F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 February 1942

PG30304a

     
     
 
1.February 1942.
 
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- CC 61
U 109
- CB 49
U 402
- Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
U 575
- CD 30
 
67
- DG 41
123
- CD 30
404
- BF 50
576
- BC 68
 
69
- BF 50
125
- CB 63
432
- CD 90
581
- Op(Az.-Gibr.)
 
82
- CC 13/Op
128
- Bermudas
435
- Op(AE 56)
582
- BD 52
 
84
- BD 59
129
- CF 46
455
- Op(AE 50)
586
- Op(AM)
 
85
- Op(BB-BC)
130
- CB 48
456
- Br'büttel
591
- Op(AM)
 
86
- Op(Neufundl.)
132
- AL 12
502
- DF 39
653
- BF 50
 
96
- BF 50
136
- AF
504
- CF 52
654
- CC 13
 
98
- BC 57
156
- DF 62
505
- BE
701
- BD 28
 
103
- Op(CA)
161
- CF 48
553
- BE 66
751
- Op(BB 70)
 
105
- BE 40
213
- AM 33
563
- AM 14
753
- BF 50
 
106
- Op(CA)
332
- BE 86
564
- BB 93
754
- BD 48
 
107
-
Op(CA)
333
-
BE 70
566
-
BB 92
 
 
108
- CB 51
352
- Op(AE 50)
572
- Op(CF 72)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 505 - 132 - 654 - 553 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125 - 404 - 753.
  Sailed:    - . -
  Entered Port:  U 753 - St. Nazaire; U 404 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Searching for "Spreewald".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Operation U 82 see No. IV a.
    2) U 402 sighted a destroyer in square CE 5682.  Fired spread of three, missed.
  b) Nothing seen.
  c)  Submarines reported in squares:  BE 6654 - AM 53 - CF 4626 - BE 1945 - AE 55 - CA 6897 - BB 76 - CB 1466 - CA 5745-8163-5199 - DB 3854.
    Enemy submarine reports showed:  tanker "Esso-Williamburg" (11,400 BRT) in square CA 7332; tanker "Niobe" (7550 BRT) in CA 5215; tanker "Gulfwing" (10,208 BRT) CA 7332; tanker "Lusiana" in DC 1222.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy U 82:  U 82 maintained contact and reported at 1600 from square CC 2734.  At 1730 U 566 was still some 130 miles away favorable weather conditions.
     U 82 gave further shadower reports, and transmitted beacon signals during the night for U 566.  No more reports after 0200 presumed contact temporarily lost.
  b)  U 136 joined group "Schlei" and was allocated attack area in square AL 30.  U 213 was already in the same area.
  c)  U 432 probably carried out convoy duty according to plan.  U 130 and 109 were waiting for an improvement in weather to carry out refueling in square CB 4965.
       
- 46 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) 1) When crossing 400 west U 156, U 67 and U 502 sent passage report as instructed.  All boats have 190-200 cbm. fuel.
    2) Sinking of steamer "Spreewald"
      At 1700 on 31:1 report of torpedoing of English steamer "Brittany in square BE 7142.  1744 SOS in German by German steamer "Spreewald" in same square.  Steamer radioed: "Have British prisoners on board, ship sinking and on fire."  Message was repeated by Landsend.  (British Wireless station)  As torpedoing took place on the German prize route U-boats were ordered at 1854 to report immediately who had torpedoed a ship in BE 7140 giving fuller details.
      At 1851 U 575, who was to convoy steamer home, should report situation if enemy was encountered.
      At 1921 U 701, U 84, U 333 were ordered to make for square BE 7141 immediately.
      At 2120 all boats in square BE left half and BD right half were ordered to report position.  As no reports were received by then.  U-boats were informed of the sinking of the German steamer ("Spreewald" and "Brittany" were one and the same).
      At 2214 U 333 reported with T.O.O. 1907 that he had just sunk a passenger-freighter in square BD 33.  Appearance similar to "Spreewald".  Commander reported that torpedo was fired at 350 m. range "to be quite certain of enemy character".
      The garbled position reported by U 333 was 270 nm. to the north.  To make certain U 333 was again requested at 0137 to report time and position of sinking in a straight message according to Naval grid square.
      At 0217 U 333 reported his position in BE 7230 making for BE 7142.
      It was then clear that U 333 sunk the steamer and had wrongly encoded his position in the first report.  The following submarines were ordered to go to the scene of the sinking:  U 333, U 105, U 84, U 701, U 582, and during the morning U 332 as well.
      At present it is quite impossible to understand how the commander of the U 333 did not realize until so late that he had sunk the "Spreewald".
      It is intended to search for and rescue the crew and the prisoners with every possible means.
      Cremer (Cdr. of U 333) was at the scene of the sinking at 1100.  It was marked by a large patch of oil but no wreckage.  He reported that no boats were lowered at the first hit and that fog prevented him seeing anything at the second hit.  However, he assumed that the crew was able to leave the ship, as it did not sink for some time.  During the day he continued to search
 
 
 
- 47 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      for survivors.  No trace of survivors was found to the south, on a sweep to the southeast and up to the north, or from north to west.  At 1742 while searching in BE 7121 he sighted a destroyer proceeding at high speed on a westerly course about 6 nautical miles from the scene of the sinking.  During the night he searched in the direction of 1000 on the assumption that the life boats would set sail for Cape Ortegal.  The other submarines already reported their arrival.
          U 105 at 2200 on 1.2.
          U 84     " 0900 on 2.2.
          U 701   " 2000 on 2.2.
          U 582   " 1600 on 2.2.
          U 332   " in the morning.
      They were set to search for lifeboats as follows:
     
1) Assuming that the rescue boats were drifting without sails (wind S 3-4).  U 105 made long sweeps from east to west from the scene of the sinking to the north.
2) Assuming that the boats were sailing east.  Search in sectors from the place of sinking:  U 84 sector 80-900, U 333 sector 90-1000, U 332 sector 100-1150.
      After first light C.O. Atlantic Air Force was to send 5 FW-200 to search the same area.
       
V. Report of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  Submarines at 1.2.1942
  I) Total in service (without foreign boats):
   
at 1.1.1942
248
   
Commissioned in January
15
   
 
263
   
 
   
Losses in January plus)
05
   
Numbers on 1.2.1942
258
  i.e. 10 more than on 1.1.1942.
    plus) losses in January:
     
    U 75 - Lieut. Ringelmann, tested boat, last message on 27.12.1941 while attacking convoy off the Lybian coast.
    U 79 - Lieut. Kaufmann, tested boat, left Salamis 21.12.41.  Cause of loss unknown.
    U 374 - Lieut.(jg) v. Fischel, tested but comparatively new boat.  Last report on 7.1.42 in the Mediterranean.  Probably destroyed on 13.1.42 when attacking destroyers east of Sollum.  One destroyer was possibly sunk.
 
 
 
- 48 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
    U 93 - Lieut.(jg) Elfe, tested boat.  Destroyed on 15.1.42 in attack west of Portugal on Gibraltar convoy sailing on northerly course.  
    According to English reports numerous prisoners have been taken from U-boats in the Mediterranean.  Details not yet available.
       
  II. Boats distributed as follows:
(type)
II
VIIa
VIIb/c
VIId
IXb/c
Xb
XIV
 
On active service
-
-
77
1
22
-
-
100 plus UA=101
 
 
On trials
-
-
63
4
26
3
3
99
 
 
Training Crew
40
4
13
-
2
-
-
59
 
40
4
153
5
50
3
3
258
       
  III. During January
     Total number of boats increased by 10 boats
     Number of boats on active service increased by 10 boats
             "        "        " on trials decreased by 1 boat
     Number of training boats increased by 1 boat.
       
  IV.  Of 101 boats on active service at 12.42:
    a)
1) In operation area
 
  Northern Atlantic
16
boats
  Southern Atlantic
-
 
  Mediterranean
6
    "
  Arctic
3
    "
   
 
2) En route to operations area
 
  Northern Atlantic
22
boats
  Southern Atlantic
-
 
  Mediterranean
1
boat
  Arctic
-
 
   
 
3) Returning from
 
  Northern Atlantic
15
boats
  Southern Atlantic
-
 
  Mediterranean
1
boat
  Arctic
1
    "
   
 
4) Special duty (convoy)
1
    "
   
 
  Total at sea
66
boats
   
including Mediterranean and Arctic
    b) In port for repairs:  35 boats.
    c)
1) Of the 15 boats named under a) 1) as being in operations area, 7 are on Norwegian operations and lie off Seydisfjord or Reykjavik and northwest of
 
 
 
- 49 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     
  the Hebrides, 3 boats are operating in the Mediterranean west of Gibraltar, and 6 boats operating off the coast of America.
2) Of the 22 boats given under a) 2) as en route to the North Atlantic the distribution is as follows:
  5 boats proceeding to Aruba-Trinidad area in accordance with operational order 51, 2 boats en route for Straits of Florida, 2 boats moving to a fresh field of attack in the operational area off the coast of the U.S.A., 1 boat from home waters in area northwest of the Hebrides, 12 boats (1 type IXb, 1 type IXc, 10 type VIIc) as second wave in the attack area St. Johns, Halifax or, with the type IX boats as far as Cape Hatteras.
  Of these 12 boats 3 further boats cannot take part in the operation planned:
  1 boat (Type VIIc) for a convoy duty
  2 boats (1 type IXb, 1 type VIIc) trying to pick up survivors of "Spreewald".
  Thus for the time being 9 boats are available for the operation planned to take place off the coast of the U.S.A., only one IXc boat for Cape Hatteras.
    V. Calculation of Average number of boats operating daily during the month of January in the Atlantic:
     
a) At sea each day an average of 41.5 boats
  Returning each day an average of 6.4 boats.
b) Total of boats that left port during January: 53
  of these, from home ports: 19
  of these, from western France: 34
                  gives a daily average of: 1.7 boats.
     
c) The lowest number of boats at sea was on January 1: 22 boats
  of these on return voyage: 3        "
  of these on outward voyage: 13      "
                  gives in operational area: 6        "
   
 
1) These 6 boats in the operations area are operating west of Gibraltar, during the new moon period they were in the Azores area.
2) The 13 boats on outward voyage consisted of 5 coming out from home waters, 1 boat carrying out convoy duties, and 7 boats approaching American coast. (see IV c) 2) in summary for 1st January).
d) Greatest number of boats at sea was from 25th to 27th January: 60 boats
  of these; on homeward voyage: 20    "
  of these; on outward voyage: 20    "
  entered port: 5       "
                  leaves in operational area: 15    "
 
 
 
- 50 -
     
     

     
     
 
     
  1) The 15 boats in the operational area consisted of 3 boats in Azores area, 2 boats northwest of the Herbrides, 1 boat off Reykjavik and 9 boats in St. Johns area (Newfoundland) as far as Cape Hatteras.
  2) The 20 boats on outward voyage consist of 12 boats leaving home waters at intervals to take up positions around Iceland (3 boats off the Seydisfjord) or northwest of the Herbrides, 2 boats detailed for convoy duties, and only 6 boats approaching the American area.
e) The lowest number of boats in the operations area was from 3rd to 9th January:  3 boats.
  These are the boats lying between the Azores and Gibraltar in connection with the Mediterranean operation.
f) The highest number of boats in the operations area was on 23rd and 24th January:  22 boats.
  10 boats were in American area (St. Johns to Cape Hatteras), 8 boats northwest of the Herbrides, 3 boats between Azores and 1 boat off Reykjavik.
    VI. After suspending sending boats to the Mediterranean (apart from 3 supply boats) the number of boats in the Atlantic again showed a constant increase.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- CC 39
U 109
- CB 49
U 402
- CB 56
U 576
- BC 83
 
67
- DF 50
123
- CE 15
432
- CD
581
- Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
 
69
- BF 40
125
- CC 42
435
- Op(AE 50)
582
- BD 65
 
82
- Op(CC 34)
128
- DC 64
455
- Op(AE 50)
586
- Op(AM)
 
84
- BE 70
129
- CF 48
456
- Helgoland
591
- Op(AM)
 
85
- Op(BB-BC)
130
- CB 49
502
- DF 50
653
- BF 40
 
86
- Op(BC)
132
- AL 25
504
- CF 49
654
- CC 22
 
96
- BF 40
136
- AM 16
505
- BF 40
701
- BD 61
 
98
- BC 72
156
- DF 50
553
- BF 40
751
- Op(BB 70)
 
103
- Op(CA 50)
161
- CE 69
563
- AF 78
754
- BD 52
 
105
- BE 70
213
- AM 25
564
- BB 93
   
 
106
- Op(CA 50)
332
- BE 72
566
- CC 30
   
 
107
-
Op(CA)
333
-
BE 70
572
-
Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
 
 
108
- CB 41
352
- Op(AE 50)
575
- CD 24
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 505 - 132 - 654 - 553 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
  Sailed:  U 436 - Kiel;  U 156 - Wilhelmshaven;  U 126 - Lorient.
  Entered Port:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) On request U 86 reported situation in operations area:
      Traffic Cape Race to Cape Francis stopped.  Since 25.1 in area BC 50-60-80-90.  No shipping.  boat then
       
- 51 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      operating against convoy U 82.
    2) For convoy U 82 and U 402 see paragraph IVa (1 and 2).
  b) None.
  c) 1) Submarine warning for CA 5597.  In square DC 27 unidentified steamer gave submarine report.  Ship sank.
    2) The Dutch tanker "Corilla" (8096) was torpedoed in square BB 7383, and the unregistered steamer "Carriria" in BD 71.  Possibly both ships are the same, as the message intercepted from the latter was very fragmentary.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy U 82:  When U 566 enquired situation, U 82 reported at 1103:  enemy in CC 3518, speed 14 km., course 800.  Boat maintained contact and reported enemy almost hourly.  According to this information the convoy route runs CC 3621 - CD 1423 - CD 1292 - 1351 - 1363.  Transports sailing in line abreast, destroyers sweeping ahead.  Convoy zigzags slightly on a mean easterly course.  U 566 requested beacon signal at 2000, but reported at 1628 that further operations were without a chance of success because of new enemy position in CC 3322.  Boat continued on "west" course.  In answer to question:  which boats were operating against convoy U 82, U 86 and U 575 reported.  The latter was in CD 16 and was capable of 13 km.  U 86 requested beacon signals at 2000 and picked it up at 0234 somewhere about CD 1347.  At 0625 U 575 requested further beacon signals and was thus also in the vicinity.  Last convoy report from U 82 at 0803 from CD 2127 on an easterly course.
      Convoy U 402:  At 1853 U 402 reported that "Langibby Castle", 2 destroyers and 1 corvette had left Horta at 1615.  Easterly course, speed 9 km, sharp zigzags.  As boat maintained contact, U 572 was ordered to operate against this convoy.  At 2100 enemy was in CE 6487 (contrary to German Intelligence report, she was not in tow), U 402 was forced to submerge, depth charges were dropped, later boat followed up.  Contacted convoy again and reported firing a spread at the destroyer, which missed.  At 0730 convoy was in CE 6588 on a mean course of 950, speed 10 knots.  Submarine was forced to submerge and followed convoy.
  b)  None.
  c)  U 432 probably carried out convoy task according to plan.
  d)  See rescue attempts "Spreewald".
  e) Rescue attempts "Spreewald":
     During the day U 582 was put on to searching west and north of the place of sinking.
 
 
 
- 52 -
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
    Although the search to the east by Condors was fruitless, about 2100 U 105 sighted:
      3 boats and 3 rafts with 24 Germans and 58 prisoners in BE 4720, about 40 sea miles north of the scene of sinking, and picked them up.  One boat was still missing.  The captain of the steamer was in her and she was stated to be somewhere in the vicinity.  Boats were ordered to collect round U 105 by using beacon signals.  U 105 was put in charge of further search.
    0442 - U 105 instructed the submarines to make for square 4787 and to search from first light in the sector 20-1200.  According to survivor's statements the Captain sailed away from the other boats in an easterly direction with about 20 men on the evening of 1 February.
       
    U 84 had to turn back to port because of lack of fuel.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- CD 25
U 109
- CB 49
U 333
- BE 70
U 566
- BC 79(Op)
 
67
- DF 75
123
- BD 89
352
- Op(AE 50)
572
- Op(Azor.Gibr.)
 
69
- BF 40
125
- CC 52
402
- CE 65(Op)
575
- CD 21(op)
 
82
- CD 21(op)
126
- BF 50
432
- CD
576
- BC 81
 
84
- BE 70
128
- DC 59
435
- Op(AE 50)
581
- Op(Azor.Gibr.)
 
85
- Op(BB-BC)
129
- CE 95
436
- Br'büttel
582
- BE 40
 
86
- CD 21(op)
130
- CB 49
455
- Op(AE 50)
586
- Op(AM)
 
96
- BF 40
132
- AL 52
456
- AN 37
591
- Op(AM)
 
98
- BB 90
136
- Op(AL 30)
502
- DF 48
653
- BE 63
 
103
- Op(CA)
156
- DE 72
504
- CE 92
654
- BC
 
105
- BE 40
158
- Helgo.
505
- BF 50
701
- BE 40
 
106
- Op(CA)
161
- CE 87
553
- BF 50
751
- Op(BB 70)
 
107
-
Op(CA)
213
-
Op(AL 30)
563
-
v. Bergen
754
-
BD 65
 
108
- Op(CA)
332
- BE 70
564
- Op(amer.Küste)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 132 - 654 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125 - 553 - 505 - 553.
  Sailed:  U 578 - St. Nazaire.
  Entered Port:  U 563 - Bergen; U 505 - Lorient; U 553 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy U 82 and 402, see IVa (1 and 2).
    2) U 106 made situation report:  Strong American traffic north-south from 30.1.  Ships darkened in CA 58 - 81 - 82 - 84 and 85.  Sharp zigzags, moderate air reconnaissance.  English shipping routes for single unescorted ships leading to the assembly areas off Hatteras and south America converge in CB 50.  English steamers dropped
- 53 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      depth charges.  Sunk:  "Empire Wildebest"  (6,000 BRT) in CB 6192; "Traveler" in CB 5172; "Rochester" in CA 8241; "Americaland" in CA 8458 = 32,154 BRT.  3 duds amongst 5 misses, one definitely pistol.  87 cbm.  Returning.
  b) None.
  c) 1) British motor ship "Silverey" (4,535 BRT) torpedoed in BB 7495 (submarine warning sent out).
    2) Panama steamer "San Gil" (3,627 BRT) torpedoed and sunk in CA 5751.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy U 82:  Contact unbroken.  0800 U 86 fired spread of three.  2 explosions after 10 minutes, probably end-of-run detonator.  At 1000 U 82 reported that convoy in CD 2136 was zigzagging at 900.  U 82 sent beacon signals until 1200.  U 575 made an unsuccessful underwater attack then continued on a westerly course because of compressor trouble.  From 1300 the convoy steered a mean course of 800, from 1800 of 900.  Favorable weather conditions, wind SW 1-2.  Towards evening poor visibility in patches because of fog.  Again beacon signals for U 86, then at 2320 contact broken in BD 7786.  U 82 followed up on a mean course of 800. No further reports.
    Convoy U 402:  At 1200 U 402 again sighted the convoy in CE 6590, on SE course, 10 km.  Weather moderate, wind SE 2-3, varying visibility because of rain.  When requested, U 572 reported from CF 7323.  Boat was some 80 miles ahead of convoy.  U 402 was again forced away and pursued. but maintained contact.  At 1930 fresh mean course of 1400, speed 8 knots, freshening SE 4.
  b)  None.
  c)  U 432 reported from CC 90 that supply task had been completed.  Was proceeding to operational area via Cape Hatteras.
  d)  Rescue attempt "Spreewald" see 4.2.42.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 106 reported 4 ships totaling 32,154 BRT sunk.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
4.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- CD 35
U 109
- CB 49
U 333
- BE 48
U576
- BC 72
 
67
- DA 32
123
- BE 47
352
- Op(AE 50)
578
- BF 50
 
69
- BE 67
125
- CC 37
402
- CF 57
581
- Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
 
82
- BD 78
126
- BF 70
432
- CC 86
   
     
 
- 54 -
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
 
 
 
84
- BE 82
128
- DC 13
435
- Op(AE 50)
591
- Op(AM
 
85
- Op(BB-BC)
129
- CE 88
436
- Helgol.
653
- BE 64
 
86
- BC 90
130
- CB 49
455
- Op(AE 50)
654
- BC
 
96
- BE 61
132
- AL 91
456
- AN 34
701
- BE 40
 
98
- Op(Küste)
136
- Op(AL 30)
502
- DA 32
751
- Op(ameri.K.)
 
103
- Op(CA)
156
- DA 32
504
- CA 82
754
- BE 40
 
105
- BE 40
158
- Helgol.
564
- Op(Amerik. Küste)
   
 
106
- CA 96/Op
161
- CE 87
566
- BB 99
   
 
107
- Op(CA)
213
- Op(AL 30)
572
- CF 82
   
 
108
- Op(CA)
332
- BE 72
575
- BC(Op)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 132 - 654 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125 - 106.
  Sailed:         U 752 - Kiel; U 656 - Brest.         Entered Port:    - . -
   
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy U 402 see No. IVa.
    2) U 109 sank British tanker "Trontolite" (7,115 BRT) in CB 9713.
    3) U 136 reported at 0700 enemy convoy (No. 6) in AL 0389 on westerly course.  (17 vessels)
  b) None.
  c) American freighter "Collamer" (5, 112 BRT) shadowed by submarine in DC 9936, also USA tanker "W.W. Bruce" (6,728 BRT) in DB 3660.  Steamer "Sinclaire" made submarine warning in DB 3568.  Ship on fire, hit by torpedo.
    British tanker "Trontolite" was torpedoed in CB 9750.  Submarine warning for this area.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy U 402:  At 1030 U 402 reported convoy in CF 5791 on easterly course, 10 knots.  Subsequently U 402 was forced to submerge and lost contact.  Had 21 cbm. fuel left.  Impossible to refuel, so ordered to return home.
    No report received from U 572.  Doubtful whether the boat was attacking convoy or had even found it.
    U 581, which had also an attack area around Azores - Gibraltar, was not directed to this convoy, as reports of air attacks immediately west of Gibraltar showed that boat was there, i.e. was too far away.
     Operation was therefore finished, as lack of fuel prevented the decisive boat from continuing the pursuit.
       
- 55 -
 
 
     

     
     
 
    Convoy U 82:  At 1356 U 82 reported fruitless search.  Probably due to wide zigzagging of convoy.  The high speed of the enemy ruled out a follow up.  Boats U 575 and U 86, that were operating against the same target, also broke off the search.  U 82 had one damaged torpedo aft and 26 cbm. fuel, so turned for home from BD 8746.  Operation in this area finished.  Result:  1 destroyer sunk by U 82.
    This result shows once again, how difficult it is to score successes against fast convoys:  It is all out of proportion much harder to maintain contact, and above all to re-establish it, than with normal convoys sailing 8-10 sea miles; and yet in several cases successes have been achieved against fast convoys.  In connection with them, it is always debatable whether the small chances of success warrant the very high fuel consumption on the chase.
  b) 1) U 86 ordered to operate in square BC according to fuel situation; subsequently return north of German steamer route (4730 'N).
    2) U 576 ordered to operate as far west as possible (American coast).
    3) U 156, U 67, U 502 given coded order "Neuland 176" in accordance with Operational Order 51, No. 10, i.e. simultaneous surprise attack before sunrise on 16th February.
    4) U 352 ordered to take up attack position off Reykjavik.  U 435 and 455 were in the northern and southern half of the sector off Seydisfjord.
  c) None.
  d) Rescue attempt "Spreewald":
    The search by sectors on 3.2 brought no success.  U 105 ordered the search to be carried out up to the limits of a 140 nautical mile circle round the place of sinking.  Boats then to form up in the order U 754, 123, 701, 105, 333, 332 into a reconnaissance strip from square BE 1994 to 7364 and sail east in longlegged zigzags.
     U 582 turned homewards because of lack of fuel.  4 February from a coded radio conversation with U 105 it transpired:
    1) that survivors stated the missing lifeboat was well equipped,
    2) that it was possible it was picked up by the steamer sighted on 1 February,
    3) that all survivors are on board the U 105.
     In the evening all boats were told to return, U 105 at full speed.
    U 96, U 653, U 69, which were on outward voyage, were ordered to search squares BE 58, 82, 85 on 5.2.  If nothing sighted, to continue course westwards.
 
 
 
- 56 -
 
     

 

     
     
 
    A Dornier 24 of the Brest Sea Rescue Unit was instructed to pick up on 6.2 one of the German survivors on U 105, who was suffering from blood poisoning.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 109 reported sinking of tanker "Trontolite" (7,115 BRT).
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- BD 96
U 109
- CB 97
U 333
- BE 40
U 576
- BB 95
 
67
- DQ 28
123
- BE 57
352
- AE 58
578
- BF 40
 
69
- BE 58
125
- CD 14
402
- CF 56
581
- Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
 
82
- BD 89
126
- BF 40
432
- CC
582
- BE 56
 
84
- BE 68
128
- DC 74
435
- Op(AE 50)
586
- Op(AM)
 
85
- Op(BB)
129
- DG 11
436
- AN 60
591
- Op(AM)
 
86
- Op(BC)
130
- CB 97
455
- Op(AE 50)
653
- BE 55
 
96
- BE 52
132
- AL 98
456
- AN 20
654
- BC 89
 
98
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- Op(AL 30)
502
- DQ 28
656
- BF 10
 
103
- Op(CA)
156
- DA 28
504
- CE 75
701
- BE 40
 
105
- BE 59
158
- Helgol.
564
- Op(amerik. Küste)
751
- Op(BB 70)
 
106
- CB 73
161
- DG 11
566
- Op(BB 70)
752
- Br-büttel
 
107
-
Op(CA)
213
-
Op(AL 30)
572
-
Azor.-Gibr.
754
-
BE 43
 
108
- Op(CA)
332
- BE 40
575
- Op(BB-CC)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 132 - 654 - 754 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125 - 106 - 82 - 109.
  Sailed:         - . -
  Entered Port:        - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 6 see No. IVa.
    2) At 0940 U 586 reported a heavy cruiser and 1 destroyer in AM 4310.  Westerly course, medium speed; contact lost at 1400.  Enemy was then on a southerly course, speed 16 knots.
    3) U 103 reported:  From 2.2. - 5.2. operated in CA 50 (south of New York) and sank 3 tankers and 1 freighter, totaling 26,539 BRT.  4 unexplained misses.  Brisk north-bound traffic in CA 55 to 59.  (rest of radio message fragmentary, repeat requested)
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Steamer "Sixaola" (4,693 BRT) was pursued by submarine in DC 1440.  Same message from unidentified steamer in DC 3510.
    2) Motor tanker "Stillmann" (1,306 BRT) in CA 7622, and tanker "Niobe" (7,153 BRT) made submarine warnings.
       
- 57 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Plane sighted submarine and dropped 3 depth charges.  Oil on surface.
    3) Steamer "Halcyan" fired at in DD 3165 by submarine.
    4) English plane reported submarine diving in AM 1967 (U-586).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 6:  U 591 was operating against this convoy and at 0830 reported position in AM 13.  U 136 maintained contact, was forced to submerge at 1130 and at 1648 established contact in AL 6215, course 2600, 10 knots.  At 1830 U 591 requested beacon signals.  Patches of fog rendered it difficult to maintain contact.  0342 U 136 reported sinking of a two-funelled destroyer and that contact had been lost thereby.  U 591 must have been somewhere in the vicinity.  Both boats followed up in the direction of the main course.  
  b) - c) None.
  d) Rescue attempt "Spreewald":
     Attempt to take over survivor failed.  Dornier 24 snapped a wing when alighting.  Crew taken over by U 105.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 103 reported sinking 4 ships totaling 26,539 BRT.  
  U 136 reported sinking 1 destroyer.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- BE 76
U 109
- CB 96
U 333
- BE 91
U 576
- BB 80
 
67
- DQ 43
123
- BE 68
352
- AE 72
578
- BF 40
 
69
- BE 76
125
- CD 20
402
- CF 38
581
- Op(Azor.-Gibr.)
 
82
- BD 95
126
- BE 94
432
- CC 84
582
- BF 40
 
84
- BF 40
128
- DB 90
435
- Op(AE 50)
586
- AM 41(Op)
 
85
- Op(BB 97)
129
- DF 38
436
- AN 34
591
- Op(AM)
 
86
- Op(BC)
130
- CB 96
455
- Op(AE 50)
653
- BE 73
 
96
- BE 49
132
- BE 34
456
- AE 87
654
- BC 89
 
98
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- AL 51(Op)
502
- DQ 54
656
- BF 10
 
103
- CA 50
156
- DQ 43
504
- CD 96
701
- BE 65
 
105
- BE 60
158
- AN 63
564
- Op(amerik. Küste)
751
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
106
- CB 72
161
- DF 38
566
- Op(Amerik. Küste)
752
- AN 66
 
107
-
Op(CA)
213
-
Op(AL 30)
572
-
CF 93
754
-
BE 38
 
108
- Op(CA)
332
- BE 96
575
- Op(BC/CC)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 352 - 105 - 132 - 82 - 402 - 572 - 106 - 654 - 754 - 109 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
  Sailed:         - . -
  Entered Port:        - . -
       
- 58 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 6 see No. IVa 1.
    2) Convoy U 82 (No. 7).
    3) U 106 reported passenger freighter (8,000 BRT) sunk with last electric torpedo and gunfire in CB 5682.  Course 200.
    4) U 564 Situation Report:  No shipping in BB, poor visibility, heavy icing.  Air reconnaissance.  85 cbm.  If necessary would request fuel from U 103.
    5) U 98 Situation Report:  En route to BC 40-50-60 and BB no shipping.  Cape Race light burning as in peacetime.  Slight air and sea patrolling off Sable Island.  Reconnoitered as far as 75 miles SE Cape Sable.  No shipping anywhere.  If necessary would request fuel.  Still 73 cbm.
      U 109 Situation Report:  Fuel taken over from U 130.  6.2 "Halcyan" sunk in DD 3174 gunfire after 2 misses with torpedoes.  Total success 4 steamers totaling 29,330 BRT.  On homeward cruise.
    6) U 402 Situation Report:  Summary of details already reported.  Uselessness of this report pointed out to boat.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Motor tanker "Pomella" (6766 BRT) reported surfaced submarine in CB 9477.  British Admiralty issued submarine warning for area.
    2) "Empire Sun" torpedoed in BB 7494.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 6:  Hydrophone bearing reported by U 136 probably meant that U 591 was being listened to.  U 136 suspected enemy to the south on a course of 2400.  At 1950 faint hydrophone bearing in AL 4731.  As prospects were slight and the boats were getting farther and farther away from their operational area, around Iceland-Herbrides, they were ordered to return to their attack positions.  When U 136 reported smoke in AK 6855 at 2103, the boats were instructed to remain and attack if contact could be established.  At 0341 U 591 reported no success, on homeward journey.
    2) Convoy No. 7:  At 1305 U 82 reported convoy (20 steamers) on southerly course in BE 7429.  For the time being it was not clear whether it was a Gibraltar convoy.  If it was, no attack should be made because of the small ships and recent experiences.  To clear the matter up, U 82 was asked the strength of the escorting forces and
 
 
 
- 59 -
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
      his own fuel reserves.  At the same time the position compared with previous experiences and the rhythm of the Gibraltar convoys show that it could not be one of these.  Naval War Staff was of the same opinion.  In answer U 82 reported that he had enough fuel to enable him to maintain contact for 36 hours.  Only corvettes had been observed as escort.  It was probably a very valuable south-bound convoy that was obviously weakly defended and worth attacking by the submarines intended for the west.  U 82 should maintain contact until the other boats come up.  Thus the U 69, 96, 653 should operate against this convoy.  At 1529 U 82 reported from BE 7491 that enemy's course was 1600, 7 knots.  Varying visibility 3-6 miles.
      At 0300 U 69 reported a destroyer in BE 7724.  At 2035 a boat reported without signature that for 5 hours no shadower reports had been received; one engine faulty for some time.  It was assumed that this report was from U 96 and it was instructed to proceeds towards America.
  b) None.
  c) 1) In accordance with Naval War Staff order on the protection of the coast of Norway by submarines (see No. IV) U 435 - 436 - 456 were ordered to proceed at once to Kirkenes at a distance of 30-80 miles from the coast of Norway.  Boats listed would then come under the authority of Group North or Admiral Arctic.
    2) U 103 and 564 were instructed to carry out the fuel transfer in square CB 7355 during the night of 9.2.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 106 reported sinking a passenger freighter of 8,000 BRT.
    U 109 reported sinking "Halcyan" (3,531 BRT).
       
VI. General:
  a) In accordance with a Hitler directive the number of submarines in the Norway area was to be considerably strengthened as follows:
    a) The boats in the Arctic (4 at the time) were to be increased to 6, of these, 2 boats to be kept in a state of readiness in Narvik or Trondheim.
    b) 2 boats were to be kept ready in both Trondheim and Bergen.
    c) 8 boats should still remain in the Iceland-Herbrides area.  To fulfil these requirements boats from home waters were to be stationed as follows:
     
a) Arctic:
  1) U 134, 584, 585 already in area.
 
 
 
- 60 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
     
  2) U 435, 436, 456 of the boats at sea would be sent there.
  3) About the middle of February U 592 and U 77 would follow from home waters.
b) Trondheim:  U 454 (at the time undergoing repairs), and in mid-February U 403 from home waters.
  Bergen:  U 589 and 593 from home waters at the end of February.
c) Iceland-Herbrides area:  at the time occupied by U 455, 352, 213, 586, 136, 591 and 435, which would have to go to the Arctic and would be relieved by U 752 (leaving Heligoland on 7.2).  U 405 would join them from home waters at the end of February.
     
  Naval War Staff at first wished to transfer some submarine training to Norway in order to have the necessary boats there without harming Atlantic operations.
  However, B.d.U. had to point out:
  1) Tactical training was quite impossible in Norway as free, safe sea area was not available.  There was no room in the fjords, and outside the fjords was an operational area.
  2) Gunnery practice could be carried out in Norway only on a very limited scale, and as the events of the summer showed, was insufficient.  It is limited by the question of space, which allows only shoots on a par with the earlier torpedo boat shoots in Geltinger Bay, and by the daylight situation, which in summer permits hardly any but day shoots and in winter, night shoots.  Boats which were trained in this way in gunnery would not be ready for active service and would have to return to the Baltic for thorough training.
  3) Diving training by the front line training group would be possible in theory, but would be ruled out by the fact that the boats requiring training in diving could not make their way through the operational area, as they would have to because of icing in the Baltic approaches.  (In summary it would be a different matter).
  4) Recovery boats could not be brought through the western Baltic and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (Kiel) because of the icing -- they would not be capable of making the voyage.
  5) It is basically correct to utilize the training facilities in the Baltic as long as possible, then when icing starts to do outstanding jobs and overhaul training gear - ships and recovery vessels, so that training can recommence immediately once the Baltic is open again.
 
 
- 61 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      Naval War Staff had to admit the correctness of these views and sanctioned the plans set out at first.  Thus it appears that the strengthening of the positions in Norway will be at the expense of Atlantic warfare.  But this assumption is not correct.  For even if the transfer of training were possible, the delays and deterioration of the training under such conditions would have a bad effect on Atlantic operations.
  b)  The drawbacks caused by recently worsening ice conditions for training in the Baltic have been reduced to a minimum.  Boats which have finished or nearly finished their training, are taken to Kiel to complete outstanding jobs.  Thus, providing the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and the Elbe are navigable, they can be sent on operations, even if not quite fully trained. Boats remaining in the eastern Baltic can continue Gunnery and diving practice and complete any odd jobs.
    The main drawbacks of the cold period are:
    1) that a series of boats must be sent on operations without full training (lack of tactical training);
    2) that the odd jobs take longer than usual because of the cold and an accumulation of boats;
    3) that putting into operation of boats that have been completed by the yard is delayed, because equipping takes twice as long as usual and the boats also have to run out to Heligoland to carry out trimming experiments, compensation etc. and make good the damage caused by ice when passing through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- BE 83
U 109
- CB 77
U 333
- BE
U 582
- BF 50
 
67
- DF 66
123
- BE
352
- Op(Reykjavik)
586
- Op(AM)
 
69
- CF 10
125
- BD 77
402
- CG 12
591
- AL 40
 
82
- CF 12
126
- BE 88
432
- CC 75
653
- CF 10
 
84
- BF 50
128
- Op(Florida)
455
- Op(AE 50)
654
- BC 86
 
85
- Op(BB-BC)
129
- DF 56
502
- DQ 48
656
- BE 61
 
86
- BD 19
130
- CB 77
504
- CD 87
701
- BE
 
96
- BE 71
132
- BF 40
564
- CB 50(Op)
751
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
98
- Op(CB 24)
136
- AK 60
566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
752
- Heligoland
 
103
- CA 65
156
- DP 63
572
- CG 41
754
- BE
 
105
- BF 40
158
- Heligo.
575
- Op(BC-CC)
   
 
106
- CB 65
161
- DF 55
576
- BB 80
   
 
107
-
Op(CA)
213
-
Op(AL 30)
578
-
BE 67
 
 
108
- Op(CA)
332
- BF 40
581
- Op(Azor. Gibralt.)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 332 - 105 - 132 - 82 - 402 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 754 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 84 - 582 - 125.
  Sailed:  U 154 - 155 - 162 - Kiel.
  Entered Port:  U 84 - 582 - Brest.
       
- 62 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy Nos. 6 and 7 see No. IVa.
    2) U 352 made report: Boat had investigated inner fjords around Seydisfjord.  No barrages, no defenses, no ships.  Air patrol twice daily.  Fire extinguished after 4.2  No shipping observed to date in AE 47.
    3) U 751 made report from sea area round Nova Scotia:  Steamer traffic of entire east runs on a 90 m. depth of water parallel to the coast.  By day slight, at night sometimes brisker independently routed shipping movements.  Moderate destroyer and patrol activity.  Air patrols also at night.
      Successes:  tanker "Silveray", freighter "Empire Sun" sunk.  Tanker "Corilla" torpedoed.  All torpedoes fired.  Returning.
  b) None.
  c) British steamer "Atlantian" fired at by submarine in BB 7581.  Submarines were sighted: by American steamer "Ameriham Anrom" in CA 7686, by the American steamer "Zacapa" in unknown position and by USA tanker "Van Dyke" in DC 1253.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 6:  At 1203 U 136 reported from AK 9196 that contact had been lost, cruising in attack area.  At 1355 boat sighted a destroyer on a course of 2200 in AK 9277 and again took up the pursuit.  Order to return to attack area was not effective, as U 136 picked up the convoy at 1255 in AK 9432.  Boat was given permission for unrestricted attack only on favorable occasions.  U 213 also operated against convoy and closed in at 1510 when weather was misty.  Submarine forces to submerge and pursued until 2000 with depth charges.  Contact lost.  U 213 was ordered to return to attack area.  U 136 reported last position of convoy at 1715 in AK 9424, course 2600.  Miss fired at destroyer, contact lost, returned to attack area.  Operation closed.  As it was probably a Halifax convoy, it might be possible to pick it up again in the sea area south of Newfoundland.
    2) Convoy No. 7:   As contact had not been re-established by morning, the boats were ordered to continue cruising.  Despite repeated requests, U 82 had not reported.
  b)  U 591 and U 352 were detailed to make the weather reports from certain sea areas requested by Naval War Staff.  These boats were allocated squares AL 50 or AE 70 as attack areas.  Order:  Until rescinded, make short weather report three times daily.  Begin at 0200 on 9.2 change position within attack area designated.
 
 
- 63 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  c) None.
  d) 1) Fuel transfer from U 103 to U 564 has been fixed for 8.2 because of present favorable weather.
    2) Assuming that U 125 had sufficient fuel to be able to spare some, the boat was requested to report position and amount of fuel.In reply U 125 stated he was in CD 48 and had 56 cbm.  He intended giving some to U 69.
    3) U 161 (West Indies boat) made passage report from DF 84 - 190 cbm.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 751 sank tanker "Silveray" 4,535 BRT.
  U 751 sank "Empire Sun".
  U 751 torpedoes tanker "Corilla" 8,096 BRT.
       
VI. General:
            The weather reports requested by Naval War Staff affect a most important operation and are therefore essential.  It makes little difference to U 352 that was to have operated off Reykjavik and must now report from the area south of Iceland, the boat is in any case able to carry out its tasks in the weather report room too.
            U 591 must certainly leave its area (Iceland-Herbrides), but WSW of Rockall Bank may well be quite favorable for attacks on merchant shipping.
            Weather reports from the Bay of Biscay will have to be dealt with by boats passing through.
            Even though in this case the prejudicing of submarine warfare is only slight, the demands demonstrate the calls that must be made on submarines to carry out operations with other forces.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- BF 40
U 125
- CD 49
U 352
- Op(AE 71)
U 591
- AL 50 Op.
 
67
- DP 67
126
- CF 21
402
- BE
653
- CE 32
 
69
- CE 32
128
- Op(Florida)
432
- CB 96
654
- BC 96
 
82
- BE 70
129
- DF 81
455
- Op(AE 50)
656
- BE 52
 
85
- Op(BB-BC)
130
- CC 84
502
- DP 92
701
- BF 40
 
86
- BD 29
132
- BF 50
504
- DF 11
751
- BB 70
 
96
- BD 92
136
- AK 92
564
- CB 50
752
- AN 66
 
98
- Op(amerik. Küste)
154
- Br'büttel
566
- Op(Küste)
754
- BF 10
 
103
- CB 71
155
- dto.
572
- CG 15
   
 
106
- CC 41
156
- DP 64
575
- Op(BB-CC)
   
 
107
- Op(CA)
158
- AN 66
576
- Op(amerik. Küste)
   
 
105
- BF 50
161
- DF 81
578
- BE 58
   
 
108
-
Op(CA)
162
-
Br'büttel
581
-
Op(Azor.-Gibraltar)
 
 
109
- CC 73
213
- AK 93
586
- AM(Op)
   
 
123
- BF 40
332
- BF 50
   
   
 
   
333
- BF 40
   
   
     
 
- 64 -
 
     
     

 

     
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 82 - 402 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 656 - 754 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 125 - 751 - 105 - 132 - 332.
  Sailed:     - . -     
  Entered Port:  U 105 - Lorient;  U 132 - 332 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 576 reported single ships at irregular intervals from northeast to southwest.  Mainly very fast independent ships.  Slight air patrols.  A spread of 4 was fired at a vessel of "Lady Nelson" class, but it missed.  3 inexplicable dud shots.  Still 5 and 2 torpedoes, 72 cbm.  Heavy formation of drift ice from BB 5878 to the west.
    2) On 7.2, U 566 fired a spread of three at a large freighter belonging to a convoy in BB 8785.  Hard explosion after the interval estimated for running.   Hit not observed.   Fired other misfires in BB 8715 in spite of precise preparation.  Range up to 400 m., SE 7, sea 4, fog-rain.
    3) U 108 made report:  Nothing seen during approach.  A great deal of bad weather.  No traffic in CA 38; nothing encountered in CA 57-58 excepting steam trawler showing lights.  Slight air patrol.  On 6.2 a dud spread of two and an air-driven torpedo failure were fired at a steamer on a southerly course.  On 8.2 "Ocean Venture" was sunk in CA 8112.
    4) U 107 found busy traffic in CA 80, no air patrol.  On 7.2 a destroyer was sighted.
      Sunk:  31.1 in CB 5478 "San Arcadio" (7,419 BRT);
                  6.2 in DC 2134 freighter (4,500 BRT).  West 5.
    5) U 586 scored two hits on an 8,000 BRT tanker in AM 2252.  Ship was burning, submarine forced to sheer off by escort.
    6) Convoy U 654 (No. 8) see No. IVa.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Submarine warning for area CA 51.  Sighting report of submarine in DC 1252 made by USA tanker "J.W. Van Dyke" (11,651 BRT).  Other submarine sightings in DO 7733 were unlikely.
    2) USA tanker "Cities Service Koolmotor" (6,762 BRT) reported pursuit by submarine in DM 1470 (U 128?)
    3) Steamer "Ocean Venture" sank in CB 7265 (U 108!)
    4) On 1.2. American merchant vessel in the Atlantic was instructed to hug the coast from Key West to Cape Hatteras.  Set course so that Wimble Shoals, Winter Quarter Shoals and Diamond could be navigated by day.  During the day and in bright moonlight to steer a
       
- 65 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      zig-zag course.
      Mona Passage was to be avoided because of submarine sighting report.  (Submarines were informed accordingly)
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 6 (U 136!):  U 575 and U 85 were informed that on 9.2 the convoy would probably be in BC 3867 at 1500 or on 10.2 somewhere about BC 5858.  Dispersal possible in BC.
    2) Convoy No. 8:  At 1645 U 654 sighted a convoy on southerly course in BC 5939.  Steamers were proceeding at distant intervals, according to a later report on a course of 2100, 8 knots.
      Poor visibility.  Wind SSW 2.  Swell 1.  U 575 and U 85, who were supposed to be in the same area where asked to give their positions.  U 575 was in CC 24 and U 85 in BC 80.  U 654 maintained contact.  Boat was free to attack and reported at 1927 and 2141 that the convoy had dispersed.  Steamers were steering a southwesterly course independently.  Position BC 5991.
      2343 U 85 requested beacon signals.  U 654 still maintained contact and at 0413 reported a formation of 10 steamers in BC 5894.  U 85 had not succeeded in establishing
      U 654 had fired all torpedoes. Successes:  1 corvette sunk, 1 steamer torpedoed.  Remaining with convoy for U 85.
  b) 1) U 96, U 578, and U 653 were allocated lower half of square BB and square CB as attack area.  Boats were directed against east to west and coastal traffic in BB and against north to south traffic in CB.
    2) The boats were ordered to run on the great circle when crossing the Atlantic, in order to save fuel.  This is usually automatic, but cannot be expected of inexperienced commanders as a matter of course.
    3) U 129, U 504, U 161 were forbidden to attack independently routed ships between longitude 300 and 450 because the blockade runners "Osorno" and "Pietro Orseolo" were expected.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 103 had not yet transferred fuel to U 564.
    2) U 125 was ordered to carry out fuel transfer to U 69 in the evening of 11.2 in CE 4184.
      In answer to query U 125 reported that he could spare 10 cbm.
    3) U 129 (West Indies boat) reported position DF 8243 (passage report 400 west).
 
 
- 66 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
    4) Despite repeated calls U 82 and U 581 have not reported.  It must be assumed that U 82 was destroyed in attacking convoy (No. 7).
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 566 hit on freighter.
  U 108 sank "Ocean Venture".
  U 107 sank "San Arcadio" 7,419 BRT.
  U 107 sank freighter 4,500 BRT.
  U 586 torpedoed tanker 8,000 BRT
  U 654 hit on freighter.
  U 654 sank a corvette.
       
VI. General:
  (Situation off coast of America according to report K.U. 123)
  a) Lieut.(s.g.) Hardegen, commander of U 123, being the first commander to return from the east coast of America, made a report on his experiences in this previously unknown area.  The expectation of encountering many independently routed ships, clumsy handling of ships, slight, inexperienced sea and air patrols and defenses was so truly fulfilled that conditions had to be described as almost completely of peacetime standards.  Independent operations by submarines were therefore correct.
    The commander found such an abundance of opportunities for attack in the sea area south of New York to Cape Hatteras that he could not possibly utilize them all:
    At times there were as many as 10 ships in sight that were sailing with lights on peacetime courses.  Thus there were numerous opportunities for 2 or even 3 boats to attack at one spot alone.
    The commander's report showed clearly that the initial attack could have been much stronger if instead of only 6 it had been possible at the time to release to B.d.U. the 12 large boats he had requested.  The opportunity, which will not occur again, was certainly utilized and brought satisfactory successes, but it was impossible to really make the most of it.
    It was obvious from the start that such favorable conditions would soon cease -- they already seem very different.
  b)  Repeated messages about brisk traffic in Freetown area again suggest that further attacks should be launched there.  Further support is given by the following:
    1) Agent's reports and radio intercepts show more traffic in the area again, also that the English do not suspect the presence of submarines in the area at the present.
 
 
- 67 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
    2) After America's entry into the war the American safety zone no longer protects the enemy and so no longer invites the transfer of shipping movements to this area as observed during the summer.
    3) The appearance of German submarines off the east coast of America and their anticipated appearance after 16.2 in the Aruba-Trinidad area are further reasons for the enemy not to shift his traffic to the western Atlantic, more especially because nothing has happened for a long time in the Freetown area.
    4) During the last appearance of submarines in this area, they were subject to many restrictions where American ships were concerned.  THese restrictions no longer exist - the American supplies going to Freetown-Bathurst-Monrovia-Lagos-Takaradi which were observed at that time and also confirmed by numerous reports, are now free for attack.
       
      I therefore suggested to Naval War Staff that 2 boats due to become available in the west - U 68 and U 505 - should again be sent to the Freetown area, whilst the new large boats coming from home should go direct to the east coast of North America.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 66
- BF 50
U 123
- BF 50
U 213
- AL 48
U 578
- BE 72
 
67
- DP 82
125
- CD 55
333
- BF 50
586
- Op(AM 22)
 
69
- CE 25
126
- CF 15
352
- Op(AE 70)
591
- Op(AL 58)
 
85
- Op(BC 80)
128
- Op(Florida)
402
- BF
653
- CE 23
 
86
- BD 29
129
- DF 79
432
- CB 86
654
- BC 80
 
96
- BD 84
130
- CC 83
455
- Op(AE 50)
656
- BE 45
 
98
- Op(amerik. Küste)
136
- AL 47
502
- DP 86
701
- BF 50
 
103
- CB 73
154
- Helgoland
504
- DE 35
751
- BB 89
 
106
- CC 51
155
- dto.
564
- CB 73
752
- AN 37
 
107
- Op(CA 85)
156
- DP 57
566
- Op(CB 21)
754
- BF 50
 
108
- Op(CA 81)
158
- AN 37
572
- BF 40
   
 
109
- CC 58
161
- DF 79
575
- Op(BC-CC)
   
 
 
162
-
Helgol.
576
-
Op(BB 86)
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 751 - 402 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 754 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 333 - 701 - 66 - 123 - 125.
  Sailed:         - . -
  Entered Port:  U 123 - Lorient;  U 333 - La Pallice;  U 701 - Nazaire;  U 754 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 8 see No. IVa.
    2) In AM 23 U 586 again attacked the tanker which was torpedoed on 8.2.  Two impacts heard.  Ship was not
       
- 68 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      seen to sink. All torpedoes fired, on return voyage to Bergen, 38 cbm.  On 5.2 boat fired a dud spread of four at a cruiser and 4 misses at 3 patrol vessels.
  b) None.
  c) British turbine vessel "City of Capetown" sighted a torpedo track in ET 2990 (Freetown area).  (This was unlikely, as none of our own submarines were in this area.)
  d) On 2.2 a submarine was sunk by ramming 1 to 5 sea miles south of Pico Island (Azores).  This was U 581.  The second watch officer of this boat swam to the island.  4 other ratings were supposed to have been picked up by the English.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 8:  U 654 maintained contact.  Attempted to direct U 85 to the enemy by beacon signals.  Not successful.  The reverse was also attempted by U 654 taking bearings on U 85, but U 85 could not make contact with the enemy. Reasons for this could not be ascertained until the boats were back in port.  1503 U 654 reported the steamers (probably 10 vessels) in BC 8190, course 2300.  Speed 8 knots, 34 cbm.  Boat had to give up pursuit about 2400 hours because of lack of fuel.  Last enemy report at 1953 from BC 8510.
    At 2317 U 85 also turned back because of lack of fuel.  This operation against this convoy was thus closed.
     Successes:  1 corvette sunk, 1 steamer (7,000 BRT) torpedoed.
  b)  U 98 could not depend on refueling.  Was allotted squares BB, lower half, and square CB as attack area.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 752 and U 158 were ordered to enter Bergen because of damage to bow-caps and sounding set respectively.
    2) U 103 reported that fuel could not be transferred because of weather.Only 4 cbm. could be spared.  As it seemed pointless to keep the boats waiting longer, U 103 was ordered to continue on his homeward voyage.  U 564 unrestricted action in whole sea area.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U66
- BF 50
U 125
- CD 62
U352
- Op(AE 78)
U 586
- AM 24
 
67
- DP 78
126
- CE 63
402
- BF
591
- Op(AL 55)
 
69
- CE 18
128
- Op(Florida)
432
- CB 84
653
- CE 21
 
85
- BC 80
129
- DA 33
455
- Op(AE 50)
654
- BC 80
 
86
- BE 17
130
- CC 68
502
- EE 13
656
- BD 69
 
96
- BD 76
136
- AL 54
504
- DE 29
751
- BB 99
 
98
- Op(BB-CB)
154
- AN 66
564
- Op(Küste)
752
- AN 43
 
103
- CB 73
155
- AN 66
566
- Op(amerik Küste)
   
 
106
- CC 61
156
- AN 43
   
   
 
- 69 -
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
 
 
 
107
- Op(CA)
158
- AN 43
572
- BF 20
   
 
108
- Op(CA)
161
- DA 36
575
- Op(BC-CC)
   
 
109
- CC 68
162
- AN 62
576
- Op(amerik. Küste)
   
 
   
213
- AL 55
578
- BD 93
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 751 - 566 - 402 - 85 - 572 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 125 - 66.
  Sailed:         558 - Brest.
  Entered Port:  U 66 - Lorient; U 572 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 9 (U 591) see No. IVa.
    2) U 586 reported situation in area around Rockall:
      Only air patrols, no sea patrols.  No planes north of 590.  Patrols in AM 21.
    3) Report from U 85:  No traffic in BB, poor visibility bad icing.  Nothing seen in CB 31-37, mainly heavy weather.  Much air activity in BB 80-90, isolated planes in left half of BC.
      Total successes:  2 ships - 15,000 BRT.
      On return journey 2 plus 5 torpedoes, 29 cbm.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Submarines sighted:
              CA 5444
              ET 67(?)
              CA 8267
              DC 1187
    2) American motor tanker"Australia" (11,628 BRT) reported from DC 1192, that she was being hunted by a suspicious looking vessel.
    3) Submarine warning by American tanker "Thermo" (4,487 BRT) from CA 49.
    4) British motor tanker"Victolite" (11,410 BRT) was torpedoed in CB 7456.
  d) Spanish ship's officer (Naval Reserve Officer) reported on harbors in Curacao: open, not mined, no black-out.  Large stores of petroleum on shore.  20-25 large tankers, mainly enemy, always there.
    Trinidad:  again no black-out, no mines.  As many as 25 ships in harbor, brisk coming and going of shipping, including transports.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 9:  At 1930 U 591 sighted convoy (15 ships) on easterly course, speed 8-10 knots.  Boat had operational freedom and orders to continue reporting contact.
       
- 70 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    U 136 and 213 were put on to convoy.  As they were inexperienced boats and the area was very strongly patrolled and also because it had been arranged with Group North (Norwegian operations) that single boats should always operate there, they were ordered to return if enemy countermeasures in the attack area were very strong.  Reports from U 591 stated that convoy had steered a course AL 5132-5214-5216.  At 2250 U 136 requested beacon signals, 0135 he attacked in AL 5235, sank a corvette and scored hits on 2 steamers.  Boat reported strong defenses between the vessels, forced to sheer off!  At 0445 convoy was in AL 6121.  U 591 also attacked, sank an 8-10,000 ton tanker and torpedoed 2 freighters.  U 213 reported on request that his position was AL 3812, so he was still about 120 sea miles off.  U 591 still had 39 cbm., had fired all torpedoes and had to reload.  Requested that shadowing should be taken over.  As it appeared unlikely because of the nearness of the coast and the strong defenses based there, that it would be possible to launch another attack the following night, the order was given to break off and return to the attack areas if air patrols were strong.  U 591 was to reload, but only in darkness.
  b) 1) U 136 and U 213 were given the northern half of AM as a new attack area.
    2) From the present date boats are absolutely forbidden to attack in sea area "Way Anton" and in the area whose eastern boundary runs from CE 2289 and western boundary from CD 4139 to the south.  Exceptions: convoys outside BF, warships, and enemy independently routed ships outside BF, providing these are closely escorted by destroyers.
  c) 1) Contrary to order of 6.2 U 656 was ordered to take up his position by 14.2 in CD 6555 to carry out a special task.  Return route via BD 77, BE 54 and BF 79.
  d) At the same time U 125 and 69 were ordered to maintain complete radio silence within a radius of 400 miles from rendezvous CE 4184.  (Fuel transfer from U 125 to U 69).  No beacon signals were permitted.  If the boats had not met by the night of 12.2, U 125 was to continue on homeward voyage.  U 69 was to proceed to operational area in southern half of BB and in CC.  Shipping situation was pointed out.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 85 sank 1 ship 6,000 BRT in BC 8179
  U 591 sank 1 ship, 8-10,000 BRT in AL 6121
  U 591 torpedoed 2 freighters in AL 6121
  U 136 sank 1 corvette in AL 5235
  U 136 torpedoed 2 steamers in AL 5235.
       
VI. General:
            Following on the return of the commander of U 333, who sank the "Spreewald", it appeared appropriate to tighten up the attack restrictions etc. in "Way Anton".  With the new wording (see under
 
 
 
- 71 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  IVb 2) any misinterpretations, which really were hardly possible before, are now obviated in such a manner that greater security could not even be achieved by forbidding all attacks.
          It now remains to fix afresh the western limits of the attack restrictions; for the time being the western boundary has been fixed at 450 and a final ruling has been requested from SKL.
            The details of the "Spreewald" sinking are reported elsewhere.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- ED 33
U 125
- CE 41
U 162
- AN 30
U 575
- Op(BC-CC)
 
69
- CE 41
126
- CE 68
213
- AL 38
576
- Op(BC-CC)
 
85
- BC 67
128
- Op(Florida)
352
- Op(AE 70)
578
- BD 83
 
86
- BE 52
129
- DQ 29
432
- CB 75
586
- AF 77
 
96
- BD 74
130
- CD 45
455
- Op(AE 50)
591
- AL 62(Op)
 
98
- BC 99
136
- AL 62-Op
502
- ED 36
653
- CE 12
 
103
- CB 59
154
- AN 30
504
- DE 51
654
- BC 92
 
106
- CD 17
155
- AN 30
402
- BF 50
656
- BD 94
 
107
- Op(CA)
156
- ED 32
558
- BF 10
751
- BC 75
 
108
- Op(CA)
158
- Bergen
564
- Op(amerik. Küste)
751
- BC 75
 
109
- CD 44
161
- DQ 61
566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
752
- Bergen
 
  On Return Passage:  U 751 - 586 - 402 - 85 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:      U 505 - 68 - Lorient.    
  Entered Port:  U 402 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 9 (U 591) see No. IVa.
  b)- d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Convoy No. 9:  As no radio message was received from U 136 and U 213 in answer to the request that they should take over shadowing, these two boats were requested to proceed to position, in order to get some idea of the situation by the convoy.  At 1037 U 591 was forced by a search group to sheer off and lost contact.  Final position at 0900 was AL 6212.  Easterly course.  U 591 was in pursuit.  Weather favorable, west 3, sea 2, cloudy, visibility 12 miles.  At 1230 U 591 again picked up the convoy in AL 6232.  Flying boats as air escorts!  At 1823 U 591 was forced by Sunderland to submerge and did not get contact again until 0313 (12.2) in AH 4210.  As weather took a turn for the worst and boats had only a little fuel, the order was given at 0600 to the convoy submarines to break off pursuit before first light and move away: U 213 to go to fresh attack area AL 50 (to take over weather reporting from U 591), U 136 to go to northern half of AM, U 591 to go to northern half of AM subsequently, according to fuel supplies, to proceed to Bergen.
       
- 72 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  None.
  c)  U 656 approaching area for convoy duty.
  d)  No report of fuel transfer from U 125 to U 69.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  
            Following the sanction of Naval War Staff, U 505 and U 68 have left for the Freetown area.  (see 8.2)
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- ED 61
U 109
- CE 51
U 161
- DQ 54
U 566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
68
- BF 50
125
- CE 41
162
- AF 79
575
- Op(BC-CC)
 
69
- CE 41
126
- CE 83
213
- AM 10(Op)
576
- Op(amerik Küste)
 
85
- BD 47
128
- Op(Florida)
352
- Op(AE 70)
578
- BD 84
 
86
- BE 62
129
- DQ 43
432
- CA 95
586
- AN 23
 
96
- BC 97
130
- CD 52
455
- Op(AE 50)
591
- AM 42
 
98
- Op(BB-CB)
136
- AM 42
502
- ED 53
653
- CD 33
 
103
- BC 66
154
- AN 24
504
- DE 45
654
- BD 71
 
106
- CD 27
155
- AF 87
505
- BF 50
656
- CE 16
 
107
- Op(CA)
156
- ED 29
558
- BF 19
751
- BC 84
 
108
- Op(CA)
158
- AN 23
564
- Op(amerik. Küste)
752
- Bergen
 
  On Return Passage:  U 591 - 751 - 586 - 85 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:         U 94 - 587 - St. Nazaire;  U 588 - Lorient.
  Entered Port:  U 586  Bergen.  Boat is entering Trondheim on 20.2 because of dockyard difficulties.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) English plane sighted a submarine in BF 4226.  (U 558, searching for crew of plane).
    2) Steamer "Jamaica Producer" (5,464 GRT) reported submarine in AM 4621.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  U 656 approaching area for convoy duty "Osorno" (trans. note: German blockade runner)
  d)  Boats were informed of the possibility of their meeting the steamer "Regansberg" (trans. note: another German blockade runner; which left port on 12.2.)
- 73 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- ED 46
U 109
- CD 62
U 162
- AF 77
U 576
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
68
- BF 73
125
- CE 43
213
- AL 61
578
- BD 74
 
69
- CD 63
126
- CE 76
352
- Op(AE 70)
587
- BF 50
 
85
- BD 46
128
- Op(Florida)
432
- Op(CA)
588
- BF 59
 
86
- BF 40
129
- DP 66
455
- Op(AE 50)
591
- AM 27
 
94
- BF 50
130
- CD 62
502
- ED 46
653
- CD 22
 
96
- BC 88
136
- Op(AM)
504
- DD 66
654
- BD 81
 
98
- Op(BC-CC)
154
- Bergen
505
- BF 73
656
- CD 35
 
103
- CC 54
155
- AP 77
558
- BF 40
751
- BC 95
 
106
- CD 34
156
- ED 43
564
- Op(amerik Küste)
752
- AN 20
 
107
- Op(CA)
158
- AN 20?
566
- dto.
   
 
108
- Op(CA)
161
- DD 69
575
- Op(BC-CC)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 591 - 751 - 85 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:        - . -          Entered Port:        - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 352 reported at 1600 from AE 7568 that a convoy had been sighted. 5 vessels, 4 of them corvettes, course 1200, 9 knots.  Submarine was forced to sheer off shortly before firing, lost contact.  (Convoy No. 10).
    2) At 2111 U 654 reported large two funnel steamer and 1 destroyer in BD 6328, course 600, 16 knots.  Boat had no torpedoes left, none of own boats in vicinity.
    3) U 564 report:  Boat rammed U 107 in CA 8844, bow tubes out of order.  Tubes probably damaged.  "Victolite" sunk in CB 7455.  Otherwise nothing sighted.  Necessary to return.  62 cbm.
    4) U 109 report:  Very brisk traffic of single ships during the day in CA 7938 and 39, at night no traffic but fishing vessels showing lights. Air and sea patrol only inshore.More traffic in the vicinity of the 200 m. line.  On 10.2. 3 dud double shots at fast freighter, 12.2 a miss fired at a tanker.  Still 3 electric torpedoes, 55 cbm.  Starboard external fuel tank crushed, fuel had run out.  Returning in company with U 504.  If necessary would take over 10 cbm from him.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Plane sighted submarine in AM 2948.
- 74 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) American steamer was instructed to sail 9 miles away from navigational aids when passing through the Straits of Florida.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 213 was allocated the northern half of AM as fresh attack area; U 352 west of Reykjavik.
     Positions to be taken up after completion of the weather reporting requested by Group North.
  c)  U 656 at rendezvous for convoy "Osorno".
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 564 - "Victolite" - sunk in CB 7455.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- BD 72
U 109
- CE 14
U 162
- AM 30
U 576
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
68
- BE 98
125
- CE 25
213
- AL 61
578
- BC 95
 
69
- CD 53
126
- CE 77
352
- AE 76
587
- BF 40
 
85
- BD 55
128
- Op(Florida)
432
- Op(CA)
588
- BF 40
 
86
- BF 43
129
- DP 83
455
- Op(AE 50)
591
- AM 20
 
94
- BF 40
130
- CE 18
502
- ED 71
653
- CD 13
 
96
- BC 79
136
- Op(AM)
504
- DD 83
654
- BE 41
 
98
- Op(BB-CB)
154
- Bergen
505
- BE 96
656
- CD 65
 
103
- CC 61
155
- AM 30
558
- BE 29
751
- BD 71
 
106
- CE 11
156
- ED 44
564
- CA 88
752
- AF 79
 
107
- CA 88
158
- AM 33
566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
   
 
108
- CA 88
161
- DP 94
575
- Op(BC-CC)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 591 - 751 - 85 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:         U 404 - Lorient.         Entered Port:        - . -
   
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 103 sighted a large, blacked out freighter at 1126 in CC 7325, course 2600 (no attack made, as submarine had fired all torpedoes).
    2) U 107 reported steamer in CA 8693 with course of 3300.
       
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Submarine warnings were given for following positions:  AM 4551 - CD 1153 - BB 6760.
       
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    2) Canadian "Lady Nelson" torpedoed in BB 6760.
    3) American steamer instructed to take over pilots off Brenton Reef lightship (CA 3447).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 158 - 162 - 155 were ordered to make direct for area CA 87, without first replenishing.
    2) U 129 was given "Area Klagenfurt" (north of Trinidad - see Operational Order 51) as his attack area .
      U 161 was given "Area Graz" (NW Trinidad).
      The following order was issued to Group "Neuland" (U 67 - 156 - 502 - first West Indies boats):
     
1) Primary task is to attack shipping.
2) After such attacks have been carried out, guns may be used against land targets from the morning of "Neuland" day (16.2), if there should be any favorable opportunities.
3) If no shipping targets are encountered, guns may be used against land targets from the evening of "Neuland" day.
  c) U 656 was at rendezvous for convoy "Osorno".
  d) 1) U 125 waited until the evening of 12.2 at the rendezvous but did not meet U 69.  The weather would in any case have prevented a fuel transfer. As ordered, boat continued on homeward journey.  U 69 entered operations area in lower half of BB and in CB.
    2) U 564 and U 107 arranged rendezvous for 16.2 at 1500 in CB 7155.  Planned to transfer fuel from U 564 to U 107.
    3) In BF 4371 U 86 picked up crew of He-111 that had been forced down.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15.February 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
- Op(EC 90)
U 125
- CF 15
U 213
- AL 03
U 575
- Op(BC-CC)
 
68
- CF 33
126
- DF 31
352
- AE 71
576
- Op(amerik. Küste)
 
69
- CD 51
128
- DD 71
404
- BF 50
578
- BC 85
 
85
- BD 66
129
- DP 96
432
- Op(CA)
587
- BE 60
 
86
- BF 50
130
- CE 29
455
- Op(AE 50)
588
- BE 60
 
94
- BE 60
136
- Op(AM)
502
- Op(EC 90)
591
- AM 24
 
96
- BB 99
154
- AF 79
504
- DD 73
653
- CD 11
 
98
- Op(BB-CB)
155
- AM 23
505
- CG 11
654
- BE 51
 
103
- CC 73
156
- Op(EC 90)
558
- BE 27      
     
 
- 76 -
 
     
     

 

     
     
 
 
 
 
106
- CE 21
158
- AM 25
564
- CA 35
656
- CD 65
 
107
- CA 95
161
- DP 87
566
- Op(amerik. Küste)
751
- BD 82
 
108
- Op(CA)
162
- AM 23
   
752
- AF 77
 
109
-
CE 25
 
 
 
 
  On Return Passage:  U 564 - 591 - 751 - 85 - 107 - 103 - 106 - 654 - 86 - 109 - 130 - 125.
  Sailed:         U 503 - Kiel (U 377 Kiel, left to be attached to command of Admiral Arctic)
  Entered Port:  U 86 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 564 sighted tanker (9,000 BRT) in CA 9428, course 3350, 7 knots.
    2) U 98 sank steamer "Beila" in CC 36.  Nothing else sighted.  On return voyage.
    3) On 9.2 U 575 sighted escorted steamer in CC 31.  On 15.2 heard fast single ship in BC 83, followed without success.On return voyage in BD 64.
    4) U 455 reported no traffic in Seydisfjord area.
  b) None.
  c) Submarine report by tug "Allegheny" from CA 5766.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c) U 656 convoy duty probably carried out as planned.
  d) U 94, 587, and 588 who were on their outward voyage, were set to search for the crew of an FW-200 that had been forced down on 13.2 in BE 6789.  U 587 found a rubber dinghy with 5 of the crew and took them on board.  Boat continued outward voyage.  Intended to transfer men to a homeward bound boat.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 98 - 1 steamer "Beila" sunk in CC 36.
       
VI. General:
            However satisfactory the rescue of the crews of 2 planes by submarines in the last few days may be, and however natural such help at first appears, it is nevertheless always difficult to decide whether submarines on their outward voyage should be used to search for the crews of planes that have been forced down.  Under present conditions every drop of fuel is vital for the boats, if they are to maintain sufficient operational freedom in distant operational areas.  It may well happen that a request for help will have to be refused for the sake of operational duties.
       
       
       
       
       
                                                                            (signed):  Dönitz
       
       
       
       
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Penciled notes written in by Ia (Naval War Staff):
       
           So much depends on the rescue of the experienced crew of a plane that has been used for naval warfare, that a very serious reason would have to be given if such a request were refused.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
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