F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 28 February 1942

PG30304b

     
     
 
16.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 128
- DD 70?
U 404
- BF 40
U 578
- BC 75
 
68
- CF 38
129
- EE 15
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BE 67
 
69
- CD 17
130
- CE 35
455
- Op(AL 50)
588
- BE 90
 
85
- BE 42
136
- Op(AM)
502
- Op(EC 90)
591
- AM 25
 
94
- BE 90
154
- AM 77
503
- Br'buttel
653
- CC 31
 
96
- Op(BB-CB)
155
- AM 17
504
- DD 71
654
- BE 37
 
98
- CD 21
156
- Op(EC 90)
505
- CF 39
656
- BD 77
 
103
- CC 67
158
- AM 17
558
- BD 39
751
- BE 74
 
106
- BD 98
161
- EE 19
564
- CA 93
752
- AM 31
 
107
- CA 93
162
- AM 18
566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
   
 
108
- Op(CA 50)
213
- AL 31(Op)
575
- BC 68
   
 
109
- CE 31
352
- Op(Reykjavik)
576
- Op(amerik. Küste)
   
 
125
-
CF 21
 
 
 
 
126
- DF 24
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 564 - 591 - 751 - 575 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 109 - 130 - 98.
  Sailed:         - . -
  Entered Port:        - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 576 reported:  No shipping in BB 58-59-81-83.  A/S hunt.  8,000 BRT freighter sunk in BB 8851.  On return voyage.
    2) U 564 reported tanker "Opalia" in CB 4798.  Gun duel, only 3 hits, tanker escaped.
    3) As leader of Group "Neuland", U 156 reported 2 tankers 5,800 BRT sunk off Aruba.  Only A/S defenses searchlights, plane, 1 patrol boat.
  b) None.
  c) Report of appearance of German submarines off Curacao and Aruba.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 161 and U 129 in area north of Trinidad were given operational freedom.
    2) U 502 and U 67 ("Neuland" group) were ordered to shell the tank installations on Aruba and Curacao.
    3) U 732 was allotted northern half of AM as attack area.
    4) Attack area of U 96 - 69 - 578 - 653 unlimited to the west.
    5) U 558 - 587 - 588 - 94 - 404 were given area CB-CA to operate in U 126 - to attack in area Straits of Florida
       
- 79 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      or north and south of them.
  c) U 656 probably carried out convoy duty according to plan.
  d) 1) U 564 and 107 intend to carry out fuel transfer.
    2) U 587 and 751 were to be in BE 8132 at 1100 on 17th to take over the 5 men rescued from the FW-200.  U 751 - on return journey - was to take them on board.
    3) U 156 had 2 men wounded by a barrel premature while shelling Curacao.  Naval War Staff gave permission to enter Martinique.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 156 reported sinking 2 tankers (5,800 BRT).
       
VI. General:
  a) The only report to hand from the Aruba area claims only an unsatisfactory success.  Even though the indirect success may be great, the primary aim of the operation must be to inflict direct damage on the enemy.
    This is best effected by destroying enemy shipping, only after all possible opportunities for this had been seized should the tank installations on land have been shelled.
    Apparently U 156 acted in this way, but the shelling, presumably because of the barrel premature, did not have the desired effect.
    About 1500 a teleprint arrived from Naval War Staff:  C-in-C Navy wishes the submarine operations in this area to be opened by shelling the tank installations.
    But the use of guns was sanctioned by operational order from 0800 (5 hours before dawn at that place).  In accordance with the order from C-in-C Navy, U 502 was sent to Aruba as U 156 had a breakdown.  When off Curacao U 502 and U 67 were ordered to use guns against tank installations, if possible.
    I had decided against issuing an order to commence submarine operations by shelling the tank installations, as there was a danger that such shelling, which might or might not be successful, would do away with the element of surprise and spoil chances of sinkings.
  b) The barrel premature on U 156 gives rise to the fear that similar runs of misfires may occur, as with the "South" boats in the Spring.But according to information from Navy High Command-Gunnery- (Captain v. Goetze) the ammunition that contained so many duds is no longer in use so that it may be expected that this is an isolated case.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
17.February 1942.
 
 
- 80 -
     
     

 

     
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 125
- BE 88
U 213
- Op(AM)
U 575
- BD 45
 
68
- CF 68
126
- DF 18
352
- Op(Reykjavik)
576
- BB 99
 
69
- CC 37
128
- DC 90?
404
- BF 47
578
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
85
- BE 51
129
- ED 63
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BE 82
 
94
- BE 81
130
- CF 16
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BE 81
 
96
- Op(BB 88)
136
- Op(AM)
502
- Op(EC 90)
591
- AM 23
 
98
- CD 31
154
- AM 32
503
- Helgoland
653
- CC 21
 
103
- CD 48
155
- AL 39
504
- DC 95
654
- BE 63
 
106
- BE 79
156
- Op(EC 90)
505
- CF 68
656
- BD 86
 
107
- CB 49
158
- AL 62
558
- BD 37
751
- BE 81
 
108
- Op(CA 50)
161
- ED 66
564
- CB 49
752
- Op(AM)
 
109
- CF 13
162
- AL 03
566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 751 - 575 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:         U 332 - La Pallice.
  Entered Port:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 752 reported "Q" ships in AM 33.
    2) Report from U 108:  Traffic to America stopped excepting close inshore.  Moderate northeast traffic in DC 12-21 and south of it.  (English) Night route for traffic to America via shallow water.  Sunk:  4 freighters totaling 22,000 BRT.  Protracted return voyage.  3 torpedoes, 65 cbm. fuel.
    3) On 16.2 U 502 (Neuland boat) sank 2 tankers totaling 3,300 tons off the northwest coast of Paraguana, and scored 2 hits on a 1500 ton tanker.   On 17th Nicolaashaven (Aruba) was completely blacked out, 3 patrol boats, no traffic.  Air patrol by day.  Impossible to use ship's guns.  145 cbm. fuel.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Finnish steamer "Modesta" sighted a submarine in DC 53(?), and the American steamer "Montosa" a suspicious vessel in DB 59.
    2) English plane attacked submarine in AM 3645.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 455 ordered to include AE 5564 in its patrol area.
    2) U 504 was allotted the same attack area as U 129, i.e. DB 90 and north or south of it.
       
- 81 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) Apparently U 128 was on the wrong operations area and will arrive on 19.2 in the attack area ordered - "Straits of Florida".
  c) Apparently U 656 carried out convoy duty as planned.
  d) 1) No report on transfer of fuel from U 564 to U 107.
    2) U 587 and U 751 did not meet.  Boats continued outward or homeward voyage respectively.
    3) U 130 (on homeward trip) arranged rendezvous with U 587 for 18.2 at 1500 in BE 7265 (to take over aircrew).
    4) Boats were directed against Mexican and South American ships under strict observance of prize regulations.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 108 made a fresh report of 3 freighters, totaling 17,000 BRT, sunk.  
  U 502 reported 2 tankers totaling 3,300 BRT sunk and 1 tanker totaling 1,500 BRT torpedoed.
       
VI General:
            Further details of the convoy U 402 ("Llangibby Castle") 2-4 February were given in the oral report of Lieut.(s.g.) Hirsacker, Commander of U 572, and of v. Forstner, Commander of U 402:
  a)  U 572 operated against convoy but had to make a temporary change of course because of a message and when he later returned to the correct position could no longer get near.
  b)  As previous reports of his sinking showed, U 581 was also immediately off Horta and made arrangements to meet U 402 there.  It would have been correct for U 402 to report this as well.
            The foregoing shows, how easily one can miscalculate the position of a submarine, when no definite reports are available.  It was assumed here, because of the English aircraft report that U 581 was off Gibraltar.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
18.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 125
- BE 98
U 213
- Op(AM)
U 566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
68
- CF 94
126
- DE 38
332
- BF 58
575
- BD 29
 
69
- CC 28
128
- DC 70
352
- AE 47-Op
576
- BC 79
 
85
- BE 53
129
- Op(ED 98-99)
404
- BE 58
578
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
94
- BE 72
130
- BE 72
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BE 49
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- Op(AM)
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BE 75
 
98
- CE 11
154
- AM 26
502
- EC 91-Op
591
- AM 24
 
103
- CD 54
155
- AL 51
503
- Helgol.
653
- BB 89
 
106
- BE 86
156
- ED 82
504
- DC 85
654
- BF 40
 
107
- CB 58
158
- AL 54
505
- CF 94
656
- BE 46
 
108
- DD 13
161
- Op(ED 98-99)
558
- BD 52
751
- BE 59
 
109
- CF 22
162
- AL 61
564
- CB 58
752
- AM 33-Op
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 575 - 751 - 108 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 109 - 130 - 125.
       
- 82 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Sailed:        - . -  
  Entered Port:        - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 154 reported light or no air patrol in AM 10, moderate traffic.  183 cbm. fuel.
    2) Report from U 352 in sea area west of Reykjavik.  Numerous air patrols, lights burning.  No patrol vessels outside barrage.  No steamer traffic.  No offensive action because of weather. Returning, no successes.
    3) U 156 reported many independently routed ships in ED, center, and upper right hand corner; mostly radiating from Trinidad.  Usually 2-4 large tankers in main harbor, shipping leaving port took on the whole a northwest course towards the north. Shelling of land installations had little effect.  Boat steered for "Fort de France".
  b) None.
  c) 1) Submarine was bombed by plane in BE 5878 (U 404).
    2) Submarine warning by American tanker "Vacuum".  Was followed by suspicious looking vessel.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 69 reported patch of oil, impossible to disperse it.  Boat was accordingly directed to more distant operational area in BC 5797.  300 miles deep.
    2) As Associated Press reported that transport of petroleum from Venezuela had been stopped for the time being U 502 was ordered to operate against east-west traffic north of Maracaibo Bay until transport was recommended.
    3) After transferring wounded U 156 was to be free to attack at discretion.  Instructed to concentrate on Mona Passage and Windward Passage.
  c)  U 656 believed to have carried out convoy duty as ordered.
  d) 1) U 130 took over air-crew from U 587.
    2) U 564 and U 107 continued homeward trip.
    3) U 68 and U 505 were directed to attack French convoy traffic along the coast of Africa.
       
V. Reports of Success:   None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- 83 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
19.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 125
- BF 74
U 213
- Op(AM)
U 566
- Op(BB 87)
 
68
- DH 16
126
- DE 52
332
- BF 42
575
- BD 39
 
69
- CC 31
128
- Op(Florida)
352
- AE 72
576
- BC 88
 
85
- BE 63
129
- Op(ED 98-99)
404
- BE 46
578
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
94
- BD 93
130
- BE 81
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BE 71
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- AM 15(op)
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BD 96
 
98
- CE 21
154
- AM 15
502
- Op(EC 90)
591
- AF 77
 
103
- CD 64
155
- AL 44
503
- Helgol.
653
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
106
- BE 94
156
- ED 55-Op
504
- DC 75
654
- BF 50
 
107
- CB 66
161
- Op(ED 98-99)
505
- DH 14
656
- BE 91
 
108
- CB 89
162
- AL 52
558
- BD 43
751
- BE 69
 
109
- BE 89
   
564
- CC 17
752
- Op(AM)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 130 - 125 - 654.
  Sailed:  U 592 left Hamburg to join command of Admiral Arctic.
  Entered Port:  U 654 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) At 1156 U 136 sighted convoy (No. 11) in AM 1326, course southeast, speed 8 knots.  Submarine was forced to sheer off.  As all torpedoes below decks had been fired, boat was ordered to move away to the west and reload, if it was not possible to press on.
      No further reports of convoys.
      On 17.2 U 136 sank a freighter (8,000 BRT).  It is surprising how many convoys have been picked up recently in the operational area northwest of the North Channel by the few submarines stationed there.
    2) U 352 reported enemy submarine in AE 75.
    3) On 18.2 U 108 sank English steamer "Somme" (5,265 BRT) in CB 8926.  19.2 dud shot fired at steamer in CB 9711.  Both steamers belonging to convoy that had been dispersed in the area east of Newfoundland.
    4) U 161 reported that he had penetrated the Gulf of Paria between Trinidad and Venezuela and sank 1 tanker (4,000 BRT) and 1 freighter (6,000 BRT) in 11 meters of water, probably off Port of Spain.  The narrow entrance to the Gulf was protected by 4 searchlights and patrol vessels.  Much east-west traffic under cover of the coast.  Concentrated air patrolling.  In view of the shallow water and narrow entrance, this boat's operation was extremely creditable.
    5) U 67, whose attack area lay around Curacao, reported that he sank a tanker of the "Rosalia" class (5,100 BRT) on 16.2.  From then on, lights on land were doused and traffic ceased.  Bombed!  U 67 also had 4 unexplained
       
- 84 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      dud torpedoes, some fired at stationary targets at short range.  Attempts to shell the island were twice prevented by patrol vessels.
  b) None.
  c) 1) United Press "Maracaibo" reported the names of 6 tankers sunk by submarines:
      "Pedernales"  (3,945 BRT)
      "Oranjestad"  (2,396 BRT)
      "San Nicolas"  (3,191 BRT) (was towed to Aruba)
      "Tijuana"  (2,395 BRT)
      "Monagast"  (2,650 BRT)
      "Rafaelita"  (3,177 BRT)
      "Akanias"
      There was no news of three others.
    2) Reuter reported:  14.2 Brazilian steamer "Barque" (5,152 BRT) torpedoes and sunk.  (Sinking must have occurred off the coast of America.  The boats in the Caribbean were not given permission to attack until 16.2.)
    3) USA ships were instructed:
     
1) Not to leave important Caribbean harbors except by day.
2) To blackout when sailing at night.  (boats have been informed).
    4) Report of being torpedoed by "Empire Seal"  (7,964 BRT) in BB 7758; "Scottish Star" in EF 4960 (longitude of scene of torpedoing probably wrong, no German submarine in that area).  Also "Elizabeth Massey" (4,323 BRT) in DB 9460.
    5) Submarine warning from tanker "Eagle" (6,003 BRT) in DB 3780 and "Oklahomann" (5,508 BRT) in DC 12.
    6) Submarine sightings.  English plane sighted submarine in AM 1217.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 154 instructed to make for Cape Hatteras.
  c) U 656 reported from CD 29 that "Osorno" had not been met.  Still 92 cbm. fuel  (submarine ordered to move away to northwest and report, if not encountered by 2400 on 18.2).
  d) U 68 and U 505 were informed that the German tanker "Charlotte Schliemann" would leave Las Palmas between 21 and 23.2.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 136 reported sinking of 1 freighter (8,000 BRT).
 
 
 
- 85 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  U 108 reported sinking of steamer "Somme" (5,265 BRT)
  U 161        "      "        "     2 ships (10,000 BRT)
  U 67          "      "        "     1 tanker (3,100 BRT)        
       
VI. General:
          The submarine situation in Norwegian waters demands the use of boats from Atlantic ports.  After exhausting their offensive powers, boats have turned homewards earlier than expected, and on the other hand delays have been caused in the dates for homebased boats to leave port because of the worsening icing conditions.
          The present situation and intended operations are as follows:
    1) Admiral Arctic Command including Narvik-Tromsoe demands:
      6 plus submarines.
      U 584, U 585, U 134, U 456, U 436, U 435 are available.
      The last boat must return to Trondheim for periscope repairs.
      En route to Narvik:  U 377 in northern North Sea, U 592 will leave Heligoland somewhere about 22.2.  U 584, U 134, U 585 have been in northern waters since the beginning of December.  It is intended to relieve them as soon as new boats are available from home.
    2) Trondheim:
      Requirements:  2 serviceable boats.  U 454 now in Trondheim will be ready for operations from 21.2.  The boat will be relieved by 403, which will leave Kiel on 23.2.  It will then operate in the Iceland-England area.  It is not intended to use it again in the northern area.
      U 586, at present undergoing repair in Trondheim yard.  Should be ready for operations about 15.3.
    3) Bergen:
      Requirements:  2 serviceable boats.  U 591 undergoing repairs since 20.2.  U 593, U 589 leaving Heligoland about 1.3.
    4) Hebrides-Iceland area:
      Requirements:  8 boats.
      In operational area:  U 455, U 136, U 213, U 752; on return journey to western France U 352.
      U 155, U 158, U 154, U 162 (type IXc boats) passed through this area en route for America.  No more boats will pass through for a fortnight.
      To bring the submarines up to the number required, the next boats that become ready for action will be sent from Atlantic ports to the operational area, as follows:
      U 87 on 22.2; U 135 on 22.2; U 553 on 24.2; U 701 on 26.2.
      U 405 will be the next boat to leave from home waters and will sail from Heligoland about 5.3.
 
 
- 86 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
20.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 125
- BF 40
U 213
- Op(AM)
U 566
- Op(Küste amerik.)
 
68
- DH 46
126
- DE 45
332
- BF 47
575
- BE 18
 
69
- Op(amerik. Küste)
128
- Op(Florida)
352
- AL 22
576
- BC 97
 
85
- BF 42
129
- Op(ED 98-99)
404
- BE 44
578
- Op(amerik Küste)
 
94
- BD 91
130
- BE 83
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BD 67
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- AM 13
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BD 94
 
98
- BD 97
154
- AL 39
502
- Op(EC 90)
591
- AN 24
 
103
- CD 63
155
- AK 92
503
- AN 93
653
- Op(amerik Küste)
 
106
- BE 98
156
- Op(Caribbean Sea)
504
- Op(DB 90)
656
- CD 29
 
107
- CC 18
158
- AK 93
505
- DH 44
751
- BF 48
 
108
- CC 74
161
- Op(ED 98-99)
558
- BD 44
752
- Op(AM)
 
109
- BE 95
162
- AL 48
564
- CB 63
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 591 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:         - . -
  Entered Port:  U 591 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 96 reported:  North-south traffic off southeast coast of Nova Scotia.  Much driving snow and icing.  20.2, 2 freighters sunk 8,000 BRT (probably "Empire Seal" and 6,000 BRT).
    2) U 566 reported convoy and single-ship traffic south of Sable Island to the coast of Nova Scotia at 3000.  On 15.2 9,000 BRT freighter torpedoed in BB 7544 (south of Halifax).  Probably sunk, but not observed, as submarine was forced to sheer off.  A great deal of heavy weather, driving snow (weather and icing conditions will shortly prevent operations in this area, which is still good).
    3) U 432 made a fragmentary report:  Moderate north-south traffic in area New York-Cape Hatteras.  Much careless air patrolling.  4 freighters totaling 20,000 BRT sunk, amongst them "Olinda".
    4) Caribbean:  U 156 reported that wounded were duly landed at Martinique, one wounded man died on board.  On 19.2, 2 misses fired in ED 55 against freighter in ballast depth setting 3 and 2 meters with certain firing data.
      20.2, 2 hits and 3 misses fired at stationary freighter (4,000 BRT) in ED 65.  Sinking not observed because of flying boat.
    5) U 129:  one report from attack area northeast Trinidad.  East of Trinidad no traffic, nor off the main harbors on the north.  Little air activity. Freighter (5,500 BRT) on a course of 2900 sunk in EO 1527.  Intended operating in area southeast Trinidad.
  b)  None.
       
- 87 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) 1) William C Atwater (2,450 BRT) reported sighting of suspicious looking vessel in DB 9790.
    2) American tanker "Swiftsure" (8,207 BRT) sent submarine warning in CA 5470.
    3) USA ships were warned of mine barrage off Chesapeake Bay.
    4) American tankers instructed to anchor in DM 2710 (north of Key West) and await further orders.  Boats were duly informed.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 656 was allotted large square CB.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 96 reported sinking of 2 freighters totaling 14,000 BRT.
    U 566       "       probable sinking of 1 freighter 9,000 BRT.
    U 432       "       sinking of 4 ships totaling 20,000 BRT.
    U 156       "       2 hits on freighter 4,000 BRT.
    U 129       "       sinking 1 freighter 5,500 BRT.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
21.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 125
- BF 46
U 213
- AM 15-Op
U 566
- BB 88
 
68
- DH 76
126
- DD 69
332
- BE 86
575
- BE 55
 
69
- Op(BC)
128
- Op(Florida)
352
- AL 35
576
- BC 99
 
85
- BF 40
129
- ED 90 Op
404
- BD 65
578
- CB 23
 
94
- BD 82
130
- BE 92
432
- CA 58-Op
587
- BD 58
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- Op(AM)
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BD 84
 
98
- BD 99
154
- AL 51
502
- Op(Aruba)
653
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
103
- CE 42
155
- AK 86
503
- vor Bergen
656
- CD 15
 
106
- BF 70
156
- ED 60 Op
504
- Op(DB 90)
751
- BF 40
 
107
- CC 24
158
- AK 94
505
- DH 74
752
- Op(AM)
 
108
- CC 73
161
- ED 98-99-Op
558
- BC 68
   
 
109
- BF 70
162
- AK 93
564
- CC 24
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:         U 124 - UA - Lorient.
  Entered Port:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) At 1130 U 107 scored hit on tanker in CC 2723 with last torpedo.  Tanker was at first on a course of 2350, after the hit 3400.
       
- 88 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) At 1800 U 564 reported a tanker on a course of 2800 in CC 2543, at 1700 a tanker in CC 2526, course southwest.  At the same time U 107 reported 5 tankers in CC 2490, widely scattered, on southwest course.  Doubtless ships belonging to a dispersed convoy.  Probably ONS.  It was regrettable that two submarines that had fired all torpedoes should happen upon this convoy.  The nearest boat was on its homeward way - some 200 miles northwest of the position reported.
  b) None.
  c) 1) At 1110 steamer "JSMD" reported that it had been torpedoed in CC 2493, at 1410 tanker "Enleina" (6,207 BRT) reported the same from CC 2439.  According to T.O.O. and call-sign they were two different vessels, but as no other submarine was in the vicinity, it had to be assumed that in each case it was the tanker that had been torpedoed by U 107.
    2) Tanker "Circle Shell" (8,207 BRT) reported that it had been torpedoed in ED 95 (operational area of U 161).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 107 reported 1 hit on tanker.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
22.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 124
- BF 55
U 162
- AK 94
U 564
- CC 31
 
68
- DT 36
125
- BF 64
213
- Op(AM)
566
- BB 97
 
69
- BC 84
126
- DD 59
332
- BE 84
575
- BE 64
 
85
- BF 40
128
- Op(Florida)
352
- AL 62
576
- BD 78
 
94
- BD 72
129
- Op(BD 98-99)
404
- BD 56
578
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
130
- BE 69
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BD 49
 
98
- BE 78
154
- Op(AM)
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BD 75
 
103
- CE 27
155
- BD 14
502
- Op(Aruba)
653
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
106
- BF 64
156
- Op(EC 90)
503
- v.Bergen
656
- CC 36
 
107
- CC 31
158
- BD 15
504
- Op(DB 90)
751
- BF 40
 
108
- CC 82
161
- Op(ED 98-99)
505
- DT 26
752
- Op(AM)
 
109
- BF 40
   
558
- BC 83
A
- BF 50
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 109 - 130 - UA - 125 - 106.
  Sailed:       U 135 - St. Nazaire; U 87 - La Pallice.   
  Entered Port:        UA - 106 - 124 - Lorient;  U 503 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 89 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) At 0600 U 155 sighted a convoy on a southwest course, low speed, in BD 1428 (No. 12).  This may be ONS 67, which according to our data should be somewhere in this area.  U 158 was in the vicinity and U 587, 588, 594 and U 69 some 200-300 miles south of the convoy.  U 155 was ordered to report contact every 4 hours until the other boats operating against the convoy requested more frequent shadower reports.  At 0828 U 155 reported that he had sunk a tanker (9,000 BRT), and a freighter (6,000 BRT).  Boat was forced to submerge and depth charges were dropped.  For a time contact was lost.  Convoy consisted of about 5 steamers and 3 escorts.  U 158 was south of the convoy following a searching course.  At 1553 U 155 reported that he had been forced by destroyers to submerge for a short time.  Position of convoy at 1500 was BC 3955.  U 158 requested beacon signals several times during the day.
    2) At 1220 U 154 sighted a convoy in AK 6823 (No. 13).  Easterly course in direction of North Channel, 9 knots.  Boat maintained contact.  At 0535 on 23.2 he reported firing a total of 10 misses based on good firing data during 3 night attacks on a convoy of 16 steamers and 3 destroyers.  Boat was forced to sheer off, contact was lost.  Last position at 0625 was AL 4522, course 700, 9 knots.  Only U 752 was favorably placed for attack on convoy.  He was about 250 miles to the east and made for the convoy.
    3) U 128 reported from operational area in Straits of Florida that he had sunk a tanker (3,000 BRT) in DB 9546 on 19.2, and a fully loaded tanker (12,000 BRT) in DB 9439 on 22.2.  Peacetime lights, no air patrol, only destroyers in DB.
  b)  None.
  c) Reports of torpedoing:
    1) American steamer "Lihue" (7,000 BRT) torpedoed in ED 5540 (Caribbean) sinking!
    2) Unidentified torpedoing.  Steamer in EO 15 (submarine warning was given as a result).
    3) Report from radio "Louisburg".  Submarine sighted in BB 7551 (30 miles southeast Halifax), a merchant ship torpedoed.
    4) American steamer reported:  Saw a ship blow up 10 miles west of Rapid-Jupiter (Straits of Florida) probably hit by torpedo.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  See IIIa 1 and 2.
  b) - c) None
  d)  U 564 and U 107 arranged new rendezvous for 23.2 to carry
 
 
- 90 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     out fuel transfer.  At 1200 in BC 7963.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 155 reported sinking 2 ships totaling 15,000 BRT.
    U 128       "        "        "   2 tankers totaling 15,000 BRT.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
23.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 124
- BF 48
U 162
- BD 13
U 564
- BC 79
 
68
- DT 66
126
- DD 49
213
- Op(AM)
566
- BC 77
 
69
- Op(BC)
128
- DB 90
332
- BE 75
575
- BF 44
 
85
- BF 60
129
- Op(ED 98-99)
352
- AL 93
576
- BD 88
 
87
- BF 57
130
- BF 45
404
- ED 46
578
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
94
- BC 69
135
- BF 54
432
- Op(CA 90)
587
- BC 69
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- Op(AM)
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BC 97
 
98
- BE 18
154
- AL 40
502
- Op(EC 90)
653
- Op(amerik Küste)
 
103
- CE 34
155
- BD 60
504
- Op(DB 90)
656
- CC 29
 
107
- BC 79
156
- Op(EC 90)
505
- DT 56
751
- BF 60
 
108
- CD 68
158
- BC 60
558
- BC 75
752
- Op(AM 19)
 
109
- BF 50
161
- Op(ED 98-99)
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 107 - 564 - 566 - 751 - 575 - 108 - 85 - 103 - 109 - 352.
  Sailed:         U 71 - St. Nazaire.
  Entered Port:  U 109 - Lorient; U 85 - 751 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys No. 12 and 13 see No. IVa.
    2) U 504 reported situation from operational area in Straits of Florida:  Much traffic within the 20 meter line.  Hence, no day attacks.  Single large ships at night within the 200 meter line.  Moderate destroyer and air patrols since first attack.  Good chances for attack, but strong patrolling in DB 9790.
      Sunk:  Tanker (6,000 BRT), gasoline tanker ("Gulfpride" class) 12, 510 BRT (probably the "EM-Plum" mentioned in the press).  Four masted freighter ("Cambridge" class) 10,846 BRT.
    3) U 352 reported destroyer in BE 3251, easterly course, high speed.  Fired dud spread of four.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Latvian steamer "Everagra" (3,702 BRT) shadowed by submarine in DC 1210.
    2) The unidentified steamer reported under IIIc 2 on 22.2 was the American "West-Zeda" (5,658 BRT).
       
- 91 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 12:  Contact was not re-established until 1300 on 23.2 by U 587 in BD 6859.  According to new report, convoy consisted of about 4 destroyers and 16 steamers.  Contact was maintained until 2230, when U 587 was forced to sheer off by destroyers.  Last position BC 9287.  U 587 had final contact with the leading destroyer escort.  It appears that U 587 was deliberately drawn off from the convoy on a southeast direction by the destroyer escort.
    At 0200 U 558 reported the convoy in BC 9426 and maintained contact till morning.   Apparently another submarine had attacked, for U 558 reported at 0700 that convoy was firing star shell in BC 8932.  The following boats must have been in the immediate vicinity of the convoy:  U 158 - 155 - 587.  It was also to be assumed that U 558 - 94 - 404 - and U 69 which had made a weather report from that area, were operating against the convoy.
     U 587 sent warning of "Q" ship and 2 patrol vessels in BC 9424 (behind the convoy).  "Q" ship had cable laying gear (Kabellegersteven) and dim side-lights.  She has already been reported several times from this area.  Apparently she is fitted with torpedo nets, as a torpedo hit aft by U 587 had no effect.
    Convoy No. 13:  At 1954 U 136 contacted the convoy in AL 0273.  During the day A/S defense was given by long-range reconnaissance land planes and advanced destroyer escort.  Contact was maintained during the night.  U 136 had 2 dud shots and U 154 4 on tankers during attacks.  U 154 was instructed to return immediately to Lorient, U 136 to continue reporting contact for U 752 and U 213.  According to his own report the latter was very close to the convoy.
  b) U 502 and U 67 were given a free hand in the Caribbean.
  c)  None.
  d) U 564 reported sinking 3 ships totaling 29,356 BRT.
       
VI. General:
            The number of misses reported is again unusually high, certainly at least some are caused by failures.  In the meantime the investigation of the possibilities of failures yielded the following information:
     Because of a report from U 94 that at times considerable excess pressure existed in the depth gear pockets, a number of torpedoes were examined by the Inspectorate of Torpedoes.  It was established that faulty assembly and insufficient greasing by the automatic grease cup 6.1% of the depth gear pockets had not the required pressure-tightness and were,
 
 
- 92 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     therefore, inclined to run too deep.  Previous methods of testing had not shown up this source of failures.  Even though this small percentage does not explain all unaccountable misses, this office considers that a most important source of failures has been discovered.  The Inspectorate of Torpedoes has therefore tightened up the testing methods, it has also issued instructions on filling the grease cup and the type of grease to be used.  These instructions were to be passed immediately to submarines out on patrol, who were to act on them, so that those torpedoes that could no longer be overhauled by the fitting out depots, would be handled correctly.  Special emphasis was laid on the need to vent the depth-gear pocket with normal pressure in the boat.This case again shows that the operational personnel's suspicions as to the cause of failures were in the main, correct.  Again this proves how difficult it is despite complicated tests to discover the causes of failures, as it is almost impossible to re-construct actual operational conditions at such trials.  Therefore B.d.U. agrees with the Inspectorate of Torpedoes that the fullest possible tests and trials must be carried out for the sake of the efficiency of operational torpedoes.
    B.d.U. has requested a more speedy development of a depth gear that is completely unaffected by excess pressure in the torpedo.  In the meantime C-in-C Navy has ordered its immediate construction.
     It is hoped that failures caused by pistol failures will be still further reduced by the Pi G7h pistol which is now coming into use.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
24.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 126
- DD 71
U 213
- AL 03-Op
U 566
- BC 87
 
68
- DT 93
128
- Op(DB 90)
332
- BD 96
575
- BF 46
 
69
- Op(BC 89)
129
- Op(ED-EO)
352
- BE 39
576
- BD 97
 
71
- BF 58
130
- BF 50
404
- BC 90
578
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
87
- BF 46
135
- BF 49
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BC 89
 
94
- BC 90
136
- AL 39-Op
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BC 90
 
96
- Op(amerik. Küste)
154
- AL 39
502
- Op(EC-BD)
653
- Op(CB 86)
 
98
- BE 27
155
- BC 89
504
- DB 96(Op)
656
- CC 19
 
103
- CF 12
156
- Op(ED-EC)
505
- DT 83
752
- AL 03(Op)
 
107
- BC 85
158
- BC 90
558
- BC 89
   
 
108
- CB 48
161
- Op(ED)
564
- BC 88
   
 
124
- BE 69
162
- BD 17
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 576 - 98 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 575 - 108 - 107 - 103 - 130.
  Sailed:  U 403 - 589 - Kiel;  U 160 - W'haven;  U 553 - St. Nazaire.
  Entered Port:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy's No. 12 and 13 see No. IVa.
       
- 93 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) At 2140 U 505 contacted a fast convoy in DT 3490, southerly course 15 knots.  Air escort.  Submarine was forced to sheer off several times and finally lost contact about 0100.  At first light it followed up and if it could not sight the enemy, would continue on southerly route.  Last position of convoy at 0100 in DT 3790, southeast course, 15 knots.
    3) U 502 reported on behalf of U 67 fast steamer in EC 6869, zigzagging on mean course of 1100, 14 knots.  After U 502 had made an unsuccessful gun attack, steamer set a roughly northerly course.  Submarine lost contact.
    4) U 161 reported from Caribbean:  21.2 fired dud spread of two at a tanker (3,000 BRT) just off the main harbor (Port of Spain).  Sank tanker (5,000 BRT) in ED 9739.
      23.2 torpedoed "Lihue" in ED 5955.  Boat suspected "Q" ship.  Moved away to northwest because of planes.  Noticed by 2 steamers.
      For the moment there was still much traffic approaching the main harbor from northwest.  It was supposed that shipping left by the southeast.  Strong air patrol off Port of Spain.  Still 4 plus 4 torpedoes.  135 cbm.
  b)  None.
  c)  (X) U.S.A. shipping was given following instructions:
     Shipping proceeding to Aruba and Curacao is to arrange course so that last 50 miles are covered by day.
    Because of submarines, it is suggested that ships proceeding from or to Trinidad should not use the eastern Caribbean, but keep close inshore on the eastern side of the chain of islands.
    After navigating the Mona Passage the course is as follows:
      65 deg. 21 min. W. - 16 deg. (minutes missing) N. and
      62 deg. 40 min. W. - 13 deg. 30 min. N., then as ordered.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 12:  At 0918 shadower report from U 558 in BC 8925.  U 158 reported one hit on tanker (10,000 BRT), and 1 hit heard on tanker (4,000 BRT).  At 1549 U 155 contacted convoy in BC 8935.  Course 2200, 9 knots.  Visibility changeable, some fog.  The convoy was far behind and its position tallied with that of U 558 at 0918.  U 155 moved course towards west to improve its position.  At 1610 U 107, which was on its return voyage, reported the convoy in BC 8592 on a course of 2300.  This report placed convoy 50 miles farther west than did that of U 155.  It agrees with the position reported by U 558.  Because of lack of fuel, U 107 could not maintain contact.  At 2000 U 155 was forced right away from the convoy by destroyers and reported the latest exact position of the convoy at 1830 in BC 8595, roughly the same position that was reported by U 107 at 1610.  From this time on contact was
 
 
- 94 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
    interrupted and was not picked up again by the morning.  The supposition that the convoy had split into one fast and one slow formation, seemed correct.  However, it was possible that the varying positions given for the convoy were caused by poor fixes by the submarines.
    Further events:  U 587 reported that a torpedo hit was scored amidships on a tanker (10,000 BRT) by U 158, which set it on fire and aleak by gunfire.  Left in sinking condition.
     U 558 reported:  2 hits scored on each of 2 freighters (7,000 BRT and 5,000 BRT) probably sunk.  1, 5,000 BRT freighters were torpedoed, and 1 9,000 BRT tanker.  The tanker "Eidanger" (9,432 BRT) was fired at and broke up with the finishing shot.  Set on fire fore and aft by shelling.  It was not possible to plan operations for the boats during the night, as their positions in relation to the convoy were unknown, and when requested were not received in time.  Also the number of boats available to cover a sector from 1800 - 2900 was not sufficient for a convoy, whose speed had been gauged at 9-10 knots.
    Convoy No. 13:  U 136 maintained contact with slight interruptions until 0412 on 25th.  As the position of the convoy was then only about 90 miles from the North Channel, the submarine was instructed to give up the chase and return immediately to western France.
     U 213 had given up pursuit of the convoy at 2100, as he was probably forced by the convoy's air escort to submerge. U 752, who was requested at 000 on 25th to report whether attack could be made during darkness could not pass his message until 0648 to say that he had broken off pursuit at 2400.
     Result:  4 submarines took part in the operation.  U 154 fired 14 misses;  U 136 2 misses;  U 752, 2 misses and 2 hits.  Explanation of the misses fired by U 154 cannot be given until the commander returns to base.
  b)  None.
  c)  None.
  d) U 558 reported:  In convoy No. 12 two tankers with antisubmarine nets were observed.  Reports from U 558 and 587 (see Convoy No. 12), and the oral report by the commander of U 654, have strengthened the suspicion that the English are using torpedo nets to deflect torpedo attacks.  Submarines have been instructed to look out for this and report immediately.  The (Torpedo Experimental Establishment) ("Tewa") has been informed of the necessity of developing a countermeasure against anti-torpedo nets.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 587 reported torpedoing and shelling of 1 tanker (10,000 BRT).
  U 158 reported a hit on a tanker of 10,000 BRT and on one of 4,000 BRT.
 
 
- 95 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  U 558 reported sinking 3 ships totaling 21,432 BRT, and torpedoing 3 ships totaling 19,000 BRT.
  U 161 reported sinking 2 ships totaling 12,000 BRT.
  U 752 reported 2 hits.
       
IV. General:
  Position in Northern Waters:  As Naval War Staff has requested the speediest possible closing of the gaps which have occurred all over the Norway area (including Iceland), it has been necessary to make certain alterations in the plan made on 19th February.
  1) Northern Waters:  U 456, 436, 585, and 435, which will be available at Trondheim on 2.3.  Also U 377, 454 at present in sea area off Trondheim.
    U 403, U 589 to leave Heligoland about 2.3.  U 134, U 584 returning home for overhaul in dockyard.
  2) Trondheim:  U 586, ready 10.3.  U 405 ready to leave Heligoland about 2.3.
  3) Bergen:  U 591 ready for operations 8.3.  U 593, ready to leave base 6.3.
  4) Iceland Area:  In operational area:  U 752, U 213.  
    En route there:  U 87, U 135, 553 from Atlantic harbors.
    Also:  U 701, U 753, U 569 from Atlantic harbors.
    Returning to base:  U 455, U 136.
    Reserve: U 592 in Heligoland, operational readiness not yet known.
  In all 24 submarines have so far been set aside for the Norway area.  As time goes on this number will be considerably increased.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
25.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(Karib. Meer)
U 124
- BE 83
U 161
- ED 55-Op
U 505
- DT 61
 
68
- BJ 33
126
- DC 91
162
- BC 67
553
- BF 50
 
69
- BC 87-Op
128
- Op(Florida)
213
- AL 38-Op
558
- BC 87
 
71
- BF 40
129
- Op(Karib Meer)
332
- BD 84
564
- BC 97
 
87
- BF 45
130
- BF 50
352
- BF 50
566
- BC 86
 
94
- BC 80
135
- BF 48
403
- Br-buttel
575
- BF 50
 
96
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
136
- AM 46-Op
404
- BC 80
576
- BD 96
 
98
- BE 53
154
- AL 91
432
- Op(CA)
578
- Op(amerik Kuste)
 
103
- CF 21
155
- BC 87
455
- Op(AE 50)
587
- BC 87
 
107
- BC 94
156
- Op(Karib. Meer)
502
- BC 68
588
- BC 80
 
108
- CD 55
158
- BC 87
504
- Op(DB 90)
589
- Br-buttel
 
653
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
160
- Helgol.
752
- AM 01-Op
   
 
 
656
-
BC 87
 
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 130 - 154 - 136 - 98 - 576 - 564 - 566 - 352 - 575 - 108 - 107 - 103.
  Sailed:         U 105 - Lorient;  U 373 - La Pallice.
  Entered Port:  U 130 - Lorient.
       
- 96 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 12:  see No. IVa.
    2) Situation report from U 129:
      Proceeded to EO 55, as it was not possible to haul ahead during the day, because of observation from land and air.  Brisk traffic between 15 and 30 miles north of 200 meter line until 22.2.  Ships steered course of 3150.  No ships on reciprocal course.  Traffic now reversed.
      Intended observation:  To make sorties along the coas, if not successful, to operate in EO 60 or EP 40.  (To pick up the traffic via "Barbados").  New success:  3 freighters totalling 18,400 BRT; 10 torpedoes, 132 cbm.
    3)
I) U 502 reported:  Sunk, tanker "Greta Field" class (10,191 BRT) in EC 8279.  Tanker "Thaila" (8,329 BRT) in EC 9153.  Hit on tanker (6,000 BRT) in EC 9217.  Total:  26,900 BRT sunk. 6,000 BRT torpedoed.
II) Much independently routed traffic windward - Aruba in EC 67.  Returning from Mona cruise.
  b)  None.
  c)  (X)  British steamer "La Carriere" (5,685 BRT) torpedoed and sunk at 0600 on 25.2 in ED 1587.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 12:  No further contact with convoy.  Submarines were instructed to return to attack areas after dusk.  After exchanging radio messages it was established that the tanker "Eidanger" reported by U 558 and the 10,000 ton tanker reported by U 587 are the same.  U 155 reported that he was probably the first to torpedo this tanker.  From a new report made by U 158 his torpedoed tanker (10,000 BRT) probably sank.
    Total result:
      U 155 - 2 ships - 15,000 BRT sunk
      U 158 - 1 ship - 10,000 BRT sunk
                    1 ship - 4,000 BRT torpedoed
      U 94 - 1 ship - 7,005 BRT sunk
      U 558 - 2 ships - 12,000 BRT sunk and
                     3 ships - 19,000 BRT torpedoed
      U 587 and U 558 together sank one tanker (10,000 BRT).
     The results from this convoy are particularly satisfactory.
    1) as pure sinking,
    2) because they show that even amoung the young, newly commissioned commanders there are men who are capable
 
 
- 97 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      of the difficult task of pursuing a convoy,
    3) because the English have been dealt another heavy blow.
    The contradictions in positions, (which were caused either by variations in fixes or by the convoy dividing) cannot be cleared up until the commanders return.
  b)  New attack areas for boats that were following convoy No. 12:
      U 158 - 155 - 162 to make for CA 79 (Cape Hatteras).
      U 558 to freelance.
      U 69 former attack area.
      U 404 - U 588 - 94 square CB and north of it as far as the coast (Nova Scotia).
      U 587 - 656 to BB, eastern third and BC (Newfoundland and east thereof).  If weather becomes foul, south of this entire area.
  c)  None.
  d)  U 455 has not yet answered after several requests to do so.  Right at the beginning of its trip this bosat had a transmitter breakdown lasting several days, so it is assumed that this is again the case.  Boat has been instructed to make for Bergen and to be there on 1.3 ready to be escorted back.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 94 reported sinking "Empire Hail" (7,005 BRT)
    U 129        "        "          3 freighters totalling 18,400 BRT.
    U 502        "     torpedoing 2 ships totalling 18,520 BRT and 1 ship of 6,000 BRT.
       
VI. General:
            The convoy success also gives rise to the following deductions:
            It shows that such successes are still quite possible.  However, the greatest possible number of boats is required, both to pick up the enemy and successfully attack him.  These numbers are not available, as the following submarines have to be set aside for essential duties outside the war on merchant shipping:
    21 boats in the Meditterranean (besides the boats loast there, or while en route there).
    24 boats to protect Norway, of which some will leave port shortly.  
          However, in my opinion, it is well worth considering whether the protection of Norway cannot be achieved indirectly by using submarines against merchant shipping.
            An operation against Norway is for England and America mainly a question of shipping space and escort vessels.  The more shipping is sunk on any spot and the more the threat to vital imports via the Atlantic draws off escort forces, the less opportunity the enemy has of earmarking shipping and escorts for a landing operation,
 
 
- 98 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  which without sufficient re-inforcements is doomed in advance.  The greater our submarine success in the Atlantic, the less the enemy will even be able to think about preparing such operations.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
26.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(Karib. Meer)
U 126
- DC 81
U 213
- Op(AM 19)
U 566
- BC 99
 
68
- DT 63
128
- Op(Florida)
332
- BD 79
564
- BD 75
 
69
- CC 31
129
- Op(EO 55)
352
- BF 64
575
- BF 64
 
71
- BE 69
135
- BE 63
373
- BF 58
576
- BE 66
 
87
- BE 39
136
- AM 73
403
- Br'buttel
578
- Op(CA 50)
 
94
- CC 31
154
- BE 31
404
- CC 31
587
- CC 20
 
96
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
155
- CC 31
432
- Op(CA)
588
- BC 79
 
98
- BF 46
156
- Op(Karib. Meer)
455
- AE 56
589
- Br'buttel
 
103
- BE 88
158
- CC 31
502
- EC 60
653
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
 
105
- BF 58
160
- Helgol.
504
- Op(DB 90)
656
- CC 31
 
107
- BD 74
161
- Op(Karib. Meer)
505
- DT 91
752
- Op(AM)
 
108
- CD 61
162
- BC 85
553
- BF 57
   
 
124
-
BE 94
 
558
-
CC 20(op)
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 373 - 154 - 576 - 502 - 98 - 564 - 455 - 566 - 352 - 575 - 108 - 107 - 103.
  Sailed:       U 405 - Kiel;  U 569 - 701 - 753 - St. Nazaire.   
  Entered Port:  U 373 - La Pallice;  U 575 - 352 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Abandoned steamer drifting in BB 7555.
    2) Submarines sighted in CA 9714 and DC 1218.
    3) USA patrol plane attacked submarine on 26.2 in ED 83.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 155 allotted attack area off coast north of Cape Hatteras,
    U 162 and U 158 south of it.
     These boats, also U 587 - 656 - 94 - 404 - 588 were informed of the shipping movements in their operational area.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- 99 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
27.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(Karib. Meer)
U 126
- DC 72
U 332
- BD 77
U 569
- BF 50
 
68
- BJ 93
128
- Op(Florida)
403
- Helgol.
576
- BF 40
 
69
- Op(BC)
129
- Op(Karib. Meer)
404
- BC 75
578
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
 
71
- BE 67
135
- BE 29
405
- Br'buttel
587
- Op(BB-CB)
 
87
- BE 35
136
- BE 36
432
- Op(CA)
588
- BC 84
 
94
- BC 77
154
-  
455
- AF 75
589
- Helgol.
 
96
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
155
- CC 27
502
- EC 36
653
- Op(BB.CB)
 
98
- BF 64
156
- Op(Karib. Meer)
504
- Op(DB 90)
656
- Op(BB-BC)
 
103
- BE 94
158
- CC 27
505
- BJ 31
701
- BF 50
 
105
- BF 48
160
- Helgol.
553
- BE 63
752
- AM 19-Op
 
107
- BD 76
161
- Op(Karib. Meer)
558
- Op(CC-BC)
753
- BF 50
 
108
- CE 41
162
- BC 87
564
- BD 49
   
 
124
-
BE 71
213
-
Op(AM)
566
-
BD 78
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 136 - 576 - 502 - 98 - 564 - 455 - 566 - 108 - 107 - 103.
  Sailed:         - . -
  Entered Port:  U 98 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 558 reported protracted return trip from CC 29 via BC 35.  Still 55 cbm. fuel.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Submarine reported in sea area round Cape Hatteras.
    2) British "orali" sighted torpedo in CC 2553.
    3) The wreck of a steamer - well above water - reported in DB 36.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
  d) 1) Submarines warned of three-masted sailing ship, that has already appeared several times in BE.  Sailing ship has powerful camulflaged A/A/ armament.  Apparently aircraft and submarine decoy.
      (Report of rescued air crew)
  e) U 592, formerly attached to Group North and recently operationally unserviceable because of damage from ice, will be ready to leave port on 28.2.  It has been instructed to relieve U 593 at Trondheim.  U 593 will then join the reserve.  U 403 and 589 come under the command of Group North from 27.2.
       
- 100 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
          The report made by the Commander of U 575, Lieut.(s.g.) Heydemann, gave the following information:
  The submarine was to wait for "Spreewald" from 28th January in CB 37.  On 30th January it transpired that the submarine was some 30 miles off position, as during the previous days no fix had been possible.  But "Spreewald" has probably already passed the rendezvous on 29.1.
          If the submarine had used its radio (say, to send beacon signals every 4 hours on long wave) a meeting might have been brought about, and the sinking of the ship which occurred later might have been avoided.
          I believe that the use of radio on short waves tends to put the enemy off rather than attract him; if any fixes are made they cannot be exact enough to permit a submarine chase, even if forces are within attacking distance.Even if the enemy should be able to make any deductions from such bearings these would force the ships to reverse routes, and this could only be welcomed.
          The enemy can pick up long wave beacons only if within range and monitoring these frequencies.
            To sum up, I consider:
    1) The use of short waves by a submarine will not mitigate against an encounter on the contrary, a diversionary effect may be expected, at any rate in an area where submarine radio traffic is no exception.
    2) The use of long waves has some dangers, but they are very slight and must be accepted, if a boat is uncertain of a fix -- providing, that the submarine allows for the encounter and the convoy.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
28.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(Karib. Meer)
U 128
- Op(Florida)
U 404
- CC 22
U 576
- BF 50
 
68
- Op(Freetown)
129
- Op(Karib. Meer)
405
- Helgol.
578
- Op(BB-CB)
 
69
- Op(BC)
135
- AL 99
432
- Op(CA)
587
- Op(BB-BC)
 
71
- BE 58
136
- BF 40
455
- AN 24
588
- BC 78
 
87
- AM 77
154
- BF 40
502
- DO 78
592
- Heligoland
 
94
- CC 13
155
- CC 41
504
- Op(DB 90)
653
- Op(CA 99)
 
96
- Op(amerik. Kuste)
156
- Op(Karib. Meer)
505
- EJ 61
656
- Op(BB-BC)
 
103
- BF 40
158
- CC 42
553
- BE 32
701
- BF 40
 
105
- BE 69
160
- Helgol.
558
- CC 34
752
- Op(AM)
 
107
- BD 57
161
- Op(Karib. Meer)
564
- BD 58
753
- BF 40
 
108
- CE 24
162
- CC 32
566
- BD 87
   
 
124
- BD 92
213
- Op(AM 17)
569
- BF 40
   
 
126
-
Op(DB 90)
332
-
BC 98
 
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 558 - 154 - 136 - 576 - 502 - 564 - 455 - 566 - 108 - 107 - 103.
       
- 101 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Sailed:  U 503 - Bergen.
  Entered Port:  U 576 - St. Nazaire;  U 455 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 96 reported further successes:  steamer "Torungen" (1,948 BRT) and "Kars" (8,888 BRT were sunk in BB 7746 and 7557 respectively.  Increased air and sea patrols in Nova Scotia sea area.  No traffic observed as far as Nantucket Lightship since 26th.  Still 60 cbm.
    2) U 432 reported further successes:  Ore ship (10,000 BRT) sunk in CA 7936 (Cape Hatteras).  Busy north-south traffic - also at night - via CA 7992.  Moderate air patrolling by day.
    3) U 578 sank tanker (10,000 BRT) in CA 5211 (off New York), and a warship with four funnels in CA 5458 with spread of 2.  Some doubt whether "Memphis" class or destroyer.  Latter improbable, as torpedoes struck though set at 3 meters.
      Situation:  Brisk single ship movement on 20 meter line, north-south in CA 50.  Moderate air patrolling.  Still 64 cbm.
    4) U 156 reported much traffic in Mona Passage.  Concentrated air activity, probably a great deal of civilian traffic.
      Sunk:  "La Carriere"  (5,685 BRT) in ED 15.
      Sunk by gunfire, freighter (2,500 BRT) north of Haiti, tanker (4,500 BRT) in DO 71.  Gun barrel that was damaged by barrel premature was again rendered servicable by sawing off 40 cm.
  b)  None.
  c)  Syl vom-Arroe (Silver Arrow?) (7,790 BRT) reported suspicious vessel in ED 99.  Steamer Glenbey (9,146 BRT) reported being pursued by suspicious vessel in BD 4920.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 129 was directed to attack Bauxite export from Georgetown in British Guiana and Paramaribo in Dutch Guiana.  Submarine was to operate off these harbors as long as shipping warrents it.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) The still ample fuel reserves of U 578 and U 96, which are at present operating off New York, show that it is feasible for type VIIc boats to operate immediately off the American coast.  As long as the shipping situation
 
 
- 102 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      permits these boats to achieve good successes in a very short time (without long hunting), it will be worthwhhile operating in this area.
    2) This hunting close inshore when anti-submarine measures are still only moderately effective, is an excellent schooling for the actions they will later have to fight against convoys.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 96 reported 2 ships, totalling 10,836 BRT, sunk.
    U 432 reported 1 ship, 10,000 BRT sunk.
    U 578 reported 1 ship, 10,000 BRT and 1 warship sunk.
    U 156 reported 3 ships, totalling 12,685 BRT, sunk.
       
       
       
       
                                                               (signed)  Dönitz
       
       
  COPY OF COMMENTS BY NAVAL WAR STAFF ON B.d.U. WAR DIARY
 
                                                (16 - 28.2.1942)
       
1) 25th February, Para.  VI General:
        There is no doubt that every ton of shipping sunk reduces the ene,y's chance of launching overseas operations.  But Naval War Staff considers that despite the sinking of enemy merchant shipping already achieved, he still has sufficient tonnage to invade Norway.  To transport some 100,000 men of all branches for this task would require about one and a quarter million BRT.  The re-inforcements and supplies would require about 20 to 50,000 BRT per month.
           As all enemy shipping is taken up by civilian and military duties, fresh demands for shipping space can be met only by diverting it from other tasks.
           If the enemy considers a landing operation has good chance of succeeding he will accept a temporary reduction in civilian shipping movements.  Thus, even if heavy sinkings continue off the coast of America, he will still be able to operate against Norway, unless he feels constrained to use all available tonnage for other military needs, such as reinforcements for the Near and Far Middle East.
       
2) 27th February, Para. VI General:
  a) It may well be that a submarine can cause convoys, single ship, or even naval forces, to veer off, if it sends radio messages, but there is, as yet, no evidence for this assertation.  If, for example, the enemy did not attack submarines that used their radio while following courses off the convoy routes, it may be that he did not whish to scatter his escort forces.
     Previous experiences show that the enemy probably gains information about refueling positions or rendezvous from messages passed by submarines in areas with little traffic.  It is not certain that the enemy makes such deductions, possibly a striking radio silence in certain sea areas may lead to the same result.
 
 
- 103 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     Until this matter is cleared up, submarines returning should use their radio as little as possible.
  b)  D/F traffic between blockade runners and submarines should not be carried out for the following reasons:
    1) Blockade-runner's radio ooperator lacks experience of sending wartime D/F; if D/F-ing is essential, only the submarine should transmit.
    2) If the blockade-runner sends D/F signals this is very noticeable, as the long-wave transmitter of a steamer is limited to a range from 585 to 825 meters.
    3) If the submarine sends signals, this may also attract the enemy's attention.
    Very often it is better for blockade-runner and submarine to risk missing the rendezvous than to transmit D/F signals.
    If D/F signals must be sent, the submarine must always transmit.
    The control station on land is responsible for deciding whether D/F shall be used to bring about a meeting.
 
 
   
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 104 -
 
 
     

 


 

Click the icons to view the associated records

Return to the B.d.U. KTB/War Standing Orders page