F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 November 1941

PG30300a

     
     
 
1. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- Op(AJ 81)
U 98
- BF
U 201
- BE 61
U 564
- BF 60
 
66
 - Op(DH 15)
101
 - AL 01
202
 - Op(AJ 82)
567
 - AL 71
 
68
 - Op(St.Hel.)
103
 - Op(DG 36)
203
 - Op(AJ 86)
568
 - BD 61
 
69
 - BF 44
106
 - BC 56
208
 - BC 70
569
 - Op(AJ 81)
 
73
 - BC 59
107
 - Op(DH 14)
332
 - AF 87
571
 - AK 47
 
74
 - BC 70
109
 - BC 70
373
 - BE 38
572
 - BF 47
 
77
 - BD 15
123
 - AJ 74
374
 - BC 70
573
 - BC 70
 
82
 - Op(AJ 82)
124
 - BF
402
 - AF 87
577
 - AK 51
 
84
 - Op(AJ 86)
125
 - CF 90
432
 - BF 60
751
 - BD 15
 
85
 - Op(AJ 95)
126
 - EU
502
 - BD 57
A
 - CD
 
93
 - Op(AJ 94)
129
 - CF 52
552
 - AL 50
   
 
96
 - BD 33
133
 - AK 64
563
 - BF 50
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 125 - 564 - 502 - 563 - 568 - 101 - 73.
  Entered Port:  U 564 - Lorient;  U 563 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 561 - 652 Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Target convoy No. 8 in area west of Ireland.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) See paragraph IVa for convoys Nos. 7, 8 and 9.
    2) At 1500 U 374 sighted a convoy in BC 4172, course 500 (Convoy No. 10).  For further details see para. IVa.
    3) At 1827 U 106 reported convoy in BC 5645, 3200, and at 2105 that she had lost contact and had sighted only one destroyer and 2 vessels.  (Boat was directed to stalk Convoy No. 10).
  b)  G.A.F. picked up outward convoy in AL 5549 and sent beacon signals.  Not heard by any of the boats.
  c)  None.
  d)  Scheduled convoy left Gibraltar at 1600.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 7:  (First detected by U 74 at 1704 on 27th October in AL 7473.)
    At 1150 U 74 reported that her search had been fruitless so far and was following up in the direction of 2300.  At 1352 U 208 sighted two sharply zigging steamers in BC 7539, course west.  At 1804 boat reported that the steamers sighted were Portuguese.  U 74, 208, 573 and 109 are still stalking the convoy.  These boats have now been given permission to attack in the area west of 550 West and south of 430 South, as far as 600 West.
     Contact was not established again, visibility 2 miles, wind N.E. 3-4.  U 74 is stalking Convoy No. 10, remaining boats have been given a free hand within the limitations of their fuel reserves.  The chase is now abandoned.
     Total success:  1 tanker.
- 195 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Convoy No. 8:  (First detected by U 552 at 0534 on 31.10 in AK 9973.)
    At 0932 U 552 reported contact in AL 5743, course 300.  At 1142 U 567 reported a chaser group 20 miles astern of the convoy.  Contact was then interrupted and was not reestablished by morning. Air reconnaissance also had no success in finding the convoy.
    Results to date:
    U 552 - 1 destroyer sunk.
                - 1 steamer torpedoed.
    U 567 - 2 steamers, hits probable.
       
    Convoy No. 9:   (First detected by U 96 at 2124 on 31.10 in AL 7898.)
    At 1121 U 96 sighted the convoy in BD 3636, course 1700, and reported at 1230 that it consisted merely of 2 detached steamers with destroyer escort.  The whole convoy came in to sight at 1402 in BD 3933 on a southerly course.  Contact was maintained until 2001, when it was lost in BE 1774.  Boat followed up on different courses without success.  At 0256 she reported very lights in a bearing on 1200, in BD 6328.  Searched till morning without success.
    Weather:  S.E. 1-2, visibility over 10 miles.
    At 1630 U 502 reported operation against convoy given up because of loss of fuel.  U 572 reported that she was stalking this convoy.
    The following outward bound boats have also been committed:  U 201, 98 and 373.  In addition, U 103, 107 and 66, coming from the south.
    The following boats are now stalking the convoy:  U 96, 77, 751, 568, 98, 201, 373, 103, 107 and 66.  Air reconnaissance has been ordered for 2.11.
       
    Convoy No. 10:
    U 374 (committed to Convoy No. 7) sighted a convoy at 1500 in BC 4172, course 500.  Boat was forbidden to attack and ordered to shadow the convoy.  U 569, 38, 82, 202, 84, 203, 93 and 85 belonging to Group "Schlagetot", were instructed to operate against the convoy, as were U 123 and U 106.  These boats were combined to form Group "Raubritter".  Order given:  Search sector 200 to 700, starting from position in BC 4172 at 1500.
     Sequence from the north:  U 123, 569, 38, 82, 202, 84, 203, 93, 85.  U 374 was given a free hand, as was U 74, who had also hoped to join in the convoy attack.  U 106 was requested to report her intentions in connection with the attack.  At 2001 U 374 reported convoy in BC 4191 course 500, speed 9 knots.  Contact was lost, at 0300 again restored in BC 4133, course 200, then once more interrupted.  Shadower forced to submerge.
     Radio communication was extremely poor.  Reports were not received here until hours later.  U 203 also reported no reception on Greenland radio service.  No further reports had come in by the morning.
 
 
- 196 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  None.
  c)  Escort task UA completed.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 96 - 1 passenger steamer (8,000 GRT) belonging to Convoy No. 9 (burnt out).
                1 steamer (5,000 GRT) belonging to Convoy No. 9, sunk.
    U 552 - 1 destroyer belonging to Convoy No. 8, sunk.
                  1 steamer belonging to Convoy NO. 8, torpedoed.
    U 567 - 2 steamers hit, probably belonging to Convoy No. 8.
       
VI. General:
  Naval War Staff has requested 6 submarines for escort duties during November.  These tasks demand boats with good stocks of fuel, as they must proceed at high sped for long distances.  It will be possible only in exceptional cases to detail boats from the operational area that still have sufficient fuel, in the majority of cases fresh boats will have to be detailed.
  Hence, in November the demands made on submarines for special tasks will reach a pitch never before known.  4 boats will have to be detailed for the reconnaissance demanded for special purposes in the north, and they will hardly be available during November for other duties, 6 boats are needed for escort duties, 4 boats are in northern waters.By far, the greatest number of the boats in the North Atlantic operational area will have to break off by mid NOvember, hence from this time onwards submarine warfare will practically have to cease, especially as further boats will have to be detailed for operations instructed in Naval War Staff Ia 1791/41 dated 29.10.41.  It appears doubtful to me whether these special duties (escorts, reconnaissance in the Northern area) are sufficiently vital to warrant interference with submarine warfare, for since the British organized the convoy system, successes in submarine warfare can only be achieved if there is sufficient reconnaissance to detect convoys.
  This reconnaissance must of necessity be carried out by the boats themselves, hence, it demands large numbers of boats and makes it necessary to concentrate our slight submarine resources.
   
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- 197 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
2. November 1941
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- BC 13
U 98
- BE 58
U 201
- BE 46
U 567
- AL 60
 
66
 - CF 84
101
 - AL 37
202
 - BC 16
568
 - BE 41
 
68
 - Op(St.Hel.)
103
 - CF 75
203
 - BC 24
569
 - BC 12
 
69
 - BE 65
106
 - BC 27
208
 - BC 70
571
 - AJ 95
 
73
 - BC 69
107
 - CF 76
332
 - AN 29
572
 - BE 68
 
74
 - BC 20
109
 - BC 70
373
 - BE 55
573
 - BC 70
 
77
 - BD 55
123
 - BC 12
374
 - BC 10
577
 - AK 48
 
82
 - BC 12
124
 - CG 16
402
 - AF 75
652
 - BF
 
84
 - BC 16
125
 - CF 65
432
 - BF
751
 - BD 51
 
85
 - BC 24
126
 - EU
502
 - BD 61
A
 - DF 38
 
93
 - BC 24
129
 - CF 42
552
 - AL 60
   
 
96
 - BD 60
133
 - AK 01
561
 - BF
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 125 - 502 - 568 - 101 - 73 - 432.
  Entered Port:  U 432 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 434 - Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Target Convoy No. 9.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) See paragraph IVa for Convoys No. 8, 9 and 10.
    2) Report from U 573 covering last few days in BC 73:  Only fishing vessels and aircraft, 1 destroyer.
    3) U 208 reported 1 ship (6,000 GRT) sunk in BC 72.
    4) U 109 reported strong patrolling by aircraft and destroyers in BC 75 and 78.  1 tanker sighted, course S.E.
  b)  Convoy No. 9 picked up by aircraft at 1700 (paragraph IVa).
  c) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 8:  At 1238 U 552 made contact with escorts in AL 6261, at 1300 she picked up the convoy in AL 6236 and shadowed it with some interruptions until 0330 when she lost the convoy in AL 4212 and broke off pursuit.  U 567 twice requested beacon signals during the night, apparently obtained contact, reported 5 inexplicable misses at 0630, then also gave up the chase.
     Weather at 0200 - wind E, cloudless.  Visibility 10 miles.  Operation completed.
    Total successes:  1 destroyer sunk, 1 steamer torpedoed, 2 steamers probably hit.
       
- 198 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Convoy No. 9:  Air reconnaissance reported position of convoy at 1630 as BE 4921.  According to cross bearing at 1700 convoy was in BE 4848.  U 98 was in the immediate vicinity.  At 1845 boat made contact in BE 4799 and maintained it until 2053 in BE 7136.  Then forced to sheer off.  Last course S.E.  By first light U 96, 201, 98, 69, 373, and 572 should certainly have made contact, and probably U 77 and 751.  Owing to a breakdown the order to continue the search in the sector 200 - 1300 was not transmitted.  Hence the search was carried on during the night without any order to attack.  Weather: very favorable at first. gradually worsening.  Wind freshening to S. 5-6, thus the convoy was expected to be making only slight progress.  Visibility remained good.
       
    Convoy No. 10:
    At 1000 the sector to be searched was increased by 300 to the west (350 - 650).  Weather:  very good visibility, sea slight.  At 1729 U 123 contacted and shadowed the convoy until 0213 in AJ 7873.  In the meantime U 38, 569, 82 and 202 reported that they were in pursuit.  U 203 reported at 0415 and 0530.  No further contact.  U 106 and U 571 are also being committed against this convoy.
       
  b) U 208, 374 and 573, belonging to Group "Mordbrenner" (S.E. of Greenland) reported return because of lack of fuel.  U 109 moved away to CC 39 to effect minor repairs, she intended further operations in CC 60.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 374 - 1 ship - 6,000 (GRT) (Independent)
    U 208 - 1 ship - 6,000 (GRT) (Independent)
       
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3. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AJ 70
U 98
- BE 70
U 201
- BE 70
U 567
- AM 01
 
66
 - CF 46
101
 - AM 15
202
 - AJ 70
568
 - BE 46
 
68
 - Op(St.Hel.)
103
 - CF 45
203
 - AJ 70
569
 - AJ 70
 
69
 - BE 70
106
 - AJ 76
208
 - BC 44
571
 - AJ 85
 
73
 - BD 48
107
 - CF 46
332
 - AF 73
572
 - BE 70
 
74
 - BC 10
109
 - CD 30
373
 - BE 70
573
 - BC 79
 
77
 - BE 70
123
 - AJ 70
374
 - BC 27
577
 - AJ 95
 
82
 - AJ 70
124
 - CG 42
402
 - AE 93
652
 - BF 48
 
84
 - AJ 70
125
 - CG 17
434
 - AF 79
751
 - BE 70
 
85
 - AJ 70
126
 - EU
502
 - BD 63
A
 - DF/DG
 
93
 - AJ 70
129
 - Azoren
552
 - AM 43
   
 
96
 - BE 70
133
 - AK 44
561
 - BF 44
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 125 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 101 - 73.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 565 - 205 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Target, Convoy No. 9 in BE 70.
       
- 199 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For convoys No. 9 and 10 see paragraph IVa.
    2) At 1529 U 74 sighted convoy in AJ 7693.  See paragraph IVa for further details.
    3) U 374 reported results of reconnaissance in area Belle Isle Straits and St. Johns:  Normal peacetime activity, lights showing, no patrolling.  Independents cruising with lights.
    4) U 126 sighted one independent steamer in EV 91.
  b) Convoy not found (owing to breakdown of one engine it was not possible to catch up).
  c) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 9:  In view of air reconnaissance further search was carried on during the day without at first any specific distribution.  Then after the receipt of the position report at 2130, the order was given to continue searching between 107, 96, 572, 69, 373, 201, 103).  U 751 and U 66 are returning because of lack of fuel.  U 77 is bound for Vigo to replenish.  Weather:  S.E. 5-6 freshening, visibility over 10 miles.
       
    Convoy No. 10:  Search was continued without distribution because:
    1) Radio communication with the boats was extremely unreliable and it was certain that some reports had never reached Operational Control, hence the situation on the spot could not be gauged properly.
    2) As numerous boats were in the immediate vicinity (6 of them definitely had contact) and the visibility was very variable the possibility existed of the enemy coming into sight when actually in the submarine area.
      Successes:
      U 202 - 3 steamers sunk.
      U 569 - 2 steamers hit.
      Requests to the boats to give their position and a report on the situation did not bring any clarification.
      At 1200 the order was given to continue searching the whole sector (without specific distribution) between 330 and 400.  At 1530 U 203 made contact in AJ 7924, course 3100, speed 8 knots, but after a successful attack was lost again in fog through depth charging.  According to hydrophone bearing, boat calculated course to be 2700 (in Belle Isle Straits).  Operational Control assumed that further operations against Convoy No. 10 were useless because of fog and the proximity of Belle Isle Straits.  All boats were directed to stalk Convoy No. 11.
 
 
 
- 200 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Convoy No. 11:  At 1529 U 74 made contact with the convoy in AJ 7693 (while searching for Convoy No. 10), course 500, moderate speed (over 11 knots).  At 1955 she lost contact and calculated convoy course at 20 - 300.  Boats were distributed according to their reported or estimated positions to Convoys No, 10 and 11, or according to their "short signal" reports stating which they were attacking.  Weather:  foggy patches, visibility up to 8 miles between them.  At 2130 order was given to continue search in sector 10 to 500 (U 84, 74, 106, 557).  U 571, 577 and 133 were outward bound and were also committed to attack the convoy.
  b) - c) None.
  d) U 77 (committed against Convoy No. 9) requested permission to refuel at Vigo.  Refueling was sanctioned so that the boat can be set onto the outward bound Gibraltar convoy during the next few days.  The attack is to be carried out on 6th - 7th November.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 202 - 3 steamers totaling 13,000 GRT sunk (belonging to Convoy No. 10)
    U 569 - hits on 2 steamers belonging to Convoy No. 10.
       
VI. General:
  After explaining the probable developments in the number of submarines operating in the North Atlantic, I have requested Naval War Staff to reconsider their decision on the escort tasks ordered on 1.11.  (See War Diary for 1.11)
       
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4. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AJ 70
U 98
- CF 10
U 201
- CF 20
U 561
- BE 61
 
66
 - CF 20
101
 - AM 24
202
 - AJ 70
565
 - BF
 
68
 - Op(St.Hel.)
103
 - CF 20
203
 - AJ 70
567
 - AL 62
 
69
 - CF 10
106
 - AJ 80
205
 - BF
568
 - BE 54
 
73
 - BD 46
107
 - CF 10
208
 - BC 54
569
 - AJ 87
 
74
 - AJ 80
109
 - CC 60
332
 - AF 47
571
 - AJ 70
 
77
 - CF 20
123
 - AJ 70
373
 - CF 10
572
 - CF 10
 
82
 - AJ 70
124
 - CG 74
374
 - BC 37
573
 - BC 58
 
84
 - AJ 80
125
 - BF 70
402
 - AE 86
577
 - AJ 80
 
85
 - AJ 80
126
 - EV 90
434
 - AF 75
652
 - BE 65
 
93
 - AJ 70
129
 - Azoren
502
 - BE 43
751
 - CF 20
 
96
 - CF 10
133
 - AJ 59
552
 - AL 66
   
 
A
 - DF 95
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 125 - 66 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101 - 73.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 433 - St. Nazaire.  U 81 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Plane did not take off because of fog on the airfield.
       
- 201 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  At 1742 U 502 sighted convoy in BE 4298, southerly course, high speed (No. 12).  See paragraph IVa for further details.
  b)  None.
  c)  At 0730 on 3.11 the steamer "De Braaf" was torpedoed in 220 50'.  South longitude (?).  Assumed to be U 68.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 9:  Search continued until dark.  Air reconnaissance rendered impossible by fog on flying field.  Weather:  S.E. 5 - 6, probably good visibility.  Operation discontinued at 2100 in order to stalk a convoy which had left Gibraltar on the evening of 1.11.  (Convoy No. 13)  She was expected to be in CF 68 or 69 by the morning of 5.11.  Group "Stoertebecker" U 96, 98, 69, 201, 103, 107, 373 and 572 were ordered to operate in this direction as their fuel supply and position allowed.  As no enemy contact was expected on 5.11, while the weather continued unfavorable the main task on 5th November would be the picking up of the enemy by the Air Force and by the submarines taking bearings.
       
    Convoy No. 12:  U 502 (returning because of lack of fuel) picked up the convoy at 1742 in BE 4298, southerly course 10-12 miles.  Shadowed until 1900 to 4615, contact was then lost.  Returning.  She did not attack the convoy as:
    1) Contact could not be maintained.
    2) Group "Stoertebecker" could not have contacted the convoy until the evening of 5th.
    3) Enemy speed was too high to permit any attacks on the convoy (Prospects were diminished by the weather situation).
 
 
 
    Convoy No. 11:  Search during the day was unsuccessful.  Weather:  East 3 - 4, fog or visibility up to 2 miles.  As the prospects of picking up the convoy, which had been reported proceeding at moderate speed (11 - 17 knots) were very poor after the contact had been lost, it was decided to discontinue the operation and take up the patrol line from AD 9561 to AJ 3667 at cruising speed.
    U 203, 202, 84 and 93 are making a protracted return voyage because of lack of fuel.  They have been ordered to proceed past St. Johns and Cape Race if possible.  U 74 has been given a free hand.  Group "Raubritter" still contains U 123, 38, 577, 106, 571, 133, 82 and 85.  No sinkings have been achieved in this convoy.
  b)  None.
  c)  U 109, who is at present believed to be in CD 60, has been selected for the task of escorting the prize "Silvaplana" back to port.This vessel will pass CD 37 between 7th and 11th November.
       
- 202 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) 1) Special task for Naval Group North:
      This consists of the following during the early part of November.
     
1) Investigation of icing in the Denmark Straits (U 332 has been allocated this task).
2) Undetected reconnaissance in the area in the southwestern part of AE.  To begin with, it is intended to retain all the submarines coming from the North Sea in this area for 4 days each.  At present, U 402 and 434 are outward bound and they have been given the task of reconnoitering.
3) Later several boats will carry out stationary reconnaissance in this area.
    2) Special tasks in the Mediterranean:
      (previous correspondence "C.O. only" !)
      On account of the order to increase commitments in the Mediterranean, U 205, 433, 81, 565 (all outward bound into the North Atlantic) have been recalled if their charts were not adequate, or if their equipment was sufficient they have been sent direct to the Mediterranean.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 203 - sank 2 ships and torpedoed 2 ships.  Convoy No. 10.
       
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5. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AJ 50
U 98
- CF 50
U 202
- AJ 48
U 565
- BF
 
66
 - BE 88
101
 - AM 32
203
 - AJ 85
567
 - AL 67
 
68
 - FU
103
 - CF 50
205
 - BF 48
568
 - BE 64
 
69
 - CF 50
106
 - AJ 50
208
 - BC 56
569
 - AJ 87
 
73
 - BD 64
107
 - CF 19
332
 - AE 61
571
 - AJ 50
 
74
 - AJ 61
109
 - CC 60
373
 - CF 50
572
 - CF 19
 
77
 - CF 31
123
 - AJ 50
374
 - C 39
573
 - BC 68
 
81
 - BF
124
 - DH 34
402
 - AE 84
577
 - AJ 50
 
82
 - AJ 50
125
 - BF
433
 - BF
652
 - BE 54
 
84
 - AJ 50
126
 - EV
434
 - AE 93
751
 - BE 85
 
85
 - AJ 50
129
 - Azoren
502
 - BE 52
A
 - DS 12
 
93
 - AJ 81
133
 - AJ 65
552
 - AL 67
   
 
96
 - CF 50
201
 - CF 50
561
 - BE 27
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 125 - 66 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101 - 73 - 569 - 565 - 81.
  Entered Port:  U 125 - 565 Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 81 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Four planes searched for a convoy (No. 13) leaving Gibraltar.
       
- 203 -
 
 
     

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 124 sighted a fast convoy at 0204 - 2 steamers and 2 destroyers - in CF 6189, course E.S.E.
  b)  Convoy not picked up. Nothing seen.
  c)  Admiralty instructions on 3.11:  Steer zig-zag course between 100 West and 200 East as far as 350 South.
  d) The destroyer sunk by U 83 on 21.10 was the "Cossack" (attack on aircraft carrier "Eagle").
       
IV. Reports of Success:  None.
       
V. General:
  a) It has been learned after the event from English newspaper reports on the loss of U 570 on 27.8 that the Commander (Lt.(s.g.) Rahmlow) was supposed to have suffered from gas poisoning.  The depressing occurrence may therefore be explained partially by the fact that the Commander was temporarily unable to control the situation and the decision to surrender was taken and carried out by the first Watch Officer, Lt.(j.g.) Berndt.  He was later shot while trying to escape in England.  Probably the full significance of his behavior did not dawn on him until he was a prisoner, when he preferred death while trying to escape to all else.  However, this matter cannot be cleared up until reports from the men concerned are available.
  b) Naval War Staff has limited the order for convoy escort tasks (see 1.11 and 4.11) to the extent of saying that as a general rule they are only to be carried out if they do not entail the sacrifice of more than about half the operation.  However, such opportunities will be exceptions.
 
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6. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
 - AJ 29
U 98
- CF 51
U 203
- AJ 96
U 567
- AL 82
 
66
 - BE 97
101
 - AF 70
205
 - BE 99
568
 - BF 48
 
68
 - Op(St.Hel.)
103
 - CF 38
208
 - BC 66
569
 - AJ 97
 
69
 - CF 28
106
 - AJ 29
332
 - N. of Iceland
571
 - AJ 29
 
73
 - BE 44
107
 - CF 51
373
 - CF 60
572
 - CF 52
 
74
 - AK 41
109
 - CD 51
374
 - BD 51
573
 - CF 29
 
77
 - CG 11
123
 - AJ 29
402
 - Op(AE 73/76)
577
 - AJ 61
 
81
 - BF
124
 - CF 67
433
 - BF 60
652
 - BE 42
 
82
 - AJ 61
126
 - EV
434
 - AE 84/85
751
 - BE 94
 
84
 - AJ 87
129
 - CF 94
502
 - BE 64
A
 - DS 51
 
85
 - AJ 62
133
 - AJ 34
552
 - AL 81
   
 
93
 - AJ 86
201
 - CF 29
561
 - BE 14
   
 
96
 - CF 52
202
 - AJ 82
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 103 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101 - 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 433 - 74.
  Entered Port:  U 433 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Convoy No. 13 not spotted.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  Southern area:  U 68 made a situation report.  No shipping sighted on a sweep into Whale Bay.  On 28.10. independent "S" sunk in CG 2637.  1.11. independent "N" sunk in GH 2638.
  b) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 13:  Despite use of 6 planes and generally still favorable visibility, no success obtained from air reconnaissance.  Order was given to move away after dark and take up a fresh patrol line from CF 1873 to CF 2468 by 0709.
    Future intentions:  As neither Air Force nor submarines have detected the enemy and air reconnaissance gives reason to suppose that he is farther to the west (No. 13), the patrol lines are to be moved in that direction.  Besides the possibility of still finding No. 13 there, the boats will be in an area where, according to the schedule established by dead reckoning, there should be an "SL" convoy (91) - No. 14 - and an "OG" convoy.  (The presence of "SL" has been confirmed by an aircraft warning).  U 107 is returning.  Group "Stoertebecker" still consists of 6 boats.
  b) - c) None.
  d) 1) Submarine warning covering AE 97 shows that the enemy suspects boats to be in the Shetland - Iceland area.  Apparently they are not ours, however, in view of the special task for Naval Group North the information is valuable.
    2) As our own blockade runner (Portland) will be passing, the operational area for submarines in the Southern area will be limited to the S.W. until 11th November by a line from ES 15 to ES 95.
       
- 205 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- Op(AD 96)
U 98
- CF 18
U 202
- AJ 98
U 567
- AL 88
 
66
 - BE 96
101
 - to Bergen
203
 - BD 12
568
 - BF
 
68
 - CH 24
103
 - CG 11
205
 - CG 19
569
 - BD 23
 
69
 - CF 19
106
 - Op(AJ 32)
208
 - BD 45
571
 - Op(AJ 32)
 
73
 - BE 54
107
 - CF 53
332
 - N. of Iceland
572
 - CF 19
 
74
 - AK 55
109
 - CD 37
373
 - CF 24
573
 - BD 57
 
77
 - CG 20
123
 - Op(AD 95)
374
 - BD 38
577
 - Op(AJ 31)
 
81
 - BE 69
124
 - CF 81
402
 - Op(AE 73)
652
 - BD 38
 
82
 - Op(AJ 36)
126
 - EV
434
 - Op(AE 84)
751
 - BF 40
 
84
 - BC 15
129
 - DG 26
502
 - BE 66
A
 - DS 81
 
85
 - Op(AJ 36)
133
 - Op(AJ 32)
552
 - AL 87
   
 
93
 - BC 16
201
 - CF 24
561
 - BD 35
   
 
96
 - CF 19
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 107 - 103 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 568 - 751 - 101 - 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
  Entered Port:  U 568 St. Nazaire;  U 101 Bergen
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None owing to lack of machines and unfavorable weather.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) At 2142 steamer Nottingham (Dutch - 399 GRT?) torpedoed in AK 8351.
    2) (Priority Radio Intercept).  Information on position of SL 91 on 1.11 (set on to Group "Stoertebecker").
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Group "Stoertebecker" did not contact the enemy by dark.  They are now committed mainly against "SL 91" (No. 14).  Further stalking of No. 13 ("HG") has been given up as the convoy has apparently already slipped through or taken evasive action far to the west.  The information gained from a priority radio intercept on the position and course of "SL 91" on 1.11. indicated that the convoy passed east of the Azores, a mean course of about 210 W. was estimated.
       
- 206 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    It may have been delayed by the long spell of bad weather.The order has been given to take up a new patrol line from CF 1974 to CF 2894 after dark and at 0900 on 8.11 to proceed from this area in a reconnaissance line with mean course "S" to meet the convoy.
  b)  Patrol line "Raubritter" (SE of Greenland) has presumably been taken up by all boats during the night of 7th to 8th November.  They have been ordered to cruise to and fro.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 68 sank 1 steamer of "Clan MacArthur" class (10,000 GRT) - independent, and 1 steamer "Bradford City" (4,953 GRT) - independent.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- Op(AD 96)
U 98
- CF 19
U 205
- CG 49
U 572
- CF 27
 
66
 - BF 70
103
 - BF 70
208
 - BD 55
573
 - BD 67
 
68
 - Op(GH)
106
 - Op(AJ 32)
332
 - AD 52
577
 - Op(AJ 31)
 
69
 - CF 27
107
 - CF 36
373
 - CF 28
652
 - BD 25
 
73
 - BE 52
109
 - CD/CE
374
 - BE 18
751
 - BF
 
74
 - AK 91
123
 - Op(AD 95)
402
 - Op(AE 73)
A
 - DS 89
 
77
 - CG
124
 - CF 78
434
 - Op(AE 84)
   
 
81
 - CG 13
126
 - EV/EU
502
 - BF 46
   
 
82
 - Op(AJ 36)
129
 - DG 56
552
 - BE 15
   
 
84
 - BB 63
133
 - Op(AJ 32)
561
 - BD 25
   
 
85
 - Op(AJ 36)
201
 - CF 28
567
 - BE 16
   
 
93
 - BC 41
202
 - AK 97
569
 - BD 33
   
 
96
 - CF 19
203
 - BD 28
571
 - Op(AJ 32)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 107 - 66 - 103 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 502 - 751 - 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
  Entered Port:  U 751 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 105 - 565 -  Lorient;  U 433 - St. Nazaire;  U 574 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  4 plus 2 machines seeking Convoy "SL 91" (No. 14) in area CF 20 and 50.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  None.
  b)  One plane spotted convoy in approximately CF 5261.
  c) - d) None.
       
- 207 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Group "Stoertebecker" did not contact the enemy.  The air reconnaissance spotted Convoy No. 14, but only one plane.  Beacon signals were sent for only a very short time (plane was overdue), hence, only one submarine heard them.  Boat was ordered to operate on the D/F bearing.  The other boats continued searching until it was necessary to move away into new patrol line.  Assuming that the bearing taken by the submarine was correct and that the convoy was maintaining mean course "N", the order has been given to the boats to take up reconnaissance patrol from CF 1366 to CF 2346 at 1000 on 9.11.  They are then to search at the convoy's speed of advance, i.e. 7 knots.
  b)  U 652 and 561 have been detailed as escort for "Ship 45" which is expected in CD 37 on 17.11.  Until that time the boats are to operate as follows:  U U652 in BC 30, U 561 in BD 10.
  c)  U 77 reported from CG that she had replenished at Vigo.  UA reported from ES 34 that she had completed her task on 29.10 in CD 91 (escort of Motor Vessel "Portland")
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  Report made by B.d.U. to C-in-C Navy in Berlin.
  1) Situation report on Conditions in the Atlantic.
    Now that independent shipping movements have ceased and shipping is proceeding in convoys which are difficult to detect, more frequent attacks on convoys can be made only if large numbers of submarines are available, as this ensures more frequent detection of convoys.  s considerable numbers of submarines have to enter the Mediterranean for political and strategic reasons, which are of paramount importance, B.d.U. requested that further dispersal of submarines for secondary duties should be avoided.  These tasks are certainly excellent in themselves but compared with the gaps they cause in the Atlantic battle, are most injurious to our cause.
  2) The lack of repair workers is already being felt: the long periods required for carrying out final tasks are delaying the operational readiness of submarine new constructions; operational submarines require disproportionately long repair periods.  Some remedy must be found, as when the number of operational boats increases greatly in the near future the demands for repairs will increase sharply.  A mobile dockyard worker unit was suggested, this could be employed to relieve any dockyard that was overburdened with work.  It was requested that an investigation should be made to find out whether workers for submarine repairs could not be drawn from other Navy repair yards.  C-in-C Navy informed B.d.U. that he intended raising the question of labor during a conference with the Fuehrer in the coming week.
 
 
 
- 811 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  3)  The delay in the operational readiness of new constructions - from 3 to practically 4 months after they are commissioned - is partly due to the inadequacy of recovery vessels.  The number of recovery vessels quoted as being in the Firing Flotillas is purely theoretical, as on account of age and breakdowns on an average only about 30% of the recovery vessels are i a state of readiness. This has resulted in holding up the newly constructed boats with the 25th Submarine Flotilla.  At present there are 11 submarines with this Flotilla, which has only 2 recovery boats available (instead of 5 or 6).  The number of torpedoes fired has been reduced from 43 to 26.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- Op(AD 96)
U 98
- CF 13
U 203
- BD 61
U 567
- BE 43
 
68
 - GG
105
 - BF
205
 - CG 85
569
 - BE 12
 
69
 - CF 22
106
 - Op(AJ 32)
208
 - BD 64
571
 - Op(AJ 32)
 
73
 - BE 62
107
 - BE 96
332
 - AD 82
572
 - CF 21
 
74
 - BE 11
109
 - CD 30
373
 - CF 22
573
 - BD 69
 
77
 - CG
123
 - Op(AD 95)
374
 - BE 27
574
 - AO
 
81
 - CG 43
124
 - DG 39
402
 - Op(AE 84)
577
 - Op(AJ 31)
 
82
 - Op(AJ 36)
126
 - EU
433
 - BF
652
 - BD 16
 
84
 - BC 47
129
 - DG 83
434
 - Op(AE 84)
A
 - ES 34
 
85
 - Op(AJ 36)
133
 - Op(AJ 32)
552
 - BE 42
   
 
93
 - BB 69
201
 - CF 23
561
 - Op(BD 10)
   
 
96
 - CF 21
202
 - BD 32
565
 - BF
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 107 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 73 - 569 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
  Entered Port:  U 103 - 66 - 502  Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 575   St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Target "SL 91" (Convoy No. 14) 4 machines taking part.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 69 reported 1 destroyer at 0208 in BE 7698, course "N", 10 knots.
  b)  Nothing sighted.
  c) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 14:
     As contact was not re-established by the boats nor the air reconnaissance, Group "Stoertebecker" (reinforced by U 552 and 567 in the west and U 77 in the east) was ordered to take up position in reconnaissance line from BE 7252 to BE 8163 by 1000 on 10.11.  Mean course "N" was taken to be set, speed of advance 7 knots.  It was planned to pick up the convoy again by air reconnaissance.  Boats were to search in their patrol line.  A very definite depression in the vicinity hampered operations.  Weather:  NW 7 - 8 cloudy, rain, poor visibility, variable.
       
- 209 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  None.
  c)  U 109 escort duty carried out according to plan.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- Op(AD 96)
U 98
- BE 73
U 203
- BE 41
U 567
- BE 72
 
68
 - St. Helena
105
 - BF 41
205
 - CG 90
569
 - BE 25
 
69
 - BE 73
106
 - Op(AJ 32)
208
 - BF 40
571
 - Op(AJ 32)
 
73
 - BF 40
107
 - BF 70
332
 - AL 12
572
 - BE 43
 
74
 - BE 24
109
 - CD 30
373
 - BE 81
573
 - BE 49
 
77
 - BE 85
123
 - Op(AD 95)
374
 - BF 40
574
 - AN 30
 
81
 - CG 81
124
 - DG 66
402
 - AL 31
575
 - BF
 
82
 - Op(AJ 36)
126
 - EV
433
 - BF 73
577
 - Op(AJ 31)
 
84
 - BC 49
129
 - DT 12
434
 - Op(AE 84)
652
 - BC 36
 
85
 - Op(AJ 36)
133
 - Op(AJ 32)
552
 - BE 72
A
 - ES 62
 
93
 - BC 48
201
 - BE 81
561
 - Op(BD 10)
   
 
96
 - BE 73
202
 - BE 14
565
 - BF 72
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 107 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 73 - 569 - 202 -84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 43  Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Target "SL 91 (Convoy No. 14) in area BE 40 - 70.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 123 reported from the area SE of Greenland that she had sighted nothing for 4 days, no patrols.
  b)  Nothing seen.
  c) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 14:  Neither planes nor submarines made contact during 10.11. As it was possible that the convoy was farther south than the submarines, they were ordered to remain stationary in a patrol line when they reached the line BE 4582 to BE 5493.  U 77 reported that she was returning because of engine trouble.  Her position is remaining unoccupied.
  b) 1) Mediterranean - Special Operation:
      During the operation ordered the following attack areas were allocated:  U 205 and U 81 large grid square CH east of 10 55' W.
       
- 210 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Special task for Naval Group North:
      See paragraph IVd on 4.11.
      In order to reconnoiter enemy shipping the following areas were allocated.
      U 105 - AE 84 right half and 85
      U 402 - AE 89
      U 434 - AE 76 northern half and 73.
    3) Group "Raubritter", in position S.E. of Greenland, was given orders to set course 1300, daily coverage 100 miles.  This change of position was made because the boats had not contacted the enemy for days and shipping was believed to be farther south.  U 123 reported that she was returning.  The group still consists of U 38, 577, 106, 571, 133, 82, 85.
  c) U 109 carried out her escort task according to plan.
  d) U 68 was ordered to refuel from ship 16 on 13.11 in CF 29, center.
       
V. Reports of Success: None.
       
VI. General:
  In connection with the 4 boats already carrying out reconnaissance duties in the North, Naval War Staff has now requested 4 more boats for weather reports, including 1 boat off Jan Mayen if possible combined with submarine operations.  So once again the departure of one ship will interfere with submarine warfare.  No less than 8 submarines have already been diverted to this task before the ship has even left port.  Considering how fears for this ship have increased since preparations were first begun, so that demands on submarines have grown greater than those originally intended, the present situation in the Atlantic and the "Bismark" episode must, of necessity, increase still further the fears for the safety of this ship, if indeed this task is ever carried out at all.  Initialed for SK1 Naval War Staff).
  (Trans: note - manuscript note in the margin dealing with the part underlined, reads: "Fears have not increased in the meantime.  The measures ordered were planned from the very beginning!"  Initialed for SK1 Naval War Staff).
    It it thus to be feared that the task of escorting this ship will be an ever widening circle and demand more and more naval forces, which will be diverted from their own proper tasks.
  If this does occur, the sending off of the ship will not lift a burden from the submarine, and give power to submarine warfare, on the contrary, it will be detrimental.  It can hardly be hoped that this detrimental effect will be off-set by comparatively large successes being scored by the ship.  The weakening of the submarine war through detailing boats for special tasks can certainly not be measured in terms of the successes which might have been gained by the boats detached, the detachment of one boat has far greater repercussions.
  The loss of one boat from a reconnaissance patrol entails a smaller reconnaissance area for the lot and less chance of finding anything - and finding the enemy is the most difficult of all the problems in submarine warfare.
 
 
 
- 211 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Once the enemy has been found the lack of one boat reduces the likelihood of maintaining contact or of re-establishing it after it has been interrupted.  When actually attacking, the chances for each individual boat boat are increased in ratio to the number of boats taking part, i.e. in ratio to the degree in which the enemy escort is split up.
    Summarized this means:  That boats detailed for special tasks sacrifice not only their own chances of success, but also those of the boats remaining for submarine operations proper are considerably reduced.
  It is impossible to set out in cold figures the extent to which the chances of success will be reduced if, as at present envisaged, 8 boats are withdrawn from submarine operations.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AD 96
U 96
- BE 46
U 202
- BE 27
U 565
- CG 21
 
43
 - BF
98
 - BE 46
203
 - BF 40
567
 - BE 45
 
68
 - GG 20
105
 - BF 41
205
 - CH 70
569
 - BF 40
 
69
 - BE 54
106
 - AJ 32
208
 - BF
571
 - AJ 32
 
73
 - BF
107
 - BF
332
 - AL 10
572
 - BE 46
 
74
 - BF 40
109
 - CD 30
373
 - BE 54
573
 - BE 57
 
77
 - BE 54
123
 - AD 96
374
 - BF
574
 - AN 20
 
81
 - CG 90
124
 - DG 95
402
 - AK 46
575
 - BF
 
82
 - AJ 36
126
 - FF 24
433
 - CG 21
577
 - AJ 31
 
84
 - AL 78
129
 - DS 63
434
 - Op(AE 76/73)
652
 - Op(BC 30)
 
93
 - BC 58
133
 - AJ 36
552
 - BE 45
A
 - ET
 
85
 - AK 17
201
 - BE 54
561
 - BD 16
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 107 - 573 - 374 - 208 - 77 - 569 - 73 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74 - 123.
  Entered Port:  U 107  Lorient;  U 73  St. Nazaire;  U 374  Brest.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Situation report by U 93 on Cape Race:  Beacons as in peacetime, patrols, fishing vessels, lights darkened;  no other shipping.
    2) Situation report by U 434 (special task in north) from Iceland/Faroes area:  Average visibility 2 miles, no shipping, no patrolling.  Task carried out without being spotted.
  b)  Nothing sighted.
  c)  None.
  d)  USA vessels are to make for MONROVIA, unload here, English vessels will carry cargo further, course at first 3150.
       
- 212 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 14:
    Further pursuit appears useless now.  Operation discontinued.  Order to Group "Stoertebecker" to take up positions in a patrol line from AK 9522 to BD 3399.  It is expected that this line will be manned by the morning of 14.11.
  b) 1) It is planned to form loosely knit long patrol lines with Groups "Stoertebecker" and "Raubritter" on each side of the great circle Cape Race - North Channel on about 530 30' N. by about 14th November.  The order was passed to "Raubritter" on 10.11 and to "Stoertebecker" on 11.11.
    2) Mediterranean:  To commence with it is proposed to send 6 boats on operations in the western Mediterranean.  Owing to the urgency of this task, some of the boats already outward bound in the North Atlantic have been diverted.
      Situation on 12.11:  According to dead reckoning U 205 and U 81 are already east of Gibraltar.  Provisional allocation to attack areas east of Gibraltar, north or south of the latitude of it.  U 565 and U 433 are outward bound somewhere west of Lisbon.  U 431 and U 95 are still in their bases but are to be committed to the Mediterranean.  They will be operationally ready on 15th and 19 November 1941 respectively.  Until further orders, B.d.U. has operational control in the Western Mediterranean.  The first operational area proposed lies west of 30 East.  Operational Order No. 48.
  c) U 109 operated according to plan.  The air reconnaissance sent out picked up the ship.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  A review of the organization of Operational Control in the Mediterranean resulted in the following decisions:
  1) Submarine Operational Control must be carried out from Rome, as this is the only way of ensuring sufficiently close cooperation with the other operational H.Q.s.
  2) Submarine Operational Control in Rome must also take over control of the submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean if large scale operations render this imperative.
  3) The difficulty of the task demands not only a personality with special qualifications but also that he must be given a sufficiently responsible position.
  4) A fully equipped base with a flotilla organization must be created for the boats operating in the Western Mediterranean.
    In accordance with these views, Naval War Staff has been requested:
 
 
 
- 213 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  a) To create "F.d.U. ("S.O. Submarines") Mediterranean on the staff of German Admiral Rome", military subordinate to B.d.U. and operationally subordinate to the German Admiral.
  b) The following are to come under the command of "F.d.U. Mediterranean":
    23rd Submarine Flotilla, Salamis, which will retain tactical control in the Eastern Mediterranean so long as the task remains a local one in the Tobruk - Alexandria area.
     29th Submarine Flotilla, Spezia (to be newly formed).
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AJ 36
U 98
- BE 42
U 205
- CH 70
U 571
- AK 19
 
43
 - BF 46
105
 - BE 31
208
 - BF
572
 - BE 45
 
68
 - GG 10
106
 - AK 19
332
 - AL
573
 - BE 67
 
69
 - BE 45
109
 - CF 21
373
 - BE 46
574
 - AF 76
 
74
 - BF
123
 - AK 17
402
 - AK 39
575
 - BF 44
 
77
 - BF 40
124
 - DT 18
433
 - CG 50
577
 - AJ 36
 
81
 - CH 70
126
 - FF 42
434
 - AM 13
652
 - BC 38
 
82
 - AK 01
129
 - DS 95
552
 - BE 41
A
 - ET
 
84
 - BD 32
133
 - AK 19
561
 - Op(BD 10)
   
 
85
 - AK 51
201
 - BE 46
565
 - CG 43
   
 
93
 - BC 67
202
 - BF 40
567
 - BE 41
   
 
96
 - BE 45
203
 - BF
569
 - BF
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 573 - 208 - 77 - 569 - 123 - 202 - 84 - 203 - 93 - 74.
  Entered Port:  U 208 - 203  Brest;  U 569 - 74  St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 375 - 453  Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None, owing to lack of planes.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) At 0506 U 205 sighted formation of British warships in CH 7623, course W. (See paragraph IVb).
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Northern area:  According to a high priority Radio Intercept the "ONS 33" was in AL 41 at 1500 on 11.11.  (See paragraph IV).
    2) Southern area:  On 3.11. auxiliary cruiser "Asturia" or an unidentified unit received orders to patrol in area FG and north to northeast of it.  An earlier high priority Radio Intercept suggested that the enemy suspected a submarine supply vessel and submarines in this area.At 1930 British steamer reported submarine in FE 3618 (U 126).  A submarine warning was issued.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 214 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) Northern area:  After high priority Radio Intercept report on "ONS 33" had been received, Group "Raubritter" was ordered to operate on mean course "S" as fuel supplies permitted.
      Situation:  Data for interception of convoy very unreliable.  Assumed to be on a S.W. course, speed 6 knots.
      It is planned to draw the boats to the south so that they will be on the assumed advance route of the convoy.
    2) Mediterranean:  At 1500 Italian plane spotted a formation of battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers in CH 9148, course "W".  U 81 was ordered to take up position with U 205 in the area south of Cape de Gata.  At 0506 U 205 sighted the formation.
  c) U 652 and 561 were ordered to escort auxiliary cruiser "Ship 45" in to port, for this purpose they are to take up position from 0800 on 17.11 until 2400 on 21.11 at the rendezvous in CD 86 or 38.
  d)  U 332 reported the results of her ice reconnaissance in the Straits of Denmark for special operation of Navy Group North.  This completes the task set out in paragraph IVd) 1 and 2 on 4.1.41.  The stationary reconnaissance proposed in paragraph IV d) 3 is to be as follows:  from 15 - 21.11. U 332 is to be somewhere near AD 53, U 434 about AD 73, U 105 about AE 85, U 402 about AE 89 to carry out undetected reconnaissance.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 74 sank "Nottingham" (5,400 GRT) on 7.11.  Radio Intercept Service reported her as being 399 GRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AK 19
U 98
- BD 36
U 205
- CH 70
U 567
- BD 36
 
43
 - BE 62
105
 - AM 71
332
 - AD 89
571
 - AK 51
 
68
 - CF 29
106
 - AK 01
373
 - BE 17
572
 - BE 14
 
69
 - BE 14
109
 - BF 80
375
 - AO
573
 - BE
 
77
 - BF 55
123
 - AK 29
402
 - AL 18
574
 - AN 11
 
81
 - CH 70
124
 - DT 71
433
 - CG 85
575
 - BE 67
 
82
 - AK 52
126
 - FE 36
434
 - AL 30
577
 - AK 19
 
84
 - BE 15
129
 - EH 34
453
 - AO
652
 - BC 34
 
85
 - AK 56
133
 - AK 52
552
 - BD 36
A
 - ET
 
93
 - BD 47
201
 - BE 17
561
 - BD 10
   
 
96
 - BD 36
202
 - BF 50
565
 - CG 81
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 573 - 77 - 123 - 202 - 84 - 93.
  Entered Port:  U 77  Lorient;  U 202  Brest.
  Sailed:  U 372  Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 215 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) According to Radio Intercept Intelligence the R.A.F. was set onto a submarine waiting position 120 miles E. of Gibraltar (U 81 or U 205).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy "ONS 33" (No. 15):
    Boats of the "Raubritter" are still stalking Convoy NO. 15 with southerly courses, according to dead reckoning they are abreast of the 6 knot position. U 38 is returning.
  b) 1) Special operation for Naval Group NOrth (see paragraph IVd) on 4th and 12th November 1941) is not being carried out and has thus been cancelled for the submarines.  The 4 boats already detailed have thus become available for other duties.
    2) U 105, 575, 574, 43, 434 have been ordered to make for BC 47.  It is intended to set up a patrol round Cape Race.  U 332 and 402 have been given AK 92 as approach point.  These boats are to extend the Group "Stoertebecker" patrol.
  c) U 109, 652, 561 carried out special task according to plan.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  The views expressed on 10.11 on the special operation for Naval Group North have now lost their point.  (See IVb).  The submarine arm has now been spared a considerable dissipation of its strength over an indefinite period.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
14. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AK 17
U 105
- AM 17
U 372
- BF
U 571
- AK 59
 
43
 - BE 29
106
 - AK 59
373
 - BD 33
572
 - AK 99
 
68
 - CF 29
109
 - BF 91
375
 - AN 30
573
 - BF 40
 
69
 - BD 33
123
 - AK 67
402
 - AL 35
574
 - AM 22
 
81
 - Op(CH 70)
124
 - EH 33
433
 - CG 98
575
 - BE 29
 
82
 - AK 91
126
 - FE 61
434
 - AL 30
577
 - AK 55
 
84
 - BE 28
129
 - EH 64
453
 - AN 30
652
 - BC 64
 
85
 - AK 91
133
 - AK 67
552
 - AK 95
A
 - ET 60
 
93
 - BD 49
201
 - BD 33
561
 - Op(BD 10)
   
 
96
 - AK 99
205
 - Op(CH 70)
565
 - CG 94
   
 
98
 - AK 96
332
 - AD 59
567
 - AK 95
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 573 - 123 - 93 - 84 - 38.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 216 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Northern area:  U 106 reported a destroyer in BD 1425, course S.W. (probably part of the escort for Convoy No. 15).  U 561 reported that she had sunk 2 independents totaling 12,000 GRT in BD 42.
    2) Mediterranean:  U 205 reported 3 torpedo hits on an aircraft carrier ("Ark Royal") and a destroyer.
      U 81 reported a fan of four at a battleship ("Malaya") and at "Ark Royal".  1 probable hit on the battleship, 2 hits with uncertain target.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Aircraft carrier "Ark Royal" sunk, battleship "Malaya" badly damaged, towed into Gibraltar.
    2) 11.11 convoy (probably outward bound "OS" in AM 5187.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Northern area:  Group "Stoertebecker" was ordered to move patrol line to AK 6784 - AK 9993.  More frequent inward and outward convoy traffic is suspected in this area again.
      U 332 and 402 have therefore been allocated AK 59 as approach square.  These boats are to extend the patrol line manned by Group "Stoertebecker".
    2) Convoy No. 15:  OPerational Control suspected convoy in the vicinity of the destroyer reported by U 106 in BD 1425.  Convoy's speed of advance was estimated at 7 knots.  Boats were ordered to continue searching.
      U 82 is returning because of lack of fuel.
  b)  U 81, 565 and 205 have been ordered to take up position in attack area east of Gibraltar, north of 350 55' N.  U 443 to take up position south of this latitude with main emphasis on the area off Melilla.  Eastern boundary formed by a line from Cape de Gata to Cape Ferral.
  c) U 109, 561, 652 carried out escort duty according to plan.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 561 sank 2 vessels (12,000 GRT).
       
VI. General:
  The reports made by the two boats in the Mediterranean, the Admiralty announcement of the sinking of the "Ark Royal" and the German Intelligence report that "Malaya" had been taken to Gibraltar have not yet provided a clear account of how U 205 and U 81 achieved this success, nor of the events leading up to it.
 
 
 
- 217 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    However, with this success the boats have made an even better and quicker start in their task of relieving the situation in the Mediterranean than could reasonably have been hoped.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15. November 1941.
 
 
 
I.
U 38
- AK 28
U 105
- AL 72
U 372
- BE 64
U 571
- BD 14
 
43
 - BE 46
106
 - BD 14
373
 - AK 99
572
 - AK 95
 
68
 - GF
109
 - BE
375
 - AO
574
 - AM 16
 
69
 - AK 96
123
 - AL 74
402
 - AL 19
575
 - BE 13
 
81
 - Op(CH 70)
124
 - EH 65
433
 - CH 70
577
 - BD 11
 
82
 - BD 32
126
 - FE 56
434
 - AL 36
652
 - BC 98
 
84
 - BE 62
129
 - EH 83
453
 - AO
A
 - ET 60
 
85
 - BD 12
133
 - BD 12
552
 - AK 67
   
 
93
 - BD 67
201
 - AK 99
561
 - BD 45
   
 
96
 - AK 95
205
 - Op(CH 70)
565
 - CH 70
   
 
98
 - AK 92
332
 - AK 34
567
 - AK 91
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 123 - 82 - 38 - 93 - 84.
  Entered Port:  U 573  St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  U 573 reported enemy submarine in BF 6731.
  b)  None.
  c) Short instructions for the steamer "City of Lincoln" show that independents are to make for British Guiana when first leaving Gibraltar, then when they reach 440 West they are to steer for the coast on course "S" and proceed to Capetown inside the 300 mile zone as far as 180 "S" then via CG 62/63.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Group "Stoertebecker":  As no convoys are expected for the next few days in this Group's area, the boats are to stalk the Convoy (No. 16) that was reported by Radio Intercept Service on 11.11 in AM 5187.  Hence, they were ordered to move their patrol line from AL 7771 to BE 1867 and to remain there until 2200 on 16.11, then on course "S" with speed of advance 7 knots to take up patrol line from BD 3641 to BE 4561.
      It is planned to get ahead of the estimated enemy position by first light.
      U 402 has joined Group "Stoertebecker" and has been given AK 99 as approach point.
       
- 218 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Convoy No. 15:  Boats stalking this convoy were ordered to break off the search if they could not contact the enemy.  They were then to make for square BD 39.
      U 106 reported that she was returning because of lack of fuel.
      U 577, 571, 85 and 133 still belong to Group "Raubritter".  Operation is now finished.
  b) Mediterranean:
     U 81, 205, 433 and 565 have been combined to form Group "Arnauld".  As increased enemy anti-submarine chasers are expected the boats may move away to the east as far as 20 East at discretion.  Spezia is the base for these boats.
  c)  U 109, 561 and 652 carried out escort duty according to plan.
  d)  As no situation report on the Azores has yet been received, U 129 has been asked to give her position if she is outside a 400 mile circle from the supply rendezvous.  The boat has not replied.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 81 and U 205 sank the carrier "Ark Royal" and torpedoed battleship "Malaya".
       
       
       
                                                                   (signed):  DÖNITZ.
       
 
 
   
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 219 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
B.d.U.
   Ref.  3642
     
1.12.1941.
    
   To:  High Command of the Navy - 1 SK1 -
       
           The War Diary of B.d.U. will in future be kept in the form used for the first time in this volume.
       
           This form gives clearer insight into the current operations which are now more easily identified by clear cut headings.
       
                                            For B.d.U.
                                                    Chief of Operational Division
       
                                                            (Signed):  GODT
       
       
 
 
   
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 220 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   Naval War Staff
   First Division
   Ref. 539
     
Berlin 8.1.42.
       
   To:  B.d.U.
   Re:  War Diary B.d.U. for 1-15.11.41.
  Previous Correspondence:  B.d.U.  3642.
       
           The Naval War Staff is unable to agree with B.d.U. in his views on paragraph VI - General - in his War Diary for 5.11.41.
       
           The assumption that the Commander was temporarily incapable of maintaining control and the fact that the First Watch Officer attempted to escape do not provide grounds for deducting that the First Watch Officer decided to surrender the boat or actually carried it out.  Nor that he did not realize the enormity of his behavior until later.
       
           Naval War Staff considers that neither the Commander nor the First Watch Officer can be considered guilty until more is known of the incident.
 
 
 
           (Trans:  penciled note states:  "An appropriate note has been added to the War Diary and a fair copy of the above has been included in the War Diary")
       
                                                            Initialed for Naval War Staff.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 221 -