F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 June 1941

PG30291

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
16.6.
  Positions at 0800:
In the patrol line "Western Boats" from BC 8720 to CC 6980:
  U 111, 77, 557, 108, 101, 75, 553, 751.
  In the patrol line "Kurfürst" from BD 38 to BE 18:
  U 204, 43, 73 and 201.
  Operational area west of Iceland:  UU 79 and U 559.
 
  Operational area west of North Channel:  U 552, 147, 141.
       
 
  South of Iceland under way:  U 203, 371.
       
 
  Returning:  U 106 Biscay area.
 
  U 38 approximately Cape Verde Islands.
 
  U 48 North of Shetlands.
       
 
  Outward-bound:  U 71 northern North Sea.
 
  U 123 Biscay area, Southern boat.
 
  U 138 west of Portugal.  Special Operations according to Operational Order 44.
       
 
  In South area:
 
  U 103, 107, 69 and UA proceeding to refuelling rendezvous White, approximately 200-300 m. southeast therefrom.
   
  In Lorient:  U 66, 74, 105, 109, 124, 556.
   
  St. Nazaire:  U 46, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98.
   
  Kiel:  U 68, 202, 561, 564, 566, 652, 137, 146.
   
  Wilhelmshaven:  U 67.
       
      Bergen:  U 143.
       
      Ready to put out up to 1st July:  U 202, 564, 556, 96, 137, 146, 562, 143, 66, 98, 109, 56, 125, 83.
       
      Italian U-boats:  I 22, 17, 23, 27 returning approximately BD 60.  All other boats in base.
       
      In order to disguise orders regarding disposition of U-boars points of reference will be introduced.
       
      U 557 reported avoiding a torpedo track in CC 3656 and later observed a British U-boat of the Thames Class making off in a north-westerly direction.  Nothing further to report.
 
 
         
 
 
- 92 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
17.6.
  U 371 reported sinking a freighter of 9,800 GRT, thereby experiencing 3 failures when firing recovered torpedoes, one of them being a pistol failure.  She has only 50 cbm fuel left and will, therefore, be assembled with the other boats which have little fuel to Group "Kurfürst" which covers a patrol line from square BD 19 to BE 18.  
 
  U 143, as the first boat ready for operations, has been assigned for "Barbarossa" (invasion of Russia) in the North Sea the operational area west of the Orkneys and Shetlands.
   
  U 202, 564, 137, and 146 have left Kiel for operations.
   
 
  Operational areas north of the Shetlands are planned for U 137 and U 146.  The other two boats will proceed into the Atlantic.
 
   
 
  U 106 has put out from Lorient.
 
   
 
18.6.
  U 552 reported sinking 25,541 tons, and withdrawing to AK owing to an oil trace.  U 552 had been operating in the outlet of the North Channel and achieved obvious success but there was also strong defensive action.
 
   
 
  U 559, which had reported a faulty periscope, has been ordered to take up position in the northern half of squares BD 20 and BD 30, if she is able to carry out night attacks.
 
   
 
  The lull in traffic in the area of the Western boats is striking.  I have ordered that the most northerly boat of the patrol line (U 111) should advance to the N.W. up to the ice limits, in order to determine the position of the ice limit and whether there is traffic between it and the patrol line.  I have ordered the patrol line, with the aid of reference points, from BC 8720 to CD 5540.  On the one hand, in order still to intercept the traffic proceeding through the S.E. sector of the operational area open to U-boats and, on the other hand, to mislead the enemy, in case he had knowledge of the patrol line, by this new disposition.
 
   
  U 38 gave her passage report in DH 44.
   
  The Commanding Officer of U 106, Lt. Oesten, came in to give his report.  This Commanding Officer carried out an operation in the south, while escorting the vessel "Lach" from Rio through the American safety zone.  He sank 11 vessels, 70,159 tons.
  He probably obtained a hit in confusion during an attack on the convoy not on a steamer but on the battleship "Malaya" which was torpedoed at the time according to an intercept message.
   
19.6.
  U 73 is returning, and U 559 will take up her position.
           
 
 
- 93 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  U 552 reported towards evening a convoy on north-easterly course in AM 4471, that is incoming.  U 552 was given freedom of attack and was to maintain contact for the two small boats.  In the course of the night, however, she was driven off and reported contact lost.
 
  According to an intercept message a British convoy was at 1700 on the 18th June 5 miles southwest of Cadiz.  U 123 was informed accordingly.
   
  Put out:  from Kiel U 562, from Lorient U 556, from St. Nazaire U 96.
   
 
20.6.
  The disposition of U-boats as it is at present has not brought the expected success.  I had hoped to intercept the enemy convoys by concentration of the boats in one patrol line in an area where I suspected traffic to be heavily concentrated.
 
  There are three possible reasons why the enemy was not intercepted:
 
 
1) Passing through the waters round Newfoundland which are dangerous owing to ice conditions and heavy fog.  This entails acceptance of danger constituted by natural circumstances which, however, form at the same time a protection from danger of being detected by the enemy.
2) By-passing the patrol line in the south, in the area of the German prize route, in which operations by U-boats are not possible.
3) Breaking through the patrol line itself under protection of the frequent fog in this area, and perhaps with the aid of far-reaching location gear.
 
  The possibilities given under 1) and 2), however, show that the enemy can scatter his traffic even along the Newfoundland Bank and that operations so far west will only intercept with certainty a large concentration of traffic if this can be approached west of 500 off the Canadian and North American ports of departure themselves.
 
  This is not possible at present owing to political reasons.  I have, therefore, decided to have the U-boats leave the area south of the Newfoundland Bank, which constitutes only one possibility of encountering traffic and to dispose them at the narrowest point S.E. of Greenland up to our own prize route.  A loose and wide disposition which is no more unfavorable for the interception of traffic, considering the character of the U-boat, than the apparently close patrol in the patrol line.  The boats in the North Atlantic, therefore, have been ordered to take up the following operational areas, with spacing 100 miles:
 
 
U 71
-
AJ 2550;
U 96
-
AJ 3850;
U 203
-
AJ 8250;
79
-
AJ 5650;
651
-
AK 1750;
371
-
AK 4840;
108
-
AK 7730;
553
-
AK 5950
556
-
AL 7191;
552
-
AL 0150;
201
-
AL 5543;
751
-
BD 2350;
75
-
BD 1550;
558
-
BD 4550;
557
-
BD 5328;
77
-
BC 2350;
101
-
BC 9250;
111
-
BC 8720.
    
                               
 
 
- 94 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  U 43 and U 559 have not been limited in their operational areas, as they are about to return.
 
  For the following boats operational areas are extended within the large squares in which they are at present, but without any limitation to the east, as follows:
  U 552 in the latitude of part square 10
  U 201 in the latitude of part square 40
  U 556 in the latitude of part square 70
 
  U 71 and U 101 - spacing 200 miles.
 
   
 
  On departure for the new areas for attack U 73, 108 and 79 are instructed to report total success and situation in the operational area.
 
   
 
  U 73 did not sink any tonnage and had 1 pistol failure and 2 failures, cause unknown.  She sighted in BD 19 S.W. bound traffic and in BD 72 and BD 55 1 freighter.
 
   
 
  U 108, has sunk, up to now, 4 ships, 27,340 tons amongst them the "Michael E" which was probably an auxiliary cruiser as she had a catapult aircraft on board.  She observed in BD 6370 heavy west-bound traffic but has sighted nothing since 10th June.  U 79 has sighted nothing since leaving Iceland.  50% fog.
 
   
 
  U 203 sighted the USA battleship "Texas" in the blockade area.  She reported attack unsuccessful.
 
   
  I am giving the following order as a precaution - USA warships should not be attacked even in the blockade area, since the present permission to do this does not seem to agree with the political views of the Fuehrer.  After discussions, however, with the Naval War Staff the following order from the High Command will be given to the U-boats:
 
1) Immediate operations against USA warships are permitted only when they have passed over the western boundary of the blockade area by 20 or more miles to the east.
2) Within this 20-mile strip on the western edge of the blockade area procedure is to be the same as ordered outside the blockade area.
  The following new attack areas have been ordered in the Southern area in case further refuelling is effected:
  UA south of a line with a bearing 400 from Freetown, U 103, 107 and 69 north therefrom.
   
21.6.
  U 111 reported from BC 42 having proceeded over Cape Race, Johns, to BC 51.  She encountered 100% fog and saw only one iceberg.
   
  New operational areas are ordered as follows:
       
 
 
- 95 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  For U 202 - AJ 3850;  U 564 - AK 1150;  U 96 - AL 8750, spacing 100 miles.
 
  Regarding the procedure in connection with USA warships, the following radio message has been sent to the boats, in accordance with new instructions from Naval War Staff.
   
  "The Fuehrer has ordered, for the next weeks, avoidance of any incident with the U.S.A.  Procedure accordingly in any doubtful case.  Further, attacks on warships within and outside the blockade area until further notice only cruisers, battleships and aircraft carriers and only if these are definitely recognized as enemy vessels.  If warships are proceeding without lights this is not to be taken as an indication that they are enemy ones".
   
 
22.6.
  U 43 reported, upon enquiry, that she had sunk 3 ships, 10,000 tons, but encountered no other traffic.
 
   
 
  U 204 sank the vessel "Mercier" (7,886 tons) on the 10th June.  Since then nothing further sighted.  Returning.
 
   
 
  U 141 reported a 4,000 ton vessel sunk.  She had a pistol failure and a surface runner.  Returning as torpedoes expended.
 
   
 
  In the Southern area the supply ship "Lothringen" has apparently been detected by the enemy, since U 103 reported returning not having met the supply ship.
 
   
 
  U 107 reported that UA intends to proceed to Freetown.  U 69 requested refuelling on the 30th June from "Culebra", and that she herself is returning direct to Lorient as her torpedoes are expended.  90,272 tons in all sunk.
 
   
  U 48 has left Kiel.
   
23.6.
  Air reconnaissance detected an outward-bound convoy in the outlet of the North Channel. The convoy is proceeding to AM 4243, course 3000.  The boats were informed accordingly but it is not assumed that any of them is in a favorable position.
   
  U 552 contacted an incoming convoy.  She reported it once at 0400 and then at 0800 in AL 2514, course 800, speed 7 knots.  She was given permission to attack and ordered to report on further contact, as there was a possibility of the boats coming from the north, and U 202 and 564, approaching the convoy.  U 552 reported the enemy once again in AL 2372 on a zig-zag course.  There were then no further reports of contact.
   
  U 203 reported towards 1500 contact in AJ 9253 with an incoming convoy.  She had then to remain in contact and not attack, so that as many boats as possible might be brought up to the convoy.
         
 
 
- 96 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  In the course of the evening U 203 gave further reports of contacts which ceased, however, towards midnight.  Boats operating against the convoy were ordered, even if contact was broken off, to proceed further in the general direction of advance.
 
  At the request of Group "West" U 66, putting out into the southern area, has been sent along route "B" since it is suspected that there are enemy warships here.
   
  U 66 out into the southern area.
   
 
  U 98 put out from St. Nazaire.
 
   
 
24.6.
  U 79 contacted, at 0641 in AK 4445, the convoy reported yesterday by U 203.  She gave further reports of contact up to 1500.  In the meantime U 203 reported at 1330 that he had contacted a convoy, course S.W. in AK 4543.  2 convoys were, therefore, meeting in a very narrow area.  The boats were ordered to go into operation against the most favorable one.  All the boats, therefore, even those to the south which cannot operate with any prospect of success against the N.E. bound convoy, have good prospects for attack.  U 203, however, gave only one further report of contact at 1632 in AK 4460, 2200, speed 9 knots, but subsequently reported at 2020 that she was returning owing to broken muffler valve.  4 ships were sunk, 24,000 tons.  It was wrong of the boat to attack before other boats were up to the convoy.  It was also wrong to leave the convoy without an urgent reason, after expending her torpedoes.  The Commanding Officer, who is still inexperienced and was on his first operation, was, therefore, ordered to remain if possible with the convoy if able to dive, and to report the last position and course of the enemy.
 
  She then gave the last enemy position in AK 4467, course 2200, at 1700.  She reported limited ability to dive and contact lost.  Returning.It cannot be established definitely until the boat returns whether it was absolutely necessary for her to do so.  In any case it was a mistake on the part of the boat not to report immediately on starting back also on the last enemy position etc.  In view of good prospects for other boats it would even have been in order for the boat to continue to maintain contact without regard to ability to dive.  An order to this effect, however, is of no purpose now, since the boat left the convoy several hours ago.
 
  In the case of the N.E. bound convoy also U 79 lost contact in the meantime at 2000.  U 371 reported returning owing to fuel shortage.  This was extremely early for the boat and regrettable for the situation at the time, since U 371 was in a very favorable position as regards the reported convoy.  U 71 reported by means of a short signal contact with the convoy.The convoy was attacked at 1130 by U-boats, according to intercept messages.
 
  In the night U 65 reported by a short signal that she had contacted the N.E. convoy and later reported once more having been driven off in AK 1973.  She was ordered to pursue and try to establish contact with every means in her power.
    
                               
 
 
- 97 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  U 552 reported, on enquiry, from AK 3299:  "pursued and depth-charged for 12 hours, Q ship, operating on convoy of U 79".
 
  U 147 was requested for the last time to give her position.  No answer.  There is cause for grave anxiety regarding this boat.
   
  In the South area U 123 was ordered to refuel from "Culebra" in the night of 24th to 25th.  She gave her position in DH 91.
   
 
  The Italian U-boat I 8 sighted in CG 1421 an aircraft carrier and 2 destroyers.
 
   
 
  U 38, Commanding Officer, Lt. Liebe, has put into Lorient.  Operation had to be broken off earlier than intended owing to lack of refuelling facilities.  Sinkings:  8 vessels, 54,259 tons.  The Commanding Officer has, therefore, sunk over 200,000 tons, and will be awarded oak leaves to the Knight's Cross.
 
   
 
25.6.
  U 71 has started on return passage.  She reported no traffic in the operational area.  While attacking the convoy she was depth-charged, but is able to dive.  According to an intercept message, the ships of the outgoing convoy were to keep N. and W. of a line from AJ 5782 to BC 1517.  This means, therefore, that the ships were to proceed, in spite of the danger of ice and fog, over the Newfoundland Bank.
 
   
 
  U 111 broke off as hopeless her passage to the N.W. against the outgoing convoy.  She reported overall thick fog.  Since 7th June there have been only 100 hours without fog.  Owing to fuel situation she is continuing her return passage.
 
   
 
  In the South area U 123 carried out refueling from "Culebra" in the night of 24th to 25th June.
 
   
  UA has had no success up to now, only having encountered neutral ships, and is proceeding to Freetown.
   
  U 561 has put out from Kiel.
   
26.6.
  U 101 reported from square BC 3796 having broken off operations against the S.W. convoy as they were hopeless owing to fog.  Since the 9th June she has sighted nothing and has sunk up to now 12,771 tons.  She has 10 torpedoes left and has started on return passage.
   
  U 75 has started on return passage.
   
      U 556 reported at 0958 that she suspected the convoy to be in AK 1420 as she had sighted destroyers and aircraft.  At 1045 she contacted the convoy in AK 1423.  The convoy was proceeding on a N.E. course, and there were further reports of contact.  U 552 could not operate against this convoy owing to her fuel situation.  She started on return passage from AK 1895.
       
 
 
- 98 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  U 201 and U 96 reported their positions on request, and U 564 also as follows:  AK 36, AL 75 and AK 21.
 
  Further reports of contacts, according to which the convoy was proceeding on an easterly course, and details regarding escorts were received from U 556.  U 564 and U 201 reported by a short signal "Yes", i.e. they were up to the convoy.  According to an intercept message 4 tankers, 37,286 tons, have been torpedoed up to now.
  The last report from U 556 was at 2330 from AK 2275.
   
  U 98 has been assigned, as operational area, square AJ 83, spacing 200 miles.
 
   
 
  U 107 gave passage report from DH 47.
 
   
 
  U 141 has put into Lorient.
 
   
 
27.6.
  At 0203 U 556 reported the convoy in AK 2291.  She observed that a boat sank one tanker and one freighter.  U 79 is returning from AK 2401.  She sank a 10,000 ton tanker, this probably being one of those already known by an intercept message to have been sunk.
 
  There were no further reports of contact until towards midday.  U 651 and 562 reported by means of a short signal "Yes", i.e. they were up to the convoy.  U 651 then gave, upon request, a contact report at 1400, according to which the position of the convoy was AK 3278, course 800, speed 9 knots.  There were escorts around the convoy.  No further reports.
 
  At 2030 U 651 reported from AK 3293 that the convoy had dispersed into groups and single vessels.  Contact lost.
 
  U 562 was pursued and depth-charged for 4 hours.  She reported fog.  She had contact last with a heavily escorted (8 destroyers, 2 corvettes) part of the convoy (15 vessels).  No contact for 9 hours.  Port coupling faulty.  The convoy has, therefore, dispersed, the valuable vessels apparently heavily escorted by destroyers.  Probably none of the boats still have contact.
 
   
  U 552 reported a torpedo failure.  Torpedoes expended in AK 2818.  In this area a sinking was also reported by intercept messages.
   
  U 77 operated against the S.W. bound convoy reported by U 203.  She reported extensive fog and, in the east half of square BC, slight traffic.  She sank the vessels "Tresillian", "Alexandria" and "Anna Burgaris", together 13,700 tons.
   
  U 143 was sent to Bergen for refueling, so that 2 boats always, of the three stationed north of the Shetlands, might be in position.
   
  U 146 is to make advances into the area left by U 143.
   
      In the Southern area U 69 detected a convoy, in the early morning hours, in DT 6220, course 00, speed 10 knots.  In a second
       
 
 
- 99 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  radio message she reported two vessels sunk, one probably, total result 30,724 tons, torpedoes expended (DT 3971).  She was ordered to maintain contact, as far as her fuel allowed, for U 123.  U 123 made a contact at 1230 in DT 3587.  There was air cover over the convoy.  She was given permission to attack and ordered to report on further contact.  U 66 was to operate against the convoy.
At 2200 there was a further report of contact from U 123 in DT 3415.
  The convoy was then proceeding on a course of 3100.
   
  Refueling from "Culebra" is planned for U 69 for the night of 29th to 30th June.
   
 
28.6.
  The following reports have been received from the boats operating against the north convoy:
 
  U 201 was not able to carry out attack owing to fog.  She has had no further contact since 1500 of the previous day, and has also seen nothing in the position last reported by U 651.  U 564 sank with certainty 2 vessels, 13,000 tons, and a third one (5,000 tons) probably.
 
  On this convoy, therefore, there has been no contact for hours and it appears to have escaped to the east into the more strongly defended area and in order to prevent unnecessary fuel consumption, I had just ordered the boats which were off this convoy to withdraw to the S.W., when U 651 again made contact in AL 2278 at 1530.  The enemy was proceeding with course east, speed 10 knots.  Boats which were favorably placed to this position were to operate again against the convoy, otherwise to report "No" and withdraw to the S.W.  U 651 was given freedom of attack.  There were further reports of contact from U 651 until 2358 from AL 3323.  U 201 was the only boat to report "No", meaning that she was not operating against the convoy.  She was chased by an anti-submarine group with aircraft from AL 2195 to AL 1234.  I assume, therefore, that all other boats in this area are operating against the convoy.
 
  British vessel "Grayburn", 6,342 tons, was sunk in AL 3356, according to an intercept message (probably by U 651).
 
   
 
  U 558 and 553 were operating against the S.W. bound convoy reported by U 203.  Both reported that operations without a shadower were hopeless and were therefore broken off.  They reported extensive fog, and nothing sighted.
 
   
 
  According to estimated dead reckoning the convoy reported by U 69, still being contacted by U 123, will be in the area of the Northern boats on 3rd to 4th July.  I shall attempt to intercept this convoy once more up there, and the boats will be assembled in the area formed by squares 10 and 20 of the large square BE and square 30 of the large square BD.
  
                           
 
 
- 100 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  The boats will be assigned their operational areas in loose disposition, so that they can be concentrated at a given time.  The boats on return passage have been instructed to remain as long as possible in the area ordered.
 
  In the Southern area U 123 contacted the north-bound convoy.  She reported it at 0200 in DT 2623, with course 2800, speed 7 knots.  Up to now she has sunk 1 tanker and 2 freighters, with 20,000 tons.  No contact after being pursued and depth-charged.  She pressed on and made contact again at 1430 in DT 2246, was again driven off and kept up pursuit.  The convoy is now proceeding on a course 3000.  U 66 has been ordered to operate at maximum speed against the convoy.
   
  U 109 has put out from Lorient.
   
 
  U 204 has put into Brest.
 
   
 
29.6.
  There have been no further reports from the boats operating against the north-bound convoy.  It was once again detected at 0745 in AL 3666 by air reconnaissance.
 
   
 
  At 0720 air reconnaissance reported in AL 9121 two cruisers and 2 merchant vessels, probably a convoy, course 2400.  This course is in the exact direction of the new disposition of the boats ordered yesterday.  Early morning reconnaissance has, therefore, been requested from the Air Corps, Atlantic, for the 30th June in the area in which the convoy is expected tomorrow morning.  In order to make more certain that the convoy would not turn away from the favorable S.W. course, to the S., I intended that radio traffic should be sent to create the impression of danger in this area E. of 230.  Returning boats E. of 230 W were, therefore, requested to give their position.  The following reported:
 
  U 71 - BE 64;  U 552 - BE 31;  U 371 - BE 29;  U 43 - 36 hours off port of destination.
 
   
 
  U 552 reported a Q ship this morning in AL 9424.
 
   
 
  U 201 has been assigned AL and AM as operational area.
   
  U 562 reported from AK 61 that she still had all her torpedoes not having fired any owing to the weather.
   
  In the Southern area U 103 apparently encountered single vessels from the convoy of U 123.  She reported 2 vessels, 11,472 GRT, sunk in DG 9240.  THe convoy must, therefore, have been near U 103.  U 103 was to keep contact as far as her fuel supplies permitted and, if necessary, request "Culebra".
   
  At 1430 U 123 reported that the convoy once again in DG 9421, course 3150, speed 7 knots, open formation, and at 2205 that she had been driven off in DG 27 by the auxiliary cruiser "Rio Azul" had then sunk it and was continuing pursuit.
           
 
 
- 101 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  The two Italian boats I 8 and I 10 have been sent out from Bordeaux to operate against this convoy.
 
  According to intercept message the two harbors of Takoradi and Lagos have been closed by the British Admiralty until further notice.  Success of operation by U 69.  It is assumed that several vessels were sunk.
   
  U 203 has put into St. Nazaire.
   
 
  U 143 has put into Bergen.
 
   
 
  The Commanding Officer of U 204, Lt. Kell came in to give his report.  This was the first operation by Commanding Officer and boat.
 
  He encountered little traffic.  Sunk:  1 vessel - 7,886 tons, 1 drifter.
 
   
 
  The Commanding Officer of U 203, Lt. Mutzelburg, came in to give his report.
 
  This was also the first operation by Commanding Officer and boat.  His mistake in withdrawing, as the only boat contacting, from the S.W. bound convoy on the 24th June without urgent reasons and without immediately informing B.d.U., has been admitted and will serve as experience for future cases.
 
  Sunk:  4 vessels, 24,000 GRT.
 
   
 
30.6.
  In connection with the awaited convoy S.W. Ireland, the boats have been ordered to look out for a beacon signal from aircraft sent in against this convoy.  Nothing, however , was sent.  The aircraft apparently did not find the convoy.  At 1615 there was a special intercept message, according to which the position of the awaited convoy at 2000 on the 29th June was about 510 N., 220 W.  The boats were ordered to proceed to the S.E. at maximum speed and then sent position BE 1917 calculated by dead reckoning for 1700.
   
  The Air Corps, Atlantic, was asked to send out intensified air reconnaissance on the morning of 1st July in the area BE 41 to BE 46 where the convoy was expected to be at this time.  Towards evening the Air Corps, Atlantic informed me that at 0900 this morning a Condor machine had sighted the convoy in BE 2145.  There was no report from the sea as radio was faulty.  The position is somewhat different from that of the special intercept message but it is unlikely to be more accurate.  In order not to create confusion, this position was not given to the boats.
   
  U 202 reported from AJ 3838 not having fired any torpedoes as she had sighted nothing.  U 564 sank another vessel of 3,000 GRT and her position at 0425 was in AK 15.
               
 
 
- 102 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  The following boats reported sinkings from the N.E. convoy:
U 203 - 2 vessels
12,000
tons.  
U 371 - 1 vessel
7,000
tons.  
U 564 - 3 vessels
16,000
tons.  
U 564 - 1 vessel
5,000
tons. probably.
U 79 - 1 tanker
10,356
tons. torpedoed.
    1 vessel
1,524
tons sunk.
     
53,380
tons.  
  According to intercept messages, the following were reported torpedoed:
 
Vessel "Malaya"
8,651
tons.
Vessel "Maasdam"
8,812
tons.
Tanker "Kongsgaard"
9,467
tons.
Tanker "Tibia"
10,356
tons.
The following were reported sunk:
Tanker "Inverlee"
9,158
tons.
Vessel "Grayburn"
6,342
tons.
  Of these U 79 probably sank the tanker "Tibia".  How far U 564 contributed to these sinkings and torpedoings, can only be established definitely after the boat has returned.
  The actual extent of the sinkings in the convoy can no longer be confirmed as the two boats which were up to the convoy for the longest period, U 556 and U 651, are no longer reporting.  They must be considered lost.
 
   
 
  For the boats leaving the N.E. convoy the following attack areas have been ordered:
 
  U 202 - AJ 5345;  U 564 - AJ 3785;  U 562 - AJ 6765;  U 561 is at first to proceed to the above attack area of U 564.
 
   
 
  In the Southern area U 69 has carried out refueling and gave her passage report in DH 69.
 
   
 
  U 95 has put out from St. Nazaire.  U 68 has put out from Kiel.  U 43 has put into Lorient.
 
   
 
  Reichsminister Dr. Todt has handed over in St. Nazaire the first three completed U-boat pens.
 
   
   
                                  (signed):  DÖNITZ
   
   
   
   
   
   
       
 
 
- 103 -
 
     

 


 

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