy at 0210 (W/T message is not clear.  Command presumes sinking as according to a Radio Intelligence Report a steamer was torpedoed in this area).
 
 
 
- 142 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    U 591 reported sinking an 8,000 GRT ammunition freighter at 0906 in AK 1929.  Operations on the convoy continue.
  b) - c) None.
  d)  According to directions from the Naval War Staff, Chilean ships are not to be attacked, in spite of the breaking off of relations, and contrary to the general directions, on political grounds, even if these ships are obviously armed.  Boats are to report when Chilean vessels are armed, insufficiently identified or sailing in convoy.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 230 - 1 ship  5,000 GRT
    U 591 - 1 ship  8,000 GRT
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DG 95)
U 218
-
BF 70
U 444
-
Op(BD 36)
U 591
-
Op(AK 27)
 
66
-
Op(DG 92)
221
-
Op(BD 36)
445
-
Op(CG 80)
598
-
BF 80
 
67
-
CF 35
226
-
BF 40
447
-
AK 25
600
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
68
-
Op(EC)
228
-
Op(AK 27)
448
-
AK 01
603
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
84
-
Op(AJ 91)
229
-
AK 25
454
-
BF 64
604
-
BF 40
 
86
-
Op(AK 99)
230
-
Op(AK 27)
461
-
DG 27
607
-
BF 58
 
87
-
BF 40
303
-
BF 61
462
-
BE 83
608
-
BD 29
 
89
-
Op(AJ 59)
305
-
AE 85
463
-
BE 60
615
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
91
-
Op(AJ 96)
332
-
Op(AK 27)
468
-
Op(AK 77)
616
-
Op(AK 20)
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
333
-
BE 64
504
-
Op(DG 92)
618
-
Op(AK 39)
 
106
-
DF 49
336
-
BD 66
506
-
Op(GR)
621
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
107
-
Op(CG 80)
338
-
AL 15
508
-
BD 90
628
-
BF 51
 
109
-
CF 35
358
-
BF 64
509
-
Op(KY)
631
-
BF 40
 
119
-
BD 29
359
-
Op(AK 18)
510
-
OP(FA)
633
-
AK 20
 
130
-
CF 16
373
-
Op(AK 99)
511
-
BF 61
634
-
Op(AK 27)
 
134
-
BF 80
376
-
BE 42
513
-
Op(CD 40)
638
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
135
-
BE 53
377
-
BD 29
515
-
Op(CD 30)
641
-
AK 28
 
155
-
Op(DM 50)
382
-
BF 61
516
-
Op(KZ)
642
-
AK 28
 
156
-
Op(EE)
383
-
BF 45
518
-
Op(FJ)
653
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
159
-
BE 91
384
-
BF 80
521
-
Op(DG 85)
659
-
AK 01
 
160
-
Op(KP)
405
-
Op(AK 27)
523
-
Op(AK 20)
664
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
167
-
CF 95
406
-
Op(AK 99)
524
-
CF 39
665
-
AL 22
 
172
-
Op(CD 10)
409
-
Op(AK 27)
526
-
Op(AK 27)
666
-
AL 22
 
180
-
DG 12
410
-
Op(CG 85)
527
-
Op(AK 20)
707
-
BF 64
 
182
-
Op(KP)
415
-
AF 76
529
-
Op(AJ 91)
709
-
Op(AK 20)
 
183
-
Op(DM 70)
432
-
Op(AK 20)
530
-
AK 28
753
-
BF 40
 
185
-
Op(DM 70)
435
-
Op(AJ 95)
558
-
Op(DG 98)
757
-
Op(AK 99)
 
188
-
AN 23
439
-
AK 27
566
-
Op(AK 27)
758
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
190
-
Op(AK 28)
440
-
Op(BD 36)
569
-
Op(BE 89)
759
-
AL 72
 
202
-
Op(DG 98)
441
-
Op(BD 33)
590
-
BD 37
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 87 - 135 - 218 - 178 - 226 - 303 - 358 - 359 - 376 - 377 - 382 - 383 - 405 - 432 - 448 - 454 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 511 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 659 - 707 - 753 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 610 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 511 - 382 - 303 - Lorient;  U 454 - 707 - 358 - St. Nazaire.
       
- 143 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 15, see para IVa.
    2) U 510 reported a convoy consisting of 11-15 steamers on a course of 3100 in EP 4540.  As the next boat was about 600 sea miles to the north, U 510 was ordered to attack without giving contact reports.  U 156 was to operate according to circumstances and of necessary request reports.
    3) U 130 was approached by a/c at 0500 in CF 1560 while proceeding to the American coast.  The boats confirmed a convoy on a northerly course after submerging and obtaining a hydrophone bearing.  The boat pursued without success as far as CF 1596 and then continued its westward passage.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  ED 9587, BB 8163, EP 49, EE 91, AK 3561, AK 2647.
    2) There were reports of torpedoing and SOS messages from the Yugoslavian steamer "Vojvoda Putnik" of 5,876 GRT in AK 2643, steamer "Amsterdam" on 580 42' N. an unknown steamer in AK 1833 and a sinking report from an unidentified convoy vessel.
    3) U-boat attack in EO 63.
    4) A convoy consisting of 23 freighters, 11 transport vessels, 4 destroyers and 5 escort U-boats, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at 1730 on 8.3 on a course for the Atlantic.  Convoys of the type previously confirmed, proceed at a speed of 7.5 knots via the points CG 8550 and CG 8150.
  d) 1) According to Radio Intelligence Reports 6 apparently small coastal convoys put out of Cape Town in the period between 2nd - 8th.3, which are to disband according to previous information, somewhere in the vicinity of Port Nolloth, and leave the steamers to proceed by themselves, as far as 180 and 240 S. and to the west.  At the same time, according to this report, steamers destined for Cape Town are to be picked up near Port Nolloth and escorted in convoy to the south.
    2) Of the convoy traffic from America to North Africa with a 4 week rhythm - the slower part had already put out on 4.3 - 2 days earlier than anticipated - and the faster section on 5/6.3.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 15:
     The weather conditions were not improved to any extent on the 8th.  The visibility remained poor, and owing to snow and hail squalls, variable.  Wind was west from strength 5 to 6.
    The assumption that the convoy had split in to two parts was not confirmed. U 526 re-established contact at 1132 in the morning in AK 2691.  The convoy had remained on his general course from 500 to 600.  No reports of a more southerly course
       
- 144 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     were received.  Up to the hours of darkness 3 other boats had arrived at the northerly section, all of which however including U 526, had lost contact with the convoy at dusk.  U 566 established temporary contact at 0500 on the 9th in AK 3662, but was forced to submerge and were then passed over by the convoy.  The convoy consists, according to a message, of 5 ships and has a flying boat for protection and escort vessels reputed to be southeast of the convoy.
    The assumption that owing to the bad and difficult weather conditions of the last days a large part of the convoy had been split up, has been confirmed.  Several boats reported isolated vessels from the area astern of the convoy.
    Owing to the variable weather the various boats ran into destroyers and had depth charge attacks.  Boats received serious damage.
     U 359 reported a triple miss on a freighter on the 7th in AK 1871.
    U 527 reported a quadruple miss on a tanker in AK 2787 and E-miss on a freighter in AK 2783 on the morning of the 8th.
     
Successes:  
Presumed:
 
U 527 1834 in AK 2842 isolated vessel of 6,000 GRT sunk.
6,000 GRT
 
U 190 2158 in AK 3814 isolated vessel of 6,500 GRT sunk.
6,500 GRT
 
U 591 in AK 3594 damaged 7,000 GRT freighter sunk
7,000 GRT
 
U 642 2230 in AK 3857 isolated vessel of 3,500 GRT sunk.
3,500 GRT
 
   
4 ships/23,000 GRT sunk
    4 boats broke off operations on the convoy owing to fuel shortage - U 432, 359, 405, 566.
  b) 1) As intended, the area between the Canaries, the islands and the mainland is again occupied by boats.  The following ops. areas are allocated:  U 66 between Palma and Tenerife, U 521 between Tenerife and Gran-Canaria, U 504 between Gran-Canaria and Fuerteneventura.  
      Further, to occupy positions at a depth of 20 sea miles;  U 202 = DH 6444, U 43 = DH 9649, U 548 = DH 9684.
      In the areas mentioned there is busy north/south traffic of small convoys according to special Radio Intelligence reports and agent's reports.
      Boats are to remain unobserved if possible, and to maintain wireless silence.
      Replenishment of fuel supplies is not anticipated.
    2) If the boats do not sight traffic in their present area, U 506 is to occupy the area south of Cape Town and to operate on traffic according to para. III d 1).  U 182 has complete freedom of movement to the east as far as the boundary of the ops. area.
    3) U 463 is to proceed to BD 24 and supply boats having to break off convoy ops. owing to fuel shortage.
  c) The area of Route "A" east of Cape Town is to be extended immediately as follows:  The boundary now runs from FM 4957 via GZ 7644, JK 8254, JC 1432 and KG 6876 then to the west as far as the African coast.
 
 
 
- 145 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
V. Reports of Success:
    U 527 - 1 ship  6,000 GRT
    U 190 - 1 ship  6,500 GRT
  U 591 - 1 ship  7,000 GRT
    U 642 - 1 ship  3,500 GRT
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DG 74)
U 202
-
Op(DH 77)
U 445
-
Op(CG 86)
U 603
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
66
-
Op(DH 71)
218
-
BF 54
447
-
Op(AK 34)
604
-
BF 52
 
67
-
CF 64
221
-
Op(BD 34)
448
-
AK 58
607
-
BF 64
 
68
-
Op(EC)
226
-
BF 58
461
-
DG 26
608
-
BD 29
 
84
-
Op(AJ 91)
228
-
Op(AK 33)
462
-
BE 93
610
-
BF 58
 
86
-
Op(BD 23)
229
-
Op(AL 15)
463
-
BE 64
615
-
Op(AJ 95)
 
87
-
BF 40
230
-
Op(AK 30)
468
-
Op(AK 77)
616
-
Op(AK 30)
 
89
-
Op(AJ 59)
305
-
AE 85
504
-
Op(DH 71)
618
-
Op(AK 30)
 
91
-
Op(AJ 96)
332
-
Op(AK 34)
506
-
Op(GR)
621
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
103
-
Op(CG 89)
333
-
BE 51
508
-
BE 99
628
-
BF 52
 
106
-
DF 44
336
-
Op(BD 58)
509
-
Op(KY)
631
-
BE 60
 
107
-
Op(CG 80)
338
-
Op(AK 30)
510
-
EP 45
633
-
Op(AK 30)
 
109
-
CF 53
359
-
AK 02
513
-
Op(CD 40)
634
-
Op(AK 34)
 
119
-
BD 29
373
-
Op(BD 31)
515
-
Op(CD 30)
638
-
Op(AK 30)
 
130
-
CF 35
376
-
BE 57
516
-
Op(KZ)
641
-
Op(AK 30)
 
134
-
BF 70
377
-
BD 29
518
-
Op(FJ)
642
-
Op(AL 13)
 
135
-
BF 58
383
-
BF 54
521
-
Op(DG 94)
653
-
Op(AJ 99)
 
155
-
Op(DM 50)
384
-
BF 70
523
-
Op(AK 30)
659
-
AK 59
 
156
-
Op(EE)
405
-
AK 36
524
-
CF 68
664
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
159
-
CF 31
406
-
Op(AK 97)
526
-
Op(AK 34)
665
-
Op(AK 34)
 
160
-
Op(KP)
409
-
Op(AK 30)
527
-
Op(AK 34)
666
-
AL 22
 
167
-
CD 86
410
-
Op(CG 85)
529
-
Op(AJ 83)
709
-
Op(AK 30)
 
172
-
Op(CD 20)
415
-
AF 72
530
-
Op(AK 30)
753
-
BF 91
 
180
-
DG 42
532
-
AK 61
558
-
Op(DH 77)
757
-
Op(AK 95)
 
182
-
Op(KP)
435
-
Op(AJ 95)
566
-
AK 36
758
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
183
-
Op(DM 70)
439
-
Op(AK 34)
569
-
BE 95
759
-
BE 13
 
185
-
Op(DN 70)
440
-
Op(BD 34)
590
-
BD 38
   
 
188
-
AF 87
441
-
Op(BD 31)
591
-
Op(AK 34)
   
 
190
-
Op(AL 13)
444
-
Op(BD 34)
598
-
BF 70
   
 
 
 
600
-
Op(AJ 99)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 87 - 135 - 218 - 226 - 359 - 376 - 377 - 383 - 405 - 432 - 448 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 569 - 604 - 607 - 608 - 628 - 659 - 753 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 607 - St. Nazaire;  U 604 - 628 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 168 - 198 - Kiel;  U 306 - 592 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 15 see para IVa.
    2) U 107 reported a convoy in CG 8185 on a course of 2700 speed 12 knots at 1800.  The boat was not in contact and pursued it.  As the "Robben" boats have received instructions in the meantime to withdraw, and their fuel supply is adequate for an operation to the north, they have been
       
- 146 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      informed by the Command that the convoy is assumed to be making for England and that they are free to operate accordingly.  Just before 0100, U 107 reported that is had searched on a north and northwesterly course without success, and that the convoy had presumably made off at a high speed.  Contact was not re-established and the operation is therefore ended.
    3) U 150 chased the convoy reported - which consisted of 15 loaded vessels as well as 4 destroyers and 3 escort vessels in daily and continuous air activity, from EP 73 to EP 41.  The boat sank a passenger freighter of 10,000 GRT, 2 freighters of 14,000 GRT, 2 ammunition steamers of 12,000 GRT and 1 tanker of 8,000.  One steamer of 5,000 GRT was left sinking and one other steamer of 6,000 GRT was torpedoed. The boat withdrew to EP 43 to recharge the batteries and to escape interference.  The boat is assured of a supply of 3 + 8 torpedoes.
    4) U 506 sank a loaded 6,000 GRT freighter in KY 5399, course west.  While at periscope depth the boat came into collision with an unidentified object whereby the air target periscope was knocked off and the port shaft was jammed.  Proceeded to the south for repairs.  On 9.3 the boat sank "Pearl Moor" of 4,581 GRT on a northwesterly course from Aden to Cape Town in KY 9415.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  CG 8518, CG 8372, BB 64, ED 9587, AK 3945, BB 8160.
      Reports of attacks and torpedoing:  In AE 3746 (American steamer WKYL), ship in a convoy on about 530 N and in ED 6368.
  d) 1) The last part of the ordered route for fast escort groups which put out on 5/6.3 is given in a special Radio Intelligence Report.  The positions are:  DG 3977, DH 3153, CG 8827, DJ 2199.  Simultaneously the entire route for the stragglers of this convoy are given in the following passage points:  DE 1597, DF 1459, DF 3938, DG 5266, DH 3432, DJ 1324.  This refers to the convoy UG F 6.
    2) An eastbound convoy (probably HX 228) was in BC 3610 at 2000 on 8.3.  For measures to intercept both these convoys see para IV b).
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 15 9/10.3
     Convoy operations were again influenced by adverse weather conditions.  It was difficult to maintain contact with the convoy with wind strength 8-9, poor visibility of 2-3 sea miles and hail and snow squalls.  U 229 established contact at 1105 in AL 1557 with the convoy consisting of 4-5 steamers - reported it frequently before losing touch at 1900 when the boat was forced to submerge by corvettes.
     3 other boats came up temporarily in the course of the day; U 409, U 447 and U 641.  U 332 and 230 sighted the convoy in the night of the 10th but could not maintain contact owing to poor visibility.
     U 405 reported contact with 2 steamers at 1732 in AK 3863.  At 1910, U 665 reported a large freighter with torpedo nets in AL 1694.
 
 
 
- 147 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     Defence activity was more in evidence than on previous days.  6 boats reported a/c.  3 boats were attacked by depth charges without sustaining serious damage.  One boat reported that after there had been explosive soundings 40 bombs were dropped.  There was no hydrophone bearing.  Numerous boats were intercepted by surface escorts.4 boats were attacked by depth charges.  One boat was pursued by a U-boat chaser group, and reported that the enemy was working with red and white searchlights.
     
Successes:  
Assumed:
 
U 230 reported another 5,000 GRT freighter sunk on 7th.
5,000 GRT
  sinking not observed in W/S 8-9
U 530 At 2136 in AL 1763 isolated vessel of 6,000 GRT sunk.
6,000 GRT
 
U 405 At 2235 in AL 1753 freighter of 6,000 GRT sunk.
6,000 GRT
 
U 229 At 0116 in AL 2519, 2 hits on convoy.
2 hits
 
   
3 ships of 17,000 GRT sunk and 2 hits scored.
    At 0846 on the morning of the 10th, U 229 reported a convoy in AL 2612.  Boats within operational distance of the convoy are to continue operations, the other boats on the other hand are to withdraw in order to meet the isolated vessels following on.  As increasing air and surface defence activity must be expected owing to the proximity of the coast - it is intended to break off operations after loss of contact.
  b) 1) Group "Robbe" has been in the intensively air patrolled area of Gibraltar for about 10 days, and is therefore ordered to withdraw to the west.  With the exception of U 103 all boats are so low in fuel that they cannot undertake large operations.  For this reason, the following operational areas are ordered:  U 445 = CF 35, U 103 = CF 36, U 410 = CG 14, U 107 = CG 15.  Only through England/Gibraltar traffic will be in the area.
    2) Group "Raubgraf" will proceed on a course of 3450, speed 6 knots at 1900 in patrol channels.  The boat intends to intercept - according to its own dead reckoning on 10.3 approx. - the expected ON 171 convoy.
    3) In order to intercept the fast America convoy confirmed from special Radio Intelligence Reports, which should be in about DF 10 on 12.3 (working from the known end points), U 172, 515, 513, 167 and 130 are ordered to proceed to DF 24, daily reckoning 180 sea miles.  U 106 is to remain in the area reached:  DF 10.
    4) Group "Neuland" with the boats U 608, 757, 406, 86, 373, 441, 440, 221, 444, 336 and 590 are to be deployed against the convoy confirmed from special Radio Intelligence Reports to be in BC 36 on 8.3.  The former channels had to be transferred to the north and the enemy is expected to divert traffic in that direction.  The Group receives orders to take up position in reconnaissance channels from AK 8319 to BD 2375 at 0900 on 10.3, and to approach the convoy on a course of 2600, speed 4 knots - U 659 and U 44 enroute for supplies, are to extend the channel to the north for reconnaissance purposes.
 
 
   
 
- 148 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    5) U 333's new position is AL 71.  If necessary the boat can still be detailed to operate on the convoy.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 510 - 7 ships  49,000 GRT - 1 ship torpedoed
    U 506 - 2 ships  10,581 GRT
    U 230 - 1 ship  5,000 GRT
    U 530 - 1 ship  6,000 GRT
    U 405 - 1 ship  6,000 GRT
    U 229                                          - 2 hits.                    
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DH 84)
U 190
-
Op(AL 20)
U 440
-
Op(AK 89)
U 590
-
Op(BD 23)
 
66
-
Op(DH 76)
198
-
AO
441
-
Op(AK 89)
591
-
Op(AL 20)
 
67
-
CF 83
202
-
Op(DH 79)
444
-
Op(AK 97)
592
-
AF 79
 
68
-
Op(EC)
218
-
BF 52
445
-
Op(CG 71)
598
-
BE 92
 
84
-
Op(AJ 67)
221
-
Op(AK 89)
447
-
Op(AL 20)
600
-
Op(AJ 96)
 
86
-
Op(AK 80)
226
-
BF 60
448
-
AK 59
603
-
Op(AJ 92)
 
87
-
BF 50
228
-
Op(AL 20)
461
-
CF 99
608
-
Op(AK 83)
 
89
-
Op(AJ 56)
229
-
Op(AL 20)
462
-
BF 48
610
-
BF 73
 
91
-
Op(AJ 92)
230
-
Op(AL 20)
463
-
BE 54
615
-
Op(AJ 67)
 
103
-
Op(CG 84)
305
-
AE 87
468
-
Op(AJ 96)
616
-
Op(AL 20)
 
106
-
CF 14
306
-
AF 79
504
-
Op(DH 81)
618
-
Op(AL 20)
 
107
-
Op(CG 49)
332
-
Op(AL 20)
506
-
Op(JJ 26)
621
-
Op(AJ 93)
 
109
-
CF 83
333
-
BE 52
508
-
BE 75
631
-
BE 56
 
119
-
BD 29
336
-
Op(BD 23)
509
-
Op(KY)
633
-
Op(AL 25)
 
130
-
CE 28
338
-
Op(AL 25)
510
-
Op(EP 43)
634
-
Op(AL 20)
 
134
-
BE 92
359
-
AK 64
513
-
Op(CD 45)
638
-
Op(AJ 55)
 
135
-
BE 61
373
-
Op(AK 86)
515
-
Op(CD 31)
641
-
Op(AL 20)
 
155
-
Op(DM 50)
376
-
BE 59
516
-
Op(KZ)
642
-
Op(AL 20)
 
156
-
Op(EE)
377
-
BD 29
518
-
Op(FJ)
653
-
Op(AJ 92)
 
159
-
CF 21
383
-
BF 52
521
-
Op(DH 74)
659
-
AK 59
 
160
-
Op(KP)
384
-
BE 92
523
-
Op(AL 30)
664
-
Op(AJ 67)
 
167
-
CE 76
405
-
Op(AL 20)
524
-
CE 86
665
-
Op(AL 20)
 
168
-
AO
406
-
Op(AK 83)
526
-
Op(AL 20)
666
-
Op(AL 25)
 
172
-
Op(CD 24)
409
-
Op(AL 20)
527
-
Op(AL 25)
709
-
Op(AL 25)
 
180
-
DG 72
410
-
Op(CG 44)
529
-
Op(AL 56)
753
-
BF 60
 
182
-
Op(KQ 65)
415
-
AE 69
530
-
Op(AL 20)
757
-
Op(AK 83)
 
183
-
Op(DM 70)
432
-
AK 91
558
-
Op(DH 79)
758
-
Op(AJ 50)
 
185
-
Op(DM 70)
435
-
Op(AJ 92)
566
-
Op(AL 20)
759
-
BE 24
 
188
-
AF 72
439
-
Op(AL 20)
569
-
BF 71
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 87 - 135 - 218 - 226 - 350 - 376 - 377 - 383 - 405 - 432 - 448 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 566 - 569 - 608 - 659 - 753 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 218 - 383 - Brest;  U 135 - 226 - Lorient;  U 753 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 663 - Brest;  U 572 - Lorient;  U 163 - La Pallice.
       
- 149 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 15 and 16 see para IV a).
    2) U 221 sank the steamer "Jamaica" of 4,500 GRT, course 2100 speed 16 knots in BE 1571 on 7.3.  On 8.3 the boat fired a single miss of a ship type "City of Calcutta" in DD 3586.
    3) U 621 sighted an isolated vessel on a southerly course in AJ 9319 while proceeding to the new patrol channels.  Report of success has not yet been received.
    4) U 202 reported 2 steamers in DH 9764 and DH 9737 respectively on a northwesterly course.  It received orders to attack and boats in this area are to operate on this report.  U 202 confirmed the neutrality of the vessels after dark.  Boats took up their previous positions.
    5) U 105 situation report:  Have been in DM 76 since 9.3.  Daylight air activity by all types of a/c, slight surface patrol at night.  Encountered convoy consisting of 6 steamers and 4 radar locating escort vessels on 10.3 morning.  Sank tanker of type "British Confidence" and ammunition ship of 8,000 GRT.  The convoy was enroute from Windward Passage to Guantanamo.  At 1500 another convoy consisting of 30 steamers, course 900, speed 7.5 knots, was confirmed emerging from the port mentioned.  Forces to submerge by escort, contact lost.  Withdrew to charge batteries and assess damage after depth charge attack.
    6) U 160 had temporary contact with a small convoy on a course of 500, speed 10 knots in KP 8294.  Beaten off by air radar.
    7) U 516 has withdrawn owing to the Commander's stomach pains.  Boat requests ops. area of "Port Nolloth" (see KTB of 8.3 para III d) 1) before return passage.  The Commander is presumably all right again for the time being.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DN 73, AK 89, KZ 21, AL 2857 and a sighting in unknown position.
    2) U-boat attack:  In DN 7685 (U 185).  There was a sinking report from an American steamer with the C/S "KENZ" in AE 2851.  A further torpedo report from the British steamer "Rosewood" of 5,989 GRT in AL 2558, from an unknown position, possibly from convoy.
    3) Unknown craft (JV 52) sent an SSS report adding that it had rammed U-boat.
  d) The favorable conditions prevailing at the moment in special Radio Intelligence matters has led to quick research into the plans for the slow section of the American convoy.  According to this it proceeds via CB 7129, DD 2241, CC 7689, CD 9698, CE 9541.  The stragglers are given the following routes:  DD 2436, CC 7975, DE 3233, CD 9695, CE 9814, DH 2245, DJ 2199.
       
- 150 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 15:
      Weather conditions in the convoy area were reported as follows:  wind strength up to 10, poor visibility, snow and hail.
      U 229 reported the convoy in AL 2612 at 0846, but lost contact again at 1130.  U 634 sighted the convoy at 1700 in AL 3511 and lost contact at dusk.  The number of craft in the convoy is not apparent from the report.  From messages received on previous days, however, it cannot be a large convoy.  Proof of this lies in 2 messages from U 523 and U 642, both of which report an isolated vessel with numerous escort vessels.  The convoy has therefore probably been disbanded.
      U 409 reported searching activity by escort craft with red searchlights, and U 332 reported that after being located by explosive charges similar to explosive soundings, it was attacked with depth charges at long intervals.
      Successes:
      U 229 reported with reference to his report of the 10th that on the morning of the 10th the boat scored a hit on a freighter of 2/5,000 GRT, on a 3,500 GRT freighter and a further hit on one of the two first 5,000 GRT freighters.
      Two ships were left sinking.
              2/10,000 GRT vessels presumed sunk,
              1/3,500 GRT vessel presumed torpedoed.
      U 409 reported one hit on a 5,000 GRT freighter, an 8,000 GRT tanker and an 8,000 GRT tanker at 2213 on 9th.
              1/5,000 GRT ship presumed sunk,
              2/16,000 GRT ship presumed torpedoed.
      U 616 reported torpedoing a 1/5,000 GRT vessel at 1500 in AL 2496.  Probably sunk.
      Operations were broken off at dawn on the 11th owing to the proximity of the coast and anticipated air activity.  Apart from this, according to all reports, another group comprising several vessels cannot be expected.
      Final Summary Convoy No. 15:
      Operations against the SC-convoy bound for England lasted 5 days from 6.3 to 11.3.43 and extended over a distance of nearly 800 sea miles.  Operations were adversely affected throughout by the very strong westerly winds and poor visibility, which was on an average never more than 1-2 sea miles owing to hail, snow and fog.  This had the result of splitting up the convoy (with the exception of 4 or 5 steamers) on the first day, and the ships proceeded independently to the east on the convoy route. It is owing to the fact that a large number of boats were detailed for this operation, that a proportionally large number were sunk. 17 boats were operating on the 6th and 7th and they were joined by 10 more boats on the 8th.  On the average about 15 boats operated on the convoy, the remainder were either approaching or on the return passage.  10 boats attacked with success, sinking for the most part isolated vessels.  Without a doubt there would have been greater chances of success had the convoy remained intact, as more than one ship could have been torpedoed in one attack.
 
 
 
- 151 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      13 ships of altogether 73,000 GRT and 3 ships of altogether 19,500 GRT were torpedoed, and possibly sunk.  A ship damaged by a torpedo hit could scarcely survive in a seaway of 6 to 8.
      Enemy defences were unable to cope with the boats attack, either by means of underwater or surface location.  In the poor visibility boats often ran into convoy escort vessels and received depth charge attacks.  7 boats reported depth charge activity and 4 boats were bombed.  None of the boats sustained serious damage.  Presumably no boat was lost to the convoy.
      2 boats reported that the enemy was using red searchlights as a defence measure also variously observed to have taken place in the case of previous convoys.  It does not appear from the boats messages that the enemy has had any success as a result of this method. Apart from this two boats reported being attacked by depth charges at long intervals after previous location by explosive charges similar to explosive soundings.  The possibility of locating a U-boat underwater by an a/c appears unlikely.
    2) Convoy No. 16:
      U 336 southernmost boat of the Group "Neuland" reported a convoy at 1335 on 10.3 in BD 2268.  The Group "Neuland" was at once detailed to operate on this convoy at high speed, including U 333 leaving the area, but still in the vicinity.  U 432, 405, 566 and U 359 were given freedom of movement.
      U 444 obtained contact at 1657 and reported the convoy's course as 60, speed 10 to 12 knots.  Altogether 9 boats coming up during the night maintained contact until 0725.  Convoy route BD 2268, 2354, 2333, AK 9884, 9862.
      U 221 sank 3 steamers carrying ammunition at 2126 in BD 3115.  The boat withdrew for repairs as a result of damage caused by the explosions and subsequent depth charges.
      Reports of U 86 and U 406's intention to attack with F.A.T. were received.  Further reports of success were however not received up to 0800.
      A Radio Intelligence Report mentions the torpedoing of a steamer sailing in convoy at 0200.
      Successes:
      U 221:  sank 3 ammunition ships of the type "Port Wyndam", "Hertford" and "Kent" (of 8,580, 10,923, 8,697 = 28,200 GRT)
      The convoy intercepted is HX 228.
  b) 1) The Command decided contrary to the orders of the previous day, to operate on the slower convoy group - by reason of the new, good special Radio Intelligence conditions. According to dead reckoning the convoy should be approximately, with a speed of 9 knots, in CD 85 on 12.3.
      U 130, 515, 172, 513 and 106 also 167 received orders to take up position in patrol channels from CD 8381 to DF 2221 on a course of 270, speed 5 knots, at 1000 on 12.3.
      In order not to compromise the channel the boats are not to occupy their positions before the ordered time.
      Position CE 86 is ordered for the boats disposed further afield:  U 159, 67, 109, 521, 524 and 103.  Another channel is to be disposed here in the course of 13.3. 
      U 103 was formerly underway to CF 36.  Owing to its large fuel supply it was also drawn into the convoy operations.
      U 445 occupied its operations area.
 
 
 
- 152 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Group "Raubgraf" takes up position this evening in the patrol channels from AJ 5268 to 9383, as the convoy is not expected to haul off further to the west.  Delay, due to bad weather must be expected.
    3) U 305, 631, 384, 598, 135, 610 and 260 are to proceed to AK 69 to take up position in new patrol channels.
  c) None.
  d) 1) U 180 reported on request average daily reckoning as 140 sea miles to the ordered assembly point = JA 24.  Sailing time about 45 days.  The boats received permission to attack only unescorted isolated vessels, as execution of the special task must be insured.
    2) U 87 replenished supplies from U 461 on 26.2 in DG 2792 and subsequently turned back as ordered.  There have been no messages from the boat since then, so that its loss must be presumed.  There is no information.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 221 - 1 ship  3,500 GRT
  U 185 - 2 ships  16,000 GRT
  U 229 - 2 ships  10,000 GRT
  U 409 - 1 ship  5,000 GRT  2 ships torpedoed
  U 616 - 1 ship  5,000 GRT
  U 221 - 3 ships  20,200 GRT
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DH 86)
U 190
-
AL 16
U 444
-
Op(AK 99)
U 590
-
Op(AK 99)
 
66
-
Op(DH 85)
198
-
AN 36
445
-
CF 63
591
-
AL 27
 
67
-
CF 76
202
-
DH 97
447
-
AL 37
592
-
AF 72
 
68
-
Op(EC 20)
221
-
Op(AK 99)
448
-
AK 86
598
-
BE 59
 
84
-
Op(AJ 64)
228
-
AL 27
461
-
CF 72
600
-
Op(AJ 93)
 
86
-
Op(AK 99)
229
-
AL 35
462
-
BF 68
603
-
AJ 67
 
89
-
Op(AJ 53)
230
-
AL 28
463
-
CF 72
608
-
Op(AK 99)
 
91
-
Op(AJ 68)
305
-
AL 22
468
-
Op(AJ 93)
610
-
BF 47
 
103
-
CG 74
306
-
AF 52
504
-
Op(DH 85)
615
-
Op(AJ 67)
 
106
-
DF 21
332
-
AL 25
506
-
Op(JJ)
616
-
AL 27
 
107
-
CG 18
333
-
AL 77
508
-
BE 84
618
-
AL 16
 
109
-
CF 73
336
-
Op(AK 99)
509
-
Op(KY)
621
-
AJ 92
 
119
-
BD 29
338
-
AL 36
510
-
Op(EP)
631
-
BE 27
 
130
-
CE 47
359
-
AK 94
513
-
CD 85
633
-
AL 32
 
134
-
BE 58
373
-
Op(AK 99)
515
-
CD 59
634
-
AL 25
 
155
-
Op(DM 30)
376
-
BE 69
516
-
Op(KZ)
638
-
Op(AJ 52)
 
156
-
Op(EE)
377
-
BD 29
518
-
Op(FJ)
641
-
AL 35
 
159
-
CF 43
384
-
BE 53
521
-
DG 69
642
-
AL 35
 
160
-
Op(KP)
405
-
AK 69
523
-
AL 35
653
-
BF 54
 
163
-
BF 54
406
-
Op(AK 99)
524
-
CF 76
659
-
AK 86
 
167
-
CD 99
409
-
AL 18
526
-
AL 26
663
-
BF 54
 
168
-
AN 36
410
-
CG 14
527
-
AL 34
664
-
Op(AJ 64)
 
172
-
CD 59
415
-
AE 68
529
-
Op(AJ 56)
665
-
AL 16
 
180
-
DG 79
432
-
AK 94
530
-
AL 18
666
-
AL 26
 
182
-
Op(KQ)
435
-
Op(AJ 68)
558
-
Op(DH 88)
709
-
AL 38
 
183
-
Op(DM 70)
439
-
AL 24
566
-
AK 66
757
-
Op(AK 99)
 
185
-
Op(DN 81)
440
-
Op(AK 99)
569
-
BF 49
758
-
Op(AJ 56)
 
188
-
AF 47
441
-
Op(AK 99)
572
-
BF 91
759
-
BE 53
 
       
- 153 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 359 - 376 - 377 - 405 - 432 - 448 - 461 - 462 - 508 - 566 - 569 - 608 - 659 - 759.
  Entered Port:  U 462 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  U 564 - Brest;  U 129 - Lorient;  U 191 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 16 see para IVa.
    2) U 621 fired a triple miss on the reported isolated vessel and later possibly scored a hit.  After temporary losing contact, the boat sank the steamer in AK 7174.  Tonnage 6,000 GRT.
    3) U 615 in the channel belonging to the Group "Raubgraf", observed a stationary escort vessel in AJ 6715 for several hours and sighted a destroyer on a southerly course at high speed in AJ 6741.  Search for the presumed convoy was broken off without success.  The boat returned to its position.
    4) U 634 encountered a southward bound isolated vessel in AL 2654.  It was soon invisible owing to snow gusts.  Subsequently the boat experienced hydrophone activity by a corvette.
    5) U 506 intends to carry out repairs off the coast and will withdraw in the full moon period to GH 70.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DL 6598, AK 9647, AM 1812, AK 96 and 2 other boats in 520 N, and unknown longitude.
    2) U-boat attack in DM 7673.
    3) Report of torpedoing from British steamer with call sign BFYF in DL 6921.
  d) According to special Radio Intelligence Report ONS 169 was in AJ 3710 on the forenoon of 9.3.  Course 2600 and speed 2 knots.  The convoy's position is further back than reckoned owing to bad storms.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 16:
    There was no more contact with the convoy after dawn of 11.3.  U 406 reported it at 1158 in AK 9921 and U 359 which had chased an isolated vessel to the north, reported being passed over at 1600 in AK 9625 by the southeastward bound convoy.
    Apart from the isolated vessels already mentioned U 359 sighted 2 isolated vessels on a course of 50 at 2324 in AK 9681.  U 440 reported chasing an isolated vessel in AL 74.
     U 580 reported hydrophone bearing in true course of 1150 from AL 7158 at 0057 on 12.3.; 405 at 2320 on 113.  No hydrophone bearing.  Other messages which might have shed light on the convoys position have not been received.
       
- 154 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Defence:  It is apparent from messages subsequently received that surface force defence is normal.  3 boats report having been beaten off by destroyers followed by hydrophone searching.
     Heavy air activity was noticeable by day, and this greatly hindered the boats operations.  According to Radio Intelligence there are numerous aircraft attacks from the convoy area
    U 359 broke off operations owing to fuel shortage; U 757 which was seriously damaged as a result of the explosion of a torpedoed ammunition ship, will be accompanied together with the Medical Officer's boat.
    Successes:
     
U 336 At 2332 on 10.3 double spread on steamer hit possible.
U 757 "William Palmer" of 7,602 GRT sunk.
U 590 At 0215 on 12.3 one steamer of 6,000 GRT sunk, one other hit on steamer possible.
U 86 At 0510 on 11.3 tanker of 8,000 GRT sunk, 2 hits on another steamer.
U 406 At 0725 at 11.3 hits on tanker of 8,000 GRT heard.
U 359 At 1112 on 11.3 one hit on isolated vessel ( steamer)
U 440 2 hits on isolated vessels possible.
  b) 1) As the position of the "ONS" 169 convoy given in a special Radio Intelligence report is further west than previously supposed, Group "Raubgraf" is to proceed to reconnaissance channels on a course of 2700 degrees, speed 5 knots at 1000 and will remain in position reached from AJ 5159 to 9282 as patrol line.  Owing to U 621's return passage, U 608 and 468 are to move up one position to the N.W.
    2) Groups "Ostmark" and Westmark" were disbanded after breaking off operations on Convoy 15.  The boats with an adequate supply of fuel are to be incorporated in a new group "Sturmer" and are to take up position in the following order in reconnaissance lines from AK 0371 to AL 728, course 240, cruising speed 5 knots at 2000 on 15.3.  U 305 - 527 - 666 - 523 - 229 - 526 - 642 - 439 - 338 - 641 - 565 - 618 - 190 and 530.  Positions are not to be occupied before the ordered time.
      Of the remaining boats in operation against the convoy, U 332 has freedom of movement to the west, as stragglers are presumed.  U 634 - 409 - 591 - 228 - 616 and 230 are proceeding at economical cruising speed to supply position BD 2455 and is to replenish supplies there from U 463 for further operations.
      U 709 is on the return passage owing to complete transmitter breakdown.  It will attempt to send a situation report with the emergency transmitter via another boat.
  c) 1) U 119 has up to now supplied U 608 for further deployment and U 377 for return passage.
    2) U 757 was seriously damaged by the explosion of an ammunition ship it had torpedoed.  Both batteries and starboard Diesel were put out of action.  The boat cannot submerge but it is still afloat.  The boat requests medical assistance.  U 119 received orders to arrange a meeting in BD 3477 on 12.3.  U 659 - 448 - 432 - 405 - 566 and 359 are to replenish fuel supplies in the same position.  U 228 is to receive the entire remaining quantity for further operations.  The boat first ready for the return passage is to remain by U 757 until this boat is again sea-worthy.
 
 
 
- 155 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) U 180's Commander requests a speeding up of the passage to the intended meeting place, on account of the passenger (?) on board.  After a discussion with the Naval War Staff the boat received orders to proceed at a speed necessary to ensure a meeting on 23.4.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 621 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 757 1 ship 7,602 GRT  
U 590 1 ship 6,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 86 1 ship 8,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
U 406 1 ship 8,000 GRT  
U 359     1 ship torpedoed.
U 440     1 ship torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12. March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
Op(DH 90)
U 190
-
AL 42
U 444
-
Op(AL 70)
U 590
-
Op(AK 70)
 
66
-
Op(DH 85)
191
-
AO 47
445
-
Op(CF 36)
591
-
AL 42
 
67
-
CF 96
198
-
AN 43
447
-
AL 64
592
-
AF 47
 
68
-
Op(EC 20)
202
-
Op(DH 90)
448
-
BD 26
598
-
BE 15
 
84
-
Op(AJ 59)
221
-
Op(AL 70)
461
-
CF 54
600
-
Op(AJ 92)
 
86
-
AK 78
228
-
AL 42
463
-
BD 38
603
-
Op(AJ 67)
 
89
-
Op(AJ 54)
229
-
AL 28
468
-
Op(AJ 92)
608
-
Op(AL 70)
 
91
-
Op(AJ 91)
230
-
AL 51
504
-
Op(DH 90)
610
-
BE 56
 
103
-
CF 86
305
-
AL 20
506
-
KZ 88
615
-
Op(AJ 67)
 
106
-
Op(CD 89)
306
-
AF 47
508
-
BE 92
616
-
AL 42
 
107
-
Op(CG 15)
332
-
AL 20
509
-
Op(KY)
618
-
AL 10
 
109
-
CF 96
333
-
Op(AL 70)
510
-
Op(EP)
621
-
AK 74
 
119
-
BD 29
336
-
Op(AL 70)
513
-
Op(CD 89)
631
-
BF 12
 
129
-
BF 54
338
-
AL 30
515
-
Op(CD 86)
633
-
AL
 
130
-
Op(CD 83)
359
-
AK 77
516
-
Op(KZ)
634
-
AL 26
 
134
-
BE 51
373
-
Op(AL 70)
518
-
Op(FJ)
638
-
Op(AJ 51)
 
155
-
Op(DM 30)
376
-
BF 91
521
-
DG 61
641
-
AL 20
 
156
-
Op(EE)
377
-
BE 45
523
-
AL 27
642
-
AL 20
 
159
-
CF 66
384
-
BE 24
524
-
CF 96
653
-
Op(AJ 92)
 
160
-
Op(KP)
405
-
AK 95
526
-
AL 20
659
-
BD 26
 
163
-
BF 40
406
-
Op(AL 70)
527
-
AL 20
663
-
BF 40
 
167
-
Op(DF 22)
409
-
AL 44
529
-
Op(AJ 55)
664
-
Op(AJ 58)
 
168
-
AN 43
410
-
Op(CG 14)
530
-
AL 50
665
-
AL 10
 
172
-
Op(CD 86)
415
-
AE 83
558
-
Op(DH 90)
666
-
AL 20
 
180
-
DS 53
432
-
BD 23
654
-
BF 54
709
-
AL 65
 
182
-
Op(KQ)
435
-
Op(AJ 67)
566
-
AK 95
757
-
BD 34
 
183
-
Op(DM 70)
439
-
AL 20
569
-
BF 91
758
-
Op(AJ 58)
 
185
-
Op(DN 80)
440
-
Op(AL 70)
572
-
BF 80
759
-
BE 65
 
188
-
AE 68
441
-
Op(AL 70)
 
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 228 - 230 - 359 - 376 - 377 - 405 - 432 - 447 - 448 - 461 - 508 - 566 - 569 - 591 - 608 - 616 - 621 - 659 - 709 - 759.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 260 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Gibraltar convoys in the area west of Portugal.
       
- 156 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 16 and convoy report U 43, see para IV a.
    2) U 448 established contact with an isolated vessel on a general course southwest, speed 14 knots in BD 5133 at 1814.  After a high speed chase lasting several hours the steamer disappeared in the darkness owing to the U-boat's inability to overhaul her.
    3) U 468 chased a large tanker of the type "Cadillac" of 12,062 GRT on a southerly course, as far as AJ 9585 and sank her there with 3 torpedo hits.  Estimated at 10,000 GRT.
    4) U 91 fired a triple miss in spite of precise preparation, at a suspicious looking steamer of 15,000 GRT.  Depth charges were dropped afterwards and the boat suspected it of being a "Q ship".
    5) U 260 reported while underway in BF 6492, 2 silhouettes without lights the size of trawlers.
    6) U 183 situation report:  Continuous location while proceeding through Windward Passage in DN 8550.  There is only daylight air activity in the present operational area.  An Argentinean vessel on an easterly course, was confirmed on the 6th, 7th and 8.3.  A freighter of 7,000 GRT course 400, speed 15 knots was sunk in DL 6921 on 11.3.
  b)  The aerial reconnaissance sighted a northward bound convoy in CG 1276, and a convoy consisting of 47 ships and 6 escort vessels on a course of 1800, medium speed, in BE 9284.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DH 95, FJ 82, CA 3742, DN 7567, EF 8680, CH 8291, BF 4535.
    2) The convoy intercept by a/c refers apparently to a convoy using a cover name used earlier presumably OS 44.  The previous OS convoy was intercepted on 25.2, so that the time interval amounts to 3 weeks according to reckoning.
       
- 157 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      From this, it appears that the England-Freetown convoy traffic is again sailing at regular intervals.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy report U 43:
      The boat sighted a small convoy of 4 steamers and 3 escort craft on a southwesterly course at 1450 in DH 9646.  It was apparently at once forced to submerge and lost contact.  Later at 1900 U 504 reported the convoy on a course of 225, speed about 15 knots in H 9853.  Depth charges were dropped very close to the boat and there was machine gun fire which necessitated withdrawal to ascertain the extent of the damage.  Boats near the Canaries were ordered to operate on the convoy in spite of the enemy's high speed.  As, however, no more contact messages were received and in the meantime the America convoy expected by the other boats and of the utmost importance for the Africa supplies, had been intercepted in CD 80; only boats in a favorable position were left to operate on the southward bound convoy.  The remaining boats operated at maximum cruising speed on the America convoy. Before morning all boats had broken off the pursuit and proceeded to the west.  There were no successes.
      Merely U 43 subsequently reported having sunk a large passenger steamer of the "Blue Star" Line, on a northerly course, speed 13 knots; in DF 9329 on 3.3.
    2) Convoy No. 17:
      Before the interception of the America convoy, the boats detailed for this operation received the following order:
     
I) U 130, 515, 122, 513, 106 and 167 form the Group "Unverzagt".  If there is no previous contact boats in reconnaissance channels ordered for 12.3 at 1000 for this group are to turn back on a course of 900, speed 8 knots.  In this way an unobserved passage during the night is to be avoided.  At a speed of 8 knots the convoy should be in the vicinity of the channel towards evening, according to reckoning.
II) U 159, 109, 524, 67, 521 and 103 are to take up position in reconnaissance channels from CE 8272 to 8878 at 0900 on 14.3 as the Group "Wohlgemut".  The channels are on the latitude of the route given in the special Radio Intelligence Report.
  U 130 reported a destroyer in CD 8256 on a course of 900 at 1841, and presumed that the convoy would be in CD 8272 at about 2000.  Course 750, speed 7 to 8 knots according to the new position. The Group "Unverzagt" received orders to operate on this.  U 130 is not to attack until another boat has reported contact.  Further, the Group "Wohlgemut" was detailed to operate at high speed.  The convoy was in CD 6258, course 800, speed 8 knots, at 2300.  U 515 requested D/F signal at 2300.  Contact was subsequently broken off.  U 172 was chased by a destroyer and forced to submerge at 0500 in CD 8316.  The boat observed the firing of star shells and heard depth charges.  Further reports have not been received.  It is intended to allow the boats to search independently by day in the prevailing good visibility, and if the convoy is not found, to dispose both groups early on 14.3 in a channel.
 
 
 
- 158 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) Convoy No. 16:
      No convoy messages have been received.  As it may be assumed that the enemy has diverged to the north, the boats have been ordered to operate on the enemy course 10 - 500.
      Subsequently U 590 reported the last hydrophone bearing - true course 850 at 0800 on 12.3 in AL 7265.
      Two boats reported being forced to remain submerged by a/c.  
      As no contact was established during the day, the boats received instructions to continue operations until dawn on 13.3 and then if contact has not been obtained, to break off.  The boats are informed that according to the reckoning of the Naval War Staff the convoy should be in the channel area from AL 2950 to AL 6810 at 0800 on 13.3.
      No messages were received up to 0800 on 13.3.
      Final summing up:
      Convoy 16, (HX 228) was intercepted at 1335 on 10.3 by U 336 the most southerly boat of the Group "Neuland", and 26 hours later, at 1600 on 11.3, reported by U 359 for the last time.  There was continuous contact during the night but this was interrupted at dawn apparently, owing to air patrols and only temporary re-established by U 406 at 1158 and U 359 at 1600.
      The Command informed the boats after the first breaking off of contact, of their supposition that the convoy would probably steer a general course of 55 to 700 after a large zig zag to the north at night and proceed at a speed of 8 to 10 knots.  
      On receipt of U 359's convoy report of 1600, 11.3, the boats received orders to operate on the enemy course of 40-700, speed 8-10 knots.
      As there was no indication of the convoy position up to 1000 on 12.3, it was presumed the enemy had again deviated to the south.  The boats received instructions to operate at high speed on the enemy course of 10-500.
      In order to exhaust all possibilities, the operation was continued in spite of unsuccessful searching in the course of the 12.3 to daylight in 13.3.  If there was no enemy contact the boats were to withdraw to the west.  Nothing was sighted before daylight.  The convoy operation was therefore broken off.
      The surface craft defences must be considered to have been normal.  The strong air patrols by fast land a/c, which began to operate on 11.3 complicated matters considerably and led to the breaking off of contact and the inability to reestablish it.
      U 444 which maintained good contact to begin with reported for the last time at 0029 on 11.3 and did not reply to repeated requests.  The loss of this boat must be presumed.  (see under IVd).
      Weather conditions were normal. The prevailing wind was NW, between strength 5 and 7, seaway 4 to 6.  An average visibility was 10 sea miles, often affected by snow gusts.  Cloud 7/10.
      After the discontinuation of contact messages by U 444, the reports of the convoy were spasmodic and often very belated.  Although the boats were expressly instructed on the necessity of quick transmission of complete enemy contact
 
 
 
       
- 159 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      messages also of information on the enemy this did not improve.  As far as can be seen at present, cooperation between the boats could have been better.
      The following results were achieved:  
      6 steamers (including one tanker) were sunk altogether 49,802 GRT.
      1 tanker (8,000 GRT) and 1 steamer each hit by 2 torpedoes.
      The sinking of both units may be presumed.  4 other steamers were probably torpedoed.
  b) 1) The Command decided to operate on the intercepted HX 229 on the strength of the special Radio Intelligence Reports received.  Group "Raubgraf" remains in the former channel. The convoy ONS 169 expected by the boats must have already passed through.  Group "Sturmer" is to be reinforced and will take up position at 2000 on 14.3 with the boats U 305, 527, 666, 523, 229, 526, 642, 439, 338, 641, 665, 618, 190, 530, 631, 598, 384 and 134 in reconnaissance channels from AK 3563 to AL 7215 on a course of 260, cruising speed 5 knots.
      A disposition further north is not considered necessary, as in the event of the enemy proceeding on a course far to the north Group "Raubgraf" would be in a position to intercept it.
    2) U 221 has carried out repairs and is waiting in AL 70.Disposition in a new patrol line with additional boats is planned.
    3) U 445, 610 and 107 are operating on the southbound convoy reported by a/c in BE 9284.
  c) None.
  d) 1) In order to facilitate the transmission of closed areas within Route "A" to boats these will be divided into the following sections.
     
 
Section
"A"
extends from
W. France to 300 W.
 
"
"B"
"        "
300 W. to the south to 300 N.
 
"
"C"
"        "
300 N. to 150 N.
 
"
"D"
"        "
150 N. to 050 S.
 
With the immediate closing of section "B" until further notice, only section "A" is open for attacks on isolated vessels.
    2) According to an English radio report, a/c observed a German U-boat hit a mine and sink - after a large explosion, shortly before the attack on it.  This was probably U 87.
    3) U 633 reported for the last time on 3.3 from about AL 30, on patrols encountered in the Iceland Passage.  Subsequently the boat was detailed to operate on Convoy No. 15 on 6.3.  It is not known whether it established contact as no convoy message was received. Numerous requests remained unanswered.  Its loss must be presumed.
    4) U 444 operated within the Group "Neuland" on Convoy No. 16 and last reported it in AK 9877 on 11.3.  The boat did not afterwards answer. U 441 observed an a/c attack on U-boat in AK 96 at 1009 on 11.3.  This was probably U 444 and the loss of this boat must be presumed.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 468 - 1 ship  10,000 GRT
  U 183 - 1 ship  7,000 GRT
  U 43 - 1 ship 6,000 GRT
 
 
 
- 160 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
13.March 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DH 95
U 190
-
AL 48
U 445
-
Op(CG 12)
U 598
-
AL 78
 
66
-
Op(DH 85)
191
-
AN 36
447
-
AL 92
600
-
Op(AJ 91)
 
67
-
CE 97
198
-
AN 28
448
-
BD 29
603
-
Op(AJ 59)
 
68
-
Op(EC 20)
202
-
Op(DH 90)
461
-
CF 29
608
-
Op(AL 55)
 
84
-
Op(AJ 56)
221
-
Op(AL 77)
463
-
BD 29
610
-
BE 51
 
86
-
AL 48
228
-
AL 47
468
-
Op(AJ 92)
615
-
Op(AJ 56)
 
89
-
Op(AJ 52)
229
-
AL 01
504
-
DH 97
616
-
AK 69
 
91
-
Op(AJ 67)
230
-
AL 47
506
-
Op(JJ)
618
-
AL 42
 
103
-
CF 76
260
-
BF 58
508
-
BF 72
621
-
BD 12
 
106
-
Op(CD 89)
305
-
AL 15
509
-
Op(KY)
631
-
AL 78
 
107
-
Op(CG 12)
306
-
AE 68
510
-
Op(EP)
634
-
AL 01
 
109
-
CE 86
332
-
AL 19
513
-
Op(CD 89)
638
-
Op(AJ 51)
 
119
-
BD 37
333
-
Op(AL 55)
515
-
Op(CD 86)
641
-
AL 45
 
129
-
BF 48
336
-
AL 55
516
-
Op(KZ)
642
-
AL 51
 
130
-
CD 83
338
-
AL 51
518
-
Op(FJ)
653
-
Op(AJ 67)
 
134
-
BE 12
359
-
BD 34
521
-
DG 26
659
-
BD 34
 
155
-
Op(DM 30)
373
-
Op(AL 48)
523
-
AL 19
663
-
BE 66
 
156
-
Op(EE)
376
-
BF 64
524
-
CE 97
664
-
Op(AJ 55)
 
159
-
CE 91
377
-
BE 51
526
-
AL 19
665
-
AL 45
 
160
-
Op(KP)
384
-
BE 12
527
-
AL 18
666
-
AL 01
 
163
-
BF 96
405
-
BD 34
529
-
Op(AJ 55)
709
-
AL 93
 
167
-
Op(CD 89)
406
-
Op(AL 57)
530
-
AL 48
757
-
BD 34
 
168
-
AN 28
409
-
AK 69
558
-
Op(DH 90)
758
-
Op(AJ 55)
 
172
-
Op(CD 86)
410
-
Op(CG 12)
564
-
BF 44
759
-
BF 59
 
180
-
DS 91
415
-
AE 85
566
-
BD 34
-
 
 
182
-