F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 June 1940

PG30267

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
16.6.
 
        Positions of our own boats:
 
        In the Atlantic operations area:  UA, U 25, U 28, U 29, U 30, U 32, U 38, U 43, U 46, U 47, U 48, U 51, U 52, U 101.
 
 
        On the way out:  U 122 off the Shetlands.  U 65 off the Herbrides.
 
 
        Boats have reported the following successes:
 
U 46: 53,000 tons.
U 101: 41,580 tons including the English "Wellington Star" of 11,400 tons.  U 101 is starting her return passage she has used all her torpedoes.
UA: sank the auxiliary cruiser "Andania", 13,950 tons, belonging to the Northern Patrol.
 
 
        U 43 has requested supply in NW Spain, it is planned for 18.6.
 
 
        U 52 is to operate against the traffic from England round Quessant to the French Atlantic ports, which according to radio intelligence, is heavy.  U 52 is the boat which could not arrive in time to operate against the HX 48 convoy from Halifax.
 
        The reason for this traffic is the general situation on land:  Occupation of the Channel coast and the Army's rapid advance towards the Atlantic coast is forcing England to divert her transports to ports in the Gironde and Loire estuaries and Quiberon Bay.  It is probably a matter of withdrawing British land forces and material.
 
17.6.
 
        Group "PRIEN" has made no contact with the Halifax convoy.   As the convoy might be delayed, the group was to remain in position for today.  In the afternoon a further radio intelligence report was received to the effect that the rendezvous had been transferred further south.  A new disposition is no longer possible, the boats are already too far back.  They have been ordered to operate at the approaches to the English and St. Georges Channels and the French Atlantic ports.
 
        They will thus be attacking the same targets as U 52.
 
 
        U 29 has requested to refuel in NW Spain.  Her supply is planned for a later date than U 43.  
 
 
U 99 left Kiel for the Atlantic.
 
   
 
18.6.
          U 52 and U 38 sighted valuable targets.  U 52 soon lost contact with a troop transport as her speed was too low.  U 38 shadowed a convoy for some hours and later apparently U 25 also sighted it.
 
   
 
          UA has started on her passage to her actual operations area.  She intended to proceed at a great distance off the coast, which is contrary to her operations order.  She has therefore been ordered to approach closer to the coast and operate along the shipping route.
 
   
     
           
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
19.6.
 
        U 43 has supplied and has given a different approach route to that given in the Spanish instructions. 
 
        U 25 was rammed while making a submerged night attack on a convoy.  Periscope and bridge damaged.  She tried at first to remain in her operations area, but the damage was so heavy that she had to start her return passage.
 
20.6.
 
        U 26 left Wilhelmshaven.
 
 
        U 99 requested permission to put into a Norwegian base to land a sick man.
 
21.6.
 
        U 29 supplied according to plan.  According to a report from Spain she may have been seen.
 
 
        U 48 reported 48,000 tons sunk, she has started on her return passage, as most of her torpedoes have been used.
 
 
        U 99 was so badly damaged by a/c bombs that she had to return to Wilhelmshaven.  It is possible that the boat was attacked by an a/c from "SCHARNHORST".   The matter cannot be cleared up until U 99 and "SCHARNHORST" have both entered port.
 
22.6.
 
        U 34 left Wilhelmshaven, U 102 Kiel, both for the Atlantic.
 
 
        U 32 and U 47 successfully attacked a convoy approaching from the west.
 
 
        There was a further conference with Group West on the mining situation.  It would be desirable to clear the minefields in the English Channel as well as those off the bases which we intend to set up in France.  As with the few forces available, only one of these problems can be solved, it was thought best first of all to make sure of one suitable fitting-out place on the Atlantic coast and postpone sweeping in the English Channel which would be a long drawn out task.  Group command will issue instructions to concentrate all forces on Brest and later possibly on St. Nazaire.  Lieut. Commander BRUMMER-PATZIG and Lieut.(E)(s.g.) LOOSCHEN from B.d.U. Headquarters are on their way to look for suitable fitting-out ports in France.  The torpedo train, with 24 torpedoes will remain in Wilhelmshaven until the situation is clearer.  Efforts are being made to get a mobile radio station for the torpedo train.
 
 
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
23.6.
 
        U 30 requested supply in N Spain.  She has been ordered to carry out "AROZ" during the night 25/26/6.  She has so far sunk 2 steamers.
 
        U 46 attacked an a/c carrier proceeding on a SW course at high speed, escorted by 2 destroyers.  This is probably "Illustrious" which, according to radio intelligence analysis, is on her way to the West Indies.  It is doubtful if the attack was successful.
 
 
        U 28 reported that weather conditions made action impossible.
 
 
        U 43, which is much further south, reported:  Action restricted by weather conditions.  According to weather data available, the unfavorable conditions cover the whole area from the latitude of the Faroes to the latitude of Gibraltar.  It is not possible therefore to direct the boats to a better area.
 
 
        Group "RÖSING" is being dissolved, as torpedoes have mostly been used and boats have to return.  Only U 29 and U 43, which have supplied in Spain, will remain in the operations area and a dividing line has therefore been ordered for their operation, a line bearing 110 degs. from Cape Villano.  The great successes of the Army and the G.A.F. in the west have forced France to ask for an armistice.  In a short time the French Atlantic ports will be able to be used as supply bases for torpedoes and fuel and later for repairs.  In order that torpedoes can be supplied as soon as possible, the torpedo train, which has been made ready in anticipation and consists of goods wagons with torpedoes, air pumps, torpedo material and the necessary personnel has left for Paris under the command of the Torpedo Director of Wilhelmshaven Naval Dockyard, Captain TROTHA.  From Paris it can be sent quickly to any place on the coast.
 
24.6.
 
        U 99 entered Wilhelmshaven.  The dockyard will need about 2  1/2 days to repair her.
 
 
        U 32 has started on her return passage, having used all her torpedoes.  She has sunk 23,000 tons.
 
 
        U 52 has been ordered to operate along a line at the latitude of square 41 BF without limit east or west.  This area has so far been occupied by U 25.  U A has been ordered not to enter the area between 36 degs. and 30degs. N.E. of 11 degs., the area occupied by the only Italian U-boat in the Atlantic.  Of the 5 Italian U-boats which left for operation in the Atlantic, only one actually arrived there.  There is one in Centa and one in Algeciras, and there is no news here of the other two.  This seems to indicate that nothing much can be expected of our ally's U-boat Arm, at any rate for the present.
 
 
        Naval War Staff informs us that U 29 supplied in Spain without incident, but that she may have been seen by fishing vessels or picket boats.
 
 
        U 30 is therefore to carry out "ARROZ" instead of "BERNARDO", so that the latter is not compromised by too frequent use.  "ARROZ" has become less favorable recently because Italian ships anchored in the vicinity.  A decision is to be made today.
       
 
        The question of transferring B.d.U. Headquarters to an
 
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
 
Atlantic port has been considered:
1) U-boat operations in the Atlantic are of just importance.  They require shortest lines of communication to Naval War Staff and personal contact with the U-boat commanders.  Good telephone lines are desirable to the Organization Department in Kiel and to Group West.
2) Close cooperation with G.O. commanding air forces Brest would be a great advantage.
3) A U-boat staff officer would have to be attached to Group West to control arrivals and departures of U-boats.
4) The port can only be considered fully fit for use if U-boats can enter it (mines) and all the necessary means of communication are available to control the U-boats, in cooperation with the G.A.F. and home stations.
5) Before a decision is reached B.d.U. himself will inspect the relevant ports with his Communications Staff Officer
 
 
        U 30 will carry out supply "ARROZ" today.
 
25.6.
 
        U 101 entered Heligoland and came on to Kiel under escort.  This boat just penetrated into the Channel and sank 2 steamers there.  Because of strong air patrol, she proceeded off the western approach to the Channel and finally to the Finisterre sea area.
 
        Total results:  41,500 tons.
 
 
        All U-boats have been given Naval War Staff's order not to take any action against French ships which are clearly making for a French port, but to treat then as enemies if they are darkened or in convoy or steering for an enemy port.
 
26.6.
 
        U 30 has carried out "ARROZ" and is to have an operational strip at the latitude of square 41 BF without limit E or W.
 
 
        The sea area N of 5880 and E of 0300 E has been closed until further notice to our own U-boats, so that the Air Force may carry out a constant anti-S/M hunt.
 
27.6.
 
        U 99 left Wilhelmshaven for the Atlantic.
 
 
        U 38 reported the sinking of 35,000 tons.  She is returning as she has used all her torpedoes.
 
 
        U 34 sighted a battleship with 3 destroyers, course SW, for a short time, NW of the Herbrides.  This is probably "Valiant", coming from the North Sea.
 
              U 122 has reached the latitude of Finisterre.  Her operation area will be square CF 30, where U 101 observed large steamers on course of 30 degs. and 120 degs.
 
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
 
        U 43 and U 29 have been ordered to concentrate on square BE 90.
28.6.
 
        U 47 requested refuelling in Spain, reporting at the same time that she had sunk 33,130 tons for certain and a further 7,000 probably.  Shortly afterwards she reported sinking another 6,500 tons and that she would not refuel, but start her return passage with 2 torpedoes left.
 
 
        U 26 reported one oil cooler out of action, damage cannot be repaired with own resources.  The boat's speed is thus reduced.  As there are so few Atlantic boats available U 26 is to continue her patrol even under these difficult conditions.
 
29.6.
 
        U 48 entered Kiel, U 25 Wilhelmshaven.
 
 
        U 48 operated in the Atlantic after short repairs in Trondheim.  She successfully attacked convoys and sank altogether about 42,686 tons.
 
 
        U 25 missed a battle cruiser (Renown or Repulse) because the firing gear failed in the center shot of a triple fan.  She afterwards attacked the convoy which this heavy ship was escorting, but it evaded the attack by making a smoke screen and turning away.  U 25 then sank the auxiliary cruiser "Scotstown" off the North Channel and fired on another large steamer with very good firing data. The shot had no effect, clearly because the impact firing unit failed.  While making an attack submerged by night she was rammed and the damage to periscope and conning tower forced her to return home.  Result:  23.000 tons.
 
 
        U 28 started on her return passage with a result of 11,000 tons, also U 51 with 32,000 tons for certain and a probable further 6,000.  The gaps thus created will be filled by U 34, U 26 and U 102, new arrivals in the operations area.
 
 
        Boats' reports and meteorological forecasts indicate that weather will be bad in the northern half of Biscay for some days and boats have therefore been advised to operate further south for a time.
 
 
        U 99 reported that she was attacked by a/c with German markings in an area not released for anti-S/M hunts.  There is good reason to believe that it was one of our machines as a report from a Stavanger a/c gives the same time and a position about 40 miles away from that given by the U-boat.
 
 
        U A requested supply in the Las Palmas Roads, but this has been refused for reasons of security.  The boat has sufficient reserves of fuel for her operations.
 
 
30.6.
          U 47 reported the sinking of 51,086 tons.
       
              U 43 and U 30 attacked a convoy reported by U 43 herself.  According to radio intelligence reports 2 steamers were damaged and abandoned by the convoy.
       
 
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
 
        U 26 and U 102 also each managed to make contact with a convoy.
 
 
 
                                   (signed):  Dönitz
 
                               Rear Admiral and B.d.U.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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